World War 2 in Italy: The 1944 Battle of Anzio

World War II’s 1944 Battle of Anzio took place from January to June in Italy. It started following an Allied decision to attack this central part of Italy. William Floyd Jr. explains the background to battle and how it evolved over the first half of 1944.

Sherman tanks at Anzio in 1944.

In early November 1943, Adolf Hitler would sign a formal order stating there would be an “end of withdrawals.” In Italy, this would condemn a million German soldiers to the brutal combat that would soon follow. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Hitler’s favorite general at the time, would leave the Mediterranean Theatre to over see the Atlantic Wall defenses in France for the expected Allied invasion.

Rommel, at the time, would state to a comrade that, “the war is as good as lost and hard times lay ahead.”

The Battle of Anzio was incredibly brutal and would cost thousands of Allied and German lives as well as the lives of Italian civilians. Anzio is a small town on the west coast of Italy on the Tyrrhenian Sea about thirty miles south of Rome. In the early morning hours of January 22, 1944, Allied troops of Fifth Army came ashore along a fifteen-mile stretch of Italian beach near the prewar resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno. The Allied landings could not have been carried out any better. German resistance was so light that British and American forces gained their first day’s objectives by noon, moving three to four miles inland by dark.

The local German commanders were surprised by the landings. They had been assured by their superiors that an amphibious assault would not take place during January or February. Within a week, the Allies would consolidate their positions and achieve a minor breakout from the beachhead. The Germans began to gather troops to eliminate what Hitler would call the “Anzio abscess.” The fighting over the next four months, on the Italian peninsula, would be some of the most savage of the war.

Agreeing the operation

The Anzio operation had been shelved on December 18, 1943, due to the fact that Anzio was too far ahead of the front to guarantee a swift overland hookup with the isolated vulnerable beachhead. However, changes of the command structure in the Mediterranean theatre would soon lead to the operation being revived. General Dwight Eisenhower would relinquish command of Allied forces in the Mediterranean to British General Sir Henry M. Wilson in January 1944. Eisenhower would become Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord, the cross-channel invasion of France. Under Wilson the Anzio plan would be resurrected with the influence of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill playing a large roll. Despite their differences on certain aspects of strategy, both the Americans and the British were united in the hope that Italy, the weaker of the Axis partners, could be forced out of the war. 

Anzio was not only within striking distance of Rome, the ultimate prize, but was also within range of Allied aircraft operating out of Naples. One week before the landings at Anzio, the Allied Fifth Army made up of U.S., British, and French units would mount an offensive on the German Gustav defensive position in the area of Cassino and plan to link up with the forces at Anzio for the drive on Rome. In the meantime, Allied forces of the Eighth Army were to break through on the Adriatic front or at least tie down German forces to prevent them from being sent to Anzio.

General Mark Clark had chosen Major General John P. Lucas, U.S. Army Commander of Fifth Army’s VI Corps to lead the Anzio invasion. Lucas’s orders were to divert enemy strength from the south in anticipation of a violent enemy reaction requiring defensive positions. Secondly, he was to move toward the Alban Hills for a link-up with the remainder of Fifth Army on D + 7. Clark became increasingly pessimistic about the British plan and the feasibility of the overall Anzio operation. The notion that the troops landing at Anzio could take and hold the Alban Hills so soon after the landing, as part of the British plan, seemed overly optimistic. Under the circumstances, the best that Clark could tell Lucas was to be flexible, leaving the decision about how far and how fast to move VI Corps up to him.

The landings at Anzio would be protected by Allied air and naval forces. There were approximately 2,600 Allied aircraft available to provide close air support for the invading forces and to destroy enemy airfields and hinder communications. The naval flotilla assigned to support the landings was designated Task Force 81, commanded by U.S. Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry. The task force was made up of over 250 combat-loaded vessels and amphibious craft of all sizes and descriptions. 

The German Forces in the Mediterranean were led by air force officer, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring who had arrived in Rome in December 1941. He had been a founding member of the Luftwaffe prior to receiving the rank of Field Marshal. The exact German reaction to the landing at Anzio was, of course, impossible to predict. The only thing that was known for certain was that the German response would be swift and brutal.

Start of the invasion

The Anzio invasion began at 2:00 A.M. on January 22, 1944, and achieved, General Lucas would recall, one of the most complete surprises in military history. The Germans had already sent their reserves south to counter the Allied attacks on the Garigliano River on January 18, leaving a nine- mile- wide stretch of the Anzio beach defended by a single company. The first waves of Allied troops moved rapidly inland. All VI Corps objectives had been taken by noon as Allied air forces flew 1,200 sorties in and around the beachhead. By midnight over 36,000 troops and 3,200 vehicles, over 90% of the invasion force, was ashore.

Allied units would continue to push over the next few days against scattered but increasing German resistance. Allied forces would capture the town of Aprilia on January 25. The Allied drive created a huge bulge in enemy lines but did not completely breakout of the beachhead. The Third Division commander, Major General Lucian Truscott, on orders from the corps commander, ordered a halt to the offensive which turned into a reorganization of the beachhead forces between January 26 and 29. During this time the materiel buildup would continue despite German air and artillery harassment. During this time the number of Allied troops on the beachhead increased to over 60,000.

In response to the landings, Kesselring would send elements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads leading north from the Alban Hills. Hitler would send additional forces from Yugoslavia, France, and Germany. By the end of D-Day thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite delays caused by Allied air attacks. The German commanders were astonished that Allied forces had not taken immediate advantage of the unopposed landings. 

General Lucas now planned a two-pronged attack for January 30. One to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna and the second was a move northeast up the Albano Road, break through the Campoleone salient, and exploit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A link-up with Fifth Army in the south was still believed possible.

Driving forward?

The initial Allied attack on Cisterna would be carried out by Ranger Battalions under Colonel William O. Darby. Unknown to the Americans, their assault was aimed at the center of an area occupied by thirty-six enemy battalions massing for the February 1 counterattack.

The Rangers would get within 800 yards of Cisterna, when the Germans discovered the advancing lightly armed Rangers armed with only grenades and bazookas for anti-tank weapons. They attempted a fighting withdrawal but were mercilessly cut down. Of 767 men in the two battalions, only 6 would survive.

In spite of the disaster involving the Rangers, some progress was made by 3rd Division units against a much stronger enemy. But by nightfall on January 31, the Americans were still a mile from the village. It became apparent that the Americans were not going to capture Cisterna, and that new German units were arriving in the Anzio area. On orders from Clark and Lucas, Truscott was ordered to dig in.

The other prong of the Allied attack resulted in the Allies reaching Campoleone and penetrating the German main line. But the exhausted Allied troops were unable to exploit their success causing their drive to come to a halt, as a German counterattack began on February 3-4 at Campoleone salient. British forces held but were then ordered to retreat a distance of about 2.5 miles. Lucas then ordered Allied troops to form a beachhead defense line which was to be held at all costs. The Germans would continue their attack off and on until February 22. The offensive would be halted by Allied air power, naval gunfire, and artillery. The VI Corps would go over to the offensive and re-take some lost ground.

On February 29 the Germans resumed the offensive directed at the U.S. 3d Division in the Cisterna sector. General Truscott who had replaced General Lucas as VI Corps commander would substantially reinforce his defensive position. The Germans would continue to seek a breakthrough without any success. A final German assault would fail on March 4.

Following the collapse of the German drive, a three-month lull would begin. Both armies would limit their operations to defending the positions they held at the beginning of March. The VI Corps would reorganize and regroup bringing its full strength to 90,000 men in six divisions.

Supply problems at Anzio, originally one of the main concerns of the Allies would never reach a crisis point. LSTs would begin bringing loaded trucks to Anzio every day, fifteen smaller vessels arrived each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty Ships delivered heavy equipment. Between January 22 and June 1, over 531,511 long tons of supplies arrived at Anzio.

Operations in the spring

On May 5 General Clark would give General Truscott orders for a new Allied offensive code-named BUFFALO. Units from Anzio were to cut Highway 6, the main German line of retreat and trap the enemy forces retreating north through the Liri Valley. The operational concept had been dictated to Clark from Alexander, but Clark had little faith in the plan succeeding. Clark felt the British had received too much credit for Allied gains thus far. Clark wanted Fifth Army to have the honor of liberating Rome. He told Truscott to be ready at any moment during the breakout to swing north toward Rome.

On the night of May 11-12, Fifth and Eighth Armies launched their long- awaited attack against the Gustav Line but initially achieved little success. However, the Germans would abandon Monte Cassino after a week of fighting against Polish forces and the French along with US II Corps and would finally succeed in breaking the Gustav Line. The II Corps would move toward the Anzio beachhead against weakening German resistance.

At 0545 on May 23 an artillery barrage opened on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry attacks along the entire line from Cassino to the Mussolini Canal. Although enemy resistance was very stiff, but by evening the Allied forces had breached the main line of resistance. The next day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna. The town would fall on May 25. On the same day the II and VI Corps would complete their juncture causing the beachhead to cease to exist.

Meanwhile, the breakout in the west was proving very costly to the VI Corps, taking over 4,000 casualties in the first five days of the offensive. In the meantime, elements of Fifth Army joined in the pursuit of German forces falling back on Rome. American forces would liberate the Italian capital on June 4, 1944.

In perspective

The Anzio campaign has always been controversial from the time it was conceived. General Lucas had stated before the landing that he had always considered it a gamble. He maintained that under the circumstances the Anzio forces accomplished all that could have been realistically expected. However, some of Lucas’s critics maintain that a more aggressive commander such as Patton or Truscott could have obtained the goals of the landings with a bold offensive. Yet the campaign did achieve a number of goals including the eventual liberation of Rome.

What do you think of the Battle of Anzio? Let us know below.

Now read William’s article on World War II’s 1943 Trident conference here.

Bibliography

1.     Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

2.     Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001).

3.     Clayton D. Laurie, Anzio 1944 – United States Army Center of Military History.

4.     John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed, The Oxford Companion to American Military History ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

5.     Correlli Barnett, Hitler’s Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).

The Modern Greek State: 1898–1913 – Glory Days

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1898 and 1913 and looks at what happed in Crete, the Greek political, and scene, the Balkan Wars, and how ultimately it was a positive period for Greece. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here and part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here.

A lithograph of the Battle of Yenidje/Giannitsa in the First Balkan War.

The story narrated so far for Greece is not unique. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) By the turn of the 20th century, all modern Balkan countries (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) had suffered indebtedness and political instability, and the maneuvering of the great powers restricted their foreign policy options. The governments of all three were committed to schemes of territorial expansion, but the restraining influences of disorganized armies, chaotic public finances and great power pressure inhibited them. Only through cooperation with one another could they realize their expansionist dreams.  The cooperation process culminated to the inferno of the first and second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Greeks, these were good wars. (Glenny, 2012)

I. Introduction

Cooperation between the Balkan States was not easy. Under the guiding hand of Bismarck, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan States to three expanding spheres of interest – Austro-Hungarian, Russian and British. This created confusion and resentment in many parts of the Balkans. Especially Bulgaria was reduced from 176,000 square kilometers, after the Treaty of San Stefano, to just 96,000 square kilometers. Serbia’s westwards expansion was also blocked. Thus, they both turned their expansionist ambitions south to Macedonia, claimed also by Greece.

Things became more complicated when in 1885 Bulgaria, violating the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Eastern Rumelia, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Powers accepted the outcome of the Bulgarian intervention. The Serbian king Milan Obrenović knew that the annexation gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the impending struggle for Macedonia. He saw the treaty violation as an opportunity to test his new standing army and attacked Bulgaria but was thoroughly defeated. 

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the victory over the Serbs and with Greece bankrupt, distracted by the Cretan Revolt and finally defeated by the Ottomans in 1897, Bulgaria had indeed an important strategic advantage in Macedonia at the eve of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the realization of the Bulgarian threat by the Ottomans and internal divisions among the Bulgarian parastatal organizations which, like in Greece, were coordinating foreign policy led to a significant decrease of the Slavic influence in Macedonia immediately after the suppression of the Ilinden uprising in 1903. (wikipedia, 2021)

Indeed, Greek guerrillas, under the leadership of officers secretly sent by the government in Athens, used the opportunity and swept through western Macedonia restoring the Greek influence in the region. This renewed activity and the retreat of Bulgarian aspirations hastened a change in Serbian policy, too. Serbia would now be fighting for territorial influence not just against the Greeks and Bulgarians, but also against the Ottomans and Albanians. The situation was so complicated that, at various times, the struggle for Macedonia pitted Slav against Slav (Bulgarians against Serbs); Slav against Hellene (Bulgarians against Greeks); Slav against Muslim (Serbs or Bulgarians against Ottomans or Albanians); Hellene against Muslim (Greeks against Turks or Albanians); and Muslim against Muslim (Ottomans against Albanians). The situation calmed after the Young Turks revolution of 1908, which, in its early stages at least, rejected the path of nationalism and created hope for peaceful coexistence among the different ethnicities in Macedonia. (Glenny, 2012)

The successes in Macedonia restored the confidence of the Greek officer’s corps after the debacle in the 1897 war. The army blamed the Crown Prince Constantine for the defeat against the Turks and the politicians for Greece’s chronic lack of preparedness for war. In August 1909 an army conspiracy, the Military League, launched a successful coup d’etat. This did not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of a junta. The officers involved exercised pressure on the new government from behind the scenes to provide for the necessary restructuring of the army and the obliteration of the influence of the palace on it. They also invited Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan rebel politician outside the old political establishment to lead the effort. (Glenny, 2012) (Malesis, 2018)

II Eleftherios Venizelos

In Crete

Venizelos was born in Mournies, a part of the city of Chania, in Crete in 1864, the year of the first territorial expansion of modern Greece to the Ionian Islands. His father Kiriakos, a merchant, was involved in the local social and political developments and was often prosecuted by the Turkish authorities during the frequent Cretan revolts. Thus, Venizelos spent part of his early life in exile. 

