Jacqueline Kennedy’s Influence on the Arts in America

In 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a powerful speech on the arts in America. But what is less known is that Kennedy’s speech was heavily influenced by his wife Jacqueline Kennedy. David Huff explains.

Jacqueline Kennedy in May 1962.

Art and history

On Saturday, October 26, 1963, President Kennedy gave a speech to the students at Amherst College as he dedicated a library named for the American poet Robert Frost, who died on Tuesday, January 29, 1963. The speech was rich, eclectic, and moving as he galvanized a generation of Americans not only to lead lives of civic commitment, but also to challenge the conventional power structure that existed in America at that time.

The speech is well known for its stirring statements in which the late-President issued a clarion call about the hope and possibility for American society. Kennedy, who was ahead of his time, spoke eloquently when he declared:

"I look forward to a great future for America, a future in which our country will match its military strength with our moral restraint, its wealth with our wisdom, its power with our purpose. I look forward to an America which will not be afraid of grace and beauty, which will protect the beauty of our natural environment, which will preserve the great old American houses and squares and parks of our national past, and which will build handsome and balanced cities for our future"

"I look forward to an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or statecraft. I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. And I look forward to an America, which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well. And I look forward to a world which will be safe not only for democracy and diversity but also for personal distinction."

Yet, Kennedy also issued a warning that is true today as it was in his time:

"And the nation which disdains the mission of art invites the fate of Robert Frost's hired man, the fate of having "nothing to look backward to with pride, and nothing to look forward to with hope."

Jacqueline Kennedy and the arts

In our contemporary society, we need to improve the growing differences that divide us as a civilization. The ongoing discussions and vitriolic debates regarding race, poverty, social unrest and economic disparity fail to provide a positive impetus for a consensus as to the course of action. Yet, many Americans do not realize that President Kennedy's innovative speech at Amherst was, in fact, influenced by the artistic mind-set of Mrs. Kennedy when she was first lady. Eclectic and forward thinking, she adopted as her mantra that successful civilizations can achieve a cultural renaissance by cultivating the reservoir of talent and individual ingenuity that resides within its people.  Mrs. Kennedy understood that other parts of the world, such as Europe, had implemented cultural policies not only to preserve their unique cultural heritage, but also to broaden public participation in cultural life. For example, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Britain are countries that promote an active cultural policy in their respective countries. Mrs. Kennedy believed that if these Western civilizations engaged in the improvement of the cultural and artistic fabric of their modern-day societies, America had the power to create a Department of Culture that would provide the basis for an educated exchange on the improvement of our own unique culture.

The creation of a culture department could help oversee the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, assist colleges with instituting and preserving arts management programs; and assist in the coordination of complex and myriad tasks that confront major artistic American centers and symphonies. In addition, a Department of Culture could conduct arts and cultural economy studies, develop cultural plans for neighborhoods or cities or towns that elevate eclectic cultural communities and assets, and allocate workforce investment and small business administration, and community economic development funds to arts and culture organizations. 

Furthermore, a culture department could work closely with major American music festival organizers - such as those at Aspen and Interlochen, the Tanglewood Music Festival, and the Wolftrap National Park for the Performing Arts - to encourage and assist young people, via corporate and privately sponsored scholarships, to study the performing arts.

The generous commitment of corporations, foundations, nonprofit groups, individual donors and others to invest time and resources in support of a department of culture would greatly benefit children and youth and provide the impetus for the kind of bold and creative synergy that the performing arts really need for continued growth and development in America. Prominent organizations, such as The Ford Foundation, The Catherine B. Reynolds Foundation, and The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation have demonstrated a keen interest in promoting and supporting arts organizations throughout the United States.

Lack of Artistic Willpower and It’s Consequences

Unless there is a concerted effort, however, on the part of government, corporations, private philanthropy, and grass-roots organizations, the political climate - and debate - concerning the arts is likely to get worse. Throughout our nation, politicians are cutting arts programs in the public schools and universities at both the state and federal level. In addition, artistic institutions, such as symphony orchestras, are struggling to survive due to a lack of corporate sponsorship and poor ticket sales. One might ask if poor ticket sales are a direct result of the decease in music and art programs in public education. As these programs have been the first to be cut in education over the past forty years, there goes any chance for children to gain knowledge and an appreciation for classical music and art.

Conclusion

The creation of a culture department in America is not quixotic, even in these turbulent times. In our multicultural society, the partnership between the government and corporations and individual philanthropy in sponsoring a department of culture would provide the engine for an infusion of creative, engaging and innovative ideas that will inspire people regardless of race, gender, and economic background to reach for something better. Artistic expressions would serve as a beacon of hope and promise in a world enveloped by skepticism and uncertainty. To those who suggest we cannot afford to implement a Department of Culture, I reply that America cannot afford not to do so. We have the funds to create a Department of Culture, we simply need to summon the will and self-discipline to raise the cultural bar in our country. The missing link, however, is the political willingness to embrace, to encourage a forward-thinking enterprise capable of creating a cultural renaissance in America. To that end, the American people - particularly the young - deserve a better society that benefits all of our citizens, not just a few.

What do you think of Jacqueline Kennedy and the arts? Let us know below.

David M. Huff was born in Wheeling, West Virginia in 1968. A violist, he studied with the Pittsburgh Youth Symphony Orchestra from 1983-1984. He attended the Interlochen Arts Festival and Interlochen Arts Academy from 1984-1986 and also participated in the Boston University Tanglewood Institute's Youth Program during the summer of 1986. He earned a B.A. in History from West Virginia University and an M.A. in History/Research from West Virginia University. He works in a Washington, DC International law firm as an Intellectual Property Trademark, Litigation, and Patent Specialist.

How the 1952 US Election Led to the Modern Election Campaign

The 1952 election was important for a number of reasons, with Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the first Republican president for two decades – but in many ways it was also the birth of the modern election campaign. Here, Victor Gamma looks at the story of how television commercials became a part of the campaign thanks to an advertising executive.

Eisenhower on the presidential campaign trail in Baltimore, September 1952.

In October 1952 millions of television viewers began seeing twenty to thirty-second advertising “spots” that appeared every hour between their favorite programs. Audiences were used to seeing ads, but this one was like nothing they had ever seen. The ad did not feature Lucky Strikes or some other product; it featured one of the candidates running for president that year. After the announcement “Eisenhower Answers America” blared into the living room, viewers watched the Republican candidate deliver short, simple answers to questions from average citizens. 

Many were appalled. Senate hearings, conventions and addresses had all been televised before, but this felt more like watching a commercial than observing a serious discussion about national issues. Television was for low-class entertainment. When the Eisenhower ads began running, Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, declared “I think the American people will be shocked by such contempt for their intelligence; this isn’t Ivory Soap versus Palmolive.”  In 1952 television was an uncertain element in the political landscape. That uncertainty, along with the contempt, would not last long. Beginning that year it would play such a significant role in American politics that, essentially, a run for the White House would soon become a glorified marketing campaign. Advertising people were now hired to help “sell” the candidate. These slick professionals would “handle” the campaign—at least the TV appearances. Politics had become a business. The results would forever affect everything from the way candidates were presented to the cost of campaigning, which would go from less than $20 millions in 1948 and rise steadily up to an incredible $260 million by 1972. 

The power of TV

The potential of television was first seen the previous year. On March 12, 1951 a political event was televised to a national audience for the first time. The occasion was the Senate Committee hearings on organized crime in New York. If the hearings had taken place just a year earlier not much would have happened, but since then the number of homes with television sets had skyrocketed. In New York 51% of homes now had a set. During the Senate hearings, people were not only glued to the television, they called their friends to tell them about it. Americans watched, mesmerized, as gangsters like Frank Costelo came under the harsh glare of questioning. At one point the camera focused on the Mafiosi’s hands, clearly revealing a frightened and guilty man. The mobsters in turn drummed nervously on the table, sweated, or tore pieces of paper to shreds. It was the stuff of Hollywood. The mob became the subject of conversation in households across America. LIfemagazine wrote, “Never before had the attention of the nation been so completely riveted on a single matter.” But an unexpected, and even more important result was that, overnight it catapulted the chairman of the hearings, Estes Kevauver, to national fame. The senator duly announced his candidacy for the White House shortly afterwards. The lesson was not lost on keen observers of the political scene: if the relatively bland and uncharismatic Kevauver could become an overnight celebrity with a shot at the presidency, what could be done with a candidate with more “star” quality? They were soon to find out - with the help of Madison Avenue. 

Rosser Reeve

By the time Rosser Reeve took his first stab at presidential politics, he was the most innovative and successful advertiser in the country. In his youth he left his native Virginia for New York to work in the advertising industry. After learning the ropes with a number of firms he co-founding Bates & Co. with Ted Bates and began to evolve an approach that would lay the foundation for ‘scientific’ advertising. His technique was simple, blunt, and amazingly successful. His ad for Anacin, for example, increased sales from $18 to $54 million in eighteen months. Sophistication and artistry were not a prominent feature of his ads. Many of them, in fact, have been called “the most hated commercials in television history.” But he knew how to sell a product. To be effective an ad had to stick relentlessly to a single theme, focusing on the essentials. Reeves invented a new term: unique selling proposition (USP) to describe his methods. The goal was to make a product stand out from the competition in a way that made sense to consumers. Reeves would find a simple, easily relatable concept and pound it into the head of potential buyers. For this he earned the nickname “The Prince of Hard Sell.” That was all well and good for Anacin, but could this same approach get a candidate elected? Reeves' first attempt took place in 1948.

That year Thomas Dewey was running for president against the incumbent, Harry Truman. Overwhelmingly, political pundits predicted an easy win for Dewey, Reeves was not so sure. He attempted to interest the Republican candidate in a series of campaign ads. He proposed to the nominee that they saturate the swing states in the two or three weeks before the election with short radio or television features that the industry called “spots.” Although the number of television sets in the nation was small, Reeves believed that the strategic use of well-crafted ads placed in critical states or counties could make the difference. The overconfident Dewey turned Reeves’ proposal down flat, “I don’t think it would be dignified,” the candidate remarked. The Republicans lost that November. Later research confirmed Reeves suspicion: the Republican contender had fallen short by just a handful of votes in a few key states.

