Culp's Hill is a frequently overlooked area of the Gettysburg battle and played a crucial role in the Union's victory. Situated about three-quarters of a mile south of Gettysburg, it formed the tip of a fishhook-shaped series of hills and ridges that made up the Union lines. The significance of Culp's Hill lay in its strategic location. It guarded the main Union supply line on the Baltimore Pike and protected the rear and right flank of the Union army positioned on Cemetery Ridge.
Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened at Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field.
If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here.
Scene behind the breastworks on Culp’s Hill, morning of July 3rd 1863. By Edwin Forbes.
Cemetery and Culp’s Hills
The configuration of the Union lines, with Cemetery Hill at its center, provided a strong defensive position known as the "fishhook." This layout allowed the Union forces to benefit from interior lines, making it easier to reinforce and support different sections of the line. Cemetery Hill, situated behind the town, offered a natural defense as attacks could not be launched directly from the streets. To reach Cemetery Hill, attackers had to either capture Culp's Hill on the East or the northern section of Cemetery Ridge on the west. General Lee's strategy relied on attacking the flanks, while the Union's strategy focused on defending these hills to protect the center.
Culp's Hill itself consists of two distinct peaks, an upper hill and a lower hill, separated by a narrow saddle. The higher peak, densely covered in trees, rises to an elevation of 630 feet above sea level, while the lower peak is approximately 100 feet shorter. The eastern slope of Culp's Hill descends towards Rock Creek, while the western slope leads to a saddle with Stevens Knoll. This topography provided natural advantages for defenders, making it challenging for attackers to gain a foothold on the hill.
July 1st
Following the retreat of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps regrouped at Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were positioned to safeguard the withdrawal. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s division hurried to Culp’s Hill to protect the right flank, and additional reinforcements were on their way. By 4:30 p.m., 500 troops from the 7th Indiana and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps had arrived, with Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger’s 1st Division taking up position behind Cemetery Hill. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm, adding 8,000 fresh troops to the Union forces, bringing their total strength to around 20,000 soldiers combined with the XI Corps. The Federals, in addition to the reinforcements, had managed to salvage most of their artillery pieces during the retreat, with almost 40 guns joining Smith’s six guns atop Cemetery Hill.
Ewell's missed opportunity to seize Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often regarded as a critical moment in the battle. When Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's third division arrived, he was instructed to take the hill if it was not already occupied. However, Johnson hesitated and decided against the attack, sending a small party to scout the area. This party encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, leading to a skirmish that forced them to retreat. By 7 pm, Culp's Hill was well-defended, with the Iron Brigade and other units in position, making it a challenging target for the Confederates.
Pfanz concluded that Ewell had made the best decision, citing the failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk, but was it as prepared at 5 pm? It was less well-defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, General Gordon wrote in his memoirs that he was ready, but his men had seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. Moreover, the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.
Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable Given the discretionary and inherently contradictory order he received from General Lee, General Ewell chose not to attempt the assault. The three main reasons most often given include: 1) the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, as his men had marched a great distance and were exhausted 2) the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg immediately to the north, and 3) that after the battle at Barlow’s Knoll and the attacks through the town, there had been enough casualties and mixing of lines to severely weaken command and control. He might also have realized that although he might have been able to take Culps Hill, he couldn’t hold it with a single division after a counterattack from East Cemetery Hill.
And surely that would require a general engagement. It’s possible that Ewell may have felt that it was practicable to take the hill, but did not see how he could do so without bringing on a general engagement. He only had 1 division on hand, it was getting dark, and he wasn't going to receive any backup in any attack. He wanted support and none was available.. However, Jubal Early opposed the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching the York Pike, and he sent the brigades of John B. Gordon and Brig. Gen. William "Extra Billy" Smith to block that perceived threat. "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was within an hour of arriving on the battlefield and Early urged waiting for Johnson's division to take the hill. After Johnson's division arrived via the Chambersburg Pike, it maneuvered toward the east of town in preparation to take the hill, but a small reconnaissance party sent in advance encountered a picket line of the 7th Indiana Infantry, which opened fire and captured a Confederate officer and soldier. The remainder of the Confederates fled and attempts to seize Culp's Hill on July 1 came to an end.
Although Ewell has been blamed for not aggressively pursuing the Union line on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, which left the Union on high ground, most military authorities and historians who have looked into the matter have pretty routinely concluded that Culp's Hill would not have been easy to capture on July 1st. Some historians say that it's 20/20 hindsight that Ewell could have easily pushed the Union line from the high ground; others say he was too timid. Stephen W. Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.
