The Vicksburg Campaign: Part 1 - The Strategic Problem of Vicksburg

The Vicksburg campaign was a series battles from 1862 to 1863 in the US Civil War. The fighting was focused on Vicksburg, Mississippi. In part one of a two-part series, Lloyd W Klein looks at the strategic importance of Vicksburg.

The bombarding and capturing of Fort Hindman, Arkansas Post, January 1863. By Currier and Ives.

"See what a lot of land these fellows hold, of which Vicksburg is the key! The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket.”

-- Abraham Lincoln

“ … the nailhead that holds the South's two halves together."

– Jefferson Davis

The vital importance of controlling the Mississippi River was apparent from the beginning of the Civil War. The river not only served as a crucial supply route but also facilitated the transportation of troops and military provisions, while also aiding in effective communication. By gaining control over the Mississippi River, the Union would effectively cut off the Confederacy's access to this vital thoroughfare, creating a division between the western and eastern southern states. Furthermore, this strategic move would enable Northern traffic to freely navigate the entire length of the river, essentially transforming it into a logistical superhighway that would greatly influence operations in the Western theater.

By June 1862, the Union army and naval forces had captured New Orleans and many other forts and cities along the Mississippi River. However, the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg in Mississippi remained under their control. With General Halleck's transfer to Washington as the commander-in-chief, General Grant assumed command of the Army of Tennessee and was entrusted with capturing Vicksburg.  This was no easy task. It had been tried by others without success.

Admiral Farragut had attempted an assault up the river in May 1862 after he captured New Orleans.  He demanded surrender but he had insufficient troops to attack. Returning with a flotilla in June 1862, his attempts to bombard the fortress into surrender were unsuccessful. Throughout July, the Navy shelled Vicksburg and engaged in minor battles with Confederate vessels in the area, yet their forces were not enough to attempt a landing, leading to the abandonment of the mission.

Geography

Vicksburg held immense strategic significance due to its geographical location overlooking a sharp 180-degree bend on the Mississippi River, situated atop a towering 200-foot bluff. Because of the horseshoe turn, ships were essentially forced to face toward it, then away from it, and had to maneuver slowly. Perched on high, steep bluffs 200 feet above the river and heavily defended by forts and earthworks, it was heavily defended with formidable forts and earthworks. It was called the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy" for good reason, as it appeared impregnable to any military force of that era.

North and east of Vicksburg, the Mississippi Delta was formed by the convergence of the Yazoo River with the Mississippi River. Spanning over 7000 square miles, this alluvial floodplain boasts an intricate network of streams, rivers, bayous, and swamps. Some of these waterways were navigable, while others were impassable. The Delta is a 7000 square mile alluvial floodplain, with many streams, rivers, bayous, and swamps, some of which were navigable, some of which were entirely unpassable. Its geological origin is that of regular flooding of both rivers over thousands of years, creating a flat, fertile land with swamps and other wetlands. It was a land inhabited by swarms of mosquitoes carrying malaria, poor roads, and untamed wilderness. Additionally, it housed some of the largest, most productive, and isolated cotton plantations. The slave population in this area developed its own unique culture and music, which eventually emerge as Mississippi Delta Blues.

A bayou is a sluggish and narrow river characterized by an ill-defined shoreline, often associated with a marshy lake or wetland. It can also refer to a creek whose direction of flow changes daily due to tidal shifts. Bayous typically contain brackish water and are frequently boggy or stagnant. On the other hand, a swamp or marsh is a low-lying wetland predominantly covered by woody vegetation. These areas experience saturation of water in the ground and are either partially or intermittently submerged. Swamps and marshes serve as transitional zones between land and water. Wetlands encompass not only floodplains but also other areas that are prone to flooding or remain underwater.

The Initial Advance

Ulysses S Grant assumed command of the Army of Tennessee and immediately devised a strategic plan. Departing from Memphis, he aimed to trace the path of the Mississippi Central Railroad towards the south, reaching Holly Springs. Meanwhile, General Sherman was entrusted with leading four divisions, totaling around 32,000 soldiers, down the river. Grant, on the other hand, would continue his advance with the remaining forces, approximately 40,000 strong, along the railroad line towards Oxford. The Confederate forces, under the leadership of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, posed a formidable challenge, with 12,000 troops stationed in Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi, while Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn commanded around 24,000 soldiers in Grenada.

Grant faced numerous obstacles in his mission, including the Confederate Army's opposition, the demanding terrain and geographical features, the prevalence of diseases, and logistical difficulties in maintaining a steady supply chain. However, his most significant concern came from the political realm. President Lincoln envisioned a two-pronged offensive strategy, with Major General John McClernand authorized to advance down the river, while Nathaniel Banks would move upstream from New Orleans. This political pressure added an additional layer of complexity to Grant's already challenging circumstances.

General Grant's initial strategy to reach Vicksburg by taking the most straightforward overland route, following the train road, proved to be unsuccessful. The problem with this direct approach was that it was too predictable and vulnerable: any threat to the single-lane Mississippi Central Railroad would have disastrous consequences. Unfortunately for Grant, the Confederates had Nathan Bedford Forrest, a skilled commander who posed a significant threat to this route. As a result, Grant's offensive failed as raids by Van Dorn and Forrest disrupted his supply lines and communication networks. The destruction of the supply depot at Holly Springs forced Grant to abandon his original plan.

Chickasaw Bayou

Meanwhile, Sherman moved downriver to Johnson's Plantation and attempted a direct northeast advance toward Vicksburg. However, this strategy required traversing through swamps and facing strong defenses on hills overlooking a bayou. Despite launching attacks for three consecutive days at Chickasaw Bayou (December 26 - 29, 1862), Sherman's forces made no progress. The heavily fortified hills and the challenging terrain hindered their advancement, leaving them unable to break through.

On December 27, the Union army pushed their lines forward through the swamps toward the Walnut Hills, which were strongly defended. On December 28, several futile attempts were made to get around these defenses. On December 29, Sherman ordered a frontal assault, which was repulsed with heavy casualties, and then withdrew.

The problem was that the bayou ended in a wall of hills, the Walnut Hills, which provided a strong defensive advantage. The strategic significance of this attack was in its proximity to Vicksburg, which is exactly what enabled Pemberton to bring sufficient manpower for its defense. Another factor was that Porter’s bombardment failed to have an important effect. Sherman had over 30,000 men of whom 1700 were casualties; Pemberton had about 14,000 with less than 200 casualties.

General McClernand and Arkansas Post

Meanwhile, General McClernand led his Corps to Memphis and proceeded down the Mississippi River, where he instructed Sherman to join forces with him, disregarding Grant's directives. Their target was Arkansas Post, home to Fort Hindman at the junction of the Arkansas River, located 50 miles upstream. With the support of Admiral Porter's ironclads bombarding the fort, they managed to land sufficient numbers of troops to capture the fort and take prisoners despite sustaining heavy losses.

Initially skeptical of the expedition, Grant expressed disapproval in a letter to Halleck. However, the successful outcome compelled Grant to recognize its importance and collaborate with McClernand. The capture of Fort Hindman was crucial in preventing potential threats from the rear, underscoring the necessity of neutralizing such strongholds to secure Grant's position.

Although McClernand incurred over 1000 casualties in a 30,000-man army, he captured 5000 Confederates. Grant would need to win a victory over the rebels and his rival in his army. As a Democratic congressman from Illinois and a close friend of Lincoln, McClernand enjoyed a political alliance with the President. However, his position as a political general had its drawbacks. While serving as second in command at Belmont and later as a division commander at Donelson, Grant knew that if he failed, he would be next in line. Despite this, Grant maintained direct communication with Lincoln, bypassing the chain of command, and freely offered his advice and criticism of others. His ultimate goal was to secure an independent command.

Grant’s Bayou Operations

From January to March 1863, Grant’s basic plan was to get close to Vicksburg with his army so that in the Spring, he could be ready, without being exposed to the town's formidable artillery. Grant sought to create alternative routes that could serve as highways for his troops by preparing waterways in the vicinity,. These operations involved a series of seven initiatives or "experiments" that took place from January to March 1863. Although all of these attempts ultimately failed, Grant's willingness to explore various possibilities demonstrated his fearlessness in the face of potential failure. This mindset, characterized by creativity and thoughtfulness, ultimately led to his success. Grant's relentless pursuit of alternative strategies showcased his determination to find a solution, even if it meant considering unconventional approaches.

Grant’s Canal

One in particular deserves special mention. Grant's Canal was an attempt to create a canal through De Soto Point in Louisiana, across the Mississippi River from Vicksburg, Mississippi. In 1862, Farragut had explored the option of bypassing the fortified cliffs by constructing a canal across the river's bend, the De Soto Peninsula. Brigadier General Thomas Williams was sent to De Soto Point with 3,200 men to dig a canal capable of bypassing the Confederate defenses. Diseases, especially malaria, yellow fever, and dysentery, as well as falling river levels, prevented Williams from successfully constructing the canal, and the project was abandoned.  In January 1863, the project regained momentum when General Grant took an interest in its potential.

Encouraged by Grant, who had received favorable feedback from the navy regarding President Lincoln's support, Sherman's troops resumed excavation in late January 1863. Mockingly referred to as "Butler's Ditch" by Sherman, referencing Major General Benjamin Butler, who had initially dispatched Williams for the task, the canal was a mere 6 feet wide and 6 feet deep. Recognizing the extensive engineering challenges, Grant initiated modifications by relocating the entrance upstream to capitalize on a stronger current.

Reports indicated that the water in the canal was stagnant and lacked any current, necessitating the need for a deeper channel for the Union Navy ironclads to navigate through. Grant, recognizing this issue, also gave orders to widen the canal. However, as the month drew to a close, it became evident to Grant that the canal project would not be successful. Union officers who visited later discovered that the water level was only 2 feet and observed the absence of any current, despite earlier reports of depths reaching up to 8 feet and widths up to 12 feet in certain areas. The situation took a turn for the worse when a sudden rise in the river caused the dam at the canal's entrance to break, resulting in flooding in the surrounding area. Consequently, the canal began to fill up with sediment and backwater. In a desperate attempt to salvage the project, two large steam-driven dipper dredges named Hercules and Sampson were deployed to clear the channel. However, their efforts were thwarted by Confederate artillery fire from the bluffs at Vicksburg, forcing them to retreat. By the end of March, all work on the canal was abandoned.

In April 1876, the Mississippi River changed course, forming a channel through De Soto Point. Vicksburg became isolated from the riverfront after the oxbow lake formed by the course change became cut off from the river. It was not until the completion of the Yazoo Diversion Canal in 1903 that Vicksburg regained its connection to the river. Although most of Grant's Canal has been destroyed over time due to agricultural activities, a small section measuring approximately 200 yards in length still remains. It is worth noting that General Grant did manage to alter the course of the Mississippi River, a remarkable feat of engineering. However, this achievement came too late to hold any military significance.

Lake Providence

Brig. Gen. James B. McPherson constructed a canal stretching several hundred yards from the Mississippi River to Lake Providence, enabling access to the Red River via Bayous Baxter and Macon, as well as the Tensas and Black Rivers. This strategic waterway would allow Grant's forces to link up with Banks at Port Hudson. By March 18, the connection was navigable, but the limited number of "ordinary Ohio River boats" provided to Grant for navigating the bayous could only accommodate 8,500 men. Although this was the only one of the bayou expeditions to successfully bypass the Vicksburg defenses, it was not enough for a successful Vicksburg operation. It did allow the possibility of sending reinforcements to Banks.

Yazoo Pass

The Yazoo Pass initiative aimed to reach the elevated terrain above Hayne's Bluff and below Yazoo City by breaching the Mississippi River levee near Moon Lake, approximately 150 miles above Vicksburg, near Helena, Arkansas. This plan involved traversing the Yazoo Pass, an ancient route from Yazoo City to Memphis that had been obstructed by the 1856 levee construction, isolating the Pass from the Mississippi River to Moon Lake. The route would lead through the Coldwater River, then the Tallahatchie River, and finally into the Yazoo River at Greenwood, Mississippi. It may also have been intended as a method to raid the railroad bridge at Grenada.. Despite the Union's efforts to blow up the dikes on February 3, obstacles such as low-hanging trees and deliberate Confederate obstructions hindered progress. These setbacks allowed the Confederates to hastily erect "Fort Pemberton" near the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers, effectively repelling the Union naval forces.

Steele’s Bayou

On March 14, Admiral Porter attempted to reach Deer Creek by sailing up the Yazoo Delta through Steele's Bayou, which is located just north of Vicksburg. The purpose of this maneuver was to outflank Fort Pemberton and enable the landing of troops between Vicksburg and Yazoo City. However, the Confederates obstructed their path once again by felling trees and causing the paddlewheels of the boats to become entangled with willow reeds. This situation raised concerns that Confederate troops might seize the boats and sailors, necessitating Sherman to move troops by land to rescue them.

Duckport Canal

Another canal project known as the Duckport Canal was initiated to create a waterway from Duckport Landing to Walnut Bayou, aiming to allow lighter boats to bypass Vicksburg. However, by the time the canal was nearly completed on April 6, the water levels had significantly decreased. As a result, only the lightest flatboats were able to navigate through the canal, rendering it ineffective for larger vessels.

Milliken's Bend

The main challenge Grant faced in dealing with Vicksburg was its formidable position as a fortress situated on elevated bluffs along the river. The city boasted massive batteries that could outmatch any Union ships on the river. Additionally, Vicksburg was surrounded by nine major forts or citadels and protected by 172 guns, which commanded all possible approaches by both water and land. Furthermore, the city housed a garrison of thirty thousand troops, making it a highly fortified and well-defended stronghold.

Moreover, the turn in the river beneath the town ensured that any naval force would face immediate and devastating bombardment, making it a formidable barrier for potential invaders. However, the protected northern invasion route through a maze of swampy bayous posed a significant obstacle for Grant's army. While his troops could camp on the west side of the river, the logistics of launching an attack from that position were complex and uncertain. The necessity of eventually crossing the river to the other side raised questions about how the supply line and reinforcements would be managed during the movement.

Grant wasn’t actually directly across the river, because the large Cypress Swamp comprises the west bank. He was located at Milliken’s Bend, upriver from the 180-degree turn in the river. Despite the seeming disadvantage of being further away, this positioning allowed for a level of strategic ambiguity that Pemberton underestimated. Milliken's Bend, situated in Louisiana about 15 miles upriver from Vicksburg, served as a crucial staging area for Grant's army by 1863. The distance from Pemberton's forces provided Grant with the element of surprise and control over the river traffic, enhancing his strategic advantage.

The construction of bridges, corduroy roads, and the clearing of swamps by McClernand's troops from Milliken's Bend to the proposed river crossing at Hard Times, Louisiana, below Vicksburg, demonstrated the meticulous planning and effort required to overcome the challenging terrain. By filling in the swamps and creating a 70-mile road by April 17, the Union forces were able to establish a vital connection for their movements toward Vicksburg. This logistical feat showcased the determination and resourcefulness of Grant's army in navigating the difficult landscape to achieve their strategic objectives.

April brought receding waters and the emergence of roads from Milliken’s Bend to points downriver on the west bank. Grant planned to march his troops over those roads to a location where he could ferry them to the east bank of the river.

The Plan Emerges

Grant pored over maps and developed a plan requiring naval cooperation by January. Grant expressed that the next step was to get south of the city when he first landed at Young’s Point, in late January. In early February 1863, Grant conveyed to General Halleck and Admiral Porter his conception for the campaign. He later convened a staff meeting to outline his intentions. He expressed his desire to lead his army south of Vicksburg, cross the river, and sever the vital railroad link between Vicksburg and Jackson. However, despite his clear plan, Grant chose to delay the execution of his strategy until Spring. According to Grant's account in his memoirs, he attributed this delay to the high water levels of the river in January, which made it impractical to commence the campaign at that time.

