Delving into the character of General Ambrose Burnside, the man whose facial hair lives on as “sideburns” in the vernacular, threatens to lose many readers from the start. Most Civil War enthusiasts would consider him a prime candidate to be named the worst Union general in the war and with some merit. And, no question, he made a series of wild miscalculations and poor judgments.
Lloyd Klein explains.
Ambrose Burnside, 1862 (on the left).
“All the world is a stage, but the play is badly cast.”
― Oscar Wilde
Burnside was actually a very talented man who was grossly miscast in the war. Baseball fans recognize that a pitcher who loses 20 games in a season must be thought of highly because a bad pitcher would never get the opportunity to keep losing; that may be a good analogy to keep in mind when reading about him. The commonly held view that he was always on hand to lose a battle will absolutely be demolished by this in-depth study, although some will not willingly part with that cherished myth.
His father had been a slave owner in South Carolina who freed his slaves and moved to Indiana. Ambrose graduated from West Point, served in garrison duty at the end of the Mexican War, served under Braxton Bragg in Nevada and California, and was the recipient of an Apache arrow through his neck in Las Vegas. He was promoted to first lieutenant and sent to duty in Rhode Island. There he resigned from the army, became commander of the state militia, got married, and went into business, with no expectation of seeing military service ever again. But you know, life can be funny sometimes; our destiny is often beyond our control.
Burnside relinquished his U.S. Army commission to fully dedicate himself to perfecting the Burnside carbine, a groundbreaking breech-loading firearm (as seen in the patent drawing). He ingeniously crafted a unique brass cartridge for this carbine, designed to hold both bullet and powder, with a notable absence of a primer. To load the weapon, users would open the breech block by manipulating the twin trigger guards, inserting the cartridge. Upon pulling the trigger, the hammer struck a separate percussion cap, creating a spark. A hole in the cartridge base ignited the black powder, with the conical cartridge expertly sealing the barrel-breech junction. Unlike many contemporary breech-loaders prone to gas leaks upon firing, Burnside's design triumphantly eliminated this issue.
President Buchanan's Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, entered into a substantial contract with the Burnside Arms Company to outfit a substantial portion of the Army, mainly cavalry, prompting Burnside to establish extensive manufacturing facilities. However, these plans were marred when allegations arose that Floyd accepted bribes to terminate the $100,000 contract with Burnside. This revolutionary concept took time for the military to grasp, and by the time its value was recognized, Burnside had already sold the patent. In 1857, the Burnside carbine triumphed in a competition at West Point, outclassing 17 other carbine designs. Nevertheless, government orders for these carbines were initially sparse. This changed with the outbreak of the Civil War, resulting in over 55,000 carbines being requisitioned for Union cavalrymen. It became the third most widely used carbine during the Civil War, surpassed only by the Sharps carbine and the Spencer carbine.
In 1858 he ran for Congress as a Democrat in Rhode Island and lost. Newly married and out of a job, he needed to find a way to support his young family. So, Burnside went west looking for a job, any job. And he was hired as the Treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Anyone who doubts that the Goddess of History doesn’t have a mordant sense of humor will find this coincidence a bit much. So, consequently, his new boss became George B. McClellan, and in his position, he began working directly with its corporate attorney, one Abraham Lincoln.
The Start of the Civil War
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a colonel in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry Regiment and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Notably, two companies of this regiment were armed with Burnside carbines. In less than a month, he advanced to brigade leadership within the Department of Northeast Virginia. His performance during the First Battle of Bull Run in July was unremarkable, but he temporarily assumed division command in lieu of the wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter.
And so suddenly, Ambrose Burnside, inventor, failed politician and businessman, Indian fighter, and fledgling railroad executive, found himself a brigadier general in the Army of the Potomac. Initially tasked with training troops in the nation's capital, his destiny took a sharp turn that autumn. Burnside was entrusted with leading three brigades within the North Carolina Expeditionary Force. Their mission: to seal the North Carolina coast to shipping as part of the naval blockade. Collaborating closely with maritime experts, Burnside orchestrated an impressive amphibious operation that indeed achieved an 80% closure of the coastline. His significant promotion to Major General on March 18, 1862, played a pivotal role in later events during the war. His brigades were officially amalgamated to form the IX Corps, and he earned recognition as one of the Union generals who contributed to Union victories.