1952

Four years later, in 1952, having been denied the White House for twenty years, the Republicans were desperate and this time it was Reeves who was asked to help with Eisenhower’s run against the Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson. Rosser’s chance had come. It took no time for the basic scheme to formulate in his mind; he would “package” Eisenhower just as he did his products; Eisenhower would be the unique item that television viewers needed and Stevenson would be brand X. Reeves understood the audience of the coming image-obsessed age: They would not sit still for a long speech. Instead of a thirty-minute speech by Eisenhower, (who was a mediocre speaker anyway) he would offer a mini drama. Viewers would see Eisenhower’s triumphant arrival, applauded by adoring citizens, some standing on chairs to see the conquering hero. Flags would be everywhere, and then shots of his proud wife Mamie, brief segments from his speech, more wildly cheering crowds, and then the hero’s equally dramatic departure. 

But it was another idea, the political spot that would have the greatest impact. The strategy was to deluge the public during the last three weeks of the campaign with short TV broadcasts called “Eisenhower Answers America.” The spots, lasting no more than thirty seconds, catered to a short attention span and did not appeal to depth of knowledge. The ads came straight out of a manual on marketing. To quote one of them;  “the art of penetrating a specific market with a high-density campaign and yet using a minimal amount of time and money.” In these spots, an average American citizen would be seen asking a question. The next scene would feature Eisenhower giving a short, pithy reply. Above all, the candidate would speak the language of the average person. But they would not waste money broadcasting them everywhere at once, they would concentrate on only the critical areas, forty-nine counties in twelve states, to be exact.

Spots

The whole scheme almost didn’t come off. When Reeves met with Eisenhower in the summer of 1952 to pitch his idea, the candidate at first resisted. The general failed to see how he could articulate his views in thirty seconds. But when the persuasive Reeves began to describe his television spot concept as “the essence of democracy,” Eisenhower capitulated. Reeves, now working with “Citizens for Eisenhower” set to work. His first task was to sharpen the candidate's image in the minds of the voters. He sat down with a stack of newspaper clippings of Eisenhower speeches and read through them. Ike’s speeches, like his entire campaign, tried to hit every target, like buckshot. There was no clear message. This was against every sound principle of advertising. The mind of the voters could only hold on to one, or at most three, simple messages. Focus on these and then you could hope to penetrate the hearts and minds of the people. Some protested that “you can’t say anything in a fifteen-second speech.” But the virtuoso adman would soon prove that “less is more.”  Reeves distilled three “selling points” from Eisenhower’s speeches: he would bring peace through strength, fight communism and clean up corruption. Nor would he have his candidate deliver lengthy orations like the brainy Stevenson. As Reeves later remarked, all anyone could remember of even the greatest speeches in American oratory were a handful of words like “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.” Next, with the help of Reader’s Digest and George Gallup, he conducted surveys of Americans' most prominent fears. Near the top of the list of worries were the issues of war and peace. He could now craft his TV spot to cater to those worries and come up with one, simple, effective slogan; “Eisenhower, Man of Peace.” “Time for a Change,” was the other slogan used. 

Now it was time to produce the spots. This proved easier said than done. First off, the Eisenhower campaign would only set aside one day for filming. Reeves had to reduce his vision of fifty spots down to twenty-two. The candidate himself presented a problem, too. In his earlier television appearances Eisenhower came across as wooden and clumsy. The lighting, which hadn’t adjusted for television yet, made him look old. They were working with very primitive equipment and a candidate uncomfortable with the whole process. Reeves wanted Eisenhower to appear without his glasses but the general could not read the prompter board. They adapted by creating a prompter with extra-large letters. Finally things began to click. The initially nervous Eisenhower began to warm up after the first few spots. Things were going so well, in fact, that Reeves coaxed an additional eighteen spots out of the candidate. Once Ike’s footage was complete, Radio City Music Hall was searched for anyone who looked and sounded like a typical American. They directed these “typical Americans” to ask questions that would fit with Eisenhower’s pre-recorded answers. To the television audience it would all look like the questions and answer sessions took place at the same time. The spots, at a cost of $1.5 million, were then to be strategically broadcast in the states that looked close. 

The spots start

Beginning in the second week of October, 1952, television viewers began to see the spot in which Eisenhower, looking directly at the camera, candidly fielded questions from ordinary Americans. One spot featured a frustrated woman who complained “You know what things cost today. High prices are driving me crazy!” Eisenhower answered, ‘Yes, my Mamie gets after me about the high cost of living. That’s another reason I say it’s time for a change. Time to get back to an honest dollar and an honest dollar's worth.” In another spot an anxious-looking man flanked by his wife asked “Mr Eisenhower, will we have to fight another war?” Eisenhower calmed his fears while at the same time getting in a jab at the Truman administration, “No, not if we have a sound program for peace. And I’ll add this; we won’t spend hundreds of billions and still not have enough tanks and planes for Korea.” The spots aired in a slot of time between popular shows, when viewership was high.  For the next three weeks, just as Rosser Reeves planned, millions of television viewers and radio listeners could not escape the hourly-broadcasted “Eisenhower Answers America.” 

Did Reeve’s experiment pass the ultimate test? We cannot credit the television spots too much. The word to describe their impact would be more “helpful” than “decisive.” For a variety of reasons, Eisenhower would most likely have won with or without “Eisenhower Answers America.” Additionally, television viewing of the campaigns was actually relatively low. The Republican Convention only achieved a 36 Hooper rating as opposed to a 62 recorded for I Love Lucy. Even during the height of the campaign, in October, a mere 15% of Americans heard either candidate on television.  The fact was, most of the television audience preferred to watch their favorite programs instead of the political ones. But the canny Reeves overcame that obstacle by running his political spots like ads, between popular shows. Viewers would see them whether they wanted to or not, just like a shampoo commercial. On the other hand, many non-voters and normally Democratic voters switched to Ike based on the commercials. They liked what they saw: a likeable, hard-hitting war hero who was down to earth and serious about solving the major problems of the day. It was not until the next election that television became truly critical, but those pioneering ads of 1952 laid the foundation. The possible dangers of the dominance of media advertising on politics were discussed even during the 1952 campaign. Charges of demagoguery and shallowness abounded. But regardless of the dire warnings of critics, the marriage of politics and Madison Avenue was here to stay. 

What do you think of the 1952 election commercials? Let us know below.

Now, read Victor’s series on whether it was right to topple William McKinley’s statue in Arcata, California here.

References

Halberstam, David, The Fifties. The Ballantine Publishing Group, 1993. 

Kathryn Cramer Brownell, "This Is How Presidential Campaign Ads First Got on TV." Time, August 30, 2016. (online article.) https://time.com/4471657/political-tv-ads-history/

Hollitz, John E. Eisenhower and the Admen: The Television "Spot" Campaign of 1952.”The Wisconsin Magazine of History. Vol. 66, No. 1 [Autumn, 1982], pp. 25-39 (15 pages)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4635688?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_cont   ents

“Eisenhower Answers America: The First Political Advertisements on American TV (1952)” Politics,Television | September 28th, 2012. http://www.openculture.com/2012/09/the_first_political_advertisements_on_tv_1952.html

Reeves, Rosser (1910-1984) Ad Age, September 15, 2003.https://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/reeves-rosser-1910-1984/98848

The British Leader at the Height of Empire: Lord Salisbury

Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister of Britain at the peak of its power. He was Prime Minister on and off during the period from 1885 to 1902 and had a great influence on the country’s foreign policy at its colonial height. Avan Fata explains.

Lord Salisbury in 1886.

At the turn of the 20th century, the British Empire seemed to be at its zenith. Its colonial holdings far surpassed the second largest imperial power, the French, and the City of London was the trading capital of the world. Yet as the Victorian age gave way to the Edwardian, many in Whitehall and the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that these heights of economic and political might would not be easy to maintain, let alone to increase further. The economic-industrial disparity between Britain and other European great powers was closing, and from the New World the United States was also narrowing the gap.

In foreign politics too, there were signs of a storm on the horizon. The competition between imperial states had also reached a crossroads; large swathes of the globe had already been partitioned between imperialist European states, and some feared that the next “Scramble” would be over the dying carcass of an empire at the end of its tether; not for nothing was the Ottoman Empire termed the “sick man of Europe”. Britain had reluctantly taken up the task of helping to secure the Sublime Porte - as the Ottoman capital at Constantinople was known - from foreign encroachment and possible invasion.

Russia remained the perceived enemy of British foreign policy; its expansion eastwards and into Central Asia had been dubbed “The Great Game” by a British officer and later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim. But Britain also faced the rising ambitions of a newly-created German Empire, whose Kaiser Wilhelm II had dismissed Bismarck as Chancellor in favor of pursuing a more expansionist foreign policy, dubbed Weltpolitik (world politics). 

Enter Salisbury

It was in these circumstances that Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, became Prime Minister. First elected to 10 Downing Street in 1885, he would go on to serve two more terms (1886 - 1892, 1895 - 1902); leading Britain for a total of 13 years and 252 days - only Robert Walpole, William Pitt the Younger, and Lord Liverpool served longer. Curiously however, Lord Salisbury also served as his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; a realm which he had considerable experience in.

Salisbury’s first foray into foreign affairs came in 1876, when he was chosen by then prime minister Disraeli to represent Britain at the Constantinople Conference. Despite the conference’s failure to secure greater rights and land for Bulgarian and Herzogvinian subjects in Ottoman territory, it catapulted Salisbury into the political spotlight. Two years later during the Russo-Turkish War, when Disraeli’s Cabinet protested the Treaty of San Stefano, Salisbury was chosen to succeed Lord Derby (who had resigned as Foreign Secretary due to the protest). Even before his official appointment on 2 April, Salisbury single-handedly drafted a circular calling for a congress of European nations to re-examine the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, which was duly approved and dispatched to the great powers.

At the resulting Congress of Berlin (1878), Salisbury was overshadowed publicly by Lord Beaconsfield, but it was apparent to all the plenipotentiaries that he had been the architect of the Congress and the subsequent settlement. The Congress overruled many of the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, reducing the size of a new Bulgaria and returning Russian-conquered territories back to the Ottomans, whilst also securing Cyprus for the British - ostensibly for use as a naval base to dissuade any future Russian aggression into the Straits.

Despite being a Conservative, Salisbury was not particularly supportive of the Empire. He questioned its actual economic benefits, and would come to prefer maintaining the status quo as opposed to seizing any new territory. In a speech as Prime Minister after the Diamond Jubilee of 1897, he remarked that ‘our first duty is towards the people of this country, to maintain their interests and their rights; our second is to all humanity.’ In his foreign policy, he eschewed these priorities, placing the security of the Empire first and foremost.

