In perhaps the pivotal moment of the Civil War, on July 3 at 1 pm, about 12,000 men charged across a field about a mile in length and were cut down in an extraordinary artillery barrage. The infantry attack was named after Confederate General George Pickett, who led the charge of his division from the south portion of the field. Generals Pettigrew and Trimble also led their divisions in the charge from the northern part of the field. These divisions advanced toward the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, encountering fierce resistance in the form of intense artillery and rifle fire from Union troops strategically placed on higher ground.. Only men from Pickett’s division made it to the Angle and pierced the Union line; Pettigrew and Trimble never crossed the Emmitsburg Pike.
Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened during Pickett’s Charge.
If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here, and part 4 on Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field here.
Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg.
Meade Staff Meeting
Late in the evening of July 2nd,, General Meade held a council of war to decide what should be done after two days of intense warfare. Probably Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. His senior staff officers and corps commanders concurred that, despite the significant losses suffered by the army, the most prudent course of action was to maintain their current position and await the enemy's attack. As the meeting ended, Meade took aside Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command of the II Corps, and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed and if he concludes to try it again, it will be on our center."
Lee’s Plan
In contrast, General Lee did not convene a similar council of war, and his subsequent reports indicate that no alternative course of action was seriously considered. General Lee had intended for an early morning assault to coincide with the attack on Culp's Hill, but the arrival of Pickett's forces was delayed. The reasons behind this delay have been a topic of debate among historians ever since, and it remains a point of contention.
Longstreet’s intent to try a flank attack further around the Union right was immediately denied by Lee that morning, who insisted on an infantry attack on the Union center. Longstreet considered the attack unlikely to succeed, and according to his memoirs, he told Lee so in the moment. His reluctance to order Pickett’s Charge is one of the most renowned anecdotes of the Civil War. His memoirs describe that he told Lee: “General,” said Longstreet, “I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.” His reluctance and doubt have reverberated in history.
Pre-Attack Bombardment
The July 3 bombardment before Pickett’s Charge was the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for one hour, starting around 1 p.m. The Confederate artillery, numbering between 150 to 170 guns, unleashed a barrage along a two-mile line, aiming to weaken the Union defenses and silence their artillery. The cannonade is believed to be the most intense artillery attack in history up to that moment. Despite the massive scale of the bombardment, its impact was limited.
The Confederate guns inflicted some damage on the Union batteries, but they largely overshot their targets. Part of the reason the Confederate bombardment was ineffective was that Confederate artillerymen missed their marks due to poor visibility from the smoke on the battlefield. July 3, 1863, was an extremely hot, windless day and the smoke from the guns hid the lines from the Confederate gunners, who thus could not adjust their range. The smoke from the firing hung low over the battlefield during the summer heat so no one could see what the effect on the defense line was and to make adjustments. Another factor was that It was usual to aim over the heads of the enemy so the explosion would maximize the shrapnel below. Further, at Cemetery Ridge, the line was very narrow, so there was little room for error. For these reasons most of the shells sailed over the heads of the line into the rear, causing mostly unimportant damage.
Fuses. But the most significant problem was that the fuses used burned longer than expected. The fuses used were not the usual ones; these had an extra second burn before detonating. The reason for this originated in a fire in the Richmond arsenal producing the fuses. An explosion in Richmond Harbor in April 1863 blew up the fuse manufacturing area, which led to a deficiency of the usual artillery fuses, so replacement ones had to be used from ordnance supplies manufactured in Selma and Charleston. These new fuses took 1 second longer than what the artillery commanders were used to, delaying detonation.
The Bormann fuse was the most common fuse used on smoothbore field artillery ammunition during the war. Both sides used this design. Bormann fuses were notoriously unreliable and were often replaced with copper fuse adaptors to accept the standard paper time fuse. The Confederates adopted the Bormann fuse, a mechanical fuse, in 1861 and immediately began having problems.
The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target. Today, manufactured products are tested for effectiveness before they are sent to the supplier. After Gettysburg, Lt James Dinwiddie working for the Ordnance Dept investigated the fuses and it was found that they contained a resin filler that would soften and mix with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July. The filler mixing with the powder was the cause of the longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells.
