US Civil War – The Confederate General Edward Kirby Smith

General Edmund Kirby Smith was a remarkable man who also was perhaps the Confederacy’s most successful general, even including Robert E. Lee. Because he was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi in 1863, most history narratives tend to lose track of him at that point, discounting the fact that he was the de facto ruler of that part of the country for 2 years. Lloyd W Klein explains.

General Edmund Kirby Smith, circa 1862.

Background

Smith was born in St Augustine, Florida. His parents were from Connecticut.  At the time of his birth, his parents were residing on the frontier, a region that was previously under Spanish control but had recently been acquired by the United States. Smith's father, Joseph Lee Smith, was appointed as a Superior Court judge in the newly acquired Florida Territory, while his grandfather, Ephraim Kirby, had served as an officer under the esteemed George Washington.

Despite his family's non-military background, Smith's parents insisted that he attend West Point, following his sister's marriage to a graduate from the artillery service in Florida. He followed his older brother in enrolling at West Point where Smith earned a respectable

25th ranking within his class of 41 cadets. However, it was not only military pursuits that captivated Smith's interests. Throughout his life, he harbored a profound fascination for botany and eventually became a highly accomplished botanist. His dedication to this field led to the creation of remarkable collections, which he later donated to renowned institutions such as Harvard, the Smithsonian, and UNC.

Smith's military career flourished during the Mexican War, where he actively participated in significant battles and eventually rose to the rank of captain. Subsequently, he was assigned to combat the Comanche, where he ascended to the rank of major. Smith's military progress continued as he became a captain in the Second US Cavalry, a position bestowed upon him by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. Serving under the command of notable leaders such as Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee, Smith found himself among a select group of officers from the 2nd Cavalry who achieved the esteemed rank of full general, alongside Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and John Bell Hood. Notably, from 1855 until the conclusion of the Civil War, Smith's valet was Alexander Darnes, a 15-year-old enslaved individual of mixed race who belonged to Smith's family.

The War Begins

Smith was in Texas with the 2nd Cavalry when the war started.  On January 31, 1861, Smith was promoted to major and became commander of Camp Colorado. When secessionists began the seizure of Federal property, Smith initially refused to surrender his post to Colonel Henry E. McCulloch's Texas Militia forces but then changed his mind.

With secession, he resigned from the US Army and entered the Confederate Army as a lieutenant colonel, He served as General Joseph Johnston's chief of staff at Harper's Ferry as Confederate troops organized in the Shenandoah Valley. On June 17, 1861, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and placed in command of the 4th brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah. He led this brigade at First Manassas, where he was wounded in action in the head and neck. While recuperating he served as a commander of a Florida department, then promoted to major general and division commander in the ANV.

Although his wound at First Manassas was described as “serious”, In August 1861, Smith met Cassie Selden. While recovering from being wounded he still found time for wooing. The couple married on September 24.

Command of East Tennessee

After recovering from his wound and entering into marriage, he was dispatched to the western region to assume command of the Army of East Tennessee. On October 11, 1861, Smith was promoted to the rank of major general and took command from General Felix Zollicoffer in the District of East Tennessee. Smith's time in Tennessee was met with controversy as he adopted a strict approach, implementing martial law and suspending habeas corpus. Numerous individuals suspected of being Unionists were imprisoned or expelled, leading to a surge in anti-Confederate sentiment.

In August 1862, Smith's army, consisting of 6,500 soldiers, advanced through eastern Kentucky in support of General Braxton Bragg's invading Army of Mississippi. The objective of Bragg and Smith was to bolster pro-Confederate political factions in the Union-controlled border state and recruit new soldiers. While Bragg led his forces northward from Tennessee, Smith directed his troops towards Richmond, Kentucky, targeting the railroad hub in Lexington and the state capital in Frankfort. By August 28th, the Confederate advance, spearheaded by division commander General Patrick R. Cleburne, approached Richmond, Kentucky. Smith's Army of East Tennessee numbered 19,000, while Bragg's Army of Tennessee consisted of 35,000.

On August 29, 1862, a portion of Smith's army encountered an equally sized contingent of Nelson's forces, estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000 troops. The Battle of Richmond ensued for two days, culminating on August 30, and resulted in a resounding victory for the Confederates. There were at least 5,000 Union casualties versus 750 Confederate losses. Also, substantial territory was surrendered, including the cities of Lexington, Richmond, and Frankfort, the state capital. When Smith subsequently seized control of Frankfort on September 2, it was the only state capital under Federal control to fall throughout the entire war. Out of the 6,800 Union soldiers engaged in the battle, approximately 4,000 were captured, while the remaining either fled towards Lexington or perished or sustained injuries on the battlefield. Additional losses were incurred during the battle, including the capture of Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson and the injury of Nelson, who suffered a neck wound.

Promotion to Command of the Trans-Mississippi & Perryville

Smith was promoted to the newly established rank of lieutenant-general on October 9, 1862. He took command of the 3rd Corps, Army of Tennessee. Subsequently, on January 14, 1863, Smith was transferred to lead the Trans-Mississippi Department; this department included Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, western Louisiana, Arizona Territory, and the Indian Territory. Smith was given the responsibility of leading the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, which encompassed the western Confederate states. In this position, he successfully maintained Confederate control over the region for 2 years. Throughout the remainder of the war, he remained stationed west of the Mississippi River, with a portion of his time spent in Shreveport, Louisiana. By October, Buell's army had received reinforcements and had become strong enough to become the aggressor. Smith and Bragg, however, were unprepared for Buell's advance and had not yet combined their armies.

Bragg recognized the importance of controlling Kentucky for the defense of the Western theater. This realization was influenced by Kirby Smith, who believed that launching an offensive action could have significant implications for the war. Bragg relocated his 30,000 troops to Chattanooga to join forces with Smith. They met on July 31 and decided to divide their army. Two of Bragg's brigades would join Smith in marching into Kentucky, with the intention that if Buell pursued Smith, Bragg would move north to attack Buell's rear. Additionally, Bragg sent his cavalry, led by John Hunt Morgan, north into Ohio. It was expected that Grant would remain in his position, focusing on the pursuit of Vicksburg. Smith believed that this plan would alleviate supply issues and divert the Union armies from their intended movements. Furthermore, an invasion of Kentucky would pose a threat to Indiana and western Ohio, to establish the Ohio River as the Confederates' northern border.

The plan to invade Kentucky was ambitious but carried significant risks. It relied on flawless coordination between two armies that lacked a unified command structure. Bragg, despite pressure from President Davis to proceed with the invasion, began to have doubts almost immediately. Smith, foreseeing the challenges, quickly abandoned the agreement, realizing that embarking on a solo venture in Kentucky would be highly precarious. The successful execution of the military operation required a high level of coordination between two armies that lacked a unified command structure. Despite initial enthusiasm and pressure from President Davis to seize control of Kentucky, General Bragg soon began to have doubts about the feasibility of the mission. Meanwhile, General Smith, driven by personal ambition, reneged on the agreement and deceived Bragg about his true intentions. He cunningly requested additional troops under the guise of an expedition to Cumberland Gap, only to later reveal his plan to bypass it entirely. This left Bragg in a difficult position, unable to compel Smith to adhere to their original strategy, and forced to redirect his focus toward Lexington instead of Nashville.

The turning point of the campaign came on October 7, 1862, when one corps of General Buell's army confronted General Bragg's forces near Perryville, Kentucky. Despite the Confederates' hard-fought victory in the Battle of Perryville, the arrival of the majority of Buell's army by the end of the day nullified their gains. Faced with the prospect of losing everything they had fought for, Bragg made the controversial decision to withdraw during the cover of night, much to the dismay of his subordinate officers, including General Smith, who had advised Bragg to capitalize on their success and continue the fight. As a result, Bragg's army ultimately retreated from Kentucky, leaving the state under Union control for the remainder of the war.

As forces under Grant tightened their grip on the Mississippi River, Smith attempted to change the trajectory of the war. However, his department never had more than 30,000 men, and they were stationed over an immense area.  Consequently, Smith found it challenging to concentrate his forces effectively to challenge Grant or the formidable U.S. Navy on the river. Despite facing criticism for not coming to the defense of Vicksburg, particularly as Grant's momentum grew, Smith's hands were tied by the constraints of his resources. Ultimately, Vicksburg fell under Union control, further solidifying their hold on the Mississippi River.

Following the Union forces' capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Smith found himself cut off from Richmond, resulting in his isolation from the rest of the Confederacy. Despite this, Smith established his authority over a semi-autonomous region, effectively governing an area that operated almost independently. Throughout the remainder of the war, Smith faced the daunting task of governing the district and waging war with minimal support and limited communication with the Confederate government.  in Virginia, Despite these obstacles, Smith persisted in his efforts to reclaim Vicksburg from the Union, albeit from the western side of the Mississippi, but his endeavors proved unsuccessful.

Smith's interest in this region stemmed largely from the influence of Arkansans and Missourians in the Confederate Congress, who played a significant role in securing his appointment. Consequently, Smith's semi-autonomous Confederate region became derisively referred to as "Kirby Smithdom." This term reflected the perception that Smith held a considerable degree of authority and control within his designated territory, separate from the central Confederate command.

Being cut off from the main Confederate army, one might assume that Smith's forces would suffer from starvation and lack of military supplies. However, the reality was quite different. The territory under Smith's control was remarkably well-supplied, as the Union army would discover in 1864. This unexpected abundance of resources further bolstered Smith's position and allowed him to sustain his troops and continue his resistance against the Union forces.

Red River Campaign

The Red River expedition, a military operation conducted by the Union during the American Civil War, involved approximately 30,000 federal troops led by Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks. This campaign aimed to secure the key Confederate supply depot in Shreveport and disrupt the Confederacy's supply lines by controlling the Red River and its surrounding region. The plan was devised by Major-General Henry W. Halleck as a diversion from Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant's strategy to encircle the main Confederate armies by utilizing Banks's Army of the Gulf to capture Mobile. However, the expedition ultimately failed due to poor planning and mismanagement, unable to achieve any of its objectives.

In March 1864, Union forces, comprising both army and navy components, embarked on a march into Louisiana along the Red River. They encountered logistical challenges caused by the low water levels on the river, necessitating the construction of dams and the removal of obstacles to enable their gunboats to proceed. As the Union forces advanced, they faced resistance from Confederate troops in a series of engagements, including the Battles of Mansfield on April 8, 1864, and Pleasant Hill on April 9, 1864. These battles ended in Confederate victories, compelling the Union forces to retreat. The situation worsened for the Union troops as the water levels of the Red River continued to decrease, making it increasingly difficult for their gunboats to navigate. Moreover, they found themselves isolated and susceptible to Confederate attacks.

Despite being significantly outnumbered, General Smith skillfully orchestrated the defeat of both Union advances. On April 8, Confederate troops under the command of Major General Richard Taylor successfully repelled Union General Nathaniel Banks's Red River Campaign. Recognizing their perilous situation, Union forces retreated from the Red River in late April 1864. Throughout their withdrawal, they encountered constant harassment and attacks from Confederate forces. By the time May 1864 rolled around, it was clear that the Red River Campaign had come to an end. The Union forces regrouped in Alexandria, Louisiana, and abandoned their original objective of capturing Shreveport.

Price’s Campaign

Later that year Smith went on the offensive. Major General Sterling Price's Army of Missouri, consisting of twelve thousand soldiers, was sent on an ill-advised and disastrous raid into Missouri. The objective of this raid was to capture St. Louis. It is worth noting that Price himself was a former governor of the state. Price's request for additional troops was denied, leaving him with only twelve thousand cavalry soldiers for the expedition when he wanted, and needed, many more. Price’s raid was initially conceived as a full invasion of Missouri with three goals: divert attention from the river to cross troops into the western theater for defense of Mobile and Atlanta, affect the 1864 election, and lure Missouri into leaving the Union. As commander of the Confederate Missouri state troops at the outbreak of war and field commander of the army in Arkansas, Price was the natural choice.

On August 28, 1864, Price's Raid commenced as he departed from Camden, Arkansas. It became evident that Price had not adequately planned his expedition, as the events that unfolded over the next three months proved to be disastrous. Engaging in a series of battles, Price's forces suffered heavy losses, and by the end of the raid, only six thousand survivors remained as they limped back into Arkansas. This outcome highlighted the poor execution and planning of Price's campaign, ultimately leading to its failure and further solidifying its place in history as a significant Confederate defeat.

