The Crimean War – Part 4: Life on the Frontlines & the Human Experience

War is often remembered for its battles, its victories, and its great leaders, but for the ordinary soldier, the reality is far grimmer. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the trenches of the Crimean War, where men endured not just the enemy's gunfire but an even more relentless onslaught: hunger, disease, and the unforgiving elements.

Terry Bailey explains.

Read part 1 in the series here, part 2 here, and part 3 here.

The Mission of Mercy: Florence Nightingale receiving the Wounded at Scutari. By Jerry Barrett.

The winter of 1854–1855 turned the besieged city of Sevastopol into a frozen wasteland, where soldiers huddled in ill-equipped trenches, wrapped in tattered uniforms that offered little protection against the biting cold. Food was scarce, medical care was rudimentary at best, and the looming specter of death came as often from sickness as from enemy fire.

Rats, lice, and the stench of decay were constant companions. Letters Home painted a picture not of glory but of sheer survival in a war where the greatest challenge was simply staying alive.

Yet, amidst this suffering, change was brewing. The horrors of the Crimean War would spark reforms in battlefield medicine, bring women like Florence Nightingale and Mary Seacole into the public eye, and transform war reporting forever. This conflict was not just fought in the trenches, it was fought in the hospitals, the newspapers, and in the minds of those who would demand a better future for the soldiers of tomorrow.

Life in the trenches: Mud, hunger and the shadow of death

For soldiers on the frontlines, the Crimean War was defined not just by battle, but by relentless suffering. The harsh winter of 1854–1855 turned the trenches outside Sevastopol into frozen pits of misery. Soldiers faced extreme cold with inadequate clothing, often wearing threadbare uniforms unsuited to the brutal climate. Supplies were inconsistent, and food shortages left men weak and malnourished. Hard biscuits and salted meat made up the bulk of their diet, with fresh rations arriving sporadically, if at all.

Disease was as deadly as enemy fire. Dysentery, typhus, and cholera swept through the ranks, claiming more lives than the battles themselves. Lice and rats were omnipresent, spreading filth and infection. Letters from soldiers described the unimaginable stench of decaying bodies, the cries of the wounded, and the relentless fear of the next attack.

Medicine and Florence Nightingale's legacy

The appalling conditions of battlefield hospitals were brought to the world's attention by Florence Nightingale, a determined British nurse who arrived in Scutari in 1854. Hospitals were overwhelmed, with wounded men lying in their filth, untreated for days. Infection was rampant, and medical supplies were scarce.

Nightingale, along with a team of nurses, introduced basic hygiene practices, insisting on cleanliness, fresh air, and proper nutrition. Though germ theory was not yet understood, her efforts significantly reduced death rates. Dubbed "The Lady with the Lamp," Nightingale's nightly rounds brought comfort to the suffering, and her work laid the foundation for modern nursing.

Women in the war: More than just nurses

While Nightingale became the face of female contributions to the war effort, many other women played crucial roles. Mary Seacole, a Jamaican-born nurse and entrepreneur, independently travelled to the war zone and set up the "British Hotel" near Balaclava, offering soldiers warm meals, medical care, and even morale-boosting comforts like fresh linens and tea. Despite being overlooked by British authorities, Seacole's efforts were widely recognized by the soldiers she treated.

Women also played vital roles as camp followers, laundresses, and caregivers. Some disguised themselves as men to fight, while others served as spies or helped transport supplies. The Crimean War broadened the perception of women's capabilities in conflict, laying the groundwork for future involvement in military and medical service.

The first war of the press: War correspondents and public opinion

The Crimean War was the first major conflict to be extensively reported in newspapers, changing how wars were perceived at home. William Howard Russell of The Times was the first modern war correspondent, sending back vivid and often damning accounts of the British army's struggles. His reports exposed government mismanagement, the suffering of the soldiers, and the incompetence of some commanders, leading to public outrage and political reforms.

Illustrations and early war photography also emerged, with Roger Fenton capturing haunting images of the battlefield. Though staged to avoid showing corpses, his photographs gave civilians a stark glimpse of war's desolation. The press coverage of the Crimean War shaped public perception, fueling both patriotic fervor and calls for change.

Needless to say, the Crimean War was more than just a military campaign; it was a turning point in how war was fought, perceived, and remembered. For the soldiers trapped in the trenches, it was a grim struggle against not only the enemy but also disease, hunger, and the merciless elements. The horrors they endured underscored the urgent need for improved logistics, medical care, and military planning, lessons that would influence future conflicts.

Florence Nightingale and Mary Seacole's efforts revolutionized battlefield medicine, proving that compassionate and systematic care could save lives even in the direst conditions. Their contributions marked the beginning of modern nursing and demonstrated that women had an indispensable role to play in war beyond traditional domestic spheres. The presence of women in military operations would only grow in significance in the decades to come.

At the same time, the Crimean War ushered in a new era of war reporting. The firsthand accounts of war correspondents like William Howard Russell shattered the romanticized image of battle, exposing the incompetence of leadership and the suffering of common soldiers. Photography, though still in its infancy, provided the public with a tangible, visual connection to the realities of war. Never before had the home front been so intimately tied to events on the battlefield, paving the way for future conflicts to be scrutinized through the lens of journalism and public opinion.

In many ways, the Crimean War set the stage for the modern era of warfare. The lessons learned in its muddy, disease-ridden trenches shaped military reforms, the evolution of medical care, and the role of the press in holding governments accountable. Though often overshadowed by later conflicts, its impact was profound, leaving behind a legacy that still resonates in military, medical, and journalistic practices today.

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The 1860 U.S. Presidential Election - Part 2: The Campaign & Result

The 1860 Presidential Election set the stage for the Civil War and had significant repercussions for the United States. Throughout the 1850s, the nation grappled with contentious issues surrounding states' rights and the institution of slavery in the territories, which ultimately shaped the political landscape of the election. This period saw the Democratic Party splinter into Northern and Southern factions, reflecting deep divisions within the country. Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln emerged victorious against Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge, Northern Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, and Constitutional Union candidate John Bell. The electoral divide between Northern and Southern Democrats highlighted a profound sectional conflict, enabling Lincoln and the Republican Party to ascend to power without any backing from Southern states. In the wake of Lincoln's election, and before his inauguration in March 1861, seven Southern states chose to secede from the Union, a decision that precipitated the onset of the Civil War. Just weeks after Lincoln's victory, South Carolina formally declared secession.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the campaign and the election itself.

Part 1 on the candidates is here.

Campaign poster for John Bell and his running mate, Edward Everett.

Stephen Douglas and Herschel Johnson campaign poster.

The Campaign

Following his nomination, Lincoln adopted a campaign strategy typical of the era, opting for a stay-at-home approach that involved no public speeches. Instead, he dedicated his efforts to managing the campaign from behind the scenes. He expressed that his primary goal was to prevent any divisions within the Republican Party, advising party members to refrain from discussing contentious issues that could lead to disagreements. With a united front among Republicans and existing fractures within the Democratic Party, particularly concerning Bell's candidacy, the main concern for Republicans was the potential for disunity that could jeopardize their electoral prospects.

In contrast to Lincoln's restrained approach, Douglas was highly active, campaigning vigorously in both Northern and Southern states. He passionately defended the Union and vehemently opposed secession, making a significant impact during his campaign. Breckinridge engaged in minimal campaigning, delivering only a single speech.

Much of the electioneering consisted of parades and rallies that heightened public interest, resulting in an impressive turnout on election day, with approximately eighty percent of eligible voters participating.

The electoral preferences in many of the individual states were highly illustrative of political opinion of the moment. Voters in border states like Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri tried to find a candidate who supported Union and also slavery. Texas was especially intriguing in that Sam Houston favored this approach but would lose to the popular secessionist entreaties of Louis Wigfall. The states with the largest slave holdings were those that voted solidly for Breckinridge.

Constitutional Party leaders did not expect to win the election outright, but instead sought to win states in the Upper South and the Lower North. They were particularly focused on Maryland, the lone state won by Fillmore in 1856, as well as Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

Slavery & Secession

The plantation owners in the southern states, who held significant power, were deeply concerned that Abraham Lincoln's election as president in 1860 would signal the demise of their established way of life. Outnumbered by northern advocates who championed the idea that the western territories should be reserved for free individuals, these southern elites feared that the expansion of slavery would be curtailed. They worried that if the practice of slavery was confined to the South and the sale of enslaved individuals to new markets was restricted, the value of their so-called "property" would decline, leading to a detrimental impact on their economic well-being.

The implications of such restrictions extended beyond economic concerns; they also posed serious political threats. The potential for white southerners to be placed on equal footing with the Black Americans they had enslaved was a source of anxiety, as it jeopardized not only their economic advantages but also their personal safety. The southern oligarchs, whose wealth and social standing were intricately linked to the institution of slavery, felt their control over power slipping away. This fear was compounded by the constant dread of slave uprisings and the looming threat of financial disaster if they could not extend the institution of slavery into new territories.

In light of these factors, the prospect of Lincoln's presidency was viewed as a direct threat to their way of life. The southern elites believed that his administration would dismantle the foundations of their society, leading to a loss of both economic stability and social dominance. The combination of these fears—economic decline, loss of power, and the potential for social upheaval—created a volatile atmosphere in the South, where the stakes of the election were perceived as nothing less than existential.

The establishment of slavery as a social construct became integral to the southern way of life and its economic success, leading individuals who did not own slaves to perceive it as a cause worth defending, even at the cost of their lives. In order to protect this system, the elite class of southern slaveholders reinterpreted the principles of American democracy. They argued that the vision of the Founding Fathers, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence, contained a significant flaw by proclaiming that all men are created equal. In stark contrast, these southern enslavers openly acknowledged a hierarchy among people, asserting their right to dominate.

By embedding white supremacy into the cultural fabric of society and framing slavery as a social norm, the poorer classes in the South found themselves fighting for their own sense of identity, community, and way of life. This struggle became a deeply personal battle, as they believed they were defending not only their homes and neighborhoods but also their very existence. Ironically, neither side fully comprehended the motivations and stakes involved for the other, leading to a profound misunderstanding of the conflict.

Abraham Lincoln's remarks in Chicago on July 11, 1858, which were later referenced by Stephen Douglas during their fifth debate in Galesburg, encapsulated the central issue at hand. “I should like to know, if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, where will it stop?” he asked. Lincoln questioned the implications of making exceptions to the Declaration of Independence's assertion of equality. The Northern states recognized that the fight was not solely about the rights of Black individuals; it was a broader struggle to uphold the foundational principles of equality and justice that defined the nation.

Sectional and State Predilections

Although there were four principal candidates, the electoral battles were largely sectional, with Lincoln and Douglas prevailing in the North while Breckinridge and Bell competed for support in the South. Many voters in favor of secession cast their ballots for Breckinridge, hoping to create a scenario where no candidate would secure a majority of electoral votes, thereby forcing the election to be decided in the House of Representatives. This strategic voting reflected the deep divisions within the country at the time, underscoring the contentious nature of the election.

The electoral trends observed in various states vividly reflected the prevailing political sentiments of the time. In border states such as Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, voters sought a candidate who would endorse both the Union and the institution of slavery. Texas presented a particularly fascinating case, as Sam Houston advocated for this dual support but ultimately lost to the strong secessionist appeals of Louis Wigfall. Meanwhile, the states with the highest numbers of enslaved individuals consistently cast their votes in favor of Breckinridge.

California

After the Bear Flag Revolt of 1846 and the Gold Rush, people came to SF literally from all over the world. The population of SF went from about  1000 to about 25,000 in about 5 years. As would be expected, both transplanted southerners favoring slavery (“Chivs” for chivalry), slave owners who brought their slaves with them, free blacks, immigrants, and transplanted northerners all were thrown together in a hurry. Although admitted as a free state, several hundred slaves were present and about 4000 free blacks.

There was no direct overland route to San Francisco, the primary city, from the East. Getting to SF required either a six-month cross-country trip, usually by wagon pulled by ox, or a dangerous voyage by ship around Cape Horn. The Isthmus of Panama was another option that was developed, but plenty of travelers became ill or died from Yellow Fever.

Although Leland Stanford did not share a personal relationship with President Lincoln, his role as Governor of California and his engagement with the Central Pacific Railroad significantly bolstered the Union's war efforts and influenced the nation's success during the Civil War. As the railroad project was being initiated, Stanford traveled eastward to garner support for both the railroad and his Republican candidacy for governor. In 1860, he sought backing from influential figures, discovering that Lincoln was a strong advocate for western expansion. Stanford leveraged his control over the California Republican Party to rally support for Lincoln, who, in turn, required the state's electoral votes to endorse a viable transcontinental railroad route. Thus, Stanford's backing for the Union was reciprocated with federal assistance for the Central Pacific project.

Another key figure during this period was Thomas Starr King, an Episcopal pastor in San Francisco, renowned for his eloquence and oratory skills, comparable to prominent speakers like Beecher and Emerson. Originally hailing from New Hampshire, King moved west in 1860, where he was deeply inspired by the natural beauty of Yosemite, which he viewed as a divine creation. He collaborated with fellow abolitionist Frederick Law Olmsted to advocate for the establishment of Yosemite as a protected reserve and a state park in California, reflecting his commitment to both environmental preservation and social justice.

King became an influential voice for abolition within his church, warning his congregation of the impending conflict over slavery and emphasizing the importance of preserving the Union. He captivated audiences with readings of poetry by notable authors such as Harte, Longfellow, and Lowell, while also gaining recognition for his fervent support of Abraham Lincoln's candidacy. On February 22, 1861, during a sermon on Washington's Birthday, he passionately urged his congregation of over a thousand to unite in saving the Union. He adorned his pulpit with an American flag and concluded each sermon with a heartfelt plea for blessings upon the president and all those dedicated to the cause of a united nation.

Lincoln won California in the 1860 election by just 0.6%. California had a strong anti-slavery sentiment, particularly among its settlers from free states. Many Californians were aligned with the Republican Party’s platform, which opposed the expansion of slavery into new territories and states. California’s political landscape was influenced by the growing Republican Party, which was gaining popularity in the North and West. California had only become a state in 1850, and its economy was largely driven by mining and agriculture, industries that did not rely on slavery. Many Californians saw the expansion of slavery as a threat to their economic interests and the political balance between free and slave states.

Virginia

Virginia isn’t usually considered a “border state” because it would become the capitol of the CSA and because slavery was widely practiced ante bellum. It is typically classified as being of the “Upper South” along with North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, in large part because while it did eventually secede, it was late. The western part of the state was so Unionist that it seceded from Virginia to become a separate state.

But in many ways, Virginia was not exactly a southern state either. Its markets were in the north, its western population favored Union. It was fundamentally the plantation owners who favored secession. It is fascinating that the future capital of the Confederacy just a few months before secession voted to support someone who opposed it.

The election of Abraham Lincoln as president was held on November 6, 1860. He received just 1% of the 167,000 votes in Virginia. The state was carried by Constitutional Union candidate John Bell, who ran on a platform of compromise; he won by just 156 votes over John Breckinridge. Virginia voted for John Bell over Breckinridge because Bell offered a more moderate, Unionist approach that appealed to a broad coalition of voters who wanted to avoid the extremes of both secession and a Republican presidency. These voters were concerned about the future of the Union and believed that Bell’s platform provided the best chance to preserve it, even if it meant compromising on slavery. The map shows that Bell and Douglas were strongest in western Virginia and the northern counties while Breckinridge won in the agricultural regions.

While slavery was common in Virginia, its economy was much less dependent on it than most southern states. Cotton was not grown here, nor rice. There had been a devastating drought, and many slaves had been sold to other states and territories because there wasn’t work for them. In fact, slave sales were one of the highest revenue producers in the late 1850s here.

While the elite favored secession here, many did not in 1860. This was exactly the kind of state the Constitutional Union Party was created to carry. Virginia’s decision to vote for John Bell over John C. Breckinridge in the 1860 presidential election can be understood through a combination of political, social, and regional factors. In Virginia, there was a significant portion of the electorate that favored a more moderate approach to the sectional crisis. Many Virginians, particularly the state’s political elite, feared the deepening divisions between the North and South. John Bell, representing the Constitutional Union Party, ran on a platform of preserving the Union and avoiding secession. This position resonated with Virginians who sought to avoid conflict while still upholding the interests of Southern slaveholders.

While Breckinridge, the candidate of the Southern Democrats, strongly advocated for the protection of slavery and was seen as a champion of Southern rights, many Virginians were wary of the extreme positions that could lead to secession. A significant portion of the population wanted to find a way to keep the Union intact, and Bell’s platform of compromise and Unionism appealed to these voters.

Virginia had long been a key player in national politics and had a strong tradition of statesmanship. Figures like John Tyler, a former president and a Virginian, supported Bell and helped promote the Constitutional Union Party. For many Virginians, the idea of preserving the Union was more important than advancing the interests of slavery through secession. This made Bell a more palatable candidate than Breckinridge, who was more closely associated with the secessionist cause.

Many Virginians feared the consequences of a Lincoln victory, which they saw as a threat to slavery. However, they also saw the election as a pivotal moment and believed that supporting Bell, who sought to avoid direct confrontation over slavery, offered the best chance to preserve peace and prevent the collapse of the Union.

Only 9 days later, on November 15, Virginia Governor John Letcher called for a special session of the General Assembly to consider the creation of a secession convention. The legislature convened on January 7 and approved the convention on January 14. On January 19 the General Assembly called for a national Peace Conference, led by Virginia native and former President John Tyler, to be held in Washington, DC on February 4, the same date that elections were scheduled for delegates to the secession convention.

Maryland

But interestingly, Maryland, a border state north of Virginia, made a different choice. The reasons are really interesting to consider.

Maryland gained admission to the Union as a slave state in 1788. Because Maryland borders Virginia, the slave trade and the plantation-based system of slave labor spread to Maryland and developed there, so that by 1860 there were 87,189 African American slaves in Maryland. Slavery continued in Maryland until November 1, 1864, when the state adopted its state constitution, which outlawed slavery. Delaware was admitted to the Union as a slave state in 1787.

Maryland voted for John C. Breckinridge, the Southern Democratic candidate. Breckinridge received 45.9% of Maryland’s popular vote, securing the state’s 8 electoral votes. Maryland supported Breckinridge in large part because of its geographic and economic ties to the South. Although Maryland was a border state, its economy and society had strong ties to the Southern states, particularly through agriculture and slavery. Breckinridge’s pro-slavery stance resonated with many Maryland voters.

There were also complex political divisions in Maryland. Its electorate was deeply divided between Unionists and Southern sympathizers. Breckinridge’s support reflected the influence of pro-Southern sentiment, particularly in rural areas. In that state, where the southern democrats officially split during the convention in Baltimore, there was a fragmented opposition. The state’s vote was split among the four candidates: This division allowed Breckinridge to win with a plurality rather than a majority. The map shows that Breckinridge won because of the population of Baltimore. Baltimore was Democratic in orientation but the rural areas of the west of the state were Unionist.

Maryland’s divided loyalties would continue to play a significant role during the Civil War, as the state remained in the Union despite considerable Southern sympathies.

The Presidential Election

The election took place on November 6, 1860, resulting in Abraham Lincoln securing just under 40 percent of the popular vote. Despite this, he achieved a decisive victory in the Electoral College with 180 votes, primarily by winning the Northern states, except New Jersey, which he shared with Stephen Douglas. Douglas received nearly 30 percent of the vote but only managed to capture Missouri's 12 electoral votes. John C. Breckinridge, with 18 percent of the national vote, claimed 72 electoral votes by dominating the Southern states, along with Delaware and Maryland. Meanwhile, John Bell garnered 12.6 percent of the vote, earning 39 electoral votes from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia.

The voting patterns in the South highlight the significant regional divide during this period. Lincoln did not receive any votes in the states that would later form the Confederacy, except for Virginia, where he obtained a mere 1 percent of the total vote, while Douglas received just under 10 percent. This lack of support can be attributed to Lincoln's absence from the ballot in those Southern states, reflecting the deep-seated opposition to his platform. The state was carried by Constitutional Union candidate John Bell, who ran on a platform of compromise; he won by just 156 votes over John Breckinridge.