The CSA artillerymen had no idea that there was a problem with the fuses coming out of Selma and Charleston that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond. The design modification was intended to make the fuses burn slower, but no one had informed the Confederate artillery commanders.
A week after the battle, tests were conducted on the various fuses supplied from around the Confederacy at the Richmond Laboratories. The findings showed that those fuses in shells intended to explode over the Federal position at Gettysburg ranged anywhere from 150 to 200 yards further to the rear before exploding. A 4-inch fuse would burn at the rate as a Richmond fuse one cut to 5 inches. Why this product testing wasn’t carried out sooner isn’t known.
The Confederate Artillery: Organization and Position
Focusing on the Confederate artillery positioning, the Confederate cannons are placed in a wide perimeter. While those focused on Culps Hill make sense, you will note how many batteries are placed north and northwest of town where no troops are going to charge. Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. Thus, Alexander had to organize his artillery without other help. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.
The Confederate officer responsible for this configuration was Lee's artillery chief, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. Although he was Lee’s friend, his major contribution to Pickett’s Charge was to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the two corps besides Longstreet. The responsibility for the artillery cannonade to start the charge was given to Longstreet’s Corps Artillery chief, the outstanding young artillerist, Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who had effective command of the field.
Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective. When Lee reorganized after Chancellorsville and Jackson’s mortal wounding, creating 3 Corps instead of 2, the army’s reserve artillery was disbanded and its batteries reassigned to the infantry corps. This provided each corps with five artillery battalions and the flexibility of assigning battalions to the infantry divisions or keeping them under corps command. This seemingly trivial command structure change had huge implications on July 3rd.
Note that the Confederate configuration is based on the corps location. The artillery stayed with their commander. The Union placement is based on intuitive defense. Aside from the command arrangement, geography factored in: the Confederates were occupying a wider area and many of their artillery placements were based on the needs of the previous two days and what grounds they had suitable for artillery placement.
Alexander did not have full confidence that all the enemy's guns were silenced and that the Confederate ammunition was almost exhausted. Longstreet ordered Alexander to stop Pickett, but the young colonel explained that replenishing his ammunition from the trains in the rear would take over an hour, and this delay would nullify any advantage the previous barrage had given them. The infantry assault went forward without the Confederate artillery close support that had been originally planned. When the Union artillery died down, General Alexander believed that the time to charge had arrived.
The Union Artillery Organization and Position
Were it not for General Henry J Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, the Union might have lost the battle and perhaps the war.
Before the war, General Hunt was a member of a team that had revised the drill and tactics for the artillery arm of the US Army. He was the lead proponent of a radical organization concept: instead of allowing artillery batteries to be commanded by the infantry command, where they were used only to protect troops, he proposed strategic control by artillery commanders. The idea was that artillery could do much more than protect: they could attack, both on offense and defense.
On the morning of July 3, while inspecting the Union lines, he found an elevated vantage point from which he observed something whose importance only an expert in artillery tactics would grasp: the Rebel batteries were forming in line or going into position along a line that stretched from the Peach Orchard to the edge of town to the north. He alone knew what that meant. He also observed hurried activity in the Confederate infantry lines.
General Hunt understood that these were signs of an impending enormous attack. And, he knew from Colonel Sharpe of BMI that General Pickett commanded a division that had not yet seen action. Convinced that a massive infantry assault was imminent, Hunt rode back along the Union position, directing his battery commanders to reserve fire and avoid an artillery duel, which would simply exhaust the ammunition supply before the infantry’s appearance.
He lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire. His idea was to create enfilading fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long-distance firing.
But Pendleton ran out of ammunition; Longstreet inquired if this should delay the attack, but Pendleton’s supply wagons would have required over an hour delay, by which time all of the firing benefits from the bombardment already undertaken would have been lost.
Hunt, the best-known artillerist of his day, had argued for years that a single commander of artillery should be in charge. The Confederates never accepted Hunt’s command ideas, so each division and regiment had their own artillery under the division leader’s command. Hunt had full authority over his army's artillery while the ANV's artillery was directed by the three corps artillery chiefs (note- Alexander at this time was not the 1st corps artillery chief, he was technically just a battalion commander. Putting him in charge of the bombardment was a huge breach of protocol).
This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.
