The Thirty Years’ War was a conflict fought across parts of Europe from 1618 to 1648. Here, Matthew Gentile considers the important role that mercenaries played during that war. He considers the Swedish use of mercenaries, why people became mercenaries, and how they behaved during the war.
A painting of the death of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden at the Battle of Lutzen in 1632. Painting by Carl Wahlbom.
Much has been written about the Thirty Years’ War, a grandiose conflict that engulfed Europe in flames during the first half of the seventeenth century. The war featured heroes and villains pitted against one another, men such as Gustavus Adolphus and Albrecht von Wallenstein, and was riddled with more plot twists along the way than the greatest of all Shakespearean tragedies. While it has been covered endlessly in academic texts there still remains more to be written on the subject. This article will focus on the importance of mercenary forces amongst the ranks of the more than dozen combatants in this bloody struggle. I will discuss what factors drew a man of the early modern world to a life as a mercenary soldier, cultural conceptions of the mercenary of this world, and the changing conditions in Europe that allowed the mercenary to thrive.
A conflict of realpolitik
Beginning with the infamous Defenestration of Prague in 1618 and concluding with the Peace of Westphalia three decades later in 1648 the Thirty Years’ War marked a shift in the political attitudes of the states of Europe. While differences of religious belief set the first sparks to the flame of this struggle the war soon devolved into a conflict of realpolitik. Old grievances were brought back to light and used to push current political agendas. Many states of Europe found their governmental apparatuses to be increasingly bloated due to the high costs of the war.[1] While nations such as France and Spain had more than enough able bodied men that could fight manpower ran thin in smaller nations and a strain was placed on many states throughout the continent. As a result of this and the prolonged state of war in Europe the age of the mercenary was reaching its peak. By the start of the war the common mercenary officer “had become semi-permanent heads of financial-military enterprises, operating in the name of states.”[2] It was of no importance if the officer hailed from the land for which they were currently fighting. All that was needed was a man of competence to command the mass ranks of mercenary troops.
Sweden
Of all the nations who became entangled in this far-flung struggle for the heart of Europe the one that depended the most on a backbone of mercenary forces was Sweden. What problems plagued Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden until his untimely passing at the Battle of Lützen in 1632, and the Swedes to the point that they would need to depend on foreign mercenaries to make up a bulk of their fighting force? Firstly, the population of Sweden in the early seventeenth century was estimated to be around 1,300,000 people. The Swedish population was dwarfed in comparison to some of the more densely populated states of Europe. If the armies of Gustavus were made up entirely of Swedish men they would be swept from each and every field upon which they fought. Secondly, the Swedish army of the previous century had suffered several humiliating defeats and was considered a force made up of ill trained peasants. Adolphus studied the mistakes of his forefathers and decided to depend instead on the ranks of mercenaries to make up his force. Where then did Adolphus turn to in order to create the backbone of his widely hailed army? Adolphus was dependent mainly on mercenaries of German origin, many of whom were Protestant and thus willing to help with his campaigns against the Catholic princes of the Habsburg lands, and on Scottish mercenaries. Gustavus held the mercenary Scots in such high esteem for their martial abilities to the point that he viewed them not as servants, but as friends in his employ.[3] It should be noted that the use of mercenaries was common by both Catholics and Protestants alike, often with these religious distinctions becoming less important as the war went on. The Danish, Habsburg's and French alike relied on these men.
Purpose in life
What were the conditions of early modern Europe like that would make a man want to leave behind his life and take up arms in a foreign war as a mercenary? Population growth that was owed in part to European colonialism from the early sixteenth century onwards had led to underemployment across the continent, and while there was a massive amount of new sources of food shipped daily from the new world wages remained stagnant.[4] Most of the men who made up the ranks of these mercenary forces were men from the lower classes who were searching for greater purposes in their lives. War offered a way out for young men who felt stuck in place due to their economic status, and it always paid well.[5] In his work, Europe at War: 1600-1650, David Maland opined that “The poverty of European society which made it easy to recruit soldiers made it difficult for governments and commanders to maintain them. The only way to hold men together in these circumstances was to unleash them upon open country or against a town.”[6] To the generals and kings of Europe the frustrations of the impoverished proved to be a double edged sword. And while these ruling elites certainly looked down on the acts of violence committed by men in their command they felt it better to occur in foreign lands where war and great devastation was already occurring than to have such events boil up into greater hostilities in their own lands.