The demographic disparity between the North and South played a crucial role in the election outcome, as the North had a larger population, thus controlling the Electoral College. While Lincoln dominated the Northern states, he failed to win any Southern states. Douglas managed to secure 12 electoral votes from the North, but this was insufficient to pose a significant threat to Lincoln's candidacy. The Southern vote was divided between Breckinridge and Bell, preventing either from amassing enough support to challenge Lincoln effectively.

The election of 1860 solidified the positions of the Democratic and Republican parties as the dominant political forces in the United States, while also underscoring the entrenched views on slavery and states' rights that divided the nation.

1860 Election Results

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

180 Electoral Votes

John C. Breckinridge

Democratic

72 Electoral Votes

John Bell

Constitutional Union

39 Electoral Votes

Stephen A. Douglas

Democratic

12 Electoral Votes

Implications

In a nation deeply divided, Lincoln garnered approximately 40% of the popular vote, which was sufficient for a narrow victory in a highly contested election. This statistic indicates that a significant 60% of voters opted for candidates other than Lincoln: he was truly a minority president. A pressing concern emerged: would the Southern states accept the election outcome? Just weeks after the election, South Carolina made the decisive move to secede from the Union.

Shortly thereafter, on November 15, Virginia's Governor John Letcher convened a special session of the General Assembly to deliberate on the establishment of a secession convention. The legislature met on January 7 and subsequently approved the convention on January 14. By January 19, the General Assembly had called for a national Peace Conference, to be led by former President John Tyler, scheduled for February 4 in Washington, DC, coinciding with the elections for delegates to the secession convention. By the time Lincoln was inaugurated in March, seven Southern states had already seceded, and within a month of his presidency, the nation was plunged into civil war.

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The Crimean War – Part 3: Major Conflicts of the Crimean War

The Crimean War (1853–1856) was a conflict shaped by political rivalries, military innovation, and brutal clashes that tested the resilience of European armies. At its heart lay a struggle for influence between Russia and the Allied forces of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and later Sardinia. The war's battles would reveal the strengths and weaknesses of 19th-century military tactics, paving the way for modern warfare.

Terry Bailey explains.

Read part 1 in the series here, and part 2 here.

The Battle of the Alma by Eugene Lami.

Among the most significant engagements was the Battle of Alma, fought on the 20th of September, 1854. This clash marked the first major confrontation between the Allies and Russian forces, setting the tone for the bloody campaigns that followed. It was a battle of strategy, courage, and missed opportunities, a battle that could have altered the course of the war had its victors seized the moment.

Therefore in the third instalment of the Crimean War, the aim is to delve into the key battles of the Crimean War, from the storming of the Alma Heights to the grueling Siege of Sevastopol, the legendary Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, the chaotic hand-to-hand combat at Inkerman, and the crucial naval struggle in the Black Sea. Each of these engagements played a pivotal role in shaping the war's outcome and left a lasting impact on military history.

The Battle of the Alma: The First Clash

The Battle of the Alma, fought on the 20th of September, 1854, was the first significant engagement of the Crimean War. Allied forces, comprising British, French, and Ottoman troops, confronted the Russian army along the Alma River, approximately 35 miles north of Sevastopol. The Russian forces, under Prince Alexander Menshikov, had established strong defensive positions on elevated terrain south of the river, anticipating a formidable challenge for the advancing Allies.

The Allied strategy involved a coordinated assault, with the French army, led by Marshal Jacques St. Arnaud, advancing along the coast, while the British, under Lord Raglan, took an inland route. The French initiated the attack, with General Bosquet's division crossing the river and scaling the cliffs to outflank the Russian left. Concurrently, the British forces advanced under heavy artillery and musket fire. Despite facing intense resistance, the disciplined advance of the British infantry, including the notable actions of the Guards and Highland brigades, succeeded in breaking the Russian defensive lines.

The battle concluded with a decisive Allied victory, compelling the Russian forces to retreat toward Sevastopol. However, the Allies did not capitalize on their success; a lack of cavalry pursuit allowed the Russian army to withdraw in an orderly fashion, regroup, and fortify Sevastopol. This missed opportunity extended the conflict, leading to a protracted and grueling siege that would last for nearly a year.

The Battle of Alma not only demonstrated the effectiveness of Allied cooperation but also highlighted significant tactical lessons. The engagement underscored the importance of coordinated assaults and the need for effective pursuit of retreating forces to fully exploit battlefield victories. These insights would influence military strategies in subsequent conflicts, marking Alma as a pivotal moment in military history.

The Siege of Sevastopol: A war of attrition

The Siege of Sevastopol was the longest and most grueling engagement of the Crimean War, a drawn-out contest that tested the endurance of both the Allied and Russian forces. As the home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol was a crucial strategic target, and after their victory at the Battle of Alma, the Allied forces comprising British, French, and Ottoman, in addition to, Sardinian troops moved swiftly to encircle the city. However, the Russians, led first by Admiral Vladimir Kornilov and later by the formidable engineer General Eduard Totleben, transformed the city into a fortress of resistance.

Over nearly a year of brutal combat, the siege became a grim precursor to modern warfare. Trenches stretched across the battlefield, artillery pounded both sides relentlessly, and waves of counter-assaults turned the land into a nightmarish no-man's-land. The British launched repeated attacks against the Redan, while the French targeted the Malakoff, but each advance came at a staggering cost. Despite superior naval firepower and resources, the Allies found themselves locked in a war of attrition against the determined Russian defenders.

As the months dragged on, exhaustion and disease ravaged both sides. Yet, in September 1855, after relentless bombardment and a final decisive assault on the Malakoff, the Russian position became untenable. Realizing the city could no longer hold, the Russians evacuated Sevastopol, destroying their remaining defenses and scuttling their fleet to prevent it from falling into Allied hands. The fall of Sevastopol marked a turning point in the Crimean War, illustrating the devastating cost of prolonged siege warfare and foreshadowing the brutal conflicts of the 20th century.

The Battle of Balaclava: The Charge of the Light Brigade

The Battle of Balaclava fought on the 25th of October 1854 during the Crimean War, stands as a testament to both the horrors of miscommunication in battle and the unwavering courage of soldiers. Initially centered on a Russian offensive aimed at severing British supply lines, the battle took on legendary status due to the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade.

A misinterpretation of orders led approximately 600 British cavalrymen to charge straight into a heavily fortified Russian artillery position. Lacking proper support and facing withering fire from all sides, the Light Brigade suffered devastating losses. Their bravery, however, became the defining image of the battle, symbolizing the perils of unclear commands but also the fearless discipline of the British cavalry.

Beyond this tragic episode, Balaclava also highlighted the resilience of British forces in other engagements. The 93rd Highlanders, famously dubbed the "Thin Red Line," held their ground against a Russian cavalry advance, demonstrating steadfast discipline under immense pressure. Meanwhile, the Heavy Brigade's decisive charge successfully repelled a larger Russian force, showcasing the effectiveness of well-coordinated cavalry tactics.

Though the battle itself was inconclusive from a strategic standpoint, it left an enduring legacy. Alfred, Lord Tennyson's poem The Charge of the Light Brigade immortalized the heroism and sacrifice of those who rode "into the valley of Death." Balaclava remains one of the most evocative moments of the Crimean War, a story of valor, tragedy, and the importance of clear military leadership.

The Battle of Inkerman: The Soldiers' Battle

On the foggy morning of the 5th of November, 1854, the Crimean War saw one of its most brutal and chaotic engagements, the Battle of Inkerman. Often called the "soldiers' battle," it was defined not by grand strategic maneuvers but by the courage and resilience of individual troops and small units. The Russian forces, seeking to break through Allied lines, launched a surprise assault against British positions. The thick fog obscured visibility, turning the engagement into a series of fierce, close-quarters skirmishes.

Despite being heavily outnumbered, the British forces, later reinforced by their French allies, held their ground with remarkable tenacity. The rugged terrain and poor visibility meant that command-and-control structures struggled to function effectively, leaving much of the fighting to the initiative and discipline of individual soldiers.

Bayonet charges, hand-to-hand combat, and relentless volleys of fire defined the battle, as small groups of troops clashed in isolated struggles across the battlefield. Ultimately, the Allied forces repelled the Russian attack, inflicting significant losses. Inkerman proved that superior training, discipline, and tactical adaptability could overcome sheer numerical strength. The battle also highlighted the challenges of battlefield communication and coordination in unpredictable conditions. More than a test of strategy, the Battle of Inkerman became a testament to the determination and fighting spirit of the soldiers who fought it.

The Naval War in the Black Sea

The Crimean War was not only fought on land but also saw significant naval confrontations, particularly in the Black Sea, where control of supply lines and strategic ports played a decisive role. From the outset, the British and French fleets imposed a stringent blockade on Russian ports, crippling supply routes and restricting reinforcements. This maritime pressure was a key element in the broader Allied strategy to weaken Russian resistance.

One of the war's most pivotal naval engagements occurred on the 30th of November, 1853 at the Battle of Sinop, where the Russian fleet delivered a crushing blow to the Ottoman navy. This early Russian victory, marked by the destruction of several Ottoman vessels, shocked Britain and France, prompting them to escalate their involvement in the conflict.

The Allies responded by deploying their technologically superior steam-powered warships, which soon established dominance in the Black Sea.

The naval campaign reached its climax with the bombardment of Sevastopol, the heavily fortified Russian stronghold. Although the naval artillery alone could not break the city's defenses, it placed immense pressure on Russian forces, contributing to the eventual fall of the city.

The final blow to Russian naval power came with the destruction of their Black Sea fleet, ensuring that their maritime influence in the region would never fully recover. This loss significantly weakened Russia's overall war effort, demonstrating the crucial role that naval supremacy played in shaping the outcome of the Crimean War.

The Crimean War's major battles showcased the evolution of warfare, from traditional cavalry charges to the grueling realities of siege warfare and trench combat. The bravery of soldiers on both sides was met with the harsh realities of logistical failures, disease, and miscommunication. With Sevastopol under Allied control and Russian forces reeling, the war moved toward its final phases, setting the stage for the dramatic conclusion of this historic conflict.

Therefore, it is very easy to conclude that the Crimean War, was particularly savage with important battles such as the battles of Alma, Balaclava, Inkerman, and the prolonged siege of Sevastopol, setting the stage and providing a warning of what future conflict would look like, however, it was the breaking of the siege of Sevastopol that marked a turning point in the Crimean War.

These engagements revealed the brutal realities of modern conflict, where industrial advancements, evolving tactics, and logistical challenges shaped the course of battle. The war underscored the growing importance of coordination between infantry, cavalry, artillery, and naval forces, while also exposing severe deficiencies in communication, leadership, and medical care, issues that would demand urgent reform in the British and other European armies.

The war's most enduring legacy, however, lies in its far-reaching consequences. Militarily, it demonstrated the vulnerabilities of large, conscripted armies reliant on outdated doctrines, prompting significant reforms in the Russian, British, and French armed forces. Politically, the war shattered the balance of power that had defined Europe since the Napoleonic era, diminishing Russian influence in the Black Sea region and setting the stage for conflicts in the future. Diplomatically, it highlighted the fragility of alliances, as tensions between Britain and France persisted beyond their temporary wartime cooperation.

Perhaps most notably, the Crimean War heralded a new era of warfare, where technological advancements, including steam-powered warships, rifled muskets, and the first war correspondents brought the brutality of battle closer to home than ever before. The public outcry over the appalling conditions faced by soldiers, particularly in British hospitals, led to transformative changes in military medicine and logistics, championed by figures such as Florence Nightingale. These lessons would resonate far beyond the 1850s, influencing military strategy and humanitarian efforts in conflicts to come.

While the Crimean War may not have reshaped borders as dramatically as later wars, it left an indelible mark on military history. The valor displayed by soldiers from all combatant forces, the strategic miscalculations, and the hard-fought battles all contributed to shaping the modern world. In many ways, the lessons learned in Crimea foreshadowed the brutal realities of warfare in the 20th century, making it a conflict not just of its time, but of times to come.

In the next instalment, we will explore the humanitarian crisis that emerged from the war and the critical role of medical advancements in battlefield care.

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Notes:

Victoria Crosses

The Crimean War (1853–1856) was the first conflict in which the Victoria Cross (VC) was awarded. The medal was instituted in 1856 by Queen Victoria to recognize acts of extreme valor in the face of the enemy.

A total of 111 Victoria Crosses were awarded for actions during the Crimean War. What made these VCs special was the Crimean War medals were awarded retrospectively for bravery displayed during the war, which took place before the inception and minting of the medal.

The poem, 'The Charge of the Light Brigade'

It is worth quoting Alfred, Lord Tennyson's poem about the Charge of the Light Brigade as it is intimately linked to that event.

I

Half a league, half a league,

Half a league onward,

All in the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

"Forward, the Light Brigade!

Charge for the guns!" he said.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

II

"Forward, the Light Brigade!"

Was there a man dismayed?

Not though the soldier knew

Someone had blundered.

Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

III

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon in front of them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

Boldly they rode and well,

Into the jaws of Death,

Into the mouth of hell

Rode the six hundred.

IV

Flashed all their sabres bare,

Flashed as they turned in air

Sabring the gunners there,

Charging an army, while

All the world wondered.

Plunged in the battery-smoke

Right through the line they broke;

Cossack and Russian

Reeled from the sabre stroke

Shattered and sundered.

Then they rode back, but not

Not the six hundred.

V

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon behind them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

While horse and hero fell.

They that had fought so well

Came through the jaws of Death,

Back from the mouth of hell,

All that was left of them,

Left of six hundred.

VI

When can their glory fade?

O the wild charge they made!

All the world wondered.

Honour the charge they made!

Honour the Light Brigade,

Noble six hundred!

Alfred Tennyson, 1st Baron Tennyson FRS, (6 August 1809 – 6 October 1892)

The 1860 U.S. Presidential Election - Part I: Candidates

The 1860 Presidential Election set the stage for the Civil War and had significant repercussions for the United States. Throughout the 1850s, the nation grappled with contentious issues surrounding states' rights and the institution of slavery in the territories, which ultimately shaped the political landscape of the election. This period saw the Democratic Party splinter into Northern and Southern factions, reflecting deep divisions within the country. Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln emerged victorious against Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge, Northern Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, and Constitutional Union candidate John Bell. The electoral divide between Northern and Southern Democrats highlighted a profound sectional conflict, enabling Lincoln and the Republican Party to ascend to power without any backing from Southern states. In the wake of Lincoln's election, and before his inauguration in March 1861, seven Southern states chose to secede from the Union, a decision that precipitated the onset of the Civil War. Just weeks after Lincoln's victory, South Carolina formally declared secession.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the background to the election and the conventions that selected candidates.

Republican Party candidate Abraham Lincoln.

Democratic Party candidate Stephen A. Douglas.

President Buchanan and the Election of 1856

The factors that shaped the 1860 Election became evident shortly after the 1856 Election. The Democratic nomination of James Buchanan over Stephen Douglas was largely orchestrated by James Slidell from Louisiana, who would play a significant role during Buchanan's presidency. Following Buchanan's victory over Douglas for the nomination, Douglas pledged his support to Buchanan in order to defeat John Fremont, the inaugural nominee of the Republican Party. Douglas anticipated having a say in patronage matters post-election, particularly regarding cabinet positions for two of his associates from the West. However, Slidell obstructed these appointments, having been granted authority over such decisions alongside Senator Bright of Indiana. The relationship between Douglas and Buchanan soured over the contentious Lecompton Constitution, leading to a fierce rivalry. By the time Douglas sought re-election as Senator in Illinois in 1858, Slidell had already purged many of Douglas's allies from federal positions.

The Dred Scott Decision

Another pivotal element influencing the 1860 Election was the Dred Scott decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1857. This ruling invalidated the Missouri Compromise of 1820, effectively legalizing slavery across all U.S. territories. The Court's determination that the Constitution safeguarded the institution of slavery and that formerly enslaved individuals could never attain American citizenship heightened the existing sectional tensions. As a result, the election of 1860 was poised to further illuminate the stark divisions between those advocating for the abolition of slavery and those intent on preserving it.

Stephen Douglas and Popular Sovereignty

While the term "popular sovereignty" is closely associated with Stephen Douglas in contemporary discussions, it was neither his invention nor his original concept. The term gained a negative connotation due to its association with the contentious issue of slavery. The idea was first proposed by Michigan Senator Lewis Cass, who also had presidential ambitions tied to this principle. By the year 1848, Cass had established himself as a prominent figure in American politics, leading to his selection as the Democratic Party's candidate for the presidency. The party believed that his stance on slavery would resonate with a diverse electorate.

Cass's advocacy for popular sovereignty meant that the residents of a territory would have the authority to determine the legality of slavery within their borders. While this approach garnered some support, it also raised concerns among many Americans who viewed it as ambiguous and potentially disruptive to the delicate balance between slave and free states. This apprehension contributed to Cass's defeat in the presidential election, where he lost to Zachary Taylor, a Mexican War hero known for his reluctance to express clear opinions on contentious issues, including slavery. After his electoral defeat, Cass returned to Michigan, where he continued to serve as a U.S. Senator until 1857, when he was appointed Secretary of State under President James Buchanan.

In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, championed by Stephen A. Douglas, introduced the concept of popular sovereignty to the territories of Kansas and Nebraska. This legislation empowered the settlers of these territories to determine for themselves whether to permit slavery within their borders, effectively nullifying the Missouri Compromise, which had previously established a geographical boundary for the expansion of slavery based on latitude.

Douglas's initiative aimed to organize the Nebraska territory and bring it under civil governance. However, southern senators raised concerns since the area was situated north of the 36°30’ latitude line, which would classify it as a free state according to the Missouri Compromise of 1820. To secure support from the Southern faction, Douglas suggested the creation of two distinct territories—Kansas and Nebraska—while also repealing the Missouri Compromise. This arrangement allowed the settlers to decide the status of slavery in their territories, with the expectation that Kansas would lean towards being free and Nebraska would be more accommodating to slavery, thus preserving the political equilibrium.

Douglas himself was not a slaveholder, though his wife was. His political position was that it mattered not to him whether a state or territory was free or slave as long as that had been popularly decided. He maintained that the status of a state or territory—whether free or slave—should be determined by the vote of its citizens rather than by federal intervention. This belief led him to advocate for a compromise on the contentious issue of slavery, viewing it as a pragmatic approach to address the political turmoil surrounding the topic. His key contribution was the promotion of popular sovereignty, which allowed the residents of territories to vote on the legality of slavery within their borders.

Douglas argued that the decision regarding slavery should rest with the people living in the territories, rather than being dictated by the federal government. By framing the issue in terms of democratic choice, he aimed to navigate the divisive question of slavery without taking a definitive stance for or against it. While this approach seemed like a reasonable compromise at the time, it ultimately proved detrimental to Douglas's political aspirations, as it alienated various factions and diminished his support.

The legislation had unforeseen consequences, particularly the repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which had previously prohibited slavery in Kansas. This change galvanized anti-slavery advocates in the North, leading to the formation of the "anti-Nebraska" movement, which eventually evolved into the Republican Party, dedicated to halting the spread of slavery. Additionally, the influx of both pro- and anti-slavery settlers into Kansas to influence the vote resulted in violent confrontations, culminating in a brutal conflict known as "Bleeding Kansas."

The Lincoln-Douglas Debates

n 1858, Senator Douglas sought re-election in Illinois, facing off against Abraham Lincoln, a circuit lawyer and former congressman. During the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln focused on the concept of popular sovereignty, which ultimately placed Douglas in a precarious situation. His stance on slavery began to alienate Southern Democrats who perceived him as insufficiently supportive of the institution.

Lincoln's perspective on slavery was rooted in moral opposition, yet he recognized that immediate abolition was not a feasible solution. He aimed to navigate a middle ground regarding the contentious issue of slavery. Upon receiving the Republican Party's nomination for the Senate in 1858, Lincoln asserted that the nation needed to reach a definitive conclusion on the matter, expressing skepticism about the practicality of popular sovereignty with his famous assertion that "a house divided against itself cannot stand."

