The 1803 Louisiana Purchase: The Start of the American Midwest

The Louisiana Purchase was the purchase of a vast area of land by the United States from Napoleonic France in 1803. While France only occupied a small amount of the territory, it comprised vast swathes of what is now the American Midwest. William Floyd Junior explains the history of the territory and how the US came to acquire it.

The Louisiana Purchase on a modern map. Source: William Morris, available here.

The first administration of Thomas Jefferson (1801-1805) basically turned on one event, the purchase of the Louisiana Territory and control of the Mississippi River. It was the river, which occupied the President’s mind along with its free navigation, which would lead to the acquisition of the vast territory of approximately 828,000 square miles. Jefferson first began contemplating his vision about the time of the Revolution. In confronting the problem of Virginia’s frontiers, he thought of his idea as “Empire of Liberty.” In his first inaugural address, Jefferson spoke of the United States as, “a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth generation.”

European Exploration

The story of the Louisiana Territory began as far back as 1519, when a Spanish sea expedition explored the Gulf of Mexico. This would be the first time that Europeans would site the mouth of the Mississippi River. In 1528, there was another Spanish expedition of some three hundred men travelling inland from the coast of Florida. After a torturous expedition, four emaciated survivors would reach a Spanish settlement in Mexico after wondering through southern Louisiana and much of the southwest for eight years.

In 1541, Hernando de Soto, the newly appointed governor of Cuba, organized an expedition of six hundred soldiers for the purpose of exploring the Louisiana territory. De Soto would die the following year of yellow fever. The force would be reduced by hunger, disease, and Native American attacks to about half of its original size, causing it to sail down the Mississippi to safer surroundings.

The first European settlers to move into the Mississippi Valley were French, who would come in from the north instead of the usual southern route. Samuel de Champlain became governor of new France in 1633 and would encourage his countrymen to expand further into the interior.

When King Louis XIV became ruler of France, he moved to shut the Spanish out of North America and curb British expansion. A great Anglo-French rivalry for control of the Mississippi Valley would ensue.

Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, a young adventurer-explorer would name the territory he was exploring, Louisiana after the king. On April 9, 1682, La Salle planted a column and cross-painted it with “the arms of France.” La Salle would also formulate a plan for the colonization of the lower Mississippi Valley. La Salle would be murdered by two of his own men before he could establish settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi River. In the summer of 1684, France made peace with Spain. The peace and LaSalle’s failure led the French government to abandon immediate plans for attacking New Spain by establishing colonies on the lower Mississippi.

In September 1715, after being in power for seventy-two years, Louis XIV died. He would leave France and the empire bankrupt by the cost of years of war around the world. Several years after Louis died, the rivalry between England and France would gain momentum. France would go on to claim the entire Ohio valley. English leaders looked at Louisiana along with Canada as a wall confining their colonies to the Atlantic seaboard. The French continued exploring trying to find a route to the Pacific Ocean. By 1752, they planted the French flag at the foot of the Rocky Mountains. By the early 1790s, a mass migration had started dividing the country.

1800s

By 1800, France would reign supreme in Europe and Napoleon turned his energies to rebuilding his overseas empire. Louisiana and the Floridas were major elements of his grand design centered on Santo Domingo, the richest of the colonies. In the same year, Spain ceded Louisiana to France on October 1, by the Treaty of San Ildefonso. However, Spain refused to part with the Floridas. Napoleon would now mount an expedition to take possession of Louisiana at the port of New Orleans. Jefferson became aware of the retrocession causing a shadow to fall over his administration.

Napoleon planned to build a commercial bloc in the Caribbean Basin that consisted of the strategically important West Indian Islands Martinique and Saint Dominque which would be linked with Louisiana. The French in the Mississippi Valley would be President Jefferson’s first great diplomatic crisis. He had been a long- time friend of France since his days as ambassador in Paris (1784-1789), which made him familiar with French diplomacy and politics.

Although Jefferson had never been west of the Shenandoah Valley, his attitude about the Mississippi Valley and beyond was long-standing. When news that Spain had ceded its rights to Napoleon and France, Jefferson recognized this as a fundamental shift in the strategic situation. It both threatened American security and would block western expansion.

Jefferson’s instructions to Robert Livingston, the newly appointed American ambassador to France were very direct. The fact that France would now control the Louisiana region was a major disaster that “completely reverses all the political relations with the United States and will fill a new epoch in our political course.” It constituted, he believed, the greatest challenge to American independence and national integrity since the American Revolution. Despite prior friendships with France, the moment the French occupied New Orleans, the two nations became enemies.

Monroe mission

Livingston was more than capable, but he was not a Virginian. Jefferson wanted someone in Paris whom he could trust beyond any doubt. In effect, he would order James Monroe, who was at the time Virginia’s governor, to become a special envoy to France. Monroe’s instructions authorized the purchase of New Orleans and as much of the Mississippi Valley as possible. The boundaries of the French acquisition from Spain were not clear, but Jefferson was offering up to ten million dollars.

During the winter and spring of 1803, while the outcome of the Monroe mission was yet to be decided, Jefferson’s management of the prospective crisis was both smart and shrewd. He would see to it that an old French friend, du Pont de Nemours, was provided information about America’s intentions that could be leaked in the corridors of Versailles. 

When the Spanish official governing New Orleans abruptly closed the port to American commerce, Jefferson came under considerable pressure to launch a military expedition to seize both the city and the Floridas, abandoning diplomacy in favor of war with both Spain and France. In spite of Congress authorizing the president to raise eighty thousand volunteers for a military campaign, Jefferson would reject the idea and continue to pursue a peaceful outcome. Time and demography were on America’s side, justifying Jefferson’s patient approach.

Jefferson was also lucky in that Napoleon’s decision was not to just to sell New Orleans but the entire Mississippi Valley and the modern-day American Midwest. In the early morning of April 11, 1803, Napoleon announced to his Finance Minister Barbe-Marbois that, “I renounce Louisiana.” Within hours the French were enquiring if the United States had interest in the entire territory of Louisiana. Napoleon’s abrupt decision was prompted by the resumption of the Anglo-French war. Ambassador Livingston had complained in the past that negotiating with the French was impossible: “There is no people, no Legislature, no counsellors. One man is everything. He seldom asks advice, and never hears it unasked.” This was typical of Napoleon’s all-or-nothing style. The payment that Napoleon would receive would help subsidize his European army. This worked directly to Jefferson’s advantage. Napoleon’s losing of Santo Domingo was another reason why Napoleon was willing to depart with Louisiana.

Agreement

Livingston knew what to do. “The field open to us is infinitely larger than our instructions contemplated,” Livingston would tell Madison, and the chance “must not be missed.” Livingston and Monroe, now in Paris, negotiated a treaty which gave the United States the Louisiana Territory. The area was so big that the borders were not clearly defined by either party, for about fifteen million dollars or three cents an acre.

The news of the signing of the deal that reached Jefferson on July 3, 1803, was official but not direct. The news came in a letter from the two ministers to Rufus King who got the news shortly before leaving London, brought it with him on his return home, and sent it to Madison from New York. The report of the acquisition of territory west of the Mississippi surprised the American people more than it did Jefferson or Madison. They had learned of the prospect a number of weeks earlier and had approved a larger negotiation in a private letter sent to Paris. Nevertheless, Jefferson was still surprised by the scope of the deal.

The news of the Louisiana Purchase was not accepted favorably by everyone. In Boston George Cabot wrote to his friend Rufus King, the leader of New England Federalism, regarding the recent purchase as being advantageous to France. It is like selling us a ship after she is surrounded by a British fleet,” he said. He would also write that France was, “rid of an encumbrance that wounded her pride,” while obtaining money and regaining the friendship of the United States.

As Jefferson was taking in the news, he wrote to Merriwether Lewis concerning his exploration of the newly acquired territory, “In the journey which you are about to undertake for the discovery of the course and source of the Mississipi (sic) and of the most convenient water communication from thence to the Pacific Ocean . . .” This was a letter full of optimism but also realistic. Jefferson had now done all he could to control the largely uncontrollable nature of Lewis’s dangerous mission.

The official documents concerning the deal would reach Washington on July 14 and were not made public. However, a summary of them would be given out and the financial terms made public. The terms included a payment of $11,250,000 to France in six per cent stock, redeemable for fifteen years, and the assumption by the United States of the claims of its citizens against France in the amount of $3,750,000. For a period of twelve years French and Spanish ships and merchandise were to pay no higher duties than American in the parts of the ceded territory. Finally, the inhabitants of Louisiana were to be incorporated with the United States as soon as possible, consistent with the Constitution, and were to be secure in their personal rights in the meantime. The financing was arranged with the Anglo-Dutch Merchant Banks, Barings Brothers and Hopes, which in effect bought Louisiana from France and sold it to the United States, making nearly $3,000,000 from the deal.

Constitutional matters

On January 13, 1803, Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, would write to the President explaining his constitutional position regarding the purchase of the Louisiana Territory. He would sum up his opinion by stating the following:

1st. That the United States as a nation has an inherent right to acquire territory.

2d. That whenever that acquisition is by treaty, the same constituted authorities in whom the treaty-making power is vested have a constitutional right to sanction the acquisition.

3d. That whenever the territory has been acquired, Congress have the power either of admitting into the Union as a new state, or of annexing to a State with the consent of that State, or making regulations for the government of such territory.

Later in January, Jefferson would reply to Gallatin saying, “You are right in my opinion, to Mr. L’s proposition: there is no constitutional difficulty as to the acquisition of territory, and whether where acquired it may be taken into the Union by the Constitution as it now stands, will become a question of expediency. It must be assumed at this point that the administration recognized as constitutional the acquisition of territory by treaty. The point of what should be done with it would not be answered at this point in time. For Jefferson to have suggested any difficulties to Congress at this stage would have been to invite trouble. The Senate would finally approve the treaty by a vote of 24 to 7, sealing the deal.

What do you think of the Louisiana Purchase? Let us know below.

Now read William’s article on three great early influences on Thomas Jefferson here.

Sources

1.     Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson & the new nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 745, 746, 747, 748.

2.     Alexander De Conde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976),  4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 15, 20. 

3.     www.loc.gov/collections/louisiana.

4.     Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 243, 244, 245, 246.

5.     Jon Meacham, Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power (New York: Random House, 2012), 385, 387.

6.     Dumas Malone, Jefferson The President: First Term 1801-1805 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 296, 297, 302, 312, 313.

7.     Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Merriwether Lewis, July 4, 1803, National Archives.

8.     Andrew Roberts, Napoleon: A Life (New York: Penguin Group, 2014), 324. 

Feminine National Personifications: Part 2 - Marianne (France)

Feminine personifications of nations are common around the world. Some popular examples include Britannia, Bharat Mata, and Marianne. Usually represented as goddesses, mothers, or queens, these entities embody their countries’ unity, liberty, strength, reason, and spiritual essences. As national icons, they impart to their people a strong sense of identity and belonging associated with their lands. In this two-part mini-series, Apeksha Srivastava highlights some changes in their portrayal with time, along with some similarities and differences among them.

In the first part of this mini-series, she looked at changes in the portrayal of Britannia and Bharat Mata with time. In this second part, she discusses the Marianne of France and some similarities and differences among these national personifications.

A World War II poster, translated as ‘Freedom for France.... freedom for the French.’

