The Moon Eyed People: Legends of Southern Appalachia

The legend of the moon eyed people of southern Appalachia has captivated the imaginations of Cherokee Native Americans as well as European settlers, and modern residents of the region alike. The Cherokee legend proclaims that long before the Cherokee people came to the mountains of the southeast, another race of people called the moon eyed people lived in caves and atop the mountains in large forts. Roy Williams explains.

John Sevier.

The moon eyed people were supposedly nocturnal and could not see well during the day, they also supposedly had pale skin due to their lack of exposure to sunlight. Certain stone structures such as the one at Fort Mountain in northwest Georgia are associated with this legend. The Cherokee legend claimed that the moon eyed people and the Cherokee went to war in the past and eventually the Cherokee drove them out from their mountainous territory. This myth captivated the minds of early European settlers who used this myth to claim the ahistorical connection that a previous white race had built the large stone structures in the Appalachian Mountains that the Cherokee claimed the moon eyed people had built.

The legend of the moon eyed people gives us a unique window into the minds of early European settlers in North America. The claim that a previous white race built the stone structures on the mountaintops of southern Appalachia such as the one at fort mountain spread like wildfire as it entered the public consciousness for Euro Americans. The legend was augmented and reconfigured to argue that the moon eyed people were a lost colony of Welsh men who were descendants of the Welsh prince Madoc who supposedly sailed to the Americas long before Christopher Columbus. This legend spread so prolifically that President Thomas Jefferson included correspondence to Lewis and Clarke indicating that they should keep their eyes open for evidence of “Welsh Indians” in their exploration of the territories included in the Louisiana Purchase.

John Sevier

John Sevier was the first governor of Tennessee between 1803 and 1809. Sevier fought in the Cherokee and Chickamauga wars as Euro-American settlers pushed further into Cherokee territory. Sevier supposedly interacted with a Cherokee chief named Ocotosota in the mid-1780s. The source claims that Ocotosota said that he, "told of the fort being built by white men from across the great water."  Ocotosota told him that the ruins atop fort mountain were built by white men known as the moon eyed people. This source however is difficult to determine in reliability since chief Ocotosota died in 1783, probably before governor Sevier ever interacted with him.

Benjamin Smith Barton’s book, New Views of the Origin of the Tribes and Nations of America (1797) is another source for these early interactions between the Cherokee and Euro-Americans settlers in describing the myth of the moon eyed people. Barton citing colonel Leonard Marbury describes the story in which the Cherokee expelled the moon eyed people from the mountains of southern Appalachia. Marbury recounts that, "the Cheerake tell us, that when they first arrived in the country which they inhabit, they found it possessed by certain 'moon-eyed-people,' who could not see in the day-time. These wretches they expelled." While this source has issues in determining its validity due to the separation of experience between Barton and Marbury, it does provide another clue into the legend of the moon eyed people and early Euro-American colonial thought.

Cultural significance

The legend of the moon eyed people should not be doubted when considering the cultural significance it plays to the Cherokee people. However, early Euro-American settlers’ perception of this myth should be scrutinized appropriately. The legend of the moon eyed people bears a striking resemblance to the mound builder myth which proliferated in early colonial America and into the 19th century. Native Americans told Euro-American settlers that they had not built the mounds throughout the United States. Archeological and historical research has proved the Mississippian civilization of North America built these structures hundreds and sometimes thousands of years before contemporary Native Americans came to live in these regions such as the Creek and Cherokee people. Euro-Americans settlers took this to mean that a previous advanced white civilization had constructed these structures. The legend of the moon eyed people follows the same trajectory. Euro-American used these structures to create a narrative, from the mounds built by the Mississippians to the enigmatic structures on Fort Mountain in Northwest Georgia to lay claim over the Americas in establishing their legitimacy as heirs to the lands. The mound builder myth has been refuted by archeological surveys proving that the Mississippian civilization built these structures. The ruins atop fort mountain will probably follow the same fate as a forgotten ceremonial or defensive structure built by Native Americans in the distant past. The legend of the moon eyed people endures as an important element of Cherokee culture, however any pseudohistorical claims about lost Welsh princes or ancient white civilizations in North America must be cast aside as a byproduct of the racial ideology of early European settlers.

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References

Tibbs, David (2008). "Legends of Fort Mountain: The Moon-Eyed People / Prince Madoc of Wales". Historical Marker Database. Retrieved April 30, 2013.

"Forsyth County News ('Fort Mountain')". Archived from the original on February 4, 2021. Retrieved February 4, 2021.

Barton, Benjamin Smith, M.D. (1797). New views of the origin of the tribes and nations of America. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: John Bioren for the author. p. xliv. at Internet Archive

Feder, Kenneth L. (2005). "The Myth of the Moundbuilders" (PDF). Frauds, Myths, And Mysteries: Science and Pseudoscience in Archaeology. Central Connecticut State Univ: McGraw Hill. pp. 151–155, 159–160, 164–166. ISBN 978-0-07-286948-4. Retrieved May 19, 2012.

Was the U.S. Civil War Fought for Slavery or States’ Rights?

When it comes to slavery's involvement in secession, most everyone fits comfortably within one of two groups, neither of which is correct. The first argues that slavery had nothing to do with secession; the other claims slavery was the sole cause. Jeb Smith explains.

This is part 3 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War. Part 1 on Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy is here, and part 2 on the Causes of Southern Secession is here.

General John Gordon.

"Slavery is only one of the minor issues and the cause of the war, the whole cause, on our part is the maintenance of the independence of these states....neither tariffs, nor slavery, nor both together, could ever been truly called the cause of the secession.... the sovereign independence of our states. This, indeed, includes both these minor questions, as well as many others even greater and higher." 

-Daily Richmond Examiner August 2, 1864, quoted in Rosch, From Founding Fathers to Fire Eaters Shotwell Publishing 2018

"In his message, Mr. Lincoln announced a great political discovery. It was that all former statesmen of America had lived, and written, and labored under a great delusion that the States, instead of having created the Union, were its creatures; that they obtained their sovereignty and independence from it, and never possessed either until the Convention of 1787."

-Edward A Pollard The Lost Cause : A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates E. B. Treat & Co. Publishers NY 1866

Slavery had varying degrees of influence on the Deep South's decision to secede.[1] There is no question that some in the South were willing to leave the Union to preserve slavery if it came to that. Southern slave owners viewed northern abolitionists as foreign invaders dictating their lives. To Southerners, slavery was a constitutional, Biblical, and state right, and no Northern radical was to have greater authority. Thomas Jefferson said that slavery was "The exclusive right of every state." 

The Cotton States had great economic importance riding on slavery, Mississippi alone had four billion dollars’ worth of value invested in slaves, and almost the whole economic system of the state depended on slavery. They wished to defend the financial system that had brought them so much prosperity. Yet even in Mississippi, slavery was not the sole cause of secession. James McPherson quotes the Jackson Mississippian, "Let not slavery prove a barrier to our independence...although slavery is one of the principles that we started to fight for... if it proves an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of our liberty and separate nationality, away with it."

As I have already mentioned, I think that many causes led to the secession of the Deep South. Yet, I would not wholly disagree if someone were to say that slavery was the leading cause of withdrawal in the Deep South. But there is a vast difference between saying that the South left solely to keep slaves in bondage and saying that the federal intrusion on the states' rights over the issue of slavery was the leading cause of separation. Many overstate slavery's involvement in the Deep South secession because slavery was the "occasion" to which the fight over the nature of the Union was fought.

"That institution is not a cause of this war, but simply an occasion of it. It is only the object against which the radicalism of the North has arrayed itself in Abolitionism. Had not this object existed, that Dragon from the bottomless pit, would have discovered some other eminence of Southern life, on which to expend its fury. We are leading the great battle for the sum of modern history--for the regulated liberty and civilization of the age. It is conservative religion against atheism--constitutional law against fanatical higher law--social stability against destructive radicalism."

-Rev. William A. Hall, The Historic Significance of the Southern Revolution Printed by A. F. Crutchfield Petersburg Virginia 1864

The leading cause of separation was not preserving something these states already had legal protection for, that is, slavery. Instead, it was the federal expansion past its constitutional limits and encroachments upon the states' rights. Is the federal government restricted to the powers given in the Constitution? Or was it released to step outside of its delegated powers, thus nullifying the Constitution and limited government? In 1864 Confederate general Patrick Cleburne said, "Between the loss of independence and the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the latter. Give up the negro slave rather than be a slave himself."

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

-10th amendment U.S. Constitution

"The Constitution... contains no grant of power to the Federal Government to interfere with this species of property...slave property rests upon the same basis, and is entitled to the same protection, as every other description of property." 

-Isham G. Harris Call for a Referendum on a Tennessee Secession Convention January 7, 1861

In 1862 Rose Greenhow wrote, "Slavery, although the occasion, was not the producing cause of dissolution." R.L.Dabney wrote, "Slavery was not the cause, but the occasion of strife...Rights of the states were the bulwarks of the liberties of the people, but that emancipation by federal aggression would lead to the destruction of all other rights." Just as decades earlier, John Calhoun had identified the tariff of abominations as "The occasion, rather than the real cause" of dispute. The real issue was over a limited central government.

Where you stand on the "real cause" will necessarily cause disagreement on any issue that arises; a national bank, internal improvements, slavery and so on. If the two sides fundamentally disagreed on the Constitution and the purpose of the central government, they could then never agree on any of these side issues. In Virginia Iliad, H.V Traywick quotes an article in the N.Y. Times on April 8, 1861, saying, "Slavery has nothing whatever to do with the tremendous issues now awaiting decision...The question which we have to meet is precisely what it would be if there were not a negro slave on American soil." 

Since the ratification of the Constitution, a conflict had been fought over whether we were to maintain a federated republic as understood by the states or if we were to become a centralized nation to benefit the most powerful interests and political parties. This debate raged politically on many battlefields before 1860. However, slavery was the chosen battleground of the nationalists in the fight to transform the Union in 1860. Instead of just a political issue, they would transform it into a moral issue.

The Republicans violated the Constitution and the Dred Scott v. Sandford 1857 Supreme Court ruling by trying to decide the fate of slavery by federal rather than state and individual control. Democratic plank 9 of the 1852 elections plainly stated that an attack on slavery was an attack on states' rights; you cannot separate the two issues. You cannot have the federal government decide on slavery without it greatly exceeding its original intent and purpose. 

That the federal government is one of limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution, and the grants of power made therein ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of the government; and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers. 

Democratic Plank 1 1852

That Congress has no power under the constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists or others made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences.  

Democrat Plank 9 1852 

The South viewed slaves the same way they did any other legal property. If the Government interfered with slaves, what would stop them from doing the same with any other property? If this violation by the Federal Government were allowed to happen, no rights would be safe: The Constitution would then be of no value. The Union of states that delegated certain limited powers to the Federal Government would be destroyed. And finally the Government would become limitless in power.

If the government was allowed to abandon any of its limitations, it would begin to dictate all manner of regulations and exert jurisdiction it previously was never considered to have. After a quick look at our lives today, who can say the South was incorrect in their assessment? The effects of the federal government stepping into areas past its jurisdiction delegated by the states are commonplace today. The Constitution is set aside so long as the masses' emotions are stirred over any one topic. Politicians and media provoke the mob, and no Constitution or ideas about limited Government can stop them. We have become an unlimited democracy ruled by a mob; the North destroyed the old Republic and Constitution in 1860. As a result, most outlaws in America today are found among elected officials and judges, and we simply accept their lawlessness because we have grown accustomed to servitude. 

Well before the war, on July 4 1854, famed abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison publicly burned a copy of the Constitution and spoke of it as a "Covenant with Death,  an agreement with Hell." Abolitionist John Brown seceded from the Union and created his own anti-slavery provisional Constitution. In the book, The South Vindicated from the Treason and Fanaticism of the Northern Abolitionists 1836; former South Carolinian congressman William Drayton wrote, "The abolitionists in urging their designs against the South, are guilty of infringing the acknowledged rights of those states ...it looks to revolution, it teaches that the constitution "is null and void" when opposed to their schemes." In other words, whatever the issue was, the Constitution could take a back seat if it impeded the political agenda of the day. 

An unregulated democracy, such as our Government today, has more power and violates our rights more than when we were under King George; it is not even comparable. In Red Republicans and Lincoln's Marxists, Al Benson Jr and Walter Kennedy write, "By focusing upon slavery, the bona fide story of the death of real states’ rights and the beginning of Imperial America is overlooked...we stand naked before the awesome power of our federal master."

Unlike today, antebellum America was a time when the federal government did not spread into the dominion of the states. Through the states, people were allowed self-rule and self-governance. Southerners understood that if the federal government was allowed to infringe on the states' rights on the issue of slavery, it would become an authoritarian body that no longer followed its limitations under the Constitution. These were the costs of the South's defeat in the Civil War; self-governance, and limited government. 

To desire a limited government and maintain the Constitution as handed down for generations, one did not need to be pro-slavery. Northerner writer Frederick Law Olmsted opposed slavery but objected to abolishing it "by federal edict." In 1864, Vermont Bishop John Henry Hopkins wrote, A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery, where he supported the South and the compact theory of the Union, arguing for gradual and consensual abolition.

Southerners heeded the warnings of the Founders. In a letter to Charles Hammond on August 18, 1821, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "When all Government domestic and foreign in little as in great things shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one Government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the Government from which we separated."

"I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people. To take a single step beyond the boundaries, thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition."

– Thomas Jefferson, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank" February 15, 1791 

A government of unlimited or undefined powers will eventually become totalitarian. This was widely known amongst Southerners. Thomas Jefferson believed that states' rights were the best protection to preserve liberty and a republican form of Government. John Taylor of Caroline warned, "If a government can take some, it may take all." St. George Tucker taught, "Power when undefined, soon becomes unlimited." In the first annals of Congress, James Jackson said, "We must confine ourselves to the powers described in the Constitution, and the moment we pass it, we take an arbitrary stride towards a despotic Government." James Rosch quotes John Randolph of Roanoke addressing Congress "If they begin with declaring one law of one state unconstitutional, where were they to stop? They might go on until the state governments, stripped of all authority...a great consolidated empire established upon their ruins...in such a contest the states must fall, and when they did fall, there was an end of all republican Government in the country." 

In other words, the only method to prevent an unlimited government is to counter all minor steps it takes beyond its authority. To do so, there must be a check from outside the government itself since it will not limit its own powers, only expand them. In our federated Republic, this check was the state governments who were to maintain the Founders’ principles for their peoples. Future president John Adams, a Massachusetts federalist, agreed that arbitrary power could not be left unchecked;

"Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud, is the only maxim which can ever preserve the liberties of any people. When the people give way, their deceivers, betrayers, and destroyers press upon them so fast, that there is no resisting afterward. The nature of the encroachment upon the American Constitution is such, as to grow every day more and more encroaching. Like a cancer, it eats faster and faster every hour. The revenue creates pensioners, and the pensioners urge for more revenue. The people grow less steady, spirited, and virtuous, the seekers more numerous and more corrupt, and every day increases the circles of their dependents and expectants, until virtue, integrity, public spirit, simplicity, and frugality, become the objects of ridicule and scorn, and vanity, luxury, foppery, selfishness, meanness, and downright venality swallow up the whole society. "

– John Adams, Novanglus Letters, 1774 

The claim that the Deep South left the Union to preserve slavery does not make sense; no one was trying to abolish slavery within those states. In his book, The Yankee Problem, Clyde Wilson quotes Horace Greeley at the 1860 Republican convention saying, "An anti-slavery man per se cannot be elected, but a tariff, river-and -harbor- Pacific Railroad, free homestead man, may succeed although he is anti-slavery." Historian David Donald wrote, "No responsible political body in the north in 1860 proposed to do anything at all about slavery where it actually existed." On Tuesday, March 5, 1861, the N.Y. Times editorial (which celebrated Lincoln's inaugural) said the president’s address was "explicit and emphatic in its guarantees to the alarming interest of the southern states." Lincoln "Disavowed all thought" of "interfering with slavery in any state where it exists."

On September 23, 1862, the N.Y. Times printed the preliminary emancipation proclamation with a headline that read, "the war still to be prosecuted for the restoration of the union." And in a letter to the federal minister in Paris, the secretary of the state William Seward wrote, "The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the same, whether it succeeds or fails. The rights of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will remain subject to exactly the same laws and form of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." Union generals such as McClellan and McDowell returned fugitive slaves to their masters during the war.  

Since slavery wasn't being threatened where it existed in the Union, it would be hard to accept that Southerners would fight a war and leave the country just to have slavery extended into new territories. In fact, if slavery were extended, it would provide more competition to the southern slave state's monopoly on cotton. In 1843 many wealthy southern planters and men, such as John Calhoun, voted against Texas joining the Union because they said it would reduce the price of cotton. Furthermore, the South forfeited federal protection for their runaway slaves under the fugitive slave laws by leaving the Union. They were also giving up their right to bring slaves into the territories of the United States. 

If the South fought only to preserve slavery, with no regard for states' rights, they could have remained in the Union. During the war, Lincoln told southerners if they laid down arms, they could come back into the Union with slavery intact. Even the Emancipation Proclamation was an attempt to reconcile slave states back in the Union. John Cannan in The Peninsula Campaign writes, "The emancipation proclamation was actually an offer permitting the south to stop fighting and return to the union by January 1 and still keep its slaves," and the South understood it as such. In July 1863, a Raleigh newspaper stated, "Peace now would save slavery, while a continued war would obliterate the last vestiges of it." Confederate Major General John Gordon wrote, "At any period of the war from its beginning to near its close the South could have saved slavery by simply laying down its arms and returning to the Union" Yet, for other reasons mentioned, the South chose to continue the fight.

Slavery was permitted in the South, but that does not mean it was always celebrated. Today we have legalized abortion, perhaps some view abortion as many southerners viewed slavery, as a necessary evil. 

Virginia freed more slaves before the Civil War than New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New England combined. South Carolinian Mary Chestnut said that slavery was a curse, yet she supported secession. She and others hoped the war would end with a "Great independent country with no slavery." But for the typical Southerner, the issue over slavery was much more profound as it involved states' rights and the nature of the Union.

"When the Government of the United States disregarded and attempted to trample upon the rights of the States, Georgia set its power at defiance and seceded from the Union rather than submit to the consolidation of all power in the hands of the Central or Federal Government." 

-Joseph E Brown Georgia Governor to Jefferson Davis over the Conscription act 1862

In antebellum America, the states resisted federal expansion in various ways. The first issue between central and state governments arose over the alien and sedition acts. Later problems involved internal improvements, national banking, conscription, protective tariffs, land disputes, freedom of speech, free trade, state control of the militia, fugitive slave laws, etc. No matter the subject, states generally held firm and fought against federal expansions. The South was doing what states had done in antebellum America, resisting national expansion when it went past its constitutional bounds. The outcomes of the Republican victory have resulted in our current overbearing government, which has no regard for its ostensibly limited powers, proving the South correct.

"The South's concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North's had. With complete sincerity, the South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the Founding Fathers--a government of limited powers that protected the rights of property, including slave property, and whose constituency comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white race undisturbed by large cities, heartless factories, restless free workers, and class conflict. The accession of the Republican party, with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian, free-labor capitalism, was a signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably toward this frightening future."

-James M. McPherson  Ante-bellum Southern Exceptionalism A New Look at an Old Question Kent State U Press 1983

South Carolina Secession Document

"The one great evil, from which all other evils have flowed, is the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States. The Government of the United States is no longer the government of confederated republics, but of a consolidated Democracy... the limitations in the Constitution have been swept away; and the Government of the United States has become consolidated, with a claim of limitless powers in its operations."

-Address of South Carolina to Slave-Holding States, Convention of South Carolina 1860

South Carolina was the first state to secede from the Union. If the state declaration of the causes of secession is read in full, it gives an excellent example of slavery as a state's rights issue. In the document, quoting from a resolution of the state convention of 1852, it was declared "That the frequent violations of the constitution by the United States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State in then withdrawing from the Federal Union." At that time they had refrained, but their situation had only worsened and they could no longer remain. In their declaration of the causes of independence, the writers wanted it known that state rights were the true motivator of secession. That is why at first glance through the text, you will see "FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES," with minor variations in the phrasing, capitalized three times in the document.

The document goes into the history of states' rights in America. It mentions the federal government's failure to uphold the Constitution and the government's interference with the rights of the states. South Carolina stated that if they were to stay in the Union, the "guaranties of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost" and that the federal government would become its enemy. While slavery is mentioned six times, states' rights, independent states, and state sovereignty are mentioned sixteen times. States' rights are discussed without any connection to slavery, yet slavery is always mentioned in connection with states' rights. Just as Southern democrats had been saying for decades in their political party planks, an attack on slavery was an attack on states' rights.

