The American Civil War (1861-65) saw a breakthrough in various technologies. One of particular importance was the telegraph, a communication technology that had grown greatly in significance in the years before the US Civil War broke out. Here, K.R.T. Quirion continues his three-part series on the importance of the telegraph in the US Civil War by looking at the role of the telegraph in the early years of the US Civil War and how the Union made use of it.
You can read part 1 in the series on the history of the telegraph in the 19th century here.
US Military Telegraph Service battery wagon, Army of the Potomac headquarters. In Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864.
The Telegraph Demonstrates its Usefulness
In 1861, journalists flooded into Washington, D.C. and would remain through the course of the Civil War to disseminate information across the country. The news of the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12 spread like wildfire and was immediately followed by President Lincoln’s call for 75,000 militia volunteers. [1]Because of the telegraph, Americans would read about war as the events unfolded. This speed in communications precipitated a speed in events as well.
Having read Lincoln’s call for the organization of a military, secessionists in Virginia and Maryland mobilized, hoping to capture Washington off guard and end the war before it began. The Confederacy’s secretary of war predicted that his new nation’s flag would “fly over the U.S. Capitol by May 1.” [2]Governor John Andrew of Massachusetts however, had already mobilized his state’s militia for action.
When news of the secessionist’s plan reached the capitol on April 17, the Massachusetts militia was called by the War Department. Andrews telegraphed back that, “Two…regiments will start this afternoon.” [3]These forces however, were held up by secessionists in Baltimore en routeto intercepting the forces headed to Washington, D.C. [4]Luckily, five Pennsylvanian companies had been contact by telegraph and ordered to hasten to the Capital before the arrival of the Massachusetts soldiers, thereby cutting off the secessionist coup d’état.[5]Without the near instant communication of the telegraph, Union forces would have arrived too late to secure the capitol.
The Union Organizes its Telegraph System
As the events of April 17 demonstrated, the telegraph was destined to play a significant role in the course of the Civil War. Anticipating this, Myer hoped toexpand the role of the Signal Corps by creating an officer core. In 1861, he submitted a draft of legislation to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, “for the organization of a signal corps to serve during the present war, and to have the charge of all the telegraphic duty of the Army.”[6]Despite various appropriations of money to buy equipment, Congress did not approve the creation of a dedicated officer corps for the Signal Corp until March 1863. In the interim, Myer had to rely on field commanders to detail officers and men to duty in the “acting signal corps.” [7]
Concurrent with Myer’s efforts to grow the Signal Corps was the creation of a rival organization, the U.S. Military Telegraph Service (USMTC). The secessionist uprising in the North and Upper South during 1861 caused the “seizure of the commercial [telegraph] systems around Washington.” [8]A young, ambitious Superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad was tasked with rebuilding, reinforcing, and extending the telegraph and railway infrastructure from Washington south toward the heart of the Confederacy. [9]The Superintendent’s name was Andrew Carnegie. Completing this, Carnegie and his task force enlarged the network to connect important stations such as “the navy yard and the arsenal, with the War Department, and to run lines to Arlington, Chain Bridge,” and other outposts.” [10]
Anson Stager, the general superintendent of the Western Union Telegraph Company was appointed captain and assistant-quartermaster of the USMTC on November 11, 1861, and was “assigned in Special Order 313 to duty as general manager of military telegraph lines.”[11]Stager and the entire USMTC reported directly to Secretary of War Stanton. By an act of Congress in 1862, the civilian operated USMTC, through the oversight of the War Department, took control of all commercial telegraph lines in the Union.
Battle for Supremacy
In an effort to outflank the USMTC, Myer proposed the creation of a “Telegraphic or Signal Train to accompany the Army on the march.”[12]These “trains” consisted of two wagons equipped with five miles of telegraphic wire and telegraph equipment. Raines, explains that, “[i]n battle, one wagon remained at the starting point as a receiving station, while the other traveled into the field with the sending instrument.” [13]The first field operations of the telegraph train were during the Peninsula campaign in May 1862. General McClellan witnessed “the great usefulness of this system” but perceived it as a supplement to the work already being done by the USMTC. [14]
The telegraph trains of the Signal Corps were again deployed during the battle of Fredericksburg. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was connected with his division commanders Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner and Maj. Gen. William Franklin, as well as the Union supply base at Belle Plain throughout the course of the combat. The success of the trains enabled Myer to appropriate additional funds so that “by late 1863 thirty [telegraph trains] were in service throughout the Army.” [15]This success however, exacerbated the tension between the Signal Corps and the USMTC both of which were actively operating lines throughout the battlefront.