Marianne

The Liberal

The 1789 French Revolution saw personifications of “Liberty” and “Reason” combined into one figure, accompanied by the cockade of France and the Phrygian cap (worn by freed slaves in Greece and Rome). She symbolized the nation and replaced the monarch’s image on the new seal of the Republic in 1792. She personified the newly created state, representing the liberation of France [1]. 

Eugène Delacroix’s painting La Liberté Guidant Le Peuple was the first work that put Marianne within a revolutionary tradition (combative “Athena-type”), giving her a socio-political dimension. For many people, her naked upper body signified the liberty she took to defend her lands and children, overstepping the conventional standards [2]. Contrastingly, Daumier’s La Republiquedepicted Marianne suckling two children on her breasts. It represented her as a nourisher of her citizens (“maternal-type”). Agulhon’s book, Marianne into Battle[3], explains how she has been a bold personification of the popular ideals in 19th-century French politics and republic.

The Popular

Marianne continued to evolve in response to the needs of her nation. French political figures have manipulated her image to their specific purposes over different times. She is present on coins, stamps, statues, official buildings, and the official government logo. Other than unifying government-public relations, Marianne gave a more accessible image to France. Her portraits were modeled after French celebrities like Brigitte Bardot (1968), Michèle Morgan (1972), Catherine Deneuve (1985), Laetitia Casta (2000), and Sophie Marceau (2012)[4,5,6]. However, the origin of Marianne’s name still remains unclear. Some believe that it was the combination of Marie (Virgin Mary) and Anne. Others think that it came from Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana’s name or the image of politician Jean Reubell’s wife.

The Strong & Secular

Ni Putes Ni Soumises (2002) was formed against the violence targeting women in working-class suburbs largely populated by North African minorities, and Marianne here was represented as a sense of unity by women of different ethnic backgrounds. Overall, Marianne is a secular image but she is sometimes associated with shades of grey. The new emblem design for theOlympic and Paralympic Games Paris 2024 was recently revealed by the Organizing Committee and Marianne is a part of it[7].

In the Media

Marianne-jokes/cartoons/caricatures have been circulated in recent decades. After the signing of the Entente Cordialebetween England and France in April 1904, Marianne was seen in a number of sketches[8]. In another cartoon from 1898, China is being divided up by Victoria (the UK), Nicholas-II (Russia), Wilhelm-II (Germany), and a samurai (Japan). Marianne, a Russian ally, looks on[9]. In the German posters, Marianne very rarely defeated Germania[10]. Marianne’s continued association with entertainment, fashion, and media assured her rise as the “glamorous” personification of the French Republic.

Some Similarities

Although Britannia, Bharat Mata, and Marianne have their own biographies and share of controversies, they share some common characteristics. They embody love, patriotism, sacrifice, and righteousness, playing a significant role in uniting their countries. The mere lines of the nation-maps need such visual representations, to gain and uphold this collective consciousness and identity. Their ultimate purpose is to facilitate the emotional attachment of the people to their national territory. However, the roles of these ideal symbols of equality and justice are often modified due to changing political/social/economic conditions. Sometimes, they are the protectors, and other times, they need protection.

Britannia, Bharat Mata, and Marianne have some resemblance in terms of leading their countries into hope and success, recycling history/religion, and evolving with time. Such national identities never disappear and are always needed to build and rebuild the nations in one form or another. They also convey a diluted message of “woman-power”.

Some Differences

While Britannia (as a symbol) originated from the Romans and Bharat Mata was inspired by mother goddesses, Marianne translated some of the Virgin Mary’s duties to a national context. Even when Marianne is employed by right-wing politics, she can still continue to represent democratic France. However, some people believe that after 1947, Bharat Mata is not strong enough to depict democratic Indian politics because of her associations with a specific religion. Furthermore, Marianne seems to be more accepted and promoted by her nation’s government than Britannia and Bharat Mata. Another difference is the Bharat Mata temples as an attempt to create a composite religious and national identity. Such places of worship do not seem to be reported in the case of Britannia or Marianne.

Britannia, eventually, started being used to depict the untrue-and-forceful “civilization” of the barbaric colonial “others” in an attempt at self-glorification. In contrast, Bharat Mata was never utilized for this purpose since India never oppressed other regions/countries. Some people think that the Bharat Mata is heavily inspired by Britannia, a byproduct of the century-old direct British rule over the Indian subcontinent. But, others believe that she was derived from goddesses Durga/Kali/Mother-Earth, all of which were worshipped many years before the beginning of the British Raj.

Reflections

The first question that comes to mind is why do some nations choose female personifications? Perhaps, because it is a woman who gives birth and protects her children from danger. She teaches them the principles of life and can be identified with the image of Mother Earth. When turned into a mother/goddess/queen, this “woman” image seems to have an amplified emotional impact on people.

These symbols are tough yet gentle, magnificent yet ordinary, attractive yet simple, combative yet caring, and powerful yet submissive. However, even though the female is idealized, it seems that the male citizens are the major subjects who make most decisions. The woman is above man symbolically but is below them in reality. Nevertheless, there is also the fact that the loving maternal presence is eternal whereas the decision-makers change with time. 

Amidst all these circumstances, it is up to us to utilize these national icons for the betterment of the country and the world as a whole. Of course, the ideal situation is never realized, but constant efforts to get close to it will always help. For example, instead of looking at Britannia, Bharat Mata, and Marianne as goddess/mother/queen, if we try to associate their positive features and power with all girls and women of the respective countries, it would make them more accessible and beneficial to us. Understanding these symbols gives an idea of the past and present foundations of the country they belong to, and their further utilization can predict the path on which that country is headed. The final question that arises is, have we learned enough from the past that could, possibly, aid us to improve our future?

What do you think of these feminine national personifications? Let us know below.

Apeksha Srivastava completed her Master’s degree from the Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. She is currently an aspiring writer and a second-year Ph.D. candidate at this institute. This article is based on an assignment she submitted for the course, Perspectives on Indian Civilization. 

References

1. Marianne goes Multicultural: Ni putes ni soumises and the Republicanisation of Ethnic Minority Women in France. Bronwyn Winter. 2009. French history and civilization: Papers from the George Rudé Seminar Vol 2.

2. Spectres of the Original and the Liberties of Repetition. Leora Maltz-Leca. African Arts. Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 32-45 (14 pages). Published by: UCLA James S. Coleman African Studies Center.

3. Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880. Maurice Agulhon. Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: Cambridge University Press or Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris. 1981.

4. Icon-ising national identity: France and India in comparative perspective. Subrata K. Mitra and Lion König. National Identities, 15(4), 357–377.

5. https://frenchmoments.eu/marianne-and-the-french-republic/

6. https://kids.kiddle.co/Marianne

7. https://www.olympic.org/news/paris-2024-unveils-new-olympic-and-paralympic-games-emblem

8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marianne#/media/File:Germany_GB_France.gif

9. https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/image/imperialism-cartoon-1898

10. Symbiosis between Caricature and Caption at the Outbreak of War: Representations of the Allegorical Figure Marianne in "Kladderadatsch". Douglas M. Klahr. Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 74. Bd., H. 4 (2011), pp. 537-558 (22 pages). Published by: Deutscher Kunstverlag GmbH Munchen Berlin.

America’s Long Lasting Legacy from World War One

World War One was notable for so many reasons. From understanding the current state of Eastern Europe to sewing the seeds of the Second World War, or understanding the falls of both the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. The war also influenced the way the U.S. conducts foreign policy. Alan Cunningham gives his view.

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson returning to America after the Versailles Peace Conference in July 1919.

American involvement in the First World War resulted from both the German Empire’s targeting of American ships via unrestricted submarine warfare and the sending of the Zimmermann telegram from Germany to Mexico. Wilson had the capability to claim that the U.S. was under threat from attack and did so, eventually contributing to the Western European war effort significantly and assisting in bringing the war to an end. From a strategic standpoint, Wilson’s overall stated goal was peace - he wanted the world to have the same ideals and beliefs that the United States itself had, or claimed to have. He repeatedly tried to broker a peace agreement between the warring factions.

I would argue that the most important result of U.S. intervention into the First World War was the retreat back into isolationism. Prior to WWI, the U.S. had been largely keeping to itself, largely engaging in domestic matters, and externally when the country was threatened (or perceived to be threatened) by a foreign nation within its sphere of influence. From the end of the Civil War to the First World War, the United States was becoming more involved in the global scene (with the taking of, what were essentially colonies, in the Philippines and Cuba in the Spanish-American War and multiple interventions in Mexico and Latin America). Despite this, the American public and political leaders retreated inward and left the global scene, instead focusing on “internal growth and development” by increasing tariffs, “that were enacted to restrict the influx of imported goods, thereby increasing domestic production”. While this was the initial motivation factor throughout the 1920s, the later collapse of the U.S. (and global) economy from 1929 further ingrained the idea that the U.S. should focus on domestic issues. The fact that congressional inquiries and anti-war books (USMC Gen. Smedley Butler’s War is a Racket among them) discussed wartime profiteering also put off many Americans on going to war for corporate desires.

Lack of commitment to the League of Nations

While these are certainly legitimate concerns for not going to war or becoming involved in the global stage, it is also possible that, had the U.S. been more committed to the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s, a stronger, global force may have been created that could have prevented Hitler’s rise to power, the rise of Fascism in Europe, and minimized the effect of the global economic depression of the 1930s.

David Carlin, a graduate of Williams College and a member of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, wrote in an article on the Second World War that, “Poor Western leadership allowed the Nazi menace to grow to monstrous proportions. This catastrophic failure in leadership offers important lessons for decision-makers today… [in 1935] given the early stage of Germany’s military preparations, Western pressure could have easily neutralized the military threat. Failing to act when the stakes were low was the West’s first mistake.” Having a strong, global power like the League of Nations, with support from the largest and strongest nations in the world could have assisted in many problems that arose from the Treaty of Versailles and the ending of the First World War.

The First World War, while highly important, is not discussed or remembered enough in the United States today. I hardly recall learning anything substantial about the conflict in my high school and even some college history courses; for the most part, it was summed up as an international conflict in which the U.S. entered late and won the war.

Yet, the global conflict has had a long-lasting and important impact upon the U.S. in more ways than one. One of the biggest impacts in the United States was the fact that women were able to play much more of a role in society and this eventually helped to pave the way for voting rights. David Smith, a correspondent for The Guardian, has also said that, “The war was a catalyst for the great migration of African Americans, and those who returned from the war, finding inequality intact, demanded civil rights. In addition, the conflict heralded the rise of conscription, mass propaganda, the national security state and the FBI. It accelerated income tax and urbanisation and helped make America the pre-eminent economic and military power in the world”. Not only this, but medical advancements and improvements, such as, “…screening for tuberculosis, treatment for tetanus, vaccines for typhoid, prevention of venereal disease and disinfection for surgery” came about during and in the aftermath of the war.

Without doubt, many economic, social and cultural achievements and advancements came about from World War I. The First World War’s greatest and most long-lasting impact upon the world has been in the way the United States defines itself and the role the country should have in global politics and affairs.

The impacts

The United States has often desired not to focus on foreign matters, but to look inwardly at domestic issues. This struggle is illuminated very well by the aftermath of World War One, in which the U.S. kept out of the League of Nations and retreated to focus on the economy and social issues, more domestic issues. This is the most important and long lasting effect as the U.S. still, as a country, has not been able to decide its place in the world. The desire of the public to focus on internal issues (such as the 2008 banking crisis) instead of the U.S. intervention in the Middle East (combined with the unclear strategies, controversies around COIN (Counterinsurgency), and the problem of trying to fight global terrorist groups) is a more recent example of this. The 2016 Presidential election of Donald Trump, a blatantly isolationist figure, also shows how many Americans desire not to be involved in foreign matters and become a “strong, isolationist” power.