"For more than thirty years the people of South Carolina have been contending against the consolidation of the government of the United States...the United States Government has steadily usurped powers not granted- –progressively trenched upon States Rights." 

-Charleston Mercury South Carolina April 20, 1861

Slavery in the Territories

"The struggle in our territories...has not been a struggle for the emancipation of slaves. It has been a contest for power...The Northern people, in attempting to preclude the Southern people, by the legislation of Congress...a party hostile both to the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court, have been placed in control of the Government...Whether all the States composing the United States should be slaveholding or non-slaveholding States, neither the Northern nor Southern States ought to have permitted to be a question in the politics of the United States."

-Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs C.S.A 1861- Provided by the Abbeville Institute September 4, 2014

The fight over the expansion of slavery into the new western territories was a political battle. Were the states coming into the Union allowed their state rights as all previous states had been, or was the federal Government allowed to infringe on those rights and command them? Were states sovereign or subject to federal control? The South fought for these new states coming into the Union to be allowed to decide on their own about slavery regardless of the outcome. 

Further, was the federal Government allowed to command where slave owners were allowed to go within the Union? Could they prevent their migration to the western territories, thus giving political control to the Republican party? Were Southerners full citizens in their own country with the same rights as non-slave owners? Would the Federal Government be allowed to discriminate against any minority group that lacked the powers to defend themselves? 

But the southern objection was more than a fight for seats in Congress, as slavery was very unlikely to extend west. According to David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered, "Slavery did not go into New Mexico or Arizona, Kansas, after having been opened to the peculiar institution for six years, had only two negro slaves." To many Southerners, the fight was to maintain states’ authority in the Union and preserve the Constitution and people's self-government.

That when the settlers in a Territory, having an adequate population, form a State Constitution, the right of sovereignty commences and being consummated by admission into the Union, they stand on an equal footing with the people of other States, and the State thus organized ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its Constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery. [Emphasis added.]    

-Southern Democrat Party Platform 1860 

 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Disappeared Dead of Waterloo: Were Their Bones Sold?

On June 18, 1815, the fields near the small village of Waterloo in modern-day Belgium witnessed one of history's most significant and brutal battles. The conflict, which marked the final defeat of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, left an indelible mark on the landscape and history alike. Yet, despite the staggering death toll, estimates suggest around 50,000 soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured, the mass graves expected to hold the remains of these fallen warriors remain conspicuously absent. This mystery has led historians and archaeologists to a grim and unsettling theory: that the bones of Waterloo’s dead were harvested and sold for industrial purposes in the 19th century.

Richard Clements explains.

The morning after the Battle of Waterloo on June 19, 1815. By John Heaviside Clark.

The Carnage of Waterloo: A Battlefield of Corpses

The Battle of Waterloo was a clash of titans, with Napoleon's Armée du Nord pitted against the combined forces of the Seventh Coalition, led by the Duke of Wellington and Prussian Field Marshal von Blücher. The battle raged for eight grueling hours, culminating in a decisive victory for the Coalition. In the immediate aftermath, the battlefield was a harrowing sight. Contemporary accounts describe piles of corpses, wounded soldiers left untreated, and the pervasive stench of death.

Major W.E. Frye, who visited the battlefield just days after the fighting ceased, recounted "a sight too horrible to behold" with "heaps of wounded men with mangled limbs" and a multitude of carcasses. These vivid descriptions paint a picture of immense loss and devastation, yet they also underscore a mystery: where are all the bodies now?

The 19th Century Bone Rush: A Macabre Industry

In the decades following the battle, Europe experienced a peculiar and macabre industry boom, the trade of human bones. It was common practice to use bones as a source of phosphate fertilizer, a crucial component for the agricultural revolution of the 19th century. Historical records indicate that bones were collected from battlefields across Europe, ground into bone meal, and transported primarily to Britain, where they were in high demand.

The industrial use of bones extended beyond agriculture. The sugar industry, in particular, utilized bones in a process known as bone black or bone char filtration. This involved burning bones to create a porous, carbon-rich substance that could decolorize sugar during the refining process. The demand for bone char was significant, as it produced a higher quality of refined sugar, which was essential for the growing consumer markets in Europe and America.

Professor Tony Pollard of the University of Glasgow, a leading expert in battlefield archaeology, has extensively studied this phenomenon. Pollard's research, published in the Journal of Conflict Archaeology, suggests that Waterloo, with its high concentration of casualties, was a prime target for this gruesome trade. He points to newspaper articles from the 1820s, such as one from The London Observer, which reported that "more than a million bushels of ‘human and inhuman bones’" were imported from European battlefields into the port of Hull.

These bones likely served dual purposes: providing phosphate fertilizer for agriculture and supplying the bone char needed for sugar refining. This dual use underscores the macabre efficiency of the bone trade and highlights the economic incentives that drove the harvesting of human remains from battlefields like Waterloo.

A Missing Piece of History: The Search for Mass Graves

Pollard’s investigation into the Waterloo battlefield has been driven by a combination of historical accounts, memoirs, and early visitor descriptions. These sources frequently mention the presence of mass graves. For instance, several accounts describe mass burials at Hougoumont, a key location in the battle. Yet, despite these reports, no substantial human remains have been discovered in modern excavations.

In an attempt to uncover the truth, Pollard and his team, through the organization Waterloo Uncovered, have embarked on a multi-year geophysical survey. This initiative aims to locate grave sites that correspond with historical descriptions. The hope is that even if the bones were removed, there would still be archaeological evidence of the pits where they were buried.

Expert Opinions and Alternative Explanations

While Pollard's theory is compelling, it remains a topic of debate among historians and archaeologists. Some experts suggest alternative explanations for the missing bodies. For example, it is possible that many of the dead were buried in shallow graves, which over time, could have been disturbed by agricultural activity or natural decomposition processes. Others argue that some bodies may have been incinerated in the aftermath of the battle, a practice not uncommon in the Napoleonic Wars.

Dr. Dominique Bosquet, an archaeologist with the Walloon Heritage Agency, emphasizes the need for direct evidence. "While the theory of bone collection is plausible given the historical context, we need more concrete archaeological evidence to confirm it definitively," he says. This sentiment is echoed by other scholars who call for continued excavation and analysis.

Conclusion: A Tale Yet Unfinished

The mystery of Waterloo’s missing dead is a poignant reminder of the human cost of war and the complexities of historical research. While the theory that soldiers' bones were collected and sold as fertilizer is supported by compelling circumstantial evidence, definitive proof remains elusive. As Pollard and his team continue their work, the world watches with bated breath, hoping for answers to this macabre historical puzzle.

The investigation into the fate of Waterloo's fallen soldiers underscores the importance of interdisciplinary research, combining historical accounts with modern archaeological techniques. It is a journey into the past that may one day reveal the final resting places of those who gave their lives on that fateful day in June 1815.

Richard Clements in his own words:

I am a dedicated writer with a passion for history and uncovering its mysteries. I specialize in creating engaging and well-researched content that brings historical events and intriguing mysteries to life. With a keen eye for detail and a love for storytelling, I have written on various historical topics, from ancient civilizations to modern history. My work aims to captivate readers and provide them with a deeper understanding of the past and the mysteries that intrigue us. He posts on X/Twitter here.

References

Pollard, Tony. "The Archaeology of Waterloo: Mapping the Missing Mass Graves." Journal of Conflict Archaeology, vol. 6, no. 1, 2022.

Frye, Major W.E. Aftermath of Waterloo: An Eyewitness Account. Historical Press, 1817.

"More than a Million Bushels of Bones Imported into Hull." The London Observer, 1822.

Bosquet, Dominique. "Excavations at Waterloo: An Ongoing Search for Truth." Archaeology Today, vol. 12, no. 4, 2023.

University of Glasgow Press Release, 2015. "New Discoveries at the Waterloo Battlefield."

Did Sire Robert Peel Create 19th Century Social and Political Stability in Britain?

Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was one of the most dominant politicians of the nineteenth century in Britain. He is well-known for founding the Metropolitan Police Service in 1829 and repealing the unpopular Corn Laws in 1846. These measures were certainly instrumental in providing a degree of stability since they began the process of making streets safer and making bread cheaper for the people, respectively. Yet, Peel is also controversial. Whilst he has been widely accredited with bringing social and political stability to Victorian England for ordinary people, Peel had initially opposed some of the most progressive measures of his day. Furthermore, recent reappraisals of Peel have suggested that his efforts have been exaggerated. It is worth considering the extent to which Peel truly helped create mid-Victorian social and political stability.

Beth Ross explains.

Sir Robert Peel. Portrait by Thomas Lawrence.

Metropolitan Police, Corn Laws, and Social Stability

During his time as Home Secretary and Prime Minister, Peel brought in a series of reforms that intended to improve the condition of England. First and foremost was the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. Prior to the Act’s passing, there was no organised police force in England. The only forces were the Manchester Police and Bow Street runners, who were considered corrupt or unable to prevent crime.[1] In London, the situation was worse; parishes reserved the right to manage their watches independently, and there were generally no police on patrol during the night.[2] An indication of the system’s incompetence before Peel lies in the fact that crime rates in London were increasing. At its peak, one in every 383 people was a criminal.[3] Riots, too, were becoming common. Imminent reform was evidently needed, prompting Peel to respond with a scheme that began in London. A new police force was set up, headed by two magistrates. To increase the morality and efficiency of this force, Peel ensured that the two senior magistrates were “of the highest capacity and character.”[4] It did not take long for their success to become apparent. During the mounting political unrest of the 1830s and 1840s, only London had any hope of maintaining a modicum of peace.[5]This was largely thanks to the establishment of the new police force, whereas other local authorities struggled. Furthermore, the police created by Peel also set a precedent for becoming the model other developing forces would follow over the next quarter of the century.[6] The new force was also instrumental in maintaining order. In 1848, with the Chartists marching on London, the upshot was astonishingly orderly and had a relatively low level of violence.[7] It was said that one of the main reasons for this outcome was the existence of Peel’s police.

Peel’s police force undeniably had a positive impact on maintaining social security and stability. What would essentially have been a chaotic situation was diffused by a police force constructed mainly by Peel. Urgent reform had obviously been needed in this area, and it can justifiably be argued that Peel certainly delivered it. The police force, alongside Peel’s criminal laws, have often been hailed for their contributions in creating social stability. So, too, was his repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Although this was a disastrous move for his party, it improved the hardships of ordinary workers. When the Corn Laws were in effect, employees had to pay extra for bread, a challenging burden in the current economic conditions.[8] The repeal of the Laws benefitted the bottom 90% of income earners, making the movement a very “pro-poor policy.”[9] Unsurprisingly, Peel was widely celebrated and fondly remembered by the people after his death, primarily for repealing the Corn Laws. High bread prices had been one of the most debilitating aspects of nineteenth-century England.[10] Peel had, in effect, taken one of the most significant burdens on low-income families and erased it completely, thus improving their standard of living to a degree.

Limitations of his Reforms

On the other hand, it is also possible that undue credit has been given to Peel for the changes his reforms instigated. With his criminal laws, Peel attempted to encourage juries to convict criminals by removing the death penalty for several offences, believing that juries were far less likely to make convictions for fear of condemning someone to death.[11] However, the reduction in death sentences only started after Peel left his office as Home Secretary in 1830, and noticeable law changes did not occur until the Whigs took power.[12] Executions, the very thing that Peel had sought to reduce, only decreased on a larger scale under Russell, the Whig who succeeded Peel as Prime Minister.[13] In another instance, Peel’s 1844 Banking Act created two separate departments within the Bank of England to maintain regulation. In reality, this had the opposite effect. Because the Bank now could issue loans on the market like many other banks, a surfeit of cheap money emerged. This, in turn, worsened over-speculation on the performance of railways, leading to a financial meltdown in 1847 (albeit a brief one).[14] Ultimately, the 1844 Banking Act was temporarily suspended, attesting to its failure. Peel has even been blamed for “the economic ruin of thousands.”[15]Admittedly, the Act would eventually lay the foundations for Britain’s financial policy up until the First World War,[16]but it cannot be denied that it was a failure in the short term. Therefore, it appears that the credit given to Peel for specific innovations has been over-emphasised.

A Progressive Politician?

As mentioned above, Peel was a controversial character. Earlier in his career, he had ardently opposed what was considered some of the “most great progressive movements of the age.”[17] These were votes for working men, Catholic Emancipation, and the 1832 Great Reform Bill. Regarding the Bill, Peel felt that it was extremist in nature and would threaten the current constitution.[18] Somewhat arrogantly, he thought it was wrong for the government to concede to public opinion. Although the Bill only had a limited impact, it did increase the electorate and lay the groundwork for further change.[19] Peel essentially opposed the beginnings of progressive change, which would potentially benefit society. Concerning Catholic Emancipation, he refused to support it at first because Catholics did not swear allegiance to the Crown.[20] While he eventually threw his support behind both causes, it is worth noting that he only supported Emancipation for fear of an Irish uprising in 1829.[21] Had this threat not existed, Peel probably would have remained firm in his original views, thus leaving Catholics vulnerable and without any political rights. Moreover, he also refused to support a bill proposing that working days be reduced to ten hours only. Yet when a twelve-hour bill was proposed in 1843, Peel threatened Parliament with his resignation if it did not go through.[22] He even accepted an amendment to the Mines Bill, which suggested that the age of exclusion from work be lowered from thirteen to ten.[23] Taking these instances into account portrays Peel in a new light. Rather than being the engineer of social stability, Peel instead emerges as a less progressive politician than is usually supposed. Technically, his refusal to support a bill that would reduce the hardships of a working day for ordinary people, alongside his initial opposition towards Catholic Emancipation, meant that Peel was working against creating mid-Victorian social stability.

Political Instability

Whilst it can be said that Peel at least contributed to social stability in part through his creation of the Metropolitan Police Force, it can be argued that he contributed to stability less on a political scale. During his term as Leader of the Opposition and Prime Minister, relations between Peel and his party were fraught. In fact, the Conservatives had broken up when he resigned in 1846 and were to see limited power for the next thirty years.[24] Most Historians, by all accounts, blame Peel for this outcome, citing his arrogant and aloof nature as the primary cause. Even Norman Gash, a biographer of Peel known for his praise of the man, admitted that Peel demonstrated these qualities.[25] His relationship with his backbenchers was even worse. They usually received his scorn. Then, on the matter of the Corn Laws, Peel refused to discuss anything with them.[26]

His behaviour towards his backbenchers effectively destroyed the party’s loyalty to him after years of tension. 231 voted against Peel on the Corn Laws, whilst only 112 sided with him.[27] Many of the Tories felt deceived by Peel after he had fought the 1841 election by promising to defend agricultural protection.[28] Peel was hardly wrong for repealing the Corn Laws – on a social scale, they had quite a positive impact. However, from a political perspective, it had the opposite effect since his decision cost the Conservative Party its unity and resulted in its split. The repeal was a success for the nation, but Peel can and should still be held accountable for its lasting damage to his party. Had Peel communicated with his party more and showed more respect for his backbenchers, the general tensions and subsequent split of the party in 1846 may have been avoided.

Overall, Peel was indeed the engineer of social stability to an extent. The unrest that England had previously been dealing with gradually transformed into stability.[29] For the next 25 years after 1846, social discontent was far less prevalent than it had initially been.[30] However, Peel’s contribution should not be overstated. Whilst he undoubtedly played a role in ensuring stability in Victorian social life, he also blocked some of the most popular reforms of his time. He rejected the Chartists’ call for democracy in the early 1830s and late 1840s. Of the significant reforms he did enact, not all had as much impact as has previously been accepted. Besides, regarding political stability, it is difficult to argue that he brought much security to that area, if any. Peel was partially to blame for the Conservative Party’s split in 1846. A compromise may have been reached between Peel and the party had he not acted so coldly towards his backbenchers. As his repeal of the Corn Laws showcases, Peel was a Conservative devoted to acting in the nation’s interests above his own party’s. Whilst this helped to bring about a degree of social stability, it is clear that his efforts have previously been exaggerated and were also at the expense of the political stability of the Conservative party.

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Bibliography

Adelman, P., Peel and the Conservative Party, 1830-1850 (London: Longman, 1989).

Beales, D., ‘Review: Peel, Russell, and Reform’, The Historical Journal, (1974), 17(4), pp.873-882. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638561 [Accessed July 21, 2024].

Briggs, A., The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). Available at: https://www.vlebooks.com/Product/Index/2022035?page=0&startBookmarkId=-1 [Accessed 21 July 2024].

Cragoe, M., ‘Sir Robert Peel and the “Moral Authority” of the House of Commons, 1832-41’, The English Historical Review, (2013), 128(530), pp.55-77. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23362289 [Accessed July 21, 2024].

Crosby, T. L., Sir Robert Peel’s Administration, 1841-1846 (Devon: David & Charles Ltd., 1976).

Evans, E. J., Sir Robert Peel: Statesmanship, power and party, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006).

Evans, E. J., The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783-1870, 4th ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2019).

Gash, N., Mr Secretary Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel to 1830 (London: Longmans Green Ltd., 1961).

Gash, N., Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2011).

Gaunt, R. A., Sir Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy (London: I.B. Tauris and Company Ltd., 2010). Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/anglia/detail.action?docID=676745 [Accessed July 21, 2024].

Hawkins, A., ‘“Parliamentary Government” and Victorian Political Parties, c.1830-c.1880’, The English Historical Review, (1989), 104(412), pp.638-669. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/570379 [Accessed July 21, 2024].

Hilton, B., A Mad, Bad, Dangerous People?: England, 1783-1846 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Hurd, D., Robert Peel: A Biography (London: Phoenix, 2008).

Irwin, D. A., and Chepeliev, M. G., ‘The Economic Consequences of Sir Robert Peel: A Quantitative Assessment of the Repeal of the Corn Laws’, The Economic Journal, (2021), 131, pp.3322-3337. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab029.

Morrow, J., ‘The Paradox of Peel as a Carlylean Hero’, The Historical Journal, (1997), 40(1), pp.97-110. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3020954 [Accessed July 21, 2024].

Ramsay, A. A. W., Sir Robert Peel, ed. by Basil Williams (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1928).

Read, D., Peel and the Victorians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987).

[1] Ramsay, 87

[2] Ramsay, 87; Hurd, 103

[3] Ramsay, 87

[4] Ibid, 88

[5] Read, 103

[6] Gash 1961, 506

[7] Hurd, 106-7

[8] Evans 2006, 71

[9] Irwin and Chepeliev, 3324

[10] Evans 2006, 1

[11] Ibid., 16-17

[12] Beales, 880

[13] Evans 2006, 17

[14] Hilton, 549-550

[15] Ibid.

[16] Gaunt, 56

[17] Evans 2006, 2

[18] Adelman, 8; Hawkins, 652

[19] Cragoe, 56

[20] Evans 2006, 2; Hurd, 41

[21] Evans 2006, 2

[22] Adelman, 41

[23] Ibid., 39

[24] Evans 2006, 3

[25] Evans 2019, 332; Crosby, 148; Gash 2011, 708

[26] Morrow, 105

[27] Briggs, 294

[28] Evans 2019, 329

[29] Gash 2011, 714

[30] Evans 2019, 334

The Vicksburg Campaign: Part 2 - Grant Devises a Solution

The Vicksburg campaign was a key series battles from 1862 to 1863 in the US Civil War. The fighting was focused on Vicksburg, Mississippi. In part two of a two-part series, Lloyd W Klein looks at how Grant devised a solution.

See part 1 on the strategic problem of Vicksburg here.

The Battle of Big Black River Bridge, as shown in Harper’s Weekly in June 1863.

General Ulysses Grant had surreptitiously moved his army and navy south of Vicksburg and created diversions to keep the Confederate commander Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton from knowing his whereabouts. But now, he had to cross the Mississippi River to be on the same side of the river as Vicksburg. Porter effectively managed to relocate steamships and transport vessels from the northern region of Vicksburg to where Grant's troops were stationed, ready for transportation across the river. Grant's infantry had advanced southward, and with an abundance of supplies and river transports, the Union Army was finally able to cross the Mississippi River. The Federal landing at Bruinsburg, Mississippi, on April 30, 1863, and the ensuing victory at the Battle of Port Gibson the next day were the start of Grant’s movement toward Vicksburg.

However, the crossing did not unfold as smoothly as anticipated.

Grant's initial strategy to land at Grand Gulf was thwarted by a Confederate division that had fortified the area, and even a bombardment by Union ironclads failed to dislodge them. Consequently, Grant instructed Porter and McClernand to facilitate a crossing at Grand Gulf, Mississippi. On the morning of April 29, McClernand embarked his troops on transports at Hard Times, awaiting Porter's gunboats to weaken the Confederate stronghold. Following a five-hour battle, the Confederate forces emerged victorious as Porter's vessels retreated, sustaining casualties in the process. The Battle of Grand Gulf ended in a Confederate victory when Porter's vessels withdrew after losing 19 killed and 56 wounded.