His father was granted amnesty in 1872 and returned to Chania, where he successfully set up his business and provided for the best preparation of Eleftherios as merchant. The latter complied at first, but later managed to convince his father to study law in Athens, where he developed his interest for politics. He also became involved with chieftains and veterans of the island’s revolutions and exiles because of them, who, together with his compatriot students, constituted the core of the Cretan irredentism in the Greek capital. He develops intense activity and soon becomes a leading figure among them.

By the time that Venizelos returned to Chania to practise law in 1887, apart from the respect of the Cretans in Athens, he had the good fame of his father, who died four years earlier, and the help of Kostas Mitsotakis, a local politician and husband of one of his sisters (he had four as well as a younger brother) to rely on for the advancement of his political carrier. He also proved to be an excellent lawyer, which added to his fame and financial comfort.

Thus, it came to no-one’s surprise, when in 1889, he was elected to the Cretan Assembly, a representation body of the semi-autonomous state granted to the island by the Pact of Chalepa in 1878. (wikipedia, 2020) This first tenure did not last long though. A few days after the elections, the old political establishment, proposed the declaration of unification with Greece. Venizelos, as well as the Greek government, immediately realized the dangers of yet another premature revolt and worked to establish a climate of appeasement and moderation. To no avail. The Turks crushed the new revolt and declared martial law. The Pact of Chalepa was no more and Venizelos found himself in Athens once more, this time as an exile.   

His exile does not last long. In April 1890 he returns to Chania, after general amnesty was granted, and in December 1891 he marries his wife, Maria. His happiness does not last long though. After the birth of his second son, in November 1894, his wife died. At the same time Crete was going through one of the worst periods of its history. The martial law and Turkish terror were casting a dark shadow over the island. The Cretan reaction comes with another revolt in May 1896. Venizelos feared a repetition of the harsh measures of 1889 and was against it. The international condemnation of the Hamidian massacres (wikipedia, 2021) though and the pressure exercised by the Great Powers to the Sultan did not allow for a similar reaction. Thus, the movement was successful in forcing the sultan to commit himself for the restoration of the privileges of the Pact of Chalepa.  

Venizelos was not hesitant to get involved in another revolt though, when the sultan did not honour his commitment. Not only as a politician but also as front-line fighter. This is the crisis that culminated to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Although Venizelos was in line with Trikoupis’ approach that foreign policy should be dictated by the national centre and supported unification with Greece, he did not hesitate to disagree with the Greek government after the Greek defeat and opt for the more realistic solution of Cretan autonomy under the condition that the Turkish army withdrew from the island. His insistency and the clumsy handling of the situation by the Turks, with irregulars attacking British forces, resulted not only to Crete’s autonomy, but also to the appointment of the Greek king’s second born prince George as high commissioner. 

In December 1898 prince George arrived in Chania. He claimed excessive powers for himself, and Venizelos supported him as a strong executive authority was necessary for the rebuilt of the devastated island. He also served for two years as minister of justice in the cabinet of the prince demonstrating significant legislative work. Cooperation did not last long though. Venizelos believed that the main aim should be full Cretan autonomy and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ armies from the island, which, in effect, occupied it. Prince George on the other hand was unsuccessfully trying to convince the Powers to accept the unification of the island with the Greek kingdom. When the commissioner used suppressive measures to settle the differences with the politician, Venizelos revolted. 

The centre of the revolt was at Therisos, near Chania, where Venizelos and his supporters declared the unification of Crete with Greece on the 11th of March 1905. This was an attempt to turn the tables as any reaction from the prince would be an act against his own diplomacy that far. In any case, it was the reaction of the foreign armies on the island that would decide the outcome of the revolt. Eventually, Venizelos found himself in a tough spot, but, preferring a realistic approach instead of a fight to the end, he managed to exploit the differences between the Great Powers and by mid-summer managed to achieve: amnesty for himself and his supporters, the establishment of Cretan militia and withdrawal of the Powers’ armies from the island, a loan for the Cretan autonomous state, provisions for the settlement of important pending issues with the Turks, revision of the Cretan constitution. The Greek king would have the right to nominate the high commissioner, but his suggestion was subject to the approval of the Powers. King George decided to withdraw his son and substitute him with former prime minister Alexandros Zaimis. The Powers accepted. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Thus, by 1905 Venizelos had two revolts on his account and a major clash with the royal dynasty and the political establishment supporting it in mainland Greece. No wonder that the officers of the Military League considered him the ideal candidate for the premiership a few years later.

In the Greek political scene

In the elections of the 8th of August 1910 Venizelos was voted member of the Greek parliament for the first time in his career. Contrary to might be expected of him, he did not accept the premiership offered by the Military League. He pointed out that the army officers had committed a serious political mistake: They revolted against the old political establishment and the crown and after gaining control of the situation they trusted the same establishment with the reorganization of the state. Instead, he proposed a compromise: A revision of the constitution of 1864 to introduce the necessary reforms, after which the Military League would dissolve itself. Nevertheless, material provisions of the constitution and especially that concerning the form of government would remain untouched. The crown was safe. Venizelos’ stance served for an improvement of his relations with the palace, especially with king George.

After the king’s invitation to implement the compromise he suggested, Venizelos formed his first government on the 6th of October 1910. But, although the parliament elected in August included 122 independent members, the majority was still with the old parties and Venizelos was not willing to become ‘prisoner’ of this majority. Thus, he convinced the king to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections on the 28th of November. The leaders of the old parties considered this a constitutional coup and decided to abstain from the upcoming elections. As a result, Venizelos’ newly formed Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority of 307 out of 362 seats. 87% of the new MPs were elected for the first time. 

The revision of the constitution introduced important novelties such as a new regime for the expropriation of land, the establishment permanence for the civil servants, compulsory and free elementary education and a ban on the election of army officers as members of parliament. The goal was to address chronic problems of the state like the oppression of the landless, clientism and army interventions in politics. Venizelos actually retained the ministry of the army for himself, and significant compromises were made here. He took as his adjutant the pro-royal captain Ioannis Metaxas, the later dictator during the interwar period in the 1930s, and most importantly restored the crown prince Constantine at the head of the army in June 1911. The reason behind these compromises was the avoidance of an internal front as Venizelos’ concern during this period was the country’s foreign policy. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Nevertheless, he ensured public support with the elections of March 1912 by winning again with an overwhelming majority against the united opposition this time.

Preparation for war

In February 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a defence agreement and two months later a military pact for common action against the Turks regarding their claims in Macedonia. Venizelos actively pursued Greece’s participation to the alliance but was at first met with reservation from the Bulgarian side. (Malesis, 2018) Nevertheless, the Slavs had no navy and Greece was necessary to restrict the capacity of the Turkish fleet to move freely in the Aegean. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) As far as the Greek army was concerned though, after Greece’s defeat in 1897 and considering its financial problems, it was estimated that it counted far below those of the other Balkan States. (Glenny, 2012) Knowing this, Venizelos did not insist on any settlement of the division of the potential territorial gains in Macedonia during the negotiations. Thus, finally Bulgaria felt comfortable to accept Greece in the alliance in May 1912. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Bulgaria completely underestimated the capacity of the Greek army. The international financial control after 1897 helped tiding up the country’s finances and the surpluses of 1910 and 1911 together with loan take outs in the same period created an abundance of cash for the Greek state at the eve of the war. (Kostis, The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day, 2018) Actually, the reorganization effort started in 1904 already with the establishment of the National Defence Fund by the government of George Theotokis. From 1904 till 1912 214 million drachmas were spent on armaments of which 50% during the last two years, when Venizelos came to power. For comparison, the national GDP in 1910-11 was 282.28 drachmas per capita (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) , whereas the legendary armoured cruiser Averof (Carr, 2014) cost 24 million drachmas. Venizelos also materialized the decision of Stefanos Dragoumis’ government in 1910 to invite, following a demand of the Military League, French and British officers to undertake the training of the army and navy. The French mission under general Eydoux arrived in January and the English mission under admiral Tufnell in May 1911.

During this preparation period Venizelos faced the opposition’s criticism that once again preferred the old ‘wait and see’ tactic determined by public opinion and possible political cost. The palace and general staff were also not pleased with the invitation of the Anglo-French military missions as the crown prince and his officers were trained in Germany and admired the Prussian military tradition. Nevertheless, Venizelos was determined to pursue an active participation to the upcoming war and did not hesitate, against the public opinion, to refuse the admission of Cretan representatives to the Greek parliament in May 1912 that might have triggered a reaction form the Great Powers (and the Turks) that at this point were split regarding their policies in the region and could not undertake coordinated action to prevent the war. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars commenced on the 8th of October 1912, when tiny Montenegro, the fourth member of the Balkan alliance, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Five days later an ultimatum issued by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia was delivered to the Turks, demanding such an extensive number of reforms in favour of the Christian populations of the empire that could not be accepted. Their declaration of war followed on the 17th of October. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Military operations lasted only 10 weeks, but the numbers of combatants involved were huge. The Bulgarians mobilized a full 25% of their male population, just under 500,000 men. (Glenny, 2012) The Greeks and Serbs fielded about 200,000 men each and this at a time when their population was less than 3 million. (Malesis, 2018) The Turks were about 350,000. 200,000 combatants, excluding civilians, were killed. The vast massacres of the soon to come First World War relegated the social and economic impact of the Balkan Wars to the penny place. But those who witnessed or participated in them were given a unique insight into what the 20thcentury had in store for the world. (Glenny, 2012)

During the first phase of the war (First Balkan War) the Turks had just come out of a war with Italy and were obliged to fight in four different fronts: against the Bulgarians in Thrace; against the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia; against the Serbs and Montenegrins in northern Albania (I refer to modern Albania, as this state did not exist at the time of the Balkan Wars) and Kosovo; and against the Greeks in Epirus. (Glenny, 2012) The Greek army made significant gains in southern Epirus, setting the city of Ioannina under siege, and in western and central Macedonia, taking Thessaloniki, after winning the race to the city over the Bulgarians. The Greek navy was proved predominant in the Aegean by blocking the naval transport of Turkish troops from Asia Minor to the different fronts and freed all occupied islands. At the same time the rest of the Balkan Allies neutralized almost every pocket of resistance in Europe stopping only 40 km from Constantinople. Thus, soon the Turks reached for an armistice which was signed with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins in December. The Greeks retained a state of war as Ioannina was still under siege and they also needed to continue controlling the movements of the Turkish fleet in the Aegean. (Klapsis, 2019)   

At the conference of London, in December 1912, the Great Powers tried to regain the initiative in the Balkans with their ambassadors discussing separately from those of the war parts. Nevertheless, Sofia, Athens and Belgrade were no longer prepared to bow to the strategic requirements of the Great Powers. (Glenny, 2012) Furthermore, the Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, although it confirmed the drastic reduction of the Turkish possessions in Europe, contained no specific provisions for the definition of the new borders in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. The incorporation of a new Albanian state complicated things even more.(Klapsis, 2019) It was time for the Balkan states to settle the differences among themselves. 

Meanwhile, Greece, still in a state of war with the Turks, had taken Ioannina and advanced into northern Epirus, before the Treaty of London was signed. Bulgaria, overemphasizing the contribution of its army during the hostilities, was by no means willing to accept any conventional ratification of the status quo after the First Balkan War. (Klapsis, 2019) Realizing the danger, Venizelos turned to Serbia for the formation of a common front against their former ally. The Serbs accepted but demanded that the Greco - Serbian Defensive Treaty includes also mutual support in the case of an Austrian attack against Serbia now that the latter’s ambition on the Adriatic were restricted by the Italo – Austrian push for an Albanian state in the region. Although the Germanophile crown prince Constantine was against this development, later to play a crucial role for the Greek participation to the First World War, the Treaty was signed on the 1st of June 1913. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

The Second Balkan War commenced in mid-June with a sudden Bulgarian attack against Greece and Serbia. After few initial successes, the Bulgarian army was thoroughly defeated by the combined armies of Greece and Serbia (supported also by the Montenegrins). Taking advantage of the situation Romania also entered the war occupying Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. The Turks also retook Adrianople from the Bulgarians. The final settlement took place on Balkan ground with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. For Greece the result was astonishing. The gains in Epirus, west and central Macedonia were supplemented by eastern Macedonia till the port city Kavala. In Bucharest, Crete was also finally ceded to Greece that occupied also the islands of north - eastern Aegean, although their fate was to be decided by the Powers at a later point. Within a year the frightened and despised Greece of the past doubled its territory (from 63,211 to 120,308 square kilometres) whereas its population increased by 80% (from 2.6 to 4.7 million people). (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

III Conclusion

Greece’s expansion before 1912 was rather coincidental. The Ionian islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George in 1864. The annexation of Thessaly was also the result of serendipitous international relations in 1881. It was actually lost to Turkey after the defeat of 1897 and was luckily granted back to Greece, together with the right to appoint the high commissioner in Crete, because of the power play between the Great Powers that the Greek government could barely influence. 