Foreign policy

To Salisbury, managing foreign policy demanded a calm and unwavering statesman. ‘Sleepless tact, immovable calmness and patience’ were, he deemed, the qualities which would allow a diplomat to succeed. Perhaps more significant to his government and those in Europe, he refused to entangle Britain in any alliances. Much like Gladstone, Salisbury did not prefer to enter Britain into any mutual defense pacts, viewing them as commitments which would seriously hinder Whitehall’s ability to act independently of its continental counterparts. When his government and public opinion pressed for an Anglo-German alliance, Salisbury was reluctant to permit talks with Berlin. When it became clear that the Germans were unwilling to support Britain in the Far East against Russia, whilst simultaneously asking for British colonial concessions, Salisbury remarked to German ambassador Paul von Hatzfeldt that ‘you ask too much for our friendship.’

This commitment to a lack of commitment was seen by Salisbury’s Conservative colleagues not as a deliberate choice, but rather a continuity of a longstanding preference in British - and prior to 1707 English - foreign policy. As far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, they argued, ensuring a balance of power in Europe and remaining independent of embroilments on the continent was the modus operandi. In 1896, Salisbury’s adherence to this doctrine earned a name: ‘splendid isolation’, after a Canadian politician and later Joseph Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) popularized it in debates. Salisbury’s critics were more inclined to use the term ‘terrible isolation’.

For his own part, Salisbury took disdain with the term, deriding it as ‘jargon about isolation’, and mentioned to Queen Victoria that isolation ‘is much less danger [sic] than the danger of being dragged into wars which do not concern us.’ In hindsight, non-intervention seems a more apt term to use, as Britain was far from isolated from the various quarrels taking place at the fringes of its empire: Russia in the Far East and Central Asia, Germany in Africa and the Pacific, and France in Northern Africa as well as the Sudan. In each case, Salisbury balanced the interests of London and the other powers with great skill and, as with the case of Portuguese claims in South Africa (1890), with military pressure if need be. It was during Salisbury’s reign that the Royal Navy adopted the ‘Two Power Naval Standard’, the policy that the British fleet should be equal in strength to the next two largest navies combined. 

Conclusion

Salisbury’s power declined following the Second Boer War, which broke out against his will in 1899. His own health was failing, and in 1900 he finally handed over the reins of the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne. At the end of his political career, he had managed to usher the British Empire into the 20th century with great diplomatic skill and tact. Far from being preyed upon by the other great powers,  Salisbury had defended British interests across the world and expanded the “red on the map” by six million square miles, a feat unmatched since the days of Pitt the Elder. His policy of splendid isolation however, was judged by his successors to be a relic of a bygone Victorian age, and Britain would enter into her first mutual defense pact with Japan in 1902. 

Let us know what you think of Lord Salisbury below.

Now read Avan’s series on First World War historiography here.

Sources

Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970.                                     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Howard, Christopher. “Splendid Isolation.” History 47, no. 159 (1962): 32-41. Accessed August 22, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24404639.

Leonard, Dick. British Prime Ministers from Walpole to Salisbury: The 18th and 19th Centuries. New                   York: Routledge, 2021. 

MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World                                     War. London: Profile Books, 2014.

Margaret M. Jefferson. "Lord Salisbury and the Eastern Question, 1890-1898." The Slavonic and East                                European Review 39, no. 92 (1960): 44-60. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab                               le/4205217.

Penson, Lillian M. "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy." Cambridge                                               Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1935): 87-106. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab             le/3020834.

Roberts, Andrew. Salisbury: Victorian Titan. New York: Phoenix Press, 2006. 

The Modern Military History of India: Part 1 - The Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry

India’s military history is rich, long and storied yet there is criminally little written about it and it is hideously ignored in many debates on military history of the 19th century. This perhaps is because Indians themselves know very little about what the Indian Army did in the years between 1858 and 1910. In these few decades, the Indian Army became one of the most combat experienced forces in the world as it fought alongside the British Army from Egypt to Afghanistan. The Indian Army (though officially known as the British Indian Army, it was always referred to as the Indian Army), which was already one of the most professional and most well-equipped forces in the world, by the time the Great War rolled around, had become arguably the single most experienced armed force in the world alongside the British Army.

Siddhant A. Joshi starts his series of the modern military history of India by looking at Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry.

Subadars (Sikhs) and Gunners (Punjabi Muslims) in the 1890s..

Introduction

Since the British and Indian Armies rarely fought alone, the technologies, techniques and tactics used by either one of them became commonplace in both. Not only that, but their military history also became inextricably interlinked and both armies developed processes that were born of their shared experience – processes and doctrines and traditions that stand to this day. The British Army commemorates the many contributions, sacrifices and stories of Indian soldiers with just as many memorials to Indians as there are to Brits. The Indian Army too does the same and has, in fact, kept many units that were raised by the British.

However, not many outside the armed forces know of this. That is the aim of this – to bring to light that which should long ago have been known.

The Frontier Campaign – Beginnings

To understand this little-known campaign, one must first understand an area of the Indian Subcontinent that was then called the North West Frontier Province or the NWFP. It was an area that had formed just south of the intersection of the Karakorum and Pamir Mountains and just north of the Hindu Kush Mountains and had long been used as a gateway for invasions since it stood between mountains that have been impassable for large armies for centuries. It quickly became the frontier of British India – lands ungoverned by any state and occupied only by tribes of armed Pashtuns.

It was the natural path into India from Afghanistan and its existence posed a threat to the existence of British Rule in India for one reason alone – the Great Game. During this period, the Russians and the British were playing a long-running and high-stakes chess match in Afghanistan for control of the country. Whoever controlled Afghanistan would control not only India’s North Western border but Russia’s southern border.

Afghanistan quickly became the linchpin for the two powers’ plans and prospects in Asia. And, sure as the sun rises every day, one of the most important chess pieces became the North Western Frontier Province. And, in the NWFP there stood a mountain pass – the infamous Khyber Pass –which was of immense strategic value in safeguarding the approach into the subcontinent (a value it still holds!). To guard this pass, the British had recruited a small regiment composed entirely of Pashtun Tribesmen from the neighbouring Tirah and Malakand regions since they knew the land the best.

However, Tirah itself was not of much importance. Colonel T. H. Holdich, writing a few months after the end of hostilities in the campaign, says ‘It is a species of cul de sac, possessing little or no strategic value.’[1] And Malakand was much the same.

If that were true, why did the British and Indians spend months fighting the tribesmen of the regions and mobilise well over 100,000 troops for the cause? It is simple. The tribes guarding the Khyber Pass revolted, attacked their own men and took up positions all along the Khyber. While of utmost importance was the Khyber Pass, securing it was of no use unless the rebellion was put down.

The Frontier Campaign – 1897-1898

‘Our little wars attract far less attention among the people of this country than they deserve. They are frequently carried out in circumstances of the most adverse kind. Our enemies, although ignorant of military discipline, are, as a rule, extremely brave and are thoroughly capable of using the natural advantages of their country.’ These were words written by author G. A. Henty when describing the Tirah and Malakand Offensives.[2]

Neville Chamberlain (yes, that Neville Chamberlain) wrote on the matter and Winston Churchill (yes, that Winston Churchill) was a young Second Lieutenant in the campaign and he too wrote on the matter extensively. It is their works that the remaining part of this article will rely upon.

The thing that is of utmost importance to understand is that the Tirah Campaign was one part of a larger conflict referred to as the ‘Frontier Matter’ by Churchill, with the entire conflict revolving around suppressing tribal rebellions in the NFWP. The Tirah Campaign which was an offensive against the Afridi tribes would take place simultaneously with the offensives against Pashtun tribes in Malakand and the offensive against the Mohamand tribes.

To tackle these rebellions, the Indian Army set up 2 distinct forces – the Tirah Field Force and the Malakand Field Force.

Composition of British Indian Forces

1.     Tirah Field Force - General William Lockhart, KCB[3]

a.     1st Division – Brigadier General William Symons

                                               i.     1st Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Derbyshire Regiment
- 1st Bn The Devonshire Regiment
- 2nd/1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 30th (Punjab) Regiment 
- No. 6 British Field Hospital
- No. 34 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     2nd Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment
- 1st Bn Royal West Surrey Regiment
- 2nd Bn 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry
- Sections A, B No. 8 British Field Hospital
- Sections A, C No. 14 British Field Hospital
- No. 51 Native Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- Gurkha Scouts
- No. 1 Mountain Battery 
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery 
- No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 28th Regiment, Bombay Infantry (Pioneers)
- Two companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners
- Karpurthala Regiment
- Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers
- No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 63 Native Field Hospital

b.     2nd Division – Major General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs

                                               i.     3rd Brigade
- 1st Bn The Gordon Highlanders
- 1st Bn The Dorsetshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 15th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment
- No. 24 British Field Hospital
- No. 44 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     4th Brigade
- 2nd Bn, The King's Own Scottish Borderers
- 1st Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 36th (Sikh) Regiment Of Bengal Infantry
- Sections C, D No. 9 Field Hospital
- Sections A, B No, 23 British Field Hospital
- No. 48 Native Field Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery
- Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 21st Regiment Of Madras Infantry (Pioneers)
- No. 4 Company Madras Sappers And Miners
- Jhind Regiment 
- Sirmur Sappers
- Section B Of No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 43 Native Field Hospital

2.     Malakand Field Force – Major General Bindon Blood[4]

a.     The MFF had no divisions

b.     1st Brigade
- Royal West Kent Regiment
- Highland Light Infantry
- 31st Punjab Infantry
- 24th Punjab Infantry
- 45th Sikhs
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

c.     2nd Brigade
- The Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment)
- 35th Sikhs
- 38th Dogras
- Guides Infantry
- 4 Company Bengal Sappers
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

d.     3rd Brigade
- The Queen’s Regiment
- 22nd Punjab Infantry
- 39th Punjab Infantry
- 3 Company Bombay Sappers
- No. 1 Mountain Battery

e.     Cavalry
- 11th Bengal Lancers

 

The Tirah Field Force – Bravery of the Sikh Troops

To get to Tirah, the Force had to march through demanding terrain and the feats of bravery in combat and mountaineering of the Indian Army have been well recorded. In one instance, some 250 men of an unspecified Indian artillery regiment were told to move their guns across a mountain pass. G. A. Henty, referencing the event, describes it as a ‘splendid feat’ when the 250 Indians led by 2 British officers brought the guns by hand (their horses having gone lame or died) through the mountain pass in just a few days through immensely deep snow.