McClernand unloaded his soldiers and marched them south to De Shroon's (or Disharoon) plantation, located about 5 miles north of Bruinsburg on the west bank of the Mississippi River. That night, Porter's gunboats and the transports ran the Grand Gulf batteries and joined McClernand's men at De Shroon's.  Grant arrived on April 29 and devised a new plan to disembark his soldiers at Rodney, Mississippi, located around 12 miles downstream. However, a fortuitous encounter with an escaped slave led Grant to Bruinsburg, a port with excellent steamboat facilities and a convenient road leading up the bluffs east of the river. Upon arrival, the soldiers found the port nearly deserted, with only a local farmer as a witness to their invasion.

Battle of Port Gibson

The Battle of Port Gibson began with the landing of 17,000 Union soldiers at Bruinsburg,  Grant's army, after successfully crossing the river, proceeded towards their initial target, Port Gibson, located approximately ten miles east of Bruinsburg. This strategic location held control over the local road network, making it a crucial objective for the advancing Union forces. The skirmishes between the Union army and Confederate outposts lasted for three hours on May 1, before escalating into a full-fledged battle at dawn.

The challenging terrain initially favored the Confederate defense, characterized by flat-topped ridges and steep ravines. The ridge-tops were devoid of trees, while the ravines were densely covered with vegetation, making off-road movements arduous. Centers Creek, situated between the Bruinsburg and Rodney roads, posed a significant obstacle due to its near-impassable nature. McClernand, overseeing the attack with Porter's assistance, navigated the challenging terrain to lead the Union forces toward their objective.

Under McClernand's command, the Union forces encountered solid Confederate defense, with Brig Gen Martin Green leading the main brigade. However, the tide turned when Logan managed to flank the Confederate right, compelling the defenders to retreat. The unexpected arrival of Union forces in the evening led to a rare night battle, with Green requesting support from the Rebel right flank. Just as reinforcements arrived from Vicksburg, Osterhaus launched an attack on the Confederate right flank, further destabilizing their defense. The Confederates continued to fall back and establish new defensive positions at different times during the day. Eventually, they conceded and left the field in the early evening. The collapse of the Confederate line following Logan's assault prompted a retreat, ultimately resulting in the fall of Port Gibson and Grant's subsequent advancement inland. Grant was now in control of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.

Grant’s defeat of the garrison at Port Gibson forced the abandonment of the defenses at Grand Gulf. Pemberton was caught with his army scattered and could only oppose Grant with inferior forces at Port Gibson. The battle allowed control of the entire area where the Union army needed to cross the river and start its movement.

Grant was faced with a critical decision at this stage, as he had multiple options available to him. One possibility was to launch an attack on Vicksburg from both the south and the east. Another option was to collaborate with General Banks, seize Port Hudson, and then proceed to march on Vicksburg as a combined force. However, Grant was well aware of Banks' incompetence and had no intention of allowing him to disrupt their operations. If Grant had chosen to join forces with Banks, he would have been subordinate to him, which he strongly opposed.

Consequently, Grant had to carefully consider his next move. Although his orders, or at least Halleck’s plan, were to rendezvous with General Banks and capture Port Hudson before jointly assaulting Vicksburg, Grant decided to deviate from these instructions. Instead, he sent a message to Halleck, informing him that Banks was currently engaged in his own operations, and that waiting for him to finish would require waiting another month. Instead, Grant made the deliberate choice to advance independently, fully aware that it would take approximately 8 days for his message to be received and a response to be given. By avoiding the collaboration with Banks, Grant was able to pursue his own plans without any hindrance. As a result, he found himself in a favorable position to accept the surrender of Pemberton, while Banks remained stationed at Port Hudson.

The Move Inland

Once the areas on the river crossings were in Union control, Confederate forces situated between the Big Bayou Pierre and the Big Black River found themselves in a compromised position. Recognizing this vulnerability, the Confederate troops swiftly moved towards Hankinson's Ferry across the Big Black River. At this juncture, Grant's original plan was to feign a move north along the same path as a diversion to threaten a direct advance toward Vicksburg. However, reconnaissance revealed that Pemberton had established formidable defensive positions to the south of the city.

Consequently, on May 7th, Grant made a strategic decision that would later be regarded as one of the most brilliant maneuvers of the war. He opted to disrupt the city's supply line by capturing the railroad connecting Jackson to Vicksburg. This route involved a shift towards the east, with the ultimate objective of turning west to launch an assault on Vicksburg. By cutting off the town's supply lines, its strategic advantages were transformed into vulnerabilities.

Rather than taking a direct approach towards Vicksburg from the southern front, Grant led his army in a northeasterly direction, utilizing the protection of the Big Black River on his left flank. The plan was to target the Southern Railroad of Mississippi between Vicksburg and Jackson. Severing this vital transportation link would cut Pemberton's supply chains and communication networks, effectively isolating Vicksburg. As the Union forces advanced inland, each corps was strategically positioned, with McClernand's on the left, Sherman's in the center, and McPherson's on the right. However, the further Grant's army moved inland, the more susceptible they became to potential attacks.

The Supply Line

The crucial question of the whole campaign is how Grant would supply his army. Grant established a base at Grand Gulf on the Mississippi River to support the army's advancement inland. This supply base played a crucial role in sustaining the Union Army's movements in Mississippi. However, it is important to note that Grant did not completely sever his supply line when he reached Vicksburg and reconnected with the fleet on the Yazoo River. It is a misconception, often perpetuated by modern narratives, that Grant was without a supply line. Grant actually established and effectively maintained a main supply route throughout his movement toward Vicksburg.

General Sherman expressed apprehensions regarding Grant's logistical planning, deeming it insufficient and vulnerable to attacks. Grant, in opting for an indirect approach to Vicksburg by targeting the railroad east of the city. necessitated a longer and riskier supply route. This choice prompted Sherman to caution Grant about the potential challenges of maintaining such a large army with limited resources. Grant's response reflected his reliance on utilizing available provisions and sourcing the rest from the surrounding area. Sherman on May 9 warned Grant: "There are over 500 wagons across the river ... Stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quickly as possible, for this road will be jammed as sure as life if you attempt to supply 50,000 men by one single road." Grant replied,  "I do not calculate the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf ... What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance."

The myth of Grant's cutting loose from his supply base began when Charles Dana, a former reporter who accompanied Grant's army as an observer for the Secretary of War, wrote back to Washington on May 4, 1863: "As soon as Sherman comes up and the rations on the way arrive, he [Grant] will disregard his base and depend upon the country for meat and even for bread." In 1867 Adam Badeau, a former Grant staff officer, published the first volume of his three-volume Military History of General U. S. Grant. Badeau wrote that "[Grant] at once decided to abandon his base altogether, to plunge into the enemy's country with three days rations, trusting to the region itself for forage and supplies." A year later, in The Personal History of U. S. Grant, Albert Richardson compared Grant's Vicksburg Campaign with "Scott's brilliant campaign from Puebla to Mexico," and wrote that Grant "determined to abandon his base."

However, Grant himself refuted these claims during an interview in 1879 with a New York Herald reporter, clarifying that he did not sever ties with his supply base during the Vicksburg Campaign. Grant said that, as his troops crossed the Mississippi on April 29 and 30, he "had rations in abundance on board the transports, but no transportation for them into the interior." He said he did not abandon his base but "directed the officers to gather all the wagons and teams they could from the plantations as we moved on." He explained that while his troops had ample rations upon crossing the Mississippi, there was a lack of transportation for these supplies. Grant emphasized the importance of maintaining a supply line for essential items that could not be procured from the local environment, such as ammunition, coffee, bread, salt, and sugar.

But, when writing his Personal Memoirs in 1885, more than 22 years after the conclusion of the Vicksburg Campaign, his account of the supply line issue added to the confusion. Grant supported the myth that he had decided to abandon his supply base at Grand Gulf on May 3 by stating, "I determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in Vicksburg and invest or capture the city." This statement was almost identical to one he had previously written for an article in Century magazine in July of 1884, which was published in 1885 and later included in the four-volume Battles and Leaders of the Civil War in 1887. Grant's use of the phrase "cut loose from my base" at Grand Gulf on May 3, often cited by authors and historians, contradicts his own words eight pages later. Grant recalled that on May 12, at Dillon's farm, he decided to redirect his columns towards Jackson. He wrote, "But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none — to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I turned quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear." Therefore, it becomes clear that Grant intended to secure his communications, rather than solely focusing on food supplies.

The Battle of Raymond

Grant devised a new strategy on May 7th, opting for an indirect approach rather than a direct assault on Pemberton's forces south of Vicksburg. Instead of crossing the Big Black River and heading north, Grant planned to reach the railroad east of Vicksburg and approach from that direction. This plan, however, came with its own set of risks and challenges, as it required a longer line of supply. Despite the potential difficulties, Grant's army continued to move northeastward towards the railroad on May 11th, while General McClernand expressed concerns about the enemy isolating the Union army by cutting off their supply line.

Grant intended to first cut off the railroad before launching an attack on Vicksburg. As his forces drew closer to the railroad, Grant discovered that Pemberton had already begun constructing fortifications to protect it. It became evident that Vicksburg had strong defenses in the southern part of the city and a well-established supply line from Jackson via the railroad. Grant believed that the enemy was positioned to the north, defending the railroad.

Pemberton suspected that Grant's primary target was the railroad. In response, he strategically positioned his troops along the entire line from Warrenton to Bovina, constructing fortifications at key points. As Grant's intentions became more apparent, Pemberton extended his line of defense to Edwards Station and fortified that area as well. However, this left the rail centers at Bolton and Clinton vulnerable. To address this, Pemberton ordered reinforcements arriving from the south and east to march to Raymond, where they would form the left wing of his army, guarding the north-south roads that connected the rail line from Jackson to Vicksburg. Pemberton planned to strike Grant in the flank if he attacked Edwards Station or the Big Black Bridge. If Grant turned toward Jackson, Pemberton would strike him in the flank and rear as he passed.

Many renderings of the Battle of Raymond suggest that Johnston was in command in Jackson at this time. In fact, on May 10, he is not present in the vicinity, having just been appointed commander. He was en route; Johnston wasn’t even appointed until May 9 and didn’t arrive until May 13; at that point, McPherson was already positioned between the two Confederate armies.

Pemberton knew that reinforcements were gathering in Jackson. So, on May 10 he ordered them all to a small town called Raymond about 20 miles southwest of Jackson.

General John Gregg led a brigade to Raymond with the intention of ambushing a Union advance party, despite his limited military experience as a Texas politician. However, faulty intelligence led him to believe he would only face a small contingent of Union troops. After an exhausting 200-mile march from Port Hudson, Gregg's 3,000-man brigade arrived in Jackson on May 9th, only to be ordered to march 19 miles to Raymond after a day of rest. Arriving late in the afternoon on May 11th, his men were so fatigued that they dropped to rest where they stood.

Meanwhile, Grant had authorized McPherson to begin his march toward Jackson on the same day. Gregg, under explicit orders to not engage a larger force, was supposed to withdraw slowly toward Jackson while alerting Pemberton for a coordinated strike. However, McPherson's strategic deployment of troops lured Gregg into a pitched battle by concealing his forces and showing only Logan's 2nd Brigade up the road. This tactical maneuver led to Gregg's brigade being drawn into a confrontation, McPherson then had the 1st and 3rd Brigades march through the woods unseen. Once Logan’s entire division was in place, he ordered the men forward.

At approximately 10:30 am, McPherson issued the command to move forward. The 23rd Indiana, known for their skills as skirmishers, defied orders and crossed the creek ahead of the federal line, unknowingly setting off the Confederate ambush. Overwhelmed by the two Confederate regiments, the Hoosiers fled with the Confederates in pursuit. The Confederates, in turn, chased the Indiana troops across the creek only to be met by a hidden federal infantry brigade. A complex and chaotic engagement developed as three Confederate regiments emerged from the woods after chasing away a cavalry picket only to find that the force they had been ordered to encircle was two federal brigades. Although some accounts suggest McPherson sent in his men in waves, perhaps due to weather conditions, others say he was hiding his deployment from Gregg to deceive him.

Gregg found himself in a challenging situation as he attempted to disengage from the fight. By 4 pm, he finally managed to regroup his forces and ordered a retreat. However, amid the chaos, Gregg failed to communicate the unfolding events to Pemberton, leaving a gap in the Confederate command structure and strategic coordination.

As Gregg retreated through Raymond, reinforcements began to arrive to cover his withdrawal, including cavalry regiments, infantry units, and a brigade from Georgia. With approximately 5,000 men on the field, McPherson's forces were consolidating towards the fortifications being constructed in Jackson. The opposing forces clashed at Fourteen Mile Creek, where Gregg attempted to halt the Union army's advance. Despite initial success in causing heavy casualties, the Confederate troops were eventually outmatched by the Union's superior numbers and firepower, leading to a strategic retreat back to Jackson.

General Joseph Johnston and Jackson MS

Grant's strategic plan revolved around disrupting the railway supply route that connected Vicksburg to Jackson. The primary objective was to prevent potential attacks from General Johnston, who was stationed in Jackson, that could have resulted in Grant's forces being trapped between Johnston and Pemberton. To execute this plan, Grant made adjustments by instructing McClernand and Sherman to hold Pemberton in position while McPherson swiftly advanced from the rear to capture the state capital. This tactical maneuver aimed to sever Pemberton's supply line and weaken the defenses of Vicksburg, ultimately allowing McPherson to rejoin Grant's forces.

On May 14, 1863, Grant redirected his army towards the east to force General Johnston's forces away from Jackson. Johnston, with the majority of his army, retreated along the Canton Road. This retreat prevented Johnston from joining forces with Pemberton, who was now isolated in Vicksburg. With Johnston out of the picture, Grant shifted his focus back to Vicksburg. Once the Union forces gained control of the capital, communication between Pemberton and General Johnston was severed, further isolating Pemberton's troops.

In response to Johnston's orders, Pemberton, commanding approximately 23,000 men divided into three divisions, was instructed to leave Edwards Station and launch an attack on the Union troops at Clinton. However, Pemberton and his generals believed that Johnston's plan would likely lead to disaster. Instead, they decided to divert their attention and attack the Union supply trains en route from Grand Gulf to Raymond. On May 16, Pemberton received another message from Johnston reiterating his previous orders. Unfortunately, Pemberton had already set off after the supply trains and found himself on the Raymond-Edwards Road, with his rear positioned at a crossroads just south of the crest of Champion Hill. As a result, when Pemberton obediently ordered a countermarch, his rear, including the supply wagons, inadvertently became the vanguard of his attack.

Battle of Champion Hill

The Battle of Champion Hill, which took place on May 16, 1863, marked a significant turning point in the Vicksburg Campaign. It was a critical moment for Pemberton, as he had one last opportunity to fend off Grant's forces. However, his confusion during this crucial juncture ultimately sealed his fate. With his troops outnumbered 32,000 to 22,000, Pemberton formed a defensive line along a ridge that overlooked Jackson Creek. This defensive position covered the Middle Road and Raymond Road to the south.

In the early morning of May 13, the three divisions of Generals Bowen, Loring, and Stevenson marched out from the Black River fortifications and began their strike toward what Pemberton hoped was the rear supply line of the Federal Army. More importantly, Grant knew Pemberton was coming. One of the messengers between Johnston and Pemberton was actually a Union operative who turned over his messages to General McPherson, who in turn reported the information to Grant. On the morning of May 16, 1863, the rebels met, not Grant’s supply line as expected, but most of his Federal Army at a place known as Champion’s Hill.

The situation became precarious for Pemberton when General Stephen D. Lee, stationed atop Champion Hill, alerted him to a Union column advancing on the Jackson Road. This Union movement threatened to cut off the Southern forces from Edwards Station and the vital route to Vicksburg. In response, Pemberton shifted his troops northward to protect the hill and the Jackson Road.

Grant, on the other hand, ordered attacks by Logan and Hovey, while John A. McClernand's corps launched an assault on Pemberton's left flank, and James B. McPherson's corps attacked from the right. Despite the excellent defense provided by Stephen Lee, the Union forces managed to seize the crest of the hill around 1 PM. McPherson's corps continued to advance, capturing a crucial crossroads and effectively closing off the escape route via the Jackson Road.

Although a counterattack by Bowen's division briefly pushed the Federals back beyond the Champion Hill crest, they were unable to maintain their position due to insufficient numbers. Recognizing the dire situation, Grant launched a counterattack, committing all of his forces. Pemberton's men were unable to withstand this assault, prompting him to order his troops to utilize the only remaining escape route, the Raymond Road crossing of Bakers Creek.

McPherson on the right (north) flank fought the lion’s share of the battle. His casualties constituted the bulk of the Union losses, about 2,500. The Confederates suffered about 3,800 casualties, perhaps half were captured. Grant criticized the lack of fighting spirit of McClernand, his rival for Union Army leadership. McClernand had delayed his attack and then was stopped by a smaller force. McClernand's casualties were low on the Union left flank (south). Sherman and the others wanted to see him gone, but Grant counseled a different course of action.

The decision made by General Pemberton regarding the abandonment of Vicksburg, as ordered by General Johnston, remains a pivotal question in the context of the entire war. This question not only fueled a post-war dispute between Pemberton and Johnston but also subjected Pemberton to enduring criticism. On one hand, General Johnston displayed little confidence in defending Vicksburg and instead advocated for the merging of Pemberton's forces with his own. By uniting their armies, Johnston believed they could confront Grant's troops in an open battle and subsequently allocate their forces to other vulnerable areas of the Confederacy. Conversely, Confederate President Jefferson Davis consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Vicksburg at all costs, leaving Pemberton torn between conflicting directives. It is crucial to acknowledge the challenging position Pemberton found himself in, torn between the expectations of his military and civilian superiors.

However, fair criticism can be directed towards Pemberton for his slow response, failure to anticipate Grant's movements and lack of coordination with Johnston. Attempting to appease both his military and civilian superiors proved to be an impossible mission. The complexities of the situation, coupled with the pressure to please conflicting authorities, hindered Pemberton's ability to make swift and strategic decisions. While it is understandable that he could not simply disregard the orders of his president, the consequences of his indecisiveness and lack of proactive measures were significant. Pemberton's retreat from Vicksburg ultimately resulted in continuing censure and placed him at the center of scrutiny for years to come.

Battle of Big Black River Bridge

Pemberton realized that his army was at a numerical disadvantage, prompting him to make the strategic decision to retreat towards the Big Black River Bridge. To buy time for the Confederate army to regroup, he assigned General William W. Loring's division to hold Raymond Road while the rest of the troops moved north. The division under Bowen and the brigade of John C Vaughn were tasked with defending the works at the bridge, with the advantage of natural barriers such as swampy terrain and a bayou in front of them.

On the Union side, Major General John McClernand led the pursuit of the Confederates and engaged Bowen's rear guard. A swift Union charge managed to break the Confederate position, leading to a rout during the retreat and river crossing. Many Confederate soldiers were captured in the process, while the remaining troops sought refuge within the fortifications at Vicksburg, Mississippi, marking the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg the following day.

Grant had initially planned for General Sherman to surprise Bowen and Vaughn at the Big Black River crossing at Bridgeport, seven miles away, where he could reach the west bank of the Big Black River and take Bowen and Vaughn by surprise. Meanwhile, his subordinate Gen. Michael K. Lawler had a different idea.

Martin Green’s Brigade held the Confederate left without any artillery support, while Lawler’s brigade was positioned nearby in the tree line. A scout informed Lawler of a sunken area close to the Rebel line, allowing his men to charge across open ground with minimal risk from artillery fire. Recognizing a strategic opportunity – no one was covering the river – his brigade charged a sunken area that was bisected by a marsh.

The following morning, Lawler’s Brigade took the initiative to charge the Confederate lines without explicit orders, disappearing from view after advancing 50 yards. During the charge, both sides engaged in intense artillery exchanges, resulting in General Osterhaus of Grant’s command being wounded by a Confederate shell. Meanwhile, Gen. Eugene Carr’s Division began to assemble opposite the Confederate lines.

By 9 o’clock, Lawler identified an opportune location to strike the Rebel defenses and ordered his men to charge. The Federal troops, who had seemingly vanished from sight, reemerged and swiftly advanced the remaining 50 yards to assault the gap between Martin Green’s Arkansas Brigade and Vaughn’s Tennessee Brigade. Despite facing fire from infantry and artillery as they crossed the bayou, the Federal soldiers managed to breach the Confederate breastworks and engage in close combat. Witnessing the success of Lawler’s charge, the rest of the Union line followed suit and joined the assault. Overwhelmed by the increasing number of Union infantry, the Confederates retreated, leaving behind their cannons and approximately 1,700 men who surrendered.