Grant directed his army to march southward along the west bank of the Mississippi River, aiming to position his forces well below Vicksburg. The next step in his plan involved transporting his troops across the river, a task that required navigating past the formidable guns of the city. Once safely on the Mississippi shore south of Vicksburg, Grant intended to strike inland, engaging any Confederate forces encountered along the way, with the ultimate objective of capturing Vicksburg. Grant's meticulous planning involved extensive study of maps and charts, as he single-handedly devised this approach. However, his subordinates, including Sherman, McPherson, and Logan, expressed reservations about the plan, deeming it too risky. By using the new road, and a large Bayou, Grant was capable of reaching Hard Times Landing without being detected. The army marched south on the west side of the Mississippi River and crossed the river south of Vicksburg at a place named Hard Times.

Hard Times is just beyond Big Cypress swamp. At that location, the Mississippi River takes a wide inward turn. Bayou Vidal, which may have once been the main river channel, provided a direct route for Grant's forces. This route was approximately six miles beyond Grand Gulf on the opposite side of the river, where they boarded transports to cross over to Bruinsburg. Grant recognized the significance of this route and understood that he could continue to utilize it for transporting supplies as long as necessary.

Grant had three options for attacking Vicksburg: The first option was to return to Memphis and approach the city from the north and east via an overland route. However, Grant dismissed this option as it would have negatively impacted morale to retreat. The second option involved directly assaulting the city by crossing the Mississippi  River. Grant rejected this option, believing it would result in a significant loss of life or even defeat. The third option was to march his troops down the west bank of the Mississippi, cross it, and approach the city from the south and east. Upon hearing Grant's plan, Sherman expressed doubts and suggested that Grant should reconsider option #1 and return to Memphis. Blair after the war also expressed his skepticism at the time. 

The Naval Rendezvous

Grant’s particular genius in the war was his brilliant collaborations with the navy. His victories at Forts Donelson and Henry for example were made possible by the combination of ground and water approaches. In that sense, the concept of combined arms forces was an innovation General Grant developed. Vicksburg is the outstanding application of the model.

The Union troops needed to rendezvous with their Navy to cross into Confederate territory, but the success of this operation depended on the ability of the boats to evade the guns defending Vicksburg. It was crucial for there to be an adequate number of gunboats and transport ships positioned south of the city to ensure the plan's success. Once the Union Navy had navigated downstream past Vicksburg, there was no turning back due to the strong river current.

On the evening of April 16, two weeks before the planned river crossing, Admiral David Porter guided the Union fleet past the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg to join forces with Grant. Despite being detected by Confederate lookouts as they rounded De Soto Point, the fleet pressed on and engaged in battle with the Confederate batteries. Despite sustaining damage from enemy fire, the Union fleet successfully fought their way through to rendezvous with Grant.

Porter directed to ensure the concealment and protection of the boilers on the steamships by utilizing barriers made of cotton, hay bales, and bags of grain. This strategic measure would prove beneficial in the future as well. Additionally, to provide an extra layer of defense, coal barges, and surplus vessels were securely fastened to the sides of the critical vessels. Commencing at 10 pm on April 16, Porter assumed command of a fleet consisting of seven ironclad gunboats, four steamers, the tug Ivy, and a variety of towed coal barges, as they embarked on a downstream journey. The Union vessels were illuminated by Confederate bonfires, becoming targets for a relentless two-hour barrage from the Vicksburg guns. Despite the intense fire, the ironclads and supply-laden transports successfully navigated past the Vicksburg guns. The Confederate cannons unleashed a total of 525 rounds, resulting in sixty-eight hits. Remarkably, only one vessel was lost, and there were no casualties among the crew. Additionally, the Confederates had placed ropes strung across the river with explosives attached that could be moved by pulleys.

Grant realized that it would be impossible to provide his army with supplies using the muddy west bank road. As a result, a second convoy was organized to address this issue. On the night of April 22, six transport vessels, without any escorts, were tasked with towing barges loaded with 100,000 rations and other essential supplies, attempting to pass through the Vicksburg batteries. Grant, recognizing the importance of additional supplies, ordered another group of vessels to bring reinforcements one week later on the same night. This time, six protected steamers, under the command of Colonel Clark Lagow from Grant's staff, towed twelve barges filled with rations. Despite facing heavy fire from the Vicksburg batteries, five of the steamers and half of the barges successfully made it through. The vessels were primarily manned by army volunteers from "Black Jack" Logan's division, as the civilian crews were too fearful to navigate through the dangerous Vicksburg gauntlet. Although the run was mostly successful, the leading vessel, a hospital ship, was unfortunately sunk, resulting in the loss of two lives.  Meanwhile, by cutting a new road through the swamp, when necessary, McClernand's corps worked its way south and was joined by one of McPherson's divisions.

Diversionary Tactics

To enhance the element of deception during his planned landing, Grant employed diversionary tactics to divert Pemberton's attention away from the south and the river crossing site. These tactics were executed through two well-conceived feints.

Snyder’s Bluff

While he was moving south with McClernand and McPherson on the west (Louisiana) bank, Grant had Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps threaten Vicksburg from the north. On April 27, Grant ordered Sherman to proceed up the Yazoo River and threaten Snyder’s Bluff northeast of Vicksburg. On the 29th, Sherman debarked ten regiments of troops and appeared to be preparing an assault while eight naval gunboats bombarded the Confederate forts at Haines’s Bluff.

Sherman’s division remained north of Vicksburg. General Sherman led a highly successful diversionary attack by utilizing a combined naval and infantry operation. Blair's division, consisting of eight gunboats and ten transports, secretly and quietly moved to the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou the night before the operation. At 9 am, all gunboats, except one, opened fire on the enemy forces in the bayou, while one gunboat and the transports moved upstream.

At the Battle of Snyder’s Bluff, the troops proceeded upstream until approximately 6 pm, crossed Blake’s Levee, and launched an assault on the artillery near Drumgold’s Bluff. This location was significantly north of Vicksburg, diverting focus from the ongoing activities downstream. The attack faced insurmountable challenges due to the strategic positioning of batteries on Drumgold’s and Snyder’s Bluffs, as well as the course of the Yazoo River that General Sherman's forces had to navigate.

At first,  heavy casualties were sustained. The next morning more troops were deployed, but the difficult terrain of swamps and marshes posed formidable barriers to any progress. Sherman eventually retreated to Milliken’s Bend, realizing that his contingent, which constituted only a fraction of General Grant's overall command, would likely have failed to capture the bluffs even if a direct attempt was made.

Sherman withdrew on May 1 and hastily followed McPherson down the west bank of the Mississippi. His troops were ferried across the river on May 6 and 7.

This diversionary maneuver effectively drew Pemberton's attention away from Grant's actual landing site. Pemberton sent 3,000 troops that had been marching south to oppose Grant.

Grierson’s Raid

The success of this diversion was remarkable, as it involved a daring cavalry raid that originated from La Grange, TN and penetrated central Mississippi on April 17. This marked the commencement of a relentless 17-day campaign characterized by constant movement, widespread devastation, and frequent clashes. Upon its conclusion, General Grant aptly hailed it as "one of the most remarkable cavalry exploits of the entire war."

Under the leadership of Grierson, a force of 1,700 soldiers from the 6th and 7th Illinois, as well as the 2nd Iowa Cavalry regiments, embarked on this audacious mission from La Grange. Over the course of 17 days, Grierson's troops covered a staggering distance of 800 miles, engaging Confederate forces repeatedly. They successfully disrupted two vital railroads, took numerous prisoners and horses, and inflicted significant damage to enemy property. Their journey culminated in Baton Rouge on May 2, where Grierson joined forces with Nathaniel Banks in the ongoing siege at Port Hudson.

By skillfully diverting attention to the north and east of Mississippi, this raid effectively diverted Confederate focus away from the gathering of troops at Grand Gulf. Through the deployment of small patrols and deceptive maneuvers, Grierson managed to confuse the enemy regarding his true location, intentions, and direction. Operating deep within enemy territory, his forces systematically dismantled rail infrastructure, liberated enslaved individuals, razed Confederate storehouses, disabled locomotives, and obliterated commissary stores, bridges, and trestles. The lack of a viable response from General Pembleton further contributed to the raid's triumph. While Forrest was engaged in Alabama, combating Streight's Raid, other Confederate cavalry units were dispatched but proved unable to catch up with Grierson's swift movements. This strategic diversion ultimately hindered Pemberton's ability to effectively counter Grant's advance from the south, as he found himself inadequately equipped to confront the Union forces due to the distractions caused by Grierson's audacious exploits.

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Further Reading:

·       Donald L Miller, Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon and Schuster, 2019.

·       Grant’s Memoirs

·       Sherman’s Memoirs

·       Grant by Chernow

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/vicksburg

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg

·       https://civilwarmonths.com/2023/04/15/vicksburg-grant-and-porter-assemble/amp/

·       https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/achenblog/wp/2014/04/25/ulysses-s-grant-hero-or-butcher-great-man-or-doofus/

·       https://www.historynet.com/vicksburg-the-campaign-that-confirmed-grants-greatness/

·       https://www.vicksburgpost.com/2003/01/27/water-returned-to-citys-doorstep-100-years-ago/?fbclid=IwAR1X5nFZ8F-l_0sbr3Ki1HBygBiPb-GCgxl4aBCznjSOgKAvVdURVJUvJDA

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/nature/river-course-changes.htm?fbclid=IwAR3mflQUgR8JaUEIcrm2v_lLlfdGup44_XwzxIcJ1mTAyyCT2h_umfcT2Sc

·       https://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-colonel-benjamin-griersons-cavalry-raid-in-1863/

·       https://www.historynet.com/griersons-raid-during-the-vicksburg-campaign/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/major-general-benjamin-grierson-2360423

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/04/29/that-other-cavalry-guy-benjamin-h-grierson/

·       https://www.historyonthenet.com/grant-vicksburg

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-gibson

·       https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/battle-of-port-gibson/

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battleportgibson.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/grants-vicksburg-supply-line

·       https://www.historynet.com/mississippi-nightmare/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-champion-hill-2360280

·       https://www.rebellionresearch.com/battle-of-raymond?fbclid=IwAR1L1PcCwGRCFLg-Bv7neO1tG6cv7RsnmZO8kNvv5XVjUBkM6t3CiPtu96c_aem_th_AaSypV4shWeio-QbLLXIuILea41vtkZsruFEMGykenl_kK8dPEuWWYZiUP44s9G8ws4&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

·       Klein LW, Wittenberg EJ. The decisive influence of malaria on the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign. Surgeon’s Call: The Journal of the National Civil War Medicine Museum. 2023; 28(1): 4 – 14.

Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy

In Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War, Jeb Smith argues that the winner writes the history. This is evident in many ways and categories. The North propped itself up and vilified its enemy, the South. Today, we will take a look at Abraham Lincoln and race.

This is part 1 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War.

A U.S. Postage stamp issued in 1958. It commemorates the 1858 Lincoln and Douglas debates.

People are taught that Lincoln was a strong abolitionist, a champion of racial equality, and a great emancipator. They portray Lincoln as going to war to free the slaves; Lincoln advocated freedom and liberty for all; he is the savior of the Union and Constitution to boot. Lincoln was a kind, warmhearted, caring person, who never told a lie, and a great leader who united and led America to renown. This image comes perhaps from a desire for who they want him to be rather than who he was. Just as Southerners idolize their heroes, modern statists do the same with theirs, such as Lincoln. What most people think they know about Lincoln is well off the mark. We will look at his views on race below.[1]

"I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in anyway the social and political equality of the white and black races -- that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

 -Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas Debate Charleston, Illinois, September 18, 1858

I understood Lincoln as someone who desired equality for all. Instead, I found Lincoln was a white supremacist who viewed blacks as inferior beings. During a debate with Stephen A. Douglas on August 21, 1858 in Ottawa, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "Free them and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this…We cannot then make them equals." In response to the Dred Scott ruling, Lincoln said, "I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment." At the eulogy of Henry Clay in 1852, Lincoln gave a speech in which he called the declaration of independence the "The white man's charter of freedom."

Fear

Lincoln often used the N-word, and was known for his racist jokes. Abolitionist John Hume described Lincoln as "strongly prejudiced against the black man." According to Bennett's calculations, Lincoln stated publicly, at least twenty-one times, that he was opposed to equal rights for Blacks. Bennett writes, "Lincoln never pretended to be a racial liberal or a social innovator. He repeatedly said, in public and in private, that he believed in white supremacy." Lincolns close friend and biographer Ward Lamon said Lincoln had an "abhorrence of negro suffrage and negro equality." According to Lincoln, God has "Made us separate." Lincoln feared whites and blacks interbreeding. A former slave turned influential abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, spoke of Lincoln as "The white man's president." 

"Abraham Lincoln was not, in the fullest sense of the word, either our man or our model. In his interests, in his associations, in his habits of thought, and in his prejudices, he was a white man. He was preeminently the white man's President, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men. He was ready and willing at any time during the first years of his administration to deny, postpone, and sacrifice the rights of humanity in the colored people to promote the welfare of the white people of this country.…he still more strangely told us that we were to leave the land in which we were born; when he refused to employ our arms in defense of the Union; when, after accepting our services as colored soldiers… he told us he would save the Union if he could with slavery; when he revoked the Proclamation of Emancipation of General Fremont; when he refused to remove the popular commander of the Army of the Potomac, in the days of its inaction and defeat, who was more zealous in his efforts to protect slavery than to suppress rebellion; when we saw all this, and more, we were at times grieved, stunned, and greatly bewildered." 

-Frederick Douglass Oration in memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876 

"If Mr. Lincoln were really an Abolition President, which he is not; if he were a friend to the Abolition movement, instead of being, as he is, its most powerful enemy...Whoever lives through the next four years will see Mr. Lincoln and his Administration attacked more bitterly for their pro-slavery truckling, than for doing any anti-slavery work. He and his party will become the best protectors of slavery where it now is...Slavery will be as safe, and safer, in the Union under such a President, than it can be under any President of a Southern Confederacy. This is our impression, and we deeply regret the facts from which it is derived." 

-Fredrick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

According to Bennett, for over two decades in Illinois as a lawyer and politician, Lincoln never supported abolitionists, rights for blacks, or their progress in that direction. Lincoln never spoke out against the state laws that did not allow blacks to gather in large numbers, learn to read, or play percussion instruments. In 1848 Lincoln supported the Illinois state law of not allowing blacks to migrate to the state and not allowing blacks citizenship. In 1836 Lincoln voted in support of denying blacks the right to vote, and he also voted for an Illinois state law that taxed blacks without representation. In 1858 Lincoln refused to sign a bill that would allow them to testify against whites in court. In Charleston, Lincoln declared, "I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship." and "I will to the very last stand by the law of this state, which forbids the marrying of white people with Negroes"

As a lawyer, Lincoln helped defend the fugitive slave law, publicly supported the fugitive slave law, and spoke out against its repeal. Nathaniel Stephens said Lincoln had a "wholehearted, one might say, serene, support of the fugitive slave law." Ward Lamon said Lincoln was the "steady though quiet opponent of abolitionist Owen Lovejoy." Donald Riddle said: "He did not make any attempt to advocate or support anti-slavery or abolitionist messages." In 1858 Lincoln declared, "I have said a hundred times, and I have now no inclination to take it back, that I believe there is no right, and ought to be no inclination in the people of the free States to enter into the slave States, and interfere with the question of slavery at all." 