At the beginning of the 20th century things were different. Greece was actively pursuing international alliances. It did not hesitate to change sides when the national interest and not have public opinion dictating it. It capitalized on the painful cumulative growth it had experienced since its establishment and combining military action with diplomacy achieved its greatest triumph to this day. As it was noted ‘For the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Greece was fighting and winning without patrons’. (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Nevertheless, despite Venizelos’ criticism to the Military League that it tried to push reform using the old establishment, he worked with the same establishment. It was probably necessary in view of the imminent developments and the need for internal peace. By restoring the crown prince at the head of the army and pro-royal officers at the general staff though, he revived a power system that the Military League meant to neutralize. Already during the Balkan wars there was significant friction between the politician and the commander in chief regarding the appropriate strategy. The disagreement for the race to Thessaloniki in 1912 (supported by Venizelos) against an advance to Monastir (supported by Constantine) or that on signing the agreement with the Serbs, before the Second Balkan War, are typical examples. King George, who, within a few months, tasted all the joy that was deprived of him during the humiliations of the past, was able to mediate successfully between the two. But in March 1913 he was murdered in Thessaloniki by a paranoid person, according to the official version. It has been commented though that the murder came in handy for the ‘German factor’. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Constantine was now not only at the head of the army but at the head of the state, too.

In short, this was undoubtedly a triumphant period for Greece. But the seeds for another catastrophe to come had also been planted.

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References                                                                                                     

Carr, J. (2014). R.H.N.S. Averof, Thunder in the Aegean. Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Kostis, K. (2018). The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Wikipedia. (2020). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Halepa

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilinden%E2%80%93Preobrazhenie_Uprising

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidian_massacres

The Trauma of the 9/11 and the Iraq War

The 9/11 terror attacks led to many consequences for America and the world. Here, David Huff returns and looks at how those events unfolded, and their implications with the perspective of the past two decades.

US troops fighting in Baghdad, Iraq in 2007. Source: Sean A. Foley, U.S. Army, available here.

Overview

The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon should not have surprised leading officials in the United States Government. Although former president George W. Bush and many of the colleagues were aware of al-Qaeda's nefarious deeds (i.e. the attack on the U.S. Cole on October 12, 2000), it is my contention that the Bush Administration had an ulterior motive when George W. Bush assumed office on January 20, 2001.Their primary goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in order to provide the United States with greater leverage in its dealings with Saudi Arabia (i.e. the Saudi Royal Family) and Iran. The installation of a more compliant power broker in Iraq would also provide multi-national corporations, especially oil companies, with a lucrative investment opportunity in that country. Although other underlying considerations may have played a factor in the administration's decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, I never believed the publicly-stated reasons for going to war in March 2003 had to do with Hussein's alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks or his supposed acquisition of material to build a nuclear weapon. 

The Iraq Debacle

In addition, as the decades have transpired, Iraq’s troubles have deepened as a result of deep structural problems that have combined together over decades of war and political crises – with factors like extreme population growth, high-urbanization, a breakdown of traditional economic structures, acute over-employment in unproductive state industries, growing water and climate issues, and the equivalent of a divided government by those who seek primarily status and personal gain at the expense of the people which, in turn, claims a far too large share of the nation’s oil wealth. To that end, in 2006, Iraq's conflict evolved into a civil war, fought among three factions: Sunni insurgents, including Islamist extremists and former Saddam loyalists; Shia militias, a number of them rogue members of state security forces; and the US-led military occupation.  As a result, the country collapsed into sectarian violence as the various factions fought for power and control, not equalitarian self-government.

Furthermore, the Bush Administration's officials were naive about September 11, 2001. It is the height of bravado to conclude that the United States could transform a very ancient civilization like Iraq that in 2003 did not have the democratic foundations required to attain a flourishing and successful democracy. That the administration's leaders could not comprehend that al-Qaeda had the capability of executing such a major operation seems to me they had not done their homework on the overall scope and power of al-Qaeda. In fact, during President Clinton's meeting with President-Elect George W. Bush after the 2000 election, Clinton told Bush about al-Qaeda's growing threat in the arena of global terrorism (please see reference below).

September 11, 2001 and Iraq in Historical Perspective

In addition, I find most telling that the Bush administration's response to 9/11 undermined the principles and values America has always stood for in the world. As an astute observer of history, their response was a continuation of the undermining of many of the core principles and values that this country has always celebrated. We didn't get "off-track" under Bush, but it seems during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, due to events including the Kennedy assassination in Dallas on November 22, 1963, the Vietnam War, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, and the Watergate scandal. Due to the lingering questions that remain unresolved in these tragedies, the American people lost their faith in government and the government earned that loss of faith. I think perhaps the second is more important when the government justifies a loss of faith - it is a deep subversion of the American democratic system. Although this contention might seem a bit different, it is interesting to note that when people become cynical toward their institutions, it leaves the door open to politicians, whether on the left or the right, who are willing to exploit circumstances and situations to achieve their own political ends.

These issues strike at the very heart of the American nation. In essence, they remind us that a free and democratic society must grapple with complex and painful political and social upheavals that challenge our conventional accounting of how we perceive our country. It is paramount that we unite as a people to combat the internal divisions as well as the cynicism that has eaten away at the fabric of our society. In order to survive as a civilization, we will have to restore our faith in our political and social institutions, provide adequate health care for all Americans and create an educational system that enables our children, who are our future, to learn and flourish. I am convinced that our civilization really needs strong, smart and courageous people who are willing to step forward to do whatever it takes to make our country a stronger and better place. All of that can be accomplished by enlightened political and moral leadership, congressional bipartisanship and the self-discipline and sacrifice of the American people.

Finally, a hallmark of a civilized society is that it protects its heritage. In short, a remembrance of things past provides an understanding of where we came from and who we are as a civilization. However, we seem to be faced with a perversion of our American heritage.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Now read David’s article on Jackie Kennedy’s influence on the arts here.

References

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/clinton-says-he-warned-bush-on-bin-laden-1.504928

Charles de Gaulle: The French Leader’s Divided Legacy

Charles de Gaulle’s impact on French history and the world history cannot denied. However, de Gaulle had his detractors and supporters on both ends of the political aisles. During World War II his actions often strained his relationships with the other Allied Powers. His actions and decisions during the Algerian War of Independence left polarizing legacies that are felt to this day. Lastly de Gaulle’s actions in 1967 in Canada would nearly lead to its dissolution.  Charles de Gaulle was the epitome of the Volte-Face or two faced leader of Europe.  

Daniel Boustead explains.

French President Charles de Gaulle with US President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

World War II

In World War II, Charles de Gaulle started to show his divisive ways by undermining the Allied political and military leadership. On one hand de Gaulle (after fleeing France after the 1940 German invasion) portrayed himself as the embodiment of the French nation, a modern-day male Joan of Arc who would lead the fight against the Nazis and their Vichy hirelings and thus restore France to its rightful place and greatness ([1]).  On the other hand according to French historian Francois Kersody, de Gaulle seemed to be permanently involved in a two-front war: “a public war against Vichy and the Germans, and a private war against the British Admiralty, the British Air Ministry, the British War Office, the British Intelligence Service, the British Foreign Office, the British Prime Minister, the U.S. State Department, and the President of the United States”. The British and the Americans viewed de Gaulle as a useful ally but also as a source of much consternation because of his prima donna behavior, incredible ego, and arrogance. On June 18, 1940, during a radio broadcast, de Gaulle gave the French people hope and issued an appeal to French servicemen to fight against the Nazis. However, his sense of ego, arrogance, and vain glory would always come to the forefront.  After the Allied Landings in North Africa in 1942 to 1943, he was particularly worried that Great Britain would take over France’s colonial role in the Levant. Once, when asked for his opinion about Charles de Gaulle, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill mused: “If I regard de Gaulle as a great man? He is selfish, he is arrogant, he believes he is the center of the world. He… You are quite right. He is a great man” (1). In May 1943 when de Gaulle (before departing London) to set up his headquarters in Algiers de Gaulle said goodbye to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Eden asked, “Do you know you have given us more difficulty than all our European Allies?” to which de Gaulle answered “I have no doubt of it. France is a great power.”(1) Once when Winston Churchill blamed de Gaulle right in front of him for his stubbornness, de Gaulle replied in a moment of naked candor “I am too poor to bow” (1). De Gaulle could not afford to compromise, as he did not have anything to compromise with. This stubbornness (according to author Jonathan Fenby) was “bordering on the irrational”(1). 

American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw Charles de Gaulle as a dictator type saying, “There is no man in which I have less confidence”(1). In fact, FDR wanted to replace de Gaulle as leader of the Free French with General Henri Giraud, but Giraud was politically inept and lacked popular support. So, as a result of this the Anglo-Americans were stuck with de Gaulle. After the June 6, 1944, D-Day Normandy invasion FDR had wanted to place France under military administration, but typically de Gaulle presented the Allies with a fait accompli by immediately setting up his own administration in Baujeau. In August 1944 when the French Resistance engaged in an insurrection which forced General Dwight David Eisenhower to liberate the city rather than bypass it, General de Gaulle ordered French General Leclerc to rush his tanks to Paris, making it look like the French had liberated themselves. To the Allies he was both a useful ally and a prima donna and who was also difficult as a partner. 

Algerian War of Independence

The Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962 would not only bring Charles de Gaulle back into political and military power but also into controversy over his actions. On May 30, 1958, Charles de Gaulle agreed to form a government and then on June 1, 1958, he presented himself to the National Assembly of France as Prime Minister ([2]). On June 4, 1958, de Gaulle visited Algeria and General Raoul Salan introduced him by saying “Our Great cry of joy and hope has been heard”, which was followed by a loud cheering for de Gaulle for three minutes ([3]). However, it was as de Gaulle was giving this speech at the Government General building in Algiers Algeria, there was an apartment building in which an unrepentant Petainist member belonging to the French Army’s splinter group of Ultras, had a rifle with a telescopic sight ready to kill de Gaulle (3). The reason this man wanted to kill de Gaulle was that he believed (along with his splinter group) that de Gaulle was going to abandon Algeria. This was the first of some 30 assassination attempts on de Gaulle’s life. This first one failed because the assassin listened to the rest of de Gaulle’s speech and abandoned his attempt to kill him.

In time de Gaulle would create many enemies over his Algeria policies. In October 1958 he told General Massu and other army officers in the Committee of Public Safety to withdraw from the organization (which was subsequently stood down altogether) ([4]). De Gaulle also issued an order to General Raoul Salan in October 1958 that said, “The moment has come when the military must cease to take any part in any organization with a political character”(4). This order enraged the “ultras” in the military, but it was followed anyway. In a devastating blow in December 1958, a one -time de Gaulle supporter General Raoul Salan (who was Commander in Chief of the French Army in Algeria and de facto civil governor of Algeria) was sent into a “gilded retreat” as a military governor of Paris by order of de Gaulle. Salan viewed the appointment as an insult.

On January 8, 1959, he became the first President of the Fifth French Republic ([5]). In September 1959 de Gaulle made an announcement in support of Algerian “self determination”. De Gaulle also made three speeches that were in favor of Algerian independence in lead up to the January 8, 1961 successful referendum offering Algerians several options, including self government. On April, 20 1961 there was a failed French Army General Putsch against de Gaulle’s Pro-Algerian independence policies that lasted until April 27, 1961 ([6]). From September 5, 1961, de Gaulle announced that his negotiations with the Algerian FLN Resistance group would no longer insist on maintaining French sovereignty over the Sahara. De Gaulle officially explained his actions towards Algeria in terms of the “inevitability” of independence, and as part of “the process of decolonization”. Furthermore, de Gaulle simply did not believe Algerian Muslim people were French (5). As de Gaulle exclaimed to French General Marie-Paul Allard in 1959, “You cannot possibly consider that one day an Arab, a Muslim, could be the equal of a Frenchman” (5). On July 3, 1962, Algeria declared its independence from France ([7]). The consequence of Algeria’s independence was that France assimilated one million Pied Noirs (Black Feet), the European settlers and Jewish people who once lived in Algeria ([8]). To Algerian Muslims, de Gaulle caved into their demands for independence, while some segments of the Pied Noirs viewed de Gaulle as a traitor for giving up Algeria.  

Canada

Charles de Gaulle’s actions in Canada would lead to subsequent events that almost split up Canada. On July 24, 1967, de Gaulle visited Montreal, Quebec and stood on the balcony of Montreal City Hall and shouted during a speech “Vive le Quebec libre” or “Long Live Free Quebec” to a crowd bellow (9). The result of the speech gave an international voice to Quebec’s burgeoning sovereigntist or separatist movement and caused a diplomatic incident. In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle’s speech Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson criticized de Gaulle’s speech saying de Gaulle’s “statements were unacceptable to the Canadian people” (9). After he gave the legendary speech he skipped his planned events in Ottawa, Canada and returned to France early. Relations between Canada and France remained touchy for years. 

One prominent Quebec separatist who was directly impacted by de Gaulle’s speech was Rene Levesque, who was then a high-ranking Liberal member of Quebec’s National Assembly. Levesque wrote a letter to then ex- Quebec Premier Jean Lesage not long after de Gaulle ‘s visit and said de Gaulle’s message had provided a “formidable injection of pride”, “the best occasion we’ve ever had to break our isolation”(9). Rene Levesque then founded the Pro-Sovereigntist political party Parti Quebecois or PQ in November 1967. Rene Levesque vaulted the PQ to power in 1976, winning 71 seats out of the 110 seats in the Quebec parliament.

Since then, there have been two referendums in Quebec, with the second putting Canada on the brink of breaking up. In 1980 there was referendum in Quebec, in which 59% voted to remain part of Canada(10).  The Second Referendum in Quebec was held in 1995 in which 50% voted to remain in Canada and 49% voted to choose to follow a secessionist path (10). The impact of de Gaulle’s words that fateful 1967 speech still lingers in Quebec’s society (9). To the Quebecois Separatist Secessionist Sovereigntists, Charles de Gaulle is a hero who continues to inspire their ideals of an Independent Quebec, while to other Canadians, especially English-speaking Canadians, de Gaulle is a separatist instigator with no diplomatic tact who almost destroyed their country.  