Throughout the Civil War, Smith had the advantage of easier access to supplies compared to other Confederate areas due to Galveston TX remaining an open port. The Trans-Mississippi region was a major supplier of food crops so that was never an issue. John Magruder was able to reopen the port at Galveston so arms could come in through the blockade. This also allowed for a smooth flow of resources and provisions, ensuring that Smith's forces were adequately equipped. Additionally, the states of Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri, where Smith operated, were known for their agricultural productivity. These states were able to produce an abundance of food, further supporting Smith's troops and contributing to their overall sustenance during the war.

Remainder of the War

For the remainder of the war, the hostilities that occurred west of the Mississippi River were characterized by skirmishes and guerrilla raids. Smith, who had effectively defended his territory known as Smithdom, was situated away from the main action. On the Union side, General Thomas had a remarkable record of winning battles he commanded, while Kirby Smith held a similar distinction for the Confederates. Despite the ongoing clashes, the war in the West gradually came to a close.

By April 1865, the surrender of Confederate Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph Johnston marked the effective end of the war in the Eastern theater. However, Smith's forces continued to hold out for approximately one more month. Eventually, on May 26, 1865, Smith relinquished his command to General Edward R. S. Canby at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This surrender signaled the defeat of Smith's command, making it the final major Confederate force to concede at the end of the Civil War. Following his surrender, Smith made his way to Galveston, Texas before eventually fleeing to both Mexico and Cuba. However, he eventually returned to Lynchburg, Virginia to sign an oath of amnesty on November 14, 1865.

After the conclusion of the war, Smith briefly took on the role of managing the Accident Insurance Company in Louisville, Kentucky in 1866. Subsequently, he served as the president of the Pacific and Atlantic Telegraph Company for two years. In 1868, Smith established a school in New Castle, Kentucky, but unfortunately, it was destroyed by fire the following year. Undeterred, in 1870, Smith and his fellow Confederate General Bushrod Johnson were appointed as co-chancellors of the University of Nashville. Additionally, they jointly oversaw the management of the Montgomery Bell Academy, a preparatory school for boys. In 1875, Smith accepted a position as a professor of mathematics and botany at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, where he remained a faculty member until his passing.

Kirby Smith passed away in Sewanee on March 28, 1893, and was laid to rest on the campus of the University of the South. Notably, he held the distinction of being the last full general of the Confederacy to pass away.

At one time, a statue of Smith held a prominent position of honor. In 1922, the state of Florida erected a statue of General Smith as one of the two statues representing Florida in the National Statuary Hall Collection at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. However, in 2018, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed legislation to replace Smith's statue with one honoring African-American civil rights activist and educator Mary McLeod Bethune. The statue was subsequently removed in 2021, with plans to send it to St. Augustine, Smith's birthplace. However, the residents of St. Augustine declined to accept the statue. Another Florida county initially agreed to house the statue, but faced opposition from mayors and public figures, leading to a re-vote that resulted in a 4-1 decision against accepting the statue. As a result, the statue is currently being stored temporarily at the Museum of Florida History, away from public display, as no suitable exhibition space has been found.

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References

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/e-kirby-smith

·       https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/edmund-kirby-smith-rebel-lord-of-the-trans-mississippi/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/general-edmund-kirby-smith-2360303

·       https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/edmund-kirby-smith-9253/

·       Davis, William C. (1999), The American Frontier: Pioneers, Settlers, & Cowboys, 1800–1899, Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres.

·       Prushankin, Jeffery S. (2005), A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press

·       https://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/edmund-kirby-smith

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/richmond

·       http://battleofperryville.com/

Cincinnatus - Man, Myth, and the Making of Rome

Throughout Roman history, few figures capture the imagination quite like Cincinnatus (c. 519 BC to c. 430 BC). Often hailed as the embodiment of Roman virtue, this legendary figure has been compared to the likes of George Washington and immortalized in the naming of the city of Cincinnati.

But who was Cincinnatus, really? A revered Roman general, a simple farmer thrust into power, or a character of mythology more than history?

Tom Curley explains.

Cincinnatus abandons the Plough to dictate Laws to Rome. By Juan Antonio de Ribera, circa 1806.

The Life of Cincinnatus

Cincinnatus, born in 519 BC, emerged from a notable patrician family during the final years of Rome's monarchical system. This era marked the transition to what would become the Roman Republic. At this time, Rome was more a minor city-state than the colossal empire it would later become.

Cincinnatus rose to prominence as a consul amidst a period of social unrest. The lower plebeian class actively sought more rights, challenging the near-absolute control of the ruling patrician class. Contrary to romantic visions of a perfect republic, this period was marked by intense, sometimes violent, socio-political struggles.

During these conflicts, Cincinnatus faced personal loss with the death of his son. This profound event led him to retire from public life, seeking solace in the more spartan existence of farm life.

However, his retreat from the political arena was not the end of his story. It was merely a prelude to his legendary role later in Roman history.

The First Dictatorship

The crisis began when the Aequi, an eastern neighbor of Rome, violated a treaty, leading to inevitable war. Rome's response was swift but perilous. Two Roman consuls led armies against the Aequi, but one was quickly besieged and trapped.

In this desperate situation, the Roman Senate turned to Cincinnatus. They appointed him as dictator, a term familiar today but with a different meaning in ancient Rome. In the Roman context, a dictatorship was a temporary measure, granting absolute power to one individual during times of dire crisis. This power was not meant to be permanent but was a response to emergencies requiring swift and decisive leadership.

When senators approached Cincinnatus with the news of his appointment, he was ploughing his farm. He asked them, "Is everything all right?" they replied that they hoped "it might turn out well for both him and his country."

Cincinnatus acted promptly. He called a public meeting, summoning every able-bodied military man to join a massive army. Leading this force, Cincinnatus successfully besieged the Aequi. Notably, he chose not to slaughter them but instead subjected them to the humiliation of passing under the Roman yoke, a symbol of defeat.

His triumph was remarkable, but even more extraordinary was what followed. After just 15 days in power, having resolved the crisis, Cincinnatus relinquished his dictatorial powers. He returned to his farm, displaying a rare example of humility and restraint.

The Second Dictatorship

Cincinnatus' retirement was interrupted 19 years later, marking his return to power under dramatic circumstances. At the age of 80, he was once again called upon to assume the role of a dictator. This time, the crisis revolved around Spurius Maelius, a plebeian accused of aspiring to be king, a serious threat to the power patricians of the Roman Republic.

Cincinnatus' response was swift and decisive. He organized the patricians to confront this would-be king. The situation escalated quickly, resulting in Spurius being driven into flight and subsequently killed in the ensuing chaos.

Remarkably, Cincinnatus' commitment to the ideals of the Republic remained steadfast. After just 21 days as dictator, having neutralized the threat to the Republic, he once again relinquished his absolute power and returned to his farm.

The Legend of Cincinnatus

The story of Cincinnatus is a symbol of Roman virtue and integrity. In classical Rome, there was a deep nostalgia for the 'good old days' of the Republic, where Romans were seen as honest, virtuous, and selfless. The ideal Roman was often portrayed as a farmer-soldier, embodying simplicity, bravery, and dedication to the state. Cincinnatus was the epitome of this ideal.

His life contrasted sharply with the later, more famous figures of the Roman Republic and Empire, such as Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and Augustus. These powerful and ambitious leaders sought to entrench power around themselves, moving away from the virtues of the early Republic.

The American Cincinnatus

Cincinnatus' legend found new life after the American Revolutionary War. The founders of the United States consciously sought to emulate the Roman Republic's virtues in shaping their new nation.

Cincinnatus became a role model, particularly in the figure of George Washington. Washington's actions after the Revolutionary War – relinquishing command of the army, refusing to establish a monarchy, and retiring after two terms as President – mirrored the virtues attributed to Cincinnatus.

How Much Do We Really Know About Cincinnatus?

The life of Cincinnatus, as fascinating as it is, raises a critical question: how much of it is actually true?

The early Roman Republic's history, particularly the time of Cincinnatus, suffers from a lack of written sources. Most of what we know was written much later, leading to uncertainties about the accuracy of these accounts.

Moralizing History

Cincinnatus was likely a real historical figure. However, our primary source of information about him is the historian Livy, who wrote centuries after Cincinnatus' time. Livy is known for infusing his historical writing with moral lessons at the expense of strict historical accuracy. This approach makes it challenging to distinguish between fact and moralistic embellishment.

For example, Livy describes Cincinnatus' victory over the Aequi in 458 BC as a "spectacular triumph." However, he then contradicts this by noting that the Aequi continued to be a threat, attacking Rome again in 457 BC and 455 BC. Such inconsistencies cast doubt on the scale and impact of Cincinnatus' victories.

The interplay of sparse evidence, embellishments over time, and inherent contradictions in the historical narrative is what makes ancient history so intriguing. Figures such as Cincinnatus occupy a unique space, straddling both mythology and history. 

Does the absolute truth really matter? The exact details of Cincinnatus' life may forever remain shrouded in mystery. However, the impact and influence of such figures are undeniably real and tangible. Their stories have shaped cultures, inspired leaders, and fostered ideals that have transcended generations.

Tom Curley is the founder of HistoryHogs.com.

American Bravery at the Alamo - The First Chapter

The April 1838 Convention of Limits Treaty was agreed between the United States and the Republic of Texas. Texas had won its freedom from Santa Anna and the Mexican Government in 1836. The treaty, which was signed before Texas was part of the United States, recognized Texas claims to disputed territory in Red River and also on the Eastern boundary. Michael Thomas Leibrandt explains.

The Fall of the Alamo or Crockett's Last Stand, circa 1903. By Robert Jenkins Onderdonk.

Here is the part that is most commonly known by Americans.

Perhaps the most memorable part of that period 187 years ago was one of the most iconic battles in history for Texas independence. This historic engagement has become widely known as The Alamo. The defense of the San Antonio mission was not only the intersection of unwavering American resolve but also the union of three US heroes; Colonel William Travis, Colonel Jim Bowie, and perhaps the first celebrity in American history in Colonel David “Davy” Crockett.

The 2023 Commemoration of the Battle of the Alamo was open to both the public and the press. The events ran into March 2023 and featured events such as “Dawn at the Alamo”, “Never Surrender or Retreat” and an “Evening with the Heroes.”

Most Americans know the story of massacre of all 189 defenders of the mission at the hands of the Mexican Army on March 6th, 1836. Legends surrounding the deaths of all three, especially Crockett have become popular chapters in American history. It is not known whether he was captured or died as portrayed in John Wayne’s 1960 version of The Alamo, but it is widely believed that he was one of its last remaining defenders.

This however was not the first act of valor by Texans at the mission against the Mexican forces.

The Alamo

The Alamo (or Mision San Antonio de Valero) was built in 1718 by Franciscan Monasteries who wished to convert native Indians to Christianity. Secularized in 1793, the original construction did not have military intentions and the roof on the main church was never completed.

The first documented military use of the mission was around 1801, also at which time the mission took the name that would last through the centuries and was also the name of the Spanish Army Unit that was stationed there. In 1813, the mission was reportedly used as a barracks for Mexican revolutionaries and American volunteers.

In 1820, Moses Austin (father of the Stephen F. Austin) petitioned Spain for an American settlement in Mexico. The Mexican Constitution of 1824 allowed foreign settlers to gain land title and tax exemption. In the 1830s, the Mexican government also armed Texian settlement garrisons with artillery pieces for protection against local American Indians, indigenous people, and native tribes.

Relations, however were soon strained between Mexico and the American settlers and Tejanos (Texians of Mexican descent living in the province of Oahuila y Tejas, or Texas.) The Mexican government, realizing the delicate situation moved swiftly to recover the cannons.

1830s battles

At the Battle of Velasco in 1832, Mexican troops clashed with Texas Militia, attempting to stop the transport of a cannon. In 1835, at Gonzales Texas, settlers draped a cloth over a six-pound bronze Spanish cannon that read “Come and Take It.”

When Mexican Dragoon cavalry crossed the river and attempted to take possession of the cannon and also a one-pound Spanish Bronze Esmeril, they were fired upon. The Texas Revolution had begun.

Mexican President Antonio Lopez De Santa Anna, sent 600 troops under General Coz north to quell the uprising. Coz became convinced upon arriving in San Antonio that the rebellion army would attack and fortified the city and the Alamo, which at that time sat just outside of the town.

His instincts proved to be quite correct.

On October 12, 1835, Steven F. Austin and Sam Houston arrived outside of San Antonio with an army of 300 men comprised of Texans and Tejanos, and began the Siege of Bexar. Texian artillery under Colonel Neill would pound the Alamo with a barrage during the attack.