When asked what he thought of having abolitionists in his party, Lincoln said: "As long as I'm not tarred with the Abolitionist brush." Bennett quotes multiple sources, such as Lincoln's close friend General James Wadsworth saying the welfare of Blacks "didn't enter into his policy at all." Donn Piatt said Lincoln "Laughed at the abolitionist as a disturbing element easily controlled." Eli Thayer said Lincoln spoke of abolitionism "In terms of contempt and derision." Abolitionist Sumner said Lincoln "does not know how to help or is not moved to help" and "I do not remember that I have had any help from him... he has no instinct or inspiration." Abolitionist John Hume stated, "The president was in constant opposition" to abolitionism. The abolitionist Journal The Liberator editorial on July 13, 1860, called Lincoln "The slave hound of Illinois" for his support of the fugitive slave law. Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered states plainly, "Abraham Lincoln was not an abolitionist."    

Bennett argues Lincoln has received the glory that the white and black abolitionists, citizens, newspaper editors, churches, members of Congress, and pastors had worked decades for. The most prominent abolitionists in the political sphere were men like Senator Sumner, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Salmon Chase, Wendell Phillips, etc. They deserve the glory that Lincoln was falsely given. Congress were the ones that abolished slavery in the territories and authorized black troops. And the people of the states, both North and South, passed the amendment to outlaw slavery after Lincoln's death.

Forever Free From African Americans

"I wish to make and to keep the distinction between the existing institution, and the extension of it, so broad, and so clear, that no honest man can misunderstand me, and no dishonest one, successfully misrepresent me." 

-Abraham Lincoln Peoria, Illinois: October 16, 1854

Lincoln never intended to end slavery where it already existed, only the extension out into the West. In December 1860, Fredrick Douglass said, "With the single exception of the question of slavery extension, Mr. Lincoln proposes no measure which can bring him into antagonistic collision with the traffickers in human flesh, either in the States or in the District of Columbia." Lincoln did not want the West to become "An asylum for slaves and n******." On October 16, 1854, Lincoln stated, "The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these [new western] territories. We want them for the homes of free white people." 

The West was to be kept for whites to be segregated from blacks' presence, live off Republican federal land grants, and become industrial. Southern agrarians were to be fenced into the South; otherwise, they would bring their despised black slaves along. Robert Fogel summarizes the abolitionist stance by quoting William Seward and Owen Lovejoy, among others, as "They were quite sincere when they assured voters that as "True republicans" they "Cared nothing for the N*****" and that the republican party aimed to make white labor respectable and honorable by keeping negroes, free and slave, out of the West." In Lincoln Unmasked, Professor Thomas DiLorenzo quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson saying, "It is the black man whom the abolitionist wishes to abolish, not slavery."

Western expansion

Ward Lamon said that originally Lincoln was not against slavery in all the western territories, only those north of the 36°30′ degrees line. However, abolitionists threatened to pull support for his election unless he stood against all western expansion. Lamon also tells us that Lincoln would rather see slavery expanded than "See the union dissolved." Lamon said of Lincoln, "It was therefore as a white man, and in the interest of white men, that he threw himself into the struggle to keep blacks out of the Territories. He did not want them there either as slaves or freemen…" Bennett quotes Lincoln warning whites that if slavery was allowed in the territories, "Negro equality will be abundant, as every white laborer will have occasion to regret when he is elbowed from his plow or his anvil by slave n******." According to DiLorenzo, Indiana (which voted for Lincoln) despised blacks so much that they gave out a $500 fine to anyone who encouraged blacks to come within their state. And ten years of prison for marrying a black. Illinois senator Lyman Trumbull, quoted by DiLorenzo, said, "Our people want nothing to do with the negro." It seems Republicans believed in a form of secession based on race rather than states.

"We, the Republican Party, are the white man's party. We are for the free white man, and for making white labor acceptable and honorable, which it can never be when Negro slave labor is brought into competition with it." 

-Lyman Trumbull Illinois Republican, United States Senator Quoted in The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War by Kenneth M. Stampp Oxford U Press 1981

Republicans did not care for equality with blacks, and they wanted separation from them. The Northern whites worked hardest to be segregated from the presence of blacks, while southerners worked with, ate with, lived with, played with,  and went to church with blacks.

"Many of those attaching themselves to the Republican party...were not in sympathy with Abolitionism. They were utterly opposed to immediate emancipation, or for that matter, to emancipation of any kind. They wanted slavery to remain where it was, and were perfectly willing that is should be undisturbed. They disliked the blacks, and did not want to have them freed, fearing that if set at liberty they would overrun what was then free soil."        

-John F Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

The fight over the extension of slavery was political. Northern industrialists needed the West free of blacks and agricultural interests. Dr. Charles Pace wrote in Lincoln As He Really Was, "Lincoln was an abolitionist when it suited him." And "Abolitionist activity was rising fast, fueled by northern capitalist and political interests needing an issue to neutralize the agrarian south." Lincoln and northern whites would fight against its extension into the West when it was politically helpful. Secretary of  State William Seward said: "The motive of those who protested against the extension of slavery had always really been a concern for the welfare of the white man, and not an unnatural sympathy for the negro." They had less concern with slaves in the South; as John Hume wrote of Lincoln, "He was opposed to slavery more because it was a public nuisance than because of its injustice to the oppressed black man."

"To protect, defend, and perpetuate slavery in the states where it existed Abraham Lincoln was not less ready than any other President to draw the sword of the nation. He was ready to execute all the supposed guarantees of the United States Constitution in favor of the slave system anywhere inside the slave states. He was willing to pursue, recapture, and send back the fugitive slave to his master, and to suppress a slave rising for liberty, though his guilty master were already in arms against the Government. The race to which we belong were not the special objects of his consideration."                                   

-Frederick Douglass Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876

Before military defeats and public opinion began to change, abolitionists were condemned by the President. When Union general John Fremont emancipated slaves in federal occupied Missouri, Lincoln recalled the orders and relieved Fremont of his command. When Union general David Hunter issued general order number 11, declaring all slaves in SC/GA/FL to be "Forever free," Lincoln revoked the proclamation. Hunter was then pressured into disbanding the regiment made up of freed slaves he had begun to form. Late in 1862, Lincoln supported slavery continuing in Union-held territory in V.A and L.A and encouraging the slave owners to peacefully come back into the Union. Mark Neely JR wrote that in 1861, "He more than once actually forced others who were trying to free slaves to cease doing so." Not surprising when Lincolns' wife, Mary, was from a slave-owning family in Kentucky. In August 1862, Adam Gurowski summer up Lincoln's actions writing in his diary, "The president is indefatigable in his efforts to save slavery." 

Even after the war, Lincoln, the North, and the Republicans maintained slavery in states like Delaware and Kentucky. Lincoln had no problem calling on men from the slave states of the Upper South to suppress the rebellion in the Cotton States. 

"The Republican party does not propose to abolish slavery anywhere and is decidedly opposed to Abolition agitation. It is not even, by the confession of its President-elect, in favor of the repeal of that thrice-accursed and flagrantly unconstitutional Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850." 

-Frederick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

In his book Battle Hymns; the Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War, Christian McWhirter quotes Federal general Phillip Kearny who said, "I think as much of a rebel as I do of an abolitionist." Today we have presented to us the idea of Northern tolerance and southern bigotry, but the reality was something else entirely. 

Abraham Lincoln the Great Emancipator? 

"If Mr. Lincoln had been told, when he entered on the Presidency, that before his term of office would expire he would be hailed as "The Great Emancipator," he would have treated the statement as equal to one of his own best jokes."

 -John Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

"Never did a man achieve more fame for what he did not do and for what he never intended to do," writes Bennett. Today we are brought up to believe the Emancipation Proclamation (E.P.) was part of the desired agenda to end slavery by Abraham Lincoln. Or worse, we are told with this presidential Proclamation; that all slaves were made forever free. Thus Lincoln was the great emancipator who ended slavery. But that story is far from the truth. 

The E.P. did not apply to slavery within the United States, and it did not free a single slave. According to Hume, Missouri abolitionists wanted the Proclamation applied to their state, and Lincoln refused the request. Instead, the E.P. applied only to Confederate-controlled areas and not to the Northern slave states still in the Union. A Confederate state only had to rejoin the Union, and slavery would be protected. Hume writes, "It was not ...intended to help the slave but to chastise the master. It was to be in  punishment of treason…The proclamation, it will be recollected, was issued in two parts separated by one hundred days. The first part gave the Rebels warning that the second would follow if, in the meanwhile, they did not give up their rebellion. All they had to do to save slavery was cease their treasonable practices." William Seward said of Lincoln's proclamation, "Where he could, he didn't. Where he did, he couldn't." The London Spectator, on October 11, 1862, read, "The Union government liberates the enemy's slaves as it would the enemy's cattle, simply to weaken them in the conflict. The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States." 

The Proclamation would end with the war, and any slave freed by it would become subject to local state laws. The document did not apply to the legality of slavery. Lincoln wrote, it was "Merely a war measure" and "Have effect only from its being an exercise of war power." Lincoln stated, "It would have no effect upon the children of the slaves born hereafter."

The Proclamation was given at the end of 1862 after the North suffered multiple setbacks. Some viewed it as an act of desperation. Lincoln gave the Proclamation as a war measure, "As a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion." The war lasted longer than anticipated, and abolitionists put pressure on Lincoln; states threatened to withhold men and their support unless Lincoln helped the Northern war effort by going after slavery to weaken the South. Lincoln and his cabinet were concerned that a rebellion would start in the North if they did not begin emancipation and certainly did not want to lose some of their most ardent supporters.

Others said its purpose was to encourage slave revolts in the South. To encourage slaves to arise and kill women, children, and masters in a revolution while the men fought at the front. The Harrisonburg Patriot and Union newspaper called it a "Cold-blooded invitation to insurrection and butchery." Of course, many slaves, innocent women, and children would be killed if an uprising happened, but it was endorsed so long as it helped bring traitors under the master's authority in D.C.

The Emancipation Proclamation

The E.P. was not Lincoln’s desire, but he was "forced into glory," as Bennett would say. Bennet quotes Lincoln, "I am driven to it." And he said he had great "reluctance" about beginning emancipation. Abolitionists set up a meeting for September 24 with a plan to withhold support for the war and to call on Lincoln to resign. Knowing this meeting and the growing feeling amongst various state governors and the people, Lincoln issued the preliminary Proclamation just two days before the meeting. Lincoln said on July 12, "The pressure in this direction [immediate emancipation] is still upon me and is increasing." Lincoln said, "For a length of time, it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure." Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered quotes Lincoln writing an admirer, saying, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess that events have controlled me." In his diary, Adam Gurowski wrote, "The patriots of both houses... the American people whipped Mr. Lincoln into the glory of having issued the emancipation proclamation." Bennett described the E.P in complete contradiction to how many school children understand it when he wrote, “The high point of a brilliant campaign in favor of slavery not freedom, and was designed not to emancipate all slaves immediately but to protect the emancipation of all slaves." 

As Bennett shows in his book, the E.P. was a conservative pushback against the radicals. On July 17, 1862, congress passed the second confiscation act. This act declared all rebel slaves in the confederacy "Forever free." On September 22, 1862, Lincoln signed the preliminary emancipation nullifying the emancipation act of congress, re-enslaving slaves. The emancipation proclamation did not free slaves in the United States, and it did not free any slave that the confiscation act would not have. It was a reaction to the radical abolitionists in congress. As Bennett writes, "The proclamation had as its purpose and effect the checking of the radical [abolitionist] program." 

Both DiLorenzo's Lincoln Unmasked and Bennett correct multiple false quotes attributed to Lincoln or those taken out of context to claim he was an abolitionist or desired equality among the races. I would recommend both authors to those interested. I will let Lincoln's close friend and admirer Ward Lamon sum up Lincoln's opinions on the emancipation proclamation.

"He did so with avowed reluctance...he never at any time favored the admission of negroes into the body of electors...he claimed that those who were incidentally liberated by the federal arms were poor-spirited, lazy and slothful...he longed to see them transported to Hayti, central America, Africa, or anywhere so that they might in no event, and in no way, participate in the government of his country...he was no Abolitionist in the popular sense."

-Ward Lamon The Life Of Abraham Lincoln From His Birth To His Inauguration As President James R. Osgood And Company, 1872

The Corwin Amendment

As Professor DiLorenzo points out, the previously proposed 13th amendment was called the Corwin Amendment; and it was something Lincoln supported. The amendment would forever allow slavery in the United States and make it unconstitutional to abolish it. It reads:

No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

In Lincoln's first inaugural address, he supported the amendment saying, "holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." According to DiLorenzo, Lincoln then sent a letter to the governors of the states transmitting the approved amendment. He told New York Senator William Seward to advocate for it in the Senate. He also instructed Seward to pass a federal law that would repeal the personal liberty laws in some Northern states used to nullify the federal Fugitive Slave Act. DiLorenzo sees Lincoln's inaugural address as the most pro-slavery speech given by a president. 

"Lincoln's first inaugural address...is probably the most powerful defense of slavery ever made by an American politician. In the speech Lincoln denies having any intention to interfere with Southern slavery; supports the federal Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, which compelled citizens of non-slave states to capture runaway slaves; and also supported a constitutional amendment known as the Corwin Amendment that would have prohibited the federal government from ever interfering in Southern slavery." 

-Thomas DiLorenzo The Lincoln Myth: Ideological Cornerstone of the America Empire LewRockwell.com 

Lincoln the Ultimate Segregationist

"Horrified at the thought of the mixing blood by the white and black races: agreed for once---a thousand times agreed... A separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation...Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization; ... Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be."

-Abraham Lincoln Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 2 Speech at Springfield, Illinois June 26, 1857

Lincoln never wanted slaves freed and made equal. Instead, he wanted to make America white from "Sea to shining sea," as Bennett stated. He promoted the removal of slaves from America back to Africa. In his July 17th 1858 speech in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races." The same year at Ottawa, he declared, "If all earthly power were given  me...my first impulse would be to free all the slaves and send them to Liberia."

It is true that Lincoln disliked slavery, but not as much as white and blacks living together. So Lincoln spent many thousands of tax dollars on his colonization plan to send the future freed slaves back to Africa. He either wanted them deported or in their all-black state. While in the White House, he held a meeting with free blacks; he asked them to lead by example for future freed slaves. 

"You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffer very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side….It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated…You may believe you can live in Washington or elsewhere in the United States the remainder of your life [as easily], perhaps more so than you can in any foreign country… an extremely selfish view of the case. There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain with us."

-Abraham Lincoln Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes August 14, 1862, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 5.Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865

Conclusion

According to our "greatest" president, for the good of humanity, free blacks should lead by example and go live in a foreign country. As a member of the Illinois legislature, Lincoln urged the legislature "To appropriate money for colonization in order to remove Negroes from the state and prevent miscegenation." In 1853 Lincoln gave a speech to the Springfield colonization society; his colonization plan would "Free slave holders from the troublesome presence of free Negroes." When pushing for his colonization plan, he said, "Where there is a will, there is a way." 

He promoted three aspects of his agenda. Gradual emancipation, compensation to slave owners, and colonization in Africa or Central America. His friend Henry Whitney said there was nothing besides preserving the Union that Lincoln felt more important. Ward Lamon said Lincoln "Zealously and persistently devised plans for the deportation of the negro." In the diary of Gideon Welles, we read, "Following the preliminary Proclamation, and as part of the plan…was the deportation and colonization of the colored race."

In Lincoln’s first state of the Union address, he suggested free blacks be included in his colonization plan when he said: "It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization." Lincoln called for three constitutional amendments for gradual emancipation, compensation, and colonization in his second inaugural address. He stated, "I cannot make it better known than it already is that I strongly favor colonization." On December 31, 1862, Lincoln signed a contract to send 500 American-born Negroes to an island off the coast of Haiti; many died, and the survivors were brought back to America. Until his death, Lincoln negotiated with European nations to deport blacks to Africa. 