Next, he ordered the last four batteries of the artillery reserve to start moving toward the Union battle line. He arranged his lines of fire from the sides of the line to aim toward the center, creating crossfire and plunging fire lanes. And he insisted that the batteries hold their fire when the Confederate batteries began their barrage – to conserve ammunition for what he knew was coming. And, he could so order, despite General Hancock ordering them to fire because he was the artillery commander independent of the Infantry. His theory of command was proven in practice.
He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition, but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long distance firing. The diminishment in US artillery fire was intentionally designed by Hunt (CO of the Artillery reserve) to create the impression among the rebels that the US artillery had been silenced and therefor would be unable to respond effectively to Pickett's charge. There was actually a substantial row between Hancock, who wanted the artillery firing to boost the morale of his troops, and Hunt who wanted to gull the rebels.
As the barrage continued, Hunt gave orders that deceived the Confederates; he directed several batteries to withdraw near the center of the line, causing the Confederates to think the batteries were destroyed. However, Hunt replaced the withdrawn batteries with artillerymen and cannons from the reserve, making sure the artillery line stayed strong along the ridge.
When the Confederate infantry broke the Union lines at The Angle, Hunt rushed forward, directly into the fray, firing away with a pistol at the advancing Rebels until his horse was shot, pinning him to the ground, but with no serious injury.
Hunt’s artillery knowledge, determination, and brilliant tactics ensured the Union line’s cannons had ammunition to fire when the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge began. Trusted by Meade and forceful enough to inspire his artillerymen to obey his orders rather than Hancock’s, General Hunt garners huge admiration from those who understand his contributions. Hunt was able to control the Union artillery as a single force which Pendleton could not do on the Confederate side Because Hunt was in charge of all of the artillery separate from Corps command, he was able to create this deception. Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down by Alexander's bombardment.
General Hunt anticipated the infantry attack across the field connecting Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge in the afternoon of July 3. As the map shows, he lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire and plunging fire. His idea was to fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. See the map which shows the lines of fire Hunt placed the Union artillery in position for, while the Confederate line of fire was straight ahead.
The Infantry Charge
Approximately 12,500 men in nine infantry brigades advanced over open fields for three-quarters of a mile under heavy Union artillery and rifle fire.
The charge was made by 3 divisions. Pickett’s division led the charge. General Pettigrew led Heth’s division (of Hill’s Corps), who had been injured on Day 1. General Trimble led Pender’s division, who had been killed on Day 2. Two brigades from Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division (Hill's Corps) was to support the attack on the right flank: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Col. David Lang (Perry's brigade). Hill’s illness precluded him from selecting who would attack from his corps; surprisingly, his troops who had fought heavily on Day 1 were chosen but those lightly used were not.
During the assault, the Confederates started to bunch up towards the center of the line. This was precisely at a bend in the Union line called the Angle. At this location, the Union line formed a 90-degree angle behind a stone wall. The 71st and 69th PA Regiments were positioned on this wall, with support from the 1st NY Battery. Under Gen. Armistead, the Confederates overran the 71st and 69th PA before reaching the 1st NY Battery
What was the landmark that was the objective of the attack?
Although traditionally the Copse of Trees near the Angle has been cited since Bachelder as the visual landmark of the attack, this is probably mythical. Lee’s objective was very likely on July 3 exactly what his original objective on July 2 was: the actual focus of the attack was Cemetery Hill and the trees they were keying on were those of Ziegler’s Grove, which was much more prominent then. Lee’s attacks on both days were intended for the Union center. It was much more strategically significant than the open area where the Copse of Trees was. It was more elevated and a perfect artillery platform (hence why the Union had artillery there) and it would command the road network.
Cemetery Hill was the key to the fishhook position. Lee saw this July 1 from Seminary Ridge and his goal never wavered for 3 days. The fundamental problem was that the town of Gettysburg is right beneath that hill, and there remains no direct route even today, you have to go by Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge. Today’s Steinwehr Avenue runs close but perpendicular to where you’d need to go. The only possible staging area would be the old Cyclotron site, and imagine that with artillery blasting the whole time from there. Washington Street does get near, but it goes directly into the center of the town. So, Lee either has to get his army up Emmitsburg Road onto Steinwehr, then make a right turn onto Washington Street or nearby, or take Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge.