After nearly eight weeks, Texian leaders were contemplating lifting the siege and withdrawing to winter quarters. It was then that two significant events transpired in the Texian camp. A Mexican defector rode into the camp, joined the Texans and told of deplorable conditions in the Alamo including rationing, starving horses, low military supplies and morale.

Ben Milam, a soldier with the Texas Militia who was himself the only the age of 47, stood up and rallied the troops at the nightly campfire and proclaimed “Who will come to San Antonio with Ol’ Ben Milam!”

Rejuvenated, the Texian Army attacked. Milam was killed in heavy street fighting but the Texians pressed on. By early December, Cos was forced to pull his artillery pieces and wounded soldiers behind the walls of the Alamo. The Mexican troops would construct some of the very fortifications that the Texian defenders would utilize twelve weeks later. On December 9th, the Mexican army raised a white flag of surrender from behind the walls of the Alamo. The victorious Texas army allowed the Mexicans to keep their regimental colors and muskets for the long march back to Mexico City. Among the military supplies that were surrendered by the Mexicans were approximately twenty cannons including; a 5-inch caliber Howitzer, three and four pound mounted artillery pieces, and small ordinance. All of these pieces would be re-purposed for the defense of Texas.

The celebration would be short-lived.

Back to San Antonio

A furious Santa Anna would shortly be assembling an army and conducting a Winter march back to San Antonio and a date with destiny and Travis, Bowie, and Davy Crockett. This time, Santa Anna would personally lead his troops.

In the end, both battles at the Alamo during the Texas Revolution would work against Santa Anna. After the massacre in March 1836, the death of all 189 defenders became a rallying cry for the Texians.

On April 21 at the Battle of San Jacinto, when Santa Anna’s army was defeated in less than 20 minutes, Sam Houston’s army broke over the Mexican breastwork defenses yelling, “Remember the Alamo!”

Whether the Army of the Republic of Texas victory at the Siege of Bexar or the legendary last-stand of the outnumbered defenders three months later, history is clear.

We shall always remember all of the events surrounding the complete story of the Alamo. At least those of us who know the full history.

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Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, Pennsylvania.

US Relations with Latin America at the Start of the 20th Century

The conventional argument by scholars is that the relationship between the United States and Latin America was acrimonious in the late nineteenth century. Here, scholar Paul Parobek seeks to present an alternative view – that the relationship between the United States and Latin America in the nineteenth century was not acrimonious, but rather, was harmonious.

Elihu Root in 1902.

‘Pan-Americanism’ refers to the sense of solidarity between the United States and Latin America. It is often overlooked in the scholarship, however, there is a plethora of archival evidence that can attest to it as this scholar found during his research. Pan-Americanism became a policy of Secretary of State James G. Blaine (March to December 1881, and 1889-1892) sought to solidify American relations with Latin America by using trade.

Secretary of State from 1905-09 Elihu Root was aware of the growing distrust of the United States by certain segments of Latin American. This can be attributed to a sense of cultural superiority known as American Exceptionalism among certain segments of American society and Secretary of State Richard Olney’s reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that made the United States fiat in the hemisphere. Secretary Root explains in a letter to Senator Tillman why Latin Americans were distrustful of the United States:

The South Americans now hate us, largely because they think we despise them and try to bully them. I really like them and intend to show it. I think their friendship is really important to the United States, and that the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen (Jessup, 1938, p. 469).

A tour of Latin America

Secretary Root took a tour of Latin America that covered a large part of coastal South America (see footnote [1]) that was previously neglected by American policymakers but had numerous American corporations after carefully examined the situation in Latin America in 1906. The opening session of the Pan-American Conference started off in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Secretary Root gave his interpretation of Pan-Americanism in a long speech where he pronounces the equality and solidarity of all the nations of the western hemisphere and international security while in Brazil:

No nation can live unto itself alone and continue to live. Each nation’s growth is a part of the development of the race…It is with nations as it is with individual men: intercourse, association, correction of egotism by the influence of other’s judgement, broadening of views by the experience and thought of equals, acceptance of the moral standards of a community the desire for whose good opinion lends a sanction to the rules of right conduct - these are conditions of growth in civilization… To promote this mutual interchange and assistance between the American Republics, engaged in the same great task, inspired by the same purpose, and professing the same principals, I understand to be the function of the American Conference now in session. There is not one of all our countries that cannot benefit the others; there is not one that cannot receive benefit from the others; there is not one that will not gain by the prosperity, the peace, the happiness of all… (Peter Myers, 1916, pp. 3-4).

Secretary Root used the Third Pan-American Conference to further rectify any misunderstandings the Latin Americans had towards the United States:

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. xv).

Significance

The trip was significant as it was meant to clear up any perceived misunderstandings and to restore relations between the United States and Latin America. Further, Bacon and Scott point out that the trip was “it was intended to be a matter of international importance” (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. xiii). They further explain that the trip had two objectives:

And by personal contact, to learn the aims and views of our southern friends, and to show also, by personal intercourse, the kindly consideration and the sense of honorable obligation which the Government of the United States cherishes for its neighbors to the south without discriminating among them, and to make clear the destiny common to the peoples of the western world (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. xiii). 

Finally according to Bacon and Scott, the trip “was the first time that a Secretary of State had visited South America during the tenure of his office, and the visit was designed to show the importance which the United States attaches to the Pan American conferences…” (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. xiii).

The election of President McKinley appeared to have affected Latin American perceptions of the United States as the solidarity was not one-sided. The Brazilian ambassador to the United States expressed his gratitude to Secretary Root for stating that “in nothing else since you came to your high post you have taken a more direct and personal interest. You seem to divine in the spirit that animates you with regard to our continent the mark that your name will leave in history” (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. 4).  Dr. Luis M. Drago of Argentina welcomed Secretary Root, stating in his opening speech that “…the traditional policy of the United States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great powers of Europe” (Bacon and Scott, 1917, p. 96). Similar sentiments were found throughout his tour of Latin America.

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[1]. According to Bacon and Scott,  Root travelled to Sio Paulo and Santos in Brazil followed by Montevideo, Uruguay; Buenos Ayres, Argentina; Santiago, Chile; Lima and University of San Marcos, Peru; Panama; Cartagena, Columbia; and San Antonio, Nuevo Laredo, City of Mexico, Puebla, Orizaba, and Guadalajara all in Mexico Bacon, R. and Scott, J. B. (eds.) (1917) Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

US Civil War Maritime Disasters

The US Civil War in the Gulf is defined by the Northern strategy of the blockade of Southern ports and the daring attempts by Confederate vessels to run this blockade.

Here, Richard Bluttal looks at this strategy and the maritime disasters during the war.

A 19th century print showing the sinking of USS Hatteras by CSS Alabama, off Galveston, Texas in January 1863.

USS Hatteras

The remains of the Union ironclad Tecumseh, whose sinking by a Confederate mine prompted Farragut’s famous order "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" are well known off Fort Morgan, Alabama. Only one U.S. warship, however, was sunk at sea in the Gulf. This important shipwreck, the USS Hatteras, has been the subject of repeated investigations by BOEM, the Texas Historical Commission, and Texas A&M University at Galveston.

In less than a year, the Hatteras captured seven Confederate blockade runners off Vermilion Bay, Louisiana. Early in 1863, she was ordered to join the squadron under Rear Admiral David Farragut, who was attempting to retake the key Texas port of Galveston, Texas. As the blockading squadron lay off the coast on the afternoon of January 11, 1863, a set of sails was sighted just over the horizon and the Hatteras was ordered to give pursuit. She chased the intruder for four hours, closer and closer into shore, and farther and farther from her supporting fleet. Finally, as dusk was falling, the Hatteras came within hailing distance of the square-rigged, black-hulled vessel. Commander Homer C. Blake demanded to know the identity of the ship. "Her Britannic Majesty’s Ship Vixen," came the reply. Blake ordered one of Hatteras’ boats launched to inspect the "Britisher." Almost as soon as the boat was piped away, a new reply came from the mystery ship, "We are the CSS Alabama!" A broadside from the Alabama’s guns punctuated the reply. Within 13 minutes, the Hatteras, sinking rapidly, surrendered. The Hatteras today rests in 58 feet of water about 20 miles off Galveston. Her 210-foot long iron hull is completely buried under about three feet of sand. Only the remains of her 500-horsepower walking beam steam engine and her two iron paddle wheels remain exposed above the sea floor.

USS Monitor

During the Civil War, the idea of the USS Monitor was born amidst a nation in turmoil. After discovering the Confederate Navy was constructing an impenetrable ironclad in Hampton Roads, Va., President Lincoln called for a naval board to propose construction of an ironclad vessel to lead the Union Navy. John Ericsson, a Swedish-American inventor, introduced a plan, which caught their attention. Complete with a rotating gun turret, low draft, sleek profile and Ericsson's claim as an "Impregnable Battery," the board was convinced to order swift production on what would become the USS Monitor. Construction immediately began at the Continental Ironworks in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, N.Y. Almost 100 days later, on January 30, 1862, the USS Monitor was launched into the East River.

On March 9, 1862, the first time iron met iron ( the ironclad confederate ship CSS Virginia) , the two warships fired upon each other for hours, each side looking for their opponent's weaknesses. Almost four hours into the battle, a shot from the Virginia exploded against the Monitor's pilot house and Captain Worden was temporarily blinded. The Monitor's Executive Officer, Samuel Dana Green, assumed command and ordered the Monitor into shallow water, where the Virginia could not follow, to assess the captain's wounds and damage to the ship. The Virginia's captain, assuming the Monitor was withdrawing from battle, withdrew in supposed victory. When the Monitor returned to resume the engagement and found the Virginia gone, her crew also assumed victory. In reality, the battle was a virtual draw with neither vessel inflicting serious damage to the other. Although the Monitor remained in Hampton Roads throughout the spring and summer of 1862, the two vessels never again met in battle.

Dive 230 feet below the Atlantic Ocean off the North Carolina coast on one of our nation’s most historic shipwrecks, USS Monitor. This Civil War ironclad sank in 1862, and in 1975, it became the first national marine sanctuary – Monitor National Marine Sanctuary. Transformed from a weapon of war to an island of marine life, Monitor continues to serve as habitat for a wealth of marine life. Dive in to see sand tiger sharks, sea turtles, and more!

SS Sultana

A boiler explodes, shattering the silence of the night and throwing the hopeless passengers of the SS Sultana into the Mississippi River. Legally allowed to carry 376 people, the Sultana was carrying over 2,300 passengers, most of whom were Union soldiers recently released from Confederate prisons. The estimated death toll increases steadily to 1,700 or 1,800 in the worst maritime disaster in American history.

The Sultana was a privately owned sidewheel steamboat built in Cincinnati, Ohio, in February 1863. A relatively large boat, the Sultana stood three decks tall and measured 260 feet long and approximately 70 feet wide – a little shorter than a football field and about half as wide. Built for the New Orleans cotton trade, the Sultana spent her first two years carrying troops and supplies up and down the Mississippi River for the Union Army, until Vicksburg, MS, was captured in July 1863. She then carried cotton, manufactured goods and civilian passengers between New Orleans and her home port of St. Louis, MO.

On April 23, 1865, the Sultana limped back into Vicksburg from downriver. She had sprung a leak in one of her four boilers, and it needed to be repaired. While the work was being done to fix the boiler, the recently released soldiers began showing up. Instead of 1,000 soldiers, as Captain Hatch had suggested, the Sultana got almost 2,000 men. They were crowded together in every nook and cranny of the steamboat, as Captains Mason and Hatch knew more men meant more money. Very late in the evening of April 24, 1865, the Sultana finally backed away from the Vicksburg wharf and started upriver on her final journey. She carried on board a total of 2,137 people; 1,960 ex-prisoners, 22 guards, 85 crew members, and 70 paying passengers.

On April 27, after unloading the sugar and taking on a new load of coal, the Sultana finally started on the last leg of the journey towards Cairo, Illinois, where the men were to be transferred to trains and taken to Camp Chase, near Columbus, Ohio for mustering out.

Around 2:00 a.m., when the Sultana was about seven miles north of Memphis, three of the four boilers suddenly exploded. The horrendous explosion came from the upper back part of the boilers and ripped upward through the heart of the Sultana. The blast went up at about a 45-degree angle, ripping apart the center of the main cabin, destroying the middle of the texas cabin (the section of a steamboat that includes the crew's quarters), and shearing off the back two-thirds of the pilothouse. The right smokestack fell into the giant hole in the center of the Sultana while the left stack crashed heavily onto the center of the crowded hurricane deck, smashing it down onto the equally crowded second deck underneath. Dozens and dozens of soldiers were crushed to death between the two decks although some were saved by the support of the heavy railings outlining the openings of the main stairway. Many people had been catapulted into the river by the force of the explosion while hundreds more fought to get away from the spreading flames and to find scraps of lumber to keep them afloat in the water. People trapped in the wreckage cried out for assistance as men women, and children who were lucky enough jumped into the icy cold river.