In another incident, Chamberlain describes an attack by two unspecified Indian infantry brigades on a ridgeline (Dagrai Heights) thought to be impregnable on October 18, 1897. It took the two brigades a few hours to link up but when they did, it was found that they had only taken 9 or 10 casualties. He describes also the action of 3 regiments on October 20, 1897 – the Gordon Highlanders, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the 15th Sikhs whom he credits with saving a retirement of an infantry brigade from an overwhelming counterattack by the tribesmen saying ‘the retirement was only saved from being a disaster by the coolness under fire of those fine regiments’. 

It is here worth noting that the 15th Sikhs and the Gordons had taken heavy losses in a surprise attack that very day suffering some 250 casualties among them. [5]

In another instance of bravery and complete dominance by Indian troops, a Sikh battalion was given the order to secure another height from the tribesmen. Led by a Punjabi officer with a British 2IC (2nd in Command), the Battalion overwhelmed the enemy position though they were outnumbered 5 to 1.

The Malakand Field Force – Sikh Troops Shine Again

Churchill[6] – known for his admiration of Indian and ANZAC troops in WW2 – narrates an amazing incident where a 62-man Sikh unit was surrounded and outnumbered by the enemy. The only nearby friendly force, some British cavalry, was unable to breakthrough and rescue the Sikhs. It appears that having accepted death, the bugle sounded charge and the outnumbered men rose out of their positions and – swords drawn – charged the pathans (general word for Afghan tribesmen). Not expecting this, the pathans simply ran for no known reason and the small Sikh unit cut down hundreds of the retreating Pathans.

Churchill also describes in detail the actions of a company of the 35th Sikhs which, during a defence, had become surrounded by the pathans. With the assistance of a squadron of cavalry, the Sikh troops of the 35th broke the encirclement and drove the vastly outnumbering Pathans into a small mountainous gulley where they were massacred by the Sikhs and the cavalry.

Henty, regarding the Malakand Campaign, relays the famous story of the handful of men from the 36th Sikhs that defended Fort Saragarhi against 10,000 tribesmen. However, that story deserves its own article!

 

In Conclusion

First things first; while I have only discussed Sikh troops here, they by no means were the only brave soldiers. They were simply the ones I chose to focus on. Many different regiments were named and many soldiers were equally as brave. Secondly, the point of this article, as ever, is simply to shine a light on that which was not known and to exemplify the bravery of those unsung heroes.

What do you think of the Indian Campaigns of 1897? Let us know below.

[1] Col. T. H. Holdich, ‘Tirah’, The Geographical Journal, 12:4 (October, 1898)

[2] G. A. Henty, A Story of Chitral, Tirah and Ashantee (Blackie and Son; London, 1904)

[3] https://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/indiancampaigns/tirah.htm

[4] Churchill’s work

[5] Neville Chamberlain, ‘The Tirah Campaign’, Fortnightly Review, 63:375 (March, 1898)

[6] Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (Longmans; London, 1898)

The ‘Scramble for Africa’ – Then and Now

When European nations ‘scrambled’ for territory in Africa in the 1800s, the results were catastrophic for its indigenous peoples. A new scramble is now on and the jury is still out on whether Africans will actually benefit this time. Dan McEwen looks at ‘The Scramble for Africa’, then and now.

The 1884 Berlin Conference, as illustrated in "Illustrierte Zeitung"

‘Scrambling’ Everywhere But Africa

Blame Portugal. Ranked 109th by size, little Portugal was the first European country to make it big as a colonial power. Under Prince Henry the Navigator, Portuguese merchants were well ahead of the curve in the so-called ‘Age of Exploration’. Their trading ships had long been slowly feeling their way along Africa’s west coast and by the mid-1400s, their crews were making fortunes trading in slaves, sugar and gold. 

While Christopher Columbus was famously sailing across the Atlantic in 1492 with visions of Oriental sugarplums dancing in his head, the intrepid Portuguese were defeating the Ottomans in a power struggle for control of the lucrative Arab/Indian trade routes. Victorious, they continued east, becoming the first Europeans to arrive by sea in China and then Japan. So toxic was their contact with the shogunate however, Portuguese traders were expelled in 1639 and Japan sealed itself off in two hundred years of self-imposed isolation from the West!

Another small nation, Holland, replaced the Portuguese, enabling The Dutch East India Company [VOC], to become the largest company to ever have existed in recorded history! Next came the Spanish, venturing westward from their possessions in Central America, laying claim to several Pacific islands, including the Philippines. The French, latecomers to the rush, established outposts in Indochina, Vietnam and on a sprinkling of Polynesian islands before being lapped by the British. Their world-class navy would resort to gunboat diplomacy to forcibly establish colonies in China. Later, the Germans, Americans and Russians likewise bullied their way into the Pacific. 

Back in the western hemisphere, the British and French went head-to-head for supremacy in North America even as Spanish explorers, conquerors and settlers following Columbus’ lead, headed for the Caribbean and Central and South America. In their quest for "gold, glory, and God", in that order. Hernán Cortés conquered the Aztec empire in Mexico, at a cost of 240,000 Aztec lives and Francisco Pizarro followed suite, nearly wiping out the Incas by 1572.  

"What happened after Columbus was like a thousand kudzus [weeds] everywhere,” laments author/historian Charles C. Mann.“Throughout the hemisphere, ecosystems cracked and heaved like winter ice.” 

Indeed, the impact of all this “exploration” on native populations was apocalyptic. Between 1492 and 1600, 55 million people, 90% of the indigenous populations in the Americas, died from European diseases like smallpox, measles and influenza. This traumatic population loss caused chaos among the indigenous tribes, making them even easier prey for technologically-advanced European powers. And now it was Africa’s turn.

The First ‘Scramble’

History books call it ‘The Scramble for Africa’, making it sound like an innocuous party game.  Africans call it ’The Rape of Africa’. By the mid 1800s, the European nations were elbowing each other aside in their headlong rush to plant their flag on African soil. Mostly it was about money.

As history professor Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor at New York’s City University frames it; “The European scramble and the partition and eventual conquest of Africa was motivated by ...the imperatives of capitalist industrialization, including the demand for assured sources of raw materials, the search for guaranteed markets and profitable investment outlets.”

All this ‘scrambling’ made the imperialist governments as nervous as cats that a war would breakout in Europe over some far off colonial territory. To prevent this, wily, old Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of a newly-united Germany, hosted a conference that still stands as an unparalleled act of racial and cultural arrogance. At the 1884 Berlin Conference, six European powers - Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Belgium - sat around a table and divided the so-called “Dark Continent” among themselves, redrawing the map of the continent to create 30 new colonies. 

The 110 million Africans who lived in those colonies were never consulted about the new borders. No Africans were invited to attend the conference and; “African concerns were, if they mattered at all, completely marginal to the basic economic, strategic, and political interests of the negotiating European powers,” says historian/author Thomas Pakenham. Between 1870 and 1914, “A motley band of explorers, politicians, evangelists, mercenaries, journalists and tycoons blinded by romantic nationalism or caught up in the scramble for loot, markets and slaves,” increased European control of African territory from 10 per cent in 1870 to almost 90 percent by 1914. Resistance was futile. 

Although most African rulers bitterly contested being handed over to unknown foreign powers, they were no match for rapid-fire rifles, gatling guns and field artillery. Their many battles frequently turned into one-sided massacres. Despite a stunning defeat at Isandlwana, British redcoats rallied and crushed the two million-strong Zulu nation in nine weeks. The Boers conducted a campaign of genocide against the natives who resisted their occupation, driving 24,000 of them into the desert to starve. As many as 300,000 Namibians died in a famine engineered by the German colonizers to bring them to heel. Eight million inhabitants of the Congo were exterminated by their Belgium overseers through a barbarous system of forced labor dedicated to supplying rubber for European vehicle tires. [Ethiopia and Liberia were the only countries not colonized - Ethiopia defeated an inept Italian army at Adwa in 1896, and Liberia became a country that some of the Black populations of the Americas moved to.]

From ‘Civilizing’ to Conquering

The motives the colonizers ascribed to this flagrant land-grab were rooted in a bedrock belief in their racial supremacy over the non-white, 'lesser' races of the world. “The French colonial ideology explicitly claimed that they were on a "civilizing mission" to lift the benighted natives out of backwardness to the new status of civilized French Africans.” But it was the British who proved especially adept at this pernicious snobbery, believing they had some higher calling to drag their Africa colonies into the modern world. Like the Spanish, they had a slogan: ‘Commerce, Christianity and Civilization.’ [Note its money first, civilizing last, just like the Spanish.] And it seems they still believe that. In 2014, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was unapologetic in his defense of the country’s tarnished record. “The days of Britain having to apologize for its colonial history are over. We should celebrate much of our past rather than apologize for it.” 

Tragically for Africa, it wasn’t just the Brits. “Almost without exception... [the colonization of Africa] is a story of the rankest greed enforced by disgusting levels of violence against the native Africans. In colony after colony, all the brave talk about white man’s civilization and justice and religion turned out to hypocritical garbage,” accuses professor Patrick Bond at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban.

Still other African scholars contend the partitioning of tribal lands into those 30 colonies had the most enduring affects on the African peoples. A 2016 study found that, “by splitting ethnicities across countries, the colonial border design has spurred political violence. Ethnic partitioning is systematically linked to civil conflict, discrimination by the national government, and instability. The study, which included more than 85,000 households across 20 African countries found that “members of partitioned groups have fewer household assets, poorer access to utilities, and worse educational outcomes, as compared to individuals from non-split ethnicities in the same country.” Furthermore, conflicts in partitioned lands are deadlier and last longer.

After World War Two, the victors assumed that decolonization would solve all these problems, and between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers. Alas, in state after state, the transition to independence led to violence, political turmoil, and organized revolts that only added to the misery of endemic poverty, hunger and disease. Tellingly, a comparison of 18 African countries found that only six saw economic growth after achieving independence.

Regrettably, most of the continent’s 54 countries remain devastated by; “...crippling rates of poverty, hunger, and disease.” 62% of Africans have no access to standard sanitation facilities. Only 43% have access to electricity and the internet. According to the World Health Organization, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the highest under-5 mortality rate in the world. Yet there’s a cautious optimism that Africa’s fortunes are finally about to change for the better.

The New Scramble

By the usual standards of measurement, Africa is poised on the cusp of greatness. In 2019, six of the world’s 15 fastest growing economies were in Africa. The continent has a booming population of 1.3 billion and will soon outnumber the Chinese. This brings with it a “demographic dividend”: the average age in Africa is 19, meaning there’s a huge and growing pool of labor at a time when labor forces in more advanced countries are aging fast. Importantly, a major impediment to economic development is finally being addressed.