This, in my view, is why the way in which the U.S. conducts foreign policy measures and engages in the world around them is one of the largest and longest-lasting impacts of the First World War.

What do you think of the influence of World War One on America? Let us know below.

The First British Man to be Shot for Desertion in World War 1: Private Thomas James Highgate

On November 8, 2006, 88 years after the end of World War I, a long campaign was over. 306 men from the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, who had lost their lives not by enemy hands but on the orders of their own countrymen, had finally been exonerated. Their posthumous pardons granted by royal assent removed the stain of desertion and cowardice from their records. Ilana Barnett explains.

Private Thomas James Highgate, available here.

Faced with the nightmare of trench warfare; watching their friends die, the stench of battlefields strewn with rotting corpses, lice infested uniforms, sleep deprivation, appalling weather, disease, and the constant fear of death and mustard gas attacks, it is hardly surprising that so many came out of the war forever changed, a damaged shell of the men they had been. The majority managed to hold it together, but for some, it all was too much and they ran while others collapsed, unable to go on. 

Nowadays we recognize the signs of shell shock, more commonly referred to as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but, in the past, it was a whole different story. These men were seen as weak and weakness could not be tolerated. The military commanders needed to make an example out of them, their men were holding on by a thread, they could not risk mass mutiny. Fear had to be instilled to keep them inline and the dread of being seen as cowards and the shame they would bring to their families was an effective deterrent.

Only a few weeks into the war, the military elite was faced with a terrible decision, they did not hesitate and on September 8, 1914, Thomas James Highgate, aged 19, became the first British soldier to be executed for desertion. Tragically he was not the last.

A Difficult Childhood

Thomas James Highgate was born on May 13, 1895, in Shoreham in Kent, the fourth of five children of John James Highgate, a farm laborer and Alice Highgate (née Nutley). His family’s poverty meant that his childhood was not the easiest. At some point the family must have moved from Shoreham to south London as Thomas is recorded as having attended Hither Green School in Lewisham. How good of an education Thomas received is difficult to gauge as from the age of seven, he was in and out of the Lewisham workhouse as his parents struggled to make ends meet. Coming from this type of background may explain why he decided on May 18, 1907, at the age of 12, to join the Royal Navy. At the time the Royal Navy were in urgent need of more manpower to crew the newly introduced dreadnoughts.

Life at Sea

To our modern perspective the thought of a 12-year-old joining the Royal Navy is horrific but to a child born in the Victorian period without money, connections, education or prospects, it would have been viewed as a golden opportunity. Life in the Navy was hard but it did at least guarantee food, a regular wage, and a roof over your head. These young boys were expected to learn the important seamanship skills necessary to become a good sailor.

Assigned to the training ship, Exmouth in Grays on May 18, 1907, Highgate remained there for three years before transferring to the SS Oriana as a deck boy (attested by the 1911 Liverpool census). His life in the Navy was eventful.  Two of the ships he was on were shipwrecked and while on the west coast of Africa he was taken ill with yellow fever. It appears that after these traumas, his memory was permanently impaired and his medical records note that he also on occasion suffered from amnesia. 

From Sailor to Soldier

For some reason, Highgate made the decision to leave the Navy and sign up for an Army Special Reserve battalion. He spent six months with the reserve battalion, studying for his Third-Class certificate. At the age of 17 and eight months, Highgate took the final leap and enlisted in the regular army, joining the 1st Battalion, (Queen’s Own) Royal West Kent Regiment on February 4, 1913. Highgate’s Attestation Papers, the first papers a soldier signed on entering the army, describe him as 5 feet 4.5 inches, just over nine stone,  brown hair, hazel eyes, and with naval tattoos on his arms. If he thought he was getting a reprieve from his traumatic experience in the Navy, then he was in for a shock.

The Road to France and Mons

Highgate appears to have found army life difficult. He was upbraided on a couple of occasions for being late for Tattoo, reprimanded for carrying a rusty rifle, and even received 48 days detention for desertion at the beginning of 1914. It is unclear what prompted Highgate to desert but the fact that he tried to fraudulently re-enlist does indicate some form of mental instability. Why re-enlist if you wanted to desert? The medical officer, Captain Tate examining him at Dublin’s Richmond Barracks where he was stationed recorded that although his memory appears fine at the moment, “His manner is stated to be peculiar at times”. Despite all of this, the general consensus was that he was a good worker when he was actually in attendance.

Highgate knew that at the some point he would have to fight and maybe even die for his country. He even wrote a message in his payment that in the event of his death any money owed to him should be sent to his Irish girlfriend, Mary MacNulty. Still nothing in his wildest imagination could have prepared him for the horrors of World War I. Just two weeks into the war his Battalion received their orders and on August 15, 1914, he left Ireland for France. Eight days later he took part in his first engagement, the Battle of Mons also known as the First Great Battle of World War I. The fighting lasted for nine hours until the British Expeditionary Force, outnumbered by the German Army, was forced to fall back. There was no clear winner. Although from a tactical point of view, the Germans had the upper hand, in terms of casualty numbers, the British suffered fewer losses. Just over 1,600 British soldiers were killed compared to about 5,000 Germans.

It was the retreat rather than the battle that was an unmitigated disaster. The army was in disarray. The privates thought the war was over and that they had lost. The two-week retreat from the battlefield of Mons is often described as “organized chaos”. The men trudged the 250 miles (400 kilometers) towards what was later known as the First Battle of the Marne, covering about 20 miles a day. They were demoralized, physically exhausted, starving, hobbling along on blistered, bleeding feet and suffering from heatstroke; it is hardly surprising that so many got left behind, became disorientated or ran away. 

His Final Days

September 6, 1914

Either late on September 5, or in the early hours of September 6, just as his battalion was preparing to face the Germans once more, Highgate told his friends that he was going to relieve himself. He never returned. He was found at 8:15am, a short distance away in a barn by a gamekeeper searching for his bicycle, on the estate of Baron de Rothschild at Tournan-en-Brie.

Highgate was dressed in civilian clothing (it is unclear where he found the clothes but one suggestion is that he took them from a scarecrow) and without his rifle. He appeared confused and was unable to remember how he had got there, telling the gamekeeper “I have lost my army, and I mean to get out of it”.

The gamekeeper, an ex-soldier, was unsympathetic. Highgate led him to a woodshed where he had left his uniform. His rifle and cartridges were missing. The gamekeeper handed him over to the French police who in turn gave him into the custody of the British military. Captain Milward, who escorted Highgate into military custody, stated that Highgate told him that he remembered nothing except leaving his bivouac that morning.

September 7, 1914

A hasty military tribunal was convened. Highgate had no defense and no witnesses were called. He said little except to contradict what he had earlier told the gamekeeper and state that he had got lost and had meant to return to his battalion. Not at any point was Highgate’s medical history of memory loss raised to support the theory that he could have genuinely got confused and wandered off. Maybe his previous record worked against him, maybe they did not look into his background or more likely his own confused words to the gamekeeper condemned him.

It was Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig who had the final say when it came to authorizing military executions. If he had decided to, he could have issued a stay of execution. He didn’t. Haig would have been well aware that by August 30, it was being reported that there were no fewer than 12,923 stragglers. Talk of desertion was sweeping through the battalions like wildfire and the military was desperate to stamp it out. An example had to be made and sadly Highgate was the sacrifice. Senior officials insisted that the execution should be performed at once and as publicly as possible.

September 8, 1914

At 6:22am on the September 8, Highgate was informed of his fate. 

An officer arranged for a burial party and a firing squad to prepare.

While waiting to be taken to face the execution squad, Highgate wrote a sad letter to Mary. How much did he tell her of what was happening? Probably what he was allowed to write was limited. The Army would have been very careful about what information could be passed on to the world outside the army.

At 7:07am in the presence of a Church of England clergyman and witnessed by men of the 1st Dorset Regiment and 1stCheshire Regiment, Private Thomas James Highgate was tied to a stake. Often those condemned by a military court were drugged with either alcohol or morphine to calm them down before they faced the execution squad and a square of white cloth pinned to their uniform. It is not known if this was done to Highgate, it may have been a procedure implemented later on in the war, but it was said that when facing the firing squad, he cried and called for his mother. He was nineteen.

The Aftermath

Thomas’ parents suffered greatly during the war. They lost two more sons. Robert, a Lance Corporal with the East Lancashire Regiment, died on January 30, 1915 and Joseph a rifleman, with the East Kent Regiment, died of his wounds on June 6, 1916. Luckily, they were spared one son, Benjamin, who survived and died in 1940.

How much his parents understood about their son’s fate is difficult to tell. Alice submitted all three of her sons’ names to be included in the Sidcup War Memorial but other sources claim that they were shamed into leaving her home which according to records would have been Catford. Did she find out afterwards or did she know but still want her son commemorated? 

Final Thoughts

Although most people are of the view that those men executed for cowardice and desertion were just as much victims of the war as anyone else who died, there are others that do not believe that the past should be viewed with modern eyes and sensibilities. Maybe that is why Thomas’ name has never been added to the Shoreham War Memorial despite having a place left for it. Strangely his name can be found on a British war memorial to the missing at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, a commune located near the River Marne in north-central France.

Thomas’ case was tragic. It is more than likely that his memory problems were due to either to a head trauma sustained while in the Navy or to side-effects from his bout of yellow fever. When combined with the horrors of the Battle of Mons, exhaustion and possible heatstroke, it is not surprising that he broke down. The tragedy is that he was found and an example made of him. If only for a missing bicycle he may have survived.

Sadly, Thomas was the first of many. The last two men were executed only four days before the Armistice was declared.

Now that they are pardoned, let’s hope that Thomas, along with those 305 other men, will finally be at peace.

Let us know what you think about the article below.

Now, you can read Ilana’s article on the Bethnal Green tube disaster during World War II here.

Ilana Barnett writes at https://hauntedpalaceblog.wordpress.com/

Feminine National Personifications: Part 1 - Britannia (the UK) and Bharat Mata (India)

Feminine personifications of nations are common around the world. Some popular examples include Britannia, Bharat Mata, and Marianne. Usually represented as goddesses, mothers, or queens, these entities embody their countries’ unity, liberty, strength, reason, and spiritual essences. As national icons, they impart to their people a strong sense of identity and belonging associated with their lands. In this two-part mini-series, Apeksha Srivastava highlights some changes in their portrayal with time, along with some similarities and differences among them.

In the first part of this mini-series, she looks at changes in the portrayal of Britannia and Bharat Mata with time.

The East offering its riches to Britannia, Roma Spiridone, 1778. Source: British Library, available here.

Britannia

The Submissive

In his article Britannia and John Bull[1], RT Matthews mentioned how the Greeks and Romans associated anthropomorphic deities with their newly conquered lands. Several coins depicting this were made during Roman Emperor Hadrian’s journey through imperial provinces[2]. As the female personification of the recently subjugated island, Britannia can be seen on one of them. She is depicted sitting with her head slightly bowed. Her pose is submissive, with her shield at rest, and her armor cast off.