This viewpoint became central to Lincoln's campaign, as his debates with Douglas significantly elevated his profile in national politics. The discussions not only highlighted the deep divisions within the country regarding slavery but also positioned Lincoln as a formidable figure in the political landscape, setting the stage for his future leadership.

At their debate in Freeport, Lincoln challenged Douglas on the legality of a state or territory determining the status of slavery, given the Dred Scott decision had already addressed this issue. In his response, Douglas articulated the "Freeport Doctrine," asserting that while he cared about the outcome of votes on slavery, he believed it was the prerogative of white citizens to make that determination. His position was that the state government could determine the implementation of Dred Scott by legislating or not enacting local authority and passing additional laws. This was the very definition of nullification, which had been the basis of the Tariffs Crisis 25 years before. Douglas seemed to hold the view that slavery was on the decline and had reached its limits, as it was primarily profitable in regions suitable for cotton and rice cultivation. He argued that slavery would not expand into areas where the climate and soil were unsuitable for these crops. Furthermore, Douglas maintained that the slavery issue should be approached as a local community matter rather than a constitutional one.

Although Douglas emerged victorious in the election, he ultimately fell prey to the very political dynamics he aimed to eliminate from territorial governance through his promotion of popular sovereignty. His actions were not evaluated based on their original intent but rather through the lens of the ongoing power struggle between the North and South, particularly concerning the expansion of slavery. Despite Douglas's aspirations, the territories remained mere instruments in a broader political conflict, illustrating the complexities and challenges of addressing the slavery issue in that era

The Cooper Union Speech

Stephen Douglas was poised to become the Democratic nominee for president in 1860. He strategically positioned himself to attract support from both northern and southern constituents, presenting his stance as a means to end slavery for the North while simultaneously appealing to the South's desire to preserve it. Abraham Lincoln recognized that the Freeport Doctrine was merely a political maneuver and understood the necessity of demonstrating that Douglas lacked genuine support from either faction. Additionally, Lincoln sought a compelling response to the Dred Scott decision to rally northern sentiment.

On February 27, 1860, Lincoln articulated his views in a pivotal speech at the Cooper Union in New York City. This address elevated him from a regional politician to a formidable contender for the presidency, as he presented a principled argument against the expansion of slavery and the enforcement of fugitive slave laws. His position was grounded in legal reasoning and reflected a politically moderate stance for the era. In his speech, Lincoln highlighted that at least 21 of the 39 signers of the Constitution believed that Congress should have the authority to regulate slavery in the territories:

“I defy any man to show that any one of them(the Founding Fathers)  ever, in his whole life, declared that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories. “

Although not as widely recognized as many of Lincoln's other statements, these particular words showcased his political acumen and played a crucial role in securing his nomination for the Republican Party. Lincoln adeptly shifted the focus of the debate from the legality of slavery, which was constitutionally sanctioned at the time, to the issue of its expansion into new territories. This strategic pivot resonated with the centrist factions within the Republican Party, who were eager for a stance that sought to limit slavery's reach while allowing it to remain where it already existed. Lincoln believed that by restricting slavery's expansion, it would eventually wither away.

In his address, Lincoln raised significant questions about whether the Constitution actually barred the Federal Government from regulating the spread of slavery, or if it enshrined slavery as a permanent institution, effectively treating enslaved individuals as property devoid of rights. He argued that the Founding Fathers had envisioned a role for Congress in overseeing matters of enslavement. By referencing the signers of the Constitution who later voted to impose regulations on slavery, Lincoln illustrated that even prominent figures like George Washington had taken legislative action to control the institution.

As a result of Lincoln's arguments, Douglas found himself politically outmaneuvered. In the Southern states, Douglas had championed the idea of popular sovereignty as advantageous to their interests, but Lincoln's assertions exposed this stance as disingenuous. Meanwhile, in the Northern states, Douglas had attempted to align himself with anti-slavery sentiments, despite being the architect of legislation that supported slavery. This contradiction undermined Douglas's credibility and highlighted the effectiveness of Lincoln's strategic approach.

1860 Democratic Convention

The Democratic Party convened its convention in Charleston, South Carolina, during April and May of 1860. At this juncture, the party was in disarray; despite being the only truly national political entity, it failed to present itself as a unified front. The deep divisions over the issue of slavery were evident, with Southern Democrats advocating for its expansion while their Northern counterparts vehemently opposed this stance. The rift within the party had been brewing long before the Charleston meeting, primarily fueled by the rivalry between supporters of Stephen A. Douglas and those aligned with President James Buchanan, particularly figures like John Slidell. Southern senators, including Jefferson Davis (Mississippi) , Yancey (Alabama), and Rhett (South Carolina), rallied against Douglas's Freeport Doctrine and his notion of Popular Sovereignty, deeming them insufficiently supportive of Southern interests. This internal discord ultimately culminated in a divisive split when Douglas arrived at the convention lacking the necessary backing for his nomination.

During the Democratic National Convention, Slidell collaborated with Alabama's William Lowndes Yancey to obstruct the nomination of Douglas. As the specter of secession loomed, Slidell aligned himself with the more radical elements known as the "fire eaters." His actions were pivotal in the fracturing of the Democratic Party, which had far-reaching implications. The division within the party not only weakened its position but also facilitated the rise of Abraham Lincoln, whose election might have been improbable had the Democrats managed to maintain their unity.

The events surrounding the 1860 Democratic National Convention serve as a critical moment in American political history, illustrating how internal conflicts can lead to significant electoral consequences. The inability of the Democratic Party to reconcile its differences over slavery not only fractured its base but also paved the way for the emergence of a Republican president. This period marked a turning point, highlighting the profound impact of party unity—or the lack thereof—on the trajectory of national politics.

The conflict regarding the official stance on slavery led to the withdrawal of numerous delegates from Southern states prior to the selection of a candidate at the convention. Although Senator Douglas garnered significant support from the delegates, he fell short of the two-thirds majority necessary for nomination, a threshold that his adversaries had deliberately established. Southern Democrats declined to back him due to his refusal to endorse a pro-slavery agenda. In protest, many delegates exited the convention, resulting in an insufficient number of remaining delegates to secure Douglas's nomination, ultimately leaving the convention without a chosen candidate.

Northern Democrats convened for a second convention in Baltimore, Maryland, from June 18 to 23, although many Southern delegates were absent. During this gathering, the Democrats nominated Stephen A. Douglas, who won decisively against John C. Breckinridge, the current vice president from Kentucky. In an effort to reconcile the factions within the party, the convention initially approached Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Alabama for the vice presidential nomination, but he declined. Ultimately, they selected Herschel V. Johnson, a former U.S. senator and governor of Georgia, to join Douglas on the ticket.

Southern Democratic Convention

Discontented Democrats, primarily from the South, staged a second walkout during the Baltimore convention when two replacement delegations were seated. They left the convention and met on their own, where they nominated John C. Breckinridge for president, with Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon as his vice-presidential candidate. Both Stephen A. Douglas and Breckinridge asserted their positions as the legitimate Democratic nominees. In June, Yancey and a faction of staunch supporters convened in Richmond to reaffirm Breckinridge's nomination. President Buchanan endorsed this ticket, as Breckinridge had served as his Vice President and was an advocate for slavery and states' rights.

Breckinridge proposed a federal mandate that would permit slavery in the territories, mirroring the existing laws in the states, provided that the local populace supported it, thereby safeguarding the rights of slaveholders to maintain their property.

Breckinridge, a two-term congressman from Kentucky, was a notable ally of Stephen Douglas during the 1856 election. Opting not to seek a third term, he turned his focus to horse breeding and legal practice. Following Douglas's defeat at the 1856 convention, Breckinridge's name emerged as a potential vice presidential candidate to appease the faction that had lost. However, this created tension with Buchanan, who viewed Breckinridge unfavorably due to his previous support for both Pierce and Douglas, whom Buchanan considered political adversaries. Despite their earlier friendship, the Lecompton controversy ultimately severed ties between Breckinridge and Douglas, allowing Breckinridge to rise in prominence as Buchanan's presidency faltered in 1860.

At this juncture, a significant number of southern Democrats were not in favor of secession. Southern Unionists opposed the idea of breaking away from the Union. Some of these individuals chose to fight for the Union during the Civil War. Notably, several Confederate leaders, including Alexander Stephens, who would later become the vice president of the Confederacy, initially resisted the notion of secession, advocating instead for the benefits of remaining part of the Union. They held out hope that President Lincoln would adopt a conciliatory stance regarding the issue of secession. However, following the events at Fort Sumter, many shifted their allegiance to the Confederate States of America. Although Slidell initially belonged to this group, he ultimately aligned himself with the secessionist cause.

Southern Unionists can be divided into two distinct categories. Conditional Unionists typically supported the unrestricted expansion of slavery or at least favored the principle of Popular Sovereignty, advocating for the Federal government to allow the Southern states to secede peacefully. In contrast, Unconditional Unionists remained steadfastly loyal to democratic principles, regardless of the electoral outcomes. This latter group played a significant role in the Civil War, contributing approximately 200,000 troops from the South to the Union army, demonstrating their commitment to the Union despite the prevailing sentiments in their region.

The onset of the war led to noticeable fractures within the party, which undoubtedly contributed to the challenges faced in 1860. The War Democrats, a faction of Northern Democrats, were in favor of continuing the fight in the Civil War. While the majority of Northern Democrats remained committed to the Union following the secession of the Southern states, the War Democrats expressed their support for the war but were critical of the economic policies implemented by the Republicans and President Abraham Lincoln's early actions, including the suspension of habeas corpus and the detention of dissenting publishers and politicians.

In the lead-up to the 1864 presidential election, the War Democrats allied with Republicans to establish the Union Party, which ultimately renominated Lincoln for the presidency and selected War Democrat Andrew Johnson from Tennessee as his vice-presidential candidate. This group consisted of Democrats who were in favor of the war effort aimed at preserving the Union. Notable figures among the War Democrats included Benjamin Butler, who would later switch parties, and Edwin Stanton, who also changed his political allegiance.

On the other hand, the Peace Democrats, represented by individuals like George Pendleton and Clement Vallandigham, advocated for a peaceful resolution with the Confederacy, even if it meant accepting disunion. Often referred to as "Copperheads," these Democrats opposed the war and sought a negotiated settlement that would involve concessions to the South, allowing it to rejoin the Union. The term "Copperhead" was first introduced by the New York Tribune on July 20, 1861, symbolizing a deceptive and treacherous approach, akin to the snake that strikes unexpectedly.

The Republican Convention

“I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not bound to succeed, but I am bound to live by the light that I have. I must stand with anybody that stands right, and stand with him while he is right, and part with him when he goes wrong.”

 — Abraham Lincoln

The Republican convention took place in Chicago from May 16 to 18 at the Wigwam. Established in the mid-1850s following the disintegration of the Whig Party, the Republican Party primarily opposed the expansion of slavery into U.S. territories. While a significant number of its members advocated for the complete abolition of slavery, the party adopted a more pragmatic approach, refraining from calling for abolition in states where slavery was already entrenched. This moderate position focused on preventing the spread of slavery, although some delegates were in favor of its total eradication.

As the convention commenced, New York Senator William H. Seward appeared to be the frontrunner for the nomination. However, he faced considerable competition from several notable figures, including Ohio Senator Salmon P. Chase, Pennsylvania Senator Simon Cameron, Edward Bates from Missouri, and Illinois's favorite son Abraham Lincoln, who was a popular candidate among local supporters.

During the first ballot, Seward garnered the most votes but fell short of the necessary majority for nomination by about 59 votes. The second ballot saw a tightening race between Seward and Lincoln, ultimately leading to Lincoln's nomination on the third ballot. Additionally, Senator Hannibal Hamlin from Maine was selected as Lincoln's running mate, solidifying the ticket for the upcoming election.

Of all the Republican candidates who were running for President in 1860, Lincoln stood out as the most unrefined and least experienced, possessing a notably sparse resume. His political career included a single term in Congress, during which he faced defeat in two Senate elections in Illinois, a state characterized by its western prairie. Lacking both administrative and military experience, Lincoln's appearance was also unconventional; he was often noted for his ill-fitting attire and somewhat disheveled look. However, history reveals that he may have been one of the most articulate figures of his time, and with the benefit of hindsight, we can recognize that his skill as a persuasive orator was a significant asset. Observers of his speeches remarked on his awkwardness and the high pitch of his voice, yet his compelling narrative resonated with the public: he was the embodiment of the self-made man, having emerged from humble beginnings in a log cabin through sheer determination and intellect, rather than through the privileges of wealth or elite education.

The prosaic truth is that he might have been nominated simply because he was the least offensive candidate. He was a shrewd politician, first and foremost. His political positions were in the center of the party, and that was his precise political intent. Seward, who had been the Governor and Senator from New York, and Chase the Governor and Senator from Ohio, were abolitionists; and Bates, an elder statesman from Missouri, was conservative on the slavery issue, being from a border state that wasn’t inclined to overturn slavery.  In that sense, Lincoln was a safe choice for the general election.  Importantly, unlike the others, he had made no enemies along the way.  Each had people that didn't want him as the President and Lincoln’s strategy was superb.  He said to the supporters of each one of those men, “If you can’t get your first love, come to me as your second love.” He also played his cards skillfully: he didn't attack any of the others, while they were all busy attacking one another.

Lincoln demonstrated considerable political acumen, bolstered by a network of allies who actively supported him during the convention. Six months prior, his associate Norman B. Judd had journeyed to New York to advocate for Chicago as the venue for the gathering, engaging with influential figures like Thurlow Weed. The decision to select Chicago was influenced by the perception that Illinois posed no significant challenge to Seward's candidacy. Judd effectively communicated this perspective, suggesting that Illinois, lacking a clear frontrunner, could serve as a suitable compromise location. Once the convention was confirmed for Chicago, Judd facilitated discounted train tickets for attendees traveling to the city.

In addition to promoting Chicago, Judd skillfully orchestrated the seating arrangements for the convention. He strategically placed New York and other states firmly aligned with Seward to the right of the podium, while Illinois and delegations that were either opposed to or indifferent about Seward were positioned to the left. This arrangement created a central section occupied by reporters, which effectively obstructed New Yorkers from engaging with undecided delegates during the sessions. As a result, Lincoln's supporters enjoyed greater access to those delegates who were uncertain, while Seward's team faced significant challenges in swaying them.

LINK: https://thirdcoastreview.com/2023/05/26/review-against-all-odds-the-lincoln-miracle-inside-the-republican-convention-that-changed-history-by-edward-achorn/

Thanks to a resourceful convention team working behind the scenes, Lincoln successfully garnered support and fostered the impression of a popular movement. Justice David Davis, who served as the presiding judge of the Illinois 8th Circuit, played a pivotal role in this effort. Having been a close friend of Lincoln and a fellow practitioner in the same legal circuit, Davis took on the role of campaign manager. He incentivized delegates with promising job opportunities in exchange for their votes, ultimately orchestrating Lincoln's triumph over rivals Seward and Chase. Without Davis's strategic influence, Lincoln's ascent to prominence might have remained a mere footnote in history.

Ward Hill Lamon, a lawyer within the same 8th Illinois Circuit, held opposing views on abolition and leaned towards Southern sympathies. Despite their ideological differences, he and Lincoln forged a strong friendship. Lamon's notable presence made him a recognizable figure, and he played a crucial role in rallying support for Lincoln at the convention. To ensure a favorable audience during the critical balloting, Lamon resorted to printing counterfeit tickets, allowing Lincoln's supporters to fill the convention hall. Meanwhile, Seward's camp, overly confident in their chances, celebrated the night before and found themselves inebriated and distracted, leading to a missed opportunity.

As the convention unfolded, the dynamics shifted dramatically. While Seward's supporters were preoccupied with their parade outside the hall, Lincoln's backers, armed with duplicate tickets, gained entry and filled the venue. This strategic maneuvering resulted in enthusiastic cheers for Lincoln every time his name was mentioned, creating an atmosphere that suggested he was the preferred candidate among the delegates. In stark contrast, Seward's supporters, who had been unable to enter the hall, could not muster the same level of enthusiasm, undermining their candidate's position as the frontrunner. The scene painted a clear picture of Lincoln as the people's choice, swaying the delegates in his favor.

The Constitutional Union Party

The Constitutional Union Party emerged in 1859 as an effort to bridge the growing sectional divide in the United States, drawing together former Whigs and members of the Know-Nothing Party. This coalition nominated John Bell, a former senator from Tennessee, for president, and Edward Everett, the former president of Harvard University, for vice president. Their platform was particularly attractive to voters in the border states, as it sought to sidestep the contentious issue of slavery and instead emphasize loyalty to the U.S. Constitution.

Comprising mainly discontented Democrats, Unionists, and former Whigs. It was also comprised of former Know-Nothings, especially Millard Fillmore’s 1857 American Party. The Constitutional Union Party convened for its inaugural meeting on May 9, 1860, called together by Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, a former prominent Whig. At Crittenden's request, fifty former and current members of Congress met in Washington, D.C. in December 1859, where they agreed to form a new party dedicated to preserving the union and avoiding debates over slavery. This is the same Crittenden who would advance a compromise solution to secession in early 1861.During this gathering, they officially selected John Bell as their presidential candidate and Edward Everett as his running mate. The party's formation was a response to the political turmoil of the time, aiming to present a united front amidst the fractious political landscape.

The party positioned itself as a champion of law and constitutional order, deliberately refraining from taking a definitive stance on slavery or states' rights. Instead, they pledged to uphold the Constitution and maintain the Union, seeking to avoid the polarizing debates surrounding slavery that threatened national unity. Nevertheless, Bell proposed a compromise regarding slavery, advocating for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line across the nation, which would legalize slavery in new southern states while prohibiting it in northern territories, in hopes of attracting voters disillusioned by the Democratic Party's internal conflicts.

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The Crimean War – Part 2: Profiles of Nations

As the thunder of cannon fire echoed across the Black Sea, shattering the illusion of stability in 19th-century Europe, the Crimean War developed into more than a mere clash of empires, it was a crucible of change, where outdated military doctrines met the brutal efficiency of modern warfare. Nations entered the conflict seeking power, prestige, or survival, but few emerged unchanged.

Terry Bailey explains.

Read part 1 in the series here.

Tsar Nicholas I of Russia in the 1850s. By Georg von Bothmann.

From the battle-scarred plains of Crimea to the diplomatic chambers of Europe, the war reshaped alliances, exposed weaknesses, and accelerated transformations that would define the century to come. This was no ordinary war; it was a turning point in history.

In this second instalment of the series, the profiles of the combatant nations, their leaders, and the forces that shaped this conflict will be reviewed. This clash of titans brought Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia into a coalition against the might of Imperial Russia, each contributing distinct strengths, weaknesses, and strategies to the war.

Britain: An Empire at the Crossroads

As Britain waged war in the mid-19th century, it stood at a turning point between its imperial past and the demands of modern conflict. At the helm of British forces was Lord Raglan, a seasoned veteran of the Napoleonic Wars.

Though his experience was undeniable, his leadership was marked by outdated tactics, a reluctance to adapt, and infamous miscommunication, most notably, the disastrous Charge of the Light Brigade. His reliance on traditional methods underscored the growing pains of an army struggling to transition into a new era of warfare.

Britain's military prowess rested on its powerful navy, which dominated the Black Sea and secured critical supply lines. Its infantry, battle-hardened by colonial campaigns, maintained discipline and skill on the battlefield. However, these advantages were offset by significant weaknesses.

Outdated tactics, poor logistical planning, and an over-reliance on aristocratic leadership created inefficiencies that often clashed with the harsh realities of war.

Strategically, Britain sought to curb Russian expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean, safeguarding its influence and protecting vital trade routes to India. However, the war exposed severe shortcomings in military organization, particularly in supply chains and medical care.

The horrific conditions endured by British soldiers in field hospitals prompted Florence Nightingale's revolutionary work in battlefield nursing, highlighting the urgent need for reform. The conflict ultimately forced Britain to reevaluate its military approach, paving the way for modernization in the years to come.

France: Revitalized under Napoleon III

Napoleon III, the Emperor of France, was a shrewd statesman determined to restore his nation's prestige on the world stage. Balancing diplomacy with military modernization, he played a crucial role in shaping the coalition against Russia. His support for the Ottoman Empire was not merely strategic, it was part of a broader vision to curb Russian influence while reinforcing France's status as a dominant European power.