If Ziegler’s Grove was the intended focus of the attack to crush Cemetery Hill, how did the attack end up at the Angle at Cemetery Ridge instead? Hunt’s placement of his weapons forced the charge to go south. This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.
The fences on Emmitsburg Turnpike
To cross from their positions on Seminary Ridge, the infantry had to cross Emmitsburg Turnpike about 100 yards before Cemetery Ridge. Witnesses noted that Pickett’s men crossed the road without problem from the southern end of the attack and were the ones who made it to Cemetery Ridge. However, Trimble and Pettigrew’s men were caught in the road and very few moved further east. Hess first identified that a significant part of the problem was that the fences on either side of the road posed an obstacle to cross. Many were killed trying to get over the fence. But on the southern part of the road, these fence posts had been removed the day before during the July 2 battle, so they didn’t pose a problem for Pickett.
The fences on both sides of the road on the south part of the field were down from the action of July 2nd but not on the north side and this proved to be a huge obstruction. After crossing Emmitsburg Road, Kemper’s brigade was hit by flanking fire, driving it to the left and disrupting the cohesion of the assault. General Hunt had arranged his artillery to create crossfires and plunging fires on the south end. On the north part of the field, the Emmitsburg Pike was lined with fences which became huge obstacles to cross during the battle. The casualties piled up where men attempted to cross, only to be shot in the act. Many of the troops just took cover in the road. Pettigrew’s men were in a similar situation although at least some of his men were caught in artillery at the start of the battle, and panic developed. Meanwhile, those fence posts had been removed on the South part of the field in the Rebel attack on July 2. There was no problem for Pickett to get to the wall, but then Stannard and artillery units opened up firing on the flank, forcing the attack to the north.
Hancock
Winfield Scott Hancock was one of the heroes of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hancock's leadership and bravery were conspicuous during Pickett's Charge. As the Confederate forces prepared for Pickett's Charge, Hancock rode along the Union lines, boosting the morale of his troops. He famously told his men, "There is no reason why any man should be nervous...I shall lead you through this battle!"
Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war and for the rest of his life, carrying a cane.
On July 3rd, his Corps was positioned on Cemetery Ridge and therefore commanded the Union center. Hancock recognized the Confederates' intentions to launch a major assault and anticipated that the Confederate attack would focus on Cemetery Ridge and made preparations to defend against it. He coordinated with other Union generals to reinforce the defensive line and prepare for the Confederate assault.
Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war, and for the rest of his life.
He almost died. Although he was wounded during the assault, he remained on the field until the Confederate attack was repulsed. When the fighting ended, the general was taken by stretcher and ambulance to a field hospital. He journeyed through Pennsylvania to Philadelphia and then Norristown to convalesce. His wound gave Hancock enough trouble, especially when riding a horse, that he was forced to give up active command at Petersburg in 1864, and it bothered him for the rest of his life.
General Gibbon, who had been warned the night before, commanded the 2nd Division, II Corps. Gibbon's division bore the brunt of Pickett's Charge, where Gibbon was wounded. His leadership at the Angle was instrumental in the victory.
Alexander S. Webb was the brigade leader at the Copse of Trees. The 71st PA stopped the Confederate advance and forced the Confederates to seek cover behind a stone wall. Hand-to-hand fighting began in the Angle, and 2 companies fell back. Webb ordered a charge by the neighboring 72nd to drive the Confederates back, but the regiment refused the order. He then went to lead the 69th PA but was wounded in the thigh and groin. By this time, Col. Devereux's 19th MA Regiment and the 42nd NY Regiment rushed in and drove the Confederates out. He received the MOH in 1891.
Armistead
Brig Gen Lewis Armistead is esteemed as leading Pickett’s Division on the south end of the attack. He led his brigade from in front, through the artillery attack, hat on his sword, toward the Angle, over the stone wall, before being mortally wounded. Armistead embodied every positive attribute a courageous American military leader could display in a desperate moment.