The Rising Queen

This submissive Britannia disappeared when Rome’s power declined around 400 CE. She reappeared to personify Britain during the reign of Elizabeth I, making her place in maps and emblem books. In 1603, writer Henry Peacham featured Britannia on one of the first English emblem books (Minerva Britannia). She is seen striding confidently towards a ship, which symbolizes Britain’s newly acquired maritime power. The word “Minerva” is a Roman reference to the Greek goddess of war and reason, Athena. English chronicler Michael Drayton, in 1612, portrayed Britannia on his Poly-Olbion. She is seated under a Roman arch decorated with male figures (Aeneas - the founder of Rome, Julius Caesar - the first Roman conqueror of Britain, a medieval king representing the Tudor line, and a 17th-century explorer). She is the image of Britain’s sovereign powers and flourishing economy and has the horn of plenty in her left arm and a scepter in her right hand. A wreath on her head is being placed by two cherubs. Ships in the sea visible in the background are a reference to Britain’s maritime prosperity. In 1660, King Charles II issued a medal and halfpenny-coin with Britannia on the reverse.

The Colonizer

Eventually, Britannia started marking her presence on statues, paintings, monuments, stamps, and printed works, often commissioned by the government authorities. One such painting, The East Offering Its Riches To Britannia, was made by Roma Spiridione in 1778 on the British East India Company headquarters ceiling in London. Britannia is shown sitting on a rock with a lion near her as a guardian. She is humbly receiving a tribute of pearls/jewels from a dark figure (India). A kneeling woman (China) is offering her a porcelain vase, and a tea chest is lying close by. The camel and elephant on the right side of the painting symbolize the East, especially India. This work presents Britannia at a much higher stature. An interesting point to note here is that the East actually never offered anything to Britain; the latter plundered it. This painting is an interesting example of whitewashing and turning history to one’s advantage[3]. Another example of self-glorification is the painting Retribution by Edward Armitage. It depicted the soldier-massacre in Cawnpore during the Indian Rebellion in 1857. After the rebellion, a British woman and her child are shown on the ground as casualties. Britannia is furious to see her children in this condition. As revenge, she is about to kill the Bengal Tiger, the symbol of the Sepoys, with her sword[4]. It, again, portrays only one side of the story.

Made by Walter Crane, the Imperial Federation Map, published in 1886 for a London weekly newspaper, showed Britannia as the “rising world-power”. She is seated on a globe upheld by Atlas and is gazing down at the people of her empire (denoting parts of the world under British control marked in pink). Another map published in the same year shows her in the middle, with different scenes from the Empire being illustrated[5].

The Celebrity

Britannia also survived the changes in society with time. By the mid-18th-century, people started enjoying written parodies about her. Apart from entertainment, these satires emerged as ways to influence public opinion. Furthermore, caricature-illustrators elevated her to higher moral planes.

In humor magazines (like Punch), Britannia was depicted as the defender of the British Empire, who crusaded for noble causes. She also personified the virtues of the English middle-class like women should be at home for happiness in marriage. Some other cartoons emphasized her vulnerability. In another work, she is seen making preparations for the Great Party[6], holding a candle in her hand, her shield and trident put aside. We can also observe the dishes/spoons on the floor. 

The patriotic song Rule Britannia demonstrated Britannia’s true establishment as a national icon[7]. She became the symbol of Great Britain’s political presence, evolving with time. During the 1990s, the term Cool Britannia (a humorous version), was used to describe contemporary Britain, showing approval of pop groups, artists, and fashion[8].

Bharat Mata

The Goddess

India has worshipped the earth in a female form (Dharti-Mata/Bhu-Devi) since ancient times. According to some scholars, the origins of Bharat Mata (Mother India) can be traced back to this idea. She, as the national personification, was created out of the desire to be free from the British dominion[9]. After gaining popularity from KC Bandyopadhyay's play Bharat Mata (1873), she emerged as a goddess in Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s poem Vande Mataram in 1875. She was visually evoked in 1905 through Abanindranath Tagore’s painting[10].

The Symbol of Independence & Nationalism

Sumathi Ramaswamy’s book, The Goddess and The Nation[11], traced Bharat Mata’s origins to Bengal in 1904 (Mother-Bengal/Bangamata). Over the next few decades, artists added new features to her depiction such as the tricolor flag, lions (guardians/vahana), the territory-map she represented, and her weapons (like trident or spinning wheel signifying the Swadeshi Movement to boycott British-made products). In one of her articles, Ramaswamy also mentioned how Aurobindo Ghosh advised his student to become patriotic, “... It is not a map, but the portrait of Bharat Mata ... worship her with the nine-fold bhakti [devotion].” Some works depict Bharat Mata blessing freedom fighters for their sacrifice. In an election hoarding, she is seen as the nation-map, crying, and carrying Indira Gandhi’s lifeless body[12].

Associated with fury and rage, Kali is said to have emerged from goddess Durga. She apparently struck fear in some British people. Ramaswamy argued that Bharat Mata emerged as an intermediate: having fury for the oppressors and maternal love for her children. She rose as the glorious mother/goddess associated with the map of India to effectively elicit strong feelings of nationalism in people.

Shobha Singh’s painting (1947) showed Bharat Mata clad in the Indian tricolor. She has a trident in her hand and a halo around her head. The roaring lion by her side is kicking the British crown into the abyss. K.K. Rajaram’s painting (1962) depicted the Indo-China War setting. Bharat Mata is near the Ashoka Pillar. Carrying the Indian flag and a sword, she is leading four roaring lions and soldiers against the Chinese-dragon on the Himalayan borders[13].

The Unifier of Diversity

After independence, Bharat Mata was sometimes utilized for political ends. In 2011, Anna Hazare highlighted her in his campaign India Against Corruption, emphasizing that she belongs to all India and not just a particular religion. Sri Aurobindo, in 1920, had already written that “if we hope to have a vision of the mother by ... establishing Hindu nationalism ... we would be deprived of the full expression of our nationhood”[14]. In this context, Ramaswamy described an image of Bharat Mata riding through the street with houses of religious worship in the background (church, mosque, and perhaps, Gurdwara), promoting the idea of religious harmony (inclusive-Hinduism).

The Progressive

Bharat Mata survived the evolutions in popular taste. She has been represented in posters, calendars, and films. In one of his sketches, cartoonist Shankar showed Nehru as a cherub, drawing a cover (“Planning”) over the nude female form of the nation. A second cartoon depicted a “new version of Bharat Mata” who is protecting the poor from the corrupt politicians and resembles Lady Justice[15]. Another sketch portrayed her horrified at the incident of the tricolor flag being carried to support a rape accused. Such works underline the social changes in India with time in the form of different physical and emotional states of Bharat Mata.

The first Bharat Mata temple in Varanasi (1936) houses a giant marble relief map of India with its rivers, mountains, and sacred places. Another temple in Haridwar (1983) dedicated its ground floor to Mother India, represented as a map and a marble image. The map contains a network of lights indicating pilgrim places that link the entire nation[16]. Such examples beautifully depict the associations of Bharat Mata with the sacred geography of India.

Read on: In the second part here, Apeksha discusses Marianne of France and some similarities and differences among these national personifications.

Apeksha Srivastava completed her Master’s degree from the Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. She is currently an aspiring writer and a second-year Ph.D. candidate at this institute. This article is based on an assignment she submitted for the course, Perspectives on Indian Civilization. 

References

1. Britannia and John Bull: From Birth to Maturity. Roy T. Matthews. The Historian. Vol. 62, No. 4 (SUMMER 2000), pp. 799-820 (22 pages). Published By: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

2. Britannia and Melita: Pseudomorphic Sisters. Derk Kinnane-Roelofsma. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes. Vol. 59 (1996), pp. 130-147 (18 pages). Published by: The Warburg Institute.

3. The Hidden Wound. Nick Robins. The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational, 1-18. London: Pluto Press, 2012.

4. Britannia as the embodiment of Great Britain. Aline Gay, Fanny Guilbaud, and Damien Lenoir, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne, France. Essay written for Professor Béatrice Laurent’s seminar, 'Myths and Icons'.

5. Walter Crane and the Imperial Federation Map Showing the Extent of the British Empire (1886). Pippa Biltcliffe. Imago Mundi. Vol. 57, No. 1 (2005), pp. 63-69 (9 pages). Published by: Imago Mundi, Ltd.

6. Britannia's Great Party. 1851. Wood engraving. Punch (7 June 1856): 81. [http://www.victorianweb.org/periodicals/punch/95.html]

7. Britons will never be slaves! Britannia and liberty as a construct of British national identity in James Thomson and Thomas Arne’s song Rule Britannia and Thomas Rowlandson’s engraving, The Contrast, 1792, British Liberty, French Liberty, Which is best? Peter Johnston. The University of Oxford, Department for Continuing Education. Date created: Tuesday, April 18, 2017.

8. https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/cool-britannia

9. Mother India: The Role of the Maternal Figure in Establishing Legal Subjectivity. Kanika Sharma. 2017. Law and Critique, 29(1), 1–29.

10. https://scroll.in/article/805990/far-from-being-eternal-bharat-mata-is-only-a-little-more-than-100-years-old

11. The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India. By Sumathi Ramaswamy. Duke University Press, 2010. 379pp.

12. Maps, Mother/Goddesses, and Martyrdom in Modern India. Sumathi Ramaswamy. 2008. The Journal of Asian Studies, 67(03).

13. Icon-ising national identity: France and India in comparative perspective. Subrata K. Mitra and Lion König. National Identities, 15(4), 357–377.

14. The Life and Times of Bharat Mata: Nationalism as Invented Religion. Sadan Jha. 2006. Manushi.

15. https://timescontent.com/syndication-photos/reprint/just-like-that/454566/buy.jsp

16. India: A Sacred Geography. Diana L. Eck. 2011. Harmony Books.

A Shooting in Sarajevo: First World War Historiography Today – Part 2

With the centenary of the First World War’s outbreak in 2014, historians are revisiting and reanalyzing the events of the July Crisis in greater depth and breadth than ever before. In Part 2, we explore the current historiographical landscape, and identify key battlegrounds for the historians of today. Avan Fata explains.

If you missed it part 1 here introduces the debates on World War 1 historiography.

Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany in Tangier, Morocco. Part of the First Moroccan Crisis (1905-06).

In the previous article, we delved into the development of the historiography on the origins of the First World War. From the immediate postwar revisionist-orthodox debates to the ‘comfortable consensus’ of an inadvertent “slide” into war in the 1930s, to the revival of the debate over war guilt with Fritz Fischer in the 1960s. All of these debates were marked by one inescapable theme: that historians writing about 1914 were also reflecting their contemporary political situations. Many of them had fought in the war; more had lived through the turbulent 20th century which had stemmed in some way from the postwar settlement at Versailles. Yet now, in the 21st century, the First World War has faded into a distant memory – with the last veterans having passed away, it is no longer an event etched into the personal histories of our modern society. 

Even so, the events of July 1914 continue to fascinate historians and the larger public as a whole. Commemorative events to mark the centenary of the war’s outbreak were also accompanied by the publication of dozens of works on the origins of the war. Rather than finally settling the question of who started the conflict, these works represent the continuation and diversification of the debate on the beginning of World War I. This part of the article deals with that broadening of the debate, identifying the key “battlegrounds” and historiographical approaches which recent historiography has popularized.

Focuses

What made 1914 different from other crises?

This is the specific question which we might ask in order to understand a key focus of monographs and writings on the origins of World War I. Following the debate on Fischer’s thesis in the 1960s, historians have begun looking beyond the events of June - August 1914 in order to understand why the assassination of an archduke was the ‘spark’ which lit the powder keg of the continent.