But, a real conundrum exists in whether or not Lee and Ewell were talking about the same hill. Lee was on Seminary Ridge and may have been looking at East Cemetery Hill while Ewell was at the base of Culp’s Hill. It’s unclear whether Lee & Ewell had a map that showed this.
Lost Cause Reinterpretation? Although the “If practicable order” story is a central part of Gettysburg lore, appearing in many books about the Civil War — it is also greatly negative against Ewell, and perhaps purposely so. The story may have been concocted by Lee’s apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell. In truth, Lee sent no definitive orders directing Ewell to pursue the enemy when the Union lines broke in front of the town, and Ewell was not benumbed by indecision when he defeated them in the town and on Barlow’s Knoll.
It was not until after the war, and Lee’s death, that Lost Cause supporters sought to explain how the infallible general was defeated at Gettysburg. Confederate veterans like John B. Gordon, Isaac Trimble, and Randolph H. McKim insinuated in their postwar writings that it was Ewell’s timidity that had cost Lee the victory. Postwar proponents of the Lost Cause movement, assigned to Ewell's staff during the battle, criticized him bitterly to deflect any blame for losing the battle on Robert E. Lee. Part of their argument was that the Federal soldiers were demoralized by their defeat earlier in the day. McKim’s 1915 article in The Southern Historical Society Papers stated. “Here then we find still another of General Lee’s lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell, failing at a critical moment to recognize what ought to be done,” he wrote. “Had the advance on Cemetery Hill been pushed forward promptly that afternoon we now know beyond any possible question that the hill was feebly occupied and could have been easily taken, and Meade would have been forced to retreat.”
Walter H. Taylor, Lee’s former aide, also sided with the anti-Ewell faction in his memoir “Four Years With General Lee.” Taylor wrote that Ewell voiced no objection to the order he brought from Lee to take the high ground “if possible,” and that he returned to Lee under the impression Ewell would attack.
But there is another side to the story. Maj. Campbell Brown, Ewell’s stepson, and aide, observed that the “discovery that this lost us the battle is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten.” And while Taylor’s story became an important part of the controversy, Brown was adamant that he never brought such orders. In an 1885 letter to Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, the former chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac, Brown wrote, “I say broadly that Col. Taylor’s account of this battle is utterly worthless — that he carried no such order to Gen. Ewell ... I do not impugn his veracity but his memory has been trusted and has deceived him.”
Major General Isaac Trimble, who was attached on special duty to Ewell’s command during the battle, was among those who tried to dismiss Lee’s warning. Writing for the Southern Historical Society (SHS) years after both Lee and Ewell had died, Trimble recalled his attempt to persuade Ewell to attack:
“The battle was over and we had won it handsomely. General Ewell moved about uneasily, a good deal excited, and seemed to me to be undecided about what to do next. I approached him and said: "Well, General, we have had a grand success; are you not going to follow it up and push our advantage?"
He replied that General Lee had instructed him not to bring on a general engagement without orders and that he would wait for them.
I said, "That hardly applies to the present state of things, as we have fought a hard battle already, and should secure the advantage gained". He made no rejoinder but was far from composure. I was deeply impressed with the conviction that it was a critical moment for us and made a remark to that effect.
As no movement seemed immediate, I rode off to our left, north of the town, to reconnoiter, and noticed conspicuously the wooded hill northeast of Gettysburg (Culp's), and a half mile distant, and of an elevation to command the country for miles each way, and overlooking Cemetery Hill above the town. Returning to see General Ewell, who was still under much embarrassment, I said, "General, There," pointing to Culp's Hill, "is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied, as it ought to be by us or the enemy soon. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here." He said: "Are you sure it commands the town?" [I replied,] "Certainly it does, as you can see, and it ought to be held by us at once." General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped.”
— Isaac R. Trimble, "The Battle and Campaign of Gettysburg." Southern Historical Society Papers 26 (1898).
Observers at the scene later reported that the "impatient reply" was, "When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it." They also stated that Trimble threw down his sword in disgust and stormed off.
Did this happen as it is stated? No one knows. Trimble was certainly upset that he was without a command on July 1. He would lose a leg and be captured 2 days later as he led a division in Pickett’s Charge, never to return to command. So, he certainly had plenty of scores to settle in 1898, 35 years later. Ewell never wrote or spoke about the matter in the 7 years he survived after the war.
July 2nd
On day 2, Lee’s plan was for Longstreet to attack north along Emmitsburg Turnpike to Cemetery Ridge combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp. But Longstreet's brigades of McLaw and Hood were delayed and then got tangled up at Little Round Top and Sickles in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. The attack ended at the south section of Cemetery Ridge.
An acoustic shadow at Gettysburg on Day 2 occurred when Ewell was supposed to attack Culp’s Hill when Longstreet’s artillery started firing, but he never heard it, allowing Meade to shift some of the forces on Culp’s Hill to his left flank.