Under Napoleon III's leadership, the French military emerged as a formidable force. Recent combat experience in Algeria had refined their tactics, and their superior artillery, particularly rifled cannons, giving them a significant edge over their adversaries. However, internal political divisions occasionally weakened their cohesion, and coordination with allies was not always seamless.

Despite these challenges, French forces played a decisive role in key battles of the Crimean War. Nowhere was their impact more evident than at the Battle of Malakoff, where their innovative siege tactics shattered Russian defenses. Through victories like these, Napoleon III's vision of France as Europe's arbiter became a reality, securing its place at the heart of 19th-century geopolitics.

The Ottoman Empire: Defending the Sick Man of Europe

The mid-19th century saw the Ottoman Empire, long derided as the "Sick Man of Europe," fighting for its very survival. Beset by internal strife and external threats, the empire found itself locked in a desperate struggle against Russian expansion.

Leading the charge in its defense was Omar Pasha, a Serbian-born military leader whose tactical brilliance helped revitalize Ottoman forces. By skillfully blending traditional strengths with modern military techniques, he played a pivotal role in resisting Russian advances during the early stages of the war.

Despite facing considerable challenges, the Ottomans proved to be formidable opponents. Their forces, though underfunded and technologically outdated compared to the European powers, demonstrated resilience in battle. Well-acquainted with the harsh and unforgiving terrain, they made effective use of fortified positions and defensive strategies to hold their ground.

Yet, the empire's military shortcomings were undeniable. Financial constraints and internal instability weakened their war effort, forcing them to rely heavily on foreign allies for support.

For the Ottomans, this war was more than just another conflict, it was an existential fight to maintain sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. Against the odds, they stood firm, proving themselves as crucial partners in the broader coalition. In the end, their resistance not only delayed Russian ambitions but also underscored the enduring strength of an empire that many had already written off as doomed.

Russia: The Bear on the defensive

In the mid-19th century, the Russian Empire was embroiled in the Crimean conflict exposing its deep-seated military and logistical weaknesses. Under the rule of Tsar Nicholas I, Russia was an autocratic powerhouse, its policies driven by a commitment to Orthodox Christianity and territorial expansion. However, Nicholas miscalculated the resolve of European powers, particularly Britain and France, who united against him.

This misstep proved disastrous, dragging Russia into a war for which it was woefully unprepared. When Nicholas died in 1855, his successor, Alexander II, inherited not just a war, but an empire in urgent need of reform.

Russia's military was vast, boasting one of the largest standing armies in the world. It had an abundance of manpower, reinforced by the formidable Cossack cavalry, whose skill in open terrain made them invaluable on the steppes.

Yet, these strengths masked critical flaws. The majority of Russian soldiers were poorly trained conscripts equipped with outdated weaponry, a stark contrast to the well-armed and organized forces of their Western adversaries.

Furthermore, Russia's infrastructure was severely lacking. The empire's logistical networks struggled to support large-scale operations, particularly in Crimea, where inadequate supply lines hampered its war effort. Russia's strategic reliance on fortifications, especially at Sevastopol, showcased both its strengths and vulnerabilities.

While the city's defenses held out for nearly a year against relentless Anglo-French bombardment, the war exposed Russia's inability to adapt to modern warfare. Superior Western artillery, naval power, and battlefield tactics overwhelmed Russian positions, forcing a painful reckoning. The Crimean War laid bare the empire's systemic weaknesses, compelling Alexander II to embark on sweeping military and social reforms, these reforms would shape Russia's trajectory for decades to come.

The Kingdom of Sardinia: A small but strategic player

Amid the great powers of Europe, the Kingdom of Sardinia, often referred to as Sardinia-Piedmont was a relatively minor force. Yet, under the leadership of Victor Emmanuel II and his astute Prime Minister Count Camillo di Cavour, this small state played a shrewd diplomatic game.

In 1855, Sardinia joined the Crimean War, not out of direct strategic necessity, but as a calculated move to gain favor with France and Britain, an alliance that would prove crucial in the pursuit of Italian unification.

Despite its modest military size, Sardinia's army was well-trained and disciplined. More importantly, the state's leadership understood that battlefield victories were not the only path to success. Cavour used Sardinia's involvement in the war as a means to secure a voice in European politics, positioning the kingdom as a committed and capable player in continental affairs.

However, Sardinia's resources were limited, and its direct impact on major battles remained minimal. Nonetheless, the kingdom's participation paid off. By taking part in the postwar peace negotiations, Sardinia earned diplomatic recognition that would later prove instrumental in the Risorgimento, the movement for Italian unification.

Though small in military might, Sardinia's strategic engagement in the Crimean War helped pave the way for its ambitious transformation from a regional power into a key architect of a united Italy.

Comparative Analysis: Strategies, technologies and logistics

The Crimean War bridged the gap between traditional warfare and the advent of modern combat techniques. It was a conflict where outdated doctrines met emerging technologies, and where logistics played as crucial a role as battlefield tactics.

The war involved the major European powers, (Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire), and Sardinia against one of the largest standing armies in the world at the time, (Russia), each bringing its own strengths, weaknesses, and strategic approaches to the theatre of war.

Technological Advances

One of the most striking aspects of the Crimean War was the technological divide among its participants. Britain and France led the way in military modernization, equipping their forces with rifled firearms that boasted superior range and accuracy compared to older smoothbore muskets. They also capitalized on steam-powered ships, which allowed for greater mobility and effectiveness in naval operations.

Russia, in contrast, lagged behind its Western adversaries. Its army still relied heavily on smoothbore muskets, which were significantly less effective in combat. Similarly, its navy depended on wooden sailing ships, a stark contrast to the steam-powered vessels of the British and French fleets. This technological disparity had dire consequences for Russian forces, who found themselves outgunned and outmaneuvered on both land and sea.

Logistical challenges

Logistics played a defining role in the success and failure of the various armies involved. The British forces suffered from severe supply shortages, exacerbated by poor administration and mismanagement. The harsh Crimean winter further compounded these difficulties, leading to widespread disease and deprivation among British troops. These failings underscored the necessity for improved military logistics, prompting future reforms in army supply chains and medical services.

In contrast, the French military demonstrated superior organization in provisioning their troops. Their well-coordinated supply lines ensured that soldiers remained adequately equipped and fed throughout the campaign.

Whereas, the Ottoman Empire, while a crucial participant in the war, struggled with logistics and relied heavily on British and French support to maintain its forces in the field.

Naval dominance

Naval power played a decisive role in shaping the strategic landscape of the war. The British and French navies, with their technologically advanced fleets, dominated the Black Sea, allowing them to impose blockades and launch amphibious operations with relative ease. Their control of the seas enabled them to disrupt Russian supply lines and exert constant pressure on enemy forces.

Russia's naval position was significantly weaker. Faced with overwhelming naval superiority from the Anglo-French alliance, Russian commanders resorted to desperate measures, including the scuttling of their fleet at Sevastopol to prevent its capture. This move underscored the dire state of Russia's naval capabilities and the broader challenges it faced in contending with Western military advancements.

A quick breakdown of the strengths and weaknesses of each force

Each participant in the Crimean War brought a unique set of strengths and weaknesses to the battlefield:

·       Britain:- possessed a formidable navy, yet its land forces suffered from poor administration and logistical failures.

·       France:- combined military innovation with efficient supply lines, though its political situation remained fragile throughout the war.

·       The Ottoman Empire:- proved to be resilient in its defense but was technologically inferior to its European allies and adversaries.

·       Russia:- wielded an enormous manpower advantage, but its forces were burdened by outdated weaponry and severe logistical constraints.

·       Sardinia:- though a relatively minor military player, leveraged its involvement in the war for diplomatic and political gains, aligning itself with the victors.

In conclusion, the Crimean War was far more than a regional conflict, it was a transformative event that reshaped the military, political, and diplomatic landscapes of Europe. It exposed the vulnerabilities of established powers, accelerated the modernization of warfare, and foreshadowed the shifting balance of influence on the continent.

The war's conclusion did not result in a decisive territorial conquest but rather a strategic recalibration among Europe's great powers, with lasting consequences for each participant.

For Britain, the war was a wake-up call, revealing significant flaws in its military organization, logistical capabilities, and leadership structure. The failures witnessed in Crimea led to crucial military reforms, particularly in medical care, with Florence Nightingale's pioneering efforts marking the beginning of modern battlefield medicine.

Britain also reassessed its role in European conflicts, gradually adopting a more cautious approach to continental affairs while focusing on global imperial expansion.

France, under Napoleon III, emerged from the war with enhanced prestige, having played a decisive role in securing victory. The war reinforced France's military modernization efforts, bolstered its geopolitical influence, and strengthened its alliance with Britain.

However, the triumph was short-lived, Napoleon III's ambitions for continued European dominance would ultimately contribute to France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871).

The Ottoman Empire, long considered a declining power, proved that it could still mount a formidable defense. However, its dependence on European allies highlighted its strategic vulnerability. While the war delayed Russian expansion into Ottoman territories, it did little to resolve the empire's deeper structural weaknesses.

The eventual decline of Ottoman power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was, in many ways, foreshadowed by the Crimean War's revelations of internal instability and military shortcomings.

For Russia, the war was a humbling experience that exposed the limits of its vast but outdated military apparatus. The defeat at Sevastopol and the inefficiencies in its army and infrastructure forced Tsar Alexander II to embark on a series of sweeping reforms, including the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the modernization of the Russian military. While these reforms helped Russia regain strength in the long term, the war had shattered its image as an invincible empire, marking the beginning of a more cautious approach to European affairs.

The Kingdom of Sardinia's involvement, though limited in scale, was a masterstroke of diplomacy. By aligning itself with Britain and France, Sardinia secured its place at the negotiating table, leveraging its participation to gain international recognition. This diplomatic success laid the groundwork for the unification of Italy, which followed in the subsequent decade.

Beyond the strategic and political consequences, the Crimean War introduced several key innovations that would shape future conflicts. The use of railways and telegraphs revolutionized military logistics and communications, while advances in weaponry underscored the shift toward industrialized warfare. The war also marked the beginning of modern war reporting, with journalists like William Howard Russell providing firsthand accounts that shaped public perception and influenced political decision-making.

In the grand scope of history, the Crimean War stands as a harbinger of change. It was a conflict that forced nations to confront their weaknesses, adapt to new realities, and prepare for the challenges of an increasingly modern world. Though often overshadowed by later, larger wars, its legacy endures in the lessons it imparted on military strategy, geopolitics, and the evolution of warfare.

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Point of interest:

Greece

Greece's involvement in the Crimean War (1853–1856) was indirect but significant, as the conflict stirred nationalist aspirations and led to military action within the Balkans. At the time, Greece was a relatively young and small kingdom, having gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830.

However, many ethnic Greeks still lived under Ottoman rule, particularly in Epirus, Thessaly, and Crete. The war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, supported by Britain and France, presented an opportunity for Greek nationalists to push for territorial expansion.

King Otto of Greece, a Bavarian monarch ruling the country, sympathized with the Russian cause and saw the war as a chance to reclaim Greek-populated lands from the Ottomans. In 1854, Greece encouraged and covertly supported uprisings in Ottoman territories, particularly in Thessaly and Epirus, where Greek irregular forces launched attacks against Ottoman garrisons.

However, this intervention was not welcomed by Britain and France, who sought to maintain the balance of power in the region and prevent Russian influence from expanding. Viewing Greece's actions as destabilizing, they imposed a naval blockade on the country and even occupied Piraeus, the port of Athens, in April 1854 to force King Otto to abandon his expansionist ambitions.

As a result of the blockade and occupation, Greece was effectively neutralized for the remainder of the war, and the uprisings it had supported were suppressed by Ottoman forces. The episode weakened Otto's position domestically, as many Greeks resented the foreign intervention but were also frustrated by their government's failure to achieve territorial gains.

Ultimately, Greece's involvement in the Crimean War highlighted both its nationalist aspirations and its limitations as a small power caught between the interests of larger European nations.

The Crimean War – Part 1: Prelude

The Crimean War (1853–1856) stands as a defining chapter in the history of 19th-century Europe, encapsulating the tumultuous interplay of imperial ambition, religious contention, and the decline of long-established powers. Often described as the first "modern war," it bridged the era of traditional conflict with the rapid technological and political evolution that would reshape global dynamics in the decades to follow.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Battle of Sinope by Alexey Bogolyubov.

At its core, the Crimean War was a crucible of competing interests. It stemmed from the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a once-mighty force now referred to as the "Sick Man of Europe." The war's genesis lay not only in disputes over the Christian holy sites of Palestine but also in the broader geopolitical struggle to control key territories and trade routes, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. As Russia pressed forward with its imperial ambitions, the uneasy alliance of Britain and France sought to maintain the European balance of power, while Austria and Prussia trod cautiously, torn between geographic proximity and diplomatic neutrality.

This war, however, was more than a clash of empires; it was a reflection of an evolving Europe. It marked the end of the Concert of Europe, the fragile diplomatic framework established after the Napoleonic Wars, and introduced new elements of warfare and international relations.

Railroads and telegraphs revolutionized logistics and communication, while war correspondents brought the realities of battle into the public consciousness for the first time. The Crimean War also revealed the limitations of existing military strategies and forced nations to rethink their approaches to both war and governance, with significant consequences for domestic and international policy.

In examining the Crimean War, it is possible to delve into the political, diplomatic, and ideological forces that set the stage for one of the 19th century's most consequential conflicts. It explores the fragile alliances, deep-seated rivalries, and unfolding events that led to this watershed moment in European history.

Beyond its immediate outcomes, the Crimean War's legacy serves as a prelude to the seismic shifts that would shape the modern world, from the collapse of empires to the rise of nationalist movements and the ever-increasing complexities of international relations.

By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire, once a dominant force stretching from the Middle East to Southeastern Europe, was in a state of gradual decline. Weakened by administrative corruption, economic stagnation, and military defeats, hence why the empire was often described as the "Sick Man of Europe." Its territorial losses in the Balkans and mounting internal unrest posed a question that gripped European diplomacy: what would happen to the vast Ottoman territories if the empire collapsed?

Russia

For Russia, the decline of the Ottoman Empire presented an opportunity. Czar Nicholas I sought to expand Russian influence over the Black Sea and into the Balkans. His ambitions, however, alarmed other European powers, particularly Britain and France, who feared that unchecked Russian expansion would upset the balance of power and threaten their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russia's relationship with the Ottoman Empire was marked by a mix of hostility and opportunism. The two empires had clashed in previous wars, with Russia seeking access to warm-water ports and control over strategic territories. However, the Crimean War's immediate spark lay in religious disputes over Christian holy sites in Palestine, then under Ottoman control. The holy sites were sacred to various Christian denominations, including Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians. A longstanding rivalry over their custodianship intensified in the 1840s, with France backing the Catholic claims and Russia championing the Orthodox cause. When Sultan Abdulmejid I granted concessions to the Catholics under French pressure, Nicholas I protested vehemently, demanding recognition of Russia's historical rights and protection for Orthodox Christians within Ottoman lands.

Diplomatic exchanges soon turned confrontational. In 1853, Nicholas referred to the Ottoman Empire as "a dying man" and proposed to Britain a secret deal to partition its territories. Britain, however, rejected the offer, fearing the implications of Russian dominance in the region. Relations between Russia and the Ottomans soured further, culminating in Nicholas's ultimatum demanding formal recognition of Russian authority over Orthodox Christians, a demand the Ottomans refused.

While Russia sought to exploit the Ottoman Empire's weakness, Britain and France were determined to curtail Russian expansion. Britain's primary concern was safeguarding its trade routes and colonial interests, particularly the overland route to India. France, under Emperor Napoleon III, aimed to bolster its international standing and assert its leadership in European affairs. Austria, geographically close to the Balkans, faced its own challenges in maintaining stability in its territories and sought to prevent any major power from gaining an upper hand in the region.

The interplay of these powers created a volatile environment. Austria, although wary of Russia's ambitions, hesitated to act decisively, while Britain and France moved toward a more confrontational stance. The French Emperor, eager to assert his nation's influence, supported military action against Russia. Meanwhile, Britain's government, led by Lord Aberdeen, reluctantly prepared for war, driven by public pressure and strategic imperatives.

By mid-1853, diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had failed. Russia escalated tensions by invading the Danubian Principalities (modern-day Romania), then under Ottoman suzerainty. This act was a direct challenge to Ottoman sovereignty and a provocative move toward Europe. In response, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia in October 1853.

The first major clash occurred at the Battle of Sinope in November 1853, when the Russian Black Sea fleet destroyed an Ottoman squadron. The attack shocked Europe, prompting Britain and France to take decisive action. While religious disputes over the holy sites in Palestine served as a catalyst, as indicated, in reality, the Crimean War was fundamentally a struggle for geopolitical dominance. It was a war shaped by the ambitions of empires, the fragility of the Ottoman state, and the broader dynamics of 19th-century European politics. The war's early stages revealed the deep divisions and competing priorities of the involved powers. For Britain and France, the conflict was about preserving the balance of power; for Russia, it was about expanding influence; and for the Ottoman Empire, it was a desperate fight for survival.

Conclusion

The Crimean War's significance lies not only in its immediate geopolitical ramifications but also in the broader historical transformations it precipitated. This conflict exposed the fragility of alliances, the volatility of power dynamics, and the complex interplay between religion, politics, and imperial ambition in 19th-century Europe.

The war marked the decline of traditional forms of diplomacy and heralded a new era of modern warfare, characterized by the use of advanced technology, including railways and telegraphs, and the growing influence of public opinion shaped by war correspondents and photographs. For the Ottoman Empire, the war underscored its precarious position as a declining power entangled in the ambitions of stronger states.

Despite its nominal victory alongside Britain and France, the empire emerged weakened, its dependence on European support more evident than ever. For Russia, the conflict was a humbling experience that highlighted its military and administrative shortcomings, prompting internal reforms under Alexander II, including the emancipation of the serfs.

Britain and France, though triumphant, expended significant resources, and their alliance, rooted in mutual distrust of Russia, would prove to be temporary.

Ultimately, the Crimean War served as a prelude to later conflicts that would continue to shape Europe, such as the unification movements in Italy and Germany and the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century.

It revealed the limitations of the Concert of Europe, an earlier framework for maintaining stability, and demonstrated that the balance of power in Europe was increasingly precarious. In many ways, the Crimean War was a turning point, a harbinger of the profound political, social, and technological changes that would define the latter half of the 19th century and the early phases of the 20th century.

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Note:

Lord Aberdeen

Lord Aberdeen's coalition government fell in 1855 over its handling of the Crimean War, Lord Palmerston was the only man able to sustain a majority in Parliament, and he became prime minister for Britain in the latter half of the Crimean War.

Nicholas I

Nicholas I, 6 July [O.S. 25 June], 1796 – 2 March [O.S. 18 February], 1855) was Emperor of Russia, King of Congress Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland from 1825 to 1855, however, died before the war was concluded and Alexander II ascended to the Throne

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and longest-lasting empires in world history, spanning three continents at its height. It originated in the late 13th century as a small principality in northwestern Anatolia, founded by Osman I. Over the centuries, it expanded through military conquests, strategic alliances, and a sophisticated system of governance, reaching its zenith during the 16th and 17th centuries under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.

At its territorial peak in 1683, the Ottoman Empire encompassed approximately 5.2 million square kilometers (2 million square miles). Its domains stretched from southeastern Europe, including large swaths of the Balkans and parts of modern-day Hungary, to North Africa, covering areas such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. In the east, the empire included much of the Middle East, incorporating regions like modern-day Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. To the north, it reached into the Crimean Peninsula, while in the south, it extended deep into the Sudanese Red Sea territories.

The empire's size allowed it to control vital trade routes connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. The cities of Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), Cairo, and Baghdad became major cultural and economic hubs. Despite its vast size, the Ottoman administration managed a highly diverse population of Christians, Muslims, and Jews through a system of "millets," or semi-autonomous religious communities, which helped maintain relative internal stability.

