The first battle of the Overland Campaign, known as The Battle of the Wilderness, occurred from May 5-7, 1864. General Grant devised a strategic plan to have all Union armies attack simultaneously, preventing General Lee from transferring troops and resources between theaters as he had done in 1863.He would also have all of the eastern armies move toward Richmond: General Butler from the southeast, and General Sigel from the west. Grant recognized that President Lincoln needed concrete evidence of a victorious war in order to secure re-election, so he assured him that regardless of the battle's outcome, he would not retreat. Although only General Sherman managed to execute a successful simultaneous offensive campaign, it proved sufficient to achieve the desired outcome of Grant's plan.
Lloyd W Klein explains.
Major-General Wadsworth fighting in the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness
Situated south of the Rapidan River in Virginia, The Wilderness encompasses parts of Spotsylvania County and Orange County. Its boundaries extend to Spotsylvania Court House in the south and the Mine Run tributary of the Rapidan River in the west. This densely forested region consists of numerous trees and secondary growths, rendering visibility nearly impossible even to this day. Additionally, the dirt roads within the area were particularly treacherous when wet, making it extremely challenging to coordinate command and control as well as large troop movements.
Grant decided to to establish his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Major General George G. Meade. While Grant focused on overall strategy, Meade assumed responsibility for tactical matters. The battle unfolded just a few miles west of the Chancellorsville battle site,
The Strategy
In the early months of 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in a standoff along the Rapidan River in central Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate forces, was well aware of the numerical and technological superiority of the Union army led by General Ulysses S. Grant. In order to mitigate these disadvantages, Lee strategically chose the Wilderness, a densely wooded area, as the battleground. This terrain would limit the effectiveness of Grant's artillery and provide cover for the smaller Confederate force. Lee positioned his troops behind earthworks along the Rapidan River, with the intention of bringing reinforcements from the rear if necessary. Additionally, Lee's cavalry, under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart, patrolled the surrounding countryside to gather intelligence on Grant's movements.
Grant was fully aware of Lee's defensive strategy and his intention to defend Richmond, the Confederate capital. Rather than attempting to outmaneuver Lee, Grant devised a plan to push his army through the challenging forested terrain and into open ground as quickly as possible. His ultimate objective was to capture Richmond and bring an end to the war. Grant understood that time was of the essence and aimed to advance relentlessly until he reached his goal.
Both generals were keenly aware of each other's intentions and strategies. Lee relied on his scouts and cavalry to provide timely information about Grant's movements, while Grant aimed to swiftly maneuver his army towards Richmond. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation between the Union and Confederate forces in the heart of Virginia.
The Union Army commenced its movement from its base in Culpeper County, where it had concluded its operations at Mine Run the previous fall, and proceeded southward towards the fords of the Rapidan River. At daybreak on May 4, Union cavalry successfully crossed Germanna Ford, dispersing Confederate cavalry pickets and facilitating the construction of two pontoon bridges by Union engineers. Subsequently, General Gouverneur K. Warren's Fifth Corps crossed the ford and ventured into the thick woodland. General Lee had anticipated that General Grant would employ the Germanna and Ely Fords. Grant followed this anticipated course of action relying on speed rather than stealth. However, the advance of some Union units was slow, resulting in the creation of gaps. These occurrences provided Lee with an advantageous position at the outset.
Day 1: May 5
Meade, his commander, instructed Warren to strike the Confederates first, but Warren hesitated due to concerns about attacking the impenetrable thickets. He anticipated difficulties in maintaining a battle line and believed that a piecemeal movement would negate his numerical superiority. While Warren and Meade debated the advantages of an attack along the Orange Turnpike, General Richard S. Ewell's Confederate corps halted three miles west of Wilderness Tavern and constructed formidable earthworks on the western edge of Saunders Field. Reluctantly, Warren positioned his corps astride the turnpike.
Saunders Field, a 50-acre clearing near the Orange Turnpike, stood out amidst the forested surroundings. When Ewell encountered the Union Army, his orders were to engage the enemy and impede their progress, but to avoid a full-scale battle until Longstreet's corps arrived the next day. Ewell positioned his corps across the turnpike along the higher, western edge of the field, providing his troops with a clear field of fire.
As Warren emerged from the woods and entered the field, he was met by Ewell's waiting troops who initially held the advantage. Despite heavy casualties, the Federals managed a momentary breakthrough, but Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade swiftly sealed the breach. The arrival of the Union Sixth Corps expanded the front, resulting in further casualties.
Soon after, Union Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford observed another enemy column at the William Chewning farm headed east on the Orange Plank Road toward its intersection with Brock Road. Due to the limited maneuverability in the area, the crossroads of these two main roads became the focal point of the Union's defensive line. The significance of this intersection is depicted in the accompanying photograph. The potential threat posed by the Confederates was grave, as their occupation of this area could have effectively divided Warren's corps on the turnpike from Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps, which had moved further south after passing Warren. Recognizing the urgency, Meade promptly dispatched Brig. Gen. George W. Getty's Sixth Corps division to seize control of the crossroads. Around 4:00 p.m., Getty's men launched an attack, forcefully advancing through the dense thickets and engaging in close-range combat against Gen. A.P. Hill's corps. Hancock soon arrived to provide support to Getty's forces, and the battle continued until nightfall.