Alpheus Williams led the 1st Division. Due to a mix-up in the command structure, General Williams played a prominent role because of a miscommunication between General Meade and Williams’s superior officer. This miscommunication resulted in Williams commanding the XII Corps. Meanwhile, Maj Gen Henry Slocum believed he was in command of the right wing, consisting of the 11th and 12th Corps, and considered Williams as merely the temporary corps commander of the 12th. Slocum held the Union right from Culp's Hill to across the Baltimore Pike. With Longstreet’s attack, Meade ordered relocating XII Corps from Culps Hill. Williams successfully convinced Meade to leave a single brigade on Culps Hill instead of relocating everyone, to defend the entire right flank. This suggestion ultimately saved the position when the Confederate left wing launched an attack that evening. Despite leading two days of intense fighting on the Union's extreme right, Williams did not receive any official credit, as Slocum was late turning in his report, and Meade already submitted his report to the war department.
Maj Gen George Sears Greene At about 6 pm July 2nd, Meade shifted almost the entire XII Corps from the Union right to strengthen the left flank. Culp’s Hill was weakened to defend Cemetery Ridge against Longstreet’s attack on the left. Brig Gen George S Greene was a brigade commander in the division of Maj. Gen. John W. Geary.. His lone brigade of 1,350 New Yorkers (five regiments) was left to defend a one-half-mile line on Culp's Hill when an entire Confederate division attacked. Fortunately, Greene, a civil engineer, had insisted that his troops construct strong field fortifications. These preparations proved decisive and his brigade held off multiple attacks for hours. With the shift of troops, Greene was left with 5 regiments (1350 troops) to defend ½ mile of front against an entire Confederate corps.
Maj Gen George Sears Greene, a 62-year-old with an impressive war record, found himself continually overlooked for promotion due to his age. On the morning of July 2, he insisted that his men entrench on Culp’s Hill. As a former West Point professor of mathematics and engineering, Greene approached the situation with a strategic mindset that differed from his counterparts. General John Geary and General Henry Slocum did not share Greene's belief in the importance of entrenching on Culp’s Hill, but Greene's foresight would prove crucial in the upcoming battle. Neither General John Geary, a former Mayor of San Francisco, nor General Henry Slocum thought it would matter much.Geary’s division covered the lower hill, near Spangler’s Spring, Kane’s brigade to his right; then on the upper hill was Greene’s division, then Candy’s brigade, followed by a portion of Ruger’s division.
As twilight fell, the fighting on the Union left came to a close, but the assault on the Union right flank continued. Gen. Richard Ewell's forces pressed on, with Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Confederate division launching an attack on Culp’s Hill. Greene's brigade, consisting of around 1,400 New Yorkers, faced off against Johnson's 4,700 Confederates. Greene understood the significance of holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting vital supply lines. Despite being outnumbered, Greene's men were charged with holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting its supply and communication artery, the nearby Baltimore Pike. Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men were dangerously overextended since they were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves.
Johnson's Confederate forces encountered fierce resistance as they charged up the slopes of Culp’s Hill. Greene's men had constructed formidable breastworks that halted the Confederate advance. Although Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart's brigade managed to outflank the Federal right flank, Greene's strategic positioning and defensive measures proved effective. The natural obstacles provided by the hill hindered the Confederate forces' progress, showcasing Greene's tactical acumen and the importance of his decision to entrench on Culp’s Hill.
At 7 pm with darkness gathering, Ewell initiated a significant infantry attack. He deployed three brigades, consisting of approximately 4,700 soldiers, from the division led by Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson. These troops crossed Rock Creek and ascended the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. However, Greene's entrenched position played a crucial role in the outcome of the assault. It allowed for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to come to his aid from the left. Wadsworth dispatched three regiments, while Howard on Cemetery Hill sent four, totaling around 750 men. Greene issued orders to hold the position under any circumstances. Despite four subsequent attacks made in the darkness, the line to his right remained threatened but was bolstered by additional reinforcements. The assaults persisted until 11 pm and resumed the following morning.
On the far right flank of the Union army, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York faced a formidable attack. Under intense pressure, the New Yorkers were compelled to retreat and occupy a traversing trench engineered by Greene, which faced south. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, they valiantly held their ground and safeguarded the flank. Unbeknownst to Steuart's men, due to the darkness and the heroic defense of Greene's brigade, they failed to realize that they had nearly unrestricted access to the Union army's primary communication line, the Baltimore Pike, which lay only 600 yards ahead. Ireland and his men averted a potential catastrophe.