The significance of this small battle cannot be understated. The Confederates suffered heavy losses, with 1,751 men killed or captured, the majority of which were taken as prisoners. On the other hand, the Union casualties were relatively low, totaling around 235. This defeat at the Big Black River Bridge marked the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg.

Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman was killed in this action. To help save the army, Pemberton tasked Lloyd Tilghman's brigade to provide a rear-guard action that cost Tilghman his life. However, this action allowed Pemberton to retreat from the area.

The general was killed by artillery fire. His teenage son was on the field and hugged his father as he died.

Following their defeat at Champion Hill, General John C. Pemberton's forces retreated to the bridge at Big Black River, just before reaching Vicksburg. During the battle at Champion Hill, General William Loring disobeyed orders to advance, resulting in his separation from the main Confederate troops. Loring attempted to rejoin his comrades at the bridge, but the difficult terrain forced him to abandon most of his supplies and artillery. Local civilians warned Loring that a large Union force stood between him and the rendezvous point at Big Black. Instead of engaging Grant's forces, Loring decided to redirect his path and join the Confederate forces at Canton. Unbeknownst to Pemberton, who was unaware of Loring's change in direction, he ordered John Bowen's Division and John Vaughn's Brigade to defend the works at Big Black River Bridge, to buy time. Had Pemberton been aware of Loring's retreat, he may have reconsidered engaging in battle at that location, as it was intended to serve as a rear guard action for Loring. Loring's strained relationship with Pemberton was well-known, as he had difficulty working with his superiors. Despite this, Loring consistently displayed courage and honor in battle, proving himself time and time again. Instead of retreating to Vicksburg, Loring eventually reached Johnston's army. The feud between Loring and Pemberton over these actions persisted long after the war had ended.

Retreat into Vicksburg

Following the resounding Union victories at the Battle of Champion Hill and the Battle of Big Black River Bridge, Pemberton found himself cornered within the City of Vicksburg. With Sherman's corps threatening to flank him from the north, Pemberton had no choice but to either engage in battle or entrench himself within the city. The siege of Vicksburg commenced on May 18 and lasted about 6 weeks.

As the Confederates retreated, they resorted to burning the railroad bridge over the Big Black River and a steamboat serving as a bridge. By detonating incendiary devices on the bridges, they thwarted Grant's pursuit attempts. Although Vicksburg had not yet fallen to Grant's forces, the city was effectively cut off from the outside world. Pemberton and his troops were trapped within the confines of Vicksburg, buying them time but offering no escape route.

With dwindling troops and no external connections, Pemberton's situation grew increasingly dire. Grant's superior numbers and strategic control over supply lines posed a significant challenge to the Confederate forces. Despite hopes of Johnston launching an attack from the east, the advice to surrender the town and save the troops prevailed. Grant's decision to initiate a prolonged siege, following unsuccessful frontal assaults, marked the beginning of a grueling period of bombardment for Vicksburg.

Grant initially attempted to overpower the Confederate army by leveraging his larger numbers. Despite Grant's efforts to assault the trenches on May 19 and May 22, these two frontal assaults aimed at capturing the city proved unsuccessful. The defensive line surrounding Vicksburg spanned approximately six and a half miles, taking advantage of the varying terrain that included hills and knobs with steep slopes. These natural features posed a challenge for attackers, who would have to ascend them while under enemy fire. The formidable perimeter of the defensive line consisted of numerous gun pits, forts, trenches, redoubts, and lunettes, which perfectly took advantage of the natural features.

The failure to take the Confederate works by assault led Grant to initiate a prolonged siege on May 25. As part of the siege, a significant bombardment was conducted. Union forces constructed their own network of earthworks and trenches that ran parallel to it. These trenches, referred to as ditches, marked the beginning of trench warfare. The situation within the besieged city worsened as the air became polluted by the stench of dead horses and soldiers, while the wounded often lay in the space between the opposing lines. Eventually, Grant agreed to a truce in order to clear the resulting mess. Recognizing that even with 50,000 soldiers, he would be unable to fully encircle Vicksburg due to unguarded roads leading south, Grant sought assistance from Major General Henry W. Halleck. Union troops in the West were subsequently shifted, and the front line was reinforced not only with heavy artillery from massive cannons but also with naval guns that targeted the city from the river.

Grant had expressed his dissatisfaction with McClernand's lack of determination at Champion Hill, as he had failed to eliminate or capture Pemberton's entire force. McClernand's casualties were minimal on the Union's southern flank, suggesting a lack of engagement, Sherman and others believed it was time for him to be removed from his position. Grant firmly believed that if the XIII Corps had launched a vigorous attack, Pemberton's army could have been annihilated and the Siege of Vicksburg could have been avoided. However, Grant advised a different approach from his subordinates. Then, a newspaper article published an order in which McClernand praised his troops despite their unsuccessful assaults on Vicksburg. Grant saw this as an opportunity and seized it. While the order itself was acceptable, it undermined the efforts of others and contradicted both a departmental order and one issued by Grant, which stated that official papers should not be published. Consequently, Grant relieved McClernand of his duties on June 19th.

The Siege of Vicksburg

Daily bombardments began and were devastating. Union gunboats lobbed over 22,000 shells into the town and army artillery fire was even heavier. As the barrages continued, suitable housing in Vicksburg was reduced to a minimum. A ridge, located between the main town and the rebel defense line, provided lodging for the duration. The citizens of the city were unable to walk the streets or live in their houses. All above-ground homes and shelters were unsafe or destroyed.

Over time, Grant moved 77,000 Union soldiers into positions completely encircling Vicksburg, cutting off their supply line. Although surrounded and without access to food, weapons, and ammunition, Vicksburg’s Confederate soldiers and civilians continued their defense.

Confederate troops ate horses, dogs, and vegetables from the gardens of Vicksburg residents.  Towards the end, some were eating rats and tree bark.  As the siege wore on, fewer and fewer horses, mules, and dogs were seen wandering about Vicksburg. Shoe leather became a last resort of sustenance for many adults.

By the end of June, half of all of the Confederate soldiers were suffering from malnutrition including scurvy, caused by lack of Vitamin C. Others suffered from unsanitary conditions and developed dysentery, diarrhea, dehydration, and malaria. The lack of food, combined with the epidemics of malaria and dysentery, took a heavy toll on the Confederate forces. By the end of June, half were unable to report for duty and were sick or hospitalized. The poor diet was telling on the Confederate soldiers.

The townspeople were forced to build and live in caves.  Many of their homes were destroyed by artillery bombardment, and those that remained were targets. Residents and soldiers dug over 500 caves into the hillside to escape the bombardment, hiding in their basements.  During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union Over 500 caves, known locally as "bombproofs", were dug into the yellow clay hills of Vicksburg. Both soldiers and citizens were boxed in with plentiful munitions but little food.

During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union experienced 638 casualties with 94 deaths, vs. the Confederate loss of 3202 casualties with 875 deaths. Additionally, there were 380 deaths at the Battle of Champion Hill on May 16. More than 10,000 of Pemberton’s soldiers were rendered unfit for duty as a consequence of various illnesses, combat wounds, and malnutrition by the end of June. There was essentially no functional army by early July.

The Confederate Army’s struggle with malaria was a significant contributing factor to the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign and hence the war. One of the reasons the Union siege of Vicksburg was successful was because the Confederates were debilitated by an outbreak of malaria, without access to quinine. It has been estimated that 3900-8850 of Pemberton’s 30,000 men were suffering from active cases of malaria, and minimally over 200 died directly from this disease. An illness of this severity experienced in this magnitude would have rendered the Confederate military combat ineffective.

On June 28, Pemberton received a petition from his troops which stated in part, “If you cannot feed us you had better surrender.” On July 1, he queried his division commanders whether they should surrender or attempt an evacuation. All 4 of his corps commanders wrote to him of the need to surrender. The Confederates, after a long siege, beset with malnutrition and disease, were not in a condition to fight. The consensus was that disease and starvation had physically impaired so large a number of the defending army that an attempt to cut through the Union line would be disastrous; the men were too “enfeebled” to attempt an evacuation. On July 4, 1863, after a 47-day siege, Pemberton surrendered to Grant.

General Ulysses S Grant: An Analysis

The fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, just a day after Pickett’s Charge, certainly seems in combination to represent a catastrophic turn of events for the Confederacy that summer after victories that winter and spring seemed to hold so much promise.

General Grant has been demeaned as the worst POTUS in history, a drunkard, a dimwit, and most incorrectly, a butcher. While his reputation has improved lately thanks in large part to Ron Chernow’s biography and Donald Miller’s book about Vicksburg, he is routinely ranked behind Lee, Jackson, and Forrest as a Civil War general by many. Yet the truth is, General Grant did more to win the Civil War than anyone not named Abraham Lincoln.  The story of how Grant solved the conundrum that was Vicksburg should convince even the most cynical LCer of his imagination, willpower, and perspicacity. Grant tried myriad strategies before finding the one that worked. The Vicksburg campaign was an unmistakable sign of the man’s steely determination and shrewd mind. Grant failed over and over, but he never gave up.

Practically everything about the campaign was innovative. Practically everything about it. James M. McPherson has called it “the most brilliant and innovative campaign of the Civil War” and T. Harry Williams called it “one of the classic campaigns of the Civil War and, indeed, of military history.” The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (May 1986) describes the Vicksburg campaign as “the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil,” one which “exemplifies the qualities of a well-conceived, violently executed offensive plan.” Edwin C. Bearss has said. “Failure in this venture would entail little less than total destruction. If it succeeded, however, the gains would be complete and decisive.”

It was definitely a risky plan. But we can see retrospectively that it makes perfect sense. Grant made the connection that the way to attack Vicksburg was by the train route west from Jackson, which was also the target of his Autumn foray on the Mississippi Central RR route. Then he combined that with the fact that he couldn’t maneuver on the east bank north of the town due to swamps and bayous, and after Arkansas Post, he’s on the west side. So, then it’s “just” a matter of technical procedure: you have to cross someplace and you have to head to Jackson first.  When to do it? Well, he knows he’s got ground to cover and will need supplies. He has to calculate river level, rain and muddy roads, and foraging. But before mosquito season. Winter isn’t a good time. Late spring is.

Grant had endured repeated political and military setbacks, watched his soldiers and sailors sicken and die by the thousands in the malarial lower Mississippi Valley, faced two armies at the same time, and solved incredible technical and logistical obstacles. He was now the top Union general, and his self-confidence as well as what others thought would carry him to fame. It’s inconceivable to me that his reputation as a general was denigrated for 120 years.

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Further Reading:

·       Donald L Miller, Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon and Schuster, 2019.

·       Grant’s Memoirs

·       Sherman’s Memoirs

·       Grant by Chernow

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/vicksburg

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg

·       https://civilwarmonths.com/2023/04/15/vicksburg-grant-and-porter-assemble/amp/

·       https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/achenblog/wp/2014/04/25/ulysses-s-grant-hero-or-butcher-great-man-or-doofus/

·       https://www.historynet.com/vicksburg-the-campaign-that-confirmed-grants-greatness/

·       https://www.vicksburgpost.com/2003/01/27/water-returned-to-citys-doorstep-100-years-ago/?fbclid=IwAR1X5nFZ8F-l_0sbr3Ki1HBygBiPb-GCgxl4aBCznjSOgKAvVdURVJUvJDA

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/nature/river-course-changes.htm?fbclid=IwAR3mflQUgR8JaUEIcrm2v_lLlfdGup44_XwzxIcJ1mTAyyCT2h_umfcT2Sc

·       https://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-colonel-benjamin-griersons-cavalry-raid-in-1863/

·       https://www.historynet.com/griersons-raid-during-the-vicksburg-campaign/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/major-general-benjamin-grierson-2360423

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/04/29/that-other-cavalry-guy-benjamin-h-grierson/

·       https://www.historyonthenet.com/grant-vicksburg

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-gibson

·       https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/battle-of-port-gibson/

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battleportgibson.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/grants-vicksburg-supply-line

·       https://www.historynet.com/mississippi-nightmare/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-champion-hill-2360280

·       https://www.rebellionresearch.com/battle-of-raymond?fbclid=IwAR1L1PcCwGRCFLg-Bv7neO1tG6cv7RsnmZO8kNvv5XVjUBkM6t3CiPtu96c_aem_th_AaSypV4shWeio-QbLLXIuILea41vtkZsruFEMGykenl_kK8dPEuWWYZiUP44s9G8ws4&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

·       Klein LW, Wittenberg EJ. The decisive influence of malaria on the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign. Surgeon’s Call: The Journal of the National Civil War Medicine Museum. 2023; 28(1): 4 – 14.

Causes of Southern Secession in the U.S. Civil War - The Upper South

The second wave of states to leave the Union were the Upper South states. These included Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and pro-confederate Kentucky and Missouri, who held divided loyalties. The Upper South states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas had a more extensive free population than the deep South and made up most of the Confederacy. Here, Jeb Smith looks at the causes for the seccession of these states.

This is part 2 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War. Part 1 on Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy is here.

Henry Massey Rector, Governor of Arkansas at the time of secession.

"If centralism is ultimately to prevail; if our entire system of free Institutions as established by our common ancestors is to be subverted, and an Empire is to be established in their stead; if that is to be the last scene of the great tragic drama now being enacted: then, be assured, that we of the South will be acquitted, not only in our own consciences, but in the judgment of mankind, of all responsibility for so terrible a catastrophe, and from all guilt of so great a crime against humanity." 

-Alexander Stephens  

In general, there was a difference in the causes of secession between the original seven seceding "Cotton States" of the Deep South and the remaining Upper South.[1] When the Cotton States left the Union, the Upper South either turned down voting on withdrawal from the Union or voted against secession. Historian E. Merton Coulter writes, "The Majority sentiment in the Upper South had been unionist until Lincoln's call for troops...Upper South…had cried equally against coercion as secession." 

When many historians talk about secession, they almost always ignore the Upper South; they unanimously point instead to the Cotton States. I believe this omission is because connecting slavery as a cause with the Upper South would be much more difficult. Further, looking at their causes of secession exposes the transformation of our Union into a centralized nation under Lincoln. 

Lincoln's Call for Volunteers

"The South maintained with the depth of religious conviction that the Union formed under the Constitution was a Union of consent and not of force; that the original States were not the creatures but the creators of the Union; that these States had gained their independence, their freedom, and their sovereignty from the mother country, and had not surrendered these on entering the Union; that by the express terms of the Constitution all rights and powers not delegated were reserved to the States; and the South challenged the North to find one trace of authority in that Constitution for invading and coercing a sovereign State."

-Confederate General John B. Gordon Reminiscences of the Civil War New York Charles Scribner's Sons Atlanta The Martin  & Hoyt Co.1904

Like the Cotton States, the Upper South saw itself as a collection of sovereign states joined by a contract, the Constitution; if that contract was violated or not upheld, it could and should be discarded. Many believed that peaceful secession would be allowed to occur and that the principles of the Declaration of Independence would be allowed to play out peacefully. DiLorenzo quotes the reactions of multiple northern newspapers as showing substantial support for secession. Many in the North perceived that this war was one of the self-governing states versus a controlling central federal government. In Lincoln Unmasked, DiLorenzo tells us that before being deported by Lincoln, northern politician Clement Vallandigham accurately describes Lincoln's purpose for war.

"Overthrow the present form of Federal-republican government, and to establish a strong centralized government in its stead...national banks, bankrupt laws, a vast and permanent public debt, high tariffs, heavy direct taxation, enormous expenditure, gigantic and stupendous peculation . . . No more state lines, no more state governments, but a consolidated monarchy or vast centralized military despotism." 

-Clement L. Vallandigham D-Ohio 

The North's support for secession was strong before it became clear how much of an impact secession would have on government funding, as the South was the North's "piggy bank." Further, free trade policies in the South would dominate the transatlantic trade since the North desired higher tariffs. If the South had been allowed to form their Confederacy, free trade policies in the South would have drawn even more commerce to Southern ports rather than Northern. So the North would lose the primary contributor to their economic plans, and they would lose out further due to their higher tax rates, and Europeans would trade with the free trade Confederacy. Not a good situation when you are looking to expand central spending. 

Lincoln's call for volunteers to suppress the "rebellion" of the Cotton States caused the secession of the Upper South. The Cotton States felt that the federal government violated their agreement, and the Upper South believed that they had every right to leave, even if the Upper South disagreed with their reasons for leaving. As R. L. Dabney explained, "However wrongfully any State might resume its Independence without just cause, the only remedy was conciliation, and not force, that therefore the coercion of a sovereign State was unlawful, mischievous, and must be resisted. There Virginia took her stand."

According to many Republican politicians, the Union was not a voluntary contract between sovereign self-governing states governed by a constitution, but rather a centralized nation. Washington D.C., rather than "we the people," was the authority. The states, the people, were subjects, servants, and pupils of the state. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln said that the Union predated the Constitution. He referred to the Union as a "national government," and a "government proper," a "national union." Lincoln said, "The Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it." He argued that the Union was not "an association of States in the nature of contract." His opinion was that "No State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union." 

The choice given to the Upper South was clear. They could either remain under the Republican-ruled coercive national government or join the Confederacy, whose Constitution maintained the Union and a compact of sovereign states. On June 4, 1861, The Western Democrat of Charlotte, North Carolina, said the Confederacy was "The only Republic now existing in America." The old Republic had become a democracy ruled by King Numbers. This was an easy choice for the Upper South. 

The Upper South saw Lincoln's call for volunteers as a violation of the Constitution, a metamorphosis in government, and a violation of their states’ sovereignty. In 1863, the Address to Christians Throughout the World by the Clergy of the Confederate States of America suggested that the yankees, "Fight not to recover seceding states, but to subjugate them." This was a war of self-governing sovereign states versus a federal government that was willing to use military force against its own population to keep them under its jurisdiction. The Union was no longer a collection of self-governing bodies based on consent but a nation controlled by a dictatorial oligarchy. Consent of the governed was eliminated. The Upper South could not go along with what they viewed as oppressive actions by Lincoln and this transformation of the Republic.

"Subjection under an arbitrary and military authority, there being no law of Congress authorizing such calling of troops, and no constitutional right to use them....it is the fixed purpose of the government…to wage a cruel war against the seceding states...to reduce its inhabitants to absolute subjection and abject slavery...Lincoln...is now governing by military rule alone ...without any authority of law, having set aside all constitutional and legal restraints, and made all constitutional and legal rights dependent upon his mere pleasure...all his unconstitutional illegal and oppressive acts, all his wicked and diabolical purposes...in his present position of usurper and military dictator, he has been and is encouraged and supported by the great body of the people of the non slave holding States." 

-Journal of the Convention of the People of North Carolina May 20, 1861, pp11-12

Professor of History at Longwood University Bevin Alexander wrote in his book, Such Troops as These, "Forced to choose between Lincoln's demand and what they believed to be morally correct and honorable, four Upper South states…seceded as well." The Upper South refused to become slaves to any government of unlimited power. In State Sovereignty and the Doctrine of Cohesion, J. K Spaulding wrote in 1860, "Hapless would be the condition of these states if their only alternative lay between submission to a self-construed  government, or, in other words, unlimited powers and the certainty of coercion."

"Virginia...was not willing to secede hastily; but the demand of President Lincoln that she furnish troops to fight her sister States, ended all hesitation...preferring to fight in defence of liberty...to place themselves as barriers in the way of a fanatical Administration, and, if possible, stay the bloody effort to coerce independent states to remain in the Union." 

-Address to Christians Throughout the World by the Clergy of the Confederate States of America Assembled at Richmond, VA April 1863

Preserving the Constitutional Republic

"All that the South has ever desired was that the Union, as established by our forefathers, should be preserved, and that the government as originally organized should be administered in purity and truth."

 -Gen. Robert E. Lee quoted in The Enduring Relevance of Robert E Lee The Ideological Warfare Underpinning the American Civil War, Marshall DeRosa, Lexington Books 2014

"It is said slavery is all we are fighting for, and if we give it up we give up all. Even if this were true, which we deny, slavery is not all our enemies are fighting for. It is merely the pretense to establish sectional superiority and a more centralized form of government, and to deprive us of our rights and liberties." 

-Confederate General Patrick Cleburne 1864 

Lincoln and the Republican party had transformed the Union from a confederation of sovereign states to a centralized nation controlled by the majority. He endeavored to expand the central Government beyond its scope in order to achieve a political agenda. The North had abandoned the Constitution and the Republic and replaced them with a centralized democracy; in other words, a limitless government. The Upper South had no choice but to join the Confederate Constitution, which maintained the "original compact" theory of the Union. 

