At the end of 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to support the Communist-inspired Afghan government. This led to a decade-long conflict in which the anti-Soviet Islamic Mujahideen rebels were supported by the United States. Here, Daniel Boustead tells us about the conflict and some of the negative unintended consequences of American support for the rebels.
A Soviet military offensive against the Mujahideen.
From 1979 to 1989 the Americans supported the Mujahideen Islamic rebels in their fight against the Soviet Union’s invasion. The Americans supported the rebels as a means of inflicting their own “Vietnam” on the Soviet Union. The decision in sending weapons to the anti-Communist rebels helped turn the tide of the war in the rebels favor and doomed the Soviet Union - and later the USA. American support for rebels in Afghanistan, was one of a number of Carter and Reagan’s foreign policy blunders that hurt America and Israel. The U.S. decision to support the rebels in Afghanistan was a strategic miscalculation and the wrong way to overcome our defeat in Vietnam. This was known as “Vietnam Syndrome”, which haunts America to this day.
U.S efforts to support the rebels appeared as far back as March 1979 in classified protocols at the Jimmy Carter White House ([1]). This was done because the U.S. was worried about increased Soviet involvement in propping up the weak pro-Communist puppet state in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979 ([2]). In the very first hours after the Soviet Union invaded, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said “He hoped the Soviets could be punished for invading Afghanistan, that they could be tied down and bloodied the way the United States had been in Vietnam” ([3]). At the start of the conflict the American government started sending the rebels some captured Soviet weapons as a means of getting revenge for the Soviet’s (limited) involvement in the Vietnam War, while keeping their involvement minimal (6). This was a bad decision because the Islamic fundamentalism of the recent Iranian Revolution was also coming to Afghanistan.
Iranian influence
In early spring 1979, in the Shiite Muslim town of Heart, Afghanistan, religious activists started organizing along fundamentalist lines based on the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini’s example ([4]). Even the non-Shia Muslim groups of Afghanistan were beginning to organize along the lines of Khomeini’s religious-political revival (4).
In late December 1979 an amended top-secret presidential finding was signed by President Jimmy Carter, and it was reauthorized in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan (5). This permitted the CIA to secretly ship weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen rebels ([5]). The CIA would ship these weapons through the help of the Pakistani government‘s secret service, the Inter Services Intelligence or ISI (5).
In 1983, after a visit to Afghanistan, Congressmen Charles Wilson from Texas, in his role as a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, began procuring billions of dollars of weapons for the Mujahideen (11). Charles Wilson’s weapons would then pass-through Pakistan’s ISI (11).
As time went on the weapons the rebels received became more sophisticated, so that they could combat the Soviet attack helicopters. The biggest threat to the Mujahideen was the MI-24 D, which was called by the rebels “The Devil’s Chariot” (14). From 1982 to 1984 the Americans sent the Mujahideen the portable surface to air missiles such as Strela-2 and the Redeye (7). The Mujahideen did use the Stela-2 and the Redeye with some notable successes against Soviet attack helicopters, but further success alluded them due to the fact that the Mujahideen lacked the training required for successful use of these weapons (7). The Heat Seeking Strela-2 and the Redeye were not as effective against the Soviet MI-24 Attack Helicopter, because the MI-24 used two flare dispensers and the AVU system, which blocked a direct view of the hot engine exhausts and swirled the exhaust gases in the rotor streams (7). The MI-24’s began using the AVU from 1983 to 1984 (7). The AVU also increased the MI-24’s weight, which resulted in Soviet crews having, in some cases, to remove the MI-24’s armor, and so making the weapon vulnerable to attack (8). The AVU also would not work under extreme high-altitude conditions and high temperatures and thus it could not always be used in combat (8). Furthermore, the heavy weight of the AVU caused minor reductions in maximum speed and the service ceiling, which could present a problem in combat (8). The MI-24 D attack helicopter’s cockpit was vulnerable to small arms fire - which was how some were lost in combat (9).