In the aftermath, it was discovered that at least 1800 soldiers and civilians had died, making it the worst maritime disaster in American history. (The Titanic sinking in 1912 by comparison resulted in approximately 1500 deaths.) Amidst the competing headlines of the South’s elongated surrender, the assassination of Lincoln and the manhunt for John Wilkes Booth, the Sultana catastrophe received surprisingly little news coverage. A halfhearted investigation would place most of the blame on Capt. Mason, who conveniently was not alive to point the finger at others. A war weary public, eager to put the war and all of its tragedies behind them, soon forgot about the Sultana and its victims.

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No Cold War? What If Harry Truman Had Not Become Roosevelt’s Vice President in 1945?

Among the most fascinating counterfactual narratives in 20th century American political history revolves around the 1944 Democratic Convention.  On the second ballot of a wild open vote for vice president, Harry Truman came from behind and defeated incumbent Henry Wallace to join Franklin Roosevelt on his 4th-term ticket.  Truman went on to become president on FDR’s death the following April.  Books and films—most notably Oliver Stone’s The Untold History of the United States—and even plays, have since popularized the notion that delegates were bribed by a corrupt coterie of reactionary party leaders, and that if Wallace had kept his rightful place as FDR’s number two the Cold War would never have happened.  Peace and friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union would have reigned - or so Stone believes.

Benn Steil explains.

Henry A. Wallace.

My new biography of Wallace, The World That Wasn’t, grounded in masses of new primary-source material, argues that this narrative is nonsense.  I investigated the subsequent careers of the 1,176 delegates, and found that at most one of the delegates (New York’s Richard Patterson, whose vote is unrecorded) backed Truman and subsequently became an ambassador under him—ambassadorships having supposedly been the primary bribe currency. Moreover, Russian archival documents make clear that Stalin never considered Wallace more than a useful idiot who could aid his territorial ambitions in Europe and Asia.

Given the popularity of the counterfactual narrative, however, it is worth delving creatively into a pivotal episode of the early Cold War, and imagining how it might have played out if Wallace had been president instead of Truman.

On April 15, 1947, Truman’s secretary of state George C. Marshall met with Soviet leader Josef Stalin at the Kremlin to discuss the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations.  The meeting was historically consequential, leading Marshall to conclude that Stalin was determined to stoke unrest and undermine recovery in Western Europe.  The result was the creation of the Marshall Plan and NATO, both of which Wallace staunchly opposed.

What follows immediately below is a narrative of the meeting based on primary accounts, condensed from the longer narrative in my book The Marshall Plan, followed in turn by a counterfactual narrative of how the encounter with Stalin might have gone had a President Wallace represented the United States, instead of Secretary Marshall.  It will then be left to the reader’s imagination how history might have played out from there.

 

Marshall and Stalin: April 15, 1947

On the night of April 15, 1947, accompanied by Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith and Chip Bohlen, who would act as translator, George Marshall made his way to the Kremlin through what appeared to Smith to be the most heavily policed street on earth.  Ushered through a series of antechambers, the Americans arrived in a wood-paneled conference room where the Generalissimo, in his mustard-colored military uniform, stood waiting.  Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Ambassador to Washington Nikolai Novikov, and a translator were present.  Portraits of Russian Napoleonic war heroes stared down from the walls.

It was 10PM.  Stalin welcomed Marshall, complimenting him for having aged much better than he had.  He, Stalin—at sixty-eight, two years older than Marshall—was now, in contrast, “just an old man.”

Bohlen agreed.  He was surprised to see how the Soviet leader had aged. Five foot five, pock-faced, with a coarse, streaked mustache, yellowed teeth matching his eyes, his physical figure seemed to betray his legend.

George Marshall, never at ease with small talk, briefly returned Stalin’s pleasantries, recalling “with great interest” their previous meeting at the Tehran Conference in 1943, where “amphibious and cross-river operations” had been discussed.

“Yes,” Stalin interjected, “the second front.”

Marshall had wished to remind Stalin of the two countries’ recent historic collaboration, but the “second front” held different meanings for the two men.  From Stalin’s perspective, it had been deliberately, devastatingly, and unforgivably late.  America and Britain, he believed, delayed launching it for years in order that Germany and the Soviet Union might first grind each other into rubble and impotence.  Stalin, of course, had also used this tactic—letting Germans slaughter the Warsaw Poles in August 1944.

Marshall steered the meeting toward business.

He would, he advised Stalin, speak frankly—not as a diplomat, but as he had been trained, as a soldier.  He explained that he was “very concerned,” even “somewhat depressed at the extent and depth of misunderstandings and differences . . . revealed at this conference.” The Soviet Union, he said, had been held in high esteem among the American people at the end of the war.  But since that time, the Soviet government had not kept faith with agreements and was hindering progress on new ones.

The American Lend-Lease arrangement with the Soviet Union, Marshall reminded Stalin, “had been the most generous of all,” and the unwillingness of the Soviets to settle their obligations—such as the return of merchant ships and war vessels—was having “a very bad effect on the United States Congress and on public opinion.” Now, here in Moscow, an atmosphere of “suspicion and distrust [was making] agreement virtually impossible.”

Marshall was indeed speaking frankly; even brutally, as he later termed it.

Impassive, Stalin puffed a cigarette; looking down, to the side, occasionally into Marshall’s eyes as he listened to the American and his translator.  A red pen in his right hand throughout, he doodled wolves’ heads on a notepad, in plain sight of his guests—a practice he was known to have cultivated some time ago for the purpose of disconcerting them.  Harriman had experienced it in his first audience with him at the beginning of the war.

Marshall turned to the main issue dividing Washington and Moscow: Germany.  They were not making progress on any of the central matters: demilitarization, reparations, or the country’s future economic and political architecture.

Germany had brought the Soviet Union and the United States together in a common cause, from 1941 to 1945, but now that it was caged between the eastern and western halves of the continent, each under the effective control of their respective militaries, it served only to magnify the consequences of their clashing ideologies and geostrategic interests.  Little of substance, or even of clear meaning, regarding Germany’s future had been decided among FDR, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta two years prior, in spite—or because—of it being by far the most consequential issue the three governments would have to resolve.  Stalin had at the time been content to wait; he expected “the correlation of forces” to move in his favor, as they did when the Red Army beat General Eisenhower to Berlin.

Now, here in Moscow, Marshall said, there was a misconception that the United States “intended to dismember Germany.” But his government “did not have any such intention”; it “in fact desired the opposite.” It wanted the country unified economically, allowing the more industrial west to exchange goods freely with the agricultural east.  But it also believed that a powerful central German government “would constitute a real danger for the peace of the world.” Marshall further believed, yet did not say, that the main source of this danger was the Kremlin-controlled KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) German Communist Party, which had held power in the east since forcibly absorbing and dismantling the SPD Social Democratic Party in 1946.

Marshall now directed his frustration at his interlocutor for the past six weeks.  “Mr. Molotov,” he said, “had charged that the British-American bi-zonal arrangement was in violation of Potsdam.” But it “was as plain as this table that the United States and Great Britain had been forced to take this action”—merging the two zones—"in defense of their own taxpayers, by reason of the failure to establish economic unity in Germany.”

As for reparations, Marshall continued, Molotov was exaggerating what the United States had received from the American zone, while refusing himself even to provide any figures as to what the Soviet Union had received.  The two delegations had, further, reached “an impasse on the demilitarization treaty.”

There was also the wider context, Marshall added: Europe.  “We are,” he said, “frankly determined to do what we can to assist those countries which are suffering from economic deterioration.” If “unchecked, [this] might lead to economic collapse and the consequent elimination of any chance of democratic survival.”

Trying to close on a positive note, Marshall reiterated his “desire to rebuild the basis of cooperation that had existed during the war.” He had, he said, “come to Generalissimo Stalin with that hope, feeling that if they cleared away some of the suspicion it would be a good beginning for the restoration of that understanding.”

Stalin nodded.  Marshall, he said, was “quite right, that only on the basis of frankness and sincerity could cooperation and friendship be developed.”

“As to lend lease,” he confessed, “there was occasional sloppiness in the operation of the Soviet Government.” It was “very busy here because [we] suffered such great losses in the war. . . . This might be the reason for the delays.” But “there was another side to the lend lease question,” he told Marshall: “namely the credits which had been linked to lend lease.”

Two years ago, Stalin explained, in response to Ambassador Harriman’s question regarding what orders the Soviet government was prepared to place in the United States, and what credits it needed to settle them, his government had submitted a memorandum requesting three to six billion dollars.  Six billion, Stalin said, had been “long promised.” Now, after two years had passed, “no reply [had yet] been received.” This was, he suggested pointedly, “possibly due to sloppiness on the part of the United States.”

Novikov was stunned.  Six billion?  “I only knew of a promise of a one billion dollar loan,” he later recorded.  And “I was not the only one struck by Stalin’s bitter reproach.” Marshall was whispering in Smith’s ear as Stalin spoke; Smith scribbled furiously.  He reached across the table and handed Novikov a note.

“Mr. Novikov!” it read, “you know too well that it’s not so.  Six billion have never been promised.  Please, explain it to Mr. Stalin.” Novikov translated and handed the message to Molotov.  “Without moving a brow,” Molotov “put the sheet into a folder.” He “did not say a word” to Stalin, whose “strange memory lapse . . . haunted me,” Novikov noted. “[W]hat I saw was an elderly, very elderly, tired man, who, likely, was carrying his great burden of responsibility with great difficulty.” Stalin would correct himself, but only to the extent of conceding that “one year” had passed rather than two.

Stalin moved on to Germany.  “The [Council of Foreign Ministers],” he said, “had no authorization to repeal . . . the agreements entered into by the three governments.” He looked at Bohlen.

“Mr. Bohlen must remember those conversations” at Yalta, where he translated for FDR, when “all the Americans, including President Roosevelt, [Secretary of State Edward] Stettinius and [Harry] Hopkins had said they thought [the Soviet demand for $10 billion in reparations] was very small.” And spread “over twenty years this would not be hard for the Germans.” But “now there was apparently a different point of view,” that despite the Soviet Union having removed “barely two billion dollars” worth of assets no more reparations would be permitted—not even from current production.  “This the Soviet Union could not accept.” The Soviet people, Stalin said, had suffered terribly at the hands of the Germans.  He had “no pity, sympathy, or love for them.” Reparations were right and necessary.

As for “the subject of German unity,” the Soviet Union “stood like the British and Americans for economic unity.” But that was not enough, Stalin said; economic unity was not “feasible without political unity.”

“[We] are against a strong centralized German government,” Stalin clarified; we want only one that “should stand above and not below the Länder [state] governments.” But “[we] must not repeat the same mistakes as Napoleon, who set up scattered German governments.” He thereby gained “a tactical advantage from a temporarily weakened Germany,” but strengthened the hand of “German militarists” who dreamed of reuniting Germany.  “Napoleon’s action in effect gave birth to Bismarck and the Franco-Prussian war.”

If these errors were now repeated, the Soviet Union risked “losing control of the instrument of German unity and handing it over to the militarists and chauvinists.” The German people would then soon follow another dangerous and bellicose leader down the path of reconsolidation.

§

However incoherent its elements, the contours of Soviet policy toward Germany had been largely settled for a year now.  Stalin had no inclination to reopen it.

In May 1946, thirty-eight top Soviet officials, including General Georgy Zhukov and Deputy Foreign Minister Solomon Lozovsky, had submitted their conclusions on Secretary of State James Byrnes’ proposal for German demilitarization and great-power security guarantees in Europe.  They were unequivocal: Moscow must reject it.  The United States, they argued, was trying to drive the Soviet Union out of Germany to secure its “economic domination of that country” and “to preserve [its] military potential [in Europe] as a necessary base for carrying out their aggressive aims in the future.” Stalin concluded that Washington was reneging on Roosevelt’s Tehran commitment to withdraw U.S. troops within two years of the war’s end, seeking instead Soviet “sanction for the U.S. playing the same role in European affairs as the U.S.S.R.” And once Soviet troops were out of Germany, Zhukov warned, the Americans would “demand a withdrawal . . . from Poland”—a critical military corridor with Germany—“and ultimately from the Balkans.” Within a few years, there will be “a German-Anglo-American war against the USSR.”