"Mr. Lincoln is quite a genuine Representative of American prejudiced and negro hatred and far more concerned for the preservation of slavery...showing all his inconsistencies, his pride of race and blood, his contempt for Negroes and his canting hypocrisy…Mr. Lincoln takes care in urging his colonization scheme to furnish a weapon to all the ignorant and base."

 -Frederick Douglass The Life and Writings of Fredrick Douglass International Publishers Co 1950

In short, Lincoln was the ultimate segregationist. He didn't just want blacks removed from schools, restaurants, and work areas; he wanted them removed from the country. 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Collapse of the Bison Population in the US: Evaluating the Legislation of HR. 921

Over the course of the 19th century a significant environmental cataclysm befell the United States’ Great Plains. The bison which roamed the plains for millennia went from a population ranging between 30-50 million in the early 1800s to less than 1,000 at the turn of the century. Multiple historiographical traditions exist in attempting to discern what occurred and what ultimately spelled the death knell for the great buffalo herds, however, the importance of consulting primary sources can still elucidate greater understanding in comprehending the complexity of the rapid downfall of the bison.

Roy Williams explains.

Indians hunting the bison by Karl Bodmer.

For the last century, images of bison carcasses and skeletons piled high have haunted the memories of American conservationists. Artistic renderings such as American Progress by John Gast which shows the steady retreat of the bison and the Native Americans who depended upon it at the march of civilization as a hallmark of the ideology of manifest destiny. Artistic renderings also show the wanton mass killing of bison from settlers shooting the animals from trains for cheap thrills. What then caused this massive collapse of the bison populations? The answer, like most of is buried within a labyrinth of complex interactions.

Popular mythology has created a narrative built upon the legacy of the Indian Wars and the genocidal heritage of United States policy towards Native Americans in arguing that the Reconstruction era United States government willfully and intentionally sought to destroy the bison as a form of ecocide and biological warfare against Great Plains Native Americans tribes in attempting to cut off their primary form of subsistence and force them into state sponsored subservience in reservations. While Native Americans of the Great Plains had always depended on the bison as a supplemental source of food, before the introduction of European horses and diseases, they primarily depended upon agriculture. The addition of European diseases such as smallpox forced Great Plains Native Americans to adapt and reconfigure their way of life to nomadic sole dependence upon the bison for subsistence, trade, and political autonomy. This change put additional stress on an animal population which already had to contend with the dynamic and volatile nature of the Great Plains environment. Each year natural factors such as wolf predation, disease, and drought significantly reduced bison numbers. The introduction of European horses also dramatically increased hunting efficiency leading to greater harvests and additional pressure on herd populations. These numbers could rebound with steady levels of human predation but could not endure multiple upheavals which would ultimately lead to their near extinction.

Phillip Sheridan

One of the most frequently cited primary source examples of United States government complicity in destroying the bison is the 1875 speech of Phillip Sheridan before the Texas legislature. Supposedly, the Texas legislature was considering conservation measures and protections for bison to reduce the number of market hunters who were driving the southern herd to near extinction. Phillip Sheridan is cited as appearing before the legislature to oppose these protections arguing that,

 “These men [buffalo hunters] have done more in the last two years, and will do in the next year, more to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular Army has done in the last thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary; it is well known that an army losing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage. For the sake of lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated. Then your prairies can be covered with speckled cattle and festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of an advanced civilization.”

The only problem with this primary source rests in the reality that Phillip Sheridan never appeared before the Texas Legislature in 1875 because there never was any consideration by the Texas legislature to protect the southern bison herd. No archival data supports this primary source as being legitimate, the only appearance of this source rests in the memoirs of a hide hunter named John Cooke, with The Border and the Buffalo multiple years after the supposed encounter. More troubling however, is the reality of another primary source which flies directly in the face of historiographical traditions claiming a conspiratorial link between United States government’s policy against the bison.

Legislation

The legislation of HR. 921 stands as one of the most important primary sources in reconsidering the collapse of the bison populations. If the United States government intentionally committed a conspiracy of destroying the bison to force Great Plains into subservience on the reservation system, why did both the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in 1874 introduce a bill to regulate the hunting of bison only to Native Americans? Congressman Fort of Illinois introduced the bill with the goal of stopping the early extermination of the bison, recognizing that bison were “killed every year in utter wantonness without any object whatever except to destroy them.”  The fact that H.R. 921 passed in the House with a tally of 132 ayes and the nays remaining uncounted, shows that there was ample interest in protecting the bison from the onslaught of illegal hide hunters. H.R. 921 was designed to protect bison and give favorable hunting rights to Native Americans, stating, “That it shall hereafter be unlawful for any person who is not an Indian to kill, wound, or in any manner destroy any female buffalo, of any age.”

H.R. 921 ultimately failed to pass, dying at President Grant’s desk due to a pocket veto, however the significance of its passage in both the house of Representatives and Senate cannot be understated. The most likely culprit of the collapse of the bison of the Great Plains rests in the ascendancy of market hunting. For a time, it was profitable to hunt bison on a vast industrial scale. These hunts prioritized female bison for their tongues and robes providing the best meat and the best quality leather for production. The industrial revolution occurring in the east fueled the need for more leather products putting unsustainable strain on the bison populations. For a time, bison boomtowns popped up overnight in the northwest territories trading goods at extortionate rates to Native Americans who had honed and perfected their hunting techniques and could trade bison materials for these goods. This interaction in addition to the larger share of market hunting by white hide hunters ultimately spelled doom for the bison populations. The reason for this conclusion is not revolutionary in nature, the bison followed the same trends as any other animal in the United States that experienced the pressures of market hunting. The beaver of the northeast and northwestern United States was reduced to virtual extinction from market hunting. The whitetail deer and alligator of the southeast were also led to near extinction from the combined forces of deforestation and market hunting which prioritized meat and leather over the preservation of animal species. The collapse of the bison provides a cautionary tale of the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon the natural environment. Without the presence of clear and strict conservation measures, environmental cataclysm can and will occur again. Rather than being a story of intentional and willful political malevolence, the tale of the bison represents the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon nature.

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References

Dodge, Richard Irving. The Hunting Grounds of the Great West. 1877. The Newberry Library. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.americanwest.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Detail/the-hunting-grounds-of-the-great-west.-a-description-of-the-plains-game-and-indians-of-the-great-north-american-desert/4455563?item=4455597.

Flores, Dan. The Natural West. University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.

Gast, John. American Progress. Oil on canvas. Brooklyn, New York: Autry Museum of the American West, 1872.

Geist, Valerius. Buffalo Nation. Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 1996.

Isenberg, Andrew C. The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Kindy, Dave. “How Buffalo Bill and a Civil War General saved Yellowstone National Park.” The Washington Post, March, 6, 2022.

Krech, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History. New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.

Library of Congress. The Far West-Shooting Buffalo on the Line of the Kansas-Pacific Railroad. 1871. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington D.C. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c33890/?st=image.

Meriwether, Lewis, and William Clark, Jonathan Carver, and Alexander Mackenzie. The Travels of Capts. Lewis & Clarke. Philadelphia: Hubbard Lester, 1809.

Protection of Buffalo. HR 921. 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, Pt.3: 2104-2109.

Ramsay, Crooks. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 1849, 31sr Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 550), 1022.

Sandoz, Mari. The Buffalo Hunters. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1978.

Wade, Mason. The Journals of Francis Parkman. vol 2 New York: Harper, 1947.

The 1864 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House in the US Civil War

The 1864 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House was the second major battle in the Overland Campaign during the US Civil War. Following the inconclusive Battle of the Wilderness, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's army disengaged and strategically shifted to the southeast, to lure Lee into battle under more favorable conditions. Grant was committed to advancing after the Wilderness, recognizing that Lincoln’s presidency depended on the outcome. Given Spotsylvania's location at the southernmost point of the Wilderness, it was unsurprising that this town became the next target. The timing of Grant's move, however, remained the solitary uncertainty.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The 1864 Battle of Spottsylvania. By Kurz & Allison.

The Union forces consisted of approximately 100,000 troops from the Army of the Potomac (AoP), led by General George Meade, and an additional 15,000 soldiers from the independent IX Corps, commanded by General Ambrose Burnside. Both Meade and Burnside reported to General Grant, who oversaw the entire operation. On the opposing side, General Robert E Lee's Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) was estimated to have around 55,000 men, having suffered approximately 11,000 casualties during the Wilderness battle. Notably, two of the three corps within Lee's army had temporary commanders due to illness and injury: Second Corps under Maj  Gen AP Hill would be led by Maj Gen Jubal Early due to Hill’s illness, and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson would replace Lt. Gen. James Longstreet in command of the First Corps following his wounding on May 6. Third Corps remained under Gen Richard Ewell’s command. Lee visited A.P. Hill's headquarters and found him very ill in bed. He had considered Early to replace the wounded Longstreet but decided to promote R H. Anderson who had previously been in the I Corps before Jackson's death. With Hill sick Lee assigned Early temporary command of the III Corps. Gordon was promoted to command Early's division.

All these arrangements were temporary. Hill returned to command the III Corps and Early returned to his division and Gordon was assigned Johnson's division. When Ewell was sent to command the Richmond district, Early was promoted to command the II Corps and Ramseur took Early's division.

General Lee found himself uncertain about Grant's intentions after the Wilderness. Reconnaissance revealed that the river crossing equipment at Germanna Ford across the Rappahannock River was removed, indicating that Grant did not plan to withdraw as his predecessors had done. This left Lee contemplating whether the Union Army was heading east toward Fredericksburg or moving south. Lee recognized the significance of the crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House, which served as the intersection between Brock Road and the road leading to Fredericksburg, and hence was a central point for either destination.

Lee instructed his artillery chief to construct a road through the woods, connecting the Confederate position at the Wilderness to the Catharpin Road leading south. Although Lee did not emphasize the need for urgency, General Anderson and his troops were eager to leave behind the devastation of the burning forest and corpses in the Wilderness, prompting them to commence their march around 10 pm on May 7th. The arrival of the ANV at the critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House just moments before the AoP was a result of a delay in the Union movement and the construction of the road by the Confederates.

May 7

On the evening of May 7th, Grant issued orders for the AoP to commence their march towards Spotsylvania Court House. The overarching strategy devised by General Grant aimed to interpose his forces between the ANV and Richmond and to engage Lee in an open region so he could take advantage of his numerical superiority.

Grant ordered an advance along two separate routes to reach Spotsylvania Court House, which lay approximately 10 miles to the southeast. One of these routes, the more direct path, was assigned to Warren's V Corps, who would proceed along the Brock Road. Following closely behind them was Maj Gen Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps. Maj Gen John Sedgwick's VI Corps was directed to head towards Chancellorsville via the Orange Plank Road, before eventually turning south. Burnside's IX Corps was bringing up the rear, following the same route as Sedgwick's forces.

May 8

Confederate Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was ordered to prevent the Federals from reaching Spotsylvania. Fitzhugh Lee led a division of Stuart's cavalry in a fierce battle against the Union cavalry for control of the Brock Road that lasted 2 days. The Union troopers faced additional difficulties in clearing the road due to obstacles. Meanwhile, Wade Hampton and Rooney Lee's cavalrymen halted the progress of Colonel J. Irvin Gregg's brigade at Corbin's Bridge on the Catharpin Road. Another confrontation unfolded between Wesley Merritt's Union division and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, who had taken positions behind barricades on Brock Road, approximately a mile south of Todd's Tavern. Intense fighting ensued, leading to a stalemate by late afternoon. Todd’s Tavern was at the crossroads of Brock Road and Catharpin Road. This was the finish line of the race; for the army with control of this junction, Spotsylvania was just a bit down the road. That is why the indirect route Burnside & Sedgwick took was so critical: that route takes them beyond Todd’s Tavern without going through the intersection there, or to take an eastern or southern flanking. It means that Todd’s Tavern is an inherently unholdable base.

As darkness fell, General Sheridan decided to halt the advance and ordered his men to set up camp at Todd's Tavern. The first Union infantry began moving at 8 pm, but their advance was plagued by traffic jams. When Meade reached Todd's Tavern after midnight he was infuriated to see Sheridan's sleeping cavalrymen and ordered them to resume their road-clearing operation.

General Lee's forces were compelled to retreat from Todd's Tavern and regrouped at a strategically advantageous position called Laurel Hill, located on the south side of the Brock Road. This hill was the last defensible position north of Spotsylvania, and losing it would also mean surrendering control of the crucial crossroads at the courthouse. Fortunately for the Confederates, Anderson arrived at Spotsylvania on the morning of May 8, positioning his troops within two miles of Laurel Hill, which was a low ridge just south of the Spindle farm clearing.

Meade ordered the infantry to attack the cavalry positions. Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery valiantly defended the Alsop farm, causing a delay in the Union's advancement. Meanwhile, the cavalrymen established a defensive line on Laurel Hill. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, Lee called upon Anderson's infantry, who had already reached the Block House Bridge on the Po River and were having breakfast. Anderson promptly dispatched two infantry brigades and an artillery battalion.

Laurel Hill was the Confederate center of gravity; if they could push their way beyond, it would put Lee on the defensive with fewer and less bloodshed would be loss.  The Union high command did not know how many soldiers had filtered through to Laurel Hill when they originally arrived. The Confederates beat them there by a matter of minutes. If there was not a delaying action by the Confederates the Union would have easily beat them to it because the Confederates had a head start to Spotsylvania due to their interior lines and had unintentionally began withdrawing after the fire in the forest at the Wilderness.

Union Major General Gouverneur K. Warren was under the impression that Spotsylvania was within his reach, and led his Fifth Corps up the hill. To his surprise, he encountered Anderson's corps opposing him, which had arrived at Laurel Hill just as Warren's troops approached from the north, coming within 100 yards. Warren's attempts to push back the Confederates were met with significant casualties, leading both sides to begin fortifying their positions.

Later in the day, Sedgwick's VI Corps arrived near Laurel Hill and extended Warren's line to the east. At 7 pm both corps launched a coordinated assault, but they were met with heavy enemy fire and were unable to make significant progress. They tried to maneuver around Anderson's right flank, only to be caught off guard by the arrival of divisions from Ewell's Second Corps, who were there to repel them once again. Meade had lost the race despite having the inside track, based on the existing roads.

The ensuing disagreement between Meade and Sheridan regarding the effectiveness of the cavalry arm and its role in the movement sparked a quarrel. Sheridan firmly believed that he could defeat Stuart if given the opportunity. When this was reported to Grant, he responded, "Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it." This sequence of events led to the Battle of Yellow Tavern, but was also responsible for the absence of Union cavalry for the remainder of the battle at Spotsylvania, which would delay a full comprehension of the battlefield.

While Warren's unsuccessful attack on Laurel Hill was taking place on the morning of May 8, Hancock's II Corps had reached Todd's Tavern and established defensive positions on the Catharpin Road, protecting the rear of the Union army.

May 9

Grant made several attempts to break the Confederate line over the next few days, employing various strategies. The Union troops also began entrenching themselves as they prepared for the ongoing battle. On the night of May 8, the outnumbered Confederate forces entrenched along a 4-mile stretch, adopting a defensive strategy that would become a hallmark of this battle and continue to be utilized well into the 20th century. The Confederate line extended from the Po River, encompassing the Laurel Hill line, crossing the Brock Road, forming a horseshoe shape, and extending south beyond the courthouse intersection. However, the exposed salient known as the "Mule Shoe," which extended over a mile in front of the main line, posed a vulnerability in this arrangement. Despite this, it was deemed necessary to incorporate the high ground to Anderson's right.