1862
In a context where career professional soldiers ruthlessly vied for advancement, an extraordinary occurrence transpired after McClellan's Peninsula Campaign failure: Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac. He declined, citing his lack of experience in leading an army of that magnitude, resulting in John Pope assuming command. Still, the other generals looked up to him. In the lead-up to the Second Battle of Manassas, a fellow Major General, Fitz-John Porter, repeatedly conveyed messages to Burnside, questioning Pope's competence. Burnside, concurring with Porter's assessments, forwarded them to higher-ranking authorities, a crucial factor in Porter's later court-martial, during which Burnside testified in his defense.
And after the debacle of Second Manassas, once again he was offered command, and once again, Burnside declined, citing his inexperience as the reason. He acknowledged his shortcomings as a military officer. President Lincoln pressured him on several occasions, but Burnside stood firm in his belief that he wasn't capable of leading such a sizable army, a belief ultimately vindicated by history. He repeatedly declined, saying, "I was not competent to command such a large army as this."
During the Battle of Antietam, Burnside assumed command of the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, overseeing the I Corps and his own IX Corps at the outset of the Maryland Campaign. However, McClellan separated these two corps during the battle, stationing them at opposite ends of the Union battle line and restoring Burnside's authority solely over the IX Corps. Burnside, implicitly refusing to relinquish his control, operated as if the corps commanders were first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (who was killed at South Mountain) and subsequently Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, directing orders through them to the corps.
At Antietam, the fact that Burnside delayed his attack on the Union left flank until the afternoon, particularly in the context of the stone bridge over Antietam Creek, the Rohrback Bridge now known as Burnside Bridge, likely influenced the battle's outcome. A cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing the Rohrback, later Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough. Sears suggested in Landscape Turned Red that the problem was that Burnside felt he was demoted and was piqued. But its hard to imagine Burnside allowing a Union loss for that reason, and even harder to imagine that Lincoln would choose him to be the next Commander in Chief a month later if it were true.
The real story is far more complicated. McClellan sent his engineer to position Burnside but did so incorrectly. Rodman’s small force has to move on its own to Snavely’s Ford, which was the best downstream ford; this was too far away at this point for an alternative route. The idea that the Union forces could have waded across the Antietam Creek was based on a post war remark by out old friend, Henry Kyd Douglas. It was picked up by historians over the 20th Century, including Catton, who used it to make Burnside appear incompetent. The best guess is that it was not true, that there was just one ford, and it was far from ideal for a cross-river crossing under fire. This very complicated story is told in these two links: https://www.historynet.com/sculpting-a-scapegoat-ambrose-burnside-at-antietam/ and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/assault-on-burnsides-bridge-at-the-battle-of-antietam/In the afternoon, Burnside's corps advanced against the Confederate right. At this critical moment, Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry McClellan might have secured victory if Burnside had acted differently. The cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough.
Burnside failed to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area and failed to exploit numerous easily accessible fording sites beyond the reach of Confederate forces. Instead, his troops were repeatedly forced into assaulting the narrow bridge, under the threat of Confederate sharpshooters on elevated terrain. McClellan, growing impatient, sent couriers to urge Burnside forward, even ordering, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." Despite this, Burnside didn't receive reinforcements, and the battle ended with missed opportunities. He further increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders.” The IX Corps eventually broke through, but the delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended.
Astonishingly, Burnside was offered command once more, despite his poor performance at Antietam.
Fredericksburg
Lincoln issued the order to remove McClellan on November 5, 1862, and on November 7, 1862, he selected Burnside to take his place. Burnside reluctantly complied with this directive, the third such instance in 1862, partly due to the courier's message that if he declined, command would instead be given to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, whom Burnside had an aversion to. It is instructive that he was offered this position and compelled to accept the third time given his own reluctance and, as history shows, his lack of preparation for the position. The fact is, no one in the Union Army had ever been prepared for such a role, and he was as accomplished as anyone in senior leadership.