In this light, Marshall’s calls to rebuild Germany and to end reparations were two sides of the same coin.  America intended to take over Germany, rearm it, and turn it against Russia.  Marshall might as well have been pushing on a closed door from the inside; Stalin would oppose any plan that precluded Soviet control over the western half of Germany.  “All of Germany must be ours,” Stalin told Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders in 1946.  “That is, Soviet, Communist.” Stalin kept talking to Marshall only because he wanted Washington “to shoulder the responsibility for Germany’s division,” if such could not be avoided.

As for Washington’s policy on Germany, it had lurched radically since 1945.  The Truman administration was now in revolt against the mind-set that had held sway, however tenuously, in Washington a mere two and a half years prior, which viewed a united, industrially revived Germany as a continued threat to Europe.  FDR’s State Department never supported Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s plan for deindustrialization and dismembership, believing it “would provide a ready-made program for nationalistic agitators”; instead it supported only decentralization, or federalization, as a means of containing German nationalism and militarism.  Once Truman became president, he condemned Morgenthau’s “meddling” and put the State Department back in control of foreign policy.

Europe’s economic crisis now made Morgenthau’s ideas for German pastoralization look reckless.  Real gross domestic product (GDP) in Britain was tumbling (down 2.6 percent for the year), while inflation in the United States was soaring (14.4 percent for the year), pushing up British import costs.  “Production,” concluded a widely circulated report by former president Herbert Hoover, following a European trip in February, was “the one path to recovery in Europe.” And “the whole economy of Europe,” he insisted, “is interlinked with the German economy.” His ally Senator Vandenberg called Germany “the core of the whole European problem.”

Despite the massive wartime damage Germany sustained, reflected in the destruction of 40 percent of its housing stock, a remarkable 80 percent of the country’s industrial plant capacity remained intact.  Germany exited the war with a greater functioning machine tool stock than it had on entering it—much of it new (one third of industrial equipment was less than five years old, up from one tenth in 1939).  Only raw material shortages and political uncertainty held back its recovery—and Europe’s.  The United States could, therefore, Hoover concluded, “keep Germany in these economic chains, but it will also keep Europe in rags.”

U.S. military governor in Germany General Lucius Clay and John Foster Dulles, foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential hopeful Thomas Dewey, agreed with Hoover, although the two disagreed bitterly over how to manage Germany.  Clay, who considered Dulles overly indulgent of the French, wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of the country and avoid rupture with the Soviets; Dulles wanted to put the Ruhr under international control and use the resources of the Rhine basin to jump-start a new federated “western Europe.” This idea was beginning to capture the imagination of a State Department in search of ways to give substance to the Truman Doctrine.  For his part, Stalin naturally opposed German reindustrialization, particularly when its object was to bolster European capitalism.

§

Six weeks of talks in Moscow had not even begun to close the gap between Soviet and American visions for Germany.  Yet Stalin had one final proposal.

“If our views on this subject cannot be reconciled,” he put to Marshall, “there was a way out,” a compromise.  “Let the German people decide through a plebiscite what they wished.”

Marshall recoiled.  He knew full well where a “plebiscite” would lead.  He had seen the results in Poland, last July, in a baldly manipulated referendum that cleared the way for Communist control.  General elections followed in January 1947, in the run-up to which anti-Communist Peasant Party supporters were arrested by the thousands and their candidates stricken from electoral lists.  Yet in order to prevail, the Communists still had to resort to mass ballot stuffing.  Churchill had fought a lonely last-ditch diplomatic offensive against Stalin at Yalta to preserve an independent Poland as a barricade against Soviet westward expansion.  But FDR, more concerned with securing Soviet UN membership and entry into the Pacific war, capitulated to Stalin’s insistence on Allied recognition of the Soviet-backed provisional Polish government and toothless Western monitoring of future elections. Now, in Moscow, Marshall was determined to defend another such barricade a few hundred miles to the west, in Germany.

All Marshall and Stalin could agree on was that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could risk the possibility of Germany becoming an ally of the other.  “We must insist on keeping Western Germany free of communistic control,” Kennan would later urge. Marshall would call “domination of all Germany by [the] Soviets . . . the greatest threat to the security of all Western Nations.”

Thus, after ninety minutes of serial monologue, the two men resolved nothing.  Marshall was grim.  Yet Stalin remained disconcertingly calm, almost detached.

“It is wrong to give so tragic an interpretation to our present disagreements,” he told Marshall.  They were, he said, like quarrels between family members.  Differences over Germany were, he added, pointedly replacing the familial analogy with a martial one, “only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces.”

Agreement might come in time, he assured Marshall.  “When people had exhausted themselves in dispute,” Stalin said, “they recognized the necessity for compromise.  We may agree the next time,” he added encouragingly.  “Or, if not then, the time after that.” His manner suggested what researchers would later identify as signs of hostile diplomatic intent.  Unwarranted “positive sentiment” and a “focus on future” possibilities, as opposed to present circumstances, suggest imminent betrayal.

Marshall was now alarmed—not that Stalin continued to disagree with the American position, but that he was content to let disagreement drag on while Germany and Europe convulsed.  “The worse, the better”—a phrase famously attributed to the nineteenth-century radical Russian writer Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and later to Lenin—appeared to be the Soviet leader’s view. Marshall now saw that Molotov’s mulishness could not be explained away by his character.  The foreign minister had been carrying out his boss’s orders.  The Soviets, Marshall concluded, were “not negotiating in good faith.” They “were doing everything possible to achieve a complete breakdown in Europe.”

“It was the Moscow Conference,” said Ambassador Robert Murphy, General Clay’s political adviser and the top U.S. diplomat in Germany, “which really rang down the Iron Curtain.” Skeptical of prospects for cooperation with the Soviets before the conference, Murphy would thereafter see them as wholly untrustworthy and decry anything resembling American appeasement.

 

“President Wallace” and Stalin, counterfactual: April 15, 1947

President Wallace, under enormous pressure in Washington to halt and reverse Soviet expansion in Europe and Asia, led off the discussion.

“The Generalissimo must know,” Wallace said, “that fascist voices are growing louder in America.  They have been called ‘Cold Warriors,’ but some of them want hot war.  They say that Soviet peacekeepers in northern Iran and the Turkish straits are an offensive force.  That you are set on world domination.  That I should have sent battleships and air support.  That I should have confronted the Soviet Union in the United Nations.  These are lies and provocations, of course.  But Americans need your reassurance.”

Stalin lit a cigarette.  “The Soviet Union suffered far worse than any nation in the last war.  That is why I, like you, am trying to keep the peace.  It is only the imperialists and warmongers who will not see this.”

“I agree, of course,” Wallace said.  “But the American people need clearer signals of your nation’s peaceful intentions.  Otherwise, too many are inclined to see the worst.  They think our two systems cannot coexist.  Together, we must show them this is not so.”

Stalin nodded.  “We can show them in Germany.  This means keeping to what was agreed at Yalta and Potsdam.  For the Soviet people, ten billions in reparations is the least they can accept.  They cannot understand when they hear that the American military in Germany is not meeting the solemn commitments made by President Roosevelt and President Wallace.”

“As I have said, and Marshal Stalin knows well, the Morgenthau Plan remains the basis of American policy in Germany.  Germany must become a peaceable agricultural nation.  The Ruhr Valley must be placed under international control.  Its industry, the foundation of the Nazi aggression, must be put to the use of its victims.”

“Does your General Clay in Berlin understand this?,” Stalin asked.

“The general understands and is committed to the policy of his government.  It is necessary, though, that our people see that it is Germany paying reparations, and not the United States.  Right now, it is our resources keeping German workers, German women and children, alive.  General Sokolovsky, understandably, says he does not have the food resources in the east to meet the Soviet Union’s reciprocal obligations to the west.  We therefore need to work together so that the Soviet and western zones can be unified economically.”

“And politically,” Stalin interrupted.  “Otherwise, the German people will follow new demagogues into unification and war.  This is why we need a referendum in the country.”

“I will support a referendum,” Wallace said.  “But our two governments must be clear and open about what question will be put before the German people, and how the vote will be carried out.  The American people believe the Polish vote was not entirely free and fair.  They appreciate and respect that the Soviet people want—they expect—good neighbors, friendly neighbors, but believe that Soviet-German relations must be transformed in a transparent fashion such that there can be no question as to the legitimacy of the exercise.”

“The Soviet people are unified,” Stalin said, “and they want the same unity among peace-loving anti-fascists across Germany.  It is the only basis for future friendship between the Soviet and German peoples.”

“I believe this,” Wallace assured him.  “My government is concerned, though, that if business enterprises in eastern Germany continue to be transformed into Soviet corporations it will not be possible for German anti-fascists to choose freely the economic organization of their society.  We believe that progressive capitalism and socialism can co-exist harmoniously, just as capitalist and communist parties work in coalition in the Czechoslovak government.”

“It is a model for a unified Germany,” Stalin agreed, “and for cooperation between our two countries.  There are no longer American or Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia.  It can be done.”

“Then we agree.  I will ask Secretary of State Duggan to continue these discussions with Mr. Molotov.  We must show the world that the United States and the Soviet Union can resolve their differences with goodwill and dialogue.  This is why I am working for the immediate abolition of atomic weapons, and complete civilian control of our atomic energy resources in the service of universal abundance.  Why I am working for $50 billion in U.S. funding for a United Nations Reconstruction Fund, to aid the victims of fascist aggression—first and foremost in the Soviet Union.  And why I urge the Generalissimo to join me in signing a ‘peace pledge’ before my departure from Moscow.  Nothing is more important than peace between our two great nations.”

Stalin nodded.  “Peace is possible, yes.  And desirable, of course.  But let us not put the cart before the horse.  The Soviet people will not understand words of peace without actions of peace.  Elimination of your atomic bombs, of course, and your air bases abroad.  $10 billion from Germany, and at least as much from the United Nations, for the rebuilding of our industry.  And unification of Germany under true anti-fascists.  So we will keep talking, then, until we find words to dignify deeds.”

With some effort, Wallace smiled.

Peace would come, he was sure; the Common Man would not abide less.  Still, it was not easy to overcome the legacy of Bolshevik mistrust; imperialists in London and Washington had much to atone for.  He would need to do everything in his power to tamp down reactionary calls for a new Western military alliance and the division of Germany.

Benn Steil is senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author, most recently, of The World That Wasn’t: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century.

Hans Kammler: A Forgotten Nazi Henchman

Hans Kammler was a high-ranking SS officer who by the end of the Second World War had elevated to the highest ranks of Hitler’s Third Reich. Unlike most of his peers the war crimes he committed were unmentioned in the trials that followed the war, but he played a significant role in the running of the Nazi war effort and in facilitating the final solution.

Kammler was equally as ruthless as his other Nazi peers. He was a driven, ambitious career Nazi and ranks amongst one of the worst of Hitlers henchmen. Kammler’s committed suicide in 1945 which meant he avoided capture and justice.

Steve Prout explains.

A 1930s photo of Hans Kammler.

Who was Hans Kammler?

Hans Kammler was born in 1901 in Stettin, Germany. He was too young to serve during World War One but shortly after the war he saw limited action serving in the Rossbach Freikorps in 1919 during the post war chaos that spread in Germany. This was an extreme right wing anti-communist organisation led by Gerhard Rossbach which was active in the Baltic. Between 1919 and 1923, he studied civil engineering at the Technische Hochschule der Freien Stadt in Danzig and Munich. In November 1932 he was awarded a doctorate in engineering (Dr. Ing.). It was his association with the Nazis would take his career down a dark path and earn him a more dubious notoriety.

Joining the Nazi Party and Military Career

Kammler joined the Nazi Party in its initial stages in 1931 already being a firm believer in Nazi ideology and its doctrines. He saw the party as a vehicle to further his career which eventually elevated him to the very top of the Third Reich hierarchy. He started in a position as head of the Aviation Ministry's building department where he oversaw construction projects.

A year later, in 1933, he joined the SS, and his first assignment was to lead an innocuous department titledReichsbund der Kleingärtner und Kleinsiedler (The Third Reich's federation of allotment gardeners and small homeowners). He would be trusted with other roles later in same that year when he was also appointed to the Board of Directors for Homeland Building and Housing Co-operative and simultaneously serving as an advisor in SS Main Economic and Administrative Office (WVHA), where is role was to act as a consultant for the SS Race and Settlement Office. The later position was a strange fit for a civil engineer, but it was ideologically compatible for Kammler.