Tragically, during the inspection of his VI Corps line, Sedgwick was fatally shot by a Confederate sharpshooter using a Whitworth rifle from a distance of approximately 1000 feet. Sedgwick's death was instantaneous, occurring shortly after he famously remarked, "... they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."

Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps to cross the Po River and locate Lee's left flank. However, upon noticing Hancock's movement, Lee swiftly shifted two divisions to counter the Union forces at Block House Bridge, successfully forcing them to retreat across the river. When Hancock advanced, he saw that the Confederates were heavily entrenched and did not attack. This delay led to the kind of set-piece battle Lee was expert in.

Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox's division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan's cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee's right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.

May 10

Grant conducted a series of probing assaults along the entire length of the Confederate line in an attempt to identify weaknesses. He observed that Lee had concentrated his forces in front of Hancock's position, effectively controlling both Block House Bridge and the southern area of the Po. Jubal Early launched an attack on General Barlow's position, which forced Hancock to shift his corps westward for support. Consequently, Warren found himself alone facing Laurel Hill and was eager to launch an immediate attack. However, the presence of a grove of dead pine trees obstructed the assault, diminishing its impact.

Upton’s Attack

On the Union left Colonel Emory Upton’s brigade faced the Mule Shoe, with Burnside positioned on his flank. The Mule Shoe, located on the right side of the Confederate line, protruded beyond the rest of the trenches, making it a vulnerable point in Lee's defenses at Spotsylvania. The Mule Shoe's western edge later became infamous as the "Bloody Angle."

Colonel Emory Upton gained recognition for his successful leadership in attacking entrenched positions during the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House. He introduced a novel tactic for assaulting Confederate entrenchments, which foreshadowed the trench warfare strategies employed in World War I. Instead of the traditional method of advancing slowly in wide battle lines and firing at the enemy, Upton devised a novel strategy. Instead of adhering to the traditional formation, he organized his regiments into a three-by-four-column arrangement, opting not to halt and fire while crossing the field, but rather to charge directly ahead.  Instead of having his troops fire as they advanced, Upton organized his brigade to charge the enemy's position in columns, without pausing to engage in gunfire. The primary objective was to swiftly reach the enemy's fortifications, aiming to overpower them before they could mount a strong defense. The objective was to overwhelm the defenders in a specific sector by rapidly advancing with a large number of troops, without pausing to reload and fire. Referred to as the "stacking method of attack," this approach involved engaging the enemy in close combat using bayonets and rifle butts, rather than wasting time on firing shots.

Emory Upton’s improvised charge at Spottsylvania had a profound impact on the course of the Civil War and revolutionized the tactics employed in warfare. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the traditional infantry tactic of advancing in a long line, he opted for a different strategy. It was widely recognized that the conventional two-line attack, known as "Close Order," was highly vulnerable to artillery fire when executed across an exposed field. The high casualties sustained during such attacks resulted in diminished effectiveness at the focal point of the assault. Not only did this approach result in a significantly reduced number of soldiers reaching the enemy's fortifications, but even if the entrenchments were breached, there were insufficient forces to break the line or hold it against a counterattack.

Upton's innovative approach was inspired during a reconnaissance mission alongside Lieutenant Ranald MacKenzie, a young engineer. MacKenzie had been assigned the task of identifying a suitable location for Upton's regiments to strike the Confederate line. Earlier in the day, Union infantrymen had successfully pushed back a portion of the Confederate skirmish line, which was defended by Brigadier General George Doles' Georgia brigade. Doles, however, failed to reestablish the line, granting MacKenzie and Upton an unobstructed view of the enemy's position. Upon observation, they noticed a sharp swale on their right, partially shielding them from a battery of Richmond Howitzers positioned within Doles' line. Additionally, the presence of a ridge directly ahead provided ample cover for the advancing Union forces as they traversed the open field.

Upton devised a brilliant strategy that set his plan apart from previous military tactics employed during the Civil War. Rather than send all of his men in one large charge (e.g., Pickett’s Charge), or en echelon (e.g., Hood and Longstreet on day 2 at Gettysburg), or in waves (e.g., Fredericksburg), Upton opted for a more calculated approach. He intended to provide substantial support for the attack by moving his column forward, breaking through the Rebel line, and holding the ground long enough for additional troops to exploit the breach. To ensure the success of his assault, Upton ordered an artillery bombardment on the targeted line and prepared his men to charge across an open field. One might question the efficacy of this compact formation, as it seemingly remained susceptible to artillery fire, particularly from the flank. Yet, the specific topography of the Mule Shoe battlefield played a crucial role in making this alignment the right choice.

However, despite his meticulous planning, an unforeseen event occurred that disrupted his strategy. Prior to Upton's planned attack, Major General Governeur Warren, commander of the V Corps, made an appeal to George Meade, urging him to initiate the assault ahead of schedule at 4 p.m. Unfortunately, Warren's attack was repelled, causing a delay in Upton's scheduled attack time. This delay was a result of a lack of communication, as no one informed Gershom Mott, who was supposed to provide support for Upton's assault. Consequently, Mott advanced against the tip of the Mule Shoe Salient, assuming he was coordinating with Upton, only to face defeat like Warren. Regrettably, Upton remained unaware of Mott's failed attempt.

Finally, at 6:10 p.m. on May 10, 1864, Upton's men commenced their assault. Upton led a force of twelve regiments against the salient. His men advanced in a line of columns, with rifles unloaded, bayonets fixed, and marching at a rapid pace. Initially, their attack successfully penetrated the center of the Mule Shoe, but the intense fighting that ensued made it difficult to hold the ground. The success of the assault relied heavily on the supporting regiments also launching their attacks to secure the salient. However, due to the allocation of all available troops to other fronts, Upton's supporting regiments were unable to join the assault. As a result, Upton was compelled to withdraw his forces due to the enemy's artillery fire and the increasing arrival of Confederate reinforcements.

Upton ordered the artillery bombardment of the line he was going to attack. He readied his men to charge 200 yards across an open field. Realizing that advances in musketry had made obsolete the centuries-old infantry tactic of having troops attack in a long line, firing—and being slaughtered—as they went, he chose a different approach. Upton decided that his brigade would rush the enemy fortifications in columns, without slowing to stop and fire. The idea was to reach the enemy as quickly as possible.

Upton's forces managed to breach the first two lines of advanced rifle pits, successfully overpowering the defenders. Upton's attack carried the first two lines of advanced rifle pits but became bogged down within the main Confederate position. Engaging in intense hand-to-hand combat, the attacking units resorted to bayonets and rifle butts as they struggled to unleash volleys of fire. The lack of command and coordination within the attacking units made it difficult to sustain the assault. While waiting for reinforcements, it became evident that the timing of Mott's support attack was premature, resulting in a disjointed and piecemeal offensive. Ultimately, they were overpowered and had to retreat.. It was clear that had his support group charged with him, he would have held the position.

Despite the ultimate failure of the assault, Upton's innovative approach to advancing against entrenched positions garnered recognition and praise. His promotion to brigadier general on the same evening highlighted the significance of his strategic breakthrough. The linear infantry attack, a centuries-old tactic, was rendered obsolete by Upton's successful demonstration of a more effective method. Grant, observing the battle, gained valuable insights from Upton's assault, which influenced his subsequent plans 2 days later. Building upon Upton's concept, Hancock modified and implemented the columnar assault strategy.

Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox's division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan's cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee's right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.

May 11

Although the previous day’s battle had not gone well, Grant now better understood the line that Lee was defending, and he was optimistic that Upton’s innovative concept would work if supported, and if accomplished with an entire corps. To move his line around to make such an attack, he spent much of May 11 moving Hancock closer to the Mule Shoe while having Burnside attack the eastern side of the salient.

Grant’s optimism is encapsulated in his often-cited report to Secretary Stanton that although his losses were high, so were the enemies, and that “…I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

Meanwhile, Lee received reports suggesting that Grant was preparing to withdraw to Fredericksburg. In anticipation of a potential pursuit, Lee ordered the withdrawal of artillery from the Mule Shoe. Amidst a heavy downpour, General Allegheny Johnson's men could hear the noise created by Hancock's troops. Initially, this noise was interpreted as a sign of withdrawal, but suspicions arose, leading to the order for the artillery to return. Unfortunately, this order was not received until 3:30 am on May 12, a mere 12 hours before Hancock's assault.

Yellow Tavern

On May 11, General J.E.B. Stuart and the Confederate cavalry made a stand against the advancing Union cavalry near Yellow Tavern, which was located six miles north of Richmond. The Union troops, under the command of General Philip Sheridan, greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces, with a two-to-one advantage. The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately, Sheridan's men emerged victorious. The Confederacy suffered a significant blow as General Stuart was mortally wounded during the battle.

May 12

General Grant assembled a force of 20,000 soldiers from the Second Corps, positioning them opposite the tip of the salient. General Lee, recognizing the movement of the Federal troops, mistakenly believed that Grant was preparing to retreat. Consequently, he ordered the removal of his artillery from the area. The attack on May 12th involved nearly 24 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, among the fiercest witnessed during the Civil War. The assault, based on the strategy developed by Upton, was executed by multiple corps against a better-prepared, albeit somewhat surprised, Army of Northern Virginia. Although the assault was scheduled to commence at 4 am, it was delayed by over half an hour due to heavy rain and thick mist.

Hancock's men serendipitously struck the Confederate line where mainly infantry remained. Now called the Bloody Angle, recent analysis has shown that if the attack had occurred on time, no artillery was in the salient at that time. Barlow’s division swung around to the eastern tip of the Mule Shoe, overpowering the brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart. This successful maneuver resulted in the capture of both Steuart and his division commander, Allegheny Johnson. On the right side of Barlow's division, Brig. Gen. David B. Birney's division encountered stronger resistance from the brigades led by Col. William Monaghan and Brig. Gen. James A. Walker, famously known as the Stonewall Brigade. Despite the Confederates' gunpowder being compromised by the rain, they fiercely engaged in close combat. The Union troops continued their advance southward along the western edge of the Mule Shoe.

The attack had breached the lines again and took thousands of rebel prisoners. The Stonewall Brigade was crushed by the initial attack with many killed and captured. .  Only 200 men escaped the onslaught and the Brigade was dissolved into a single regiment for the rest of the war. The attack would have been devastating if it weren't for the quick thinking and reaction of Confederate Gen. John Gordon, who ordered his men to shore up the Stonewall brigades sector and to seal off the center to prevent a bigger breakthrough. Burnside was ordered to attack on the left side of Barlow's Division to pin down and expand the breakthrough, but as in previous assaults,  Burnside was halted by Confederate reinforcements; another attack around 2 PM resulted in a stalemate because both Burnside and the Confederate troops attacked each other at the same time.

Although the initial success in dismantling a significant portion of the Mule Shoe salient was achieved, a flaw in the Union plan became apparent: there had been no strategic consideration on how to capitalize on this breakthrough. The 15,000 infantrymen from Hancock's II Corps became concentrated within a narrow front, approximately half a mile wide, resulting in the loss of unit cohesion. Consequently, they devolved into little more than an armed mob. As Grant continued to deploy additional troops against the Confederate defenses, Lee swiftly shifted reinforcements into the salient.

General Lee personally observed the progress of his troops as they moved forward. Just like in the advance at the Widow Tapp farm during the Battle of the Wilderness, Lee tried to advance and lead his soldiers. However, he was prevented from exposing himself by Gordon and the soldiers' repeated chants of "Lee to the rear" defense, while Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur's brigade suffered significant losses as they valiantly fought to reclaim the entrenchments previously lost by the Stonewall Brigade. After approximately half an hour of intense combat, these brigades successfully secured a substantial portion of the eastern section of the Mule Shoe.

The assault led by Warren at Laurel Hill commenced on a modest scale around 8:15 a.m. Unfortunately, for some of his soldiers, this marked their fourth or fifth attempt at capturing the same objective, resulting in a lack of enthusiasm. After thirty minutes, the attack gradually lost momentum. Meade, recognizing the urgency, commanded Warren to launch an immediate and all-out assault, even if it meant utilizing his entire force. However, the attack proved futile, as the Union corps encountered fierce resistance from a lone Confederate division. Not only did the V Corps fail to achieve its objective, but it also failed to divert Confederate troops from other areas of the front, contrary to Grant's intentions. Grant granted Meade the authority to relieve Warren of his duties, proposing that Meade's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, assume command. Nevertheless, Humphreys skillfully coordinated the withdrawal of the V Corps units without actually relieving Warren from his position.

At approximately 6:30 am, Grant issued orders for additional troops to launch an assault on the Bloody Angle, which was the northwestern section of the salient situated closest to Union lines. In response, Confederate forces dispatched more troops to counterattack, and the line was fortified with artillery. Consequently, the battle evolved into a gruesome deadlock, with the combat persisting relentlessly for nearly 24 hours. The engagement was characterized by intense close-quarter fighting. Meanwhile, both Warren and Burnside made renewed attempts to attack their respective sections of the line, but their efforts yielded minimal results.

As the fighting raged on at the Bloody Angle, Confederate engineers hastily worked to establish a fresh defensive line approximately 500 yards southward, positioned at the base of the Mule Shoe. The conflict at the Bloody Angle persisted incessantly day and night, with neither side gaining a decisive advantage, until the fighting eventually ceased around midnight on May 13. At 4 A.M., the fatigued Confederate infantrymen were informed that the newly constructed line was prepared, prompting them to withdraw gradually from the original earthworks, unit by unit.

May 13-16

From this point forward, the battle became an attempt on both sides to find an advantageous place to strike; neither found one. Grant shifted Warren and Wright to his left to find an attacking capability from the Fredericksburg and Massoponax Church Roads. With the diminished Mule Show now the de facto center of the line, Lee shifter Anderson from his left to meet the new threat from the east. It rained a great deal of the time which prevented any massing of troops to make a determined attack.

May 17-18

Lee having shifted his men back from the left to cover his right, Grant then waited for two days of dry weather to bring Wright and Hancock back to the area of the Mule Shoe, now anchoring the Confederate left. But Ewell’s men were still there and had entrenched further. No progress was made.

May 19-21

Having once again been stopped by Lee, Grant tried a deception. He ordered Hancock to move to the railroad line and move south hoping that Lee would follow, unentrenched. when Grant would attack the rear. Grant ordered Hancock to pull back toward the Fredericksburg Road. Observing the movement, Lee sent Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corps forward as a reconnaissance force to determine where the Federals were going. Ewell’s men run into stiff resistance by a brigade of new heavy artillery-turned-infantry regiments at the Harris family farm. But Lee didn’t fall into the trap and discerned that Grant was once again planning on a southeast movement to the  North Anna River.

Grant meeting with his staff during the Overland Campaign at Massaponax Church, May 21,1864 by Timothy O’Sullivan, Library of Congress

Summary

The fighting at Spotsylvania was perhaps the most brutal of the war, with hand-to-hand combat of vicious severity on both sides, especially at the Mule Shoe. Despite lasting for two weeks, the battle ended inconclusively from a tactical standpoint. Interestingly, both the Confederacy and the Union claimed victory. The Confederacy believed they had emerged victorious due to their ability to hold their defenses, while the Union saw it as their triumph because their offensive continued and General Lee's army suffered irreplaceable losses.

*****

Casualties

Union: 100,000-110,000 Total

Casualties and losses: Total: 18,399 (2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded, 2,258 captured or missing)

Confederates: 50,000–63,000 Total

Casualties and losses: Total: 12,687 (1,515 killed, 5,414 wounded, 5,758 captured or missing)

*****

In terms of percentages, the battle could be considered a draw, but when looking at absolute numbers, the Union paid a heavy price. The initial stages of the battle were unfavorable for the Union forces, with the disastrous outcome at Laurel Hill and the delayed and poorly supported attacks on May 9th. General Grant's army suffered substantial casualties during the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House. Between May 5 and May 12, the Army of the Potomac experienced approximately 32,000 casualties, surpassing the combined casualties of all Union armies in any previous week of the war. Contributing to the carnage were advances in weaponry that by 1864 had outstripped the Napoleonic warfare of the day. The result was massive casualties: on May 12 alone, Lee lost eight thousand men; Grant, nine thousand.