This inter-governmental conflict reached its peak following the failure of the Chancellorsville campaign in 1863. At the battle of Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, both the Signal Corps and the USMTC were once again deployed side by side. The Signal Corps however, was forced to relinquish some of its lines to the USMTC as a result of the “technical limitations” of the Beardslee telegraph machine which the Signal Corps employed.[16]
The problem was that the Beardslee, which was powered by revolving magnets rather than by batteries, was only capable of generating enough electricity to transmit message in the five to eight mile range. [17]Maj. Gen Joseph Hooker was on the South side of the Rappahannock while his chief of staff Gen. Butterfield was ten miles on the North side of the river. The Signal Corps required three hours to transmit messages between the two commanders using a combination of electrical and visual signals. [18]Butterfield and Hooker soon overloaded the capacity of the Signal Corps lines which were staffed with many new operators and badly in need of repair after months of use. The system eventually collapsed entirely and the USMTC took over complete control of communication duties for the remainder of the campaign.
The USMTC Takes Over
In the wake of the Chancellorsville disaster, Myer decided to convert the Signal Corps to the superior Morse machine. This action however, put the Signal Corps in direct competition with the USMTC for trained operators. Without gaining the approval of Secretary Stanton, Myer placed a series of advertisements in the Army and Navy Official Gazette “calling for expert telegraphers to apply for commissions in the Signal Corps.” [19]Myer’s action was promptly chastised as “irregular and improper” by Assistant Secretary of War W. A. Nichols. [20]
Colonel Stager reacted to Myer’s action by recommending to Secretary Stanton that “management of all field and military electric telegraphs be confined to the...[USMTC], or, that that Department be abolished, and the whole business placed under the control of the Signal Corps.” [21]On November 10, 1893, Myer was recalled to the War Department where he was relieved of command. Stanton promptly issued Special Order 499 requiring “all magneto-electric field signal trains and apparatus” of the U.S. Signal Corps to be turned over to the USMTC as well as all Signal Corps personnel. [22]
In the aftermath of the Civil War the USMTC would be disbanded and the Signal Corps would by the sole department tasked with maintaining military communications. From 1863 until the end of the war however, all military telegraph communications would be carried out by the War Department through its civilian apparatus the USMTC. With this consolidation, the Union would finally be able to realize the potential of the telegraph.
What do you think about the importance of the telegraph in the US Civil War? Let us know below.
Now, you can read part 3 on The Union’s Use of the Telegraph in the US Civil War here.
[1]Paul Farhi, “How the Civil War gave birth to modern journalism in the nation’s capital,” Washington Post, (March 2, 2012).
[2]Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 1 Fort Sumter to Perryville, (New York, NY: Random House, 1958), 53.
[3]James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2001), 164.
[4]John E.O’Brien,Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War, (Scranton, PA: The Reader Press, 1910), 5.
[5]Plum, Vol. I, 64.
[6]Plum, Vol. I,9.
[7]Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, 8.
[8]A.W. Greely, “The Military-Telegraph Service,” Signal Corp Association.
[9]David Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007), 73.
[10]J. Emmet O’Brien, “Telegraphing in Battle.” The Century, Vol. 38, Is. 5 (Sep., 1889).
[11]David H. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War, (New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1907), 31.
[12]Raines, 17.
[13]Ibid., 18.
[14]U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), Ser. 1, Vol. 5, 31.
[15]Raines, 20.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Paul J. Scheips, “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict,” Civil War History, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Dec. 1963), 11.
[18]Raines, 20.
[19]Scheips, “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict,” 11.
[20]Raines, 21.
[21]Plum, Vol. II, 101.
[22]Ibid., 102.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Bates, David H. Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War. New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc. (1907).
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Ed. Roy Basler. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. (1953).
Greely, A.W. “The Military-Telegraph Service.” Signal Corp Association. Accessed May 3, 2016.
http://www.civilwarsignals.org/pages/tele/telegreely/telegreely.html
Morse, Samuel F.B. “Improvement in the Mode of Communicating Information by Signals by the Application of Electro-Magnetism.” Patent No. 1,647. United Stets Patent Office. (June 20, 1840).
O’Brien, John E. Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War. Scranton, PA: The Reader Press. (1910).
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http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3406400169.html
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Farhi, Paul. “How the Civil War gave birth to modern journalism in the nation’s capital.” Washington Post.(March 2, 2012).
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/how-the-civil-war-gave-birth-to-modern-journalism-in-the-nations-capital/2012/02/24/gIQAIMFpmR_story.html.
O’Brien, J. Emmet. “Telegraphing in Battle.” The Century, Vol. 38, Is. 5 (Sep., 1889). http://www.civilwarsignals.org/pages/tele/teleinbat/teleinbat.html.
Scheips, Paul J. “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict.” Civil War History, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Dec. 1963).
Trotter, William R. “The Music of War.” HistoryNet. http://www.historynet.com/the-music-of-war.htm.