The continent’s colonial-era infrastructure remains one of the biggest drags on economic growth. “Africa’s new national states were so small and economically weak that they could not, without giant loans, even begin to embark on the policies of national development they eagerly promised,” writes investigative journalist Lee Wengaf. No nation had the economic wherewithal resources to take on the kind of major projects – highways, railroads, power dams and sea ports – needed to compete in the global marketplace. “Hobbled with weak infrastructures...and insufficient capital to technologically advance, these economies fell increasingly behind.” 

China is changing all that. The bottomless pockets of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have already shelled out billions in funding for 200 major infrastructure projects that promise to truly modernize the continent. Beijing’s willingness to invest in Africa long-term is particularly embarrassing to those ‘civilizing” European powers who never quite got around to it. Governments and businesses from all around the world are rushing to strengthen diplomatic, strategic and commercial ties. From 2010 to 2016, more than 320 embassies were opened in African nations. Facebook and Google are madly laying rings of cables around the continent to improve internet connectivity. 

However, to many, the new scramble looks a lot like the old one. The Financial Times commented that China’s pattern of operation in Africa, “draws comparisons with Africa’s past relationship with European colonial powers, which exploited the continent’s natural resources but failed to encourage more labor-intensive industry.”

Dylan Yachyshen of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agrees, warning that; “Accompanying its ambitious infrastructure projects, Chinese state banks made massive loans to African states, employing debt-trap diplomacy that renders states subservient to Chinese interests if they cannot pay. Though China has not established colonies, the trajectory of its activity in Africa parallels that of the infancy of the ‘Scramble for Africa’.”

Iranian-American journalist and historian John Ghazvinian put it much more forcefully in Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil. “Foreign oil companies have conducted some of the world’s most sophisticated exploration and production operations…but the people of the Niger Delta have seen none of the benefits. While successive military regimes have used oil proceeds to buy mansions in Mayfair...many in the Delta live as their ancestors would have done hundreds, even thousands of years ago.”

What is to be done? Patrick Lumumba, a lawyer specializing in African laws argues persuasively that the continent’s nations must unite in a pan-African economic union similar to the EU with a single passport, a single currency and a single army as essential prerequisites for African nations to take control of their own destinies.

“We [African nations] are weak politically, we are economically weak, socially we are disorganized, culturally and spiritually we are confused. As long as we remain as we are Africa will be re-colonized in the next 25 years.” 

What do you think of the ‘Scramble for Africa’? Let us know below.

Now, read Dan’s article on the lessons from World War I here.

The Paraguayan President who Brought his Country to Military Catastrophe – Part 2: The Start of the War of the Triple Alliance

Francisco Solano Lopez was president of Paraguay from 1862 to 1870. He led the country during one of the most devastating defeats in all history – the War of the Triple Alliance. Here, Erick Redington continues this fascinating series by looking at the outbreak of the War of the Triple Alliance and how Paraguay ended up facing Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay in the war.

If you missed it you can read part 1 on the early life of Francisco Solano Lopez here.

The 1865 Battle of Riachuelo during the war.

While the immediate casus belli was caused by the seizure of a Brazilian steamer, the real beginning of the war was the Paraguayan invasion of the Brazilian territory of Mato Grasso. While a Paraguayan offensive against Brazil might look insane by referencing a map, the true balance of forces held more than a cursory glance would tell.

When Brazil entered the Uruguayan War, the Marshal grew worried about the balance of power. He understood that in a conventional military sense, Brazil would heavily outweigh tiny Paraguay. Brazil had a significantly larger population, and a much larger navy. What Paraguay had was a people used to hardship and deprivation. The habituation of following orders came naturally to people who grew up in a police state. This discipline and iron will would be what allowed a small nation to take on almost all of its neighbors and fight a long war of attrition against all odds. 

To mitigate the significant Brazilian advantages in population, resources, and space Marshal Lopez introduced universal conscription. Paraguay had a prewar population of about 450,000 so every available man had to be called to service. Raising this force was easier than arming and equipping it. Although Marshal Lopez's father had attempted to modernize the economy, and had made some impressive strides, no industrial base existed to meet the immediate needs of the army, let alone expand it to levels never before seen in the country. Little prospect existed for importing arms as well. Brazil's large navy had no problem declaring a blockade of the La Plata and on all Paraguayan river traffic. Throughout the war, Paraguay would be short ammunition, uniforms, artillery, food, and other war material. These shortages would only grow worse as all available men in the country were absorbed into the army. Arms would be inadequate as well. As the world's armies were transitioning to breech loading rifles and artillery, the Paraguayans would have smoothbore muskets little changed from before the Napoleonic Wars (except the Marshal’s personal bodyguard, which was always armed with the latest breechloading rifles). Despite the lack of modern equipment and supplies, the Paraguayan soldiers would show themselves capable of superhuman efforts. 

A major issue facing the Paraguayan army was the officer corps. Marshal Lopez had been Minister of War since 1855 and had handpicked the officer corps. Although some officers were foreign specialists in artillery and engineering, the line officers had been chosen based upon personal loyalty to the Marshal. Many of these officers were barely literate and did not have the type of training in military affairs that he had received. Lack of training and incompetence would be exhibited throughout the war with poor logistics and tactical handling of the troops in battle. Bravery and obedience were the two primary weapons in the Paraguayan arsenal. 

The lack of arms led the Marshal to order as his first offensive action of the war to invade the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso. While there, the Paraguayans burned a few villages and planted the Republic’s flag on Imperial territory. More important was the large quantity of Brazilian arms captured. These supplies would help alleviate the Paraguayan shortages throughout the first year of the war. Although the Marshal's armies would very quickly return to their territory, the invasion would nevertheless be an embarrassment to the Brazilians while providing a morale boost to the Paraguayan forces. 

Creation of the Triple Alliance

In another opening move, Marshal Lopez wanted to send reinforcements to his Blanco allies in Uruguay. While this may have been sound strategy, it would be a costly mistake and show the Marshal's impetuousness. In looking at a map, it is easy to see that Paraguay does not border Uruguay, making it difficult to directly send men to the Blancos. Due to this fact, Marshal Lopez requested of the Argentinian government permission to cross their territory to reach Uruguay. The President of Argentina, Bartolome Mitre, was in no mood to accommodate Paraguay. In the recent civil war in Argentina, Paraguay had sent troops to support Blanco-aligned rebel groups. Mitre was suspicious of Paraguayan motives, and the Marshal's large army. With control of his own country uncertain Mitre knew his country could not afford to become a base for the Paraguayan army to operate against Brazil. When the request reached him to allow the Paraguayan army to cross Corrientes province, it was refused. Since the Paraguayans did not have control of the river, there was no other way to reach Uruguay, so the Marshal ordered his troops to enter Argentina anyway. Lopez, already at war with Brazil and Uruguay, then declared war on Argentina, occupied the city of Corrientes, and declared the annexation of several Argentinian provinces.

With the declaration of war against Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina would sign a formal alliance for the conduct of the war. This treaty covered many of the things a normal treaty would cover, but there were several important parts. First, the Allies agreed to fight the war until the Government of Paraguay was overthrown. This meant the removal of Marshal Lopez as President and the dismantling of his government was a definite war aim. It further stated that the Allies agreed to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Paraguay while also delineating the future boundaries of the nations after the war, dismembering Paraguay in the process. The treaty was supposed to be secret, but very quickly made its way to the British, who then published it to the world, eventually making its way to the Paraguayans. Of course, a treaty which promised his deposition would enrage Marshal Lopez, and only furthered his resolve to fight the Allies to the finish. The Allied plans to carve up the country would go on to be very helpful for the Marshal’s propagandists to rally support for the war.

What was he thinking?

What could have led to such rashness? In the Marshal's mind, he had a window of opportunity to strike at the Brazilians occupying Uruguay before they had the chance to completely destroy the Blancos. Also, Paraguay had mobilized a large army. If it could use that army to strike the Argentinians first and knock them out of the war with one bold strike, his position would be significantly strengthened. Argentina had been weakened from near constant internecine strife and was not as strong as it first appeared. President Mitre was a successful general but knew his country's weaknesses, especially how divided it was. While many historians have viewed the Marshal's decision to take on the two biggest powers in the region as borderline insane, it was not quite as reckless as it appears with hindsight. 

But it was still reckless. This goes to another of the Marshal's character traits. He believed himself to be a brilliant military commander. He had studied the military all his life, after all. He had observed the Crimean War firsthand. He did believe in his own brilliance, and expected others to believe it as well. Raised on tales of great Napoleonic battles such as Austerlitz and Marengo, the Marshal's lesson from his historical studies was that fortune favored the bold, decisive stroke. So, he struck, and furthered the odds against himself long-term.

Marshal Lopez had a view of the Allies facing him that did not necessarily match reality and contributed to his overconfidence. For many years, Paraguayan propaganda had portrayed a very racist view of Brazilians to demonize them. Brazil was one of the last slave societies in the western hemisphere. Many of Brazil's wealthiest elites owned slaves. Although the Emperor was personally against slavery, he had found himself unable to abolish the institution. Due to the large numbers of Brazilians of African or mixed African decent, many Paraguayans held racist beliefs and stereotypes of Brazilian soldiers. Marshal Lopez would call Brazilians "monkeys" throughout the war.

His view of the Argentinians and Uruguayans was more charitable. He believed, and made many public statements, that Argentinians and Uruguayans were being used as "tools of the Empire" and, if they could only see the light, their opposition to him and his policy of the balance of power would disappear. Marshal Lopez seemed to genuinely believe in his own purity of motives for this war. Of course, any dissent from anyone under his power would be punished severely and no opposing views to this belief were heard in the Paraguayan capitol. 

This is one of the great downfalls of all-powerful dictators. They are caught in a self-confirmation bubble from which no unpleasant or dissenting information can reach. When he believed that the Argentinian and Uruguayan people would support him, no one was there to warn him of the insanity of that belief. Marshal Lopez, convinced of his own righteousness and brilliance, had no way of gaining an accurate picture of the situation his country was facing early in the war. 

Allied Squabbling

While the early attacks prevented the Allies from fully coordinating their war effort, the Paraguayans did not have the reserves of manpower and resources to sustain a war winning offensive. The Paraguayans could not even reach Uruguay. There was very little chance they could reach Buenos Aires. They had as much chance of capturing Rio de Janeiro as they did Paris or London. Once the Allies were able to coordinate themselves, the Paraguayans would have to stop the attacks and husband their strength. 