1914 was not a “critical year” where tensions were at their highest in the century. Plenty of other crises had occurred beforehand, namely the two Moroccan crises of 1905-06 and 1911, the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09, and two Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Why did Europe not go to war as a result of any of these crises? What made the events of 1914 unique, both in the conditions present across the continent, and within the governments themselves, that ultimately led to the outbreak of war?

Even within popular history narratives, these events have slowly but surely been integrated into the larger picture of the lead up to 1914. Even a cursory analysis of these crises reveals several interesting notes:

• The Entente Powers, not the Triple Alliance, were the ones who tended to first utilize military diplomacy/deterrence, and often to a greater degree.

• Mediation by other ‘concerned powers’ was, more often than not, a viable and indeed desirable outcome which those nations directly involved in the crises accepted without delay.

• The strength of the alliance systems with mutual defense clauses, namely the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, were shaky at best during these crises. France discounted Russian support against Germany in both Moroccan crises for example, and Germany constantly urged restraint to Vienna in its Balkan policy (particularly towards Serbia).

Even beyond the diplomatic history of these crises, historians have also analyzed the impact of other aspects in the years preceding 1914. William Mulligan, for example, argues that the economic conditions in those years generated heightened tensions as the great powers competed for dwindling markets and industries.[1] Plenty of recent journal articles have outlined the growth of nationalist fervor and irredentist movements in the Balkans, and public opinion has begun to re-occupy a place in such investigations - though not, we must stress, with quite the same weight that it once carried in the historiography.[2]

Yet perhaps the most often-written about aspect of the years prior to 1914 links directly with another key focus in the current historiography: militarization.

Militarization

As touched on in the first article, this aspect of the historiography is essentially the idea that Europe was ‘dragged’ into a war by the great powers’ heightened state of militarization, and that the interlocking series of mobilization plans which, once initiated, could not be stopped. In the 1990s, scholars began to re-examine these claims, which had sat so comfortably and dominantly in the interwar consensus of the 1930s and remained a key implicit assumption of Cold War historiography as well.[3]

These historians argued that despite the militarization of the great powers and the mobilization plans, the civilian statesmen remained firmly in control of policy, and that the decision to go to war was a conscious one that they made, fully aware of the consequences of such a choice.[4] The generals were not, as Barbara Tuchmann exaggeratedly wrote, “pounding the table for the signal to move”.[5] Indeed, in Vienna the generals were doing quite the opposite: early in the July Crisis Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf remarked to Foreign Minister Berchtold that the army would only be able to commence operations against Serbia on August 12, and that they would not even be able to mobilize until after the harvest leave finished on July 25.

However, the recent historiographical shift has re-emphasized investigating how militarization influenced the diplomacy of the great powers during the July Crisis.[6] Recent studies have studied in depth how the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09 and the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13 demonstrated to Vienna and St. Petersburg that military force was a helpful tool when it came to achieving their respective diplomatic aims.[7] Yet the extent to which this thinking influenced the minds of the statesmen of 1914 remains a key area under debate, with particular focus on the ‘calculated risk’ argument – the idea that all the governments understood the consequences of their mobilizations, and chose to undertake them anyways. 

These rebuttals of the “inadvertent war” thesis have proven to be better substantiated and more persuasive, thus the current norm in historiography has shifted to look further within the halls of power in 1914. That is, the analyses have shifted to look beyond the generals, mobilization plans, and military staff; and instead towards the diplomats, ministers, and decision-makers who made those fateful choices during the July Crisis.

Decision Makers

Who occupied the halls of power both during the lead up to 1914 and whilst the crisis was unfolding? What decisions did they make and what impact did those actions have on the larger geopolitical/diplomatic situation of their nation?

Although Europe was very much a continent of monarchs in 1900, those monarchs did not hold supreme power over their respective apparatus of state. Even the most autocratic of the great powers at the time, Russia, possessed a council of ministers which convened at critical moments during the July Crisis to decide on their country’s response to Austro-Hungarian aggression. Contrast that to the most ‘democratic’ country of the great powers, France (in that the Third Republic did not have a monarch), and the confusing enigma that was the foreign ministry - occupying the Quai D’Orsay - and it becomes clear that understanding what motivated and influenced the men (and they were all men) who held/shared the reigns of policy is tantamount to better understanding how events progressed the way they did in 1914.

A good example of just how many dramatis personae have become involved in the current historiography can be found in Margaret Macmillan’s chatty pop-history work, The War that Ended Peace (2014). Her characterizations and side-tracks about such figures as Lord Salisbury, Friedrich von Holstein, and Theophile Delcasse are not out of step with contemporary academic monographs. Entire narratives and investigations have been published about the role of an individual in the lead up to the events of the July Crisis, Mombauer’s Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (2001) or T.G Otte’s Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir Edward Grey (2020) stand out in this regard.

Not only has the cast become more civilian and larger in the past few decades, but it has also come to recognize the plurality of decision-making during 1914. Historians now stress that disagreements within governments (alongside those between them) are equally important to understand the many voices of European decision-making before as well as during 1914. Naturally, this focus reaches its climax in the days of the July Crisis, where narratives now emphasize in minutiae just how divided the halls of power were.

Alongside these changes in focus with the people who contributed to (or warned against) the decision to go to war, recent narratives have begun to highlight the voices of those who represented their governments abroad; the ambassadors. Likewise, newer historiographical works have re-focused their lenses on diplomatic history prior to the war. Within this field, one particular process and area of investigation stands out: the polarization of Europe.

Polarization

Prior to the developments within First World War historiography from the 1990s onwards, it was not uncommon for historians and politicians - at least in the interwar period - to propagate theses which pinned the war’s origins on factors of “mass demand”: nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism among them. These biases not only impacted their interpretations of the events building up to 1914, as well as the July Crisis itself, but also imposed an overarching thread; an omnipresent motivator which guided (and at times “forced”) the decision-makers to commit to courses of action which moved the continent one step closer to war.

These overarching theories have since been refuted by historians, and the current historiographical approach emphasizes case-specific analyses of each nation’s circumstances, decisions, and impact in both crises and diplomacy. Whilst these investigations have certainly yielded key patterns and preferences within the diplomatic maneuvers of each nation, they sensibly stop short of suggesting that these modus operandi were inflexible to different scenarios, or that they even persisted as the decision-makers came and went. The questions now revolve around why and how the diplomacy of the powers shifted in the years prior to 1914, and how the division of Europe into “two armed camps” 

What all of these new focuses imply - indeed what they necessitate - is that historians utilize a transnational approach when attempting to explain the origins of the war. Alan Kramer goes so far as to term it the sine qua non (essential condition) in the current historiography; a claim that many historians would be inclined to agree with.[8] Of course, that is not to suggest that a good work must not give more focus to one (or a group) of nations over the others, but works which focus on a single nation’s path to war are rarer than they were prior to this recent shift in focus. 

Thus, there we have a general overview of how the focuses of historiography on the First World War have shifted in the past 30 years, and it would perhaps not be too far-fetched to suggest that these focuses may very well change in and of themselves within the next 30 years too. The next and final part shall deal with how, within these focuses, there are various stances which historians have argued and adopted in their approach to explaining the origins of the First World War.

Personalities vs. Precedents

To suggest that the First World War was the fault of a group of decision-makers is leaning dangerously close to reducing the role that those officials played in the lead up to the conflict - not to mention to dismiss outright those practices and precedents which characterized their country’s policy preferences prior to 1914. There was, as hinted at previously, no dictator at the helm of any of the powers; the plurality of cabinets, imperial ministries, and advisory bodies meant that the personalities of those decision-makers must be analyzed in light of their influence on the larger national, and transnational state of affairs. 

To then suggest that the “larger forces” of mass demand served as invisible guides on these men is to dismiss the complex and unique set of considerations, fears, and desires which descended upon Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, London, Vienna, and Belgrade in July of 1914. Though these forces may have constituted some of those fears and considerations, they were by no means the powerful structural factors which plagued all the countries during the July Crisis. Holger Herwig sums up this stance well: 

“The ‘big causes,’ by themselves, did not cause the war. To be sure, the system of secret alliances, militarism, nationalism, imperialism, social Darwinism, and the domestic strains… had all contributed toward forming the mentalite, the assumptions (both spoken and unspoken) of the ‘men of 1914.’[But] it does injustice to the ‘men of 1914’ to suggest that they were all merely agents - willing or unwilling - of some grand, impersonal design… No dark, overpowering, informal, yet irresistible forces brought on what George F. Kennan called ‘the great seminal tragedy of this century.’ It was, in each case, the work of human beings.”

I have therefore termed this battleground one of “personalities” against “precedents”, because although historians are now quick to dismiss the work of larger forces as crucial in explaining the origins of the war, they are still inclined to analyze the extent to which these forces influenced each body of decision-makers in 1914 (as well as previous crises). Within each nation, indeed within each of the government officials, there were precedents which changed and remained from previous diplomatic crises. Understanding why they changed (or hadn’t), as well as determining how they factored into the decision-making processes, is to move several steps closer to fully grasping the complex developments of July 1914. 

Intention vs. Prevention

Tied directly to the debate over the personalities and their own motivations for acting the way they did is the debate over intention and prevention. To identify the key figures who pressed for war and those who attempted to push for peace is perhaps tantamount to assigning blame in some capacity. Yet historians once again have become more aware of the plurality of decision-making. Moltke and Bethmann-Hollweg may have been pushing for a war with Russia sooner rather than later, but the Kaiser and foreign secretary Jagow preferred a localized war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Likewise, Edward Grey may have desired to uphold Britain’s honor by coming to France’s aid, but until the security of Belgium became a serious concern a vast majority of the House of Commons preferred neutrality or mediation to intervention. 

This links back to the focus mentioned earlier about how these decision-makers came to make the decisions they did during the July Crisis. What finally swayed those who had held out for peace to authorize war? Historians now have discarded the notion that the generals and military “took control” of the process at critical stages, so now we must further investigate the shifts in thinking and circumstances which impacted the policy preferences of the “men of 1914”. Perhaps the best summary of this battleground and the need to understand how these decision-makers came to make the fateful choices they did is best summarized by Margaret Macmillan: 

"There are so many questions and as many answers again. Perhaps the most we can hope for is to understand as best we can those individuals, who had to make the choices between war and peace, and their strengths and weaknesses, their loves, hatreds, and biases. To do that we must also understand their world, with its assumptions. We must remember, as the decision-makers did, what had happened before that last crisis of 1914 and what they had learned from the Moroccan crises, the Bosnian one, or the events of the First Balkan Wars. Europe’s very success in surviving those earlier crises paradoxically led to a dangerous complacency in the summer of 1914 that, yet again, solutions would be found at the last moment and the peace would be maintained."

Contingency vs. Certainty

“No sovereign or leading statesmen in any of the belligerent countries sought or desired war - certainly not a European war.” 

The above remark by David Lloyd George in 1936 reflects a dangerous theme that has been thoroughly discredited in recent historiography: the so-called “slide” thesis. That is, the belief that the war was not a deliberate choice by any of the statesmen of Europe, and that the continent as a whole simply - to use another oft-quoted phrase from Lloyd George - “slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war”. The statesmen of Europe were well aware of the consequences of their choices, and explicitly voiced their awareness of the possibility of war at multiple stages of the July Crisis. 