In 1941 Kammler was moved the Waffen SS after being identified by Henrich Himmler as the driving force to implement the ambitious construction plans of the SS. His role involved the construction and design of the concentration camps to facilitate the Nazi’s extermination program for their policy of racial cleansing. Kammler was unperturbed by his new role and in fact applied himself with his blend of cruelty, barbarity, and lack of empathy when he applied these to his assignments. These were character traits that made some the most prominent and notorious Nazi’s wary if not frightened of him. By his own admission Albert Speer who was Hitler’s alleged closest confidant was one of those senior party members wary of Kammler and his ambition. Speer himself was no innocent party in utilizing slave labour for his own and his party’s needs.

The Concentration Camps and the Final Solution

Although Hans Kammler was not the architect of the final solution, he was according to historian Nikolaus Wachsmann "intimately involved in all the major building projects in Auschwitz". He was as equally culpable as his peers for the war crimes and assisting the mass exterminations in those camps. In September 1941 Kammler oversaw the expansion of the Auschwitz concentration camp. He had in recent months built a similar facility at Majdanek which eventually morphed from a labour camp to an extermination camp much like others. It is estimated eighty thousand people were murdered there at Majdanek but far worse was to come at Auschwitz.

Kammler’s redesign of the camps crematoriums made it possible to dispose of one hundred and twenty thousand bodies a month enabling the Nazi’s to accelerate their genocidal policies and in vain attempts later to try and disguise their war crimes. Over one million people would be exterminated in Auschwitz alone and doubt Kammler was undeniably complicit in all of this if only as a cold Nazi facilitator.

He would participate in further atrocities when in 1943 he was assigned the task of building the Warschau concentration camp after the Warsaw Ghetto was demolished. The Ghetto was an area that the Nazi’s designated to contain over four hundred thousand Polish Jews under crowded and insanitary conditions. The Germans planned to liquidate this area but the inhabitants, after learning of these plans, began an unsuccessful uprising. The Polish inhabitants were poorly equipped and no match for the opposing German forces and they were spared no mercy as the army crushed the small resistance.

Himmler then instructed that the territory had to be raised and flattened. The entire Jewish presence was to be erased as Himmler wanted to conceal the atrocities the Germans committed during the massacre and plunder the valuables he believed that the Jewish population kept concealed. The operation was expedited with ruthless zeal for Kammler’s to then clear the ghetto, flatten the former part of the city and construct a new prison camp where the Ghetto once existed. Although this new facility was not on the same scale as Auschwitz, nevertheless over twenty-five thousand people would die there before the war ended.

Kammler also constructed the prison camp at Mittelbau-Dora which supplied him with the slave labour resources that he required for his assignments. It is estimated that twenty thousand inmates from this camp met their deaths due to the conditions Kammler forced them to work under. Kammler's attitude towards the prisoners was one of utter indifference and cruel expediency. In one instance he once said, "Don't worry about the victims. The work must proceed ahead in the shortest time possible". His contribution to the murderous Nazi death toll certainly ranks one of the worst and cruelest. The claims that “the Holocaust would not been as efficient were it not for Kammler “and that he was “integral to the evolution of mass murder” seem fair assessments. As stated he was not the architect of the Holocaust he did play an undeniably significant role in the in the brutality of the Nazi regime.

Another reference to Kammler perfectly summed him up was that he recognized “no contradiction between notions of blood and soil and the methods of modern organization and technology.”  Or to put it another way, human life was cheap, expedient and its only value was to serve the interests of himself and the Third Reich.

The Secret Weapons Projects

Kammler was assigned later the task of overseeing the Germans special weapons project. This was primarily focused on the construction and development of the V1, V2 and ME-262 jet aircraft. This was Hitlers last hope as the tide of the war was turning against the Germans and the allied air force was dominating the Nazi occupied airspace. The frequency and intensity of the Allied bombings were severely disrupting German war production. Albert Speer suggested that German production be moved to safe underground facilities over Europe. This task was given to Kammler, and he achieved this using slave labour from the concentration camps. Over twenty thousand slaves would work and die in the most horrific of conditions.

The Myths

There have been many outlandish stories concerning the activities about the Nazi regime that were cultivated in the post-war period. Kammler’s involvement in the special weapons projects attracts its own bizarre tales, although most are implausible, taking his role in the special weapons project and blowing it out of all proportion. These stories, that are far from historical fact, have been repeated in various horror and science fiction films, yet some take them seriously. Such examples are outlandish stories related to a captured UFO that was reverse engineered to create a gravity defying atomic weapon known as the Glocke (otherwise known as the Bell). Naturally, this unlikely device also came complete with a Secret Nazi Society that protected its existence. This article will not be distracted by such inanities, but any reader can explore this the two books found in the sources (hopefully just for amusement only). The real horror story lies in the truth not fiction and that can be measured in the number of prison inmates who died because of Kammler.

Kammler’s Fate

We can be certain that Kammler died by committing suicide in May 1945 despite what alternative and tenuous theories suggest. There are slight variations to the exact date and place from the few witnesses, but they do not vary significantly and only by a few days, but this appears to have created the uncertainty as to his true fate. These slight variations would be easily explained by the panic and confusion caused during the Nazi retreat from the advancing allied armies. There are, however, other fanciful theories.

There are some accounts that claim Kammler did not commit suicide and survived. In this version of events, he was identified as an important asset purposefully sought by the Americans, then to be located and transported back to the United States where he could trade his knowledge concerning the special weapons facilities in return for a new identity and immunity from prosecution. Two historians in a documentary on this story both use unverified secondhand sources. One of these sources is an account from the son of a Donald Richardson who was a counterintelligence officer and close confident of President Eisenhower. What he had to offer exactly or what was the extent and value of his technological knowledge was unclear.

Other versions of this story get vague and veer off into conspiracy theory circles which this article will not get wrapped up in. Operation Paperclip as we know was the extraction of selected German scientists who could promote the USA efforts in technology and weapons advancement. Kammler was no physicist and nor was he a scientist. To lend weight to this a British Intelligence report compiled at the time the allies were identifying Nazi assets recognized that Kammler’s knowledge was secondhand and of limited value unlike the other scientists that they extracted. This statement makes more sense and makes this alternative version of events implausible.

His involvement in the development of modern technology however would have been limited to no more than his construction projects, supply of slave labour and administrative supervision. Had he have been captured he would have more likely been interrogated and handed over for trial which would have made more sense.

Conclusion

Kammler had all the prerequisites and mindset required to climb the Nazi ranks successfully. His cold impassionate attitude was perfectly summed up in the following quote in that he recognized “no contradiction between notions of blood and soil and the methods of modern organization and technology.” In other words, he regarded human life as cheap and expendable in serving the interests of himself and the Third Reich.

As a Civil Engineer Kammler was no more exceptional than any other within his profession. The only thing that was exceptional was his cruelty and his fanatical dedication to Nazi ideals. He knew his criminal deeds would catch up with him as the Third Reich’s control on the continent was disintegrating. The Allies were closing in on all fronts and he knew that he could not escape justice so rather than face the justice he deserved he committed suicide. In Nuremburg he was barely referenced; however thanks to the efforts of a few investigators his murderous role in the history of the Third Reich and the Holocaust will never be entirely forgotten or lost.

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Sources

Brotherhood of the Bell – Joesph P Farrell – Adventures Unlimited Press 2006

Reich of The Black Sun - Joesph P Farrell – Adventures Unlimited Press 2004

The Hidden Nazi: The Untold Story of America's Deal with the Devil (World War II Collection) – Dean Reuter, Colm Lowry, and Keith Chester - Regnery History; Reprint edition (25 Nov. 2021)

Satan’s Henchmen: Whatever became of SS General Hans Kammler 0- Robert Huddleston – self-published.

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopaedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, Volume I

Ming China, the Muslim World, Tokugawa Japan and Muscovite Russia: Assessing the Pre-Colonial Word

The designation of the year 1500 by historians to delineate the transition from premodern to modern times coincides with the commencement of Europe's ascendancy to global dominance. Nevertheless, during this epoch, there was scant evidence to suggest that Europe would eventually surpass other regions. Here, Ilyas Ali looks at Ming China, the Muslim World, Tokugawa Japan and Muscovite Russia around 1500.

Wanli Emperor of the Chinese Ming Dynasty from 1572 to 1620.

Geographically, Europe encountered impediments, susceptible to incursions from the East and South, with polar barriers in the North and expansive oceans to the West.

In contrast to the populous China and India, Europe lacked agricultural fertility and remained fragmented into diminutive kingdoms and city-states.

Despite the logical advantages of unity against common threats, such as the Ottoman menace, European entities often perceived each other as adversaries rather than allies.

This fragmentation was exacerbated by natural barriers like mountains, hindering cohesive governance. Even the formidable Roman Empire struggled to conquer Germania, illustrating Europe's military and economic constraints.

In technological and cultural spheres, Europe lagged behind, heavily borrowing from Muslim neighbors to the east.

By 1500, Europe's weaknesses seemed to overshadow its strengths in comparison to rivals. Before exploring what propelled Europe's growth, it is imperative to grasp the global landscape, scrutinizing the states of Ming China, the Muslim world, and other regions.

Ming China

At this point in time Ming China was the most advanced, the most superior civilization on the face of the earth. It was as simple as that; China was second to none.

By that point China possessed a population of about 130 million. Now, although that is dwarfed by its present population of 1 billion+, it still was almost triple Europe’s cumulative population of around 55 million.

China was governed by its well-educated Confucian bureaucracy, giving it a sophistication which made it the envy of any foreign visitor.

It was technologically superior to any other. This technological lead was mainly due to the spread of knowledge helped by the huge libraries which existed across the land.

Interestingly, although Gutenberg is heralded as the Father of the Printing Press in the West, it was actually the Chinese who invented printing. The Europeans only invented their printing press a whole four centuries after the Chinese created their ceramic movable type in the 11th century.

Their technology was not limited to just that. Even small luxuries we take for granted such as paper or paper money were created by the Chinese.

In China, there existed an enormous iron industry producing 125,000 tons a year in North China alone. This incredible sum this took Britain a whole 7 centuries to match during the Industrial Revolution.

This iron output was mainly used for military purposes. Gunpowder was another military invention invented by the Chinese which the Ming dynasty used, along with the cannon, to rid themselves of Mongol overlordship in the form of the previous Yuan dynasty.

China at this time also possessed a huge maritime fleet consisting of both military and commercial vessels. China was trading by sea with places as far flung as East Africa and the Indies. Moreover, under the famous Chinese mariner, Cheng He, an expedition was sent out at this time across the world which brought never-seen-before gifts to the emperor such as a giraffe from East Africa.

What is interesting to note is that this was all done without plundering and murdering, some the Portuguese and the Dutch would later not shy away from.

But soon enough this naval enterprising would come to a halt with the resumption and intensifying of Mongol incursions into Ming China. This, and an invasion to conquer Vietnam made these expeditions and naval expansions too costly to maintain.

However, it didn’t stop at a mere reduction in maritime efforts due to financial constraints. The Chinese by then had imposed a total maritime trade ban, thus stifling entrepreneurship and the growth of the maritime economy.

You see, Ming China was led by the Han ethnic majority, but this maritime expansion was a legacy of the previously Mongol Yuan dynasty. These Mongol-led changes had incurred Han resentment whilst they were out of power, and the sheer conservatism of the Confucian bureaucracy further provided cause for China turning its back on the oceans.

At the time, less focus was put on the navy as it was reasoned that a land force was more necessary to fight against the Mongols.

However, even here the government soon allowed the army to falter.

Where before many of China’s greatest inventions were to increase the might of their military, soon the conservative Confucian bureaucracy came after the military just as they had with the navy.

They had started to gain a negative view of war, and this anti-war outlook soon led to the starving of the army of good equipment.

Knowledge was restricted as only a few selected texts were allowed to be printed, and entrepreneurship was further stifled.

By the time the Industrial Revolution had come about in Britain 18th century, China’s ironwork which produced such a huge amount of iron had largely been abandoned.

The Muslim World

At this period of time, the year 1500 that is, the Ottomans were Europe’s most immediate threat.

If one were to make an educated guess given the relevant context of the era, they would assume that there was a good chance that it would be the Muslim World which would dominate rather than Europe.

It was they who possessed the most rapid economic growth, the most rapid military expansion, and the most rapid advancements in the spheres of technology and culture.

Of these Muslim empires, it was the Ottomans who were the greatest and closest to Europe geographically.