The Allies did begin to bicker amongst themselves. The Allied land commanders were counting on the Brazilian naval commander, the Baron of Tamandaré to clear the riverbanks for an advance against the Paraguayans. The humiliation of the successful raids by the Paraguayans led to Allied commanders on land to blame Tamandaré for their failure to advance. Alliance land forces were to be under the overall command of President Mitre, himself a general. As the initial encounters were under the command of Argentinian and Uruguayan generals, this scapegoating of the Brazilian admiral who commanded the naval forces created further strains in the Alliance. Unity of command would be one major advantage the Marshal would have over his opponents throughout the war. The allies were unsure of each other, jealous and unsparing of criticism. Marshal Lopez had total control of the troops under his command, while loyalty and fear inspired unquestioning obedience to his orders. 

Preparations for Defense

During the time Paraguayan forces were on Allied territory, the Marshal would take the opportunity to fortify the homeland in preparation for Allied invasion. After all, he had studied artillery and engineering since his teenage years and had observed early trench warfare on the Crimea. Terrain was the vital factor in the defense of Paraguay. Swampy and crisscrossed by multiple unfordable rivers, there were few natural avenues of invasion. The road network, despite the modernization efforts of President Carlos Lopez, was poor and no roads were all weather. The climate was tropical which led to infestations of insects, especially mosquitos. Where there are mosquitos, there are camp diseases such as malaria and yellow fever. The longer an army sits in one place the more unsanitary the area becomes, leading to more mosquitos and more disease including that great killer of 19th century armies, dysentery, which comes from polluted water. All these factors went into the building of one of the most formidable fortresses in the Western Hemisphere, Humaitá. 

To maintain their supply and have secure communications, the Allied armies would have to advance up the river system to invade Paraguay. The Marshal would turn all his talents to defending a bend in the Paraguay River at Humaitá. A fortified post had existed here since independence, but large-scale fortification had started under the elder Lopez stemming from fears of Argentinian invasion. By creating a large fort capable of heavy artillery emplacement and a strong garrison, the Allies would be unable to pass farther up the Paraguay River, and any ship attempting to run past the guns of the fort would have to slow down at the river bend and be blown to pieces. The landward side was covered by swamps and the approach was difficult. The defense of this fortress, and the Allied frustrations in attempting to take it, would define the next stage of the war.

For the Marshal and the Paraguayan people, the defense of Humaitá and what would follow would become the national epoch, a symbol of the national will and the determination of the Paraguayan people to defend their independence. This fortress would be the primary reason for the war lasting as long as it did. For Marshal Lopez, it would be the one thing that kept the Allies from defeating him and overthrowing his government. The survival of the army and the defenses of the Republic would determine if Paraguay itself survived. Everything would come down to Humaitá.

What do you think of the outbreak of the war? Let us know below.

Now read part 3 on devastating battles for both sides here.

Further Reading

Saeger, James Schofield. 2007. Francisco Solano Lopez and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, Volume 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2005. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Edited by Hendrick Kraay. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2017. The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866-70. University of Calgary Press.

Russia’s First Female Ruler: Sophia Alekseyevna

In the world of 17th century Russia, women had no rights. The daughters and sisters of the Russian Tsar were kept in a terem, an apartment usually located at the top of a large Russian house, where they spent their lives in isolation and boredom. The world heard of them twice in their lifetimes – with the announcement of their births, and with the announcement of their deaths. From these circumstances, Sophia Alekseyevna rose to rule all of Russia as regent from 1682 to 1689.

Jurij Cerkovnik explains.

Sophia Alekseyevna in the 1680s.

Early Years

Born in 1657, Sophia lived in a terem in her early childhood, but somehow persuaded her father, Tsar Alexis, to break with tradition and allow her to share the lessons of her younger brother Fedor. Together they studied under an eminent scholar, Belorussian monk Simeon Polotsky, who found Sophia to be ‘’a maiden of great intelligence and the most delicate understanding, with an accomplished masculine mind.’’ Securing an education at such an early age proved to be one of her greatest triumphs as it laid the foundation for her later life. 

She was nineteen when her father, Tsar Alexis, unexpectedly died, and her younger brother, fifteen years old at the time, became Tsar Feodor III.

Sophia took the opportunity to further break with tradition. Throughout the reign of her little brother, she began to emerge from the terem to attend councils of state and gradually became included in conversations and decisions, allowing her political views to mature and her confidence in her abilities to grow. With time, she came to understand that her intellectual powers and abilities matched those of the men around her; the only barrier to supreme authority was her sex and the traditions of 17th century Russia.

 

The Boyars

In 17th century Russia, a dozen ranks of nobility stood beneath the Tsar, the highest of which were the boyars who came from princely families with hereditary land titles. These noblemen made up the Tsar’s court, sat in his councils, and competed for the chance to marry their daughters to the ruler of Russia.

Sophia’s mother Maria was Tsar Alexis’ first wife. She came from the powerful Miloslavky family, but in March 1669, Maria died in childbirth. She had born the Tsar thirteen children. Five were boys, but only two would long survive her – Sophia’s brothers Feodor and Ivan, both of whom suffered from severe health issues.

Tsar Alexis, determined to secure the succession, decided to marry again, this time to a woman named Natalya Naryshkina and on May 30, 1672, Natalya gave birth to a little boy history remembers as Peter the Great.

With the death of Tsar Alexis in 1676, his eldest son Feodor became Tsar and, for the time being, the power of the Miloslavsky family was secured. Sophia had the chance to increase her involvement in politics and spread her influence, but when Feodor died six years later, the tensions between the Miloslavkys and the Naryshkins came to a head.

Feodor died without children. The two possible successors were his younger brother Ivan, sixteen at the time, and Peter himself. Ivan was half-blind and had a severe speech impediment, so the ten-year-old Peter was selected as the successor – it was assumed his mother Natalya would rule as Regent until Peter reached his majority.

For Sophia, Natalya’s Regency proved to be an existential threat. History suspects several individuals of being responsible for the upheaval that followed, but only Sophia found herself threatened with seclusion in a convent for the rest of her life. She saw the opportunity to live a meaningful life slipping through her fingers and it was that fact more than any other than most likely gave her the courage to attempt to overthrow Natalya’s regime.

 

The Revolt of the Streltsy

The Streltsy were the first professional soldiers in Russia. Formed by Ivan the Terrible, they soon became the key to power in Moscow.

The Tsar provided them with food and housing, but in peacetime, they did not have much to do and began to engage in trade. Due to their membership in the army, they paid no taxes and soon became very rich, making them less and less interested in soldiery.

The Streltsy hated foreigners and any threats to the orthodoxy, believing a change in the status quo might endanger their position. As such, they did not look kindly upon the Naryshkins and the new Regent Natalya – she had brought Western influence to court when she became Tsar Alexis’ wife.

Sophia fanned the rumors that began to spread among the soldiers. During her brother’s funeral, she had followed the hearse on foot, weeping openly, and suggested Feodor did not die of natural causes. The gossip took off from there. People claimed Ivan had been pushed aside in favor of Peter and now that the Naryshkin’s schemes had succeeded, Natalya and her family would wage an all-out assault on Russian traditions and values. The Streltsy came to hate Natalya and the rest of her family, and it took but a single spark to start the fire.

On the morning of May 15, 1682, two men rode into the Streltsy Quarter (one of them was Peter Tolstoy, an ancestor of the famous writer Leo Tolstoy). They shouted that the Regent Natalya had murdered Ivan. The Streltsy went into a frenzy – they mustered their forces and marched on the Kremlin.

Three days of carnage followed during which Regent Natalya’s brother and her closest advisor were both murdered, along with scores of noblemen. That Ivan still lived did not dampen the Streltsy’s interest in carnage.

When the horror came to an end, Sophia assumed power. She was the natural choice; Natalya was overwhelmed by the tragedy that struck her family, Peter himself was a boy of ten, and some of the most powerful men at the Kremlin had been killed in the chaos.

Sophia quickly pacified the Streltsy, then forced another coronation, this time of her younger brother Ivan. Because Peter had already been crowned Tsar, it was determined that Ivan and Peter would rule as equals, the first time in European history that such an event came to pass – all thanks to Sophia’s cunning maneuvering.

With her younger brother safely installed, Sophia had secured her position as Regent and ruled Russia for the next seven years.

 

Sophia’s Regency and Downfall

Sophia’s reign proved to be a delicate balancing act. The people accepted her Regency and government, but she had to tread carefully so as to never make it seem as though she might usurp power from Ivan and Peter. She tried to declare herself an autocrat on numerous occasions, of course, but never successfully, and she always made sure to back down before too much damage was done to her reputation.

Her greatest success as a ruler is inextricably tied to the cause of her downfall. In a peace treaty with Poland, Sophia secured the control of Kyiv under the Russian state, but in exchange, she was forced to launch two disastrous military campaigns against the Crimean Tatars.

                  It was after the end of the second failed campaign that Peter rose and challenged his half-sister. Disgusted by the military disasters and tired of wondering if his half-sister meant to kill him, the now seventeen-year-old Tsar gradually began to assume control. Sophia found herself powerless to stop it. She attempted to incite another revolt of the Streltsy but failed because circumstances had changed. When she first rose to power, Peter had been a young boy while Ivan was a sickly adult uninterested in ruling. 

The second time around, Peter was a grown man. Sophia could not overcome the realities of her gender; the Streltsy, the Russian clergy, and the rest of the people were unwilling to follow a woman over a male Tsar.

 

Conclusion

Tsar Peter exiled or executed Sophia’s main supporters and banished Sophia to a convent outside of Moscow, where she spent the remaining fifteen years of her life. She died on July 3, 1704, at the age of forty-six. 

The impact of her life cannot be exaggerated. Before her arrival, it was inconceivable for the Russians to imagine a female ruler, but after the death of Peter the Great, four empresses would succeed him. The life of an 18th-century Russian woman was light-years ahead of the life of a 17th-century Russian woman, and it is thanks to Sophia’s character and strength that such massive strides were made. 

Sophia Alekseyevna was a woman who, like many before her, found her life controlled by the realities of her era, but stepped forth in spite of the risks, seized control of her life, and altered Russian history.

What do you think of Sophia Alekseyevna? Let us know below.    

Sources

Massie, Robert K. Peter the Great: His Life and His World. New York: Ballantine Books, 1980, pp. 19-107

https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sophia-alekseyevna-1657-1704

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophia_Alekseyevna_of_Russia

Deborah Sampson: The Most Important Female Fighter in the American Revolutionary War?