At the same time, to suggest that there was a collective responsibility for the war - a stance which remained dominant in the immediate postwar writings until the 1960s - is to also neutralize the need to reexamine the choices taken during the July Crisis. If everyone had a part to play, then what difference would it make if Berlin or London or St. Petersburg was the one that first moved towards armed conflict? This argument once again brings up the point of inadvertence as opposed to intention. Despite Christopher Clark’s admirable attempt to suggest that the statesmen were “blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world”, the evidence put forward en masse by other historians suggest quite the opposite. Herwig remarks once again that this inadvertent “slide” into war was far from the case with the statesmen of 1914: 

“In each of the countries…, a coterie of no more than about a dozen civilian and military rulers weighed their options, calculated their chances, and then made the decision for war…. Many decision makers knew the risk, knew that wider involvement was probable, yet proceeded to take the next steps. Put differently, fully aware of the likely consequences, they initiated policies that they knew were likely to bring on the catastrophe.”  

So the debate now lies with ascertaining at what point during the July Crisis the “window” for a peaceful resolution to the crisis finally closed, and when war (localized or continental) was all but certain. A.J.P Taylor remarked rather aptly that “no war is inevitable until it breaks out”, and determining when exactly the path to peace was rejected by each of the belligerent powers is crucial to that most notorious of tasks when it comes to explaining the causes of World War I: placing blame. 

Responsibility

“After the war, it became apparent in Western Europe generally, and in America as well, that the Germans would never accept a peace settlement based on the notion that they had been responsible for the conflict. If a true peace of reconciliation were to take shape, it required a new theory of the origins of the war, and the easiest thing was to assume that no one had really been responsible for it. The conflict could readily be blamed on great impersonal forces - on the alliance system, on the arms race and on the military system that had evolved before 1914. On their uncomplaining shoulders the burden of guilt could be safely placed.”

The idea of collective responsibility for the First World War, as described by Marc Trachtenberg above, still carries some weight in the historiography today. Yet it is no longer, as noted previously, the dominant idea amongst historians. Nor, for that matter, is the other ‘extreme’ which Fischer began suggesting in the 1960s: that the burden of guilt, the label of responsibility, and thus the blame, could be placed (or indeed forced) upon the shoulders of a single nation or group of individuals.

The interlocking, multilateral, and dynamic diplomatic relations between the European powers prior to 1914 means that to place the blame on one is to propose that their policies, both in response to and independent of those which the other powers followed, were deliberately and entirely bellicose. The pursuit of these policies, both in the long-term and short-term, then created conditions which during the July Crisis culminated in the fatal decision to declare war. To adopt such a stance in one’s writing is to dangerously assume several considerations that recent historiography has brought to the fore and rightly warned against possessing: 

• That the decision-making in each of the capitals was an autocratic process, in which opposition was either insignificant to the key decision-maker or entirely absent,

• That a ‘greater’ force motivated the decision-makers in a particular country, and that the other nations were powerless to influence or ignore the effect of this ‘guiding hand’,

• That any anti-war sentiments or conciliatory diplomatic gestures prior to 1914 (as well as during the July Crisis) were abnormalities; case-specific aberrations from the ‘general’ pro-war pattern,

To conclude, when it comes to the current historiography on the origins of the First World War, the ‘blame game’ which is heavily associated with the literature on the topic has reached at least something resembling a consensus: this was not a war enacted by one nation above all others, nor a war which all the European powers consciously or unconsciously found themselves obliged to join. Contingency, the mindset of decision-makers, and the rapidly changing diplomatic conditions are now the landscapes which academics are analyzing more thoroughly than ever, refusing to paint broad strokes (the “big” forces) and instead attempting to specify, highlight, and differentiate the processes, persons, and prejudices which, in the end, deliberately caused the war to break out.

What do you think of World War One historiography? Let us know below.

[1] William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 

[2] A good overview of the recent historiography with regards to these aspects is Geppert, Dominik, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose, eds. The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 

[3] Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (New York: Routledge, 2003).

[4] A critical article which progressed this shift is Marc Trachtenberg, “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914.” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990): 120-150. 

[5] Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, 1962.

[6] A good overview of the historiographical developments in this regard is William Mulligan, “The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War.” The English Historical Review 129, no. 538 (June 2014): 639-666. 

[7] See for example, David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914.” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 125-161; David Stevenson, “War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914.” Past & Present 162 (1999): 163-194. 

[8] Alan Kramer, “Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part I),” Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue D'histoire Européenne Contemporaine 12, no. 2 (2014): 160-161

The Korean War: What can Today’s America Learn from it?

The 1950-53 Korean War involved a US-backed South Korea against a communist-backed North Korea. But what lessons can the US learn from the war today? Here, Michael Cho considers this question in the context of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars of the 21st century.

Members of a M24 tank crew besides the Naktong River front during the Korean War on August 17, 1950.

The Korean War was a war fought between South Korea, formally known as the Republic of Korea, and North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On June 25, 1950, seventy-five thousand North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel, the line dividing South and North Korea, to spread communist ideals to South Korea. In launching this attack, North Korean troops found South Korea completely unaware and, in many ways, powerless to fight back. Initially, South Korean troops had been driven far south by the North Koreans until the United States assisted them by providing necessary men and supplies through a United Nations sanctioned policing mission.

The Korean War was one of the proxy wars in the Cold War and was fought in an attempt to stop the growth of communism, but when examining the overall cost of the Cold War, while the United States bore a heavy material cost, proxy states like South Korea disproportionately paid the human cost. At the intersection of ideology, commerce and conflict, sits the Korean War and its lessons about the application of power in foreign policy and the costs and consequences of America’s role in the world.

Proxy wars

In many ways, the Korean War became a microcosm of the larger Cold War dynamics that dominated the twentieth century. By engaging in proxy wars across the globe, the United States was able to break down trade barriers and open up different regions of the world to American investment and influence. Ideologically, the United States prevented a possible Soviet global takeover by spreading fear of a communist global takeover; geopolitically, the US implemented their anti-communist strategy through the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The Domino theory, a theory growing out of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, stated that if the United States allowed any country to fall to communism, other adjacent countries would soon follow, resulting in a world ruled by communism. The Domino theory thus became a primary justification for United States foreign policy interventions because it predicted a global communist takeover if the United States took no action. Consequently, the United States was active globally “saving” many countries from falling to communism by fighting communism in South Korea. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan provided the strategy and the tactics to implement the American Cold War mindset globally. In the Domino theory, the United States found a reason to defend democracy in Korea and demonstrate to itself and other democratic allied countries that the United States would not allow communism to threaten their societies; in so doing, proxy wars served to strengthen international commitment to American-led institutions of global governance.

Military aid

The material cost of waging this proxy was significant and represented a strategic shift by the United States to enlarge the scope of its Cold War response under the umbrella of “humanitarian aid.” Prior to the Korean War, the Marshall Plan applied only to economic aid and support; the Marshall Plan did not cover military aid until the commitment to the Korean War was made. By supplying South Korea, who had few supplies and a scarce supply of troops, with imperative supplies and troops to win, the United States helped South Korea hold back communism. South Korea stopped North Korea’s advance in the war and reclaimed lost territory up to, and briefly beyond, the 38th parallel where the initial invasion had started. The United States heavily supplied, manned, and funded the South Koreans. It spent thirty billion dollars during the Korean War and supplied the South Koreans with vehicles such as M4 Sherman tanks, 1,000,000 personnel (consisting of mostly United States soldiers) to the mere South Korean military who had 100,000 personnel and were facing an army of 1,200,000 Chinese and North Korean soldiers.  Now heavily supplied, South Korea’s ability to win the war improved dramatically and contrasted sharply with the previous South Korea who had a limited amount of supplies and troops. As the Korean War progressed, the war turned more into a war of attrition, and South Korea was successful because it was the better supplied belligerent.

A trade-off

The Korean War represents a unique glimpse into answers to the question of how much evil is it acceptable to engage in when attempting to do good. The first is that when confronting challenges in foreign policy, nation-states often have only a series of bad options when conducting foreign policy. By fighting for South Korea, the United States successfully stopped the growth of communism in South Korea, but the war ended with around five million Korean casualties and approximately 33,000 American casualties, which highlights the significant human cost that is borne by the peoples living in the geographic region in which the proxy war occurs. Many at the time debated the proper course and conduct of the Korean War, most famously Douglas MacArthur and President Truman; regardless, the decision came down to an abandonment of core humanitarian ideals or a massive cost of human life. As recent events in Afghanistan have shown that dynamic still exists, but with the Cold War context to unify American public opinion, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the United States will make those same choices in the 21st century.

When the United States and South Korea made the choice that the material and human cost was worth the price, it used morality and the language of a humanitarian effort to explain that cost. The United States’ involvement in the Korean War proved a military necessity because US funding was the force driving South Korea forward in the war. In this situation, the United States’ aid was essential because South Korea would have lost the war after the first invasion without support from the United States. However, it was the development of a thriving economy in South Korea (often through very undemocratic means under a series of dictators in the 50s, 60s, and 70s) that created the South Korea of the 21st century. This highlights that the key component that made the American mission to defend the world from the threat of communism successful might have been the investments made in the host-proxy’s economy via the Marshall Plan. The lack of any kind of Marshall Plan-style investment into Afghanistan or Iraq following the invasions of 2001 and 2003, respectively, indicates a lack of willingness to make the same kind of commitment in the 21st century. 

In the context of today

The United States’ mission in the world has never been less certain. President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy began deconstructing elements of the WWII alliances the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were built upon. Additionally, at a time when Congress is deadlocked surrounding physical and human infrastructure investment in the domestic United States, the willingness of the United States to make the investments overseas that are truly vital to implementing its foreign policy vision is debatable at best. However, while the outcome might be uncertain and the loss of life could be great, the fate of the two Koreas offers interesting and informative lessons for the United States in the 21st century. South Korea represents a positive example of what can happen when the choice is made to uphold human rights and core democratic ideals despite the human and material cost being high and the outcome uncertain. Based upon the thriving democratic capitalist society now present in South Korea and the stark contrast with the poverty and oppression in North Korea, perhaps the true cost of leadership and the price of freedom becomes apparent. Korea serves as a useful case study for the necessary costs, successful tactics and strategies and consequences of proxy wars in defense of democratic principles. 

What do you think are the key lessons for the US from the Korean War? Let us know below.

The Algerian War of Independence’s Legacy on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

The 1954-62 Algerian War of Independence led to the end of French colonial rule in Algeria and the departure of many European settlers. On the other hand the Israel-Palestine conflict has been ongoing in one form or another since the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948. Here, Daniel Boustead looks at how the Algerian conflict influenced – and continues to influence – the Palestinian movement.

Algerian fighters in the mountains during the war. Source: Fayeqalnatour, available here.

The 1954-62 Algerian War of Independence left a lasting mark on many Anti-Colonialist Resistance movements. Its greatest and longest lasting influence is on the Palestinian resistance movements. This relationship started before Algeria gained independence from France in 1962. Even after independence, Algeria continued to give important moral, financial, and ideological support to the Palestinian cause. This continues to this day. Palestinian anti- Israel groups borrowed tactics and lessons from the Algerian War of Independence. However, there are some important historical differences as to why Algerians succeeded in their cause and why the Palestinians have not had success in their struggle for freedom against Israel. The legacy of the Algerian War of Independence served as an important political inspiration to the Palestinian Resistance whose impact cannot be overstated or overlooked.