Armistead of course was pre-war friends with General Hancock, his opponent that day. Armistead was the older man by seven years, so their paths never crossed at West Point, but army records show they met for the first time while serving on the frontier in 1844. After working together for 16 months in the remote outposts of modern-day Oklahoma, they fought in the same regiment and experienced some of the same battles in the Mexican War, where both were breveted for gallantry. Then, for a brief period after the war, as the U.S. Army occupied Mexico, Armistead commanded a small company and Hancock was one of his lieutenants. Captain Armistead was in command of the small garrison at the New San Diego Depot in San Diego, which was occupied in 1860. He was a close friend of Winfield Scott Hancock, serving with him as a quartermaster in Los Angeles, before the Civil War. He was However, during the Battle of Gettysburg, they found themselves on opposing sides of Pickett's Charge, with Armistead leading Confederate forces and Hancock defending the Union position.
It is reported that he was struck by multiple bullets as he and his men reached the stone wall. Traditionally, it is said that he was shot with 3 bullets. Armistead's wounds were not believed to be mortal; he had been shot in the fleshy part of the arm and below the knee, and according to the surgeon who tended him, none of the wounds caused bone, artery, or nerve damage. Other accounts suggest the wounds were located in the upper thigh or groin area. The exact details of his wounds may vary in different accounts, but it is generally agreed upon that he suffered injuries to his lower body.
He was then taken to a Union field hospital at the George Spangler Farm where he died two days later. Dr. Daniel Brinton, the chief surgeon at the Union hospital there, had expected Armistead to survive because he characterized the bullet wounds as not of a "serious character." He wrote that the death "was not from his wounds directly but from secondary bacterium, fever, and prostration.” One hears frequent discussions of Stonewall Jackson’s death from non-mortal wounds, but rarely Armistead’s. Infection and sepsis were the main causes of battlefield death if the initial wound was not itself mortal. Although this death would not have happened after penicillin was discovered in the mid-1930s, it was a common story in this war. Hancock wasn’t at Gettysburg long enough to see his friend and was in sufficient distress that it wouldn’t have been possible anyway. He might not even have known at the moment.
How many would have been needed to carry the position?
Longstreet ordered nine infantry brigades to make the charge on July 3. Five more brigades were held in reserve, which Longstreet never ordered to advance. Longstreet states in his autobiography that he estimated that it would have required 30,000 men to take Cemetery Ridge.
Mathematical modeling based on the Lanchester equations developed during the First World War to determine the numbers necessary for successful assaults demonstrates that with the commitment of one to three more infantry brigades to the nine brigades in the initial force, Pickett’s Charge would probably have taken the Union position and altered the battle’s outcome. If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, the model estimated it would have captured the Union position. However, the Confederates would have been unable to exploit such a success without the commitment of still more troops.
Calculations based on the Lancaster Formula which was developed in World War I suggest that 20,000 men would have been needed to make a lodgment, but perhaps 5-10,000 more would have been needed to defeat the inevitable counterattack, which is not far off from the number Longstreet hypothesized. The authors do not include Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades in the initial force. If these troops and Anderson’s entire division had attacked with the initial force, this would have supplied five additional brigades and around 5,000 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and from 15,000 to 18,000 men. These numbers would have guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle. Another five brigades and one regiment scheduled for the second wave of Pickett’s Charge from Pender’s and Rodes’ divisions, as well as at least another brigade from McLaws’ division, were also available. Had all of these men been brought into the attack column, the total would be nearer to the 30,000 men Longstreet thought necessary.
However, assuming the same rate of casualties, the cost would have been about half, or 15,000 casualties. There would have been insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success. And what about the next hill and the next one? Various regiments might have been recruited for this effort: essentially, all of Longstreet and all of Hill’s Corps. But, assuming the 50% casualty rate on this additional number, and realizing that Lee only had 60,000 men at this point, while it’s theoretically possible they might have held this line, the cost would have been intolerable. Add another 10,000 casualties and it’s hard to see how Lee could have continued the war after taking that ridge.
This illustration shows the Union line kneeling and firing, with only the officers standing. The destroyed artillery from earlier bombardment is seen in the foreground. The rebel attack is coming from the southern or left side, very accurate since Armistead was originally placed far in that direction. It shows a large contingent of southern troops in the Emmitsburg Road just as suggested by Hess in his book and as I noted in my Pickett’s charge challenges. It shows the heavy smoke from the weaponry and seminary ridge in the background. Note also the Codori Farm at the top left.