This vast expanse, however, also brought challenges. The sheer size of the empire required an extensive bureaucracy and a formidable military to maintain control over its territories. Communication and logistics across such a wide area were often strained, and local autonomy was sometimes granted to distant provinces to ensure their loyalty. Over time, these factors, combined with external pressures and internal struggles, contributed to the gradual decline of the empire, which ultimately dissolved in the aftermath of the First World War.

The U.S. Presidential Election of 1864

President Lincoln understood that his chances of reelection in November hinged on military success in a war now in its fourth year. By the summer of 1864, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had settled in for a prolonged siege against the Confederates near Petersburg, Va., and Gen. William T. Sherman was making slow progress toward Atlanta. Confederate Gen. Jubal A. Early, meanwhile, had led his troops to the very gates of Washington, D.C. in July, and had attacked a fort guarding the capital city. The war effort seemed to have stalled for the Union, and the public blamed President Lincoln.

Even getting re-nominated was not a given. We may today think of Lincoln as a god, but in 1864, he appeared to be just another failed politician. We want to think of him as this brilliant man and the best president ever, and he was, but in spring 1864, that is not even how his own party viewed him.

The biggest problem was the Radical Republicans, a hardline faction within the Republican party that held the belief that Lincoln was incompetent and therefore could not be re-elected. They had already formed a party called the Radical Democracy Party, for which a few hundred delegates had convened in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 31, 1864. They had even nominated a presidential candidate in the hope that it would drive the main party to nominate someone else.

In modern politics, we tend to think of a two-term president as standard. But in 1864, the last president to have been re-elected was Andrew Jackson in 1832; after him had been 8 one- term (or less) presidents. And before Jackson, the previous 2-term president was James Monroe, who ran unopposed.  So the odds on that basis alone were stacked against him.

Lloyd W. Klein considers the U.S. presidential election  of 1864.

Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson 1864 campaign poster.

The Republican Party Convention

The Republican Convention was held the first week of June, and the delegates who were loyal to Lincoln were so certain that they could not win election that they made a couple of major decisions about their platform and alliances. Moreover, they witnessed one of Lincoln’s cabinet who tried to get the nomination for himself.

The Republican fringe group demanding a stronger position against slavery split off to form the “Radical Democracy” party and nominated John C. Frémont as their candidate. Frémont supported combat without compromise, believed that Congress should strictly control Southern reconstruction efforts, and urged the confiscation of Confederate property. Fremont had been the first Republican nominee in 1856, just before Lincoln, who had to remove him for incompetence if not corruption early in the war.

Republicans loyal to Lincoln created a new name for their party at the convention in order to accommodate the War Democrats who supported the war and wished to separate themselves from the Copperheads, or Peace Democrats. The convention dropped then-Vice President Hannibal Hamlin, a Radical Republican from the ticket, and chose War Democrat Andrew Johnson as Lincoln's running mate. The National Unionists hoped that the new party and the Lincoln–Johnson ticket would stress the national character of the war. In a modern sense, they went after the “swing vote”.

Salmon Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, tried to use his connections within the Radical Republican group to get the nomination. In early 1864 he began a surreptitious campaign for the nomination but hastily ended it after pamphlets intended for private distribution were leaked to the press. He had threatened to resign 3 times during the 4 years of the first term in an effort to embarrass Lincoln. After the convention, he threatened a fourth time and this time Lincoln accepted the resignation.

President Lincoln ran for a second term but replaced Vice President Hamlin on the ticket with Andrew Johnson, a War Democrat. This critical segment of the Democratic Party supported the war effort and the Republicans sought to gain their support in the 1864 election. Lincoln and his running mate supported a quick end to the war, the abolition of slavery and reconstruction of the southern states following the end of hostilities. Lincoln’s opponent, General George McClellan, ran as the nominee for the Democratic Party, which wanted to end the war and accommodate the Confederacy.

The Blind Memorandum

In August 1864, President Lincoln believed he was facing defeat in the upcoming presidential election.  There were no polls as we have today; politicians had to sense what was happening and talk with local men to understand what was going on. And what Lincoln heard must have been disturbing.

Republican insider Thurlow Weed told Lincoln in mid-August 1864 that “his re-election was an impossibility.” Republican party chairman Henry J. Raymond expressed much the same sentiment to Lincoln on Aug. 22, urging him to consider sending a commission to meet with Confederate President Jefferson Davis to offer peace terms “on the sole condition of acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution,” leaving the question of slavery to be resolved later.

These are signatures of Lincoln’s cabinet members on the reverse of the “Blind Memorandum” dated August 23,1864.  Abraham Lincoln Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

It was in this context that Abraham Lincoln wrote the following memorandum on Aug. 23, 1864:

“This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.  — A. Lincoln”

Lincoln folded the memorandum and pasted it closed, so that the text inside could not be read. He took it to a cabinet meeting and instructed his cabinet members to sign the outside of the memo, sight unseen, which they did. Historians now refer to this document variously as the “Blind Memo” or “Blind Memorandum” because the cabinet signed it “blind.” In so doing the Lincoln administration pledged itself to accept the verdict of the people in November and to help save the Union should Lincoln not be re-elected.

It would be hard to imagine a more profound document in American history, and the fact that this could be so obscure astounds me, and makes me start to compare our contemporary climate. As much as we today think our upcoming election has significant implications, its hard to even compare it to what Lincoln was experiencing.

The Democratic Party Opposition

The Democratic Party still was a strong political force in the North. In August 1864 there were a lot of northerners who were tired of the war and its inconclusive results. The idea of fighting to end slavery, today taken for granted, wasn’t as popular as we might think.  The Emancipation Proclamation and the recruitment of black troops had changed the country, and not everyone liked it. The Democratic Party was generally unified in its opposition to emancipation.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

Had the Democrats a unified message the soldiers could support, Lincoln might have had serious trouble. But the Democrats were divided. The war democrats wanted to continue the war but seek peace soon while the peace democrats wanted to stop fighting immediately.  Ending slavery wasn’t a priority. Ending the war was.

Meanwhile, the Democratic Party had not yet met to make its nomination. This conflict was resolved by nominating a war democrat McClellan with a peace position plank. The Democratic platform declared the war a failure and urged that “immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities,” which McClellan could not fully support. Moreover, once the Democrats nominated George B. McClellan for president on August 30 they saddled him with a “Copperhead” peace Democrat.

There were two factions that existed among the Peace Democrats. For much of the war the Copperheads, led by Clement Vallandigham, had dominated them. The Copperheads declared the war to be a failure and favored an immediate end to hostilities without securing Union victory, either via re-admitting all the Confederate states with slavery intact and legally protected, or by formally recognizing the Confederacy as a sovereign nation and attempting to re-establish peaceful relationships.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Vallandigham and Wood calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate.

In 1863, the Peace Democrats started to splinter between the Copperheads and their more moderate members. Moderate Peace Democrats such as Horatio Seymour proposed a negotiated peace that would secure Union victory. They believed this was the best course of action because an armistice could finish the war without destroying the South. The Copperheads continued to advocate allowing the Confederate states to rejoin with slavery intact, however, believing that to do otherwise would merely lead to another Civil War sooner or later.

Its often said that politics is the art of compromise, and at this moment, that was what was tried, but it didn’t work out at all. McClellan was the front runner, so a compromise was struck On the first day of the convention, a peace platform was adopted. McClellan was personally opposed to a peace platform. McClellan supported the continuation of the war and restoration of the Union, but the party platform, written by Vallandigham, was opposed to this position. He inserted a plank calling for immediate peace negotiations.

This was the essential problem at the convention. General McClellan remained very popular and was the obvious choice for the role. But the Copperheads were against it. They tried to induce Horatio Seymour, the Governor of Ne York, to run. But the day before the convention, Seymour announced he would not run. Vallandigham knew he was too divisive. Several men were sounded out for the role, including former President Pierce, all of whom declined. Thomas Seymour of Connecticut received the most votes in opposition.

Representative George H. Pendleton, was the vice presidential candidate. He ran against 7 others, and won on the second ballot. Pendleton, a congressman from Cincinnati,  was closely associated with Vallandigham. He was known to oppose the 13th Amendment and the concept that a state could be compelled to stay in the Union.

The Candidate McClellan

McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally Southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a Northern population, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation.

Lincoln thought if elected McClellan would be forced by the Copperheads into an early truce. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign flailed as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked further tensions within his party.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then are accepted in modern society and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant.

The Campaign

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and Lincoln thought that too.

As if on cue, Lincoln’s fortunes began to change. General Sherman scored a tremendous victory when Atlanta fell to the Union on September 2. McClellan therefore had an ambiguous message against an articulate potus who suddenly was winning battles.

Had the battlefield events gone against the Union, the election would have been much closer. The capture of Atlanta and Hood's burning of military facilities as he evacuated showed that a successful conclusion of the war was in sight, weakening support for a truce. Without the fall of Atlanta early in September, it’s easy to see how the voters might not have flocked to Lincoln.

Finally northern opinion had come around to freeing the slaves and winning a war that had produced so much destruction so that there needed to be a definitive conclusion and a new beginning. In essence, this is what Lincoln was calling for in his Gettysburg Address, which we today take as almost a divine document, but in its essence, was realistically the start of the 1864 presidential campaign.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Election Results

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over

90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey. We might well ask if any fool could have come that close. Which makes me wonder, if he wasn’t that stupid, are the accounts of him as a poor general really accurate?

As it is, the popular vote was split 55%-45%, a good but not landslide victory. President Lincoln defeated General McClellan in the election winning twenty-two states to McClellan’s three. Lincoln easily carried the popular vote and won the greatest share of the electoral vote since James Monroe won re-election unopposed in 1820. Lincoln's win made him the first president to win re-election since Andrew Jackson, and the first two-term President unaffiliated with the Democratic-Republican Party or the Democratic Party since John Adams. The National Union ticket was the first and only winning ticket composed of members of two separate parties.

Had McClellan and the Democrats had a plausible, unified peace position that didn’t appear to be total capitulation, they might have had a better shot. He only lost by 10%, which isn’t really a landslide.

Senators Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson from Massachusetts wanted the Republican Party to advocate constitutional amendments to prohibit slavery and guarantee racial equality before the law. Initially, not all northern Republicans supported such measures. Eventually, these would be passed, but at the time, they were considered radical. The problems Andrew Johnson would face as president were starting in 1864.

Fremont might have been a serious third-party “spoiler”, had the newspaper New York World chosen to champion his candidacy (think: FOX News). But then. Frémont was appalled at the Democratic platform, which he described as a "union with slavery". After three weeks of discussions, Frémont withdrew from the race in September 1864. In his statement, Frémont declared that winning the Civil War was too important to divide the Republican vote. He then struck a bargain with Lincoln to remove Montgomery Blair as postmaster general, so he withdrew from the race. Blair had very conservative views on race and slavery.

The 1864 presidential campaign was bitter. More than for just a candidate, voters cast their ballots to determine questions underpinning the broader fate of the Union: Should the war be continued, or should a peace settlement be negotiated? How would the outcome of the war define the role of blacks in a post-war society?

The bloody conflict between North and South loomed over every aspect of American life. The electorate was so divided that some argued the election should be postponed until the war was over. The fact that there was an election in the midst of a civil war is one of the great achievements our country has ever had. Our commitment to fair and free elections, and that the people decide, is our greatest ideal.

Because of the Democrats’ peace platform, the election became a referendum on the war itself. The election tide turned with Union victories during the autumn of 1864 and the masses of soldiers who cast their ballots for Lincoln. The entire concept of soldiers, in the field, voting for who their leader would be, and even if the should be continued, was entirely revolutionary at the time.

Lincoln was highly popular with soldiers and they in turn recommended him to their families back home. The following states allowed soldiers to cast ballots: California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Out of the 40,247 army votes cast, Lincoln received 30,503 (75.8%) and McClellan 9,201 (22.9%), with the rest (543 votes) scattering (1.3%). Only soldiers from Kentucky gave McClellan a majority of their votes, and he carried the army vote in the state by a vote of 2,823 (70.3%) to 1,194 (29.7%).

Suppose McClellan had Won?

Had McClellan won the election, there is lots of speculation as to whether the war would have continued. The traditional argument is that Lincoln would have remained president until the inauguration, and that by March 1865 the war was all but over. McClellan would have had a victory within 4-6 weeks. He was a soldier and would not have let victory elude him.

But just as plausible is that if Lincoln had been defeated it would have been a huge shock. The Confederates would have declared victory. Would Union soldiers continue to die for a cause that would never happen?

McClellan was in an awkward position. He wrote that he was for restoring the Union. But that was after the war with 20-20 hindsight. However, his party's platform called for the cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement (meaning that the CSA would continue as a separate country). His VP was a peace candidate. His speeches at the time say he would negotiate an end to the war not fight it.

If elected, would he repudiate his party and continue the war as vigorously as Lincoln? As president, he could have done so. But the price would have been alienating many or most Democrats. Had he gone the route of disregarding Democrats, he'd have been forced to cooperate closely with the Republicans (almost becoming a Republican himself in all but name).

Alternatively, he could have decided to side with his party and stopped (or slowed down) the war effort --presumably during peace negotiations. The result being the CSA would win its independence.

Moreover, for McClellan to have won, Sherman must fail in Atlanta and Grant must have met some disaster. In hypothetical situations, you can’t just drop McClellan into Lincoln’s shoes in March 1865. You have to account for his being there.

So as with most hypotheticals, it’s too complicated to know for sure. I think the traditional view is much too simplistic. I think McClellan would have negotiated with Davis within weeks of an electoral victory.

Reports of conspiracies between Peace Democrats and the Confederate government to manipulate the election abounded—including a plan, financed with a half-million Confederate dollars, to raise an insurrection among Copperheads in the West with an aim toward creating a western confederacy.

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Was George B McClellan the Most Underrated General of the U.S. Civil War?

Here Jeb Smith argues that General George B. McClellan was the most underrated army commander of the Civil War. While he does not consider him to be a great general or military genius, he thinks the common portrayal of him as a terrible commander is unjust. No other Northern general, people say, exemplifies the stereotype of an incompetent and timid leader as McClellan does. The author argues that this is an unwarranted perception.

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan in the general's tent during the Battle of Antietam on October 3, 1862.

“No other general in the war commanded more respect and admiration from his men than George McClellan.”

-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign

“Remember that your only foes are the armed traitors,–and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided” and later “Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies,–that you are here to protect, not to destroy.”

-George B McClellan May 26 1861 and June 25 1861

Northern Democrats did not see the South as the spawn of Satan but rather as fellow Americans who, in fact, had produced most of the Union leaders up to that point. General McClellan, a Democrat, held tolerant views of the South and sought to avoid needless bloodshed. These perspectives stand in contrast to those of many modern historians and the Republicans of the time, who shaped the narrative to justify the massacres that would follow, as well as the total warfare of 1864 and 1865.

West Virginia and Promotion

“Harley six weeks had elapsed... and in that time he had actually created an army and began the first campaign.”

-George b McClellan Commanding General U.S army May 26 1861

George B. McClellan, nicknamed “Young Napoleon” or “Little Mac,” graduated second in his class of 59 at the U.S. Military Academy in 1846. His class included 20 future full-rank generals, and he later returned to West Point as an instructor.

After the war began, he excelled at organizing militia from three states into a cohesive fighting force and saw his first action as a commander of Union forces in what is now West Virginia. This was a departure from his later reputation as a slow-moving, timid general. During a successful campaign in the mountainous region he launched aggressive attacks, dislodged Confederate forces, and captured key positions. He forced the retreat of Confederate troops fortified in the mountain terrain, all while taking minimal losses and securing large supply bases and many prisoners. This success helped preserve the future West Virginia for the Union and prevented the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. President Lincoln was very impressed, which led to McClellan’s appointment to replace McDowell after the latter’s defeat in the Battle of First Manassas[1], and later as the commander of all Union forces.

Organization of the Army of the Potomac

“In a very real sense, McClellan rescued the Union in these early days from dependency and fear. Someone had to rebuild the army and show the country that there was great hope for the future.”

-S.C. Gwynne Rebel Yell: The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014

The nonmilitary press and President Abraham Lincoln, who was pressured for political reasons, wanted quick action and a fast end to the war. Part of what fueled this was the North's inability (even after First Manassas) to see how determined the South was. They thought this would be a quick, easy conflict. They underestimated the South's resolve to fight and ability to wage war. So, while the press and Lincoln called on Mac for fast action, as a military man Mac understood that the demoralized citizen army needed discipline, training, and organization. He provided these, got rid of poorly-performing generals and instilled spirit and pride in the soldiers while increasing their morale. He came to be loved and revered by his men.

One thing even those who are critical of him admit is that he was a first-rate organizer of the army. Mac took a defeated militia force and turned it into a professional army.

“McClellan had started with…a collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and un-instructed men, who were, as a rule, much demoralized by defeat and ready to run at the first shot. He ended with the finest army ever seen on the North American continent.”

-James V. Murfin Battlefields of the Civil War

Had the North attacked before they were ready, as Lincoln and the press called for, the result would likely have been further defeats and a shattering blow to national morale. As General Sherman stated, Napoléon took three years to build an army, yet “here it's expected in ninety days, and Bull Run is the consequence.”

Mac's offensive plan, as called for by many in the North, was to mass a large army, some said up to 200,000, to march on Richmond and end the war. The Northern people wanted no mistakes after First Manassas. This was Mac's general plan; one that would take time and preparation. Mac also constructed large fortifications around D.C., which had been left almost entirely unguarded by McDowell, including 48 forts and 480 guns. Given that Mac had to train, organize, recruit, and supply a massive citizen army and transform it into a world-class professional army, the time he took to do so was entirely reasonable.

“When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.”

-George B. McClellan 1861

Further, Mac was commander of all armies and planned for a simultaneous synchronized attack across the Confederacy, which would take further time to plan and put in motion. On August 4th, 1861, in a letter to Lincoln, he laid out his plan that included the main attack to be against Richmond but also simultaneously pushing into Missouri and down the Mississippi, and after Kentucky joined the Union to push into Tennessee, seizing Nashville, and also begin capturing coastal cities such as New Orleans, Savannah and Mobile, then move on to Montgomery and Pensacola. Mac wanted one massive assault to wipe out the South and not a prolonged war; this would take time to prepare. In February 1862 he wrote to Secretary of War Stanton, saying “I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves and then seeking for the most decisive results; – I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.” He did not want years of bloodshed to wear down the South, but brief, decisive action to end the war quickly.

Demotion by Lincoln

Just when Mac felt his army was ready, winter had started in, and Mac was bedridden for three weeks around Christmas. Lincoln wanted action now despite the impassable roads (he would not demand Grant move this early in ‘64) and Mac was accused of being timid. This offensive action was attempted in the winter of ‘62 by Burnside, and the results were Fredericksburg and the “mud march,” which ended in Burnside's removal. Grant, in ‘64, would start his spring offensive in April, later than Mac would his Peninsula campaign. As Grant said, the roads in Virginia would not allow large movements of troops before then, leading William Swinton in Campaigns of the Army of the Potomacto write, “It was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation’s ignorance of war.”

So Mac started at the average time for spring offensives. No other Union army was campaigning during this winter. Yet, because of Lincoln's urgency and what he saw as a too-cautious McClellan, he demoted Mac to simply commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln also forced corps commanders he had chosen on the Army of the Potomac. Mac wanted to wait to promote generals until he had seen them in battle. This was not the last time a politician interfered with Mac's plans.

Peninsula Campaign Begins

“Reduced my force by 1/3, after (bless and do not curse) task had been assigned, its operations planned... it frustrated all my plans... it left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible.”

-George B McClellan

“Let me tell you that if your government had supported General McClellan in the field as it should have done, your war would have been ended two years sooner than it was.”

-- General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and one of the leading military experts of the 19th Century

The Peninsula Campaign began with McClellan's strategic plan for an amphibious operation. Leveraging the North's naval superiority to transport and supply his army, he ultimately aimed for Richmond. Mac anticipated having over 150,000 men for the campaign as he set out for the peninsula. However, once he landed, Lincoln would significantly reduce his army with the other troops spread around the valley, D.C., and the Manassas region.