It was believed in the South that it was the North that should secede. Quoting Henry Wise of Virginia, historian James McPherson  says, "Logically the union belongs to those who have kept, not those who have broken, its covenants...the North should do the seceding for the South represented more truly the nation which the federal government had set up in 1789." The South saw the growing majority of the North interfering with the culture within their states and violating the Constitution. They observed that democracy and mob rule would take over America. The South wished to restore America to its original Constitution, a Republic of confederated states, in order to preserve liberty and self-government.

"If they [the North] prevail, the whole character of the Government will be changed, and instead of a federal republic, the common agent of sovereign and independent States, we shall have a central despotism, with the notion of States forever abolished, deriving its powers from the will, and shaping its policy according to the wishes, of a numerical majority of the people; we shall have, in other words, a supreme, irresponsible democracy. The Government does not now recognize itself as an ordinance of God...They have put their Constitution under their feet; they have annulled its most sacred provisions."

-Dr. James Henley Thornwell of South Carolina, Our Danger and our Duty Columbia, S. C.: Southern Guardian Steam-power Press, 1862

True unreconstructed Southerners carried no blind patriotism for a tyrannical democracy like "America." In a Democracy, not even the Constitution or the Declaration could protect people from the mob. Decades after the war, Major James Randolph wrote the popular southern folk song, "I'm a good old rebel." Here are some of the lyrics. 

O I'm a good old rebel,

Now that's just what I am.

For this "fair land of freedom"

I do not care a damn...

I hates the Constitution,

This great republic too,...

I hates the Yankees nation

And everything they do,

I hates the Declaration,

Of Independence, too.

I hates the glorious Union-

'Tis dripping with our blood-

I hates their striped banner,

...

And I don't want no pardon

For what I was and am.

I won't be reconstructed,

And I don't care a damn

That was the old southerner. Propaganda like "land of the free," "home of the brave," meant nothing to a people who had their government toppled, their self-governance eradicated, their former ways of life destroyed.

State Secession Documents

With their actions and words, the states of the Upper South made it clear that Lincoln's call for volunteers, state sovereignty, and self-government were the primary causes of secession. 

Arkansas

"If we go to the North we become instruments in the hands of Lincoln to coerce the seceding states. To this a large number of the people will never consent." 

-The True Democrat Little Rock Arkansas March 15, 1861

Before Lincoln's call for volunteers, the people of Arkansas voted to stay in the Union by a vote of 23,626 to 17,927. On March 4, 1861, the Arkansas convention, led by a unionist president, voted to remain in the Union. However on March 12, 1861, The True Democrat Little Rock Arkansas warned "If Lincoln attempts to carry out the doctrines of his inauguration and to coerce the seceding states, that forces us at once to take our position by their side."

On May 6, 1861, after Lincoln's call for men, Arkansas officials gathered to revote. This time the result was 65-5 in favor of secession. In response to Lincoln's call for volunteers, Henry Rector, the Governor of Arkansas, said, "The people of this commonwealth are free men, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity, their honor, lives, and property, against northern mendacity and usurpation." Arkansans' before and after votes and their declaration for secession demonstrate their motives for joining the Confederacy. The relevant section of the secession ordinance reads:

Whereas…Lincoln…has, in the face of resolutions passed by this convention, pledging the State of Arkansas to resist to the last extremity any attempt on the part of such power to coerce any State that had seceded from the old Union, proclaimed to the world that war should be waged against such States until they should be compelled to submit to their rule, and large forces to accomplish this have by this same power been called out, and are now being marshaled to carry out this inhuman design; and to longer submit to such rule, or remain in the old Union of the United States, would be disgraceful and ruinous to the State of Arkansas. 

-Arkansas State Convention

Virginia

"Secession placed no State in so embarrassing a position as the great Commonwealth of

Virginia…There is no doubt that the great body of its citizens were opposed to the state’s seceding, but they were equally opposed to the coercion of the States which had already seceded." 

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864 BiblioBazaar 2008

After the secession of South Carolina, Virginia stayed in the Union working to restore the seceding states back into the Union. However, on January 7, 1861, Virginia passed an anti-coercion resolution, by a vote of 112-5, describing the right of secession and state sovereignty. This declared that Virginia would oppose any attempt at coercion by the federal government. The resolution declares, "We will resist the same by all the means in our power." The state Governor declared, "I will regard an attempt to pass federal troops across the territory of Virginia, for the purpose of coercing a southern seceding state, as an act of invasion, which should be met and repelled." The general assembly "Resolved... that the basis of all just government is the "consent of the governed," and that such consent is the sanction of free, as force is the sanction of despotic, governments. That where this consent exists, there, whatever the form of the government, is liberty, and where it is wanting, there, whatever the form of the government, is tyranny." However, on April 4, 1861, Virginia voted to stay in the Union by a 2-1 margin. 

Likewise, decades earlier, during the tariff controversy between South Carolina and the federal government the then Governor of Virginia said if any federal soldiers were to step on the soil of Virginia to coerce South Carolina to obey the federal tariffs they had nullified, it would happen only over his dead body. Such was the conviction of Virginian men against tyranny; it was no different in 1860. By calling for volunteers, Lincoln was ignoring Virginia's stance and resolve. 

So when Lincoln called upon Virginia to supply troops to invade the Cotton States, Virginia's decision was predictable. Like most Virginians, Robert E Lee expressed his distaste for coercion when he wrote to his son George Washington Custis Lee in 1861, "A union that can be only maintained by swords and bayonets...has no charm for me." To Virginians, it was a clear distinction between government cohesion and liberty.

"As soon as it was known, that it was the intention of the northern president to usurp war-making powers, and wage war against sovereign states of the confederacy and that Virginia was called on to contribute men and money....no one doubted what her action would be...when the union became an engine for oppression...she could not hesitate to throw herself on the side of freedom."

-Richmond Whig Editorial April 19, 1861, Sic Semper Tyrannis State Independence Quoted in Virginia Iliad H.V Traywick, Jr Dementi Milestone Publishing INC 2016

Virginia voters gathered again after Lincoln's call for troops, and by a vote of 126,000 to 20,400, they left the Union. In his book, Reluctant Confederates, Daniel Crofts shows the great impact Lincoln's call for volunteers had on Virginians. Croft reports on the celebration of Virginians in Rockbridge County, who, after Fort Sumter, put up a confederate flag in celebration. In response, pro-unionist Virginians, who were by far the more numerous, erected a new, more enormous flagpole and put an American eagle on it. However, after Lincoln's call for volunteers, those same Unionists who had put the pole up with the American eagle threw it down. Rockbridge County, which had been majority unionist, then voted 1,728 to 1 for secession.

In the book, Three Months in the Southern States, Englishman Lt.-Colonel Arthur J. Fremantle wrote about a conversation he had with a Virginia woman who said that: "She had stuck fast to the Union until Lincoln's proclamation calling out 75,000 men to coerce the South, which converted her and such a number of others into strong Secessionists." Likewise, confederate artilleryman William Thomas Poague wrote, "Had Lincoln not made war upon the south, Virginia would not have left the union."

"Let us consider for a moment the results of a consolidated government, resting on force, as proposed by the dominant party at the north....a consolidated despotism, upheld by the sword and cemented by fear....now it [the union] has been seized upon by a sectional party, it is claimed that its powers are omnipotent, its will absolute, and it must and will maintain its supremacy, in spite of states and people, at the point of the sword." 

-Richmond Whig Editorial A Government of Force April 10 1861 Quoted in Virginia Iliad H.V Traywick, Jr Dementi Milestone Publishing INC

Moreover, Governor John Letcher, (who wanted Virginia to abolish slavery) opposed secession before Lincoln's call for volunteers. After Lincoln's call, however, he became a firm secessionist.  

"The President of the United States, in plain violation of the Constitution, issued a proclamation calling for a force of seventy-five thousand men, to cause the laws of the United states to be duly executed over a people who are no longer a part of the Union, and in said proclamation threatens to exert this unusual force to compel obedience to his mandates; and whereas, the General Assembly of Virginia, by a majority approaching to entire unanimity, declared at its last session that the State of Virginia would consider such an exertion of force as a virtual declaration of war, to be resisted by all the power at the command of Virginia."

-John Letcher Governor of Virginia 

Virginia did not give a lengthy declaration of why it left the Union, just a short ordinance of secession and a mention of Lincoln's call for men.

The people of Virginia, in their ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America…declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whensoever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression; and the Federal Government, having perverted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding States."

It was not northern coercion alone that Virginia objected to. When South Carolina and Mississippi were considering passing laws that would negatively affect Virginia financially unless they joined the Confederacy, Governor Letcher said, "I will resist the coercion of Virginia into the adoption of a line of policy, whenever the attempt is made by northern or southern states."

Tennessee

On February 9, Tennessee voters turned down secession by a 4-1 margin. However, things transformed radically after Lincoln's call for volunteers. Governor Isham Harris wrote President Lincoln saying that if the Federal Government would "coerce" the seceded states into returning, Tennessee had no choice but to join its Southern neighbors. He wrote "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for purposes of coercion, but 50,000 if necessary for the defense of our rights, and those of our southern brothers." 

Harper’s Weekly quotes the Nashville Dispatch on April 13, saying, "An enthusiastic public meeting was held here tonight. Resolutions were unanimously adopted, condemning the Administration for the present state of affairs, and sympathizing with the South." Harper’s Weekly also quoted a Memphis paper saying, "There are no Union men now here." On May 9, in an address to the people of Tennessee, Governor Harris said, "Force, when attempted, changes the whole character of the Government; making it a military despotism, and those that submit become the abject slaves of power. The people of Tennessee have fully understood this important fact, and hence their anxiety to stay the hand of coercion. They well know that the subjugation of the seceded States involved their own destruction." 

Harris and the people of Tennessee realized that cooperating in the subjugation of the Cotton States meant accepting their own future subjugation. Governor Harris recalled the Tennessee legislature on May 6 for another vote; voters would then approve secession on June 8 by a 2-1 margin. Reconciliation with a coercive government was out of the question; the Union was no longer. The founder's republic had vanished.

"If ever thus restored, it must, by the very act, cease to be a Union of free and independent States, such as our fathers established. It will become a consolidated centralized Government, without liberty or equality, in which some will reign and others serve the few tyrannize and the many suffer. It would be the greatest folly to hope for the reconstruction of a peaceful Union…The Federal Union of the States, thus practically dissolved, can never be restored."

-Isham G Harris, Senate Journal of the Second Extra Session of the Thirty-Third General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, which Convened at Nashville on Thursday, the 25th day of April, A.D 1861 Nashville J.O Griffith and Company, Public Printers 1861

North Carolina

"I have to say in reply that I regard the levy of troops made by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

-John Ellis, Governor of North Carolina Raleigh April 15, 1861, quoted in Harper's Weekly April 27, 1861

Before Lincoln's call to invade the Cotton States, support for the Union was overwhelming in North Carolina; they did not even vote on secession. However, after Lincoln's call for war, they unanimously adopted a secession ordinance. The same issue of Harper's Weekly quoted a dispatch from Wilmington North Carolina; "The Proclamation is received with perfect contempt and indignation. The Union men openly denounce the Administration. The greatest possible unanimity prevails." The effects were felt across political lines. McPherson  writes, "Even the previously unionist mountain counties, seemed to favor secession." 

Governor Ellis' proclamation on April 17 clarified why North Carolina stood with the South; "Lincoln has made a call for 75,000 men to be employed for the invasion of the peaceful homes of the South, and for the violent subversion of the liberties of a free people…this high-handed act of tyrannical outrage is not only in violation of all constitutional law, in utter disregard of every sentiment of humanity and Christian civilization…but is a direct step towards the subjugation of the whole South, and the conversion of a free Republic, inherited from our fathers, into a military despotism." 

Missouri

"Sir...Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and can not be complied with. Not one man will, of the State of Missouri, furnish or carry on such an unholy crusade."

-Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson Jefferson City April 17, 1861 Quote in Harper's Weekly April 27, 1861

Missouri was almost entirely pro-union. When confederates sent delegates to Missouri to convince the state to join the South, they were booed and jeered so loudly that none could hear them. On March 21, 1861, the Missouri convention voted 98-1 against secession, but they, like Kentucky, kept their neutrality. 

However, many in the state became outraged that their state sovereignty had been violated during the "Camp Jackson Affair." Union commander Nathaniel Lyon arrested the Missouri State Brigade, whom he feared were planning to seize the arsenal in St. Louis, and federal soldiers killed dozens of citizens during ensuing riots. Since the federal government violated the state's neutral position, support for secession grew within the state. James McPherson  wrote, "The events in St Louis pushed many conditional unionists into the ranks of secessionists." Lyon then pushed the Governor and state legislature out of Jefferson City, creating more anti-union sentiment. These events led to the end of neutrality, which resulted in both a pro-confederate and pro-union government within the state. On November 28, the Confederate Congress accepted Missouri as the 12th confederate state. Pro-confederate Missouri's reasons for secession centered around constitutional violations by the Lincoln administration.

Whereas the Government of the United States…has wantonly violated the compact originally made between said Government and the State of Missouri, by invading with hostile armies the soil of the State, attacking and making prisoners the militia while legally assembled under the State laws, forcibly occupying the State capitol, and attempting through the instrumentality of domestic traitors to usurp the State government, seizing and destroying private property, and murdering with fiendish malignity peaceable citizens, men, women, and children, together with other acts of atrocity, indicating a deep-settled hostility toward the people of Missouri and their institutions; and Whereas the present Administration of the Government of the United States has utterly ignored the Constitution, subverted the Government as constructed and intended by its makers, and established a despotic and arbitrary power instead thereof. 

-Missouri Causes of Secession 

Kentucky

By a 3 to 1 margin, Kentucky voted to remain neutral, but after Lincoln's call for volunteers, support for the South began to spread. The Kentucky Governor wrote, "President Lincoln, I will send not a man nor a dollar for the wicked purpose of subduing my sister southern states." On April 16, 1861 Governor B. Magoffin wrote to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War saying "Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."

However, the state's neutrality stance was violated by southern troops. In reaction, Kentucky would officially support the Union. Yet a pro-confederate government was established on December 10, 1861, and was accepted into the Confederacy by President Jefferson Davis as the 13th Confederate state. This Confederate government gave its causes of secession centered on limited government, Northern violations of the Constitution, and states’ rights. 

Whereas, the Federal Constitution, which created the Government of the United States, was declared by the framers thereof to be the supreme law of the land, and was intended to limit and did expressly limit the powers of said Government to certain general specified purposes, and did expressly reserve to the States and people all other powers whatever, and the President and Congress have treated this supreme law of the Union with contempt and usurped to themselves the power to interfere with the rights and liberties of the States and the people against the expressed provisions of the Constitution, and have thus substituted for the highest forms of national liberty and constitutional government a central despotism founded upon the ignorant prejudices of the masses of Northern society, and instead of giving protection with the Constitution to the people of fifteen States of this Union have turned loose upon them the unrestrained and raging passions of mobs and fanatics, and because we now seek to hold our liberties, our property, our homes, and our families under the protection of the reserved powers of the States, have blockaded our ports, invaded our soil, and waged war upon our people for the purpose of subjugating us to their will; and Whereas, our honor and our duty to posterity demand that we shall not relinquish our own liberty and shall not abandon the right of our descendants and the world to the inestimable blessings of constitutional government.: therefore, be it ordained, that we do hereby forever sever our connection with the Government of the United States.

 -Declaration of Causes of Secession Kentucky 

Slavery's Impact on the Secession of the Upper South

"It was necessary to put the South at a moral disadvantage by transforming the contest from a war waged against States fighting for their Independence into a war waged against States fighting for the maintenance and extension of slavery…and the world, it might be hoped, would see it a moral war, not a political; and the sympathy of nations would begin to run for the North, not for the South."

-Woodrow Wilson, "A History of The American People" HardPress Publishing 2013

Slavery's involvement as a cause for secession in the Upper South is overstated. The states of the Upper South had protection for their slave property whether they stayed in the Union or joined the Confederacy. When the Deep South states left the Union, more slave states remained in the Union than joined the Confederacy. Most Upper South state declarations did not even mention slavery; if they did, it was only in passing and usually associated with violations of state's rights or the Constitution. Instead, they heavily spoke on state's rights, state sovereignty, and Lincoln's call for volunteers as the reasons for secession. Those states had previously chosen to stay with the Union before Lincoln's call but could no longer remain under a government of force. 

Slavery was Safer in the Union Than the Confederacy 

"Seven-tenths of our people owned no slaves at all, and to say the least of it, felt no great and enduring enthusiasm for its preservation, especially when it seemed to them that it was in no danger.'" 

-John G. Barrett, The Civil War in North Carolina U of North Carolina Press 1995

The Union would protect slavery better than a Confederacy. Slavery was constitutionally protected in both the northern and southern states for the entirety of the civil war. Moreover, Lincoln and the North supported the Corwin Amendment, which would permanently enshrine slavery in the U.S. Constitution. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln said this of the proposed amendment, "To the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service...holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable."

"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

-Corwin Amendment 

The U.S. supreme court supported the fugitive slave laws, allowing federally funded agents to return runaway slaves to their masters. On the other hand, the Confederacy was unable to protect slaveowners when slaves fled to the North. In his inaugural address, Lincoln pointed this out, saying, "while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other." 

The 1860 Republican platform Plank 4 said that slavery was a state issue, and they would not interfere with it in states that already had slaves. In his inaugural address, Lincoln said, "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Likewise, on May 26, 1861, General MClellan said, "Not only will we abstain from all such interference (with slaves), we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." It is no wonder a leader of the Whig Party in Missouri said, "Howard County is true to the Union. Our slaveholders think it is the sure bulwark of our slave property."

Even after the deep South left the Union, the federal government decided it would not end slavery, in the House in February and the Senate on March 2, 1861. On July 22, 1861, Congress declared, "This war is not waged, nor (the) purpose of overthrowing… the rights or established institutions of those states." On October 8, 1861, the Washington D.C. newspaper, The National Intelligencer, said, "The existing war had no direct relation to slavery." On November 7, 1861, Commanding General McClellan said, "The issue for which we are fighting, that issue is the preservation of the Union... I express the feelings and opinions of the president when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union." On August 15, 1864, long after the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln said, "So long as I am President. It shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the Union." 

This is not to say that no one in the Upper South was upset over the Republican's intrusion into the states' rights on this issue in the western territories. There was a minor secession movement within the Upper South on the issue of slavery, especially in Virginia and Arkansas, but they were a minority. In fact, after Lincoln's call for troops, many slave owners in the Upper South argued to stay in the Union since Lincoln was powerless to interfere with slavery. 

"Is there any good reason why we should change our position? I believe that so far as the North is concerned, the prospect for the full recognition of Southern rights is better than it was at the time of Lincoln's election, or at any time within several years before. The Governors of several Northern States, including the great States of New York and Pennsylvania, have recommended the faithful observance of all the laws intended for the protection of slave property, and the repeal of all the personal liberty bills... Lincoln's administration is powerless to harm us. Before its close, his party will be scattered into fragments."

-Rep. Thomas N. Crumpler of Ashe County N.C to the House of Commons on January 10, 1861

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The War of 1812: The Battle of New Orleans & The Mississippi River

The Mississippi River — trade route, boundary line, and burial ground. According to www.nps.gov the Mississippi River flows 593,003 cubic feet of water per second into the Gulf of Mexico. This equates to 4.4 million gallons per second, with each droplet telling a story and holding a memory. Researching currents and flood stages gives us a hint at her moods, but she has long been a crucial player in the history of American. Here, Bethany Bellemin will look at the river’s importance in the Battle of New Orleans during the War of 1812.

The Battle of New Orleans. By Edward Percy Moran, 1910.

Key Players

1812. The testing time for a new American had begun. The British fleet had been confiscating crewmen from United States’ vessels claiming them as deserters of the British navy. While some of them had been deserters looking to start a new life, other sailors taken were simply American citizens going about their lives. After a few years of this injustice, the Americans had finally had enough. War was officially declared against the former mother country on June 18, 1812. It was going to be a conflict with far more significance than either side realized.

For two years war waged bringing the most pivotal battle with it. The beginning of the end started on December 21, 1814. The war had come to New Orleans, Louisiana. The ensuing conflict would prove to be a crucial and defining moment, not just for the war, but also for the entire nation.

December 1, 1814. General Andrew Jackson, the man of the hour had arrived. Robert Tallant, an authority on the Battle of New Orleans called him, “The toughest fighting man in the country.” (The Pirate Lafitte and the Battle of New Orleans, Robert Tallant, 84). Jackson was preparing for the looming battle ahead with an ill-prepared army, and he was running out of time. With his troops low on ammunition and food, Jackson prepared his defense and hoped the supply boats would arrive in time. The British, under the command of Major General Pakenham, was sailing in with a fleet, fully prepared for a quick seizure of the city and the mouth of the Mississippi River. The British army had determined to conquer New Orleans using her access to the interior via the river and put a chokehold on America. It was known that whoever controlled the river controlled the nation. The city of New Orleans knew they were a pawn in the game and the control of the river was the key element to the upcoming events in which they would be participating whether they wished to or not. There was no ignoring the British ships silhouetted against a gulf sky.