Casualty Rate
Between 10-15,000 infantry made the charge. The duration of Pickett’s Charge was 50 minutes. Total Confederate losses during the attack were 6,555, of which 1,123 Confederates were killed on the battlefield, 4,019 were wounded, and 3750 were captured including many of those listed as wounded. Many of the “wounded” died over the next days to weeks. Do the math: that’s 22 killed and 80 wounded per minute; about 1.7 casualties per second.
The casualty rate of Pickett’s Charge is typically given as 50-60%, with 10% killed on the
battlefield and 30% wounded with another 30% captured, many overlapping the wounded category. The Union loss is thought to be 1500 casualties. Pickett's division suffered 2,655 casualties (498 killed, 643 wounded, 833 wounded and captured, and 681 captured, unwounded). Pettigrew's losses are estimated to be about 2,700 (470 killed, 1,893 wounded, 337 captured). Trimble's two brigades lost 885 (155 killed, 650 wounded, and 80 captured). Wilcox's brigade reported losses of 200, Lang's about 400.
These figures are similar to the famed Charge of the Light Brigade (Crimean War, 1854) where, a British cavalry unit attacked Russian forces. The casualty rate was exceptionally high, with around 40% killed or wounded. These rates surpass the Assault on the Great Redoubt (Battle of Borodino, Napoleonic Wars, 1812), where The French Grand Army's assault on the Russian Great Redoubt during the Battle of Borodino resulted in high casualties; estimates suggest casualty rates of around 30%, and also the Assault on Marye's Heights (Battle of Fredericksburg, 1862), where the casualty rates for the Union troops were estimated to be around 15-20%.
The Confederate Army lost many of its top officers. Brigadier General Armistead was mortally wounded and captured. Garnett was killed in action; his body was never recovered and is believed to be buried with his men in Richmond, Virginia. Kemper was wounded and taken prisoner by the Union. Although the newspapers reported he was killed in the battle, his family did not believe it and were able to free Kemper from the Union prison.
Was Pickett’s Charge a Bad Decision?
The criticisms often directed at Lee for Pickett’s Charge are unwarranted. What else could he do under the circumstances? He had tried both flanks. He couldn’t go left because it led further away from any viable target. He couldn’t go right because it lengthened his supply line and he was out of artillery ammunition. If he turned around and declared victory, he wouldn’t have changed anything in the trajectory of the war and he’d be right where he started.
The Gettysburg campaign was a roll of the dice at a crucial moment.. You have to see it as a desperate final try to win the war on the battlefield. Despite all of Lee’s victories, the Union had not given up and in fact, were winning in the Western theater. The west was being lost and the confederacy was running out of time. Resources are dwindling. Davis and Lee know that things aren’t looking promising. He was a riverboat gambler who rolled the dice in every battle. From that perspective, it starts to make sense.
One hears suggestions that General Lee was ill and that he had heart disease, weakening his judgment. A contemporary analysis shows no reason for this suspicion. Heart attacks do not lead to poor judgment 2 months after they occur.
Faced with circumstances on July 3, Lee had no other options but to attack, and no other place to attack than the center. If he retreated then the campaign would be a failure. The salient on Cemetery Hill is the obvious place to attack. Ewell is stalled on the left. Longstreet tried on the right the day before. He wants to go further to the right but there is no road there and no supply line. Hill is sick. Longstreet is being obstinate. Stuart had gotten nowhere that morning. General Lee is all alone. Where Lee miscalculated is that Hunt had created a deadly crossfire with artillery that had never been done like that before. Lee had not anticipated as devastating an artillery defense and indeed, none like it had ever been organized. Lee lost that day but look at all the other gambles he won.
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Further Reading:
· Hess, Earl, Pickett's Charge--The Last Attack at Gettysburg. UNC Press, 2010.
· J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.
· Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of the Civil War (Civil War Trilogy).Modern Library, 2004.
· Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
· Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.
· William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg: A Journey in Time. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975.
· Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.
· James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/
· Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge: mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168.
· Richard Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg Magazine, No. 18, July 1998, 104-110.
· Lloyd W Klein and Eric J Wittenberg, “Did General Lee’s heart attack impact the conduct of the Battle of Gettysburg?” Gettysburg Magazine 67:July 2022; 62-75.
· James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.
· Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.
· Lloyd W Klein, “Why Pickett’s Charge Failed”. The Civil War Center. https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/