Later military supplies
The next weapon that was a “game changer” was the FIM-92 Stinger portable surface to air missile (7). The Afghan Mujahideen started acquiring the Stinger Missiles at the end of 1986 (10). Stinger Missiles started appearing in large numbers in the first half of 1987 and the end result was that Soviet attack helicopter units lost more MI-24’s in the first six months of 1987 then they had in all of the previous year (7). The Stinger Missile was so effective that the Soviet helicopter fleet was temporarily paralyzed (7). The Stinger Missiles also had an unpleasant consequence. When the MI-24’s were escorting passenger or transportation aircraft they were forced to put their MI-24’s in front of the passenger or transport aircraft and take the hit from the incoming missile themselves (7). This resulted in MI-24 helicopter crews being able to protect the transport and the passenger aircraft in the vast majority of cases, but not always (7). The Soviet Special Forces soon captured examples of the Stinger Missiles and they discovered weaknesses in the weapon, so allowing them to develop countermeasures (7). The result of this was that the MI-24 was equipped with infrared jammers, which could be tuned in to jam the Stinger’s seeker head almost perfectly (7). This in combination with the AVU System and flares reduced the effectiveness of the FIM-92 Stinger (7). Even this counter measure was not 100% effective though. The L166V Ispanka infrared jammer was not an all-protection system (8) as it was designed to counter missiles with infrared seeker heads. The Stinger Missile’s effect in the Soviet-Afghan war also sowed fear among the Soviet pilots and troops (12). From 1980 to 1989, according to the Russian periodical Mir Aviatsiya, 122 MI-24’s were irretrievably lost, with 42% of all downed MI-24 helicopters lost to “Dushkas” heavy machine gun, 30% by portable surface to air missiles, 25% by light antiaircraft guns, and the remaining 3% by small arms fire (13).
Consequences
The decision to arm Afghan Mujahideen rebels and other non-Afghan rebels during the conflict would have disastrous consequences for Israel and the USA. By the time Taliban had taken Kabul, Afghanistan in 1996, an estimated 600 of the approximately 2,300 Stingers distributed by the CIA during the Soviet-Afghan war remained missing (15). The Iranians were buying as many Stinger Missiles as they could, and CIA officers roughly estimated that Tehran had acquired about 100 Stingers by 1996 (15). In that same period the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, had possessed 53 Stingers missiles that had been collected by various Pashtun warlords that were loyal to the Taliban (15). By the end of the Soviet-Afghan war the CIA was worried that the Stinger Missiles could fall in the hands of terrorist groups or hostile governments such as Iran for shooting down American civilian passenger planes or military aircraft (12). Many Stinger Missiles went to Mujahideen commanders who were associated with anti-American radical Islamist leaders (12). In my view, the U.S. government should not have sold Stinger Missiles or any weapons to Mujahideen groups. The USA should have also stayed neutral during the Soviet Afghan conflict.
President Carter failed to resolve the Iran Hostage crisis (1979-81). In February 1982 the US government removed Iraq off the list of states, ‘supporting international terrorism’ and reopened diplomatic relations with Iraq in December 1984 (16). From December 1984 the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad provided the Iraqi Military much needed military intelligence (16). Conversely, U.S. relations with Israel were especially hurt after the Israeli Air Force’s raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor on June 7, 1981(17). The raid resulted in the delaying of a shipment of American aircraft to Israel that had already been authorized, as well the U.S. voting for a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel (17).
Conclusion
The American government supported Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Many historians believe that the American government did this as a means of inflicting a “Vietnam” on the Soviet Union. The decision to send weapons to the rebels defeated the Soviet Union but created a breeding ground for terrorists in Afghanistan. The decision also made Iran more dangerous to American national security. The U.S. decision to support the Mujahideen was one of a series of foreign policy disasters during the Carter and Reagan years. Support for the rebels was an egregious and ill-advised decision by the American government.
Now, you can read some World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, and “The Navajo Code from World War Two: Was it Unbreakable?” here.
[1] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 42.
[2] Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2012. 13.
[3] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 50-51.
6 Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: New York. Harper Perennial. 2009. 210.
[4] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 40.
[5] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 58-59.
11 Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979 -89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing, Ltd. 2012. 49.
14 Normann, Michael. MIL Mi-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 176.
7 Normann, Michael. MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 178-179.
8 Normann, Michael . MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 152-153.
9 Normann, Michael. MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present: Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 28.
10 Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2012. 30.
12 Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 11.
13 Normann, Michael. MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present:Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 179-181.
15 Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 336- 337.
16 Karsh, Efraim. Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2002. 43-44.
17 Operation Opera-Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed on January 31st, 2021. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-oprea-raid-on-iraqi-nuclear-reactor
References
Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing, Ltd. 2012.
Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004.
Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: New York. Harper Perennial, 2009.
Karsh, Efraim. Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2002.
Normann, Michael. MIL Mi-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019.
“Operation Opera-Raid on Iraqi Reactor”. Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed on January 31st, 2021. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-opera-raid-on-iraqi-nuclear-reactor.