The supplies Jackson was waiting for were running late, and his temper was running short. The keelboats hauling the goods had stalled upriver with their captains refusing to deliver the load unless they were paid a higher fee. It was a classic trade monopoly that the river has witnessed time and time again.

Enter Henry Miller Shreve, inventor and entrepreneur of growing renown along the river. With lives and the fate of the nation at stake, he knew what he had to do. In December 1814, he set off down the river in his steamboat the Enterprise which he had loaded with supplies for the small army amassing at the mouth of the Mississippi. Shreve was already tackling the Livingston-Fulton embargo on river trade and was no stranger to opposing injustice in the trade routes. Fighting for his country was just as close to his heart. He also made certain that the three keelboats delivered their load to Jackson: regardless of the captains' complaints against the action. A deal was a deal in Shreve’s mind and was as irrevocable as the flow of the river.

Now the spotlight moved to Jean Lafitte, privateer and businessman. He never revealed in his life why he disliked the British so much, but it is a known fact that he opposed them enough to refuse their offers attempting to cajole him into joining the British army, which also seemed to have lit the match that pushed him to offer his influence and abilities in the aid of his new country. He was not American born but he was American made. Jackson is said to have taken an instant liking to him which is recommendation enough from the stern general.

Alongside Henry Shreve, and the temporary ally, Jean Lafitte, Jackson was now ready. Lafitte was able to supply the flints needed to outfit the army Jackson commanded, many volunteers lacking any weapons whatsoever. (The Pirate Lafitte and the Battle of New Orleans, Robert Tallant, 119). Jackson, Shreve, and Lafitte: men that ran in very different circles and yet their decisions had brought them all together in this moment. The three men were perhaps unknowingly cornerstones for this battle, would all carry have a lifelong respect for each other.

Why New Orleans

The battle of New Orleans would forever mark the young country of America. Sometimes called the Second War for Independence, it was proof that the new country was here to stay. It would set the nation apart, a new land with opportunity and justice for all. And everyone from every people group were eager to take part in the battle. Even the Choctaw nation took an interest, making up a small group of eighteen and heading down the river to help defend Louisiana. The United States had an army of 2,131 while the British were known to be marching in with at least 12,000 seasoned soldiers. The odds were not in New Orleans’ favor. Robert Tallant made this empowering statement about Jackson’s troops: “It is doubtful if a braver little army every marched in the history of the world.” (The Pirate Lafitte and the Battle of New Orleans, Robert Tallant, 128-130). It is also to be noted that it is the first recorded time that all different people groups of the country fought united against a common foe. For the first time, the former colonists really felt like Americans.

The Mississippi River was a major deciding factor on the outcome of the war. Even the British were aware that the river would determine the winning side. Controlling the watery trade route could split the nation in half and ensure the ability to deliver ammunition along the waterways to the nation that held the power. It was well known that the majority of news, military orders, and citizen mail for the southern portion of the country went down the waterway as well; trade was not the only thing that was in jeopardy. New Orleans had long known that the war would come to them, it was inevitable. She stood at the edge of the Gulf of Mexico and going by her was the only way the interior could be reached by boat. If she fell, potentially so did the nation.

The first shots fired in defense of New Orleans were from aboard the Carolina, a steamboat merchant vessel that sailed down the Mississippi to the British encampment. Shots were exchanged beginning at 7 p.m. on December 23, 1814. It had started.

It was a long battle, lasting from December 23 to its finale on January 8, 1815. The casualties for the Battle of New Orleans were grossly unbalanced with the British recording over 2,000 casualties among their troops. In contrast, Jackson’s smaller force, with their base camp at the now famous Chalmette Plantation, endured less than 100 casualties. This success in preservation can be attributed to the guerrilla warfare style of the Americans and the fact they knew the lay of the land. Also fighting for one's own country has a higher moral fiber than fighting to conquer another’s homeland. The British soldiers were certainly less enthusiastic than their commanders about the whole affair.

A Pointless Battle or Something More?

Ironically, the war ended before the famous battle on December 24, 1814, in Ghent, Belgium. But news had to come by ship and that took time. Edith McCall, a historian on Captain Shreve, notes it was seven weeks before the news of the treaty reached New Orleans. She further states that “the Battle of New Orleans soon became known as ‘the needless battle,’ for it was fought two weeks after the war was officially over. However, no one argued that it had been a useless battle, for it won new respect for the American military forces.” (Mississippi Steamboatman: The Story of Henry Miller Shreve, Edith McCall, 29-30). The War of 1812 was considered officially ended by Congress ratifying the treaty on February 16, 1815. The United States finally saw itself as a separate country and not just a singular group of colonies that still reflected Britain. Now she saw herself as a nation that could stand the test of time and make her mark on the world.

All the men that played a part in it, the knowns and the unknowns, showed that the country was built on initiative. Shreve taking his steamboat with munitions; Jackson pushing his troops to march from Pensacola, Florida to New Orleans as quickly as possible; Lafitte relentlessly offering his aid in the conflict from supplying weapons to sharing knowledge of the swamp lands: this was initiative and these are the types of men that laid the foundation for their sons and grandsons and further down to the ones who would enlist in World War Two in the fight to protect their country and stop Nazi Terrorism. This is the backbone of America, and it took a battle that was fought too late after a war to prove it to herself.

Robert Remini, another historian covering the famous battle, remarks that “the Battle of New Orleans was one of the great turning points in American history. The country had gone to war with England in a desperate effort to prove that its independence won in the revolution was no fluke, no accident, no grant by a reluctant mother country…in that one glorious moment the nation had demonstrated that it had the strength, will, and ability to defend its freedom and prove to the world that it was here to stay, that its sovereignty and rights were to be respected by all.” (The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and the First Military Victory, Robert V. Remini, 195). The United States was now a player among the powers of the world.

The Mississippi River was the heartbeat of a growing nation at a time when roads were few and railways were fewer. Even for the people that did not live near her shoreline, the river was the line of communication and trade from north to south. For those who were directly influenced by the waterway, the river was their very own to protect and utilize. Fishing, trade, and all manner of livelihood ebbed and flowed with the river's currents. Keeping the waterway in the hands of the Americas ensured she would last as long as the river ran. The people of New Orleans and of the swamplands considered her home, but she also became a symbol: no one will easily lose what he is willing to die to protect. The Battle of New Orleans was a group of people with little connection before the event. In their attempts to protect a river they forged a bond; and in doing so solidified the United States of America. That is one of the things that makes America what it is. And we can can thank a river for that.

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References

When it comes to history, I always tell people don’t take just one person's word for it. Research it and find your own conclusions based off of the facts that present themselves. That’s what makes us all historians: the curious mind and the searching heart. I found these books to be invaluable in my study of The Battle of New Orleans and hope you find in them a piece of the past to hold onto for yourself as well.

It Happened on the Mississippi River, James A. Crutchfield, Morris Book Publishing, 2009.

The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and the First Military Victory, Robert V. Remini, Penguin Books, 1999.

The Story of the Battle of New Orleans, Stanley Clisby Arthur, 1915, republished Cornerstone Book Publishers, 2015.

Mississippi Steamboatman: The Story of Henry Miller Shreve, Edith McCall, Walker Publishing Company, 1986.

Sink or Be Sunk!, Paul Estronza La Violette, Annabelle Publishing, 2002.

The Greatest Fury: The Battle of New Orleans and the Rebirth of America, William C. Davis, Caliber by Penguin Random House, 2019.

Master of the Mississippi, Florence L. Dorsey, Pelican Publishing, 1998.

The Pirate Lafitte and the Battle of New Orleans, Robert Tallant, Pelican Publishing, 1951. (You will notice this was one of my favorite books to quote in this article. A well written and engaging narrative of Lafitte and the Battle of New Orleans).

The Vicksburg Campaign: Part 1 - The Strategic Problem of Vicksburg

The Vicksburg campaign was a series battles from 1862 to 1863 in the US Civil War. The fighting was focused on Vicksburg, Mississippi. In part one of a two-part series, Lloyd W Klein looks at the strategic importance of Vicksburg.

The bombarding and capturing of Fort Hindman, Arkansas Post, January 1863. By Currier and Ives.

"See what a lot of land these fellows hold, of which Vicksburg is the key! The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket.”

-- Abraham Lincoln

“ … the nailhead that holds the South's two halves together."

– Jefferson Davis

The vital importance of controlling the Mississippi River was apparent from the beginning of the Civil War. The river not only served as a crucial supply route but also facilitated the transportation of troops and military provisions, while also aiding in effective communication. By gaining control over the Mississippi River, the Union would effectively cut off the Confederacy's access to this vital thoroughfare, creating a division between the western and eastern southern states. Furthermore, this strategic move would enable Northern traffic to freely navigate the entire length of the river, essentially transforming it into a logistical superhighway that would greatly influence operations in the Western theater.

By June 1862, the Union army and naval forces had captured New Orleans and many other forts and cities along the Mississippi River. However, the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg in Mississippi remained under their control. With General Halleck's transfer to Washington as the commander-in-chief, General Grant assumed command of the Army of Tennessee and was entrusted with capturing Vicksburg.  This was no easy task. It had been tried by others without success.

Admiral Farragut had attempted an assault up the river in May 1862 after he captured New Orleans.  He demanded surrender but he had insufficient troops to attack. Returning with a flotilla in June 1862, his attempts to bombard the fortress into surrender were unsuccessful. Throughout July, the Navy shelled Vicksburg and engaged in minor battles with Confederate vessels in the area, yet their forces were not enough to attempt a landing, leading to the abandonment of the mission.

Geography

Vicksburg held immense strategic significance due to its geographical location overlooking a sharp 180-degree bend on the Mississippi River, situated atop a towering 200-foot bluff. Because of the horseshoe turn, ships were essentially forced to face toward it, then away from it, and had to maneuver slowly. Perched on high, steep bluffs 200 feet above the river and heavily defended by forts and earthworks, it was heavily defended with formidable forts and earthworks. It was called the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy" for good reason, as it appeared impregnable to any military force of that era.

North and east of Vicksburg, the Mississippi Delta was formed by the convergence of the Yazoo River with the Mississippi River. Spanning over 7000 square miles, this alluvial floodplain boasts an intricate network of streams, rivers, bayous, and swamps. Some of these waterways were navigable, while others were impassable. The Delta is a 7000 square mile alluvial floodplain, with many streams, rivers, bayous, and swamps, some of which were navigable, some of which were entirely unpassable. Its geological origin is that of regular flooding of both rivers over thousands of years, creating a flat, fertile land with swamps and other wetlands. It was a land inhabited by swarms of mosquitoes carrying malaria, poor roads, and untamed wilderness. Additionally, it housed some of the largest, most productive, and isolated cotton plantations. The slave population in this area developed its own unique culture and music, which eventually emerge as Mississippi Delta Blues.

A bayou is a sluggish and narrow river characterized by an ill-defined shoreline, often associated with a marshy lake or wetland. It can also refer to a creek whose direction of flow changes daily due to tidal shifts. Bayous typically contain brackish water and are frequently boggy or stagnant. On the other hand, a swamp or marsh is a low-lying wetland predominantly covered by woody vegetation. These areas experience saturation of water in the ground and are either partially or intermittently submerged. Swamps and marshes serve as transitional zones between land and water. Wetlands encompass not only floodplains but also other areas that are prone to flooding or remain underwater.

The Initial Advance

Ulysses S Grant assumed command of the Army of Tennessee and immediately devised a strategic plan. Departing from Memphis, he aimed to trace the path of the Mississippi Central Railroad towards the south, reaching Holly Springs. Meanwhile, General Sherman was entrusted with leading four divisions, totaling around 32,000 soldiers, down the river. Grant, on the other hand, would continue his advance with the remaining forces, approximately 40,000 strong, along the railroad line towards Oxford. The Confederate forces, under the leadership of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, posed a formidable challenge, with 12,000 troops stationed in Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi, while Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn commanded around 24,000 soldiers in Grenada.

Grant faced numerous obstacles in his mission, including the Confederate Army's opposition, the demanding terrain and geographical features, the prevalence of diseases, and logistical difficulties in maintaining a steady supply chain. However, his most significant concern came from the political realm. President Lincoln envisioned a two-pronged offensive strategy, with Major General John McClernand authorized to advance down the river, while Nathaniel Banks would move upstream from New Orleans. This political pressure added an additional layer of complexity to Grant's already challenging circumstances.

General Grant's initial strategy to reach Vicksburg by taking the most straightforward overland route, following the train road, proved to be unsuccessful. The problem with this direct approach was that it was too predictable and vulnerable: any threat to the single-lane Mississippi Central Railroad would have disastrous consequences. Unfortunately for Grant, the Confederates had Nathan Bedford Forrest, a skilled commander who posed a significant threat to this route. As a result, Grant's offensive failed as raids by Van Dorn and Forrest disrupted his supply lines and communication networks. The destruction of the supply depot at Holly Springs forced Grant to abandon his original plan.

Chickasaw Bayou

Meanwhile, Sherman moved downriver to Johnson's Plantation and attempted a direct northeast advance toward Vicksburg. However, this strategy required traversing through swamps and facing strong defenses on hills overlooking a bayou. Despite launching attacks for three consecutive days at Chickasaw Bayou (December 26 - 29, 1862), Sherman's forces made no progress. The heavily fortified hills and the challenging terrain hindered their advancement, leaving them unable to break through.

On December 27, the Union army pushed their lines forward through the swamps toward the Walnut Hills, which were strongly defended. On December 28, several futile attempts were made to get around these defenses. On December 29, Sherman ordered a frontal assault, which was repulsed with heavy casualties, and then withdrew.

The problem was that the bayou ended in a wall of hills, the Walnut Hills, which provided a strong defensive advantage. The strategic significance of this attack was in its proximity to Vicksburg, which is exactly what enabled Pemberton to bring sufficient manpower for its defense. Another factor was that Porter’s bombardment failed to have an important effect. Sherman had over 30,000 men of whom 1700 were casualties; Pemberton had about 14,000 with less than 200 casualties.

General McClernand and Arkansas Post

Meanwhile, General McClernand led his Corps to Memphis and proceeded down the Mississippi River, where he instructed Sherman to join forces with him, disregarding Grant's directives. Their target was Arkansas Post, home to Fort Hindman at the junction of the Arkansas River, located 50 miles upstream. With the support of Admiral Porter's ironclads bombarding the fort, they managed to land sufficient numbers of troops to capture the fort and take prisoners despite sustaining heavy losses.

Initially skeptical of the expedition, Grant expressed disapproval in a letter to Halleck. However, the successful outcome compelled Grant to recognize its importance and collaborate with McClernand. The capture of Fort Hindman was crucial in preventing potential threats from the rear, underscoring the necessity of neutralizing such strongholds to secure Grant's position.

Although McClernand incurred over 1000 casualties in a 30,000-man army, he captured 5000 Confederates. Grant would need to win a victory over the rebels and his rival in his army. As a Democratic congressman from Illinois and a close friend of Lincoln, McClernand enjoyed a political alliance with the President. However, his position as a political general had its drawbacks. While serving as second in command at Belmont and later as a division commander at Donelson, Grant knew that if he failed, he would be next in line. Despite this, Grant maintained direct communication with Lincoln, bypassing the chain of command, and freely offered his advice and criticism of others. His ultimate goal was to secure an independent command.

Grant’s Bayou Operations

From January to March 1863, Grant’s basic plan was to get close to Vicksburg with his army so that in the Spring, he could be ready, without being exposed to the town's formidable artillery. Grant sought to create alternative routes that could serve as highways for his troops by preparing waterways in the vicinity,. These operations involved a series of seven initiatives or "experiments" that took place from January to March 1863. Although all of these attempts ultimately failed, Grant's willingness to explore various possibilities demonstrated his fearlessness in the face of potential failure. This mindset, characterized by creativity and thoughtfulness, ultimately led to his success. Grant's relentless pursuit of alternative strategies showcased his determination to find a solution, even if it meant considering unconventional approaches.

Grant’s Canal

One in particular deserves special mention. Grant's Canal was an attempt to create a canal through De Soto Point in Louisiana, across the Mississippi River from Vicksburg, Mississippi. In 1862, Farragut had explored the option of bypassing the fortified cliffs by constructing a canal across the river's bend, the De Soto Peninsula. Brigadier General Thomas Williams was sent to De Soto Point with 3,200 men to dig a canal capable of bypassing the Confederate defenses. Diseases, especially malaria, yellow fever, and dysentery, as well as falling river levels, prevented Williams from successfully constructing the canal, and the project was abandoned.  In January 1863, the project regained momentum when General Grant took an interest in its potential.

Encouraged by Grant, who had received favorable feedback from the navy regarding President Lincoln's support, Sherman's troops resumed excavation in late January 1863. Mockingly referred to as "Butler's Ditch" by Sherman, referencing Major General Benjamin Butler, who had initially dispatched Williams for the task, the canal was a mere 6 feet wide and 6 feet deep. Recognizing the extensive engineering challenges, Grant initiated modifications by relocating the entrance upstream to capitalize on a stronger current.

Reports indicated that the water in the canal was stagnant and lacked any current, necessitating the need for a deeper channel for the Union Navy ironclads to navigate through. Grant, recognizing this issue, also gave orders to widen the canal. However, as the month drew to a close, it became evident to Grant that the canal project would not be successful. Union officers who visited later discovered that the water level was only 2 feet and observed the absence of any current, despite earlier reports of depths reaching up to 8 feet and widths up to 12 feet in certain areas. The situation took a turn for the worse when a sudden rise in the river caused the dam at the canal's entrance to break, resulting in flooding in the surrounding area. Consequently, the canal began to fill up with sediment and backwater. In a desperate attempt to salvage the project, two large steam-driven dipper dredges named Hercules and Sampson were deployed to clear the channel. However, their efforts were thwarted by Confederate artillery fire from the bluffs at Vicksburg, forcing them to retreat. By the end of March, all work on the canal was abandoned.

In April 1876, the Mississippi River changed course, forming a channel through De Soto Point. Vicksburg became isolated from the riverfront after the oxbow lake formed by the course change became cut off from the river. It was not until the completion of the Yazoo Diversion Canal in 1903 that Vicksburg regained its connection to the river. Although most of Grant's Canal has been destroyed over time due to agricultural activities, a small section measuring approximately 200 yards in length still remains. It is worth noting that General Grant did manage to alter the course of the Mississippi River, a remarkable feat of engineering. However, this achievement came too late to hold any military significance.

Lake Providence

Brig. Gen. James B. McPherson constructed a canal stretching several hundred yards from the Mississippi River to Lake Providence, enabling access to the Red River via Bayous Baxter and Macon, as well as the Tensas and Black Rivers. This strategic waterway would allow Grant's forces to link up with Banks at Port Hudson. By March 18, the connection was navigable, but the limited number of "ordinary Ohio River boats" provided to Grant for navigating the bayous could only accommodate 8,500 men. Although this was the only one of the bayou expeditions to successfully bypass the Vicksburg defenses, it was not enough for a successful Vicksburg operation. It did allow the possibility of sending reinforcements to Banks.

Yazoo Pass

The Yazoo Pass initiative aimed to reach the elevated terrain above Hayne's Bluff and below Yazoo City by breaching the Mississippi River levee near Moon Lake, approximately 150 miles above Vicksburg, near Helena, Arkansas. This plan involved traversing the Yazoo Pass, an ancient route from Yazoo City to Memphis that had been obstructed by the 1856 levee construction, isolating the Pass from the Mississippi River to Moon Lake. The route would lead through the Coldwater River, then the Tallahatchie River, and finally into the Yazoo River at Greenwood, Mississippi. It may also have been intended as a method to raid the railroad bridge at Grenada.. Despite the Union's efforts to blow up the dikes on February 3, obstacles such as low-hanging trees and deliberate Confederate obstructions hindered progress. These setbacks allowed the Confederates to hastily erect "Fort Pemberton" near the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers, effectively repelling the Union naval forces.

Steele’s Bayou

On March 14, Admiral Porter attempted to reach Deer Creek by sailing up the Yazoo Delta through Steele's Bayou, which is located just north of Vicksburg. The purpose of this maneuver was to outflank Fort Pemberton and enable the landing of troops between Vicksburg and Yazoo City. However, the Confederates obstructed their path once again by felling trees and causing the paddlewheels of the boats to become entangled with willow reeds. This situation raised concerns that Confederate troops might seize the boats and sailors, necessitating Sherman to move troops by land to rescue them.