The conditions under which the soldiers fought were extraordinarily challenging. Visibility was severely limited, with a range of no more than 50 feet. This made it impossible to effectively communicate and issue commands. Both sides struggled to maintain a coherent line, often breaking up into smaller groups. The dense underbrush and thorny briars caused numerous scratches to the soldiers' faces and tore their clothing. The smoke generated by gunpowder further hindered their vision, while fires ignited by exploding shells rapidly spread through the dry woods, transforming the Wilderness into a blazing inferno for all the trapped troops. The unfavorable terrain greatly hindered the progress of the two-day battle, reducing it to a series of brutal skirmishes. Additionally, fires that started in the woods proved to be particularly devastating, claiming the lives of many wounded soldiers who were unable to be rescued.
Day 2: May 6
Hancock’s Federals resumed the offensive the next morning. A.P. Hill’s tired troops were forced back, and the Confederate line seemed on the verge of collapse. At this critical juncture, Brig. Gen. John Gregg's Texas Brigade from Gen. James Longstreet's corps arrived just in the nick of time. Longstreet's timely entrance onto the battlefield prevented a potential disaster and immediately launched an attack on Hancock's corps. Two flank attacks—by Longstreet south of the Plank Road and by Gordon north of the turnpike –carried the line and forced the Union behind breastworks.
Longstreet's arrival after an arduous 28-mile march in a single day proved to be a pivotal moment for the Confederate army. His counterattack played a crucial role in saving the day. The nature of Longstreet's movement involved executing a flank attack on Hancock's left flank, utilizing an unfinished railroad bed located within a densely wooded forest. This strategic maneuver took advantage of the element of surprise, as the railroad bed was not marked on local maps. Longstreet's attack was meticulously planned and well-prepared, showcasing his tactical brilliance. By exploiting an old roadbed constructed for a defunct railroad, his forces were able to stealthily navigate through the heavily wooded area undetected, ultimately launching a powerful flanking assault.
Longstreet's men advanced along the Orange Plank Road, pursuing the Union II Corps. Within a span of two hours, their persistent assault nearly drove the II Corps from the field. Longstreet devised innovative tactics to overcome the challenging terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades using heavy skirmish lines. This approach allowed his troops to maintain a continuous barrage of fire on the enemy while simultaneously making themselves elusive targets. The effectiveness of Longstreet's flanking maneuver was evident in the words of Hancock himself, who, after the war, acknowledged the impact of Longstreet's tactics by stating, "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."
General Longstreet had returned to the ANV after being deployed the previous autumn in the Western Theater. Although he had hoped for an independent command, Despite his hopes for an independent command, his deployment in the Western Theater had not yielded the desired result. While his crucial attack at Chickamauga had showcased his military prowess, his subsequent failure to defeat Burnside at Knoxville and his ongoing disagreements with General Braxton Bragg had cast a shadow over his future prospects. General Lee had proposed that Longstreet join forces with Johnston and Beauregard for a joint offensive into Kentucky. However, Bragg, who had now assumed the role of Davis’s military advisor, swiftly rejected this proposition. Consequently, Longstreet found himself once again serving as a corps commander in Virginia.
As Lee's plan to utilize his 14,000 men as an attacking force had proven successful thus far, the next crucial step was to deliver a decisive attack. Longstreet attempted to identify the optimal location on a reconnaissance mission. However, his efforts were met with a tragic turn of events. The treacherous terrain posed numerous challenges, and it was amidst this difficult backdrop that Longstreet fell victim to friendly fire, sustaining severe wounds to his neck and shoulder. Despite being cautioned against proceeding further, his unwavering determination to strategize the winning attack propelled him forward. Tragically, this ill-fated mission resulted in the immediate death of General Micah Jenkins, who was struck in the head during the same ambush. Its an astounding coincidence that this happened just 4 miles down the road from where Stonewall Jackson was ambushed; this section of Wilderness is dark and silent, as shown in the photo.
Mahone’s 12th Virginia was returning to the Orange Plank Road when a brush fire caused them to take a different route that led them across the road in a different location than other members of their brigade. Longstreet and his staff, unknowingly, passed in the middle of Mahone’s men. In a tragic turn of events, a section of soldiers, either lying prone or kneeling, mistook the approaching figures for the enemy and opened fire. As a result, Jenkins, one of Longstreet's men, was fatally struck in the head, while two others also lost their lives.
In his memoirs, Longstreet describes the bullet as passing through his throat and right shoulder, causing his right arm to immediately go limp at his side. Despite the excruciating pain and the presence of blood in his mouth and throat, Longstreet managed to issue orders and communicate with a whispery voice. The conventional narrative suggests that the bullet entered from the front as Longstreet was riding towards his troops. However, this explanation fails to account for the long-term loss of movement in his arm and his persistent hoarseness. A more plausible explanation lies in the possibility of a nerve injury originating from his back, caused by the soldiers who were either kneeling or lying prone behind him. The bullet then passed through his throat as it exited, providing a more coherent explanation for the observed medical facts.