However, it was the Mule Shoe attacks that inflicted significant damage on the Confederates, resulting in the capture of many soldiers. Due to the suspension of prisoner exchanges, these men would never return to the fight. After suffering severe casualties in the Wilderness, Lee had no choice but to curb his aggressive instincts and prepare for a defensive battle at Spotsylvania. Employing advanced fieldworks that foreshadowed the trench warfare of World War I, Lee skillfully organized his exhausted veterans to defend against Grant's relentless attacks.

Although there was no clear victor of the multi-day battle, many consider it a strategic victory for Grant. The battles inflicted proportionately higher casualties on Lee's numerically smaller army, driving his forces into a siege at Petersburg and eventually leading him to surrender his forces at Appomattox in April 1865.

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Further Reading

·       Rhea, Gordon C. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

·       Stephen E Ambrose, Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/05/10/a-grand-charge-emory-uptons-assault-on-the-mule-shoe-salient-may-10-1864-part-2/

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/spotsylvania-court-house

·       https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/battle-of-spotsylvania-court-house

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/emory-upton

Henry Halleck: Polarizing Figure of the US Civil War

Major General Henry Halleck was a central figure in the US Civil War, being the General in Chief of the Armies of the United States from 1862-1864. However, he is often overlooked and even outright denigrated by modern minds. His portrayal in historical descriptions and fictional accounts borders on the derisory. Typical character traits that are emphasized include being a bureaucrat, a wine gourmet, and emotionally separated from the battlefield. These polarizing depictions do not give credit to a general who was a highly skilled political and administrative man who was indispensable to victory. Part of his negative historical reputation is that he wasn’t a great field commander during the war, but the concept that generals have to be battle warriors rather than policy or administrative types may fill the popular mold, but it’s not correct. Few people have the hands-on experience of foreign policy that generals do. So, men like Dwight Eisenhower, George C Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, William Westmoreland, David Petraeus, and Mark Miley deserve recognition for primarily setting policy. But Halleck lacked the diplomatic skills among his peers that these more successful men had, which may be why we remember him with such disdain.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major General Henry Halleck during the US Civil War.

Early Life and Career

Halleck was born on a farm in Upstate New York and hated that life. He was raised by an uncle who set him up for a military career. He went to West Point where he excelled, graduating 3rd in his class. He was a favorite student of Dennis Hart Mahan. He became a member of the elite Army Corps of Engineers, who studied and improved the defenses of New York Harbor and traveled to Europe to see what the French were doing. He along the way wrote books on military science. He gave a series of lectures in Boston which were collected and published in 1846 as Elements of Military Art & Science.

On his way to California for the Mexican War, he didn’t waste his time playing shuffleboard; he instead did something that made him quite famous. He translated Jomini’s Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon into English. This book made him famous in America and in Europe. The point of this book was how Napoleon used his military power to achieve political ends.

He was engaged at the Battle of Mazatlán but was primarily an administrative officer. Having achieved a reputation as a military scholar, he acquired the nickname “Old Brains”.

After the war, he resigned from the army opened a law firm, and became secretary of state of California. He married Elizabeth Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton’s granddaughter. He resigned from the army in 1854. His firm Halleck, Peachy, and Billings was highly prominent. He also was for a time president of the Atlantic and Pacific RR. He also remained a Major General in the California militia. Through land speculation, became a wealthy man. He owned a 30,000-acre ranch in Marin County.

The Civil War Begins

When the Civil War broke out, Halleck promptly volunteered, and Abraham Lincoln promptly made him a full major general. Despite being out of the army at that point for 7 years, he was ranked only by Winfield Scott, George McClellan, and John C. Frémont.

In November, Halleck was sent to St. Louis in command of the Department of the Missouri.  He replaced Frémont, who had been nothing short of a disaster. The department was rife with corruption and fraud. Halleck quickly put his administrative talents to work, and within a few months restored a measure of order to a region defined up to that point by chaos.

A series of important Union victories in his department followed. Even though he did not lead the troops personally, his organizational work had helped and Halleck, rightly or wrongly, received much of the credit. These included Pea Ridge, Island No. 10, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh.  Although he was not the commander in the field in any of these battles, he was responsible for ordering the movements that led to the battles, supervising the generals who were there, and supplying their forces.

After Shiloh, he led the Corinth campaign. His approach was to move slowly and entrench every mile or so. His methodical style was not what was needed. Beauregard was able to hold the city for over a month, then retreat without a battle. In retrospect, he could have captured the town in a week. Keeping in mind that he was a student of Mahan, and translated Jomini, both defense-minded strategists, he was fighting a Napoleonic war, not the Civil War. Old Brains was strategically obsolete.

Halleck & Grant

His relationship with his best subordinate general was difficult. When the senior manager has in his department a budding genius, how that relationship plays out tells you oodles about the kind of person he is. Ulysses Grant was a brigadier general in Halleck’s department who had never been in command of anything before, perhaps including his own sobriety. But Grant proposed an amphibious combined forces operation on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to take out Forts Henry and Donelson. Nothing like that had ever been tried and certainly was not in the books Halleck had written. I’m not sure what any of us would have thought about Sam Grant in January 1862 if we were his superior, especially when he proposed an aggressive attack to a defense-minded Old Brain.

But the resulting victory and capture of 14,000 confederates as the eastern theater was doing nothing made Halleck an important man. He promoted Grant but then relieved him, only to reinstate him. Grant wondered about this, leading to a highly cynical response from Halleck that whistles throughout history.

What did Sherman and Grant think about Halleck at this point? Was it accurate?

What changed Halleck’s mind about Grant’s plan for Fort Donelson was President Lincoln’s need for a victory. Lincoln was insistent that an offensive be started, and Halleck had no better ideas. Lincoln order was issued January 27th, ordering all Federal forces to advance on February 22nd.

But despite the victories at Donelson &  Henry, Halleck initially demoted him. Grant left his district to meet Buell in Nashville and did not immediately stop looting at the two captured forts. Halleck also cited rumors of renewed alcoholism. There are rumors of a rogue telegraph operator tossing Grant's messages to Halleck, but Halleck had issues throughout the war.  The recent Samuel Curtis bio suggests that Halleck had his aides create a digest for all communications, so Halleck was constantly under the impression that his subordinates were not communicating to him regularly when the digest failed to represent their activity. Ostensibly, for whatever reason, Halleck claimed Grant had gone incommunicado, but there appears to have been some jealousy involved because instead of claiming that Grant was not communicating appropriately, Halleck accused him of being drunk.

Once again, Lincoln and Stanton intervened. Lincoln asked Halleck to forward specific charges against Grant for official review, and Halleck was promoted to command of all armies in the west.  His jealousy being sated and his hand called, Halleck restored Grant to command. Their correspondence is ironic because Grant complained about his arrest by claiming "… there must be enemies between you and myself" and Halleck responded "…there are no enemies between myself and you," which was the truth because the enemy was Halleck himself.

Why Halleck wanted to take credit for Grant’s victory isn’t hard to understand; because it was the first major Federal victory of the war, and Halleck could parlay the victory into command of all forces in the West. Lincoln needed a general who wasn’t afraid to fight. In that sense, Halleck was a clone of McClellan, and they couldn’t have that in both theaters. Grant asked him if someone was giving Halleck bad reports about him, Halleck responded in the negative without telling him that it was he, himself, responsible. Halleck was not the commander of the Western Theater; Buell was his competition. Halleck needed the credit for his advancement.

At this stage of the war, both Grant and Sherman thought highly of Halleck and owed him their positions. Halleck was the master at that point in the war, certainly in terms of paperwork and administration. Grant had many of the qualities of a great leader that Halleck would never have: gut instinct, fearlessness, and indomitable energy. But any book on being a CEO today will tell you just as important is a sense of humility.  If you find yourself the smartest person in the room, you're in the wrong room.  Grant was not a great military thinker, but he was the greatest idea aggregator.  He sought to surround himself with thinkers and then would forge plans as an aggregate of the part. Grant regarded Halleck as "one of the greatest men of the age" and Sherman described him as the "directing genius". And why not? Halleck was in command of the best department in the Army at that point. Curtis had won at Pea Ridge, Pope at Island  Number 10, and Grant at Donelson. And in fact, he deserves some of the credit. Halleck understood grand strategy a little better than McClellan and had the ability to recognize and promote talent, but also the ambition and ego to resent being overshadowed by their successes.  Lincoln put him in the right place - where he could have rank and wield some power, and be close to power, but where he couldn't interfere any more than Lincoln himself allowed him to.  He was more than a clerk but much less than the commanding general he wanted to be.

Advancement to General-in-Chief

In March 1862 Halleck was given command also of Ohio and Kansas, placing Buell under his command. With Grant under personal attack after Shiloh, Halleck arrived to personally command this army and move on to Corinth. While Grant felt that he was being shunted aside, Halleck to some extent was doing them both a favor.

With the fall of Corinth and the collapse of the Peninsula Campaign, Halleck was transferred east to become General-in-Chief. He placed Grant in command of most of the Western forces. Lincoln was hopeful that Halleck could stimulate aggressiveness; but while Halleck excelled at training, supply, and deployment, he was awful as a strategist and unable to work with the generals under him, who simply ignored him.

Most accounts of Halleck moving Grant to his second in command suggest a nefarious motivation. The problem is that while how things turned out for Grant is well known, after Shiloh, he was under a massive media attack. The fact that Grant had been the victim of a surprise attack made him, at that moment, tough to support. But as much as Halleck didn’t support Grant, he was even less inclined to trust the volunteer generals under him.

But his failings at this level of command would soon become obvious. His biggest failure was the coup de grace for Lincoln’s views of him. When McClellan didn’t come to support Pope at Second Manassas, Lincoln lost hope in Halleck, calling him “little more than a first-rate clerk”. To be fair, there were no better generals for either Lincoln or Halleck to select from, and it’s a bit unfair to pin the blame on Halleck. Lincoln had promoted him to get the results he had in the west, but with eastern generals.  Still, Halleck was a bit thin-skinned and thereafter refused to take direct responsibility for anything that happened.

His subordinates had little respect for him. McClellan said of Halleck, “Of all the men who I have encountered in high position, Halleck was the most helplessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end.” Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Halleck originates nothing, anticipates nothing to assist others; takes no responsibility, plans nothing, suggests nothing, is good for nothing."

Grant Supersedes Halleck

Grant was promoted to Lt Gen and general-in-chief on March 12, 1864. Halleck became chief of staff, and Grant graciously stated that he had been relieved at his own request. Grant of course took a completely different view of the job than Halleck had, accompanying Meade’s army in the field and setting strategy at the battlefield.

Which left Halleck back in Washington, doing what he did best: ensuring proper supplies, equipment, and manpower. He supported Grant’s initiatives politically and the two worked very well in complementary roles. But with Jubal Early threatening the city, Halleck had responsibility for its defense. Halleck’s inability to organize a defense of the capital was his final disgrace. Chaos reigned. He did ultimately gather together a force that held Early off. Were it not for Monocacy, he might have entered the city.

After the War

With Lincoln’s assassination, Stanton took the first opportunity he could and moved Halleck out of Washington to a new job, where Halleck made a very serious political enemy. Stanton had had enough of Halleck, and without Lincoln around to hold him back, he made Halleck commander of the Division of the James, which meant Richmond. When Sherman offered Johnston the infamous gracious original surrender terms, Stanton suggested that Sherman was a traitor (actually, he was implementing what he thought Lincoln would have wanted based on their meeting at City Point) and Halleck, ever the politician, went along with it. This upset Sherman; and things deteriorated when at the Grand Review Halleck ordered one of Sherman’s Corps to pass him, which Sherman countermanded. This was a shocking turn of events since Halleck had given Sherman every opportunity to rehabilitate himself when he was deemed “crazy” at the start of the war.

Consequently, just 4 months later, Grant moved him to political exile Grant moved him back to San Francisco as commander of the Division of the Pacific. Given his home and residence there, Grant must be complimented on trying to help out his old chief as best as he could. A few years later, he was moved to command in Louisville, where he died a few years later.

Conclusion

Halleck was a bureaucrat, in every sense of the word, both good and bad. His need for success, like many of the others in the Union Army at the start of the war, precluded taking chances or doing anything not politically correct. He also had the wrong temperament for field command and was promoted beyond his capability. Still, he was an intelligent man whose inability to work with others led to terrible personal relationships, rather than he being incompetent. Administration takes on a negative connotation in the context of glorified heroes of battle, but he should be recognized for his positive contributions as well as his flaws.

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Admiral Thomas Cochrane: The Seawolf of the Royal Navy

Admiral Thomas Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald, stands as one of the most audacious and controversial figures in naval history. His career, marked by brilliance, bravery, and a defiance of convention, not only revolutionized naval warfare but also carved a place for him in maritime legend. From his early days in the Royal Navy to his exploits while engaged by foreign navies, Cochrane's life was a relentless pursuit of innovation and excellence, often at odds with the establishment.

Terry Bailey explains.

Thomas Cochrane as painted by copyist Archibald Eliot Haswell-Miller. Original painting by Peter Edward Stroehlin.

Early Life and Entry into the Royal Navy

Born on the 14th of December, 1775, in Annsfield, Scotland, Thomas Cochrane was the son of Archibald Cochrane, the 9th Earl of Dundonald, a man of scientific curiosity and perpetual financial woes. This backdrop of intellectual vigor and economic struggle likely influenced Thomas's character—imbuing him with a relentless drive and a disdain for bureaucratic incompetence.

Cochrane's father secured him a commission in the British Army at an early age, however, Cochrane managed to extract himself from the army commission preferring to join the Royal Navy as a Midshipman in 1793, at the age of 17, amid the turbulent backdrop of the French Revolutionary Wars. His early postings included the 28-gun frigate HMS Hind and the 32-gun frigate HMS Thetis. Cochrane's aptitude for seamanship and tactics quickly became apparent, and by 1796, he was promoted to lieutenant after passing the relevant examinations. His career trajectory continued to ascend as he distinguished himself with daring tactics and a sharp mind for naval warfare.

The Speedy and Mediterranean Exploits

Cochrane was given command of the small sloop HMS Speedy in 1800, HMS Speedy was not a remarkable vessel, and it was felt that command of such an unremarkable vessel was given to Cochrane as part punishment for his outspoken manner and behavior. However, this dent to his career path did not prevent Thomas Cochrane from excelling and the command of HMS Speedy simply marked the beginning of his legendary status.

HMS Speedy was a diminutive vessel with a modest armament of fourteen 4-pounder guns, which became a formidable adversary under Cochrane's command. His boldness and strategic ingenuity transformed the Speedy into a symbol of naval prowess. One of Cochrane's most famous exploits occurred on the 6th of May, 1801, when he captured the Spanish xebec-frigate El Gamo, a vessel three times the size of the HMS Speedy, boasting 32 guns and 319 men compared to the Speedy's 14 guns and 54 men. Cochrane used clever subterfuge, hoisting multiple flags and sailing directly into close quarters, where HMS Speedy's small size and maneuverability turned the engagement into a boarding action. Cochrane's men overwhelmed the El Gamo's crew which was numerically superior, capturing the ship in a remarkable display of naval audacity and tactical brilliance.