Burnside on taking command moved his army from near Culpepper to Falmouth within a few days, a pretty monumental achievement. His plan was to then make a direct attack on the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia, avoiding Lee’s forces who were then in Culpepper. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed. He had ordered pontoon bridges from DC, but they were not delivered for weeks by the Quartermaster Department. General Halleck acknowledged afterward that he had opposed the movement and had not hurried their supply. The loss of time allowed Lee to position Longstreet on Marye’s Heights.
The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. By comparison, Pickett’s charge had 6000 Confederate casualties of 12,500 engaged, or close to 50%. Malvern Hill had 8000-9000 casualties on both sides combined, or about 16-18%. Numbers aside, these figures tell us that attacks of entrenched or prepared positions in the Civil War were challenging, and the technology didn’t exist to overcome those odds.
It is so obvious to us, 160 years later, that this was a disastrous move. It wasn’t obvious to Burnside. Burnside’s decision to escalate the initial diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg was a costly and unsuccessful move. Why smart people make decisions that don’t work out can be perplexing, and General Burnside at Fredericksburg gives us a chance to see how external pressure and internal self-delusion impact our choices.
Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.
Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain. These factors, combined with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the desire for a breakthrough, led Burnside to escalate what was originally intended as a diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights. I think none of the Civil War commanders understood that artillery had changed war a great deal and still believed that brute force attacks could overcome any defense; see Lee at Gettysburg, Grant at Cold Harbor. I also think Burnside was not a strategic genius and had exactly one plan in mind, and when it failed, he panicked.
Several of Burnside's subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations about the frontal assault on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Franklin, in particular, was critical of the plan and argued against it. He believed that attacking Marye's Heights directly would result in high casualties and was unlikely to succeed. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks.
The Battle of Fredericksburg is not a moment of shining glory for General Burnside. The battle and the subsequent ill-fated offensive led to Burnside's officers voicing vehement complaints to the White House and the War Department, citing his incompetence. Burnside attempted a Spring offensive, only to encounter hindrances stemming from poor planning and organization. The Spring Offensive was known as the Mud March. Although conceptually clever, it was highly impractical for January in Virginia. Burnside's plan was quite similar to Hooker's strategy in the Battle of Chancellorsville, aiming to outmaneuver Lee using the upriver fords on the Rappahannock. Burnside intended to execute this with his cavalry, which had thus far delivered lackluster performances in the war. However, heavy rains in January transformed the roads into impassable mud, forcing the plan's abandonment
After Fredericksburg
Burnside offered his resignation, but Lincoln declined, proposing that there might still be a role for him within the army. Consequently, Burnside was reinstated as the head of the IX Corps and dispatched to command a relatively inactive department, a quiet region with limited activity. Lincoln's rationale was that Burnside couldn't get into significant trouble there. However, he swiftly found himself embroiled in a major political controversy.
Burnside was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which encompassed the states of Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois. Burnside issued a series of orders in a region with divided loyalties and sentiments, seeking to suppress "the expression of public sentiments against the war or the Administration." General Order No. 38, in particular, declared that "any person found guilty of treason will be tried by a military tribunal and either imprisoned or banished to enemy lines." On May 1, 1863, Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent opponent of the war, held a large public rally in Mount Vernon, Ohio in which he denounced President Lincoln as a "tyrant" who sought to abolish the Constitution and set up a dictatorship. Burnside had dispatched several agents to the rally who took down notes and brought back their "evidence" to the general, who then declared that it was sufficient grounds to arrest Vallandigham for treason. This led to the arrest and trial of Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent war opponent, further fueling political discord. A military court tried him and found him guilty of violating General Order No. 38, despite his protests that he was simply expressing his opinions in public. Vallandigham was found guilty of violating General Order No. 38, and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war. This turned him into a martyr by antiwar Democrats. Lincoln had to extricate the entire Republican administration from the fallout that Burnside had produced.