Mac had wanted more men for the offensive, but Lincoln wanted him to hold men back to guard D.C. Lincoln forced Mac to leave McDowell’s I Corps in D.C. along with the garrison already available. Lincoln now had a garrison of around 20,000 in D.C. and up to 74,000 as far as N.Y. that could be shipped/railed/marched to D.C. if it were attacked. Plus, McClellan had set up world-class fortifications. McClellan, McDowell, Winfield Scott, and every corps commander believed this was more than enough men to guard D.C. and supported McClellan's plan to bring more men, but Lincoln would not allow it for fear of D.C. being attacked. Perhaps out of fear of Stonewall Jackson, it was Lincoln, not the general, who, in this instance, was being overly cautious. In Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan (1864), author George Stillman Hillard wrote, “From the moment the Army of the Potomac landed upon the Peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took possession of the minds of the President, the Cabinet, and the members of Congress.”

So Mac landed the army, which was slow-moving because it was massive and carried heavy siege equipment. He faced the largest army the South would field during the war, 88,000 (Grant faced 65,000 in ’64, with a more significant force under him than Mac enjoyed). Once his army landed, he was notified that Stanton had closed all the recruiting depots in the Union. His army would now have to do without either replacements or reinforcements during a major campaign.

This was a massive shock to Mac and the generals in the army. He then was told that McDowell's 40,000 men near Manassas could not be used but must help defend against any possible action towards D.C., despite the fact that Confederates showed no signs of attacking and even burned the bridges south of Manassas as they retreated to defend Richmond. McDowell told McClellan this decision (McDowell protested it) was “Intended [as] a blow to you.” Then McClellan was told the garrison of 10,000 men at Fort Monroe would also be withheld. Even critics of McClellan, like General Heintzelman, said it was a “great outrage” to withhold his army from his command. General Wells said it was the Radical Republicans trying to get Mac to resign. Harper’s Weekly stated, “It is impossible to exaggerate the mischief which has been done by division of counsels and civilian interference with military movements.” Once more, Mac was aggressive, Lincoln and the politicians conservative.

“In General McClellan’s opinion, the way to defend Washington was to attack Richmond; and the greater the force thrown against the rebel capital, the greater the security of our own.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864

Mac was now forced to revise his plans because of Lincoln's caution. In the revised plan, McDowell would advance on Richmond from the north with his 40,000 men and better protect against an attack by Confederate General Joe Johnston if he went north to Washington. However, as Mac argued, the attack on Richmond would force the Confederate army to defend their capital rather than launch a desperate attack on D.C. This disagreement delayed the start of the campaign, with Lincoln getting his way.

“Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended.”

-- Allan Pinkerton, chief of the Union Intelligence Service, 1861-1862

Yorktown

Mac moved up the peninsula towards Richmond and was promised McDowell’s men if D.C was free of threat. His army's first encounter was with Confederate General John Magruder and a small Confederate force at Yorktown. Magruder skillfully deceived Mac into believing his force was larger than it actually was. He accomplished this by repositioning the same troops in various locations, acting aggressively, continuously moving small units, using ammunition freely, and setting up dummy defensive positions. This convinced Mac that the Confederate force was more significant than it truly was, prompting him to settle in for a siege while he awaited the arrival of his heavy artillery. Mac was concerned that his inexperienced troops might fail in an assault during the first battle of the campaign, which could damage their morale. Mac eventually captured Yorktown and 80 heavy guns without losses, but the delay gave the Confederates time to organize troops to defend Richmond.

Advance on Richmond

Mac then started to push toward Richmond, and the Confederates gave way. The Union army captured both supply and ordnance during this advance. Mac is criticized for slow movement with a smaller Confederate force in front of him, yet he relied upon his friend and “expert” spy Alan Pinkerton, founder of the Pinkerton Detective Agency. Whatever the value of Pinkerton’s other information, one area in which he failed was in accurately assessing enemy troop numbers. He gave Confederate force numbers from various agents as 160,000, 123,000, 180,000, and even 200,000 in Richmond. And on August 6, Federal General Halleck gave estimates of 200,000 around Richmond. Some northern newspapers working independently gave even higher estimates than Mac did. Because of this, Mac actually believed he was outnumbered.

This was common during the war, with generals thinking the force opposing them was more extensive than it really was. Since this was his information, he believed he was not being cautious but aggressive and daring to continue the campaign, even if at a slow/careful pace. At the time, the enemy numbers were not certain. Mac also waited for his heavy siege artillery to come up from the back, as it was needed to attack Richmond's prominent forts at the Confederate capital.

But without a doubt, the advance was working. Richmond was preparing to evacuate. It forced the Confederates to scuttle the ironclad Virginia, which caused a loss of morale throughout the Confederacy. Confederate General Joe Johnston called General Ewell from Jackson to help in Richmond. McDowell was advancing unopposed north of Richmond. Mac had achieved better success than McDowell, Burnside, Hooker, or Meade advancing on Richmond.

“It was not until 1864 that another Union army, led by Grant, would get as close to Richmond as McClellan did in the spring of 1862.”

--Great Campaigns: The Peninsula Campaign David G. Martin Combined Books PA 1992

The next time the Federals would get this close was under their top general, U.S. Grant. They also fought against a weakened Southern army in ‘64 with a much larger Federal army.

But this time, three things saved Richmond and stopped Mac from capturing the Confederate capital and being hailed as a hero. All three had to happen to stop Mac; two of them were very unlikely and could not have been foreseen.

1] Jackson in the Valley

“The most significant contrast between the Virginia campaigns of Grant and McClellan is that Early's offensive did not accomplish its ultimate objective–to relieve the pressure on Lee's army at Petersburg, Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah valley did. Unlike McClellan before him, Grant would not be forced to alter his designs on the James River one iota.

-Thomas Rowland George B. McClellan and Civil War History

Unlike Lincoln, Mac saw Jackson's valley campaign as a diversion by Lee (now in command of the Southern Army) to pull federals away to help protect Richmond. Richmond was saved because of Jackson's brilliance in the valley. He outmaneuvered and outfought a force over three times the size of his own (17,000- 60,000), defeating them in multiple battles while also threatening D.C.

Jackson knew Lincoln was concerned with protecting D.C. Hence, he knew that aggressive maneuvers would pull men from the peninsula and help save Richmond. Jackson kept 71,000 additional men away from the Richmond attack with his victories and aggressive maneuvering. Lincoln was constantly scared by what Jackson might do, and this prevented McDowell and other troops from helping Mac; the withholding of McDowell would prove decisive.

2] Lincoln Recalling Troops to the Valley

“[It was] Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror it inspired in Washington, which was the true cause of the failure on the peninsula.”

-Colonel Ferdinand Lecomte, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Because of Jackson, Lincoln recalled troops to defend Washington and the valley. He also held back McDowell's 40,000 from the attack on Richmond. This “Changed the whole nature of the confrontation near Richmond,” and “The Confederacy was truly handed an amazing gift.” Mac would have rather left Jackson to clear out the valley and even attack D.C. if he wished. Mac had built massive forts with a large garrison to protect the capital.

“Here is the true defense of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James.”

-McClellan to Halleck August 4th, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

After Pinkerton reported a large number of enemy forces to McClellan, he paused his attack due to McDowell's absence. McDowell was supposed to launch an assault on Richmond from the north to prevent the Confederates from mounting counterattacks. McDowell described his recall to the valley as “a crushing blow to us.” Even Lincoln told McClellan, “If you believe you are not strong enough to take Richmond, just know that I do not ask you to try. Just know.”

3] Lee Replaces Joe Johnston

General Joe Johnston, the commanding Confederate general, was injured and replaced by Robert E. Lee. This would change the entire campaign. Mac had been slowly pushing Johnston back towards Richmond, but Lee would take the initiative and attack Mac.

Lee vs Mac

Lincoln’s maneuvers significantly reduced the Mac forces near Richmond attempting to trap Jackson in the valley. Heavy rains swelled the Chickahominy River and created a split the Potomac army, and Lee saw his opportunity.

Lee, whom many consider not only the premier general of the South but of the war, recalled Jackson from the valley to help in the offensive vs. Mac, now with a force nearly equal to his.

Lee would strike the smaller portion of Mac's army and threaten its supply line under General Porter. Porter was supposed to be supported by McDowell from the north to meet up with his flank coming south from Manassas. Had Mac's plan been allowed, the attack would not have been possible. However, when Lincoln sent McDowell to the valley to trap Jackson, Porter was vulnerable, and Lee pounced, enabling its strategic success.

“General McClellan wished and had advised that reinforcements should be sent him by water, as their arrival would be more certain. Now that the James River was open, they might have been sent by that route... Richmond could have been approached by the James, and we should have escaped the delays and losses incurred by the bridging of the Chickahominy, and should have had the army massed in one body instead of necessarily being divided by that stream... the capture of Richmond could not be carried out because to the president’s distempered fancy Washington was not safe... McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing to the north of Richmond, in order to establish the communication between himself and General McDowell. This was running a great risk in case General McDowell should not come, because it exposed our right in a way no prudent officer would have done; and, as General McDowell did not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lee attacked in multiple bloody battles, resulting in high losses on both sides. Mac would cause high casualties to Lee during the campaign, inflicting more losses than he received. However, Mac, going from “expert” information, believed he was outnumbered and was in danger of being cut off without help from the north. With Lincoln recalling so many of his troops, he ordered a retreat off the peninsula. Mac telegraphed D.C., stating, “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington...you have done your best to sacrifice this army.”

The retreat on the peninsula was dangerous, yet McClellan and Porter skillfully conducted it to save their forces from disaster. Mac would withdraw by night and defend a favorable position by day. It was a major strategic victory for the South yet a tactical victory for the Union. Lincoln called it a “half defeat.” Given the force size and causalities suffered, Mac performed better than the future Union commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

-Peninsula campaign stats

-Union Forces 105,000 Casualties 23,900 approx.

-Confederate Forces (inc. Jackson) 88,500 Casualties 29,600 app.

Antietam/Mac Takes Command

“I must have McClellan to reorganize this army and bring it out of chaos...there is no man in this army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he can.”

-Abraham Lincoln

“General McClellan has again assumed the supreme command of the army... His reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the most unbounded enthusiasm. In every camp his arrival was greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering... Already his... visit to our camps has wrought a remarkable change in the soldiers. His presence seemed to act magically upon them; despondency is replaced by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will, hereafter direct them.”

-Ellis’s Leaves from the Diary of an Army Surgeon, p. 214, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln's selection of the aggressive Republican general John Pope to lead the army led to the embarrassment at Second Manassas. Pope was then exiled to Minnesota to fight Indians, and Lee turned his attention to an invasion of the North. Meanwhile, Mac had to reorganize Pope’s defeated, demoralized army that was integrated into his command and try to restore morale. Mac was reinstated in command of Pope's army and the Army of the Potomac on September 2nd.  The effect was immediate:

“The effect of the news was instantaneous. All of a sudden the federals forgot their defeat, weariness, and hunger and exploded into triumphant hurrahs, multitudes of caps were thrown in the air.”

-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign

Slow to Meet Lee?

A common criticism of McClellan during the Antietam campaign is that he was slow to move the army out to confront Lee's invasion, which allowed Lee to enter Maryland. Lee entered Maryland around September 4-7. Mac had just taken control of a disorganized, defeated army on the 2nd, and “worked a minor miracle in the next few days as he restored the army's morale and organization, and equally significant, its pride and sense of purpose.” No other man in the army could have restored morale and cohesion as quickly as Mac did before the Battle of Antietam. He had reorganized his army and marched to meet Lee by September 9th. Lee had expected a longer time for Mac to prepare, and his fast reaction spoiled Lee's plan to capture Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In his article Showdown on South Mountain historian Dennis Frye wrote, “Pennsylvania was Robert E Lee's target in September 1862. But Maryland and George McClellan got in the way.”

Mac had other reasons to be cautious. General Halleck advised General McClellan to be watchful regarding Washington, D.C., and to wait until General Lee's intentions were fully understood. Halleck believed that Lee was attempting to draw McClellan out, rather than planning a direct attack on D.C. Additionally, McClellan received continual reports from his cavalry regarding enemy troop strength, estimating between 60,000 and 120,000 soldiers. General Porter estimated Lee's army to be 100,000, while General Sumner's assessment was 130,000. This information was accepted by the Union high command, who believed that Lee must have been reinforced in preparation for an invasion.

Mac moved west, forcing Lee to fall back to link with Jackson from Harpers Ferry. Mac helped lead the attack at the Crampton’s Gap, Turner’s Gap and Fox's Gap battles—all victories. At Turner's Gap, CSA losses were 2,300 and USA losses 1,800, even though the attack was up a mountain and through rough terrain. On Sep 16th, Mac trapped Lee by a flank maneuver on Lee's left and captured the road to Hagerstown, forcing Lee's northern invasion to end. Frye wrote, “Lee saw his invasion crumbling. The most important matter now was not Pennsylvania, but preservation of the army.” Mac even took the unpredictable and aggressive General Stonewall Jackson off-guard, causing him to say “I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement puzzles me.”

The Battle of Antietam

The two armies met near Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17th. The “cautious” Mac would assault the Confederate lines, leading to the bloodiest day of the war. Mac's plan was to attack both the Confederate left and right simultaneously, followed up with a massive reserve attack in the center.

While not a complete failure the attack failed to destroy Lee, partly due to Burnside's late arrival at the battle. Burnside delayed his assault on the Confederate right, “throwing off the whole plan,” and allowing Lee to shift reinforcements along his line to meet Union forces in the center and left. McClellan sent a half dozen couriers to Burnside to push him to strike more swiftly and threatened to relieve him of command. Yet, Lee's army was nearly breaking in all three sectors.

Mac did not show tactical genius and made some mistakes, but in the end, it was a strategic victory for the North and a tactical draw. He rested on the 18th to resupply (artillery near out of ammo) and gave orders to attack come daylight on the 19th, but the Confederates had left. The battle sent Lee's wounded army back to Virginia and, more importantly, ended any hopes the Confederacy had for European involvement in the war. Thus Frye wrote that “George McClellan saved the union.”

“A man who could take a demoralized army, as McClellan took the combined forces that had been defeated under Pope in front of Washington at the second Bull Run, restore its discipline by the magic of his name and his swift reconstruction of its shattered organizations, and then lead it to victory within fourteen days, after an almost unexampled celerity of movement against the enemy who had crushed it two weeks before--such a man is not to be spoken of or thought of as wanting in the force and vigor of a great general.”

-- George T. Curtis, U.S. Commissioner, historian

Antietam stats

Union Forces 87,000 Casualties 12,401

Confederate Forces 47,000 Casualties 10,316

McClellan Allowed Lee to Escape?

Lincoln heavily criticized Mac for not destroying Lee's army and not following him back into Virginia. However, Mac had sent Porter to harass the enemy retreat, which had initial success, capturing 40 Confederate artillery pieces. However, A.P. Hill counter-attacked, pushing the Union men back across the Potomac. Hill said it was “The most terrible slaughter...a lesson to the enemy, and taught them to know it may sometimes be dangerous to press a retreating army.”

Often, retreating armies fought significant rearguard actions to prevent their own destruction. Civil War battles rarely ended with the destruction of one or other army, only in 1865 when the South was near defeat was an army nearly annihilated. The assumption it could happen in 1862 points more to the expectations of the early-war North than realistic military goals. When the army was criticized for not destroying Lee's forces, a soldier in the Army of the Potomac replied. “Think the rebel army can be bagged? Let them come and bag them. Easy to talk about.” Historian John Cannan said the counter attack showed the federals that the rebels “still had a formidable bite.” Dennis Frye, who studied the Antietam campaign for over 50 years, wrote that ideas that Lee could be easily destroyed were “Myths created by politicians” not accurate judgments based on historical truth.

Further, the Federals were low on supply and had just fought two large-scale engagements. Lee knew where Mac would be unable to supply his army and planned his withdrawal accordingly. Mac was also working off his cavalry’s and Pinkerton's estimates of the Confederate strength. Thinking the Confederates still had equal force, he chose not to push the attack or risk a loss on Maryland soil that would endanger D.C. and the outcome of the war.

Far from defeated, after Lee had fallen back to Virginia he planned to continue the attack again. He sent Stuart’s Cavalry to create a bridgehead at Williamsport, Maryland, to renew the invasion. However, Mac had anticipated this move and sent his own cavalry along with the 6th Corps to prevent such a move. As argued by Dennis Frye, Mac outthought Lee in Maryland.

Later in October, Mac's quick and aggressive move into the Warrenton, Virginia area surprised Lee, splitting Lee's army. Both Lee and Longstreet were concerned. However, Lincoln had given the order two days before, and Mac was removed from command.

Conclusion

“There are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the army of the Potomac ever had.”

-Francis Palfrey Antietam, Fredericksburg

While I would not go as far as the above quote does, I would say Mac was the most underrated general of the war. He does not get credit where he should and gets the blame where he should not. I do not see Mac as cautious to a fault as claimed. It was often Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck being over-cautious about protecting D.C. that interfered with Mac's plans. And his military intel let him down, not his over-cautious nature.

“Look at his campaign in Western Virginia in 1861,–a part of his military career conveniently ignored by his enemies. Here he had a separate command, a defined field of action and was not hampered and trammeled by interference from Washington; and do we see any signs of indecision and want of promptness here? On the contrary, we observe the happiest combination of judgement in design and vigor in execution: one skilful and powerful blow was instantly followed by another, and the result was absolute and permanent military success.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln and the press wanted aggression, and the results were First Manassas, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Pope at Second Manassas, and later Hooker at Chancellorsville. No general of the early war could handle the tandem of Jackson and Lee. Extreme events withheld Mac from the capture of Richmond in ‘62.

A fair critical comparison between Mac and Sherman/Grant is favorable to Mac. Later, when Grant/Sherman gained victories, it was more because of the Confederate armies' reduced capability to offer resistance than their ability to be outgeneral Mac.

I believe the real reason for Lincoln's disappointment with Mac was the North's high expectations. Underestimating the resolve of the South and their leadership, the North desired one battle and one victory in Virginia, which would win the war for them. But it took years for them to realize their error, though doubt began early as Lincoln wrote to his friend Carl Schurz in 1862, “I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our cause rather than in particular generals.”

“McClellan's relationship with Lincoln is central to any understanding of why historians judge him as a flawed personality...Lincoln has attained a stature that sets him apart from other mortals”

-Thomas J Rowland George B McClellan and Civil Har History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman Kent State University Press

Historians may have viewed McClellan negatively because he opposed and disagreed with Lincoln. He committed the “unpardonable sin” of running against Lincoln in the 1864 election on a peace platform aimed at ending the bloodshed. In 1864 George Stillman Hillard wrote, “The real reasons for which General McClellan was removed were political, and not military.” Historian Dennis Frye said “The Republicans could not allow McClellan to be a victor. They could not allow that to happen. They needed to do everything they could to smear McClellan.”

“However patriotic the abolitionist radicals in the north may have been, the very last thing they wanted was for Little Mac to win in the battle for Richmond....the abolitionists would lose their influence.”

-S.C. Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion, and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014

“There is a political element connected with this war which must not be overlooked.”

-Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War Dec 26 1861 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln acknowledged that he made many errors that undermined McClellan's chances for success. After McClellan, Lincoln refrained from becoming directly involved with his generals. It appears that some historians have unfairly attributed Lincoln's military shortcomings to McClellan.

“At this moment a considerable portion of his countrymen have their minds barred against all arguments and considerations in defense of General McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny him all military capacity is part of the creed of a great political party. Most supporters of the present administration hold it to be a point of duty to disparage and decry him.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Jeb Smith is the author of four books, the most recent being Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty. Before that, he published The Road Goes Ever On and On: A New Perspective on J. R. R. Tolkien and Middle-earth and also authored Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War, written under the name Isaac C. Bishop. Smith has authored dozens of articles in numerous publications, including History is Now Magazine, The Postil Magazine, Medieval History, Medieval Magazine, and Fellowship & Fairydust, and has been featured on various podcasts.