Conclusion

Charles de Gaulle’s impact on the 20th and even 21st centuries was important. He provided decisive leadership to the French people during World War II, while managing to also butt heads with other Allied leaders. His decisions during the Algerian War resulted in the Algerian people’s demands for independence being realized. At the same he uprooted and alienated some segments of the Pied Noir population of Algeria. In Canada he is beloved by Quebecois separatist secessionists while other Canadians despise him because he wanted to rip apart their country. Charles de Gaulle left a truly polarizing legacy.

What do you think of Charles de Gaulle? Let us know below. And find out more about him here.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Bering, Henrik. “The Audacity of de Gaulle”. Policy Review of the Hoover Institution of Stanford University (February 1st, 2013): . Accessed on November 7th, 2021. https://www.hoover.org/research/audacity-de-gaulle . 

[2] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 298. 

[3] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 301. 

[4] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a  New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 309. 

[5] Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and The Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006.  74 to 75. 

[6] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 448 to 460. 

[7] Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and The Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006. 1. 

[8] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962:With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 549. 

9 Bellemare, Andrea. CBC News . Last Posted or Modified or Updated on July 24th, 2017. Accessed on November 7th,2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/charles-de-gaulle-speech-50th-anniversary-1.4218130

10 Bryant, Nick. “Neverendum referendum: Voting on independence, Quebec-style”. Last Updated or Modified on  September 8th, 2014.  BBC News . Accessed on November 10th, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/magzine-29077213 . 

The Paraguayan President who Brought his Country to Military Catastrophe – Part 4: How the War Ended

Francisco Solano Lopez was president of Paraguay from 1862 to 1870. He led the country during one of the most devastating defeats in all history – the War of the Triple Alliance. Here, Erick Redington concludes this fascinating series by looking at how a Brazilian leader managed to take Humaita and the capital, Asuncion – and how Marshall Lopez continued to resist even after these captures.

If you missed it you can read part 1 on the early life of Francisco Solano Lopez here, part 2 on the start of the War of the Triple Alliance here, and part 3 on devastating battles for both sides here.

The 1868 Battle of Avay.

Marshal Lopez knew about all the changes in the Allied high command. He was kept informed through an intelligence network of spies and sympathizers. The changes could only have been encouraging. With Mitre gone, and Argentina facing internal dissention and rebellion, their contribution to the war would be diminished at worst, and eliminated at best. Flores' term ending, and then assassination, meant that Uruguay would have another round of internal problems, which could only work to the Marshal's favor. Then the elephant in the room, Brazil. The new commander was probably just some other decadent Brazilian noble with a fancy title, but no match for the Marshal's military genius. 

There were reasons for the Marshal to be confident. Sure his armies were ill equipped, ill fed, and his country was significantly outweighed. But these facts had been true from the start. Yet, despite all this, he had survived. Paraguay had survived. The strategy of making the Allies pay for every step, letting the terrain and disease take their tolls, seemed to be working. The Allies were barely into Paraguay. Tens of thousands had been killed or invalided out. The Argentines and Uruguayans were seemingly withdrawing from the war. There had been no uprising against his rule. The nascent Paraguayan Legion, full of his opponents, was stymied. For the Marshal, all that seemed necessary was just a little more exertion, if the Paraguayan people could give just a little more, then a peace he could live with could finally be achieved.

For Lopez, the seeming successes (or non-failure depending on your perspective) were further convincing him of his own correctness, and the baseness of his opponents. He had done this himself. The American minister to Paraguay once wrote that the Marshal had many flatterers, but no advisors. The Marshal had stymied the Allies, and this led to a further inflated ego. Other issues began to rear their heads. Lopez did not share in the privations of his soldiers. He was a known gourmand, and would eat enormous amounts of food, even specialty cakes that would have been unthinkable for anyone not in the Marshal's immediate family. Worse, Lopez would drink large amounts of alcohol. Prior to modern sanitary methods, drinking alcohol did not carry the risks of disease, such as dysentery, that drinking unclean water did. However, Lopez's consumption of alcohol grew over the years of the war, and when he drank too much, he was known to lash out at those around him angrily. These scenes of anger would not bode well for the future.

When the Marquis de Caxias took command, he trained, organized and equipped his forces. As a veteran of every war of the Empire, he knew the importance of morale and logistics, and was determined to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors. Whereas the Marshal had assumed that Caxias was going to be another dull Brazilian nobleman, it was Caxias who would rebuild the Brazilian forces, and use the newfound unity of command to wield the Allied army and navy as one instrument for the destruction of Marshal Lopez.

Humaitá Falls      

By July 1867, Caxias was ready to move the Allied Army. President Mitre had made some rumblings about wanting to return to the army to reassume command, and Caxias had to move fast to maintain his operational control. The goal was Humaitá. The Marshal had used the months of inactivity to strengthen the Gibraltar of South America. One element that the Marshal had not counted on was the advancements in naval technology of the previous decade. When Humaitá was originally built by Carlos Antonio Lopez, naval vessels were still primarily made of wood, and steam propulsion was new. The bend in the river would slow ships and the guns of the fort would bring their destruction. With ironclad warships becoming more common, even in South America, the position Humaitá was in was not as impregnable as it had been.   

Utilizing terrain and slowing down the Allies, the Marshal wanted to make his enemies bleed for every foot of Paraguayan ground they stepped on. Caxias was willing to accept casualties in order to encircle the Paraguayan fortress. Being outnumbered almost 2-1, however, limited the Marshal's options and he could not afford a pitched battle. For the Marquis, a pitched battle was what he wanted. He was simply unable to achieve it at this stage. Lopez knew his numbers were low, and he had limited prospects of getting more men. Pre-teen boys and old men were being conscripted into the Paraguayan army. These young men would prove some of the Marshal's most devoted followers. The use of child soldiers would be one of the biggest stains on the Marshal's record and is one of the greatest controversies of the war. For the Paraguayans, they felt they had no alternative. According to the Marshal's propaganda, the Allies were going to partition the country and the Brazilians were going to enslave them. These were motivations to get families to freely give up their children for service. And besides, these children would be under the command of the brilliant Marshal Lopez, who would ensure their safety.

The Marquis would order a wide flanking maneuver to surround the fortress, then when close positions were attained, begin land and naval bombardments. If the Paraguayans would not evacuate, Humaitá would be besieged and the Paraguayan army trapped inside, hopefully with the Marshal as well. Mostly, this is what happened. However, due to the terrain, it was impossible to completely surround Humaitá as closely as the Marquis would have liked. Despite this the Allied army was able to take up positions facing Humaitá, and the siege was on. The defense of this place had been built up in the minds of both sides that immediate evacuation by the Marshal was impossible. For both sides, it was the focus of the war. As long as it held out, there was still hope for the Paraguayans. If it fell, the Allies hoped they would have an open road to Asunción.  

As has been seen, Marshal Lopez was not one to sit and wait for anything to happen to him. He would make attacks during the siege, and at times put the Allies back on their heels. Active defense seemed to be the tactic Marshal Lopez excelled at. But his army was also starving. A larger proportion of his solders everyday was made up of children and old men. Weapons were outdated. Ammunition and powder were short. It was amazing the Paraguayans held on as long as they did. But the Marshal could feel the squeeze he was being put under. Slowly, steadily, month after month, the Allies strangled the Paraguayans. The Brazilians showed early in the siege that their ironclads were able to run the guns of the fortress and make it up river, virtually defeating the purpose of the fortress at that location. With the fleet now able to go upriver and shell Paraguayan positions, Humaitá slowly became untenable. Small-scale counter attacks would not be enough. The Allies inexorably closed in. But no matter how many counter attacks, ambushes, and disruptions to the Allied supply line the Marshal made, he could not shake the grip that Caxias had on Humaitá. It became a matter of time. 

Marshal Lopez was not a man to sacrifice himself in the last ditch defense of the fortress. Nor would he allow himself to be captured by his enemies while there were still Paraguayan soldiers left to carry on. Leaving a small force to man the fort and maintain a semblance of their presence, the Marshal ordered his troops to retreat further north. The Marquis was prepared to assault the fortress that for so long had frustrated Allied designs. When the Allies were prepared for the final assault, negotiations began for surrender. Over 1,200 Paraguayan troops surrendered. These men were starving and sick. Their commander, Colonel Martinez, was so starved, by one report his skin had begun to turn yellow. Despite this, surrender by the Paraguayans up until this moment had been unthinkable. To the Allies, the Paraguayans were unthinking automatons in the service of a brutal dictator. Seeing the walking corpses come out of the fort that day reinforced their belief.

Things Fall Apart

For the Marshal, surrender had been unthinkable. He had only left orders for the evacuation of the sick and wounded, not understanding this meant the whole garrison. Although he had held out for longer than anyone had the right to expect, with the fortress gone, he now began to worry about the safety of his capital. Retreat north was a necessity. The Marquis, however, was not willing to rest on his laurels and savor the triumph. Further naval probes were ordered. The advance would continue.

Before confronting his enemies in front of him, Lopez confronted his perceived enemies behind him. This would be the start of one of the greatest black marks against the Marshal’s character. Paraguay was an authoritarian state, and the Marshal was used to instant obedience. It seems that when his orders had been disobeyed and Humaitá surrendered, Lopez began to delude himself with the idea that there was a massive conspiracy against him personally. Massive numbers of arrests were made. Everyone from foreign travelers to government officials were arrested and subject to extreme forms of torture to extract confessions. Priests were used as informants and the confessional was no longer sacred. Families would inform on each other. Even the Marshal’s family was not immune. His brother would be arrested, and his mother would be tortured for the sin of telling him that he was born out of wedlock. Plots to overthrow the Marshal or to surrender to the Allies were allegedly everywhere. Historians have debated whether any of this conspiracy mongering was based in fact, but there is very little evidence. One result did come about. If no one was willing to challenge the Marshal before, now there was no one left in government or the inner circle who would even think of telling the Marshal the truth about the situation again.

Lopez looked for a defensible position from which to stymie the Allied advance. He settled on the banks of the Piquissiri River south of Asunción. It was here the Marquis would show himself a superior general to the Marshal. Caxias would cross the river, enter the terrible terrain of the Gran Chaco and flank the Paraguayan army. Then he could take the Marshal from behind and destroy him before he could retreat further north. This is exactly what happened. At the Battle of Avay, much of the remaining Paraguayan army was destroyed. With this, there was nothing stopping the Marquis from taking the Paraguayan capital, which was done on New Year’s Day 1869.

The Fall                   

Although the Allies hoped that taking the Paraguayan capital would end the war, that would not be signaled until the Marshal was removed from the board. Ever the survivor, Lopez fled north into the wilderness and the mountains. He would take whatever boys and old men were left, form a new army, and fight a guerilla war against the Allies and their newest ally, the Paraguayan Provisional government. This group was set up by the Allies to govern the country. For Lopez, this group of men was even worse than Brazilians, they were traitors. Many Paraguayans would see them the same way. The war would continue.

For over a year, the Marshal would fight his guerilla war. The Marquis de Caxias would leave the war zone, to be replaced by the Emperor’s son-in-law, the Comte d’Eu. There were more battles, but the primary result was more needless suffering by the Paraguayan people. The battles of the last year of the war would see whole villages burned to the ground and brutal reprisals and counter reprisals by both sides. D’Eu was determined to destroy the support system that sustained the Marshal’s armies and would brutally punish any area that gave the Marshal support. The Marshal would launch deadly attacks on anyone who aided the Allies or would not actively support him. Unlike many dictators who can allow passive acceptance, the Marshal required active participation in his activities by his people. The Marshal had no hope of victory, yet he would order the instant death of Paraguayans who even spoke of surrender. The Paraguayan people probably knew they were doomed, but what else could they do? The habituation of obedience had been with them since the days of Dr. Francia. There was nothing left for the Paraguayan people to do but to fight and die. 

The Comte d’Eu would order continuous campaigns to root out the Marshal. Finally, after all these years of war, Marshal Lopez was cornered. The Allies launched an attack on his camp and cut down his aides and camp followers. The Marshal, believing in his own importance to his cause, jumped on his horse and attempted to ride away. Due to the muck, getting away was not possible. Through the entire war, the Marshal had pointedly not exposed himself to danger. His supporters would say that due to his role as commander in chief and president, it would be irresponsible to expose himself. His detractors would call him a coward. At this moment, when all was lost, and escape was impossible, the Marshal found the courage to face his enemies. He was called upon to surrender by the Brazilians. He not only refused but insulted and swore at his attackers. He would curse and damn them for what they had done to Paraguay. The Brazilian commander, General Câmara, would order his men to capture the Marshal alive. No order could save the Marshal. Not only did the Brazilian troops have their blood up and adrenaline pumping, but the Emperor had offered a reward of £110 sterling for the man who would take the Marshal down. The Marshal, covered in wounds was shot in the chest and fell in the swamps of Northern Paraguay on March 1, 1870. His last words, spat with his last breath, were “I die with my country.”

Legacy

The memory of Marshal Francisco Solano Lopez Carrillo is complicated. To the Paraguayan people who he ruled over with an iron fist for most of a decade, he is a hero, a symbol of national resistance against overwhelming odds. He had defied the superpowers of South America, and though he lost, it was through his sacrifice that Paraguay was able to survive the worst war the continent had ever seen. Supporters say that the fact that Paraguay earned the respect of its’ enemies through its heroism and were moved to allow the country to survive is a testament to the Marshal. To detractors, he was a brutal dictator who launched a war that no sane person could have imagined for one moment he had a chance to win. This view is reinforced by the casualty figures. Of a prewar population of approximately 525,000, over 300,000 died. It is estimated that 90% of men in Paraguay died. This casualty figure surpasses the most brutal of wars, even the Eastern Front of World War II. 