But the Persians under Safavid rule were also enjoying a resurgence, Muslim khanates dotted the Silk Road, Muslims were gaining traction in Africa with places like Sokoto and Timbuktu rising as centers of Islamic development in sub-Saharan Africa. In India, the Mughals had entered from the North and had established a fabulously wealthy empire; in the Indies, Muslims had already gained hegemony there.

Compared to the European missionaries, the Muslims were simply unmatched.

As said before, closest to Europe were the Ottomans who had by the reached Crimea, the Aegean, the Levant, had with the use of the cannon went up the Nile, and maintained control over the Red Sea, the Balkans, and Bulgaria.

By 1529 they were already besieging areas as far west as Vienna, and by then had already ended to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire by capturing Constantinople in 1453.

Much like their army, their navy was huge and was active in North Africa, Italy, Spain and had taken Cyprus.

For centuries, you see, Muslims lands were technologically ahead and were beacons of scientific progress and development. And not just there; in mathematics, industry, medicine, and in architecture they were ahead.

Yet, in the same fashion as the Chinese, they too soon turned inwards, turning their backs to the world.

For one, the Ottomans were fighting on so many fronts that they soon became overstretched, and resources ran thin. To the East they were up against the Shia Safavid Empire, they were engaged with Europeans to their West and in Africa, and in Arabia they had troubles.

But that was all manageable, especially if they had continued having the great leadership they were blessed with up until now.

But no, it wasn’t to be. Instead the Ottomans had a string of 13 successive moronic sultans who ruled incompetently and not only held them back, but also caused the loss of their prestige.

The issue with this is not necessarily that they had such bad leaders, but that the Ottoman system of governance was so centralized that a single incompetent ruler could bring a whole empire to a screeching halt.

And whilst it is usually the army which is the beacon of technological improvement in most places, the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire became so conservative and arrogant that it itself was the biggest barrier to Ottoman modernization and renewal. Rather than taking up the same high-class weaponry that was spreading throughout Europe such as modern guns, they refused and haughtily stuck up their noses.

Moreover, they started preying on their own peasant populations by imposing such ridiculous levels of taxation which ruined trade and depopulated the Ottoman towns.

The Ottomans by 1500 were facing greater military resistance from the Europeans, but rather than learning from their mistakes, and innovating like they had before, they instead chose to revert to conservatism.

But this conservatism was on another level in Mughal India. Whilst the elites were Muslims and partial to technological innovation, the masses were Hindu, and thus constrained by the extreme taboos which prevented modernization.

Such taboos included rodents and insects being forbidden to kill which meant vast quantities of food were destroyed to them; and other social mores around the handling of refuse and excrement meant that their town were permanently unsanitary, and thus the perfect breeding grounds for plague and disease.

These taboos would confound the British when they arrived many years later.

But that’s not all. Mughal India possessed an imperial court which had levels of consumption which would make even the Sun King Louis XIV bulk in embarrassment. In fact, the court collected taxes at such astronomically high rates that the tax season was often called the ‘eating’.

Whilst people often blame the British for conquering India and bringing an end to Mughal India, the problems the Mughals faced were really more internal than external. Had they made the necessary changes, and the same can be said of Ming China and the Ottomans, not only would they have survived, but they could have counteracted European might.

Tokugawa Japan and Muscovite Russia

The Japanese and the Russians were certainly not as large as some of the other empires mentioned here at this point in time at least. But it is worth mentioning them since they were showing promise of growth to come in later generations and centuries.

Japan, for instance, was helped by its geographical situation due to its status as an island nation.

Much in the same way as in Britain, this offered it a multitude of benefits which other countries which are a part of a larger landmass did not have. For example, it is somewhat isolated from the constant threat of invasion which its continental neighbors constantly faced. Korea, for example, was always at the mercy of the much larger Chinese empires which sought successfully to make it a vassal or tributary state.

But at the same time, Japan was close enough to reap the benefits of being linked to their more financially, technologically, and culturally advanced Chinese neighbors.

Japan for a long time was ruled by a collection of warring feudal lords and had an emperor who was a mere figurehead. Even at sea warlords operated, along with pirates and traders who each saw profit to be made.

But in the 16th century, one of those feudal lords, Hideyoshi, would rise above all others to unify Japan using European firepower. This ushered in a new era for Japan, which then also came to an end after Hideyoshi died.

But this resumption in fighting was short-lived this time as the powerful Tokugawa clan would soon form the Tokugawa Shogunate which would rule a Japan free from war and conflict for the next 250 years.

What was interesting here is like many of the other empires, they also stopped their seafaring activities. But it did not hurt them as much. Rather this unbroken chain of peace, and a stable government allowed for a new climate of entrepreneurship and economic growth to form.

But one thing does stand out about Japan which others failed to learn. Japan at first saw security in its island status, and for a time they were right to do so. But when the Industrial Revolution came about and the West started colonizing far-flung lands, Japan made the necessary changes to survive and adapt.

When the Perry Expedition from the United States arrived in Japan and forced Japan to open its borders to trade, Japan saw the threat and sought to combat it by technologically modernizing and catching up to the West. And this was what ultimately saved them from being colonized like many of their neighbors did.

Russia’s geographical situation was similar yet different to that of Japan. Unlike Japan, it actually shares the same landmass as Europe. In fact, most of Russia before its eastward expansion was part of Europe. However, they were isolated from the rest of the continent as well due to poor communications which prevented the Russia from being connected to the rest of Europe.

This meant that whilst it was quite well-protected from Europe and its warring polities, it did not have the same access to technology and knowledge Europe did.

But it also was growing, like Japan.

With the arrival of the musket and cannon from Europe, it had started an eastward expansion which easily allowed them to conquer the comparatively primitive Mongol horsemen of the east. This allowed them to gain a landmass which was by far the most superior in the world.

Yet, the Russians also had many problems. They were technologically backwards compared to Europe, with even the Poles occupying Moscow for 5 years in the early 17th century; they were ruled through the military absolutism of the czars, and there was also the institution of serfdom which took until the 19th century to eradicate.

Yet it had done enough to preserve itself and was showing the sort of promise which would later make it into a world power.

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Gender-Affirming Care from the 1950s in Britain through the lens of Roberta Cowell

Roberta Elizabeth Marshall Cowell (1918-2011) was the frist known British trans woman to undergo gender-affirming surgery in 1951. Sammie Casper-Mensing looks at Roberta Cowell and what has happened since the 1950s.

Roberta Cowell in France, 1954. Source: Digital Transgender Archive, available here.

Being trans in Britain is not easy. A university student in 2018 shared that they were “laughed at, ridiculed, and became the butt of jokes that normally gender me as a woman. This has been constant since day one.”[1] Today trans people in Britain deal with social stigma and difficulty navigating and receiving gender-affirming care. But, as highlighted by the life and experiences of Roberta Cowell, the first known British trans woman to have gender-affirming surgery, being trans in the United Kingdom has never been easy. Writing in 1954, Cowell noted that “Many people were extremely kind and pleasant to me, but an equal number would go out of their way to treat me as though I were an unpleasant, perverted freak. They had no hesitation in making their attitude abundantly clear, perhaps because they considered that I had no feelings at all, perhaps because they wanted to hurt me as much as possible.”[2] Roberta Cowell transitioned more than 70 years ago, and despite her fame and improvements in the broader National Health System, trans people in Britain still experience harassment from the public and barriers to accessing gender-affirming care.

In 2018, Chaka Bachmann and Becca Gooch published the results of their survey of over 5,000 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals in Britain. The study produced by Stonewall, a UK-based charity that advocates for LGBTQ+ rights, aimed to assess the quality of life for LGBTQ+ British people. The Stonewall research study, which I will be referencing throughout this analysis, surveyed over 5,000 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals about their lives in Britain.[3]

In comparing Roberta Cowell’s life as a trans woman to the transgender individuals surveyed in the 2018 Stonewall trans report, it becomes clear that the barriers to gender-affirming care in Roberta Cowell’s life are still prevalent amongst transgender people today. These barriers transcend time and result in emotional distress for many in the trans community due to financial hurdles, social expectations, and mental health concerns.

Financial burden

One obstacle Cowell faced was the financial burden of gender-affirming care. Roberta Cowell underwent a variety of physical changes during the process of her transition, including hormone treatment, sex reassignment surgery, and plastic surgery to modify her facial features.[4] It took several years to complete these changes, and Roberta expressed her concern about the financial toll of the process, describing that “I would have to have money enough to pay for surgery and treatment, and also to start over again in a different environment when I finally made the changeover from trousers to skirts. I would also have to allow for an indefinite period during which I would be unable to work.”[5] This illustrates the financial complexity of receiving gender-affirming care as the medical treatment is only one of many factors that contribute to the cost of this process.

These financial concerns continue today, even as the majority of countries in Europe have universal healthcare. The Stonewall report found that nearly half of the trans respondents indicated that they don’t have the financial means to afford medical intervention, either because of the cost of treatment or travel expenses associated with reaching the medical facilities.[6]

Availability

The respondents of the Stonewall study also noted the difficulties that arose when attempting to find availability for gender-affirming care. Almost half of the respondents reported wanting to undergo some sort of medical intervention but were unable to because long wait times prevented them from accessing treatment.[7] One of the respondents in the Stonewall study explained “I am currently on the waiting list to start hormones and so far, my first appointment has been pushed back by nine months, added onto the nine months I have already waited. They have given me false hope and told me that my appointment would be in the next month, then continued to say the same thing month after month.”[8]

Although Roberta Cowell did not explicitly regard wait times as being an obstacle to her gender-affirming care, she did remark that she did not have an appointment for her gender-affirming surgery until nine months after she was legally registered as a woman on her birth certificate.[9] Whether this waiting period was a choice or not is hard to say, as Roberta does not reveal the purpose of this timing. The decision may have been hers or could have been the result of other obstacles, such as cost or an inability to immediately move to a new environment post-surgery.

In her memoir, Cowell admitted that she was hesitant to make the transition. She understood the social challenges this could bring to her life. There was the possibility of being labeled an outcast, or not being able to successfully present as a woman. This apprehension is apparent in her writing, as Cowell admits that “I had no desire to become a freak…There was the possibility that when it was all over I might not be socially acceptable as a woman. There was the possibility that I might become an invalid.”[10] Roberta never mentioned discrimination in her autobiography, but her fear of being labeled as a “freak”[11] illustrates the implicit doubt that loomed in her mind surrounding being accepted by society. Many of the participants in the Stonewall study faced similar concerns, although these concerns oftentimes revolved around a fear of discrimination or familial rejection. In the 2018 study, two in five trans people in Britain reported that they altered the way they dressed because they feared discrimination or harassment.[12] One of these respondents described the hostility he has faced as a trans man, sharing that “I get shouted at every single time I leave my house and threatened at least once a week. I try to closet myself from my family because I’m so close to getting kicked out. I can’t access hormone replacement therapy without going private. I’m disabled. It’s a lot to deal with and I’m crumbling under the stress but I consider myself a warrior. But really, something needs to change.”[13]Additionally, two in five trans who wanted to utilize medical interventions reported that they have not done so for fear of disrupting their family life.[14]

Necessary

Though “coming out” as trans and seeking gender-affirming care has been and can be challenging, a common experience among trans folks–from Cowell to the participants of the Stonewall study–is how necessary the transition is. Cowell described her pre-transition life as an “inky-black depression”[15] and went as far as to write that if she did not seem to be getting better, “then I considered I should be justified in taking my own life.”[16] Lack of support from family and the inability to access gender-affirming care puts trans people in a difficult position regarding their mental health and well-being. According to HPCLive, transgender youth who were able to receive gender-affirming care were 73% less likely to experience suicidality in comparison to youths who did not receive gender-affirming interventions.[17] A Stonewall study respondent emphasized this point, affirming that “We need more services available for trans people, so it gets easier to get hormones and surgery. Not sure I'd even be alive right now if I hadn't transitioned.”[18]Additionally, 1 in 5 transgender and non-binary youth attempted suicide between 2021 and 2022.[19] Another participant in the Stonewall study shared his struggles with suicidal ideation, revealing that“Coming out as transgender was the hardest thing I've ever done, and having to explain it over and over again to medical professionals that were supposed to be helping me, almost made me end my life. There needs to be better support for us.”[20] Accessing gender-affirming care is not a want, but a need for transgender individuals, yet these services are still a luxury reserved for those who have the time and money to jump through the hoops of the medical care system. 