If the word mercenary is mentioned in conversation the image of a marauding foreign soldier is often the first one that will jump into your mind. Mercenaries are portrayed as the unprofessional outsiders, groups of rag-tag men who only act on their impulses to commit mass violence, in comparison to the upright national citizen who is doing his duty and fighting to protect his country. While many portrayals of the common mercenary are correct, they were more than prone to committing violent acts, aspects of this assumption are brought into scrutiny by several historians. In Peter H. Wilson’s work The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy Wilson writes that past historians wrongly assumed that the “volunteers or conscripts serving their country… were inherently superior soldiers.”[7] While the volunteer from the Palatinate who joined the ranks of the fighting masses would be swelled with pride in defense of his homeland he would make no match during pitched conflict against the battle hardened mercenary veteran who fought on even when defeat was imminent. One such example was the Battle of Nördlingen, which was fought between Sweden and the Habsburg’s in 1634. The battle saw an outnumbered Swedish army that was dependent on their mercenary ranks. A crack group of German and Scottish mercenaries were able to break through the Habsburg front lines in the early stages of the battle; however as the tide turned against them hordes of these soldiers were cut down by the Habsburg forces.[8] While money motivated many a mercenary their honor was placed above all.
Professionals
The mercenary soldiers of the Thirty Years’ War were professionals at work as long as they were paid. The threat of violence from mercenary forces became an issue at the tail end of the war. As the conflict had existed in a prolonged state for several decades many states began to feel their treasuries dry up. As the coffers of Sweden, Spain and the other combatants drew thin mercenaries would become hostile. The aftermath of missed or late payments were often acts of mutiny committed by the mercenaries against the states who did not pay them or acts of violence during the war.[9] Much like striking workers the threat of poverty drove mercenaries to commit extreme acts. One such act involved the town of Linden in Germany. Linden, a small village in Franconia, was met with the wrath of mercenaries under Swedish employ in the winter of 1634. The mercenary forces had demanded both food and wine from the village, which at the time consisted of no more than thirteen cottages. When the villagers refused, the mercenaries responded in kind by stealing their provisions and raping a woman, known as Frau Rosch, before their violence left the village uninhabited.[10] However, when paid these mercenaries relied not on the plunder of poor farmlands to continue their campaigning, but rather extensive systems of trade and contracts with suppliers for their weapons, their clothing and their food supplies.[11]
The mercenary is often forgotten in the annals of history. During the Thirty Years’ War they were an important part of the fighting forces of a multitude of Europe’s greatest armies. While they committed horrible acts of violence these men also gained the respect of important commanders such as Gustavus Adolphus. While the coming centuries would see their role in the armies of Europe reduced the Thirty Years’ War marked the peak of the mercenary.
What do you think of mercenaries in the Thirty Years’ War? Let us know below.
[1] Greengrass, Mark. Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648. Penguin Books, 523.
[2] Ibid., 525.
[3] Donagan, Barbara. War In England: 1642-1649. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 49.
[4] Wilson, P.H. The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 330.
[5] Ibid., 330.
[6] Maland, David. Europe at War: 1600-1650. London, Macmillan, 1980. 86.
[7] Ibid., 827-828.
[8] Wilson, P.H. The Thirty Years’ War. 547.
[9] Maland, David. Europe at War. 404.
[10] Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. The Bodley Head. 565.
[11] Greengrass, Mark. Christendom Destroyed. 111.
References
Davies, Norman. (2014). Europe: A History. The Bodley Head.
Donagan, Barbara. War in England: 1642-1649. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Gardiner, S. R. (2014). The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648. First Rate Publishers.
Greengrass, Mark. (2015). Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648. Penguin Books.
Maland, David. Europe at War, 1600-1650. London: Macmillan, 1980.
Parrott, David. The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Wilson, Peter H. (2011). The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