Insane brutal dictator, or enlightened leader who was suppressed by his neighbor. These two positions polarize historians to this day. One thing the Marshal achieved, which he would have enjoyed, was eternal fame. The fame of leading one of the most epic campaigns in military history, fighting against impossible odds, and enacting a true Götterdämmerung will make his name live forever.

What do you think of how he War of the Triple Alliance ended? Let us know below.

Now, read about General Juan Peron , The Famous Argentine President who had 18 years between his two Presidencies here.

References

Saeger, James Schofield. 2007. Francisco Solano Lopez and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, Volume 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2005. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Edited by Hendrick Kraay. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2017. The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866-70. University of Calgary Press.

Poland in the Interwar Years: 1918 - 1939

Poland in the interwar years was relatively new to Europe as she had not been an independent country in her own right since 1772, having been previously absorbed into the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire.  Her reinstatement and Polish actions did little to peace or stability of post war Europe. As Europe moved closer to war in 1939 Britain was deciding whether to support Poland against Germany.  

Poland had behaved in ways that were largely indistinguishable from the likes of other neighboring totalitarian states. Could the West be confident in the Polish as an ally in the East? Was she worthy and secondly was she at scrutiny really any better than the other authoritarian European states like the USSR or Germany?

Stephen Prout explains.

Members of the Polish Army's 2nd Death's Squadron during the 1918-21 Polish–Soviet War.

Poland and the First World War

During the Great War Poland was part of Austrian-Hungarian Empire and so fought on the side of the Central Powers, technically by default Poland was part of the enemy forces. After the war all belligerents lost territory through various treaties. Poland, however had gained territory but she would not be satisfied with her initial spoils.

Whilst the war raged, Pilsudski formed the Polish Legions to assist the Central Powers defeat Russia and gain a favorable light with her Austrian masters to pave the first steps toward full independence. According to Prit Buttar, "At the beginning of the war, Pilsudski committed his forces to support the Austro-Hungarian cause, believing that Poland's best chance for independence lay in a victory of the Central Powers over Russia” however in the event of the Central Powers being defeated he secretly in in overtures to the west assured them would that he would never fight against them. However, other promising plans were afoot offered by Germany and Austria that the Polish were keen to keep simmering so in the meantime, Poland’s loyalties were with the central powers.

The Central Powers defeated Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceased hostilities. Germany and Austria-Hungary then mooted the creation of a "Mittel Europa" which translated means Central Europe in November 1917. This promised a puppet state Kingdom of Poland. Just about when it seemed the Poles were about to have their independent state Germany was defeated, and it was time for Pilsudski to try his options with the West.

A New Republic and a return of warfare

Poland’s post-war frontiers were established by Lord Curzon in 1919 (the “Curzon Line”) out of the post war treaties. Poland then engaged in a series of overlapping wars that would expand her Eastern territory beyond the post war demarcations and create enmity amongst her new neighbors. She would be far from the peaceful state that a devastated Europe now needed.

These conflicts over the next few years would the cause for the growing discontent in the Eastern regions of Europe. Between 1919 to 1920, whilst the Soviet Union was in a chaotic state, Poland invaded former Russian territory annexing vast areas of Ukraine and Belarus. By the time these overlapping wars ended with the Treaty of Riga (1921) chunks of Lithuanian territory were added, which was further subsequently “legitimized” by a questionable election held in that country in 1922.

There were numerous motives; Poland wanted to incorporate Polish peoples into their new borders and more so to re-establish her pre-1772 glory.  The opportunity was ripe as the newly formed Soviet Union was distracted by internal strife whilst simultaneously the Western powers the fates of Germany and her colonies, Turkey, and the balance of power in the Middle East.

By the time the 1921 Treaty of Riga was signed Poland had extended further into Eastern Europe. Polish borders extended 160 miles east of where they were intended by the Curzon Line and added 52,000 square kilometers.  She had significantly grown her size – and the extent of her future problems.

The new Czechoslovakia would also be subject to territorial claims. In the Conference of Ambassadors in Belgium in August 1919 Poland received a portion of Cieszyn after a brief military clash. This would not be her last claim to Czech sovereign territory. In 1938 she would participate in the dismemberment of that country, taking advantage of the Munich conference and take the industrial town of Tesin as Germany took the remainder of that country.

Poland was clearly insatiable. Not being content with just European gains in 1935 she approached Britain and France to demand ten percent of Germany’s lost African colonies. It was strange in so much as she never had any presence colonial or otherwise in Africa. It was rejected by the West, as they already seized most of the territories for themselves. Why she set her sights on Africa was contended to be due to her growing anti-Semitism.

Anti-Semitism

Germany had cast the darkest shadow in the field of anti-Semitism, but other nations also held a complicit agenda against Jewish populations. Poland had the largest Jewish population in Europe and although her actions were not as violent as Germany, she instigated numerous laws that excluded the Jewish from many avenues of daily life. 

These laws were introduced from March 1937, the first aimed at the restriction of Jews entering the legal and medical professions (not dissimilar from Nazi efforts). Another followed placing restrictions on the slaughter and supply of kosher products, which would be devastating for Jewish businesses. In April of the following year likewise restrictions were applied to Jews joining the journalist profession.  

At the same time the government passed a Citizenship Law, which set rules to revoke Polish citizenship from anybody who had lived abroad in excess of five years and only having minimal contract with the Polish homeland.  Although it did not specifically reference the Jews it was engineered to discriminate against them.

The success of these measures could be evidenced within the education sector. In 1937 the number of Jewish Students in universities stood at 7.5%; where as ten years earlier the figure stood at 20.4%.

Support of these measure where also present amongst the clergy. A surviving comment by a Cardinal Hlond labeled the Jews as a “vanguard of atheism, bolshevism and revolution.”  The comment was so blatant as to label them an “evil influence” and advised his congregations “one does well to avoid Jewish shops”.

The lack of sympathy for the Jewish population was clear in their refusal to take in Jewish refugees expelled from Nazi Germany in October 1938.  The refusals by the Polish government consequently saw fifteen thousand Jews interned in appalling conditions in a border zone of Zbaszyn.  Their fate seemed marginally better than that of those remaining in Germany.  The anti-Semitic movement within Poland continued during the occupation not by the Nazis or Soviets alone but with some Polish collaboration.  

In 1937 Poland set up a commission (Lepecki Commission) jointly with France to investigate the feasibility of a scheme on the African Island of Madagascar to relocate their Jewish population - again expulsion of a similar a kind to the Nazi’s but expulsion all the same that has received little exposure. The idea failed.

Dealing with Danzig and Germany

In the following years Poland’s presence would be a bitter reminder for Germany over her lost Eastern borders and a sizable proportion of Germans peoples that found themselves under what they regarded as a foreign rule.  Danzig would be the focal point of these major issues. Polish treatment of the overwhelmingly German population would sour German-Polish relations. 

Danzig was a free city established in 1920 by the allies that occupied approximately two thousand square kilometers of territory. After Danzig’s new status became established Poland was given control of the commerce and development, which to the indigenous Germans was ominous itself.  Poland did not always exercise her administration well and this angered the majority German population who saw their identity being diluted.  Protests ensued and the Nazi Party began to gain support.

The German population was seeing Polish dominance with Polish letter boxes appearing, commerce controlled by the Poles and the presence of increasing numbers of their soldiers on the Westerplatte around Danzig.

Poland however could also accommodate the Nazis. By 1934 the Non-Aggression Pact eased tensions and Poland suppressed any anti-Nazi protests - and in return Germany curtailed the local Nazi Party’s actions. For the time being tensions eased but it would be short lived.

Alliances & Non-Aggression Pacts

Poland could form alliances with states considered abhorrent to the Western powers (Britain could also accommodate the dictators as well).  She signed two Non-Aggression Pacts with the Soviet Union (renewed again in 1934) and one with Germany in 1934.  At the same time, she had a nascent relationship with the West.  It could be perceived that she was once again hedging her bets by playing both sides.

Apart from Italy, Poland had shown the most aggressive and expansionist tendencies for much of the inter-war years. Britain and France really did not want to expend any more loss of life, especially in an area they had less interests.

Lord Halifax and Chamberlain were rightfully hesitant over offering any promises to Poland yet ultimately favored Poland more out of lack of choices in that region for a suitable eastern ally. The only reason to favor Poland was that if Germany had to watch her eastern borders there was less of her military resource to send westwards.  Poland seemed to be the only remaining choice after the USSR’s poor military performance in the 1920s and the detrimental effect of the purges on her military.

Conclusion

Britain ultimately leant to the side of Poland, but it took a lot of deliberation on the part of Chamberlain and Halifax, who harbored doubts - much to the dismay of the Polish. 

On balance, perhaps the British were justified.  Polish invasions and annexations into other European states up the eve of the war outweighed all other aggressive states other than Italy. This would cause the enmity of her neighbors and so create her own problems. The anti -Semitic laws that were passed, and Poland’s move to a dictatorship had many similarities to Germany. Poland it seemed could accommodate the Nazis and communists with separate non-aggression pacts when expedient, the very states that alarmed the West. 

Britain ultimately opted for Poland out of political expediency.  Britain was not averse to accommodating the dictator states either if her own interests needed serving though. Lord Halifax and Chamberlain still followed the appeasement policy as the nation wanted to avoid another war. However, they needed an Eastern ally for the containment of Germany, i.e., Poland or the USSR so there was less of Germany’s military resources to face Westwards.  Poland seemed to be the most viable choice.

The Western Powers throughout the interwar period were troubled by the prospect of Soviet expansion westwards. Poland could provide part of the answer, but Britain also did not want to be tied into any perilous obligations nor did she want to guarantee Polish borders. Some of those concerns were addressed by the presence of Nazi Germany as a strong bulwark and that combined with Poland as an additional eastern buffer effectively halted Bolshevik expansion. The Eastern problem looked as secure as it could be, at least until the autumn of 1939. 

The Polish question was not a straightforward one.  Britain had already sacrificed a democracy in ceding Czechoslovakia to Germany, much to the outrage of public opinion (the same public opinions that also did not want war and praised peace in our time).  It was a difficult and divisive time. The political landscape was an almost impossible one to navigate.

What do you think of Poland in the interwar years? Let us know below.

Now read Stephen’s article on Britain’s relationships with the European dictators in the interwar years here.

Sources

Origins of The Second World War – AJP Taylor

Europe Of the Dictators – Elizabeth Wiskeman – Harper Torchbooks 1966.

Article: Anti-Semitism in Interwar Europe: The cases of Poland and Hungary - Dr Marco Soddu

Article – Graham Stewart – Historical Notes – 1999 – Chamberlains motives for Standing by Poland

Anna Maria Ciencala – Polish Review – 2016 – University of Illinois

References also from Orgy OF Murder – Jan Gabowski I review by Ofer Aderet 2017 - Haaretz

The Reality of the American Intervention in Afghanistan

In this article Brian McNash offers his hard-hitting perspective on the recent Afghanistan War. It also includes the context of the Iraq War and discusses the failures of successive US governments.

US soldiers march to a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Daychopan district, Afghanistan in September 2003. Picture by Staff Sgt. Kyle Davis, US Army.

Let’s call it what it is. George Bush lied to us about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We were doing well in Afghanistan. Gaining some traction and what we wanted most, control. Then, he siphoned troops and added more to fight an endless war on nothing. Our job was supposed to be to go get the Taliban, destroy them, capture the top people, if possible, punish them, and get out. Instead, we stayed for 20 years and played offense in Iraq to a fault while playing defense in Afghanistan. Our troops have been left to dry by every president since this war started including Bush, Obama, Trump, and even Biden. Afghans have been senselessly murdered under all these presidents. We need to acknowledge and take accountability for these truths.

We captured the top people and kept fighting a war that could never be won. We tried to destroy the threat to our homeland and emboldened a hate towards America because of our tactics, missions, and things we did over there. Our soldiers were on the receiving end of the blame, the trauma, and the effects. They were the face of America while the government officials who never stepped in Iraq or Afghanistan played chess. Those government officials include our Congress, Defense Secretaries, Vice Presidents, Speakers of the House, and President, among others. The officials who called the shots, paid out defense contractors, ran up our budget, and sent our deficit into free-fall in space. We left so much of our budget and deficit in Afghanistan and Iraq when we abandoned military vehicles, equipment, and so much more. No purpose for it anymore? Too expensive to get rid of. Not worth it? Whatever it was, we left more than just that behind.

Who failed?

Our government failed our troops, lied to everyday Americans, cost us lives, money, and years of sacrifices when it comes to our troops. Leaving behind pain and abandoning the Afghani people who helped us, only furthering a hate for America. Leaving behind equipment just gives an opportunity for terrorists to advance on their fellow people who don’t want to be ruled by them. By getting involved, America chose to take on their problems. We got too heavily involved and now the blame is on us. The troops just carried out orders. Orders from people who put contracts, lobbying efforts, lining their own pockets, and a war hungry mindset over the mission and point of going over there. The troops had to pay for it with their bodies, mental health, and sometimes their lives. We got caught slipping on 9/11 while indirectly funding the same people for years who attacked this country. Do you see why conspiracy theorists feel like they are on to something here? Our government hurt fellow Americans and our troops by waging a large offensive with big goals but a scattered plan. Talk to vets from WWII, Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and any other conflict we have been involved in. They can tell you about the toll, the empty promises, the trauma they endured, and the lies that have been told to them by the country they served and would die for. We let down our troops. We let down the American people. By choosing to try to be the Superman of the world for our own economic benefit, we let down the Afghani people. We let down the Iraqi people. We should have never dug our feet in. We should have finished the initial mission and gotten out. 