Despite the overwhelming evidence showing that gender-affirming care saves lives, anti-trans legislation and rhetoric have become commonplace in the United Kingdom. During an annual conference of the Conservative Party, U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak expressed various anti-transgender ideologies. Sunak stated, “We shouldn't get bullied into believing that people can be any sex they want to be — they can't” and went on to say “A man is a man and a woman is a woman. That's just common sense.”[21] Many of these anti-trans ideas are also being translated into policies. One such policy prohibits minors and non-binary people from changing their gender in official government documents.[22] Additionally, the U.K. government has begun drafting guidelines that would require transgender students to use gendered facilities that align with their sex assigned at birth, as well as encouraging teachers to out transgender students to their parents.[23] The National Health Service also issued an advisory in September of 2023, saying that schools should not allow students to socially transition without parental consent.[24] It’s ironic that the National Health Service would advise schools to police a student's gender expression when research and survey studies clearly show that forcing trans people to present as their sex assigned at birth can lead to severe depression and suicidal ideation. This increase in public rhetoric against transgender people is certainly disheartening for many transgender folks in the U.K. One respondent from the Stonewall study acknowledged that “Even just five years ago it was not safe for me to come out as trans, the pace of change has been amazing. Unfortunately, there now appears to be a backlash against that progress in the last year with hate from the media against trans increasing disturbingly in the last six months. This increasing transphobia is accelerating and is causing acute anxiety in my daily life.”[25] As anti-trans speech and agendas push their way back into mainstream media, transgender people in the U.K. face uncertainty about their rights being upheld and confront the additional challenge of deciding if, and when it is safe to be open about their identity.

Conclusion

After comparing the individuals in the Stonewall study to Roberta Cowell, it becomes clear that many of the obstacles faced by Roberta Cowell in the 1950s are still prevalent today for trans people in Britain. Barriers to gender-affirming care, including financial constraints, accessibility of care, long wait times, and fear of discrimination continue to make necessary life changes unavailable to trans people. These barriers lead to extreme mental health concerns for many transgender individuals, putting countless lives at stake. In analyzing the historical and current-day issues regarding gender-affirming care, it is clear that national legislation must be implemented to preserve and provide access to transgender healthcare. We cannot continue to be at a standstill for transgender rights, and we certainly cannot afford to go backward. Let's make this world into a place where all trans people can live as their true selves, one step at a time.

Bibliography

Bachmann, Chaka L, and Becca Gooch. “LGBT in Britain - Trans Report.” Stonewall, April 24, 2020. https://www.stonewall.org.uk/lgbt-britain-trans-report.

Cowell, Alan. “Overlooked No More: Roberta Cowell, Trans Trailblazer, Pilot and Auto Racer.” The New York Times, June 5, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/obituaries/roberta-cowell-overlooked.html.

Factora, James. “The U.K. Is One of the Worst Places in Europe to Be Trans, New Report Finds.” Them, November 2, 2023. https://www.them.us/story/uk-worst-places-in-europe-trans-new-report-finds#intcid=_them-bottom-recirc_5697e6aa-ecd3-4488-a8d2-36086042aa7c_text2vec1.

Factora, James. “U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak Platforms Anti-Trans Talking Points in a Speech to Tories.” Them, October 5, 2023. https://www.them.us/story/uk-prime-minister-anti-trans-comments.

Fisher, John Hayes. Sex Changes that Made History. Academic Video Online. no. 1009, British

Broadcasting Corporation, 2015. https://bridge.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01BRC_INST/es0tl/cdi_alexanderstreet_marcxml_AcademicVideoOnlinePremiumUnitedStatesASP3366432_marc

Grossi, Giuliana. “Suicide Risk Reduces 73% in Transgender, Nonbinary Youths with Gender-Affirming Care.” HCP Live, August 23, 2022. https://www.hcplive.com/view/suicide-risk-reduces-73-transgender-nonbinary-youths-gender-affirming-care.

Paley, Amit. “2022 National Survey on LGBTQ Youth Mental Health.” The Trevor Project, 2022. https://www.thetrevorproject.org/survey-2022/.

Roberta, Cowell E. Roberta Cowell’s Story: An Autobiography. British Book Centre, Inc., New York, 1954

Staveley-Wadham, Rose. “‘The Most Talked of Woman in England’ – Roberta Cowell in Our Newspapers.” The British Newspaper Archive Blog | Amazing finds and news from over 300 years of historical newspapers, June 13, 2022. https://blog.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/2022/06/13/roberta-cowell-in-our-newspapers.

[1] Taylor, qtd. in Chaka Bachmann, Becca Gooch, “LGBT in Britain - Trans Report,” Stonewall (2020), 12.

[2] Roberta Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story: An Autobiography,” British Book Centre, Inc. (1954), 52.

[3] Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 5.

[4] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story.”

[5] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 45.

[6] Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 16.

[7] Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 16.

[8] Jo, qtd. in Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 17.

[9] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 54.

[10] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 45.

[11] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 44.

[12] Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 7.

[13] Stevie, qtd. In Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 14.

[14] Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 14.

[15] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 59.

[16] Cowell, “Roberta Cowell’s Story,” 41.

[17] Giuliana Grossi, “Suicide Risk Reduces 73% in Transgender, Nonbinary Youths with Gender-Affirming Care,” HCP Live (2022).

[18] Sebatstain, qtd. in Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 16.

[19] Amit Paley, “2022 National Survey on LGBTQ Youth Mental Health,” The Trevor Project (2022).

[20] Henry, qtd. in Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 13.

[21] James Factora, “U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak Platforms Anti-Trans Talking Points in a Speech to Tories,” Them (2023).

[22] James Factora, “The U.K. Is One of the Worst Places in Europe to Be Trans, New Report Finds.” Them (2023).

[23] Factora, “One of the Worst Places”

[24] Factora, “One of the Worst Places”

[25] Willow, qtd. in Bachmann, Gooch, “LGBT In Britain,” 22.

Benedict Arnold and the Battle of Valcour Island

The Battle of Valcour Island, fought on October 11th 1776 is one of the most fascinating naval engagements fought in North America. A victory for the British, the small but determined American force under General Benedict Arnold fought tenaciously and subsequently managed to delay a British invasion south for nearly a year. This granted valuable time for the Americans to better consolidate their positions for the inevitable offensive which would culminate at the Battles of Saratoga in 1777, a decisive victory for the Americans and the turning point in the War for Independence.

Brian Hughes explains.

A depiction of the Battle of Valcour Island.

In Autumn of 1776 the outlook did not look favorable for the fledgling United States. The Battle of Long Island was a catastrophe for the Continental Army. George Washington had managed to salvage a fraction of his force, just barely escaping encirclement and annihilation as he retreated across New Jersey. Washington also faced the loss of most of the militia forces as the end of the year approached and their terms of enlistments expired.

The Americans faced setbacks in the north as well. The expeditionary force which had invaded Canada the previous year had been dislodged by a renewed British counterattack. The Northern Army was forced to discard valuable equipment and suffered significant casualties as a result. The British and their mixed force of various German, Indigenous and Canadian allies were now well poised to launch an invasion south down the strategic Champlain-Hudson Corridor, severing New England from the middle Colonies and linking up with the substantial British force pursuing Washington. If successful this operation would likely end the rebellion. 

Fort Ticonderoga

Fortunately for the Americans they still possessed Fort Ticonderoga, strategically situated between Lake(s) Champlain and George which they had captured the previous year. Major General Philip Schuyler Commander of the Northern Army recognized the tenuousness of the situation and with great resourcefulness integrated his defenses to the best of his ability. In addition to Fort Ticonderoga the Americans maintained a modest flotilla of ships to aid in their defenses. The decision was made to further augment American naval capabilities on the Lake as a means to challenge the maritime supremacy of the British to their north. The Americans however did not possess a noteworthy supply of trained seaman and commanders. The few experienced sailors within the American cause tended to prefer privateering on the high seas as the potential for prize money was a far more appealing incentive for the experienced mariner. One notable American commander would however prove to be a major asset, Brigadier General Benedict Arnold.

Benedict Arnold

Prior to the war Benedict Arnold had been a successful sailor and merchant who frequently voyaged to the Bahamas, Canada and probably Europe. Not only was Arnold a competent and knowledgeable seaman he was also acquainted with ship construction, expertise which the Americans desperately required especially in the backcountry of Upstate New York. Beginning nearly from scratch, the Americans methodically began to construct a series of ships at Skenesborough, modern day Whitehall, New York. Philip Schuyler worked around the clock to provide the Americans with whatever material they required exacerbating an already difficult logistical situation. Meanwhile, the British to the north were likewise enlarging their naval capacities as summer gave way to fall and the window of opportunity for campaigning shortened. The American Armada gradually piecemealed their force up the lake as they awaited the completion of the final vessels. The issues of supplies and armaments still plagued the Americans as they were short of nearly everything from nails for the ships to food and powder and even warm clothing.

Numbering sixteen ships and termed the “Mosquito Fleet” because of the eclectic make up of vessels. In addition to standard square rigged gunboats Arnold ordered the construction of gondolas outfitted with a triangular or lateen sail. This design afforded greater maneuverability and agility particularly in some of the narrower coves and shorelines indenting Lake Champlain. The largest vessel in the American Armada was the Royal Savage which resembled a standard Ship of the Line albeit in smaller fashion. Guns were placed fore and aft as well as the sides as the inexperienced American gun crews had to drill without powder and ammunition saving what little they had for the upcoming engagement.

Arnold displayed impressive strategic and tactical instincts in predicting the British strategy. Knowing full well that the Americans could not parity British naval power and the superior training he would have to be creative. Arnold kept the British guessing by shielding his fleet within Valcour Bay, just off the New York shoreline near present day Plattsburgh. Due to the shape of Valcour Island a vessel sailing south could not detect the presence of ships to the west. By positioning his fleet here Arnold planned to force the British to give battle on unfavorable terms sailing upwind into a narrow cove in which he could negate their advantage in firepower. But this would be a gamble, as the British could opt to disregard the little fleet to their rear and continue pressing south thus forcing a hopeless pursuit. Also, Valcour Island could be easily cut off to the north and south, trapping Arnold’s fleet and granting no chance of escape. 

Guy Carleton

As the British fleet embarked it proved to be formidable. On board was Guy Carleton in nominal charge of the invasion. The British did however spend extra time ensuring the strength of their fleet as it was now mid-October and already snow was visible on the High Peaks of the Adirondack Mountains on Lake Champlain’s western shore. The American’s had been waiting in anticipation for weeks at this point being at full mercy of the harsh northern elements without sufficient clothing and unable to go to shore due to frequent attacks from Indians loyal to the British.

Arnold arrayed his flotilla in a line of battle in Valcour Bay. As the British fleet began to sail south Arnold dispatched the Royal Savage and the highly nimble Congress to goad them into battle. In this they were successful but at cost to the Royal Savage which ran aground forcing its crew to flee. The British struggled to sail upwind and bring their superior firepower to bear on the Americans. Both sides began to exchange gunfire which wrought havoc on the ships and crew. The Battle lasted all day as casualties on both sides remained relatively light as the advent of darkness ended the engagement. The British found themselves in an ideal position to resume battle the following day as they weighed anchor with the knowledge that they had effectively nullified the American’s ammunition and powder from the battle. 

Bold decision

Arnold conferred with his officers and made a bold decision. The British fleet left just enough space for the remainder of the American boats to slip past single file and flee south. Muffling his oars Arnold led the column ever so closely past the warships standing sentinel as one by one the American flotilla fled south taking advantage of a favorable wind. As dawn broke the British were shocked. They could not fathom that the “trapped” American force would be capable of mounting an escape, they instantly gave chase. After a day-long pursuit the wind became less favorable for the Americans. On October 13th the British caught up with Arnolds fleet. Arnold scuttled his ships in the bottom of Buttonmold Bay on the Vermont side of the Lake stripping his ships of anything valuable as he led his troops overland and back to Fort Ticonderoga.

The British were surprised by the aggressive resistance by the Americans. Arriving at Crown Point on October 20th it appeared the winter was prematurely setting in. The lateness of the season coupled with the prospect of facing an even greater number of adversaries in a siege-based scenario forced the British turnaround and sail back to Canada and await the thaw of Spring. 

Arnold had achieved his objective. Despite losing the engagement of Valcour Island he managed to successfully delay a British invasion that likely would have put an end to the rebel cause. The Battle of Valcour Island resembled a nautical Bunker Hill. In spite of British victory, the dogged and resourceful Americans displayed courage in face of overwhelming odds inflicting horrendous casualties and reforming in good order to fight another day.

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