In December 1947 the French Gendarmerie found a leaflet in Ain-Beida in Eastern Algeria entitled “Against any partition of Palestine, for an Arab, free and independent Palestine(1). This document was reproduced in the Algerian nationalist newspaper El Maghrib Al Arabi on December 13, 1947. In the Algerian city of Ain Beida Algerian pro-independence leader Mohammad Zinai was suspected of organizing meetings in cafes to call young Algerian Muslims to enlist in the Arab Legion of Palestine to fight against Israel. On January 6, 1948 Algerian Muslim Mostefa Stambouli left his western Algerian hometown of Mascara along with (20 followers) to go Palestine to fight the Jews. Stambouli made a stop in Tunis, Tunisia where he planned to continue his journey to Palestine through Egypt. While he was in Tunis, he met with Algerian nationalists students Abdelhamid Merhi and M’Hamed Ferhat who hosted Stambouli at Zitounda University. After passing through the Tripolitania region of Libya, the British police arrested Stambouli. In February, 1948 Mustafa Stambouli was tried before the Sfax Court. For not holding a passport Stambouli was given a suspended sentence of 15 days imprisonment and fined 1,000 Francs. Stambouli then returned to Mascara Algeria. Stambouli’s comrade M’Hamed Ferhat tried to form a group of men to fight in Palestine but ultimately failed when he was also arrested by British police in the Tripolitania region of Libya. M’Hamed Ferhat was then sent back to Mascara, Algeria where he tried to recruit young men to fight in Palestine. On June 2, 1948 the Algerian Assistance Committee for Palestine was launched. This group failed when the main political party (the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) left the organization because its pro Arab-Muslim political agenda destroyed the chance for other political organizations to join the group in the name of the Palestinian cause.

Palestinian-Algerian Links

During the Algerian War of Independence the Palestinians displayed their solidarity to the Algerian Revolution by supporting them through fundraising (2). The reciprocal support that the Algerians and Palestinians gave to each other during this early period of time to each other’s respective resistance movements allowed for a bond that flourishes right to this present day.

The Algerian War of Independence would come to have a profound impact on the Palestinian militant groups. This was shown by Algeria’s moral, political, financial, and ideological support for the Palestinian cause. In turn the Palestinians preserved the memory of the Algerian War of Independence into their own struggle. The Algerians also viewed the Palestinian struggle as their own struggle via the legacy of the Algerian War of Independence. The future leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, was present when Algerian liberation forces entered the Algerian capital of Algiers on July 3, 1962, after successfully ending French colonial rule (3). Algeria’s future first President Ahmad Ben Bella said he was prepared to send 100,000 soldiers “to liberate Palestine” and in October 1962 stated that Israel would remain Algeria’s permanent enemy (5).  The National Liberation Front’s (FLN’s) use of terrorist attacks on the European settler population of Algeria forced not only France but also the European settler population of Algeria to give up and leave Algeria at the end of the conflict (4).

The events of the Algerian War of Independence helped give inspiration and a solution to Palestinian revolutionary Yasir Arafat on how to end Israel’s existence as a state (4). Palestine Liberation Organization member Abu Iyad said of the Algerian War of Independence and Revolution: “They symbolized the success we dreamed of”(4). Algeria’s new rulers opened material aid to future Palestinian Liberation Organization faction Fatah which was led by Yasir Arafat. Future Palestine Liberation Organization member and Fatah member Abu Jihad moved with his family to Algeria in 1963 to set up a Palestinian office for Fatah. The Algerians also helped Yasir Arafat establish contacts with the Syrian Baathist Regime which took power in Syria in 1963. Algeria was using the legacy of their colonial struggle against France to now become a host nation and a host base for Third World Anti-Colonialist revolutionary organizations. In 1988, when Palestine declared its independence, Algeria was the first country in the world to recognize its statehood (6). The Palestinian resistance movement Hamas considers the legacy of Algerian War of Independence important (7). It is Hamas’ strategy to achieve the decisive outcome of the expulsion of what they see as the Zionist occupier (7). On August 13, 2020 in the aftermath of United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, North Sudan, and Morocco announcing they would formalize diplomatic relations with Israel, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune stated “There is a mad rush among (some) Arabs to normalize ties. We will not participate in it. We will not accept it. We will not bless it. [The] Palestine cause is sacred, and we will not give it up”(6). On July 25, 2021 Algeria denounced the African Union in granting Israel observer status (8).

Battle of Algiers

The Palestinian militant groups received important inspiration from a film about the Algerian War of Independence and from actual events that happened during the conflict. In 1966, Gillo Pontecorvo’s film, Battle of Algiers, was released and it instantly became a training manual and guidebook for third world revolutionary militant movements fighting against colonialism (9). The film’s historical accuracy has been questioned by some historians. The film’s depiction of France’s brutal colonial occupation complete with checkpoints, house demolitions and separation barriers, seems relevant to the current conditions the Palestinian resistance groups are fighting in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The film’s depiction of the FLN’s use of targeting civilians and urban warfare tactics helped provide a blueprint for Palestinian militant groups with how to fight against an occupying force. The film was so controversial that it was banned from public screening in Israel and did not legally become available in Israel until 1975. It was during the Second Intifada (which occurred between 2000 to 2005) when the film gained the most relevance in the Gaza Strip and West Bank among Palestinian resistance groups. The film’s portrayal of the FLN’s use of letting off bombs in public places in order to bring the war to the enemy’s doorstep directly mirrored that of Palestinian resistance groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, justifications for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s actions are directly mirrored in the film. The character Larbi Ben M’hidi had a famous retort to his French interrogators by saying “Give us your bombers sir and you can have our baskets”. In the film, basket bombs were used as weapon by the FLN women who dropped them off at places to target civilians (10). This ultimately led to dividing French society and ending support for its colonial project in Algeria (10).

In both the film and real life, the FLN did use women to place bombs against civilian targets.  On September 30, 1956 FLN operative Zohra Drif successfully placed a beach bag  bomb at the Milk Bar on the corner of Place Bugeaud across from General Salan’s 10th headquarters, while her fellow FLN colleague Samia Lakhdari successfully placed a bomb at the Cafeteria on smart Rue Michelet in Algiers (11). Samia and Zohra were successful in their deception because of their appearance and their western style dress, which made them look European. This enabled them to pass French check points, while their male counterparts could not. Samia and Zohra’s bombs were also concealed inside beach bags under various feminine miscellany of bikinis, towels, and sun-oil. Samia and Zohra’s attack killed 3 people and injured 50.

Comparisons

Palestinian groups have perfected the art of terror. With the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August, 2005 the Palestinian resistance stepped up attacks against Israel (7). In Algeria, terrorism and urban warfare tactics successfully forced the French out of the country. Likewise, the Palestinian militant groups felt that their terror attacks and urban warfare tactics were paying dividends for them by making the Israelis retreat.

There are key important differences between the Algerian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict both sides claim a religious tie to the land. This did not exist in the Algerian conflict. At the end of French colonial rule in 1962, much of the European settler population left Algeria (12). In contrast, the Jews of Israel have few other places to go. Partly due to that, Palestinians have not been as successful as the Algerians were in their fight against Israel.

Algerians and Palestinians were supportive of each other’s causes early on. Algeria continued to give important ideological and political motivation to the Palestinian cause after independence. This was done via Algeria’s legacy of their fight for independence and both sides appropriating their struggle as their own political cause to support. The Algerian War of Independence’s legacy provided Palestinian groups with lessons and tactics on how to fight the Israelis. The influence of the Algerian War of Independence on Palestinian resistance movements cannot be denied.

What do you think of the connection between the Algerian War of Independence and the Israel-Palestine conflict? Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

1 Moussa, Nedjib Sidi. “A Contingent Nationhood: the Jewish Question and the Palestinian Cause within the Algerian Independence Movement”. Hamsa: Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies No. 4 Miscellaneous-Open Edition Journals. (2018).  6 to 7.  Accessed on September 7th, 2021. http://journals-openedition.org. translate.goog/hamsa/580?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=ajax,sc,elem.  

2 Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Kamel. Algeria and Palestine-Revolutionary Fraternity in the World of Independence Movements: Five Minutes with Abdel Razzaq Takriti. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs February 5th, 2017. Accessed on August 31st, 2021. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition....orld-of-indepdence-movements-five-minutes-with-abdel-razzaq-takriti

3 Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006. 1. 

5 Laskier, Michael M. “Israel and the Maghreb at the Height of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; 1950s-1970s”. Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol.4 No.2 (June, 2000). 7, accessed on September, 2nd, 2021, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia/edu/olj/meria/meria00_lam01.html#note*

4  Rubin, Barry and Rubin, Judith Colp. Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography. Oxford: United Kingdom. Oxford University Press. 2003. 30.  

6 Cafiero, Giorgio. “Algeria is unapologetically pro-Palestinian, and it won’t change”. Last Modified or Updated January 27th, 2021. TRT World.  Accessed on September 1st, 2021. https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/algeria-is-unapologetically-pro-palestinian-and-it-won-t-change-43634

7 Gur, Haviv Rettig. “Analysis:  The tragic self-delusion behind the Hamas war”. Last Modified or Updated July 17th, 2014. Times of Israel. Accessed on August 30th, 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-tragic-self-delusion-behind-the -hamas-war/ . 

8 “Algeria Denounces African Union granting Israel observer status”. Last Modified or Updated July 26th, 2021. Times of Israel. Accessed on September 2nd, 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/algeria-denounces-african-union-granting-israel-observer-status/

9 Norris, Jacob. “The Battle of Algiers transposed into a Palestinian key”. Modified or Updated February 11th, 2013. Open Democracy.net. Accessed on August 31st, 2021. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/battle-of-algiers-transposed-into-palestinian-key/

10 Khalidi, Rashid. The Hundred Years’ War on PALESTINE: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017. New York: New York. Metropolitan Books and Henry Holt Company. 2020. 180. 

11 Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962:  With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 185 to 186. 

12 Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge: Massachusetts. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1991. 269 and 372. 

Bibliography

“Algeria Denounces African Union granting Israel observer status”. Last Modified or Updated July 26th, 2021. Times of Israel . Accessed on September 2nd, 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/algeria-denounces-african-union-granting-israel-observer-status/

Cafiero, Giorgio. “Algeria is unapologetically pro-Palestinian, and it won’t change”. Last Modified or Updated January 27th,2021. TRT World. Accessed on September 1st, 2021. https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/algeria-is-unapologetically-pro-palestinian-and-it-won-t-change-43634 .

Gur, Haviv Rettig. “Analysis: The tragic self-delusion behind the Hamas war”. Last Modified on Updated July 17th, 2014. Times of Israel. Accessed on August 30th, 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-tragic-self-delusion-behind-the-hamas-war/

Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006.

Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge: Massachusetts. The Belknap Press of Harvard University. 1991.

Khalidi, Rashid. The Hundred Years’ War on PALESTINE: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017. New York: New York. Metropolitan Books and Henry Holt Company 2020.

Laskier, Michael M. “Israel and the Maghreb at the Height of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; 1950s-1970s”. Middle East Review of International Affairs  Vol. 4 No.2 (June, 2000). 7. Accessed on September 2nd, 2021. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia/edu/olj/meria/meria00_lam01.html#note*

Moussa, Nedjib Sidi. “A Contingent Nationhood: the Jewish Question and the Palestinian Cause within the Algerian Independence Movement”. Hamsa: Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies No.4 Miscellaneous-Open Edition Journals. (2018). 6 to 7. Accessed on September 7th, 2021. https://jounrals-openedition.org/trans.goog/hamsa/580?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_pto=ajax,sc,elem.