Political Battles and Imprisonment

Despite his successes, Cochrane's career was marred by controversies, mainly stemming from his outspoken criticism of naval administration and his political ambitions. Elected as a Member of Parliament for Honiton in 1806, and later for Westminster, Cochrane used his platform to advocate for naval reforms and to expose corruption within the Admiralty. His relentless attacks on government mismanagement earned him powerful enemies.

In 1814, Cochrane's career took a devastating turn when he was implicated in a stock exchange fraud scandal, the "Great Stock Exchange Fraud." Cochrane maintained his innocence, asserting that he was framed by his political adversaries. Nonetheless, he was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison, fined £1,000, and expelled from the Royal Navy and Parliament. Cochrane immediately escaped from prison, however, presented himself openly to protest his innocence, however, was promptly rearrested. This period was a dark chapter in Cochrane's life, but it did not diminish his indomitable spirit. It was not until 1832, that Thomas Cochrane was granted a pardon and restored to the Navy List with a promotion to rear-admiral many years after his release from prison.

Service in Foreign Navies

Undeterred by his fall from grace in Britain, Cochrane sought to continue his naval career abroad once released from prison. In 1817, he accepted an invitation to command the Chilean Navy in their struggle for independence from Spanish rule. Cochrane's arrival in Chile marked a turning point in the naval campaign. His leadership and innovative tactics, such as the use of fireships, in addition to, combined naval and land operations proved instrumental in securing key victories, including the capture of Valdivia in 1820, which significantly weakened Spanish control over the region.

Cochrane's success in Chile led to further opportunities. In 1823, he took command of the Brazilian Navy, playing a crucial role in Brazil's war of independence against Portugal. His operations in Bahia and Maranhão helped secure Brazilian sovereignty, further cementing his reputation as a liberator.

In 1825, Cochrane extended his influence to Greece, participating in the Greek War of Independence, between 1827 and 1828. Although his time in Greece was less successful, marred by political infighting and limited resources, his commitment to the cause of freedom remained unwavering.

Return to Britain and Later Years

Cochrane's international successes eventually helped pave the way for his rehabilitation in Britain. In 1832, he received a royal pardon and restoration to the navy list followed. He returned to the Royal Navy and saw a promotion to Rear-Admiral of the Blue serving with distinction. One of his significant contributions during this period was his advocacy for steam propulsion, recognizing the transformative potential of steam power in naval warfare, additionally 1847, Queen Victoria reappointed him Knight of the Order of the Bath.

His foresight contributed to the modernization of the Royal Navy and eventually, he received a promotion to Admiral of the Red in 1857, which was a relatively tranquil period compared to his earlier adventures. He authored several works, including his autobiography, which detailed his remarkable career and offered insights into his innovative approaches to naval tactics and strategy.

Legacy

Admiral Thomas Cochrane's legacy is multifaceted. He is remembered as a fearless and innovative naval commander whose exploits inspired not only his contemporaries but also future generations of naval officers. His daring tactics and unorthodox methods challenged conventional naval doctrine, earning him the nickname "The Sea Wolf."

Cochrane's influence extended beyond his lifetime, with his exploits serving as inspiration for literary characters such as C.S. Forester's Horatio Hornblower and Patrick O'Brian's Jack Aubrey, in Master and Commander. His life story, filled with dramatic turns and heroic deeds, continues to captivate historians and naval enthusiasts.

Moreover, Cochrane's advocacy for naval reform and technological advancement had a lasting impact on the Royal Navy. His early recognition of the potential of steam power and his relentless pursuit of efficiency and innovation helped shape the future of naval warfare.

Conclusion

Admiral Thomas Cochrane's career is solid proof of the power of individual brilliance and the impact of unwavering determination. His journey from a young Midshipman to a celebrated hero in multiple countries illustrates the profound influence one person can have on the course of history. Despite facing significant obstacles, including imprisonment and exile, Cochrane's legacy endures as a beacon of courage, ingenuity, and resilience in the face of adversity.

In naval history, Cochrane's name stands alongside the greatest maritime strategists and commanders. His life story is not only a thrilling saga of naval adventure but also a profound lesson in the enduring spirit of human endeavor.

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A Sailors Life in the Age of Sail

The age of sail (16th century to 19th century) ushered in a new era in world history with the rise of sailing trade and warfare. The age of sail provided the old world with the products and goods of the new, goods that were otherwise unknown to most cultures. The discovery and import of these goods led to huge economic booms for their nations, developed societies, and shaped the world as we know it. Sailors traveled thousands of miles to distant places no European had ever seen in search of exotic goods, and trade relationships with these nations. Sailors were truly the astronauts of their day, putting their fears and anxieties behind them to make the voyages necessary for the growth of their country.

In this article, Avery Scott aims to examine the daily lives of the sailors that helped to shape so much of the world. Beginning with the areas in which merchant vessels, navy vessels, and pirates/privateers are similar and then looking at some differences depending upon the type of vessel one served on.

A painting of the 1571 Battle of Lepanto.

The Sailors Life

Rations

The diet of almost all sailing vessels was the same. The men subsisted on salted pork, fish, or beef, ships biscuits, and a limited supply of vegetables such as peas. Additionally, sailors received unwanted calories from the weevils and other insects that burrowed their way into the ship’s biscuits while the vessel was out to sea, thus making an awful ration even worse. In some cases, sailors would have live animals aboard ship to assist in providing fresh food to the crew, however livestock tend to struggle on oceanic voyages and therefore they did not always last very long. Eventually it was learned that fresh fruit and vegetables, specifically vitamin C, were helpful in reducing cases of scurvy – a disease that ravished ships for years. Once this was discovered, rations of citrus fruit would be kept aboard. By doing so, ships were spared the ravages of scurvy.

Food rations were vital to the health and wellness of crews on a voyage, but alcohol played an equally significant role as a morale boost to the crew. Alcohol choices varied depending upon the location, distance, and time at sea. But the most common aboard were beer or ale, wine, and rum. Water was also kept aboard ship in large casks, but the water became undrinkable very quickly into voyage. Therefore, the men subsisted mostly on rations of alcohol.  A persistent habit of sailors was to keep the ration of rum given throughout the day and drink the total of a day's rations at one time becoming very drunk. In answer to this, Admiral Edward Vernon (known as “Old Grog” due to the grogram coats he frequently wore) required his sailors mix their ration of rum with water. This reduced the drunkenness aboard and helped to improve the overall health of the crew, even if it did not make them particularly fond of him.

Routine

Sailing ships during the age of sail more resembled a small city than a ship. Everything needed for the voyage would be packed aboard, as well as the men with the skills necessary to keep the ship moving. Movements were all controlled like clockwork. This was done to ensure order, cleanliness, and avoid idle hands that often became drunk and disorderly. Ships all used a similar watch schedule, although it may change slightly depending upon the size of the crew, but more on that in a later section. Watches were broken down into four-hour blocks of time, with two dog watches of two hours a piece. First watch was from 8:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Middle watch was from 12:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. Morning watch was 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. Forenoon watch 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Afternoon watch from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. And two dog watches from 4 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Some sailors, such as coopers, blacksmiths, and surgeons did not work based upon the watch schedule, and they worked during the day and were able to sleep during the evenings. Each watch was noted by a bell and the bosuns’ whistle. If men were below in their hammocks they would be alerted to the start of their watch, and often “started” by a bosun hitting them with a piece of tar-dipped rope. Additionally, sleepy-headed sailors would be hurried along by cutting down the ropes of their hammocks, allowing them to tumble to the deck.

Most days would begin by cleaning the ship with holy stones to ensure the grime and dirt would be scrubbed off, this was especially important after a battle, and to keep the detritus from the live animals mentioned above to a minimum. Scrubbing the deck would be followed by swabbing and rinsing. Many captains were very particular about the cleanliness of their ships and would have the ship scrubbed with vinegar to reduce sickness. Other daily tasks were different depending upon the role a sailor filled within the vessel. Gunners would be maintaining the guns, topmen would be working the sails, officers would oversee navigation, and those special trades would be involved in their work such as carpentry or making barrels.

Money

Sailors were notoriously financially irresponsible. However, much of this may be because they were often not paid until a voyage was completed. This method was thought to reduce desertion (although it did not appear to be successful). This meant that they often went months without pay, and then received a considerable sum at one time. The men would often spend a large chunk of this money of alcohol, women, and gambling – sometimes becoming so poor they had no choice but to go aboard another vessel to ensure they had food to eat. Some sailors did manage to amass some financial means while at sea, typically through prize money – something exclusive to navy, pirate, and privateering vessels. Additionally, if men had families at home, they could have some money sent to their families or paid out by the ship’s owners from their home port. This ensured their family had money to subsist on in the sailor’s absence. If a sailor were to die at sea, their sea chest (their collection of personal effects) would be auctioned off on deck, and the money sent home to the family.

Differences

Despite the inherent similarities between the various sea trades, sailors did live different lives depending upon the vessel that they served on. In this section, I will break down some of the specifics of life aboard a merchant ship, navy vessel, and a pirate and privateer.

Merchant Ships

Merchant vessels were designed to carry massive amounts of cargo, to earn the highest revenues for the owners. This meant that ships would be very heavily laden, scarcely armed, and undermanned. These ships had little chance of standing up to a dangerous enemy as they had little resources to defend themselves with. Additionally, because manpower is expensive, ship owners would not allow for more crew than were necessary to operate a ship on a voyage. For the crew this meant each man would be required to take on additional tasks that would typically be spread between many men. These men received less sleep for their work as they were more frequently required to be on deck to handle the ship. Also, to maximize profit, the victualers for a merchant ship would be more inclined to obtain subpar or insufficient rations for the voyage.

A positive for merchant sailors was they typically did not have as strict of discipline as a navy vessel would, and this could make their lives more enjoyable while at sea. Discipline could still be hard, but flogging and other punishments were less likely to be handed down. And since the men were onboard willingly, they were more frequently allowed shore leave when in port. Finally, since merchant sailors were not engaged in any military activity, they were not as likely to be killed in a battle, although the presence of disease was an ever-present threat to all ships.

Navy Ships

Navy ships were often described as “hell” to the men that crewed the vessels. Class distinctions were ever present, and punishment for the smallest infractions could be excruciating. The crew lived and worked in constant fear of the cat-of-nine-tales, as the captain and officers were always willing to pass down punishment in the name of order. Ships would have been cramped as navy vessels required larger crews to staff the guns, account for death in battle, and the man prizes that were captured at sea. The advantage to this larger crew size is it meant less work per sailor, but it also meant disease could more rapidly spread through the ship. Many navy vessels struggled to fill their ranks and were forced to use impressment to obtain the necessary sailors. The press gangs would rove waterfront streets, taverns, incoming ships, or vessels at sea to impress men for service. Because of this method of recruitment, officers had to be constantly vigilant for signs of mutiny. The fear of mutiny was so great that most naval ships had a detachment of marines aboard to help protect the officers from mutiny. Marines also acted as regular troops during battle and could inflict considerable damage from small arms fire. Life    aboard a navy ship did offer the chance of a financial reward in the form of prize money. Because the crew were entitled to prize money if they captured a belligerent nation's vessel and could successfully plunder the cargo from the other vessel.  While this money was often small in comparison to the cost of life and limb, it was a motivating factor for the men.

Pirates and Privateers

While pirates and privateers have some obvious differences, they share many of the same traits. Much like Navy vessels, these ships would be heavily manned to ensure prizes could be sailed, battles fought, and crew left for the continuation of the voyage after a battle. Pirates and privateers all made a living from battle, and this increased the risk of death. Also, if captured pirates were sure to be hung for their crimes, and often led short lives for this. Additionally, privateers were considered to be pirates by the nations with which they were at war – so a similar fate would befall them if captured.  Pirates also had limited access to resources as many places were patrolled by navy vessels looking to take down a pirate ship. Pirates did, however, have the benefit of being more democratic than their aristocratic partners in navy and privateer vessels and therefore could elect or depose their captains and officers if they felt they were not doing a good job.  Additionally, pirate vessels wrote their own ships articles in conjunction with the entire crew. By doing so, rules were established for the common good – not just those of the owners and officers. Finally, pirates and privateers had the possibility to earn huge sums of prize money, but also risked no money if prizes were not captured.

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Elizabeth Fenning: A Miscarriage of Justice in 19th Century England

On July 26, 1815, a 20-year-old woman named Elisabeth Fenning dressed in a white high-waist muslin gown. She had personally made it for her wedding to her fiancé Edward, a day that would have begun a new chapter in her life. Sadly the day never came. Instead the dress was being worn for the final chapter of her life, her death. She was preparing for the gallows where she was going to die for a crime she most likely didn't commit. Her story is one of the worst cases of miscarriage of justice in Britain.

Nonye Ugo explains.

A dpecition of Elizabeth Fenning awaiting her execution. This is from the 1912 book William Hone: His Life and Times. Image in the Public Domain.

Elizabeth “Eliza” Fenning was born on June 10, 1793 in the Caribbean island of Dominica.

Her parents William and Mary Fenning had a total of ten children, but only Elizabeth survived to adulthood, a common occurrence due to the high infant mortality rate at the time.

Her father had been a soldier. Upon his discharge, the family settled in London and he transitioned to selling potatoes.

The family was very poor, as such there were very few opportunities available to Elizabeth. She learnt to read and write, and by the age of 14 she entered service, working as a domestic servant.

By 23 she got a job as a cook to the wealthy Turner family, joining a staff that consisted of a maid, Sarah, and two male apprentices.

Olibar Turner, a wealthy tradesman lived at Chancery Lane, London with his wife, Margret, son Robert, and daughter in law Charlotte. Elizabeth was an easy going, dedicated worker, but a few weeks into her employment she had a falling out with Charlotte Turner, who threatened her with dismissal, for entering the room of an apprentice, partially dressed, to borrow a candle. Given the morals of the time partially dressed could even mean not wearing her stockings.

Dumplings

Elizabeth was hurt by what she considered a questioning of her morals and confided her feeling to Sarah, hinting that she now disliked Charlotte.

On March 21, Elizabeth asked to showcase her dumpling making skills and was granted permission to make dumplings and potatoes for the family lunch, and steak pie for the servants.

The Turner’s, with the exception of Margret who was absent, immediately became violently ill after eating the pudding. Elizabeth and an apprentice who had also eaten the pudding became just as sick.  A doctor was called. He diagnosed arsenic poisoning and after a brief investigation, concluded it had been mixed in the dumplings.

On April 11 while the family was recovering from the effects of the poison, a still unwell Elizabeth was arrested and tried for attempted murder.

The  case was presided by Sir John Sylvester at the Old Bailey. The evidence against Elizabeth was circumstantial, the state claimed she had motive, (revenge against Charlotte who had earlier reprimanded her) opportunity, (being alone in the kitchen) and means, (access to arsenic, normally used to kill rats, kept in the apprentice room drawer). Despite all their evidence being countered by facts, such as that Elizabeth had also eaten the dumplings and become sick, the drawer containing the arsenic was assessable to every member of the household, no arsenic had been found in the flour used to prepare the dumplings, and five witnesses who testified to Elizabeth’s good and honest character, the jury sentenced her to death by hanging, the then punishment for attempted murder.

Working people, angered by the injustice of the trial and convinced of her innocence, started a petition to have her reprieved. Even the Turners doubted her guilt and were ready to sign the petition but changed their minds, after being warned that they would be investigated for the crime if Elizabeth was reprieved. The reprieve was denied.

Death

So on July 26, wearing what was originally intended as a wedding dress, Elizabeth Fenning was hanged. She maintained her innocence till the end. Her funeral was held on July 31.

Immediately after, an angry mob surrounded the Turner home threatening to burn it down. They were dispersed by police, who remained days after to prevent harm to the family.