The American Revolutionary War evokes images of farmers and tradesmen putting down their tools for muskets, ordinary citizens stepping into roles otherwise foreign to them, and a willingness to fight and die for freedom. While the images in our minds of those doing so may flash from iconic officers like General George Washington, to simple privates plowing their way from New England to the mid-Atlantic and back again, history has shown us that not all those who took up arms for the fledgling republic were men. America’s first recognized female soldier, Deborah Sampson, would be a blazing example of America’s women being active in this founding conflict.

Jacqueline Nelson explains.

Portrait of Deborah Sampson. Front of The Female Review: Life of Deborah Sampson, the Female Soldier in the War of Revolution.

Origins

Deborah Sampson was born in 1760 and raised near Massachusetts’ original colony, Plymouth. She was, in fact, believed to be a descendent of both Myles Standish and Governor William Bradford. However, these deep roots would not be enough to save the Sampson children from poverty. Her father, Jonathan, was either lost at sea or abandoned the family when she was only five, and her mother was forced to ship her and her siblings off, individually, to family members willing to take them in. Then, when she was ten, Sampson was bound as an indentured servant and completed her term by eighteen. After, she would work as a teacher and weaver for several years.

At age twenty-one, Sampson went headlong into a war that had been raging for seven years. In 1782, she joined the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment as a volunteer under the alias of Robert Shurtleff/Shurtliff. Recently, a diary belonging to her neighbor was discovered which indicates that she actually tried this scheme earlier that year but was turned away because her disguise must not have been quite up to it. Dressing as a man was not only scandalous, but also illegal for the women of Massachusetts. As a result, she would be demonized by the local church. However, she would not be around to actually face their vitriol, as she tried again in May 1782, forty miles away from home, and was successfully enlisted.

Historians have long questioned why she would venture so willingly into a conflict that had already taken many American lives and had seen devasting conditions for soldiers like those infamous winters in Valley Forge and Morristown. In truth, women can be just as politically, patriotically, or emotionally driven to service as the men of their time. Similarly, as a woman who had lived in poverty her whole life, the promise of regular pay, enlistment bonuses/bounties, and other incentives for soldiers were also just as appealing to women as they were to the men. 

Service

Once enlisted, she would be assigned to West Point, where she served in the Light Infantry Troops. This demanding posting required soldiers to almost constantly be on the move, scouting the enemy, and when necessary, skirmishing with both English soldiers and Loyalist militia. Sampson’s tenure in the service is one that is debated, not in terms of her actual participation, which is undeniable, but her experiences while serving in the light infantry.

Sampson would not escape the war unscathed, and the injuries she sustained are a great example of that debate around her experience in the war. In one skirmish she is said to have received a nasty gash across her forehead from an opponent’s sword, which was treated at a field hospital, but in that same engagement she took two iron balls in her left thigh. Knowing that she would be discovered if this wound was treated, she slipped out of the hospital and back to her own tent, where she is said to have dug one piece of shrapnel out of her leg using a pen knife. Being unable to reach the other, she stitched up her wound with a simple sewing needle and lived the rest of her life with the shrapnel in her leg. Other sources indicate that she was shot in her shoulder and dug the iron ball from there.

Through it all, Sampson had been remarkably adept at keeping her identity secret, but she could not evade discovery forever. After serving for more than a year, she came down with a severe fever while serving outside Philadelphia in the summer of 1783. Her fever became untenable, and she fell unconscious. Not unlike a modern field medic or even your average EMT, medical providers often have to remove clothing to examine the body during treatment. When Dr. Barnabas Binney discovered that Robert was really Deborah, he could, as many would, report this to the closest officer and have her booted out immediately. Instead, he helped her continue to conceal her identity, temporarily, bringing her to his home, where his wife and daughters help to provide her care until she was well enough to return.

Shortly after her return, Dr. Binney would reveal her identity to her commanding officer, General John Paterson. Paterson would give her an honorable discharge on October 23, 1783, one month after the Treaty of Paris was signed, and seventeen months after she joined the army ranks. Some sources even indicate she received the discharge from General Henry Knox, one of Washington’s closest advisors. 

Legacy

Sampson would return to civilian life, marrying and having children, but she continued to struggle with poverty. Like many soldiers, her service did not come with all the rewards it was meant to. Thus, in her later years, she went on a year-long tour, at times in uniform, to lecture about her times in the service. She would also be among many soldiers who pushed for a military pension in rightful compensation for their service, though, sadly, she would not see it before she passed away at age 66. Still, Sampson would be the only woman to be awarded that pension, after much lobbying of Congress from her husband, those who saw her speak, and even founding fathers like Paul Revere and John Hancock. The committee reviewing her case came to the ultimate conclusion that the entirety of the Revolution, “furnished no other similar example of female heroism, fidelity and courage” than that found in Sampson. Sadly, they would come to this conclusion in 1837, ten years after she had passed away.

Sampson is the first recognized woman to join the ranks in the service of America, and in doing so she is the bedrock upon which American servicewomen would build. Hundreds of women are cataloged as having similarly disguised themselves as men to serve in the Civil War. Thousands would serve in the World Wars without the need for concealment through the demand for designated female branches in the armed services. Eventually, progress would lead to the integration of the armed forces, and the continued barriers being broken for women in the service today. Sampson’s headstone reads, “The Female Soldier”, and thankfully, her legacy was just the first of many.  

What do you think of Deborah Sampson? Let us know below.

References

Cowan, Alison Leigh. “The Woman Who Sneaked into George Washington’s Army.” New York Times, July 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/arts/design/the-woman-who-sneaked-into-george-washingtons-army.html

Michals, Debra. “Deborah Sampson.” National Women’s History Museum, 2015. Accessed 10/30/2021. https://www.womenshistory.org/education-resources/biographies/deborah-sampson

“Revolutionary War Diary Reveals New Details about Deborah Sampson, Who Disguised Herself as a Man to Join the Continental Army.” Museum of the American Revolution, July 3, 2019. Accessed 10/30/2021. https://www.amrevmuseum.org/press-releases/revolutionary-war-diary-reveals-new-details-about-deborah-sampson-who-disguised-herself-as-a-man-to-join-the-continental-army

The U.S. and Great Britain: The Birth of The Special Relationship and the Navy 1928-30

We frequently hear about the long-standing “Special Relationship” between the United Stated and Great Britain. In the twentieth century, the two powers bonded closely even as one waxed and the other waned. One superpower replaced another—without armed conflict between them. Only this once has that happened. Peter Deane explains the basis of this relationship through naval agreements from 1928 to 1930.

Herbert Hoover’s inauguration in 1929.

When one considers the “Special Relationship”, one often thinks of Prime Minister (PM) Winston S. Churchill, who made famous the phrase after World War Two (WWII), and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. But the real start was in 1929, by President Herbert C. Hoover and Prime Minster J. Ramsey MacDonald. A brief window for foreign policy progress was open, before the Great Depression took hold, when the negotiations leading up to the London Naval Conference of 1930 (LNC) took place. Hoover’s motivations in particular were unsentimental, and neither man sought an alliance. From this distance, the LNC itself seems history trivia: a disarmament conference that did not prevent WWII. However, the Anglo-American negotiations leading up to it left a lasting peace. After 1929, the Empire and the Republic may have had friction, but never was there a question of hostility. As late as 1928 this was not true.

The Situation through 1928

The nineteenth century saw alternate Anglo-American cooperation and friction. The Empire and the Republic shared a common language and some history. In 1902 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty seemed to Americans to be directed at their new Pacific power. The British interdiction of neutral American trade with the Central Powers during World War One (WWI) was a potent source of hostility among some Americans, particularly within the United States Navy (USN). Naval policy was a primary reason that the USN role was to safeguard belligerent rights, better known as “freedom of the seas”; i.e., American shipping and commerce; i.e., the American economy. The Naval Act of 1916 authorized a Navy “second to none”, but not one particularly suited to war against Germany. All knew the U.S. could out-build any island empire. The U.S. entered WWI only after Germany became a greater hindrance to American shipping than was Britain. 

American entry into the Great War papered over the belligerent rights issue, as did post-War disillusionment among the victors. Pacifist sentiment among them in reaction to the War led to a round of agreements in 1921-1922 aimed at disarmament as a means of war prevention. Among them were the Four Power Treaty which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Washington Naval Treaty which formalized Anglo-American “parity” in capital ships. The post-War Empire simply did not have the resources to out build the Republic.

This predicament sat poorly with some Britons. Churchill wrote that while many thought an Anglo-American war was unthinkable, “everyone knows that is not true…. Evidently on the basis of American naval superiority, speciously disguised as parity, immense dangers overhang the future of the world.” Britain nevertheless enjoyed a merchant marine quintuple the size of the American, with accompanying commercial advantages and many of which vessels could be armed, along with a worldwide set of fueling stations. The American code name for such a war was “War Plan Red.” 

Anglo-American agreement on further naval limitation fell through in 1927 at a conference in Geneva. Many on both sides of the Atlantic felt that the collapse of the talks was due to domination of the talks by the respective naval staffs, who would not compromise. The next year an Anglo-French disarmament compromise was proposed, which primarily limited the class of naval vessels the USN valued most. (This was in part due to French concerns that an Anglo-American rapprochement would distract Britain from its ties with France.) President Calvin Coolidge pulled out of further disarmament talks and signed the Naval Construction Act of 1929 to build more of the non-treaty vessels. 

Rivalry had officially resumed. International consensus was that a multinational disarmament treaty required the Empire and the Republic to settle their naval competition first. 

But in 1928, a new President was elected, who endorsed not only the naval construction bill if it proved necessary, but also naval reduction (not just limitation) by treaty if possible. 

1929: The Statesmen

The new President later recorded in his Memoirs that among basic goals of his administration was: 

“Elimination of friction with Great Britain.

a.     By ending naval competition. 

b.     By ending British expansion of air and naval bases in the Western Hemisphere. 

c.     By settling one major conflict over freedom of the seas by immunizing food ships from submarine attack in time of war.” 

His Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, wrote of his own positions: “He inclined to place primary emphasis on the re-establishment of understanding with Great Britain; returning … to the Atlantic coast he had been shocked to find that anti-British sentiment had greatly increased…. Being himself a confirmed believer in the vital importance of firm Anglo-American friendship, he at once determined to make the repair of relations with Great Britain a cardinal objective…. The obvious first step was to reach agreement on naval limitation … but it was the restoration of understanding with Great Britain that he put first.”

The President was of Quaker upbringing and saw the proper role of the USN as defense of the Western Hemisphere. (The Philippines was to become independent.) The navy was adequate to the task as it was and could be reduced significantly, with much money saved—if Great Britain was amenable. American civilians saw war with Britain as unimaginable. Friction could only be eliminated by civilian leaders.