Norris, Jacob. “The Battle of Algiers transposed into a Palestinian key”. Modified or Updated on February 11th, 2013. Open Democracy.net. Accessed on August 31st, 2021. https://www.opendeomcracy.net/en/battle-of-algiers-transposed-into-palestinian-key/

Rubin, Barry and Rubin, Judith Colp. Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography. Oxford: United Kingdom. Oxford University Press. 2003.

Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006.

Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Kamel. Algeria and Palestine-Revolutionary Fraternity in the World of Independence Movements: Five Minutes with Abdel Razzaq Takriti. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs February 5th, 2017. Accessed on August 31st, 2021. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-editon....orld-of-independence-movements-five-minutes-with-abdel-razzaq-takriti.

The Burnside Carbine: The Gun that Led to the End of the US Civil War?

Guns have played a key role in military battles for centuries, and the technology around them has continually evolved. Here, Erick Redington looks at the importance of the Burnside carbine gun in the US Civil War.

The burnside carbine. Source: Smithsonian Institution, available here.

In the years leading to the US Civil War, the industrial revolution was making itself felt in the field of military technology. During the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the standard infantry weapon in the United States was the smoothbore musket, while the standard cavalry weapon was the smoothbore carbine, a shorter version of the musket. There were multiple issues with these weapons. A smoothbore musket has no rifling and has limited range and accuracy. The firing mechanism, using loose black powder, was messy, and prone to fouling. The biggest problem was rate of fire. As a muzzle loader, a trained soldier could fire about three shots a minute. These issues combined to drive the desire for a new weapon. 

Just as there were many problems with the standard smoothbore musket, there were issues with early breech loading rifles as well. First among these was the creation of a seal in the breech to prevent the escape of gas. Another was the cartridge used. Precise machining and mechanical issues were present as well. 

The first practical breech loading rifled musket was developed by Major Patrick Ferguson of the British Army during the American Revolution. This weapon solved several issues, such as gas leakage from the breech and allowed for quicker loading, resulting in five or six shots a minute. Despite these positives, the weapon was also expensive to make and required precise craftsmanship. The British Army of the time was willing to outfit small numbers of men with the Ferguson Rifle, but the Brown Bess remained the standard for decades.[1]

Solving the issue

With the development of industrialized mass production and interchangeable parts, the technological ability to solve the issues inherent in breech loading weapons emerged. Precision tooling gave manufacturers the ability to rifle on a mass scale. Samuel Colt began mass producing firearms. Veterans began trying their hands at new inventions. One of those was Ambrose Burnside.

Ambrose Burnside has a reputation amongst historians and Civil War buffs. He is generally seen as an amiable fool at best, and an incompetent at worst.[2] These are grossly inaccurate generalizations.[3] Burnside had a very incisive mind with good attention to detail. During his service in the American Southwest after the war, he was exposed to the Hall Breechloader. This weapon had many of the improvements of a rifled breech loader but had severe issues with gas leakage at the joint of the breech and the barrel. When he decided to turn his attention to the issue of weaponry, he had a very creative solution. Burnside designed his own cartridge that was conical shaped with the bulge in the middle. This conical casing created a seal at just the point where the issues with gas leakage occurred. As Burnside was serving in the cavalry at the time, he developed his firearm as a carbine. The final product was a .54 caliber rifled carbine.[4]

In 1853, Burnside applied to the army ordinance bureau to have a prototype of his carbine design made and was granted permission. When the prototype was made, he resigned from the army and created an arms manufacturing company to market, produce, and sell his new weapon. In 1857, the army was trying to replace the Hall Carbine, and was soliciting entrants for a competition to choose a new carbine. Burnside entered the competition, and his carbine was approved. This was the first breechloader adopted by the army that utilized a metallic cartridge. The army placed an order with Burnside.[5]

US Civil War

During the Civil War, over 50,000 Burnside Carbines were ordered by the Union Army, however most of these would be delivered only in the last year of the war. At the start of the war, the Union would arm its cavalry with any weapon it could get its hands on, mostly smoothbore muzzle loaders. The Union cavalry would be repeatedly thrashed by Confederate cavalry through the first years of the war. A weapon that provided a clear advantage in firepower and rate of fire would have been a force multiplier for the North.[6]

Two questions present themselves, first: If the United States approved a breech loading carbine prior to the war, why did they not adapt the design to a full-sized rifle for the infantry? Second: If Burnside’s Carbine was approved before the war, why was it not mass produced and ready at the start of the war?  The answers to these questions were complicated. First, the army leadership at the start of the Civil War was old and set in its ways. This is especially true of the head of the Army Ordinance Bureau, General John Ripley. At the start of the war, General Ripley insisted on issuing smoothbore weapons instead of rifled due to costs. The government had large stocks of smoothbores and it was more cost effective. He also opposed breech loading and repeating rifles. The higher rate of fire of these weapons would only encourage soldiers to use more ammunition and create carelessness in aiming. The consequences of these decisions were a war that lasted years longer and cost tens or hundreds of thousands of more casualties.[7]

After the Civil War

The difference between breech loading rifles and muzzle loading rifles can be seen in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The two armies were reasonably evenly matched in manpower, but the superior firepower of the Prussians led to their decisive victory. The fabled needle-gun showed the way to the future of military small arms. It also showed the importance of a military that was willing to innovate and utilize the latest technology in pursuit of victory.

 Much like many other aspects of the career of Ambrose Burnside, this was a case of good ideas and intentions, but poor development and execution. If the ossified army leadership had tried to implement the innovations of Burnside's Carbine on a mass scale prior to the war, the Civil War could have been significantly shortened, saving lives and perhaps the reputation of Ambrose Burnside.

What do you think of the role of the Burnside carbine? Let us know below.

[1] Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2011. p. 740.

[2] I could cite hundreds, if not thousands of books here.

[3] United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington :[s.n.], 1894. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records.

[4] Books, Time-Life. Arms and Equipment of the Union. Time Life Medical, 1999, p. 58

[5] Bodinson, Holt. General Burnside’s Little Carbine. Guns Magazine, 2011. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/General+Burnside%27s+little+carbine%3A+this+odd+breechloader+saw...-a0268787627.

[6] United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington :[s.n.], 1894. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records.

[7] Scales, Robert H. “Gun Trouble.” The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, December 29, 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/gun-trouble/383508/.

Britzkrieg: British Bankers’ Secret Plan To Win World War I

Libraries of books have been written about the causes and effects of the two worst financial collapses since 1900: The Great Depression of the 1930s and The Great Recession of 2008. Yet it is much harder to find a book about the Financial Crisis of 1914, one in which British bankers tried to suspend capital flows in order to rapidly win World War I. Daniel McEwan explains.

A 1922 US gold certificate. The ‘gold standard’ system was key to the international economy at the outbreak of World War I.

The crisis ranks as “an extraordinary and unique moment in global economic history” that saw over 50 nations experience bank runs and asset crashes. For six nail-biting weeks during August and early September, as Europe’s great powers made their march of folly into war, stock exchanges world-wide were closed until further notice, including the exchange in London - closed for the first time ever! Just down the street, the Bank of England was coping with a run on gold sovereigns. And then, as suddenly as it had started, it was over. Overshadowed by news of the war’s first bloody battles, the crisis made few headlines. “Every political, social, cultural, and economic dimension of life was in crisis in summer 1914: there was nothing especially notable about the financial sector being in trouble.” The cause of the crisis remained a banking industry whodunit for nearly a century.

The story of how a roomful of the best and brightest bankers in The City, as London’s cloistered financial district is called, gambled on their own country’s future by purposely crashing the world economic system... “is simply absent not only from general texts but also from most of the specialist literature,” laments Richard Roberts, a Professor of Contemporary History at King’s College London. That these financiers triggered; “one of the top five all-time worst international banking crises makes the silence surrounding this episode all the more mystifying.”

Stopping capital flows

In 2013, Roberts attempted to unravel the mystery of the events of those six weeks in his book Saving The City: The Great Financial Crisis of 1914. The book reveals; “...there was no downfall of a major financial institution [in Britain]. The reason was massive and unprecedented state intervention that looked like wartime controls rather than financial crisis resolution.” In other words, a government bailout. 

Nicholas Lambert at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia picked through the entrails of the crisis and divined a more sinister interpretation of its events. Like Roberts, he claims the true story of the 1914 crisis has been “airbrushed out of the official history.” In his book, Planning Armageddon, Lambert exposes a conspiracy of such breathtakingly scope that critics would later denounce it as “an act of madness” and “economic suicide”. Call it “Britzkrieg”.

In 1914, The City was the beating heart of the global economy. British financiers controlled sixty to eighty per cent of every war-critical sector of the global economy, giving it “an ability to manipulate the economic system to a degree unparalleled even today,” says Lambert. Beguiled by this power, the bankers decided to break Germany’s economic ability to prosecute the war militarily, hopefully before the shooting even started!

There is no question that everyone around the table clearly understood what they were planning would cause catastrophic collateral damage to their own domestic economy! Even worse, it would hurt the economies of neutral countries; countries Britain would need as allies in the event of war -especially America. Yet still they did it, based solely on their collective assumption that as the world’s leading export nation, Germany would break first and in just a few months! All Britain had to do was endure the pain until then and presto, the war would be won! So confident were these moneymen of their plan’s success, they single-handedly touted the “home-by-Christmas” myth that would lure throngs of their fellow citizens into army recruiting stations, many never to be home by any Christmas.

Admiralty

Perhaps the bankers’ confidence was bolstered by their accomplice in this secret endeavor, the British admiralty. Theirs was the largest and most powerful blue water fleet in the world and it had practically invented the naval blockade. During its conflict with France from 1754-63, British warships had sealed off their major ports, slowly strangling the French economy. They had done it again with equal effect against Napoleon’s own attempts to blockade Britain with his Continental System. Inspired by this track record, the admirals were only too keen to do their bit to hasten Germany’s downfall, which explains why the Royal Navy moved so quickly once the shooting did start, blockading Germany and seizing/sinking a quarter of its merchant shipping in just three months!

At first, the bankers’ ruthless plan worked brilliantly. By stopping the flow of capital, they effectively locked down the world economic system. Factories and mines closed. Shipping lanes emptied but Germany did not break. It had its own plan and the Kaiser’s legions rolled across over Belgium into France, only narrowly halted just eighty miles from Paris. The war the bankers’ thought they were preventing was on. By then, their plan had made them new and powerful enemies at home and abroad. The political blowback was thunderous. Exactly as they had anticipated, the first and loudest complaints were lodged by English industrialists being hammered by the crisis just as much as Germany. And they made their displeasure known to their friends in high places who were equally appalled by what the bankers were doing.

End of the scheme

“It turned out that while the Admiralty was perfectly willing to countenance ending the economic world as they knew it, other parts of the British government were far less enthusiastic about that prospect,” observes Mark Stout, Senior Editor at War on the Rocks.

They weren’t alone. American manufacturers quickly joined the chorus of protests. Their factories were producing over a quarter of the consumer goods purchased by Europeans and the lockdown was crimping their style – and profits. After some dark warnings from the White House, the British government demanded the financiers abandon their ruinous program, no questions asked.

The war consumed the crisis but it remains an example of economic brinkmanship no nation has ever been foolish enough to repeat.

What do you think of the scheme? Let us know below.

Now read Daniel’s article on Russia’s 4 great resets here.