Faults

Fault falls on Bush and his administration for lying throughout his presidency starting with the “Weapons of Mass Destruction” lie. Fault falls on Bush for letting Dick Cheney insert his war crazed policies into his Presidency and have way too much power. I have not seen a Vice President with that much power in a long time. This falls on Obama and his administration for not pulling enough troops out and deciding to half ass it, basically sending a message of “we will still have a presence”. When they captured Bin Laden in a massive estate near a Pakistani military base that should have told us all we need to know. Get the hell out because everyone in this area could be corrupt and complicit in one way or another. We tried to play the “it’s okay we still want to help” game and locked ourselves in for the next 10 years. The fault lays with Trump and his administration, who turned on the Kurds, our most intelligent, swiftest ally out there. Instead of them being an asset to us, we stopped funding them. Then, we ended up attacking them because they retaliated after we turned our backs on them. They helped our offensive and we cut them off because we were trying to save money. There is rarely any real justification for violence. But how would you feel if somebody did that to you? Trump advanced and signed into law the largest military budget for other operations. Within all of those billions of dollars, we could not provide funding to a much-needed ally. The shift was swift and that was his fault in this. Trump also brokered a peace deal with the Taliban that was good in some respects but mostly bad. 5,000 prisoners from camps, black site prisons, and Guantanamo Bay were released, including the Taliban leader. Some of those same prisoners are back in command of the Taliban now. Others are fighting against the very troops who put them in prison the first time. Imagine how you would feel seeing this cycle happen as a soldier from any country fighting against the Taliban.

Lastly, Biden and his administration left behind vehicles, equipment, and allowed looters to get their hands on it. He basically left the terrorists bits and pieces to put back together to use on their own people and advance their own evil interests. The helicopters might not work fully but the guns do whenever there is ammo left lying around for them. Not to mention, Biden supported these wars in Congress, voted on military budget bills for the past 40 years, and his own son paid the price of his actions later in life. He knows that. He has had to face the consequences of his actions every day then and now as President. He is pulling the US out of a situation he voted for as Senator. Every President has been complicit and barely helped this endless, hopeless situation. The troops have paid the price literally, emotionally, and mentally. Some have paid the ultimate price. We the people (everyday citizens) have paid the price and it has fostered into a distrust for the government. It has also resulted in war being the new normal. If you are 20 or younger, for your whole life America has been in war. Let that sink in. There are other generations before us who have had a similar experience. But, with the help of technology and media, we see war at its worst more than ever now. Through photos, videos, reports, and more, it has been engrained in our heads that war is a constant presence in our lives.

Capitalism

Moreover, we did not just come the Middle East to get back at the people responsible for 9/11. To bring democracy to Afghanistan. Or to capture Saddam Hussein and restore democracy in Iraq. We have a capitalist economy. You do not think our government is not smart enough to capitalize on what a country has to offer. Afghanistan has rare earth mineral fields under it and the most opium fields in the world (mostly used to make heroin). They lacked weapons but we do not. There were weapons deals done between us, corporations like General Electric, and different groups or countries. Some were allies, sometimes we sought control or to take inventory, and others we wanted to outright take advantage of. The Pentagon lost billions of dollars and Presidents weren’t even aware. Congress was in the dark. There was no trail leading back to wherever that money went. To connect this all, many soldiers knew back in 2008-13 that once they left the Taliban would take Afghanistan back. Most citizens of those countries did not want Americans there. The fight over the opium fields went a couple of ways: The farmers got shaken down by Taliban and Taliban sold opium, the Farmers field got carpet bombed by the US and then they joined Taliban, or US would give farmers fertilizer who used it to make more opium or sold it to Taliban who used it to make explosives. Who did they use those explosives against? It gets worse when it comes to resources though. Soldiers couldn’t throw batteries away because people would go through the trash, wire dead batteries together so they could make an IED, and detonate it. One soldier’s story I saw talked about a female soldier coming back after getting bodies out of vehicles that suffered an IED blast. He couldn’t help but think that was the fertilizer and batteries from the US that were put together to blow us up. We were fighting a (mostly) losing battle from all sides for so long. 

One more factor in all of this: Salt Pit, other black sites, and underground prisons. Mostly controlled and ran by the CIA, we took random Afghans and tortured them for information they never had.  Many detained Afghans had things like Bollywood films of women dancing in their possession. Most soldiers will tell you that they never found incriminating data on the phones of Afghan citizens, not even porn. Yes, some were associated with the Taliban or extremism, tortured for valuable information, and rightfully held in black sites. But, for those ones who were swooped up and brought in, how do you think that makes Afghanis feel? Afghans trusted us, we used them for their resources, for control, and then threw them away. The irony is if you are Team “Get out of the Middle East”, you are indirectly Team Taliban, ISIS, etc.  But the alternative is Team Stay Forever. We can’t do that. Every soldier can tell you this was a war of resources just as much (or more) as to get back for 9/11. Every soldier knew this was a lost war 10-15 years ago. We should have listened to the ones on the ground then and we should listen to them now.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

More about Brian:

A writer of mostly nonfiction poems, short stories, articles, and more who explores a wide range of topics. Like many writers, I have a blog called Good To You (doogotouy.com) and write for part therapy and part enjoyment. 

Evidence of a JFK Murder Conspiracy? The Dictabelt Recording of the Kennedy Assassination

While the Kennedy assassination occurred some fifty-eight years ago, the case still galvanizes the American public. There remains a constant fight over the release of records pertaining to the assassination from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), QAnon supporters gathered on November 22nd 2021 to await JFK and JFK Jr.’s return, and Oliver Stone is in the process of releasing a new (and quite factually inaccurate) documentary on the Kennedy assassination.

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy still very much remains in the public consciousness and stimulates the minds of many. While the amount of persons who believe Kennedy was assassinated by way of conspiracy has decreased substantially, still nearly 25% of the American public believes there was a conspiracy of sorts, either with the CIA, the Italian-American Mafia, Castro’s Cuba, or the U.S. Armed Forces playing a role.

And one of the most definitive items of proof that conspiracy theorists provide comes from the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations.

Alan Cunningham explains.

President John F. Kennedy just before his assassination in Dallas, Texas, Friday, November 22, 1963. Also in the photo are Jackie Kennedy, Texas Governor John Connally and his wife, Nellie.

The Findings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations

The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) was an eleven-man committee created in 1976 amidst the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committees and intended to investigate “not only the assassination of Kennedy, but also that of Martin Luther King, Jr.”. In the HSCA’s final 1979 report, the Committee found that “scientific acoustical evidence established a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John f. Kennedy” while stipulating that additional “scientific evidence did not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President”.

To quote more simply from Encyclopædia Britannica, “a Dictabelt audio recording made from a Dallas motorcycle policeman’s microphone that was said to provide evidence of four shots—that is, three by Oswald and a fourth by another shooter. That fourth shot, a miss, was thought to have come from the grassy knoll. As a result of this acoustic evidence, the HSCA concluded that there had been two shooters and that the assassination was likely the product of a conspiracy”.

Interestingly, this was the only real delineation the HSCA’s final report made from the Warren Commission, which had investigated the Kennedy assassination and submitted their final report over a decade before. To quote from Encyclopædia Britannica, “…the HSCA’s findings were largely in line with those of the Warren Commission (including the conclusion that a shot by Oswald had killed the president and that a single bullet had hit both Kennedy and Connally)... The committee also concluded that neither any U.S. security or intelligence agencies (including the CIA) nor the government of Cuba or the Soviet Union had been involved. It did not rule out the involvement of organized crime or anti-Castro groups, but it could not prove it”.

For the most part, the HSCA made only one demarcation from the original Warren Commission and it came in their analysis and acceptance of the Dictabelt recording.

The Evidence for a Second Shooter

On November 22, 1963, the day Kennedy was killed, a dictabelt recording was made. For those younger readers who may be less attuned to such devices, a dictabelt was an analog audio recording device, which came about in the late 1940s and predominantly was used to take dictation.

Essentially, the dictabelt would use “a stylus to emboss a groove into flexible plastic belt, the groove being much like the groove in a phonograph record”. This video here explains the Dictabelt in far greater detail.

On the day in question, a Dictabelt recording was made of all radio traffic coming from Dallas Police Radio Channel 1, the ordinary radio channel used by the Dallas Police Department. Channel 2 was reserved for special events, which the presidential motorcade would be classified as and was recorded using a different audio device. The audio recording lasts for roughly five and a half minutes and begins at 12:20 pm, a minute before the assassination took place. The full audio can be found here.

According to Vincent Bugliosi in his mammoth book on the Kennedy assassination Reclaiming History, “…two acoustics experts from Queens College in New York, Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy [claimed] based on their mathematical computations and a static-filled Dallas police Dictabelt recording…they were able to discern, from “impulse sounds” and “echo pattern predictions,” that there was a “95 percent or better” probability that the fourth shot was fired from the grassy knoll, and hence, a conspiracy”.

This evidence for the HSCA to claim that Kennedy was assassinated by way of a conspiracy came from these audio recordings and these audio recordings alone. Prior to this, the Committee was effectively going to conclude that Lee Harvey Oswald had committed the act alone and even developed a draft of their final report. Four members of the Committee, Representatives Harold Saywer (R-MI), Robert Edgar (D-PA), Samuel Devine (R-OH), dissented to the final report with Sawyer even stating that the final report was based on “supposition upon supposition upon supposition”.

With this new evidence, the Committee entered into their report that President Kennedy was assassinated by way of a conspiracy. Today, the vast majority of Americans forget that the HSCA also affirmed that a single bullet struck both Governor Connally and the President, that Oswald had fired that round, that no signatory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community nor a Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) was involved in the assassination; the only thing that anyone takes away from the HSCA’s final report is that there was a conspiracy to kill the President.

For example, in one of the most notable (and historically inaccurate) films ever made, Oliver Stone’s 1991 picture JFK, a final title scroll reads, “A Congressional investigation from 1976-1979 found a “probable conspiracy” in the assassination of John F. Kennedy and recommended the Justice Department investigate further” while also detailing that the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not further investigate.

Most people remember the headlines, not the rest of the story. However, what gets left out of this story is the continued investigation of the Dictabelt recording by members of the U.S. government, news journalists, and scientific research based Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The Problems with the Conspiracy Claim

Almost immediately, the HSCA’s claim was met with sharp criticism from a wide array of fields and experts.

The DOJ, in spite of Stone’s JFK claiming otherwise, did investigate, commissioning a study from the National Academy of Science (NAS), a non-profit and NGO focusing on the advancement of various scientific fields in the United States. A panel of twelve physicists with a wide array of practical and academic experience in the fields of astrophysics, atomic physics, astronomy, and nuclear physics analyzed the audio recording and released their final report to the DOJ and the public in 1982.

Quoting from the NAS report, the twelve-man panel found unequivocally, “…the acoustic analyses do not demonstrate that there was a grassy knoll shot, and in particular there is no acoustic basis for the claim of 95% probability of such a shot. The acoustic impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot and the motorcade had been instructed to go to the hospital. Therefore, reliable acoustic data do not support a conclusion that there was a second gunman”.

In the succeeding decades, additional information has come out placing further doubt on the credibility of the Dictabelt recording.

As briefly mentioned before, one of the best books on the Kennedy assassination is Vincent Bugliosi’s work Reclaiming History, a 1,000+ page work that was an over twenty-year endeavor documenting the assassination, the Warren Commission investigation, and the many conspiracies that have arisen in the over fifty years since the event. Bugliosi mentions the Dictabelt at various points and, in many cases, interviews persons with extensive knowledge of the recording.

Bugliosi writes how the DOJ also conducted their own investigation into the audio, building off of the NAS’ report and, in 1988, disclosed to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary that they disagreed with the HSCA on the charge of a conspiracy. He also found that the FBI’s Technical Services Division completed their own report on the recording in 1980 and reached the conclusion that the Committee could not conclusively prove that the sounds heard on the recording were gunshots or even came from Dealey Plaza.

Bugliosi also interviewed the Dallas police officer who was allegedly driving the motorcycle from which the recording came from, H.B. McLain. McLain had testified to the Commission that his own radio had been stuck in the “on” position, allowing the audio to be recorded, yet had done so without listening to the audio in question.

Hearing the recording later, McLain informed Bugliosi that the recording’s movements did not match his own actions on November 22nd (McLain followed the presidential motorcade the entire time from Dealey Plaza to Parkland Hospital with sirens on the entire time while the recording appears to have sirens simply passing by). McLain also claimed that the motorcycle’s engine from the recording was from a three-wheeled motorcycle while he only ever drove a two-wheeled motorcycle.

Other discrepancies within the audio can be heard, such as noise from the crowd never being heard on the recording in spite of the fact that hundreds had come out to see Kennedy’s motorcade in Dallas and were making raucous noise throughout the procession.

In 2001, a rather important development occurred that, to some, seemed to vindicate the HSCA. Publishing in the peer-reviewed journal Science & Justice, Dr. Donald B. Thomas, an independent researcher of the Kennedy assassination and a research entomologist with the USDA’s Agriculture Research Service, claimed that the NAS study was flawed and that the HSCA’s original conclusion was in fact accurate. He writes, “The validity of acoustic evidence for a gunshot from the ‘Grassy Knoll’ was challenged on statistical grounds and on the basis of an anomaly on the Dallas police recordings. However, the assumptions underlying those criticisms were not in accord with evidence overlooked by the review panel. With a rigorous statistical analysis one arrives at a calculation for the probability that the recording contains a random pattern which by chance resembled the acoustic signature of a gunshot from the Grassy Knoll”.

This journal article prompted a re-investigation of the Dictabelt recording by various authorities and persons.