Lincoln and Grant faced a dilemma concerning Burnside, pondering whether he posed a greater hindrance as a general in the field or in political administration. Initially, he was dispatched to relieve Knoxville, a relatively manageable task since only 2,300 troops opposed him. However, it still necessitated the return of all three brigades from Knoxville to force the Cumberland Gap's surrender. The strategic intent of the Knoxville campaign was to prevent Burnside's reinforcement of the besieged Federal forces at Chattanooga. Longstreet’s movement forced Burnside back into the defensive works in Knoxville. Burnside effectively outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and successfully reached safety in Knoxville, where he endured a brief siege until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. It should be noted that General Burnside, widely seen as incompetent by modern enthusiasts, defeated Longstreet, widely seen as stellar, in this one-against-one campaign. There were extenuating circumstances, such as favorable terrain and supply routes, of course; but that is history. Longstreet then began a siege but it wasn’t very effective. After the first week, Longstreet learned of Bragg’s defeat at Chattanooga. Longstreet realized that time was not on his side, so he ordered an assault a few days later, but it failed miserably. Then, General Longstreet, who had bested him at Marye's Heights, launched an attack, preventing disaster despite being besieged. Grant sent Sherman to assist, but Longstreet had already withdrawn to Virginia. Longstreet's siege ended when Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman led the Army of the Tennessee to Knoxville, entered the city, and relieved Burnside. Longstreet withdrew his men and later rejoined Gen. Robert E. Lee’s command in Virginia.
Later, Grant, thinking he could better monitor Burnside in the east, brought him back to Virginia. Unfortunately, Burnside's performance at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House and later at the Battle of the Crater was subpar.
During the Overland Campaign, Burnside's actions were less than stellar. At the Wilderness, timely attacks over three days could have secured victory, but Burnside failed to launch them. On the second day, had this union general moved rapidly when ordered (or even at all), AP Hill’s corps might have been destroyed. But once again, he was too slow to recognize the potential.
The blame for the Union's failure at the Battle of the Crater initially fell on Burnside, but it was later lifted. Burnside had been ordered to change the attacking troops at the last minute by Meade. General Ambrose Burnside was the corps leader of the Union assault. He was relieved of command for the final time for this failure. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's division of black soldiers sustained very high casualties, perhaps because the Confederates refused to accept them as prisoners when they tried to surrender. He and General James H. Ledlie were drinking rum throughout the battle in a bunker behind the lines. A division of United States Colored Troops under Ferrero trained to lead the assault. The plan was for one brigade to go left of the crater and the other to the right. A regiment from both brigades was to rush perpendicular to the crater. Then, the remaining force was to seize the Jerusalem Plank Road just 1,600 feet behind the line.
But the day before, Meade ordered Burnside not to use the black troops in the lead assault. Instead, Ledlie’s division was chosen but no one told them what to do once the explosion occurred. Meade did not let them charge because he thought if it failed then it would receive political backlash in the north and only prove Lincoln's message as false. He was aligning military goals with political ones. The USCT instead charged behind the lead troops. Tactically, Union troops entered the crater instead of going around it. There, they were trapped in a hole with no support on the flanks. The ANV began shooting surrendering troops, perhaps due to racial animus. Ledlie was forced to resign by Meade and Grant.
Post-war Accomplishments
Burnside exhibited his intelligence and abilities in all of his positions after the war. He was elected Governor and later served as a US Senator from Rhode Island, chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He even attempted to mediate an end to the Franco-Prussian War.
It is remarkable that as accomplished as he was both before and after the war, his legacy among Civil War enthusiasts is so diminished. Grant remarked that Burnside was "unfitted" for army command, a sentiment shared even by Burnside himself. It should be recognized that Grant fired handfuls of generals during the war who did not live up to his standards, but he always kept Burnside around. Despite his affable personality and diverse talents, Burnside's Civil War decisions showcased his weakest contributions to history. However, astute historians recognize his deeper well of aptitude.
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