That same Spring, MacDonald became Prime Minister. He was felt to be something of an Americanophile. Both he and the Foreign Office wanted better relations with the United States and saw naval disarmament talks as the means to that end. 

1929: Preliminary Negotiations

Hoover started in March by making statements favoring disarmament. On April 22, Hugh S. Gibson, American ambassador to Belgium and previous disarmament negotiator, proposed that the U.S. was prepared to develop “a method of estimating equivalent naval values”, such that parity did not mean identicality. (This method was not specified.) Soon known as the “yardstick”, the proposal was received with enthusiasm in both nations—a breakthrough in the naval disarmament issue. “What is wanted,” Gibson concluded, “is a common-sense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means.” One British periodical called it an “American declaration of peace to Britain.” 

In May, Hoover sent as an informal emissary to MacDonald, a journalist named Edward P. Bell, to gauge his thoughts about the matter and relations more generally. These included a possible (unprecedented) visit by the PM to the U.S. for direct talks with the President. The reply Bell cabled to Hoover: “HAVE AUTHORITY MACDONALD STATE THAT IF YOU INVITE HIM VISIT YOU WASHINGTON CANVASS WHOLE QUESTION BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS HE WILL ACCEPT WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS.” 

Hoover was taken aback by the enthusiasm. On June 18, the newly-arrived American ambassador, Charles G. Dawes, gave a prominent speech in which he reiterated the principle of parity and civilian control of negotiations. Dawes was left with the details to negotiate. He and MacDonald did so over the following few months. By the fall, most issues had been agreed. The bulk of issues need to be resolved before MacDonald could visit, not least of all because the Americans wanted to be sure MacDonald would receive a friendly reception in America. 

At his point, Hoover had agreed to forgo the belligerent rights question broadly. That Summer, Macdonald agreed to “parity” according to the yet-to-be specified yardstick, over the objection of his Admiralty. These two concessions, although not linked by anyone at the time, made the deal that made the Special Relationship. It also eased the peaceful rise of the U.S. concurrent with the early decline of British power.

Why did Britain agree to parity? Great Britain was facing financial limits, in part due to the debts incurred to the U.S. for WWI. It could not afford an arms race with the United States and its seemingly endless resources.

1929: The Rapidan Conference

MacDonald’s reception in American cities proved warm and enthusiastic. His meeting with Hoover took place mostly at Hoover’s Rapidan, Maryland, fishing camp. MacDonald parried Hoover’s proposals for immunity for food ships (the Admiralty would not accept this at all)—they agreed this could be discussed after naval disarmament was settled. He declined Hoover’s offer to purchase British naval bases in the Caribbean Sea, including British Honduras, but the bases ceased to expand in subsequent years. They agreed on parity of naval forces and the use of the yardstick even if the yardstick was not fully defined. London was agreed as the setting for the next multinational Naval Disarmament Conference. 

Coverage of the Rapidan meeting generally eclipsed coverage of the October stock market crash. But the time when Hoover could concentrate on foreign affairs was coming to an end. 

1930: The LNC

From our perspective, the LNC was somewhat anticlimactic. The LNC was the last major world conference attended by ship, for the Americans the U.S.S. George Washington, the same vessel which took the Wilson delegation to the Versailles conference. Stimson led the U. S. delegation now, with another Cabinet Secretary—Charles Francis Adams III, Navy—and other members. The negotiators were civilians, not naval officers. Naval men were there as technical advisers only, unlike the failed 1927 meeting. The leading naval powers, Great Britain, the Japanese Empire and the U. S., achieved trilateral agreement on naval limitation as hoped. France and Italy could not agree and withdrew. 

The numbers and details of the London Naval Treaty are not important now. Its effect in Japan is beyond our scope here. But in both Britain and the U.S. it was considered a success and ratified that same year despite some naval opposition in both countries.

In perspective

Nineteen twenty-nine was a “hinge of history”. In the middle of the first half of the twentieth century, a deal was struck. That same half-century saw Germany twice fight violently to dominate Europe, only to founder on British opposition. One of the causes of WWI was the German Empire’s plan to achieve naval equality with the British, intolerable to the British. Yet the British Empire fifteen years later accepted parity, on paper, to the USN. Great Britain decided in this case that another war with the United States was not going to happen. 

This settlement was not without cost to either side. Both Britain and the U. S. were constrained in their potential responses to growing Japanese militarism and aggressiveness, and in their preparations for possible Pacific war. The U.S. quietly abandoned over a century of work in peace and war to preserve freedom of the seas, even merely limited to food ships. Great Britain made sacrifices which in retrospect hastened its decline as a naval power. 

Even the isolationism in the U.S. in the later nineteen-thirties, while a force among the American public, was not felt as antagonism at the highest levels of either nation. Hoover and MacDonald together had put hostility aside for good, and without fully realizing it.

What do you think of the period 1928-30 in Anglo-American relations? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Baer, G. W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 1993 (Chap. 6)

Dawes, C. G. Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain. New York, NY; The Macmillan Co., 1939 (Passim)

Ferrell, R. H. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1957 (Passim, esp. Chaps. 1-3 & 5)

Hagan, K. J. This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. New York, NY; The Free Press, 1991 (Chap. 9)

Hoover, H. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933. New York, NY; The Macmillan Co., 1952 (Chap. 45)

Jeansonne, G. The Life of Herbert Hoover: Fighting Quaker, 1928-1933. New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 (Chap. 7)

Maurer, J. H. and Bell, C. M., eds. At the Crossroads between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930. Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 2014 (Passim esp. Chaps. 0-2)

O’Connor, R. G. Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930. Lawrence, KA; University of Kansas Press, 1962 (Passim)

Roberts, A. “When Churchill Dissed America” Smithsonian Magazine, Nov. 2018

Stimson, H. L. and Bundy, McG. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York, NY; Harper Bros., 1947 (Chap. VII:2)

Wheeler, G. E. Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U. S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life. Washington, DC; Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1974 (Chap. IX)

A key US Civil War Battle in 1862: The Battle of Shiloh

The Battle of Shiloh in April 1862 is perhaps one of the most overlooked in its overall importance to the outcome of the US Civil War. In this article Curtis J. Smothers explains the battle and how it impacted the war.

The Battle of Shiloh. By Thure de Thulstrup.

The Battle of Shiloh was one of the bloodiest battle ever fought on US soil up to its time, with over 23,000 dead, 13,000 of whom were northerners. But the battle’s outcome had more far-reaching effects:

·       Shiloh nearly ruined the career of Union General U.S. Grant

·       The battle also cost the Confederacy one its best generals, Albert S. Johnston, who was shot in the leg while riding in the thick of battle

However, Shiloh’s importance lies in how it changed Grant's thinking and how it set the stage for Union domination of the Mississippi River, Grant’s going east and the eventual defeat of the Confederacy.

The sobering reality of the war to come

After Shiloh, Grant realized firsthand that the South would not be easily beaten. Before Shiloh, and based on his earlier easy victories at Fort Henry and Donelson, Grant had scant respect for the Confederate fighting spirit and ability. After the carnage and near defeat of his bivouacked, green Union troops, who ran from the hordes of yelling rebels and cowered by the river bluffs, Grant came to know what his subordinate and friend, William Tecumseh Sherman, knew: the war would last for years, and the South would have to be completely crushed.

Grant’s green troops bivouacked, but didn’t dig on

The Battle of Shiloh took place on the western bank of the Tennessee River, where Grant had ferried his nearly 50,000-man army to place called Pittsburg Landing. (Much of the bloodiest fighting took place around a church called "Shiloh," whose name, ironically, is derived from the Hebrew for "peace.") Grant's plans were to wait for reinforcement from General Don Carlos Buell and strike out at the Confederacy with his superior forces with the goal of capturing the major Confederate rail junction at Corinth, Mississippi. Grant, who was not prone to digging in or building entrenchments, figured his raw troops needed to be drilled and shaped up.

Confederates could have won

In the early morning hours of April 6, 1862, Grant was totally surprised by the Confederates, who overran Yankee camps that had failed to even post patrols.

In the ebb and flow of the battlefield on the first day, it was only through the lack of good tactical leadership, experience and good weaponry on the part of the Confederates that prevented a total Yankee defeat at Shiloh. Confederate General Johnston's biggest mistake was going to the battle front. He left orders to his subordinate Beauregard to stay behind and execute the battle plan of cutting off the Yankee retreat to the river, but Beauregard had a different plan, which was to run straight ahead and push the Yankees into the river. As Johnston bled to death after a leg wound, daylight waned and Confederate hopes of victory also died.

Beauregard decided to wait until the next day

The battle of the first day ended after Grant and Sherman rallied to stabilize the Yankee positions. Beauregard, however, figured that he had the better of Grant and would finish off the Yankees the next day. Beauregard also figured that he still outnumbered Grant, but Yankee General Buell's reinforcements arrived the next morning; and Grant's subordinate, General Lew Wallace (the man who wrote the epic Ben-Hur) whose division had taken the wrong road the day before, finally showed up for duty.

Fortunately for the Union, the second day of Shiloh saw a revitalized Yankee force and a massive counterattack that relentlessly pushed the depleted Southerners back towards Corinth, Mississippi.

Grant took a beating in the press, but Lincoln rehabilitated this fighting general

The battle was over, but the recriminations and controversy would continue. Beauregard would be vilified for not pressing his advantage at the end of the first day. Grant would take a beating in the northern press for the massive Union casualties, and would be relieved by General Halleck and demoted to a do-nothing second-in-command position.

In the end, though, Lincoln moved Halleck to Washington, D.C., and gave Grant back command in the West. (Lincoln recognized Grant as a fighter not prone to the "slows" like many other Union generals)

Grant would go on to amass an astonishing record of victories in the west that would culminate in the capture of Vicksburg that would split the Confederacy at the Mississippi. After victories in Tennessee, Grant would come east to eventually end the war. Sherman would go South and due east cutting a swath of destruction that would isolate and cripple the Confederacy. 

Shiloh forged a winning team

The victory of Shiloh solidified the relationship of Grant and Sherman and led them to a more realistic appreciation of the war. Likewise, all the principal victories of the North (out West) in 1863 and 1864 were made possible. If Johnston's Confederate forces won at Shiloh on April 6, the land-naval campaign against Vicksburg, the March to the Sea, and the Siege of Petersburg (below the Confederate capital) might not have occurred at all.

What do you think of the importance of the Battle of Shiloh? Let us know below.