In 2003, multiple investigations were performed. Court TV commissioned an analysis by the signal analysis firm Sensimetrics, Inc. for a November episode of their program Forensic Files which “concluded that there is no valid evidence for gunshots on the Dallas Police Department (hereinafter DPD) recordings… the match between the suspect sound pattern on the DPD recording and a test shot fired from the grassy knoll, was no greater than expected to occur by chance”. After the episode premiered, Thomas wrote an article aiming to rebut the conclusions made by Sensimetrics and Court TV.

Also in 2003, Peter Jennings of ABC News, for the program Peter Jennings Reporting, analyzed the Dictabelt recording and came to the conclusion that the sounds recorded on the Dictabelt could not have come from Dealey Plaza and that H.B. McLain could not have been the originator of the recording as he had yet to enter the Plaza with the rest of the presidential motorcade. The reporting in this documentary also won the Edward R. Murrow Award for News Documentary in 2004.

Interestingly, some independent researchers have criticized both the NAS report and Thomas’ conclusions. Michael O’Dell, writing for The Kennedy Assassination blog in 2003 (the personal project of Associate Professor John Charles McAdams of Marquette University), concluded that the timeline both Thomas and the NAS relied upon was faulty while also finding that original claim of a “95 percent or better” probability that a shot came from the Grassy Knoll was logically unsound. In spite of this inaccuracy on the part of the NAS, O’Dell notes that, “Although the [NAS’] timeline is inaccurate, mostly due to the misunderstanding about the Audograph mechanics and missing the skips, the corrected timeline still supports their conclusionthat the impulses occurred after the shooting”.

Perhaps most significantly, many of the original investigators from the twelve-panel NAS report published their own article in response to Thomas’. In 2005, publishing in Science & Justice as well, five of the original twelve wrote, “We affirm the NRC conclusion “that the impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot and the motorcade had been instructed to go to the hospital.” We also show that if, instead, the HOLD synchronization is ignored and the “YOU . . . Stemmons” synchronization is used, the first sounds alleged to be from shots occur at least 30 s after the assassination” while also noting that Thomas’ analysis utilized “erroneous parts of the Committee’s analysis of the Bowles recordings and combined it with an erroneous implicit assumption…”.

Despite this, debate still raged on. In 2013, Professor Larry J. Sabato, Director of the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics and a Professor of Politics, commissioned an analysis of the Dictabelt recording, coming nearly fifty years after the assassination.

Utilizing various improvements in acoustical analysis and digital methods, Sabato’s commissioned team from Sonalysts, Inc. came to the overall conclusion “The evidence obtained suggests that the motorcycle was not part of the motorcade and therefore was not in a position to record the sounds of gunfire”. Expanding upon this in their conclusion, the team states, “These data uniformly indicate that the motorcycle with the open microphone was not part of the motorcade. Therefore, it is unlikely that the motorcycle was in a position to record the sounds of gunfire. Based on these observations, we conclude that the Dictabelt recording is not applicable to the identification of assassination gunfire”.

Conclusion

The Dictabelt recording has been analyzed again and again and again. Repeatedly, it has been shown that the Dictabelt recording has been inaccurate and scientifically incapable of proving a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. There are far too many inconsistencies for it to be utilized in any kind of argument. In fact, in 1986, there was a televised criminal trial put on by London Weekend Television in which Lee Harvey Oswald was tried for the murder of President Kennedy; Vincent Bugliosi played the role of the prosecutor (which would later inspire him to write the book Reclaiming History) and Wyoming based criminal defense attorney Gerry Spence representing Oswald.

Throughout the entire trial, Spence never once brought up the Dictabelt recording, as even he knew that utilizing this would damage his client’s case. This was even before the DOJ’s 1988 report in addition to the various scientific and investigative analyses performed with more advanced equipment in the 21st century. This to me is quite telling as Spence either knew the Texas jury would not be swayed by such evidence or would have no significant basis in having his client be freed.

To put it simply, the Dictabelt recording has been proven to have far too many inconsistencies for a criminal trial or for usage in determining the surrounding aspects of the assassination. Furthermore, even when combined with all of the additional forensic, documentary, eyewitness, and ballistic evidence the end result is the same; the only logically valid conclusion is that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting on his own, assassinated the President from the Texas Schoolbook Depository.

Various government commissions and committees, federal agencies, journalists, and historians have never been able to link a U.S. federal intelligence or law enforcement agency, the Italian-American mafia, the Johnson administration, Castro’s Cuba, the Soviet Union, or the U.S. Armed Forces to the assassination beyond circumstantial evidence. There has never been any conclusive, indisputable evidence put forth that shows a conspiracy or identifies another shooter or rifle used in the assassination.

The HSCA’s final report was written with the best of intentions, to examine the subject fully and try to either verify or refute the claims made by the Warren Commission. In the end, due to sensationalist and baselessly conspiratorial forces like Mark Lane, Oliver Stone, and L. Fletcher Prouty, the American public has gained a severely misinformed view of the assassination, which continues to cause problems for society and politics.

What do you think of the dictabelt recordings? Let us know below.

US Cold War Propaganda: The CIA's Ship for Radio Broadcasts to Albania in the Early Cold War - Part 1

The US had a variety of ways to influence citizens behind the ‘iron curtain’ during the Cold War. One of those was radio broadcasts. Here, Richard Cummings, author of a recent book Cold War Frequencies (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explains how the CIA got a vessel ready to broadcast in Albania in the early 1950s.

A 1980s Radio Tirana badge. Source: Rugxula, available here.

The best-laid schemes of mice and men

Go often askew,

And leave us nothing but grief and pain,

For promised joy!

From the Poem by Robert Burns, in modern English.

Introduction

The Voice of America began broadcasting to Albania in May 1943; the broadcasts were interrupted in 1945 and resumed in May 1951. Radio Free Europe began broadcasting from Munich on June 1, 1951 and stopped on September 30, 1953.

The June 30, 1953, report from the President's Committee on International Information Activities defined early Cold War white, gray, and black shortwave radio broadcasts as: 

·       White -- The first type consists of broadcasts made in the name of the American Government, such as the Voice of America programs, or by an overtly supported station such as RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)

·       Gray -- The second type includes broadcasts by stations that are overtly supported by unofficial American organizations but to which the Government gives covert financial Support. Such stations are Radio Liberation, supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., which now broadcasts to Soviet occupation troops in Germany and Austria and selected areas in the Soviet Union; Radio Free Europe (RFE), supported by the National Committee for a Free Europe, which broadcasts to the Soviet satellites; and until recently Radio Free Asia (RFA), supported by the Committee for Free Asia, which has now ceased broadcasts to Communist China

·       Black -- The last, or black, the category includes CIA-supported clandestine stations, which purported to speak for groups inside the satellite countries

In the late 1940s, the United States decided to stem Soviet underground subversive operations and create a new clandestine agency. This would have to be a new organization not to operate against the established clandestine collection of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks already assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). On June 18, 1948, the US National Security Council (NSC) directed that the task of confrontation with the Soviet Union clandestinely to a new Office of Special Projects – the name was changed later to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).

The NSC directive gave OPC,  "A loose charter to undertake the full range of covert activities incident to the conduct of secret political, psychological, and economic warfare together with direct preventive action (paramilitary activities)-all within the policy direction of the Departments of State and Defense." In October 1949, OPC planned to use a "sea-borne broadcast transmitter" to transmit recorded programs inland with "live spot" announcements.

Albania

It was planned to use a 1000-watt, medium wave transmitter to reach the largest audience in Albania by using a strong enough signal to overpower Radio Tirana's frequency: "It has been agreed that these broadcasts shall be based, for various technical, security, and political reasons, on a ship to cruise in and around the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. [T]his vessel with minor modifications can be converted into a floating broadcasting station capable of sending medium wave broadcasts into all points in Albania. It will be operated in a 100-mile arc at the end of a 300-mile radius from the farthest point to be covered in the country."

The decision to use a vessel carrying a medium wave transmitter was that there were, at that time, no OPC land-based transmitters in Italy or Greece. Medium wave broadcasts were chosen because of an estimate that of the approximately 50,000 radios in Albania, between 30,000 and 37,500 were medium-wave sets.  It was also estimated that 10,000 to 12,000 shortwave radios receivers were in Albania, owned mainly by Communist officials.

The idea was that the boat would be purchased in Britain. In November 1949, four prospective vessels were located, with one finally identified as being suitable enough for the operation. The cost of buying this vessel was $56,000 (circa $560,000 in 2021) and OPC was to pay for it. The British Intelligence Service (SIS) was to:

·       provide cover for the purchase, refit, and extended operation, plus

·       arrange for the transfer of the vessel's title and conceal the ownership through a cover owner

SIS was also to provide the crew and costs of refitting the boat for broadcasting and the operating costs were to be divided "fifty-fifty."

For some unknown reason, this project was not jointly pursued. In April 1950, OPC, using the outline of the British plan for Albania code-name VALUABLE, decided to seek a vessel in the United States to be put into operational use in August 1950.  The project was given the cryptonym BGSPEED, a subproject of the OPC Albanian country plan BGFIEND: "A country project to select, train, and infiltrate indigenous agents into Albania to effect and support resistance activities for the purpose of overthrowing the Communist-controlled government in Tirana." 

The requirements for this vessel included:

·       Ability to support a propaganda staff of five men in addition to a full complement of the crew

·       Ability to carry sufficient water, fuel, and food to remain on the station of the heel of Italy for at least twelve consecutive days with a full complement aboard, between return trips to Athens, Greece

·       Sufficient stock of engine parts and spares aboard to operate overseas independently for one year

·       Sufficient space aboard to permit installation of radio equipment and one compartment to be used as a recording and broadcasting studio

OPC decided to use a "yacht-type vessel" because it was:

a.     The more suitable for reasons of the flexibility of operation

b.     Private cover potentialities as viewed against commercial cover

c.      Height of masts in relationship to size for the accommodation of the radio broadcast antennae

The vessel

By May 1950, two yacht brokers were asked to locate an appropriate vessel. Three yachts were identified: one was in Acapulco, Mexico, one in Miami, Florida, and one in Gloucester, Massachusetts. OPC then used a cleared "cutout" for the purchase of the yacht.  The man already owned two yachts and bought and sold yachts for years.

The "cutout" was to be financed by OPC, receive the title to the yacht and deliver it to the Smith Boat Yard in Baltimore, Maryland, for refitting and conversion to include "decking, placing of copper sheathing on the hull, …broadcast studio, and other repairs necessary for extended operations."  The "cutout "owner then was to transfer the vessel to Panamanian registration. With an OPC security clearance, a Panamanian-licensed master named Leslie Holmes would then choose the crew. $150,000 ($1,500,000 in 2021)was budgeted for the purchase. 

After inspection of two of the vessels, the "motor sail /ketch" IRMAY was chosen as the most "adaptable from the point of view of broadcast requirements, maneuverability, accommodations for the crew and staff and can be outfitted in the least time and expense." The IRMAY was purchased for $80,000 (circa $880,000 equivalent in 2021).

The captain of the IRMAY and crew were experienced and reportedly were involved in several scientific expeditions in the Caribbean and South America.

The operational cover included the chartering of the vessel to a non-existent "Institute"-- the Marine Biological Research Institute (MBRI), Inc, which was incorporated in Maryland as a non-profit organization engaged in research of Marine biology. The Charter included in the articles of incorporation was:

To promote generally the accumulation, analysis, and dissemination of scientific knowledge in the field of Marine Biology by undertaking, sponsoring, participating in studies, research projects, and field expeditions in any part of the world – making loans and gifts for such purposes – and to make such knowledge available through articles, lectures, books, letters, motion pictures, etc. 

Four Directors of the "Institute" were listed, three of whom were pseudonyms.

Funding came from a "fictitious person purportedly of eccentric habits and keenly interested in this field of science." In reality, OPC's finance office sent a cashier's check to a Baltimore bank. Other cover activities included the printing of the letterheads, issue of bona fide stock to the Directors, chartering of the vessel (including the actual transfer of funds", and the establishment of a bank account in Baltimore for "Mediterranean Marine," through which funds to pay personnel aboard and to operate the vessel would be transferred regularly to a bank account. OPC hired a part-time trusted bookkeeper to keep "double-entry bookkeeping of both the overt and covert expenses.

The "Institute" also made a letter of endorsement to the Chief OPC officer on board the vessel, indicating that he was employed in "scientific explorations in the Mediterranean." 

Approval & Set-up

OPC Assistant Director for Policy Coordination Frank Wisner approved the project on June 14, 1950. However, he wrote this handwritten comment on the cover sheet: "This project has been approved, with much trepidation… I have seen this kind of thing tried twice during the last war with eventual project abandonment in each instance."

Final arrangements for the cover "Institute" were made. A lawyer in Baltimore was cleared to set up the articles of incorporation in the State of Maryland.  His office was listed as the official address of the "Institute" for any correspondence. Four Directors of the "Institute" were listed, three of whom were pseudonyms. The printing of the letterheads, issue of bona fide stock to the Directors, chartering of the vessel (including the actual transfer of funds", and the establishment of a bank account in Baltimore for "Mediterranean Marine," through which funds to pay personnel aboard and to operate the vessel would be transferred regularly to a bank account.

In June 1950, a joint Bulgarian-Albanian propaganda center was set up in Athens, Greece. The Albanian broadcasts were to be prepared there, based on a joint propaganda policy-directive approved with the British. However, the British were not involved on the operational level. One of the Athens central radio stations would transmit to the vessel a daily teletype broadcast of the next day's program. Spot broadcasts would be transcribed on the boat.