But the hatred of the Turners remained. They eventually went bankrupt and Robert Turner ended up in a workhouse. People, especially the working class, saw the injustice of her death. They knew it was a message to the poor servants: Don’t ever even think of harming your rich masters.

So did Elizabeth Fenning really try to poison the Turners?

I strongly believe that she did not. One, there was no real evidence of the sickness being caused by arsenic poisoning. The doctor, Dr. John Marshall, only assumed it was because, arsenic was in the home, and the cutlery used in eating the pudding had turned black, which he claimed was the result of arsenic on silver. That claim was later proved to be false. For all anyone knew the Turners may have been suffering food poisoning. And, just before the trial Elizabeth was given a choice - trial or deportation to a colony. She chose going to trial, obviously because she knew she was innocent and felt it would be proven.

Two, if arsenic was used Elizabeth wasn’t the only one with access to it. The two apprentices and maid Sarah did too, and Elizabeth did leave briefly to go to the butcher shop while the dumplings were being prepared. Anyone in the household could have poisoned them in her absence.

So if the Turners were poisoned, who did it?

Maybe Sarah, taking advantage of Elizabeth’s strained relationship with Charlotte, tried to poison the family knowing Elizabeth would be accused. Robert Turner on his death bed was said to have admitted to the crime.

Whatever the truth, the fact remains there was no evidence against Elizabeth Fenning. She was convicted because she was a poor Irish servant and her supposed victims were a rich English family. Her sentence and execution was one of the worst miscarriages of British justice.

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Did One Man Really Connect Abraham Lincoln’s Death and the Identity of Jack the Ripper?

One man links two of the most notorious crimes of the nineteenth century – an Irish American by the name of Francis Tumblety. It stretches credulity but this individual, arrested in 1865, as a suspected member of the gang behind the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, was also detained by Scotland Yard in 1888 over the Jack the Ripper case.

Tony McMahon, author of a related book (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explains.

Francis Tumblety in a military uniform.

If the story rested on the bizarre coincidence of the arrests in 1865 and 1888, that would be compelling enough. But during my research, I encountered an extraordinary figure whose life consisted of a series of crises and scandals. It included two manslaughter cases; violent assaults; arrests for gross indecency; and accusations of business fraud. Then add to that being arrested as a suspected co-conspirator in the Lincoln assassination and Scotland Yard drawing up charges in relation to the Jack the Ripper case.

Even after the 1888 arrest over the Ripper murders - when Tumblety jumped bail and escaped to New York - he was soon in court for striking a young man while Manhattan later shuddered in horror at news of a copycat Ripper killing in a hotel. New Yorkers were convinced the Whitechapel murderer was in their midst and the newspapers pointed an accusing finger at Tumblety.

Tumblety did not operate in the shadows. Far from it. Styling himself the Indian Herb Doctor, he was a high-profile medicine man skillfully using the emerging mass circulation newspapers to transform himself into a nineteenth century celebrity, known throughout north America (Canada and the United States). In fact, his celebrity, and the networks he developed in high society, played a key role in protecting him from imprisonment on multiple occasions. It may also explain why he was not extradited from the United States to face the Ripper charges in London after absconding.

Tumblety’s sexuality

As an LGBT historian, I am fascinated by Tumblety’s very open homosexuality. The term was yet to be popularized in the mid-nineteenth century but nobody needed sodomy to be defined. Gay men were recognized in clubs, theatres, and taverns. Journalists commented on the doctor's nocturnal cruising and very literal clashes with younger men he picked up, then fell out with bitterly. He supplied great copy for the gossip columns of the newspapers given his repeat brushes with the police and courts. For decades he was tailed by the Pinkerton detective agency who seemed obsessed by the doctor’s man problems.

While he has been recognized as a Ripper suspect since his arrest, Tumblety’s sexuality has often been skirted around, maybe to save the blushes of some Ripperologists. Also because it raises awkward questions about his motives in the Ripper murders, which I set out to tackle in the book. To understand the kind of life he led and how he came to be implicated in these two enormous crimes, it’s impossible not to put his homosexuality center stage.

Tumblety claimed to be disinterested in the opposite sex after marrying a woman he then discovered was a prostitute. I suspect this story, told by Tumblety in his multi-edition slim autobiography, may not be true. It offered a cover for his same sex preference coupled with a violent misogyny noted by the American police and shared by them with Scotland Yard. The London police were further convinced he was Jack the Ripper after reports in the American press that Tumblety owned a grotesque collection of uteruses in glass jars which he displayed at his all-male dinner parties. The Ripper’s second victim, Annie Chapman, was missing her uterus when her body was discovered.

America

This intriguing figure began his life in Dublin but like many Irish at the time, including many of my ancestors, he boarded a ship for a new life in America. His family set up home in Rochester, New York, and the Irish teenager lived in miserable poverty. But he was growing up in a country experiencing rapid growth where hucksters and opportunists changed their backstory, adopted a glamorous persona, and fleeced the vulnerable, making considerable fortunes. This was capitalism at its most unregulated and freewheeling.

Clearly not without talent, Tumblety set himself up as a completely unqualified doctor with a flamboyant persona. To promote his dubious medical business, he processed down main street on a circus horse with a plumed helmet and assistant dressed as a native American handing out leaflets. With bombastic language, he declared war on mainstream physicians and claimed his herbal cures could tackle everything from pimples to cancer.

The association with Lincoln began with an astonishing appearance on horseback behind Lincoln’s carriage when the newly elected president processed through New York, having just been elected president in early 1861. Journalists were aghast at this unlikely vision, as the herb doctor was embroiled at that moment in a rather sordid legal case involving one of his young male assistants. Yet Tumblety ignored the brouhaha and set out to ingratiate himself with the president by moving to Washington DC, attending Lincoln’s public appearances.

However, he seems to have been playing a double game. I’ve uncovered evidence linking Tumblety to at least two members of the gang that plotted Lincoln’s assassination and a newspaper article from 1914 that proves he knew the man who fired the fatal bullet: John Wilkes Booth. Little wonder that Tumblety was arrested and held at the Old Capitol Prison in the aftermath of the presidential slaying. Somehow, though, he was able to walk out of jail a free man.

After Lincoln

The quarter of a century between the Lincoln killing and the Ripper murders saw Tumblety flitting between America and Europe. The police and Pinkerton agency continuing to keep tabs on this strange character. I believe he contracted syphilis at some point and that the condition impacted both his physical and mental health as we approach 1888. The alleged manslaughter of a patient in Liverpool led to no conviction, possibly the result of an out-of-court settlement. Then the herb doctor was arrested over gross indecency with four men. While he was being held, Scotland Yard changed tack, realizing he was Jack the Ripper.

Without giving too much away, he ends up back in the United States and it’s his last years, neglected up until now, that are very revelatory. There is clear proof that Tumblety had cultivated networks in the Irish American diaspora and what passed for a gay community. In two cases, respected political figures rescued him from criminal convictions – but for what reason?

Conclusion

American journalists had no doubt that Tumblety was the notorious serial killer who had struck terror into the streets of Whitechapel. I share some ideas, based on his life experience and character, that explain why a gay man would have committed such heinous acts. His sexuality does not rule him out at all. Reporters speculated on other crimes that he may have been linked to and the possibility that one of his “valets” – young male employees – could have helped him on his murder spree.

To me, Tumblety presents a far more intriguing prospect as Jack the Ripper than a rogue member of the Royal Family or a conspiracy by Freemasons. He was a rags to riches story that guides us through Civil War America, the Gilded Age, and on to the streets of Victorian London. His life was turbulent, violent, and scandalous. What he did was unforgivable and sheds so much light on the sexual politics, media landscape, and precarious existence that millions of people led during this period.

Tony McMahon’s new book Jack the Ripper and Abraham Lincoln: One man links the two greatest crimes of the 19th century is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

The Chinese Boxer Rebellion: A Clash of Cultures and Powers

In the twilight of the 19th century, the world watched as China convulsed in a tumultuous uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion. This cataclysmic event, which erupted in 1900, was not merely a clash of arms, but a collision of civilizations, ideologies, and ambitions. At its core, the Boxer Rebellion was a struggle for the soul of China, pitting traditional values against encroaching foreign influence.

Here Terry Bailey delves into the multifaceted dimensions of the rebellion, outline the foreign powers involved, their political aims, the valor recognized through decorations like the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, and the perspectives of the Chinese Boxers, including the pivotal role played by Empress Dowager Cixi.

The photo shows foreign forces inside the Forbidden City in Beijing in November 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion.

Origins of the Boxer Movement

To comprehend the Boxer Rebellion, one must understand its roots deeply entwined with China's history of internal strife and external pressures. The late 19th century saw China reeling from a series of humiliations at the hands of foreign powers, compounded by internal turmoil and economic distress. The Boxers, officially known as the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, emerged as a grassroots movement fueled by resentment towards foreign domination and perceived cultural erosion.

The International Response

As the Boxer movement gained momentum, foreign nationals and missionaries in China became targets of violent attacks, triggering international alarm. In response, an Eight-Nation Alliance composed of troops from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened to quell the rebellion and protect their interests in China.

Each member of the alliance had its own political aims and agendas driving their involvement in the conflict. For instance, European powers sought to safeguard their economic privileges and spheres of influence in China, while Japan seized the opportunity to assert its growing regional power. The United States, keen on preserving its ‘Open Door Policy’ and ensuring the safety of American citizens, also joined the intervention force.

The Boxers' Perspective

Contrary to portrayals by Western accounts, the Boxers were not merely mindless fanatics but individuals driven by a complex blend of nationalism, religious fervor, and socio-economic grievances. Comprising primarily of peasants and martial artists, the Boxers perceived themselves as defenders of Chinese tradition against the encroachment of Western imperialism and Christian missionary activities.

For the Boxers, their struggle was not just against foreign powers but also against the corruption and decadence of the Qing dynasty. Their rallying cry, "Support the Qing, destroy the foreigners," encapsulated their belief in restoring China's glory by expelling foreign influence and purging the nation of perceived traitors.

Empress Dowager Cixi's Role

At the heart of the Boxer Rebellion stood Empress Dowager Cixi, a formidable figure whose political maneuvering would shape the course of Chinese history. Initially hesitant to openly support the Boxers, Cixi eventually threw her support behind the movement, viewing it as a means to bolster her own waning authority and expel foreign influences.

Cixi's decision to align with the Boxers proved fateful, leading to a declaration of war against the Eight-Nation Alliance. Despite her efforts to galvanize Chinese forces, the coalition's superior firepower and logistical prowess ultimately overwhelmed the Boxer forces and brought about the collapse of their rebellion.

Legacy of the Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion left an indelible mark on China and the world, reshaping geopolitical dynamics and fueling nationalist sentiments. While the intervention of the Eight-Nation Alliance temporarily quelled the uprising, it also deepened China's resentment towards foreign powers and sowed the seeds of future conflicts, in addition to further internal strife.

The rebellion's aftermath witnessed the imposition of harsh indemnities on China, further weakening the Qing dynasty and hastening its eventual collapse. The events of 1900 served as a stark reminder of the perils of imperialism and the enduring struggle for national sovereignty.

Sun Yat-sen, known in China as Sun Zhongshan was the eventual galvanized the popular overthrow of the imperial dynasty through his force of personality. Which occurred on the 19th of October 1911. At the time of the eventual successful overthrow of the 2000 year old dynasty Sun Yat-sen was in America attempting to raise funds for the future of China.

He was a highly educated individual who was strongly opposed to the actions of the Boxers before and during the rebellion, knowing that violent offensive action against the strong foreign powers would be detrimental to China’s future.

In conclusion

The Boxer Rebellion is an outstanding example of the complexities of history, where competing interests, ideologies, and aspirations converge in a crucible of conflict. Reflecting on this turbulent chapter, it is possible to be reminded of the enduring quest for dignity, autonomy, and justice that transcends borders and generations.

Additionally, the history of the Boxer rebellion should provide a stark reminder for any nation that decides to intervene into another nation’s concerns where the intervening power has hidden political agenda residing below the surface.

This reminder should be dealt to all nations, not only where a political fueled agenda influences an intervention by military force but any intervention that the preservation and protection of life is not the prime concern of military action.

“war is a continuation of politics by other means,”

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, 1st of July 1780 – 16th of November 1831

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Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

The Boxer Rebellion witnessed acts of exceptional bravery and heroism, recognized through prestigious military decorations such as the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, for soldier of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.

Victoria Cross recipients

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB (14th of May 1870 – 9th of March 1966) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Captain RMLI, (later General)

His citation reads:

Captain (now Brevet Major) Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday, Royal Marine Light Infantry, on the 24th June, 1900. The enemy, consisting of Boxers and Imperial troops, made a fierce attack on the west wall of the British Legation, setting fire to the West Gate of the south stable quarters, and taking cover in the buildings which adjoined the wall. The fire, which spread to part of the stables, and through which and the smoke a galling fire was kept up by the Imperial troops, was with difficulty extinguished, and as the presence of the enemy in the adjoining buildings was a grave danger to the Legation, a sortie was organized to drive them out.

 A hole was made in the Legation Wall, and Captain Halliday, in command of twenty Marines, led the way into the buildings and almost immediately engaged a party of the enemy. Before he could use his revolver, however, he was shot through the left shoulder, at point blank range, the bullet fracturing the shoulder and carrying away part of the lung.

Notwithstanding the extremely severe nature of his wound, Captain Halliday killed three of his assailants, and telling his men to "carry on and not mind him," walked back unaided to the hospital, refusing escort and aid so as not to diminish the number of men engaged in the sortie.

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO (9th of May 1882 – 29th of December 1956) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Midshipman RN, (later Commander)

London Gazette citation

“Mr, (read Midshipman), Basil John Douglas Guy, Midshipman of Her Majesty’s Ship “Barfleur”.

On 19th July, 1900, during the attack on Tientsin City, a very heavy cross-fire was brought to bear on the Naval Brigade, and there were several casualties. Among those who fell was one A.B.I. McCarthy, shot about 50 yards short of cover.

Mr. Guy stopped with him, and, after seeing what the injury was, attempted to lift him up and carry him in, but was not strong enough, so after binding up the wound Mr. Guy ran to get assistance.

In the meantime the remainder of the company had passed in under cover, and the entire fire from the city wall was concentrated on Mr. Guy and McCarthy. Shortly after Mr. Guy had got in under cover the stretchers came up, and again Mr. Guy dashed out and assisted in placing McCarthy on the stretcher and carrying him in.

The wounded man was however shot dead just as he was being carried into safety. During the whole time a very heavy fire had been brought to bear upon Mr. Guy, and the ground around him was absolutely ploughed up.

Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

During the Boxer rebellion, 59 American servicemen received the Medal of Honor for their actions. Four of these were for Army personnel, twenty-two went to navy sailors and the remaining thirty-three went to Marines. Harry Fisher was the first Marine to receive the medal posthumously and the only posthumous recipient for this conflict.

Side note:

Total number Victoria Crosses awarded

Since the inception of the Victoria Cross in 1856, there have been 1,358 VCs awarded. This total includes three bars granted to soldiers who won a second VC and the cross awarded to the unknown American soldier.

The most recent was awarded to Lance Corporal Joshua Leakey of 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment, whose VC was gazetted in February 2015, following an action in Afghanistan on 22nd of August 2013, this information was correct at the time of writing.

Total number of Congressional Medal of Honor, (MOH), awarded

Since the inception of the MOH in, 1861 there have been 3,536 MOH awarded.

The most recent was awarded was made to former Army Capt. Larry L. Taylor during a ceremony at the White House, by President Joe Biden, Sept. 5, 2023, this information was correct at the time of writing.

The Medal of Honor was introduced for the Naval Service in 1861, followed in 1862 a version for the Army.