Major Battles and Casualties of Union Generals vs Lee

Union commander/ Battle/ Union Losses/ Lee loses/ Union causality per confederate causality

Pope- Second Manassas 13,879 Lee 8,353 1.65 per

Hooker- Chancellorsville 17,100 Lee 12,151 1.43 per

Burnside- Fredericksburg 13,353 Lee 4,576 2.95 per

Grant- Wilderness 18,400 Lee 11,400 1.61 per

Grant- Spotsylvania 18,000 Lee 12,000 1.5 per

Grant- Cold Harbor 12,737 Lee 4,594 2.8 per

Grant- Total 49,100 Lee 27,900 1.75 per

Meade- Gettysburg 23,049 Lee 28,063 .82 per

Meade- Total [above/Grant] 72,049 Lee 55,963 1.29 per

McClellan- Peninsula 15,849 Lee 20,133 .78 per

McClellan - Antietam 12,401 Lee 10,316 1.2 per

McClellan - Total 28,250 Lee 30,449 .92 per

McClellan was the only Union general to give more casualties than taken when faced with Lee. His average over two battles was only bested once by a Union commander, by Meade (who performed worse overall) at Gettysburg. Mac fought against Lee with, if anything, less of a manpower advantage than Grant would have later on. He also faced the Army of Northern Virginia while it had Jackson, was well supplied, and the South had high national morale, unlike what Grant faced.

How many other Union commanders can claim over two battles with Lee to have won a tactical victory on the first and a strategic victory and a tactical draw on the second while inflicting heavy losses? It is no wonder Lee said Mac was the best he faced. And famed Confederate John Mosby, the “gray ghost of the Confederacy,” said that McClellan was the best Union commander “by all odds.”

[1] The two battles at the same site were referred to as First and Second Manassas by the Confederacy, First and Second Bull Run by the Union. I will stick to Manassas throughout, except that where quotations from the Union side refer to Bull Run this will be left unchanged.

A Society Without Women? Sex & Gender in the Wild West

What would a society without women look like? Any conjecture is fanciful and contrived, but there has been a period in American history where an analogous situation prevailed for a sufficient period to provide thoughtful grist – the settlement of the American West. Fewer than one in twenty pioneers to California during the early Gold Rush is female. Even in 1853, only some 8,000 of San Francisco’s 50,000 residents were women. Well into the 1880s, men made up almost two-thirds of California’s pioneer population.

Terry Hamburg explains.

Emigrants Crossing the Plains. Drawn by F.O.C. Darley, engraved by Henry Bryan Hall.

“You have no idea how few women we have here, a San Francisco lawyer writes to his sister back home in 1849,” and if one makes her appearance in the street, all stop, stand, and look. The latest fashion is to carry them in their arms (the streets are incredibly muddy). This we see every day.”

The gender imbalance is a subject of marvel to every observer then and since. The world’s oldest profession thrives in this hormonal tsunami. In the course of 1849, the hamlet of San Francisco’s bolts to 20,000, of which it is estimated 1000 are women - and two-thirds of those work in or manage brothels. Most men pouring into the city are in their raging testosterone twenties and have been deprived of traditional sex for at least six months.

Some of the most successful and powerful women in mid-nineteenth century America live in the frontier where they are vastly outnumbered by men and subject to a more primitive, unfiltered form of masculinity. Madams, in particular, parlay their business into fortune and influence. “The only aristocracy we had here at the time,” remarks Caleb T. Fay, a leading San Francisco politician during the Gold Rush, “were the gamblers and prostitutes.” A brothel proprietress made her money off patriarchy, but that success is a challenge to it as much as an accommodation.

Exporting Virtue

It was a simple proposition. Plenty of California men - most believed rich or soon to be so - without women. Ladies possessing the adventure and pluck to travel to that far-off land might find an ideal situation. “Every man thought every woman in that day a beauty,” a Sacramento woman confesses to her diary. “Even I have had men come forty miles over the mountains, just to look at me, and I was never called a handsome woman, in the best day, even by most ardent admirers.”

The men needed both the carnal and the cultural. Females would deliver a healthy dose of virtue to tame the savage beast. “We do not wish to say, or even imply, that San Francisco is the wickedest and most immoral city in the world,” historian Benjamin E. Lloyd mused in 1876, “but it has not yet overcome the immoral habits contracted in the days when the inhabitants were nearly all males, and had nothing to restrain them from engaging in the most vicious practices; when there were no mothers to chide their waywardness and say in winning tones: “My son go not in the way of evil” and fewer virtuous sisters to welcome brothers home, and by their loving kindness and noble lives, to teach them to cease from sinning.” Readers applauded the sentiment of James Wyld in his 1849 Guide to the Gold Country of California: “Society without woman is like an edifice built on sand. Woman, to society, is like the cement to the stone. The society has no such cement; its elements float to and fro on the excited, turbulent, hurried life of California immigrants.”

There are formal schemes to fill this moral vacuum. The most celebrated is hatched in 1849 by Eliza Farnham, author and former matron of the female section of Sing Sing Prison. She has skin in the California game. Her late husband leaves a large tract of land near Santa Cruz that she is keen to develop. Farnham concocts an ambitious plan: organize a group of well-recommended marriageable women that would “bring their refinement and kindly cares and powers” to the rough-hewn society of male fortune seekers. Ideologically, Farnham goes farther than most feminists of the age, advocating the natural superiority of women. She is prominent, and so are her public supporters, the likes of Horace Greeley and William Cullen Bryant, editors of The New-York Tribune and The New York Evening Post, and Henry Ward Beecher, the renowned clergyman and abolitionist.

Farnham shuttles between cities on the Atlantic coast, addressing meetings, examining applicants, and giving press interviews. Soon, she could announce that more than 130 women had “signified” a desire to join up. The New York Tribune praises her and the “precious cargo . . . on an errand of mercy to the golden land.” Editors on both coasts are captivated by the notion. In California, there is joy. One local mining newspaper reports that “smiles of anticipation wreathed the countenance of every bachelor in town.” However, Farnham is having difficulty finding suitable clients and then closing a deal that yanks young ladies from the comforts of family and friends to trek halfway around the world on a wild speculation, and for a big fee - payable in advance, thank you. No refunds. The ballyhooed April launch is postponed. By June, she is ready to give up the plan and sail with a scant three prospects. Disappointed supporters complain that her personal standards for recruits may have been too high, along with the price tag. TheAlta California accepts the news graciously: “The will is always taken for the deed, and bachelors will unquestionably cherish the liveliest of feelings of regard for the lady who so warmly exerted herself to bring a few spareribs to the market.” Farnham expresses no regrets. After experiencing “the moral and social poverty” of California for six years, she is “grateful that my endeavors failed.”

More women

There are other grand plans to civilize the Wild West by estrogen. A few years later, Sarah Pellet, a noted advocate of temperance, abolition, and woman’s rights pursues a scheme for “amelioration of the condition of Californians.” Again, the plan looks solid on paper: export 5,000 “respectable, marriageable New England girls” to be recommended by the Sons of Temperance as “worthy girls.” The Sons of Temperance in California agrees to serve as guardians upon their arrival. If this initiative works, there are plans to up the contingent to 10,000. Unfortunately, too few worthy girls are willing to be shipped and the plan is abandoned, again breaking miners’ hearts.

The gradual but relentless march of progress will eventually balance the genders in California. 50-50 is the order of nature.

Terry Hamburg is director emeritus of the Cypress Lawn Cemetery Heritage Foundation. His recently published book Land of the Dead: How The West Changed Death In America explores how the demands of survival and adaptation in the Gold Rush western migration changed a multitude of American customs, including the way we bury and grieve for our ancestors. California and San Francisco serve as case studies. Visit his author page: https://www.terryhamburgbooks.com.

General George Armstrong Custer in the U.S. Civil War

George Armstrong Custer is well-known to every American as a Native American fighter following the U.S. Civil War, particularly highlighted by the events of the Last Stand at the Little Bighorn River, which has become a significant part of American folklore. The leadership he exhibited while commanding the 7th Cavalry, often accompanied by the tune of Garryowen, is familiar to many.

Custer's legacy is marked by deep controversy and division, as he has faced severe criticism for his actions against Native Americans, which many view as genocidal. Conversely, he is also regarded by some as a martyr for the cause of American expansionism. Both perspectives hold validity, rendering him a multifaceted and complex historical figure.

Less well known are Custer's military exploits as a young officer during the Civil War. His aggressive tactics, readiness to lead from the front lines, and ability to motivate his troops contributed to his rapid rise in fame and rank, despite the inherent dangers of his approach. However, this same aggressive disposition also resulted in notable failures and precarious situations.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

General George Armstrong Custer. From a photographic negative in Brady's National Portrait Gallery.

West Point

Custer was born in Ohio on December 5, 1839. He spent part of his youth in Michigan, with a half-sister and her husband, and would consider the state his adopted home. Despite his humble background and youthful indiscretions, a Michigan Congressman secured Custer a place at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point when he was 18. Custer entered West Point as a cadet on July 1, 1857, as a member of the class of 1862, which consisted of seventy-nine cadets engaged in a rigorous five-year program. He graduated at the bottom of his class, ranking 34th out of 34, as 23 of his peers had either dropped out due to academic challenges or resigned to join the Confederacy.

Throughout his tenure at West Point, Custer consistently challenged established norms and regulations. Over the course of four years, he accumulated an astonishing 726 demerits, marking one of the most notorious conduct records in the institution's history. Although he possessed considerable intelligence and talent, he largely disregarded the Academy's disciplinary measures and exhibited a lack of diligence in his studies. His behavior nearly led to expulsion on multiple occasions, and he ultimately graduated last in his class, a designation often referred to as the “goat.” With the onset of the American Civil War in 1861, the duration of the course was reduced to four years, allowing Custer and his classmates to graduate on June 24, 1861, a fortuitous moment for an aspiring military leader.

Outbreak of the Civil War

The United States Army faced a critical shortage of officers at the onset of the Civil War. In response to this urgent need, Custer received a commission as a second lieutenant and was assigned to the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment. His initial responsibilities included training volunteers in Washington, D.C., and shortly thereafter, his unit was deployed to the front lines. During the First Battle of Bull Run, Custer served with his regiment, where Army commander Winfield Scott tasked him to deliver messages to Major General Irvin McDowell.

Following the battle, Custer remained engaged in the defense of Washington, D.C., until he fell ill in October 1861, which led to his absence from the unit until February 1862. Upon his return, he participated in the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia with the 2nd Cavalry, remaining active until early April 1862. His involvement during this critical period was significant as the campaign unfolded. 3. On April 5, 1862, Custer transferred to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, which was involved in the Siege of Yorktown from April 5 to May 4, where he served as aide to Major General George B. McClellan. By late May, he was entrusted with a leadership role that he executed with remarkable success, resulting in a promotion to Captain, although he would later face a demotion. Throughout this time, he participated in all the key battles of the Maryland campaign, further solidifying his military reputation.

During the Peninsula Campaign, on May 24, 1862, during the pursuit of General Joseph E Johnston, General George McClellan and his staff were reconnoitering a potential crossing point on the Chickahominy River. Custer overheard General John G. Barnard mutter, "I wish I knew how deep it is." Custer dashed forward on his horse out to the middle of the river, turned to the astonished officers, and shouted triumphantly, "McClellan, that's how deep it is, Genera!".

In his first battle command, He led an attack with four companies of the 4th Michigan Infantry across the Chickahominy River above New Bridge. The attack was successful, resulting in the capture of 50 Confederate soldiers and the seizing of the first Confederate battle flag of the war. McClellan congratulated Custer personally.

Antietam

Custer consistently maintained a positive rapport with his superiors throughout his military career. His collaboration with McClellan marked a significant turning point in his professional development. It is commonly understood that Custer's tenure under McClellan sparked his fascination with personal publicity, a factor that would have lasting implications for both his military engagements and his subsequent life.

During the Battle of Antietam, Custer served on McClellan’s staff, where he was responsible for the strategic placement of troops as directed by the commander. An order issued by McClellan specifically instructed General Sumner to maneuver Sedgwick and French across a creek at fords that "Captain Custer will show you," highlighting Custer's integral role in the operation. (On page 212 of Hartwig’s “I Dread the Thought of the Place”.)

Pennsylvania Campaign

Between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, there were huge changes in the command structure of the US Cavalry. Stoneman was relieved of his command and sent to Washington DC to become Chief of the Cavalry Bureau, which was a demotion. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Pleasonton succeeded him as the commander of the Cavalry Corps. Additionally, Brigadier General John Buford and his brigade were reassigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, while Brigadier General Wesley Merritt took charge of the Reserve Brigade. The death of Colonel Benjamin Franklin “Grimes” Davis at Brandy Station led to Colonel William Gamble assuming command of Buford's 1st Brigade. Kilpatrick was promoted to command of the 3rd Cavalry Division on June 13.

On June 9, 1863, Custer was appointed as aide to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pleasonton, who was tasked with the critical mission of locating General Robert E. Lee's army as it advanced northward through the Shenandoah Valley at the onset of the Gettysburg Campaign. In preparation for the Battle of Gettysburg, Custer played a pivotal role in the Battle of Aldie on June 17, contributing to the Cavalry Corps' operations in Loudoun Valley. His bold maneuvers were instrumental in delaying the Confederate cavalry, which was tasked with monitoring the movements of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. This engagement served as one of Custer's initial opportunities to demonstrate his capabilities in leading cavalry forces.

The Battle of Aldie on June 17, 1863, marked a pivotal moment in the series of cavalry skirmishes that constituted the Loudoun Valley Campaign, serving as a precursor to the more extensive Battle of Gettysburg. During this engagement, Union and Confederate cavalry forces clashed as General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia advanced northward into Pennsylvania. Custer emerged as a key figure in these confrontations, demonstrating his tactical acumen and leadership abilities.

The conflict commenced when Union cavalry, led by Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, sought to locate and confront the Confederate cavalry commanded by Colonel Thomas Munford, who was tasked with screening Lee's advancing forces. At this juncture, Custer, a young officer on the rise, was assigned to lead the 5th Michigan Cavalry regiment within Kilpatrick's division. His leadership was crucial as the Union forces aimed to disrupt the Confederate maneuvers.

As the battle progressed, Custer orchestrated several daring charges against the well-entrenched Confederate troops, who had fortified themselves along strategic roads and ridges. His aggressive strategies not only maintained pressure on the enemy but also resulted in significant casualties for his men. Notably, Custer's audacious charge succeeded in breaching a critical Confederate position, leading to the capture of several enemy soldiers and temporarily displacing Confederate forces from the battlefield. Throughout the engagement, Custer's visible presence and fearless leadership galvanized his troops.  The battle ended inconclusively, with both sides holding their ground as night fell. However, Custer’s regiment and the Union cavalry achieved their tactical objective of delaying the Confederate forces. This was important because it slowed Munford's cavalry, preventing them from fully screening Lee’s army, and allowed Union forces to gather more intelligence on Confederate movements.

On June 22, 1863, Pleasanton was elevated to the rank of major general in the U.S. Volunteers. Following a consultation with George Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac, Pleasanton received directives that would significantly impact the course of the war. He was instructed to replace political generals with leaders who were ready to engage in combat and personally spearhead mounted assaults. Among his aides, he identified three individuals who exemplified the aggressive leadership he sought: Wesley Merritt, Elon J. Farnsworth, both of whom possessed command experience, and George Armstrong Custer. Each of these officers was promptly promoted to brigadier general, with Custer taking command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade, known as the "Wolverines," which was part of Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick's division. Notably, Custer, at the age of 23, became one of the youngest generals in the Union Army, despite lacking direct command experience. The so-called "Boy Generals" were poised to make significant contributions in the days to come, with Merritt and Custer embarking on distinguished careers, while Farnsworth tragically lost his life shortly thereafter.

On June 30, 1863, Custer and the First and Seventh Michigan Cavalry were advancing through Hanover, Pennsylvania, with the Fifth and Sixth Michigan Cavalry trailing approximately seven miles behind. Upon hearing the sounds of gunfire, Custer redirected his forces toward the source of the commotion. A courier informed him that Farnsworth's Brigade had come under attack from Confederate cavalry in the town's side streets. After regrouping his command, Custer received orders from Kilpatrick to confront the enemy to the northeast of town, near the railway station. He skillfully deployed his troops and initiated an advance. Following a brief exchange of fire, the Confederate forces retreated to the northeast.  This might seem surprising because Lee and his army were somewhere to the west, but Stuart was looking for Early who he thought was still at York; but Early had left that morning.  Early had gone west that morning on exactly the road Stuart was now taking east. Though this skirmish in itself was of little consequence, it was a major part of the reason Stuart.

Following the engagement at Hanover on June 30, Custer advanced through Abbottstown, Pennsylvania, in pursuit of Stuart. By July 1, the sounds of conflict from Gettysburg, located approximately 14 miles to the west and slightly south, began to reach them late that morning. On the same day, Custer encountered Confederate Brigadier General Wade Hampton at Hunterstown, where a skirmish ensued.

The following morning, July 2, Custer received orders to advance toward Culp’s Hill with the objective of disrupting enemy communications. As he neared Hunterstown in the afternoon, he learned that Stuart was in close proximity and had not yet detected his presence. Demonstrating exceptional courage, Custer took the initiative to scout ahead alone, discovering that the Confederate forces were unaware of his troops' arrival, which allowed him to conduct his own reconnaissance.

Upon returning to his command, Custer strategically positioned his forces along both sides of the road, ensuring they remained concealed from the enemy. He placed the First and Fifth Michigan Cavalry, along with his artillery, behind a low rise further down the road. To lure the Confederate cavalry into his trap, he rallied A Troop of the Sixth Michigan Cavalry, boldly declaring, "Come on boys, I'll lead you this time!" He charged directly at the unsuspecting rebels, who, as anticipated, pursued him. Despite suffering significant losses and being left on foot after his horse was shot, Custer was rescued by Private Norvell Francis Churchill. Ultimately, Custer and his remaining troops managed to escape, while the pursuing Confederates were repelled by rifle and artillery fire, leading to a withdrawal from both sides.

East Cavalry Field

Custer spent most of the night in the saddle, and reached Two Taverns, Pennsylvania, approximately five miles southeast of Gettysburg, at around 3:00 a.m. on July 3. The cavalry skirmishes that took place on this day in 1863 are noteworthy, even though they were not the central focus of the Gettysburg battle. At East Cavalry Field, located three miles east of Gettysburg, forces led by J.E.B. Stuart engaged with Gregg's division and Brigadier General George A. Custer's brigade from the 3rd Division. This encounter resulted in an extended mounted conflict, which included intense hand-to-hand combat, with both factions asserting they had emerged victorious.

Custer's involvement in the cavalry confrontations on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg stands out as one of his most significant contributions during the war. Commanding a brigade of Michigan Cavalry, he fought valiantly at East Cavalry Field, where he played a pivotal role in thwarting Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart's attempts to launch an assault on the Union's rear during Pickett’s Charge. Custer's renowned charge, accompanied by the rallying cry “Come on, you Wolverines!” ignited a fierce battle that ultimately disrupted Stuart’s strategy and aided in securing a Union victory.

J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry finally arrived on the battlefield late on July 2, but the response from General Lee was less than enthusiastic. Lee instructed Stuart to maneuver behind the Union lines to penetrate their rear. By approximately 11 a.m., just three hours before Pickett’s Charge, Stuart had positioned his forces about three miles east of the Union line, intending to flank the Union left at Cress Ridge. However, Custer's troops, equipped with Spencer repeating rifles, held their ground resolutely, reminiscent of Buford’s brigades on the first day of battle. Consequently, at 1 p.m., Stuart ordered a direct assault led by Fitz Hugh Lee’s 1st Virginia Cavalry.

On July 3rd, Custer was reassigned from Kilpatrick's command to serve under the leadership of Gregg’s division. The overall command structure placed Buford at the helm of the 3rd Cavalry Division, with the majority of his forces positioned far from the conflict occurring in Westminster, Maryland. However, Buford's reserve brigade, commanded by Wesley Merritt, was stationed to the south of Gettysburg. At this juncture, David Gregg had two brigades under his command, one led by McIntosh and the other by Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, his cousin, both of which were deployed along the Baltimore Turnpike. Consequently, Gregg temporarily loaned one of his brigade divisions to Custer’s Michigan Brigade, while Kilpatrick and Farnsworth found themselves southwest of Little Round Top, resulting in a fragmented command structure.