The IRMAY left Baltimore for Miami, Florida, in December 1950 with OPC engineering personnel on board. There were tests conducted of the medium (sky-wave) transmissions on the way. Rough seas off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, seasickness, and mechanical problems ensued, but the tests were generally positive. The conclusion: "It can be seen that there are no technical radio factors which might limit the effectiveness of BGGIEND project as originally planned."

While in Miami, Captain Holmes made an unknown security violation. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) became aware of the OPC connection to the IRMAY. The Miami office of the Bureau of Customs wanted to inspect the vessel, but OPC contacted the Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Customs with the request to stop the inspection. ADPC Frank Wisner sent a message to Navy Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens giving some details of the BGSPEED operation. Admiral Stevens, coincidently, would later become President of the American Committee for the Liberation of Bolshevism – the parent organization for Radio Liberty. Wisner promised Stevens and the Bureau of Customs that any future operations having any bearing on those agencies would be advised by OPC.

OPC decided to let Captain Holmes continue to hold his position until the first port of call in Europe when he would be replaced and returned to the United States, possibly to face prosecution.

In St. Thomas, American Virgin Islands, the name of the yacht was changed to "JUANITA," and the registry changed from the United States to Panama. JUANITA departed from Barbados on February 1, 1951, for Europe and arrived in Patras, Greece, on March 25, 1951.

What could go wrong?  A lot…

This article is based on Chapter 5 of Richard’s book: Cold War Frequencies: CIA Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, published in 2021 by McFarland & Co. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Now read part 2 on what happened during the catastrophic mission in Europe here.

The Paraguayan President who Brought his Country to Military Catastrophe – Part 3: Devastating Battles for Both Sides

Francisco Solano Lopez was president of Paraguay from 1862 to 1870. He led the country during one of the most devastating defeats in all history – the War of the Triple Alliance. Here, Erick Redington continues this fascinating series by looking at the events in the War of the Triple Alliance, including the Battle of Tuyutí and the Battle of Curupayty.

If you missed it you can read part 1 on the early life of Francisco Solano Lopez here and part 2 on the start of the War of the Triple Alliance here.

A depiction of the Battle of Curupayty.

With Marshal Lopez's advance into Corrientes stunted, he knew that pushing all the way to Uruguay was no longer possible. He had achieved much by aggressively invading the Allied Powers. Their armies had been thrown back on their heels, causing increased dissention between the Brazilians and Argentinians, Lopez's only real hope of victory. A wealth of materiel was captured by the Marshal's army aiding the war effort immensely. The small Paraguayan industrial base would have difficulty throughout the war supplying the army with the materiel it needed to fight. The small Paraguayan nation was proving itself to be very dangerous to its larger neighbors. To some, Lopez looked brilliant. To no one more so than the Marshal himself. 

The Allies knew they would have to control the rivers in order to maintain their supply chain. The first Allied target was Humaitá, called the "Gibraltar of South America." They knew that as long as the fortress held out, they would not be able to advance further into Paraguay and take the capital, Asuncion. The Marshal knew this as well. He was determined to use every effort to defend the fort. But he knew that Humaitá needed further reinforcing. Therefore, the best strategy would be to delay the Allies as long as possible in order to improve the fortifications. In the process, the Allies would further bleed, and potentially, greater dissention would grow between the Brazilians and Argentinians. 

The Marshal also knew that Argentina was fragile at this time. President Mitre had assumed office only a few years before, after yet another civil war. Lopez knew that there were many elements within Argentina who were very sympathetic to him and were perfectly happy to see Marshal Lopez create a strong Paraguay. To these Argentinians, Paraguay was the wrong enemy at the wrong time. The right enemy would always be Brazil. The war would be used throughout as a weapon to attack those in power in Argentina. President Mitre himself was tired of the condescension with which he was treated by the Brazilian officers. They saw him as just another caudillo in a long string of caudillos ruling Argentina. The Marshal hoped that if he could inflict a few further defeats on the Allies, one or both would be willing to come to the peace table and Lopez could get a peace he could live with, rather than the partition and exile that the Treaty of the Triple Alliance called for.

The Marshal Counters

The Brazilian naval commander, Baron Tamandaré would use his fleet to advance further up the river system to allow the Allies to invade Humaitá. When the Allies made a landing at the town of Riachuelo, Lopez sensed an opportunity. The Marshal was not a man to sit back and just take what was coming, so he ordered his fleet to attack the Brazilians. The Paraguayan navy was heavily outnumbered.  The Brazilians had better armored ships with more guns. None of this mattered. What mattered was élan. Lopez would fling his navy in a night attack against the Brazilian fleet and in one brilliant move end the threat of an Allied offensive by having his sailors board the Brazilian ships under the cover of darkness, capture them, and then sail the new prizes back up the river to reinforce the Paraguayan fleet.

Of course, this is not what happened. The ships arrived after sunrise. The Paraguayan commander ordered his ships to pass the Brazilian ships and fire on the ground troops. The Paraguayans would lose more ships and have to retreat upriver. It was a disaster for the Paraguayan navy. Marshal Lopez impetuously ordered his fleet to attack an enemy that heavily outnumbered him with a confusing and frankly ridiculous battle plan to not only defeat the Brazilians but also augment his own fleet. Why did he do this? As we have seen, it was in the nature of the man to take risks and wager everything on bold, Napoleonic, plans. As someone who believed he was a military genius, he believed his plans could work. As a brutal dictator in charge of a police state, no one was brave or foolhardy enough to tell him otherwise. Due to this, a sizable part of the Paraguayan fleet that could have been used in the defense of Humaitá was lost, and future defenses were weakened.

By 1866, the Allies were finally prepared to begin what they saw as the war-winning offensive. The Allies crossed the Paraná River and entered Paraguay. The Marshal was a believer in the offensive-defensive strategy. He did not make a general, theater-wide offensive, but he began launching localized counterattacks to make the Allies keep their guard up and slow their advance. This was in keeping with the Marshal's character, but it was also the sound military move. The Marshal knew this would be a war of attrition. He had to make the Allies bleed. He needed to cause further dissention. Passively waiting to be strangled would only lead to being strangled. He had to fight. 

The local counterattacks, while not leading to battlefield victories, worked their intended purpose. The Paraguayans were able to slow down the Allies, stopping their advance at Estero Bellaco for a time. The Marshal began to grow more confident. He had been mostly successful in his strategy so far. With his increasing confidence grew his willingness to gamble. He now began to envision knocking out the Allied army with one decisive blow. When the Allies began advancing again, Lopez decided to strike the blow. The bloodiest battle in the history of South America began, the Battle of Tuyutí.

Tuyutí

With the Brazilians on the left, the Uruguayans in the center and the Argentines on the right, the Allies were drawn up in a flat, swampy area. The Marshal decided to focus his attacks on the Brazilians and the Uruguayans. Lopez had a very low opinion of Brazilians, and the Uruguayans were the smallest contingent. Initially, the Paraguayans made gains, however the Brazilian artillery would seal the fate of the Paraguayan army, and the Allies came away with the victory. The importance of the victory was not that the Allies won the battle, but that it had been so deadly.

Statistics from the Paraguayan army at this time are problematic at best. Due to the dictatorial nature of the country, and the importance that Lopez placed on propaganda, reported casualty figures from the Paraguayans can be taken sometimes with a grain of salt. The best estimates for battlefield losses were 6,000 dead and 7,000 wounded out of an army of about 25,000 men. The Allies lost over 5,000 men out of about 35,000. For the Allies, the losses were terrible, though replaceable. For the Paraguayans, this was a national catastrophe. Based upon prewar population, the losses in this battle represented over 3% of the people in the entire country. These men represented the cream of the large pre-war army the Marshal had accumulated and led into Argentina and Brazil. His army would never recover. Never again would the Marshal order a mass attack on the Allies. 

With victory comes overconfidence. The Allies, having achieved a major victory now began to advance more rapidly against the Marshal. Where other men would draw back in the aftermath of such a catastrophic defeat, Lopez was as defiant as ever. The Paraguayan army would go on to defend itself well against Allied advances. However, at the Battle of Curuzu, the Paraguayans were defeated again and finally Marshal Lopez was growing concerned. He decided to try a different tack, one which he had not utilized so far: diplomacy.

The Marshal Tries Diplomacy     

With the Allies on the move, and getting closer to Humaitá, the Marshal hoped to capitalize on the war-weariness of his opponents. He unexpectedly invited the Allied leaders to a conference to try to end the war. The Brazilians wanted nothing to do with this conference and refused to negotiate with the Marshal. President Mitre, however, decided to meet his enemy. For Mitre, beset by political opposition at home, facing rebellion in outlying provinces, and weary over his own conduct of the campaign (he was supreme Allied army commander, after all), Mitre wanted to find a way to end the war. For Lopez, this represented a wonderful opportunity. Despite his reputation as an insane warmonger, it was said that in person the Marshal could be very charming and a great conversationalist. He was very well read and quick-minded. For Lopez, this was finally his chance to divide the Allies, get Argentina to leave the war, and then take on the enemy he hated, the Brazilians. And he failed miserably. 

Accounts of the meeting vary, with some saying that the conversation was amicable, and others saying the two men got into an argument. Either way the conference was a failure. President Mitre told President Lopez of his determination to abide by all clauses of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. This included the article demanding the removal of the Marshal from power before any peace could be had. Lopez could have agreed and lived a comfortable life in exile in Europe or North America. Instead, he refused. He would fight on to the bitter end. And that is exactly what would happen. No peace, but war, war to the knife.

After the failure of the conference, Mitre decided to restart the offensive and attempt to deal the killer blow, reach Humaitá, and from there to Asunción. The invasion of Paraguay was on. The Allied army approached the Paraguayan army entrenched at Curupayty. The Paraguayans had used the truce to improve their fortifications and build further defenses. They had brought in artillery and reinforced the trenches. The Paraguayans only numbered about 5,000 men, a quarter of the advancing Allied force. In their confidence after Tuyutí, many in the Allied camp believed the Paraguayans were on their last legs and ready to fall apart. This overconfidence led to Mitre preparing a battle plan whereby the Brazilian navy would shell the Paraguayans from the river, and once softened up, the Allies would launch a grand assault to rout the enemy. Once the fleet had finished the bombardment, Mitre ordered the men in. 

The Battle of Curupayty can be likened to other thoughtless slaughters like Cold Harbor or the Somme. Allied troops went in and were massacred. The Paraguayans only lost about 50 men in the battle. The Allies, however, lost about 9,000, according to the best estimates. It was a shocking and devastating loss, but it could have been worse for the Allies. The commander of the Paraguayan army was not Marshal Lopez. He would never expose himself to battlefield danger. That was not his way. The field commander was General José Diaz, a good commander in his own right, but he operated within the Paraguayan system of nothing is done without the dictator's permission. Even considering the casualties, the Paraguayans were still outnumbered and outgunned, but they had morale on their side. If they had counterattacked and pursued the Allies, a decisive, perhaps war turning victory could have been achieved. Diaz was not stupid. He was not going to take the initiative and incur the wrath of the Marshal. The Allies were allowed to withdraw back to their entrenchments. Here the war would sit for longer than any of the participants had anticipated. For the Allies Humaitá would have to wait. Recovery from the embarrassment of Curupayty would take far longer than anyone expected. They had much bigger problems at hand.

On the Pale Horse

Part of the original defense plan of Marshal Lopez was utilizing the geography of Paraguay to slow the Allies. Much of the country is located in tropical, low-lying swamps. These swamps bred interminable swarms of mosquitos and other insects. The mosquito was, and still is, a primary vector to transport infectious disease from person to person. For the Paraguayan troops, malnourished and under equipped, disease was a fact of life. For the Marshal, there was no ability to import medical supplies. The traditional Paraguayan cure-all for everything was yerba mate, which was obviously ineffective against infectious disease. Every man lost to disease was a man out of the gun line for the Marshal. There was very little he could do to stop the epidemics though. 

With the defeat at Curupayty, the Allies needed to rest and regroup before another advance. Camp life at this time was dull and unsanitary. Given the geography of the area the Allies found themselves, and the filth of the camps, it is no surprise that epidemics began amongst the Allied troops. Dysentery, cholera, and yellow fever were some of the worst. The conditions in the camps, coupled with the terrible defeat the Allies had taken, would lead to much needed changes within the Allied army, but this was small comfort to those who had been stricken.

Out With the Old…

After Curupayty, the squabbling between the Brazilians and Argentinians only grew worse. The Allied field commander, President Mitre, was called a bungler for directing one of the most lopsided losses in modern military history. Mitre was not happy either. He was growing tired of field service. Rebellions were breaking out against his rule in the outer provinces of Argentina. Many within his own government wanted peace. He believed in the necessity of the war still, but he did not believe that he would be the man to lead it. In January 1868, Mitre would leave his army and return to Buenos Aires.

Also out at this time was the President of Uruguay, Venancio Flores. He was also worn down with campaigning and would leave the army. His term as president was ending anyway, and he was to turn over his powers to a new leader from his Colorado Party. He would be assassinated four days after leaving office. The crime was never solved. 

For Marshal Lopez, these changes symbolized a weakening of his enemies' resolve to make war on him. What he did not know was that with Argentina mostly out of the war, and Uruguay effectively out of the war, the Allies would finally have solved the one major disadvantage they suffered through compared to the Paraguayans: unity of command. And that unity would come in the form of Luís Alves de Lima e Silva, the Marquis de Caxias.

What do you think of the devastating battle for Paraguay and then the Allies? Let us know below.

Now read part 4 on the end of the War of the Triple Alliance here.

References

Saeger, James Schofield. 2007. Francisco Solano Lopez and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, Volume 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2005. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Edited by Hendrick Kraay. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2017. The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866-70. University of Calgary Press.