Duckport Canal

Another canal project known as the Duckport Canal was initiated to create a waterway from Duckport Landing to Walnut Bayou, aiming to allow lighter boats to bypass Vicksburg. However, by the time the canal was nearly completed on April 6, the water levels had significantly decreased. As a result, only the lightest flatboats were able to navigate through the canal, rendering it ineffective for larger vessels.

Milliken's Bend

The main challenge Grant faced in dealing with Vicksburg was its formidable position as a fortress situated on elevated bluffs along the river. The city boasted massive batteries that could outmatch any Union ships on the river. Additionally, Vicksburg was surrounded by nine major forts or citadels and protected by 172 guns, which commanded all possible approaches by both water and land. Furthermore, the city housed a garrison of thirty thousand troops, making it a highly fortified and well-defended stronghold.

Moreover, the turn in the river beneath the town ensured that any naval force would face immediate and devastating bombardment, making it a formidable barrier for potential invaders. However, the protected northern invasion route through a maze of swampy bayous posed a significant obstacle for Grant's army. While his troops could camp on the west side of the river, the logistics of launching an attack from that position were complex and uncertain. The necessity of eventually crossing the river to the other side raised questions about how the supply line and reinforcements would be managed during the movement.

Grant wasn’t actually directly across the river, because the large Cypress Swamp comprises the west bank. He was located at Milliken’s Bend, upriver from the 180-degree turn in the river. Despite the seeming disadvantage of being further away, this positioning allowed for a level of strategic ambiguity that Pemberton underestimated. Milliken's Bend, situated in Louisiana about 15 miles upriver from Vicksburg, served as a crucial staging area for Grant's army by 1863. The distance from Pemberton's forces provided Grant with the element of surprise and control over the river traffic, enhancing his strategic advantage.

The construction of bridges, corduroy roads, and the clearing of swamps by McClernand's troops from Milliken's Bend to the proposed river crossing at Hard Times, Louisiana, below Vicksburg, demonstrated the meticulous planning and effort required to overcome the challenging terrain. By filling in the swamps and creating a 70-mile road by April 17, the Union forces were able to establish a vital connection for their movements toward Vicksburg. This logistical feat showcased the determination and resourcefulness of Grant's army in navigating the difficult landscape to achieve their strategic objectives.

April brought receding waters and the emergence of roads from Milliken’s Bend to points downriver on the west bank. Grant planned to march his troops over those roads to a location where he could ferry them to the east bank of the river.

The Plan Emerges

Grant pored over maps and developed a plan requiring naval cooperation by January. Grant expressed that the next step was to get south of the city when he first landed at Young’s Point, in late January. In early February 1863, Grant conveyed to General Halleck and Admiral Porter his conception for the campaign. He later convened a staff meeting to outline his intentions. He expressed his desire to lead his army south of Vicksburg, cross the river, and sever the vital railroad link between Vicksburg and Jackson. However, despite his clear plan, Grant chose to delay the execution of his strategy until Spring. According to Grant's account in his memoirs, he attributed this delay to the high water levels of the river in January, which made it impractical to commence the campaign at that time.

Grant directed his army to march southward along the west bank of the Mississippi River, aiming to position his forces well below Vicksburg. The next step in his plan involved transporting his troops across the river, a task that required navigating past the formidable guns of the city. Once safely on the Mississippi shore south of Vicksburg, Grant intended to strike inland, engaging any Confederate forces encountered along the way, with the ultimate objective of capturing Vicksburg. Grant's meticulous planning involved extensive study of maps and charts, as he single-handedly devised this approach. However, his subordinates, including Sherman, McPherson, and Logan, expressed reservations about the plan, deeming it too risky. By using the new road, and a large Bayou, Grant was capable of reaching Hard Times Landing without being detected. The army marched south on the west side of the Mississippi River and crossed the river south of Vicksburg at a place named Hard Times.

Hard Times is just beyond Big Cypress swamp. At that location, the Mississippi River takes a wide inward turn. Bayou Vidal, which may have once been the main river channel, provided a direct route for Grant's forces. This route was approximately six miles beyond Grand Gulf on the opposite side of the river, where they boarded transports to cross over to Bruinsburg. Grant recognized the significance of this route and understood that he could continue to utilize it for transporting supplies as long as necessary.

Grant had three options for attacking Vicksburg: The first option was to return to Memphis and approach the city from the north and east via an overland route. However, Grant dismissed this option as it would have negatively impacted morale to retreat. The second option involved directly assaulting the city by crossing the Mississippi  River. Grant rejected this option, believing it would result in a significant loss of life or even defeat. The third option was to march his troops down the west bank of the Mississippi, cross it, and approach the city from the south and east. Upon hearing Grant's plan, Sherman expressed doubts and suggested that Grant should reconsider option #1 and return to Memphis. Blair after the war also expressed his skepticism at the time. 

The Naval Rendezvous

Grant’s particular genius in the war was his brilliant collaborations with the navy. His victories at Forts Donelson and Henry for example were made possible by the combination of ground and water approaches. In that sense, the concept of combined arms forces was an innovation General Grant developed. Vicksburg is the outstanding application of the model.

The Union troops needed to rendezvous with their Navy to cross into Confederate territory, but the success of this operation depended on the ability of the boats to evade the guns defending Vicksburg. It was crucial for there to be an adequate number of gunboats and transport ships positioned south of the city to ensure the plan's success. Once the Union Navy had navigated downstream past Vicksburg, there was no turning back due to the strong river current.

On the evening of April 16, two weeks before the planned river crossing, Admiral David Porter guided the Union fleet past the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg to join forces with Grant. Despite being detected by Confederate lookouts as they rounded De Soto Point, the fleet pressed on and engaged in battle with the Confederate batteries. Despite sustaining damage from enemy fire, the Union fleet successfully fought their way through to rendezvous with Grant.

Porter directed to ensure the concealment and protection of the boilers on the steamships by utilizing barriers made of cotton, hay bales, and bags of grain. This strategic measure would prove beneficial in the future as well. Additionally, to provide an extra layer of defense, coal barges, and surplus vessels were securely fastened to the sides of the critical vessels. Commencing at 10 pm on April 16, Porter assumed command of a fleet consisting of seven ironclad gunboats, four steamers, the tug Ivy, and a variety of towed coal barges, as they embarked on a downstream journey. The Union vessels were illuminated by Confederate bonfires, becoming targets for a relentless two-hour barrage from the Vicksburg guns. Despite the intense fire, the ironclads and supply-laden transports successfully navigated past the Vicksburg guns. The Confederate cannons unleashed a total of 525 rounds, resulting in sixty-eight hits. Remarkably, only one vessel was lost, and there were no casualties among the crew. Additionally, the Confederates had placed ropes strung across the river with explosives attached that could be moved by pulleys.

Grant realized that it would be impossible to provide his army with supplies using the muddy west bank road. As a result, a second convoy was organized to address this issue. On the night of April 22, six transport vessels, without any escorts, were tasked with towing barges loaded with 100,000 rations and other essential supplies, attempting to pass through the Vicksburg batteries. Grant, recognizing the importance of additional supplies, ordered another group of vessels to bring reinforcements one week later on the same night. This time, six protected steamers, under the command of Colonel Clark Lagow from Grant's staff, towed twelve barges filled with rations. Despite facing heavy fire from the Vicksburg batteries, five of the steamers and half of the barges successfully made it through. The vessels were primarily manned by army volunteers from "Black Jack" Logan's division, as the civilian crews were too fearful to navigate through the dangerous Vicksburg gauntlet. Although the run was mostly successful, the leading vessel, a hospital ship, was unfortunately sunk, resulting in the loss of two lives.  Meanwhile, by cutting a new road through the swamp, when necessary, McClernand's corps worked its way south and was joined by one of McPherson's divisions.

Diversionary Tactics

To enhance the element of deception during his planned landing, Grant employed diversionary tactics to divert Pemberton's attention away from the south and the river crossing site. These tactics were executed through two well-conceived feints.

Snyder’s Bluff

While he was moving south with McClernand and McPherson on the west (Louisiana) bank, Grant had Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps threaten Vicksburg from the north. On April 27, Grant ordered Sherman to proceed up the Yazoo River and threaten Snyder’s Bluff northeast of Vicksburg. On the 29th, Sherman debarked ten regiments of troops and appeared to be preparing an assault while eight naval gunboats bombarded the Confederate forts at Haines’s Bluff.

Sherman’s division remained north of Vicksburg. General Sherman led a highly successful diversionary attack by utilizing a combined naval and infantry operation. Blair's division, consisting of eight gunboats and ten transports, secretly and quietly moved to the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou the night before the operation. At 9 am, all gunboats, except one, opened fire on the enemy forces in the bayou, while one gunboat and the transports moved upstream.

At the Battle of Snyder’s Bluff, the troops proceeded upstream until approximately 6 pm, crossed Blake’s Levee, and launched an assault on the artillery near Drumgold’s Bluff. This location was significantly north of Vicksburg, diverting focus from the ongoing activities downstream. The attack faced insurmountable challenges due to the strategic positioning of batteries on Drumgold’s and Snyder’s Bluffs, as well as the course of the Yazoo River that General Sherman's forces had to navigate.

At first,  heavy casualties were sustained. The next morning more troops were deployed, but the difficult terrain of swamps and marshes posed formidable barriers to any progress. Sherman eventually retreated to Milliken’s Bend, realizing that his contingent, which constituted only a fraction of General Grant's overall command, would likely have failed to capture the bluffs even if a direct attempt was made.

Sherman withdrew on May 1 and hastily followed McPherson down the west bank of the Mississippi. His troops were ferried across the river on May 6 and 7.

This diversionary maneuver effectively drew Pemberton's attention away from Grant's actual landing site. Pemberton sent 3,000 troops that had been marching south to oppose Grant.

Grierson’s Raid

The success of this diversion was remarkable, as it involved a daring cavalry raid that originated from La Grange, TN and penetrated central Mississippi on April 17. This marked the commencement of a relentless 17-day campaign characterized by constant movement, widespread devastation, and frequent clashes. Upon its conclusion, General Grant aptly hailed it as "one of the most remarkable cavalry exploits of the entire war."

Under the leadership of Grierson, a force of 1,700 soldiers from the 6th and 7th Illinois, as well as the 2nd Iowa Cavalry regiments, embarked on this audacious mission from La Grange. Over the course of 17 days, Grierson's troops covered a staggering distance of 800 miles, engaging Confederate forces repeatedly. They successfully disrupted two vital railroads, took numerous prisoners and horses, and inflicted significant damage to enemy property. Their journey culminated in Baton Rouge on May 2, where Grierson joined forces with Nathaniel Banks in the ongoing siege at Port Hudson.

By skillfully diverting attention to the north and east of Mississippi, this raid effectively diverted Confederate focus away from the gathering of troops at Grand Gulf. Through the deployment of small patrols and deceptive maneuvers, Grierson managed to confuse the enemy regarding his true location, intentions, and direction. Operating deep within enemy territory, his forces systematically dismantled rail infrastructure, liberated enslaved individuals, razed Confederate storehouses, disabled locomotives, and obliterated commissary stores, bridges, and trestles. The lack of a viable response from General Pembleton further contributed to the raid's triumph. While Forrest was engaged in Alabama, combating Streight's Raid, other Confederate cavalry units were dispatched but proved unable to catch up with Grierson's swift movements. This strategic diversion ultimately hindered Pemberton's ability to effectively counter Grant's advance from the south, as he found himself inadequately equipped to confront the Union forces due to the distractions caused by Grierson's audacious exploits.

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Further Reading:

·       Donald L Miller, Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon and Schuster, 2019.

·       Grant’s Memoirs

·       Sherman’s Memoirs

·       Grant by Chernow

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/vicksburg

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg

·       https://civilwarmonths.com/2023/04/15/vicksburg-grant-and-porter-assemble/amp/

·       https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/achenblog/wp/2014/04/25/ulysses-s-grant-hero-or-butcher-great-man-or-doofus/

·       https://www.historynet.com/vicksburg-the-campaign-that-confirmed-grants-greatness/

·       https://www.vicksburgpost.com/2003/01/27/water-returned-to-citys-doorstep-100-years-ago/?fbclid=IwAR1X5nFZ8F-l_0sbr3Ki1HBygBiPb-GCgxl4aBCznjSOgKAvVdURVJUvJDA

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/nature/river-course-changes.htm?fbclid=IwAR3mflQUgR8JaUEIcrm2v_lLlfdGup44_XwzxIcJ1mTAyyCT2h_umfcT2Sc

·       https://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-colonel-benjamin-griersons-cavalry-raid-in-1863/

·       https://www.historynet.com/griersons-raid-during-the-vicksburg-campaign/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/major-general-benjamin-grierson-2360423

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/04/29/that-other-cavalry-guy-benjamin-h-grierson/

·       https://www.historyonthenet.com/grant-vicksburg

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-gibson

·       https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/battle-of-port-gibson/

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battleportgibson.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/grants-vicksburg-supply-line

·       https://www.historynet.com/mississippi-nightmare/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-champion-hill-2360280

·       https://www.rebellionresearch.com/battle-of-raymond?fbclid=IwAR1L1PcCwGRCFLg-Bv7neO1tG6cv7RsnmZO8kNvv5XVjUBkM6t3CiPtu96c_aem_th_AaSypV4shWeio-QbLLXIuILea41vtkZsruFEMGykenl_kK8dPEuWWYZiUP44s9G8ws4&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

·       Klein LW, Wittenberg EJ. The decisive influence of malaria on the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign. Surgeon’s Call: The Journal of the National Civil War Medicine Museum. 2023; 28(1): 4 – 14.

Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy

In Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War, Jeb Smith argues that the winner writes the history. This is evident in many ways and categories. The North propped itself up and vilified its enemy, the South. Today, we will take a look at Abraham Lincoln and race.

This is part 1 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War.

A U.S. Postage stamp issued in 1958. It commemorates the 1858 Lincoln and Douglas debates.

People are taught that Lincoln was a strong abolitionist, a champion of racial equality, and a great emancipator. They portray Lincoln as going to war to free the slaves; Lincoln advocated freedom and liberty for all; he is the savior of the Union and Constitution to boot. Lincoln was a kind, warmhearted, caring person, who never told a lie, and a great leader who united and led America to renown. This image comes perhaps from a desire for who they want him to be rather than who he was. Just as Southerners idolize their heroes, modern statists do the same with theirs, such as Lincoln. What most people think they know about Lincoln is well off the mark. We will look at his views on race below.[1]

"I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in anyway the social and political equality of the white and black races -- that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

 -Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas Debate Charleston, Illinois, September 18, 1858

I understood Lincoln as someone who desired equality for all. Instead, I found Lincoln was a white supremacist who viewed blacks as inferior beings. During a debate with Stephen A. Douglas on August 21, 1858 in Ottawa, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "Free them and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this…We cannot then make them equals." In response to the Dred Scott ruling, Lincoln said, "I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment." At the eulogy of Henry Clay in 1852, Lincoln gave a speech in which he called the declaration of independence the "The white man's charter of freedom."

Fear

Lincoln often used the N-word, and was known for his racist jokes. Abolitionist John Hume described Lincoln as "strongly prejudiced against the black man." According to Bennett's calculations, Lincoln stated publicly, at least twenty-one times, that he was opposed to equal rights for Blacks. Bennett writes, "Lincoln never pretended to be a racial liberal or a social innovator. He repeatedly said, in public and in private, that he believed in white supremacy." Lincolns close friend and biographer Ward Lamon said Lincoln had an "abhorrence of negro suffrage and negro equality." According to Lincoln, God has "Made us separate." Lincoln feared whites and blacks interbreeding. A former slave turned influential abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, spoke of Lincoln as "The white man's president." 

"Abraham Lincoln was not, in the fullest sense of the word, either our man or our model. In his interests, in his associations, in his habits of thought, and in his prejudices, he was a white man. He was preeminently the white man's President, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men. He was ready and willing at any time during the first years of his administration to deny, postpone, and sacrifice the rights of humanity in the colored people to promote the welfare of the white people of this country.…he still more strangely told us that we were to leave the land in which we were born; when he refused to employ our arms in defense of the Union; when, after accepting our services as colored soldiers… he told us he would save the Union if he could with slavery; when he revoked the Proclamation of Emancipation of General Fremont; when he refused to remove the popular commander of the Army of the Potomac, in the days of its inaction and defeat, who was more zealous in his efforts to protect slavery than to suppress rebellion; when we saw all this, and more, we were at times grieved, stunned, and greatly bewildered." 

-Frederick Douglass Oration in memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876 

"If Mr. Lincoln were really an Abolition President, which he is not; if he were a friend to the Abolition movement, instead of being, as he is, its most powerful enemy...Whoever lives through the next four years will see Mr. Lincoln and his Administration attacked more bitterly for their pro-slavery truckling, than for doing any anti-slavery work. He and his party will become the best protectors of slavery where it now is...Slavery will be as safe, and safer, in the Union under such a President, than it can be under any President of a Southern Confederacy. This is our impression, and we deeply regret the facts from which it is derived." 

-Fredrick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

According to Bennett, for over two decades in Illinois as a lawyer and politician, Lincoln never supported abolitionists, rights for blacks, or their progress in that direction. Lincoln never spoke out against the state laws that did not allow blacks to gather in large numbers, learn to read, or play percussion instruments. In 1848 Lincoln supported the Illinois state law of not allowing blacks to migrate to the state and not allowing blacks citizenship. In 1836 Lincoln voted in support of denying blacks the right to vote, and he also voted for an Illinois state law that taxed blacks without representation. In 1858 Lincoln refused to sign a bill that would allow them to testify against whites in court. In Charleston, Lincoln declared, "I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship." and "I will to the very last stand by the law of this state, which forbids the marrying of white people with Negroes"

As a lawyer, Lincoln helped defend the fugitive slave law, publicly supported the fugitive slave law, and spoke out against its repeal. Nathaniel Stephens said Lincoln had a "wholehearted, one might say, serene, support of the fugitive slave law." Ward Lamon said Lincoln was the "steady though quiet opponent of abolitionist Owen Lovejoy." Donald Riddle said: "He did not make any attempt to advocate or support anti-slavery or abolitionist messages." In 1858 Lincoln declared, "I have said a hundred times, and I have now no inclination to take it back, that I believe there is no right, and ought to be no inclination in the people of the free States to enter into the slave States, and interfere with the question of slavery at all." 

When asked what he thought of having abolitionists in his party, Lincoln said: "As long as I'm not tarred with the Abolitionist brush." Bennett quotes multiple sources, such as Lincoln's close friend General James Wadsworth saying the welfare of Blacks "didn't enter into his policy at all." Donn Piatt said Lincoln "Laughed at the abolitionist as a disturbing element easily controlled." Eli Thayer said Lincoln spoke of abolitionism "In terms of contempt and derision." Abolitionist Sumner said Lincoln "does not know how to help or is not moved to help" and "I do not remember that I have had any help from him... he has no instinct or inspiration." Abolitionist John Hume stated, "The president was in constant opposition" to abolitionism. The abolitionist Journal The Liberator editorial on July 13, 1860, called Lincoln "The slave hound of Illinois" for his support of the fugitive slave law. Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered states plainly, "Abraham Lincoln was not an abolitionist."    

Bennett argues Lincoln has received the glory that the white and black abolitionists, citizens, newspaper editors, churches, members of Congress, and pastors had worked decades for. The most prominent abolitionists in the political sphere were men like Senator Sumner, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Salmon Chase, Wendell Phillips, etc. They deserve the glory that Lincoln was falsely given. Congress were the ones that abolished slavery in the territories and authorized black troops. And the people of the states, both North and South, passed the amendment to outlaw slavery after Lincoln's death.

Forever Free From African Americans

"I wish to make and to keep the distinction between the existing institution, and the extension of it, so broad, and so clear, that no honest man can misunderstand me, and no dishonest one, successfully misrepresent me." 

-Abraham Lincoln Peoria, Illinois: October 16, 1854

Lincoln never intended to end slavery where it already existed, only the extension out into the West. In December 1860, Fredrick Douglass said, "With the single exception of the question of slavery extension, Mr. Lincoln proposes no measure which can bring him into antagonistic collision with the traffickers in human flesh, either in the States or in the District of Columbia." Lincoln did not want the West to become "An asylum for slaves and n******." On October 16, 1854, Lincoln stated, "The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these [new western] territories. We want them for the homes of free white people." 

The West was to be kept for whites to be segregated from blacks' presence, live off Republican federal land grants, and become industrial. Southern agrarians were to be fenced into the South; otherwise, they would bring their despised black slaves along. Robert Fogel summarizes the abolitionist stance by quoting William Seward and Owen Lovejoy, among others, as "They were quite sincere when they assured voters that as "True republicans" they "Cared nothing for the N*****" and that the republican party aimed to make white labor respectable and honorable by keeping negroes, free and slave, out of the West." In Lincoln Unmasked, Professor Thomas DiLorenzo quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson saying, "It is the black man whom the abolitionist wishes to abolish, not slavery."