The coordination of attacks on the Union line along the Brock Road was hindered by Longstreet's inability to command. Despite advising Lee to continue the attack, Lee chose to delay the movement until his forces could be realigned. Unfortunately, this delay provided the Union defenders with ample time to reorganize and strengthen their position. As the Confederates moved forward through the heavy brush, their lack of cohesion became evident, and they encountered obstructions in front of the Union line. It was at this point that Hancock's experienced troops successfully halted the Confederate advance. Although the Confederates briefly gained a foothold and planted their flags on the burning works, the Union troops swiftly counterattacked and reclaimed their position. According to General Alexander’s memoirs: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan."
On May 6th, AP Hill's corps, which had borne the brunt of the previous day's fighting, was not prepared for a repeat onslaught at dawn. Despite the advice of Generals Heth and Wilcox, Hill believed that Longstreet's presence on the field was necessary before he could continue the engagement. But Longstreet was late; when Hancock launched another attack, only Lt Col William Poague's artillery was holding the line, but it was beginning to falter. However, the entry of a Texas brigade from Longstreet's corps onto the field provided a glimmer of hope.
Knowing that a counterattack would save the day, Lee himself prepared to lead it but was stopped by the Texas men, who shouted “Lee to the rear”.
The potential destruction of AP Hill's corps might have occurred if General Ambrose Burnside had acted more swiftly upon receiving orders to advance. However, once again, Burnside failed to recognize the significance of the situation and did not launch an attack that could have altered the course of the battle.
Brig Gen John B Gordon's prominence within the Confederate command structure was solidified during this particular battle. On May 5, his brigade effectively counterattacked and repelled a Federal advance at Saunders Field. The following day, Gordon executed a highly successful flank attack, resulting in the capture of numerous Union soldiers and two Union generals. Although Gordon had initially proposed this maneuver at dawn, his superiors dismissed his suggestion. Positioned on the left flank of the Confederate line, Gordon's scouts informed him that his brigade extended well beyond the right end of the Union line. To confirm this report, Gordon personally conducted a reconnaissance. Eventually, Lee granted Gordon permission to launch his attack that afternoon. According to Gordon's memoirs, had he been authorized earlier, a flank attack could have enveloped the Union right flank. However, Generals Early and Ewell delayed due to incorrect intelligence suggesting that the Union IX Corps was reinforcing the area, and they were reluctant to engage with an outnumbered force.
The attack by Gordon gave rise to a couple of intriguing anecdotes of the war. When a staff officer urged Grant to retreat, claiming that Lee would cut him off from the ford, Grant became angry, telling the officer that he was tired of always hearing what Lee was going to do. He ordered the man to stop thinking about Lee and start thinking about what they were going to do. It has also been rumored that the tough day of fighting caused Grant to become emotional that evening alone in his tent.
Day 3: May 7
Both opposing forces entrenched and awaited an attack from the other army. Having come close to breaking each other's lines the previous day, both armies seemed satisfied with adopting a defensive stance. Recognizing the futility of further assaults in the Wilderness, Grant issued orders for Meade's army to withdraw under the cover of darkness. Additionally, Grant instructed Union engineers to dismantle the pontoon bridges at Germanna Ford. Despite enduring heavy casualties over the course of two days of intense fighting, Grant made the decision not to launch another attack or retreat. Instead, he opted to swiftly proceed towards Spotsylvania Court House, effectively positioning himself between Richmond and Lee's army.
Implications
The Union army experienced nearly 18,000 casualties in the Wilderness, almost twice as many as Lee’s army. But Grant’s troops were not dispirited. Previous Union commanders, Hooker and Burnside, had chosen to retreat after sustaining significant losses in battles against Lee. Therefore, the continued advancement of Union troops brought a sense of jubilation among the Federal forces.
Who won the battle? This question is essentially unanswerable. Neither side left the battlefield in retreat. Both armies had a very high rate of casualties in just 48 hours (Union 15.0% with 17,666 (2,246 killed) of 118,00 engaged; Confederate 16.7% with 11,033 (1,477 killed) of 66,140 engaged). Tactically, it was probably a draw. Strategically, Grant was able to advance, but Lee had prevented him from reaching Richmond. Indecisive is probably the best descriptor.
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Further Reading
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/wilderness
· Gordon C Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.
· John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904.
· Stecker, RM BlachleyJD. Arch Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg. 2000;126(3):353-359.https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaotolaryngology/fullarticle/404442
· Steere E The Wilderness Campaign. Mechanicsburg, Pa Stackpole Books1960;
· Longstreet J From Manassas to Appomattox. 2nd ed. New York, NY Da Capo Press Inc, 1992.
· Sorrel GM Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer. New York, NY Konecky & Konecky, 1994.