The conventional narrative suggests that the Confederate forces were unaware of the Union cavalry's movements until Stuart signaled Lee with four artillery shots. However, this account raises questions, as Gregg had already established the positions for Custer and McIntosh earlier that day. Furthermore, Pleasonton had informed Gregg of Stuart's proximity, yet he still instructed Custer to return to Kilpatrick. Both Gregg and Custer deemed this order imprudent, leading them to disregard it and prepare for engagement instead.

In response to the situation, Gregg directed Custer and the 7th Michigan to launch a counterattack. Custer took the lead, rallying his men with the call, “Come on you Wolverines.” At that moment, the Virginia cavalry was positioned behind a fence, with over 700 horsemen engaged in combat using sabers, pistols, and rifles. Just as Custer appeared poised to force a retreat among the Virginians, Stuart countered by sending Wade Hampton to launch an attack, compelling Custer to withdraw. During the skirmish, Custer's horse was killed, prompting him to borrow his bugler's mount, which also met a similar fate. In response, Gregg ordered his remaining brigade to charge once more, but after approximately 40 minutes of intense fighting, both sides ultimately retreated. Custer's valor was particularly pronounced as he orchestrated a series of audacious cavalry charges against the Stuart. Despite facing overwhelming odds, His decisive actions were instrumental in thwarting Stuart’s cavalry from launching a surprise attack on Union troops, thereby playing a vital role in securing a Union victory.

This assault was conceived as part of a tripartite offensive that was meant to occur simultaneously, with Early and Pickett launching their attacks in a coordinated manner. This reflects the traditional military strategy of the time. However, a more contemporary interpretation suggests that Stuart was expected to approach Culp’s Hill from the south, while Early’s infantry would advance from the north. It is believed that Lee anticipated that if Pickett’s charge succeeded in pushing back the Union line and Stuart managed to penetrate their rear, it would create significant confusion among Union forces. While Lee recognized the necessity of coordinating his forces for a unified attack, there is no substantial evidence to indicate that he envisioned this operation as an envelopment, particularly given the limited size of Stuart’s contingent.

The casualties incurred during the 40 minutes of intense combat at East Cavalry Field were relatively modest, totaling 254 for the Union—of which 219 were from Custer's brigade—and 181 for the Confederates. Some reports indicate that Custer's losses were as high as 257, marking the most significant cavalry brigade loss in the battle. Stuart commanded approximately 6,000 troops, while Custer had 1,200 and McIntosh had 2,400. Although the engagement did not yield a decisive tactical outcome, it represented a strategic setback for both Stuart and Robert E. Lee, whose objective to penetrate the Union's rear were ultimately thwarted.

Williamsport

The Battle of Williamsport, which lasted from July 6–16, 1863, occurred during Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg. Union cavalry forces, including those under George Armstrong Custer, pursued the Confederate army as it retreated toward the Potomac River, attempting to cross back into Virginia. Custer played a notable role in these engagements, especially in harassing Lee's rear guard and attacking Confederate forces protecting their retreat.

After the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Lee's army began retreating southward toward the Potomac River. Custer, commanding a brigade in General Judson Kilpatrick’s division, was part of the Union cavalry tasked with pursuing the retreating Confederates and disrupting their movement. His orders were to engage the Confederate rear guard, disrupt their wagon trains, and prevent them from crossing the Potomac, buying time for Union infantry to catch up.

Custer and his brigade engaged in several skirmishes with Confederate cavalry near Hagerstown and Williamsport. The Confederate forces were defending their supply trains and attempting to hold off the Union cavalry long enough to repair bridges and establish a crossing point at the Potomac River. Custer led his men in multiple aggressive attacks on Confederate positions, targeting both their cavalry and the wagon trains full of supplies. His boldness was consistent with his typical approach, charging Confederate lines in an effort to force them back.

During one of these engagements near Williamsport on July 6, Custer’s brigade became overextended after a particularly aggressive charge. He advanced too far ahead of supporting Union forces and was nearly encircled by Confederate infantry and cavalry. Custer’s position was briefly precarious, as he faced being surrounded and cut off. Despite this, Custer managed to organize a defense and retreat his brigade to a more secure position, avoiding disaster. His men were able to disengage and hold their ground until Union reinforcements arrived.

Over the course of the next several days, Custer and other Union cavalry units continued to pressure the Confederate forces around Williamsport, making repeated attempts to break through Confederate defenses and prevent Lee’s army from safely crossing the flooded Potomac River. While the Union cavalry, including Custer, succeeded in capturing a number of wagons and prisoners, they were ultimately unable to completely prevent the Confederates from repairing their bridges and making their escape into Virginia.

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.

On July 16, cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Custer was involved in these battles.

The Overland Campaign

When Major General Philip Sheridan moved east, the resulting alliance with Custer as his subordinate would produce huge dividends in many battles. On May 6 at 8 AM, Custer, commanding 1st brigade 1st division received movement orders from a position at a crossroads on Brock Road to attack Longstreet in the flank. But Longstreet wasn’t at that location. A huge battle ensued when it turned out he was moving in the vicinity of Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. The resulting, really unplanned and surprise firefight at Todd’s Tavern led to Lee’s retreat across the field.

The Battle of Trevilian Station occurred on June 11–12, 1864. It was the largest all-cavalry battle of the Civil War, Trevilian Station saw Custer lead his men in an aggressive attack against Confederate cavalry under Wade Hampton. Although the Union forces were ultimately forced to withdraw, Custer's brigade fought tenaciously.

Over 9000 Union troops faced about 6700 Confederates. It is estimated that the Union had over 1500 casualties including 150 killed, most from Custer’s brigade. The Confederates sustained over 800 casualties.

Custer’s participation at Trevilian shows the danger of his aggressiveness. Custer found himself and his division encircled by Confederate cavalry, yet he chose to stand firm rather than retreat. He inspired his men to maintain their defensive position until reinforcements arrived, allowing his unit to escape a precarious situation.  Sheridan was moving to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and create a diversion while Grant crossed the James River. But Hampton beat Sheridan to the station, and what ensued was the largest cavalry of the war. Custer’s mission was to circle into Hampton’s rear. Instead, he got trapped and had to fight desperately to get out of it. This action has been called “Custer’s First Last Stand”.

On the first day of the battle), Custer was assigned to lead a brigade in Sheridan’s cavalry corps. As Sheridan’s force moved toward Trevilian Station, Custer launched an aggressive raid ahead of the main Union force. He moved boldly into the Confederate rear, cutting off General Wade Hampton’s Confederate cavalry from their supply trains and capturing over 800 men and Confederate wagons.

However, this aggressive maneuver placed Custer and his men in a precarious position. Once the Confederates realized Custer was isolated, they encircled his brigade. Custer found himself surrounded by Hampton’s cavalry, with no immediate support from the rest of Sheridan's force.

For several hours, Custer and his men were caught in a desperate defensive situation, with their position effectively cut off. His brigade formed a defensive circle to fend off repeated Confederate attacks, using their wagons as makeshift barricades. Despite being outnumbered and surrounded, Custer managed to hold out long enough for reinforcements from Sheridan’s other divisions to arrive and relieve him. During this time, Custer lost his personal battle flag, which was captured by Confederate forces—a symbolic loss, though he managed to avoid the complete destruction of his brigade.

On June 12, the second day of the battle, Custer’s brigade regrouped and continued to fight fiercely as part of the larger Union cavalry force. Sheridan’s troops launched repeated assaults against the entrenched Confederate cavalry at Trevilian Station, but despite their efforts, the Union cavalry failed to break through Hampton’s defenses.

Though Custer and his men fought valiantly, Sheridan’s overall raid did not achieve its primary objectives. Sheridan eventually withdrew, unable to destroy the railroad or link up with Hunter. While the battle was tactically inconclusive, the Confederates held the field, and Custer's performance, though audacious, had mixed results. His initial success in capturing Confederate supplies and disrupting their rear was overshadowed by the fact that his brigade was nearly destroyed during the encirclement.

Overall, Custer’s actions at Trevilian Station were typical of his aggressive, high-risk style of command. Although he narrowly avoided disaster, his ability to lead under fire and maintain discipline in dire circumstances earned him respect, even if the battle itself was a strategic setback for the Union.

Yellow Tavern

In this battle on May 11, 1864, General Philip Sheridan outmaneuvered and outmanned Stuart. In a surprise counterattack, Stuart was mortally wounded by a retreating Union soldier. Custer’s role in this battle was pivotal. During Sheridan’s raid toward Richmond, Custer’s men were heavily involved in the fighting, and the death of Stuart marked a turning point for Confederate cavalry leadership.

Sheridan amassed over 10-12,000 cavalry and 32 artillery pieces, stretching 13 miles long. This provided him with a two-to-one advantage – Stuart had about 4500 men. He had amassed 3 cavalry divisions to fight against 2 brigades. Moreover, Sheridan’s men were armed with rapid-fire Spencer Carbines. Sheridan’s three divisions were commanded by Brig. Gens. Wesley Merritt, David M. Gregg and James H. Wilson. Stuart’s forces included Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee’s division, consisting of brigades under Brig. Gens. Lunsford Lomax and Williams C. Wickham and a brigade of North Carolinians commanded by Brig. Gen. James Gordon from Brig. Gen. William Henry Fitzhugh “Rooney” Lee’s division.

Having arrived just an hour ahead of Sheridan, Stuart chose to defend a low ridgeline bordering the road. Stuart placed his two brigades, under the commanders Lunsford L. Lomax and Williams C. Wickham, in a “Y” formation along the intersection of the two roads. On the Confederate left, Lomax’s men engaged the Union brigades of Thomas C. Devin, Alfred Gibbs, and George Armstrong Custer, and after intense fighting were driven back to the same ridge line occupied by Wickham. The initial Union charge was halted.

Stuart sent Gordon’s brigade to harass Sheridan’s rear. Sheridan wasn’t interested in outracing Stuart, he wanted to give battle. Stuart beat Sheridan to the crossroads of Telegraph Road and Mountain Road, which was necessary for Sheridan to pass through to get to Richmond. At this intersection was an old hotel called Yellow Tavern. He placed Wickham’s brigade on a high ridge and a right angle to Lomax’s brigade to form a pincher movement when Sheridan arrived. As planned, Merritt advanced toward the ridge and Lomax attacked at the flank. But, Merritt had a brigade led by Devin to flank Lomax, forcing a retreat. To protect the retreat, the 5th Virginia regrouped and Devin charged. This led to a stalemate in the area below the ridge.

After a brief lull, Sheridan renewed his attack. His men, both mounted and dismounted, charged amid the roar of a sudden thunderstorm. Custer’s brigade aimed for the center of the Confederate line. Union troops charged across Turner’s Run—a stream that bisected and ran perpendicular to the Telegraph Road—and up the ridge to the Confederate position. Witnessing the devastating break in his line, Stuart immediately galloped to the position of his old command, the 1st Virginia Cavalry. And then the 1st Virginia Cavalry countercharged, driving the Union troops back.

At this moment, at 4 pm, Custer proposed an attack along a small stream called Turner’s Run. Taking the 1st Michigan along with numerous other regiments, he made an initial lodgment in the Rebel line but was overwhelmed when reinforcements came up. In this retreat, a dismounted soldier shot Stuart in the abdomen, passing through him. As the 5th Michigan Cavalry retreated past Stuart, he was shot with a .44 caliber revolver from a distance of 10-30 yards. Stuart was killed by a dismounted Union private in retreat named John A Huff. Huff was a former sharpshooter with Berdan’s sharpshooters. Fitzhugh Lee took command and prevented a disorderly retreat. Meanwhile, Custer sent more men forward, forcing a full retreat.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864

Custer played a significant role in Union General Philip Sheridan’s efforts to defeat Confederate forces under General Jubal Early. The campaign's objective was to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Confederate control, as it was a crucial agricultural region and an important supply line for the South.

Third Battle of Winchester. In the Third Battle of Winchester on September 19, 1864, also known as the Battle of Opequon, Custer played a key role as a cavalry commander under Major General Philip Sheridan during the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Custer was in command of one of Sheridan’s cavalry brigades. Custer performed several daring charges during the battle. His aggressive cavalry tactics helped to drive Early's forces back. Custer's success in leading repeated cavalry assaults allowed the Union forces to capture Confederate positions and force a retreat. Custer’s cavalry played a key role in routing Confederate forces, and his aggressive tactics helped deliver a decisive victory for the Union. His division broke through Confederate lines and captured many soldiers and artillery pieces, contributing to the campaign's overall success. His role was primarily to flank and harass the Confederate forces under Lieutenant General Jubal Early. The Union cavalry was tasked with cutting off Confederate escape routes and striking the enemy from unexpected angles while the Union infantry pressed the Confederate center and left.

Custer’s cavalry was directed to attack the Confederate right flank. This proved to be crucial as the Confederate line was already buckling under pressure from Union infantry assaults. Custer’s aggressive push on their flank contributed to the eventual collapse of Early’s forces.

As the Confederate line broke, Custer’s cavalry was among the first to exploit the breakthrough. He led his men in a vigorous pursuit of the retreating Confederate soldiers, cutting down those who fled and capturing prisoners, artillery pieces, and other valuable supplies. His men played a significant role in turning the Confederate retreat into a rout.

Custer's cavalry captured several artillery pieces during the battle, further demoralizing Early’s troops and preventing them from re-establishing defensive positions. This loss of artillery was a major blow to the Confederate forces, who were already struggling with inferior numbers and resources.

This battle was a decisive Union victory, and Custer’s cavalry, including his aggressive leadership and ability to inspire his men to press the attack, was a key factor. This victory opened the way for further Union advances in the Shenandoah Valley, helping to secure Sheridan's objectives in the region and weakening the Confederate war effort.

Battle of Fisher's Hill. Following Third Winchester, Sheridan’s forces pursued Early’s retreating army to Fisher’s Hill. On September 21-22, 1864, Custer's cavalry helped to flank the Confederate army, contributing to the Union victory. His rapid movements and aggressive use of cavalry were critical in keeping pressure on the retreating Confederate forces.

Battle of Cedar Creek. Custer's most celebrated actions during the Shenandoah Campaign occurred at the Battle of Cedar Creek on October 19, 1864. Initially, Early’s Confederates launched a surprise pre-dawn attack on the Union army, routing them from their camps and driving them back. Sheridan, who was away from the battlefield at the start of the attack, famously rallied his forces upon his return and began a counterattack in the afternoon.

During the battle, Custer commanded a cavalry division and played a pivotal role in Sheridan’s afternoon counteroffensive. On September 25th, Grant asked Sheridan to send either Torbert or Wilson to Georgia to take over the cavalry there. Sheridan chose Wilson and put Custer in command of Wilson’s 3rd Cavalry Division in time for Cedar Creek.  His leadership helped stabilize Union forces and allowed them to regroup after the initial Confederate assault. As Sheridan’s forces pressed forward, Custer's division launched aggressive cavalry charges that shattered the Confederate flanks. His relentless attacks helped turn the tide of battle, leading to a decisive Union victory. Many historians credit Custer’s bold charges as crucial in breaking Early’s army and turning a near Union disaster into a triumph.

Custer’s role in Sheridan’s Shenandoah Campaign, particularly at Cedar Creek, solidified his reputation as a brave and effective cavalry commander. His aggressive tactics were well-suited to the fast-moving and chaotic nature of cavalry warfare, and his actions contributed significantly to the Union's victory in the Shenandoah Valley, which deprived the Confederacy of a vital region and disrupted their plans to divert Union attention away from General Robert E. Lee's forces around Richmond.

Appomattox

Custer’s cavalry had a key role in blocking the retreat of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during the final days of the war. Custer’s men captured Confederate supply trains and were among the first to receive Lee’s flag of truce, leading to the surrender at Appomattox Court House, which effectively ended the war. During the closing days of the war, Custer’s relentless pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Robert E. Lee helped to hasten their surrender. When Sheridan's troops overran Confederate defenses at Five Forks on Saturday, April 1, 1865, Lee decided to abandon the Petersburg defenses and, in doing so, to vacate Richmond. Once this decision was made, the war was essentially over.

The prelude to Five Forks was the day before, March 31. Recognizing that Five Forks was the key to control of the Southside RR, Union forces moved around the Confederate left flank. Two simultaneous battle movements, resulting in two separate actions, resulted. At the Battle of Dinwoodie Courthouse, Sheridan attempted a flanking maneuver. At the same time, Warren moved west on White Oak Road, where a battle ensued.

Lee anticipated these movements perfectly. He sent Pickett and cavalry under Fitz Hugh Lee to meet Sheridan. Although surprised, both Union attacks prevailed and the Confederate forces suffered 1500 casualties, a huge loss considering their dwindling numbers. They retreated to Five Forks.

After the Battle of Dinwiddie Court House, V Corps infantry began to arrive near the battlefield to reinforce Sheridan's cavalry. Pickett's orders from Lee were to defend Five Forks "at all hazards" because of its strategic importance. On March 30, Warren had occupied a crucial crossroads at Five Forks where Boydton Plank Road crossed Quaker Road.  Sheridan’s cavalry, meanwhile, was rapidly advancing in a left turn aimed at Five Forks.

Lee knew Grant wouldn’t make a frontal assault, and deduced his opponent’s best option. Lee ordered Pickett’s infantry to attack Warren and Fitzhugh Lee to attack Sheridan. These attacks came as a surprise, as the Union did not see these responses. Although Dinwiddie was a tactical victory for Fitzhugh Lee, by that evening, Sheridan and Warren had merged after having caused over 1500 casualties. At Five Forks, Sheridan had defeated Pickett, who famously was not present at the battle, instead being engaged in a shad bake (because of an acoustic shadow, he never heard the fighting).. The Union force inflicted over 1,000 casualties on the Confederates and took up to 4,000 prisoners while seizing Five Forks, a vital supply line and evacuation route. The end was near, and Custer had played a significant role.

During the closing days of the war, Custer’s relentless pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Robert E. Lee helped to hasten their surrender.  After a truce was arranged, General Custer was escorted through the lines to meet General Longstreet, who described Custer as having flaxen locks flowing over his shoulders. Custer said, “In the name of General Sheridan I demand the unconditional surrender of this army.” Longstreet replied that he was not in command of the army, but if he was, he would not deal with messages from Sheridan. Custer responded it would be a pity to have more blood upon the field, to which Longstreet suggested the truce be respected, and then added “General Lee has gone to meet General Grant, and it is for them to determine the future of the armies.”

Custer was in attendance at the McLean House to witness the surrender. Pictured is the furniture upon which the surrender was signed by Generals Lee and Grant at the McLean House at Appomattox. The White table and wicker chair were those used by Lee. It was purchased by General Ord who donated it to the Chicago Historical Society. it is currently on display at the Chicago Historical Museum. The leather chair and round table were used by Grant. General Sheridan bought Grant’s furniture from the McLeans and presented it to General Custer's wife as a souvenir. She used it for several years in her home, then donated it to the Smithsonian. Sheridan included a note praising Custer's gallantry. Think about how truly awesome that is, and how much Sheridan must have valued his contributions.

On April 15, 1865, Custer was promoted to major general in the U.S. Volunteers, making him the youngest major general in the Union Army at age 25. He would go on to higher glory and a crushing defeat, in the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 1870s. His background with Sherman and Sheridan, who would both go on to become Commanding Generals of the United States Army, positioned him ideally for a leading role in that conflict.

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References

·       Ambrose, Stephen E. (1996). Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors. New York: Anchor Books.

·       "George Armstrong Custer". American Battlefield Trust. November 4, 2009. 

·       Wert, Jeffry D. (1996). Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster.

·       Wittenberg, Eric J. (2001). Glory Enough for All : Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station. Brassey's Inc.

·       https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/george-armstrong-custer

·       https://www.americancivilwarstory.com/george-armstrong-custer.html

·       https://www.historynet.com/george-custer/

·       https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/george-armstrong-custer

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-first-last-stand