Western expansion

Ward Lamon said that originally Lincoln was not against slavery in all the western territories, only those north of the 36°30′ degrees line. However, abolitionists threatened to pull support for his election unless he stood against all western expansion. Lamon also tells us that Lincoln would rather see slavery expanded than "See the union dissolved." Lamon said of Lincoln, "It was therefore as a white man, and in the interest of white men, that he threw himself into the struggle to keep blacks out of the Territories. He did not want them there either as slaves or freemen…" Bennett quotes Lincoln warning whites that if slavery was allowed in the territories, "Negro equality will be abundant, as every white laborer will have occasion to regret when he is elbowed from his plow or his anvil by slave n******." According to DiLorenzo, Indiana (which voted for Lincoln) despised blacks so much that they gave out a $500 fine to anyone who encouraged blacks to come within their state. And ten years of prison for marrying a black. Illinois senator Lyman Trumbull, quoted by DiLorenzo, said, "Our people want nothing to do with the negro." It seems Republicans believed in a form of secession based on race rather than states.

"We, the Republican Party, are the white man's party. We are for the free white man, and for making white labor acceptable and honorable, which it can never be when Negro slave labor is brought into competition with it." 

-Lyman Trumbull Illinois Republican, United States Senator Quoted in The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War by Kenneth M. Stampp Oxford U Press 1981

Republicans did not care for equality with blacks, and they wanted separation from them. The Northern whites worked hardest to be segregated from the presence of blacks, while southerners worked with, ate with, lived with, played with,  and went to church with blacks.

"Many of those attaching themselves to the Republican party...were not in sympathy with Abolitionism. They were utterly opposed to immediate emancipation, or for that matter, to emancipation of any kind. They wanted slavery to remain where it was, and were perfectly willing that is should be undisturbed. They disliked the blacks, and did not want to have them freed, fearing that if set at liberty they would overrun what was then free soil."        

-John F Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

The fight over the extension of slavery was political. Northern industrialists needed the West free of blacks and agricultural interests. Dr. Charles Pace wrote in Lincoln As He Really Was, "Lincoln was an abolitionist when it suited him." And "Abolitionist activity was rising fast, fueled by northern capitalist and political interests needing an issue to neutralize the agrarian south." Lincoln and northern whites would fight against its extension into the West when it was politically helpful. Secretary of  State William Seward said: "The motive of those who protested against the extension of slavery had always really been a concern for the welfare of the white man, and not an unnatural sympathy for the negro." They had less concern with slaves in the South; as John Hume wrote of Lincoln, "He was opposed to slavery more because it was a public nuisance than because of its injustice to the oppressed black man."

"To protect, defend, and perpetuate slavery in the states where it existed Abraham Lincoln was not less ready than any other President to draw the sword of the nation. He was ready to execute all the supposed guarantees of the United States Constitution in favor of the slave system anywhere inside the slave states. He was willing to pursue, recapture, and send back the fugitive slave to his master, and to suppress a slave rising for liberty, though his guilty master were already in arms against the Government. The race to which we belong were not the special objects of his consideration."                                   

-Frederick Douglass Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876

Before military defeats and public opinion began to change, abolitionists were condemned by the President. When Union general John Fremont emancipated slaves in federal occupied Missouri, Lincoln recalled the orders and relieved Fremont of his command. When Union general David Hunter issued general order number 11, declaring all slaves in SC/GA/FL to be "Forever free," Lincoln revoked the proclamation. Hunter was then pressured into disbanding the regiment made up of freed slaves he had begun to form. Late in 1862, Lincoln supported slavery continuing in Union-held territory in V.A and L.A and encouraging the slave owners to peacefully come back into the Union. Mark Neely JR wrote that in 1861, "He more than once actually forced others who were trying to free slaves to cease doing so." Not surprising when Lincolns' wife, Mary, was from a slave-owning family in Kentucky. In August 1862, Adam Gurowski summer up Lincoln's actions writing in his diary, "The president is indefatigable in his efforts to save slavery." 

Even after the war, Lincoln, the North, and the Republicans maintained slavery in states like Delaware and Kentucky. Lincoln had no problem calling on men from the slave states of the Upper South to suppress the rebellion in the Cotton States. 

"The Republican party does not propose to abolish slavery anywhere and is decidedly opposed to Abolition agitation. It is not even, by the confession of its President-elect, in favor of the repeal of that thrice-accursed and flagrantly unconstitutional Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850." 

-Frederick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

In his book Battle Hymns; the Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War, Christian McWhirter quotes Federal general Phillip Kearny who said, "I think as much of a rebel as I do of an abolitionist." Today we have presented to us the idea of Northern tolerance and southern bigotry, but the reality was something else entirely. 

Abraham Lincoln the Great Emancipator? 

"If Mr. Lincoln had been told, when he entered on the Presidency, that before his term of office would expire he would be hailed as "The Great Emancipator," he would have treated the statement as equal to one of his own best jokes."

 -John Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

"Never did a man achieve more fame for what he did not do and for what he never intended to do," writes Bennett. Today we are brought up to believe the Emancipation Proclamation (E.P.) was part of the desired agenda to end slavery by Abraham Lincoln. Or worse, we are told with this presidential Proclamation; that all slaves were made forever free. Thus Lincoln was the great emancipator who ended slavery. But that story is far from the truth. 

The E.P. did not apply to slavery within the United States, and it did not free a single slave. According to Hume, Missouri abolitionists wanted the Proclamation applied to their state, and Lincoln refused the request. Instead, the E.P. applied only to Confederate-controlled areas and not to the Northern slave states still in the Union. A Confederate state only had to rejoin the Union, and slavery would be protected. Hume writes, "It was not ...intended to help the slave but to chastise the master. It was to be in  punishment of treason…The proclamation, it will be recollected, was issued in two parts separated by one hundred days. The first part gave the Rebels warning that the second would follow if, in the meanwhile, they did not give up their rebellion. All they had to do to save slavery was cease their treasonable practices." William Seward said of Lincoln's proclamation, "Where he could, he didn't. Where he did, he couldn't." The London Spectator, on October 11, 1862, read, "The Union government liberates the enemy's slaves as it would the enemy's cattle, simply to weaken them in the conflict. The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States." 

The Proclamation would end with the war, and any slave freed by it would become subject to local state laws. The document did not apply to the legality of slavery. Lincoln wrote, it was "Merely a war measure" and "Have effect only from its being an exercise of war power." Lincoln stated, "It would have no effect upon the children of the slaves born hereafter."

The Proclamation was given at the end of 1862 after the North suffered multiple setbacks. Some viewed it as an act of desperation. Lincoln gave the Proclamation as a war measure, "As a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion." The war lasted longer than anticipated, and abolitionists put pressure on Lincoln; states threatened to withhold men and their support unless Lincoln helped the Northern war effort by going after slavery to weaken the South. Lincoln and his cabinet were concerned that a rebellion would start in the North if they did not begin emancipation and certainly did not want to lose some of their most ardent supporters.

Others said its purpose was to encourage slave revolts in the South. To encourage slaves to arise and kill women, children, and masters in a revolution while the men fought at the front. The Harrisonburg Patriot and Union newspaper called it a "Cold-blooded invitation to insurrection and butchery." Of course, many slaves, innocent women, and children would be killed if an uprising happened, but it was endorsed so long as it helped bring traitors under the master's authority in D.C.

The Emancipation Proclamation

The E.P. was not Lincoln’s desire, but he was "forced into glory," as Bennett would say. Bennet quotes Lincoln, "I am driven to it." And he said he had great "reluctance" about beginning emancipation. Abolitionists set up a meeting for September 24 with a plan to withhold support for the war and to call on Lincoln to resign. Knowing this meeting and the growing feeling amongst various state governors and the people, Lincoln issued the preliminary Proclamation just two days before the meeting. Lincoln said on July 12, "The pressure in this direction [immediate emancipation] is still upon me and is increasing." Lincoln said, "For a length of time, it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure." Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered quotes Lincoln writing an admirer, saying, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess that events have controlled me." In his diary, Adam Gurowski wrote, "The patriots of both houses... the American people whipped Mr. Lincoln into the glory of having issued the emancipation proclamation." Bennett described the E.P in complete contradiction to how many school children understand it when he wrote, “The high point of a brilliant campaign in favor of slavery not freedom, and was designed not to emancipate all slaves immediately but to protect the emancipation of all slaves." 

As Bennett shows in his book, the E.P. was a conservative pushback against the radicals. On July 17, 1862, congress passed the second confiscation act. This act declared all rebel slaves in the confederacy "Forever free." On September 22, 1862, Lincoln signed the preliminary emancipation nullifying the emancipation act of congress, re-enslaving slaves. The emancipation proclamation did not free slaves in the United States, and it did not free any slave that the confiscation act would not have. It was a reaction to the radical abolitionists in congress. As Bennett writes, "The proclamation had as its purpose and effect the checking of the radical [abolitionist] program." 

Both DiLorenzo's Lincoln Unmasked and Bennett correct multiple false quotes attributed to Lincoln or those taken out of context to claim he was an abolitionist or desired equality among the races. I would recommend both authors to those interested. I will let Lincoln's close friend and admirer Ward Lamon sum up Lincoln's opinions on the emancipation proclamation.

"He did so with avowed reluctance...he never at any time favored the admission of negroes into the body of electors...he claimed that those who were incidentally liberated by the federal arms were poor-spirited, lazy and slothful...he longed to see them transported to Hayti, central America, Africa, or anywhere so that they might in no event, and in no way, participate in the government of his country...he was no Abolitionist in the popular sense."

-Ward Lamon The Life Of Abraham Lincoln From His Birth To His Inauguration As President James R. Osgood And Company, 1872

The Corwin Amendment

As Professor DiLorenzo points out, the previously proposed 13th amendment was called the Corwin Amendment; and it was something Lincoln supported. The amendment would forever allow slavery in the United States and make it unconstitutional to abolish it. It reads:

No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

In Lincoln's first inaugural address, he supported the amendment saying, "holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." According to DiLorenzo, Lincoln then sent a letter to the governors of the states transmitting the approved amendment. He told New York Senator William Seward to advocate for it in the Senate. He also instructed Seward to pass a federal law that would repeal the personal liberty laws in some Northern states used to nullify the federal Fugitive Slave Act. DiLorenzo sees Lincoln's inaugural address as the most pro-slavery speech given by a president. 

"Lincoln's first inaugural address...is probably the most powerful defense of slavery ever made by an American politician. In the speech Lincoln denies having any intention to interfere with Southern slavery; supports the federal Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, which compelled citizens of non-slave states to capture runaway slaves; and also supported a constitutional amendment known as the Corwin Amendment that would have prohibited the federal government from ever interfering in Southern slavery." 

-Thomas DiLorenzo The Lincoln Myth: Ideological Cornerstone of the America Empire LewRockwell.com 

Lincoln the Ultimate Segregationist

"Horrified at the thought of the mixing blood by the white and black races: agreed for once---a thousand times agreed... A separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation...Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization; ... Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be."

-Abraham Lincoln Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 2 Speech at Springfield, Illinois June 26, 1857

Lincoln never wanted slaves freed and made equal. Instead, he wanted to make America white from "Sea to shining sea," as Bennett stated. He promoted the removal of slaves from America back to Africa. In his July 17th 1858 speech in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races." The same year at Ottawa, he declared, "If all earthly power were given  me...my first impulse would be to free all the slaves and send them to Liberia."

It is true that Lincoln disliked slavery, but not as much as white and blacks living together. So Lincoln spent many thousands of tax dollars on his colonization plan to send the future freed slaves back to Africa. He either wanted them deported or in their all-black state. While in the White House, he held a meeting with free blacks; he asked them to lead by example for future freed slaves. 

"You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffer very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side….It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated…You may believe you can live in Washington or elsewhere in the United States the remainder of your life [as easily], perhaps more so than you can in any foreign country… an extremely selfish view of the case. There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain with us."

-Abraham Lincoln Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes August 14, 1862, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 5.Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865

Conclusion

According to our "greatest" president, for the good of humanity, free blacks should lead by example and go live in a foreign country. As a member of the Illinois legislature, Lincoln urged the legislature "To appropriate money for colonization in order to remove Negroes from the state and prevent miscegenation." In 1853 Lincoln gave a speech to the Springfield colonization society; his colonization plan would "Free slave holders from the troublesome presence of free Negroes." When pushing for his colonization plan, he said, "Where there is a will, there is a way." 

He promoted three aspects of his agenda. Gradual emancipation, compensation to slave owners, and colonization in Africa or Central America. His friend Henry Whitney said there was nothing besides preserving the Union that Lincoln felt more important. Ward Lamon said Lincoln "Zealously and persistently devised plans for the deportation of the negro." In the diary of Gideon Welles, we read, "Following the preliminary Proclamation, and as part of the plan…was the deportation and colonization of the colored race."

In Lincoln’s first state of the Union address, he suggested free blacks be included in his colonization plan when he said: "It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization." Lincoln called for three constitutional amendments for gradual emancipation, compensation, and colonization in his second inaugural address. He stated, "I cannot make it better known than it already is that I strongly favor colonization." On December 31, 1862, Lincoln signed a contract to send 500 American-born Negroes to an island off the coast of Haiti; many died, and the survivors were brought back to America. Until his death, Lincoln negotiated with European nations to deport blacks to Africa. 

"Mr. Lincoln is quite a genuine Representative of American prejudiced and negro hatred and far more concerned for the preservation of slavery...showing all his inconsistencies, his pride of race and blood, his contempt for Negroes and his canting hypocrisy…Mr. Lincoln takes care in urging his colonization scheme to furnish a weapon to all the ignorant and base."

 -Frederick Douglass The Life and Writings of Fredrick Douglass International Publishers Co 1950

In short, Lincoln was the ultimate segregationist. He didn't just want blacks removed from schools, restaurants, and work areas; he wanted them removed from the country. 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Collapse of the Bison Population in the US: Evaluating the Legislation of HR. 921

Over the course of the 19th century a significant environmental cataclysm befell the United States’ Great Plains. The bison which roamed the plains for millennia went from a population ranging between 30-50 million in the early 1800s to less than 1,000 at the turn of the century. Multiple historiographical traditions exist in attempting to discern what occurred and what ultimately spelled the death knell for the great buffalo herds, however, the importance of consulting primary sources can still elucidate greater understanding in comprehending the complexity of the rapid downfall of the bison.

Roy Williams explains.

Indians hunting the bison by Karl Bodmer.

For the last century, images of bison carcasses and skeletons piled high have haunted the memories of American conservationists. Artistic renderings such as American Progress by John Gast which shows the steady retreat of the bison and the Native Americans who depended upon it at the march of civilization as a hallmark of the ideology of manifest destiny. Artistic renderings also show the wanton mass killing of bison from settlers shooting the animals from trains for cheap thrills. What then caused this massive collapse of the bison populations? The answer, like most of is buried within a labyrinth of complex interactions.

Popular mythology has created a narrative built upon the legacy of the Indian Wars and the genocidal heritage of United States policy towards Native Americans in arguing that the Reconstruction era United States government willfully and intentionally sought to destroy the bison as a form of ecocide and biological warfare against Great Plains Native Americans tribes in attempting to cut off their primary form of subsistence and force them into state sponsored subservience in reservations. While Native Americans of the Great Plains had always depended on the bison as a supplemental source of food, before the introduction of European horses and diseases, they primarily depended upon agriculture. The addition of European diseases such as smallpox forced Great Plains Native Americans to adapt and reconfigure their way of life to nomadic sole dependence upon the bison for subsistence, trade, and political autonomy. This change put additional stress on an animal population which already had to contend with the dynamic and volatile nature of the Great Plains environment. Each year natural factors such as wolf predation, disease, and drought significantly reduced bison numbers. The introduction of European horses also dramatically increased hunting efficiency leading to greater harvests and additional pressure on herd populations. These numbers could rebound with steady levels of human predation but could not endure multiple upheavals which would ultimately lead to their near extinction.

Phillip Sheridan

One of the most frequently cited primary source examples of United States government complicity in destroying the bison is the 1875 speech of Phillip Sheridan before the Texas legislature. Supposedly, the Texas legislature was considering conservation measures and protections for bison to reduce the number of market hunters who were driving the southern herd to near extinction. Phillip Sheridan is cited as appearing before the legislature to oppose these protections arguing that,

 “These men [buffalo hunters] have done more in the last two years, and will do in the next year, more to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular Army has done in the last thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary; it is well known that an army losing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage. For the sake of lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated. Then your prairies can be covered with speckled cattle and festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of an advanced civilization.”

The only problem with this primary source rests in the reality that Phillip Sheridan never appeared before the Texas Legislature in 1875 because there never was any consideration by the Texas legislature to protect the southern bison herd. No archival data supports this primary source as being legitimate, the only appearance of this source rests in the memoirs of a hide hunter named John Cooke, with The Border and the Buffalo multiple years after the supposed encounter. More troubling however, is the reality of another primary source which flies directly in the face of historiographical traditions claiming a conspiratorial link between United States government’s policy against the bison.

Legislation

The legislation of HR. 921 stands as one of the most important primary sources in reconsidering the collapse of the bison populations. If the United States government intentionally committed a conspiracy of destroying the bison to force Great Plains into subservience on the reservation system, why did both the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in 1874 introduce a bill to regulate the hunting of bison only to Native Americans? Congressman Fort of Illinois introduced the bill with the goal of stopping the early extermination of the bison, recognizing that bison were “killed every year in utter wantonness without any object whatever except to destroy them.”  The fact that H.R. 921 passed in the House with a tally of 132 ayes and the nays remaining uncounted, shows that there was ample interest in protecting the bison from the onslaught of illegal hide hunters. H.R. 921 was designed to protect bison and give favorable hunting rights to Native Americans, stating, “That it shall hereafter be unlawful for any person who is not an Indian to kill, wound, or in any manner destroy any female buffalo, of any age.”

H.R. 921 ultimately failed to pass, dying at President Grant’s desk due to a pocket veto, however the significance of its passage in both the house of Representatives and Senate cannot be understated. The most likely culprit of the collapse of the bison of the Great Plains rests in the ascendancy of market hunting. For a time, it was profitable to hunt bison on a vast industrial scale. These hunts prioritized female bison for their tongues and robes providing the best meat and the best quality leather for production. The industrial revolution occurring in the east fueled the need for more leather products putting unsustainable strain on the bison populations. For a time, bison boomtowns popped up overnight in the northwest territories trading goods at extortionate rates to Native Americans who had honed and perfected their hunting techniques and could trade bison materials for these goods. This interaction in addition to the larger share of market hunting by white hide hunters ultimately spelled doom for the bison populations. The reason for this conclusion is not revolutionary in nature, the bison followed the same trends as any other animal in the United States that experienced the pressures of market hunting. The beaver of the northeast and northwestern United States was reduced to virtual extinction from market hunting. The whitetail deer and alligator of the southeast were also led to near extinction from the combined forces of deforestation and market hunting which prioritized meat and leather over the preservation of animal species. The collapse of the bison provides a cautionary tale of the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon the natural environment. Without the presence of clear and strict conservation measures, environmental cataclysm can and will occur again. Rather than being a story of intentional and willful political malevolence, the tale of the bison represents the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon nature.

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References

Dodge, Richard Irving. The Hunting Grounds of the Great West. 1877. The Newberry Library. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.americanwest.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Detail/the-hunting-grounds-of-the-great-west.-a-description-of-the-plains-game-and-indians-of-the-great-north-american-desert/4455563?item=4455597.

Flores, Dan. The Natural West. University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.

Gast, John. American Progress. Oil on canvas. Brooklyn, New York: Autry Museum of the American West, 1872.

Geist, Valerius. Buffalo Nation. Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 1996.

Isenberg, Andrew C. The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Kindy, Dave. “How Buffalo Bill and a Civil War General saved Yellowstone National Park.” The Washington Post, March, 6, 2022.

Krech, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History. New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.

Library of Congress. The Far West-Shooting Buffalo on the Line of the Kansas-Pacific Railroad. 1871. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington D.C. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c33890/?st=image.

Meriwether, Lewis, and William Clark, Jonathan Carver, and Alexander Mackenzie. The Travels of Capts. Lewis & Clarke. Philadelphia: Hubbard Lester, 1809.

Protection of Buffalo. HR 921. 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, Pt.3: 2104-2109.

Ramsay, Crooks. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 1849, 31sr Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 550), 1022.

Sandoz, Mari. The Buffalo Hunters. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1978.

Wade, Mason. The Journals of Francis Parkman. vol 2 New York: Harper, 1947.