Adelbert Ames, though not as famous as Chamberlain, who took over his position after his promotion, performed exceptionally well in the difficult circumstances at Gettysburg. During the intense attack led by Ewell on July 1, 1863, Ames, under the command of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, positioned his division in front of other units of the XI Corps on Barlow's Knoll. This exposed location was quickly overrun, leading to Barlow's capture and injury. Ames then took charge of the division and skillfully orchestrated a retreat through Gettysburg, eventually establishing a defensive position on Cemetery Hill. On July 2, during the second day of battle, Ames's division faced the brunt of the assault on East Cemetery Hill by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early but managed to hold the crucial position with support from neighboring units. Ames even engaged in hand-to-hand combat at one point. Following the battle, the soldiers of the 20th Maine honored Ames by presenting him with their battle flag as a symbol of their respect.
When the XII Corps returned to the right flank late that night, Confederate forces had taken over parts of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. Union soldiers, disoriented in the darkness, found enemy troops in the positions they had left. Gen. Williams instructed his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and await daylight. While Steuart's brigade managed to hold onto the lower heights precariously, Johnson's other two brigades were withdrawn from the hill to wait for daylight as well. Geary's troops came back to reinforce Greene, ensuring the defense of the position.
July 3rd.
The idea that the Copse was the focus was Batchelder’s incorrect and misleading attempt to bring attention to the area on the field where the attack went, not what was the real objective. Lee’s plan for both days 2 & 3 was the union center. That’s why a coordinated attack at Culp’s Hill was so necessary.
As General Lee stated in his official report, "The general plan was unchanged". The commanding position on the battlefield was Cemetery Hill. Piercing the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge was NOT the objective; Zeigler Grove was the large clump of trees in 1863, not the tiny thin saplings of the Copse. Those large trees were used for lumber many years after the battle and before John B. Bachelder's promoting and marking the high-water mark. This combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp was the real plan.
At dawn, five Union batteries opened fire on Steuart's brigade in the positions they had captured and kept them pinned down for 30 minutes before an attack by two of Geary's brigades. Simultaneously, the Confederates initiated their own attack, resulting in a prolonged engagement that lasted well into the morning, marked by three unsuccessful offensives by Johnson's troops. Despite facing relentless charges from Ewell's entire corps on the night of July 2nd and throughout the following morning of July 3rd, Greene managed to maintain control of the hill, fending off repeated assaults from 4,700 Confederate soldiers and securing the upper summit.
Although Greene's contributions to the Union victory at Gettysburg were significant, his heroism is often overshadowed by other more well-known figures from the battle. As the oldest surviving Union general and West Point graduate, Greene's legacy deserves to be remembered and honored. His monument on Culps Hill serves as a reminder of his bravery and dedication to the Union cause during one of the most critical battles of the Civil War.
In addition to Greene, General John Geary also played a pivotal role in the defense of Culps Hill. His bold counterattack on July 3, 1863, helped drive the Confederates from their positions and protected the Union Army's vital supply line, the Baltimore Pike. Geary's decisive actions at Culps Hill exemplified the courage and determination of Union forces in securing a crucial victory at Gettysburg.
East Cavalry Field
A classic cavalry engagement occurred four miles east of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 3, 1863. The strategic significance of the vacant field was heightened by the presence of two important roads: the York Pike to the north and the Hanover Road to the south. Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's Union cavalry, positioned on the Hanover Road, guarded the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Recognizing the threat posed by Confederate control of the Hanover Road and the intersecting Low Dutch Road to the Union's supply line along the Baltimore Pike, Gregg was reinforced by 1,900 Michigan cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer. Together, Gregg and Custer established a defensive line at the intersection, supported by 10 artillery pieces.
Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart led 5,000 Confederate cavalrymen to the northern side of the field. Contrary to previous teaching, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Stuart and Lee coordinated this assault with Pickett's Charge. Stuart's initial orders were to safeguard the flank of the Army of Northern Virginia, but he later admitted that his true intention was to launch a surprise attack on the enemy's rear. Stuart's charge was met with a countercharge by General Custer, effectively halting the assault. A subsequent charge led by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton with 2,000 mounted men was also repelled by Custer and the 7th Michigan regiment. Throughout the engagement, Gregg maintained his position. Although not strategically significant, the battle showcased the Union cavalry's growing prowess as a formidable fighting force, reminiscent of their performance at Brandy Station.
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Further Reading
· Himmer, Robert, "New Light on Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's Conduct on the First Day at Gettysburg". Gettysburg Magazine. 43, July 2010.
· Troy D Harman, “In Defense of Henry Slocum on July 1.”
http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay3.pdf
· Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command. New York: Scribner's, 1968.
· Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – June 13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007.
· Murray, R. L. A Perfect Storm of Lead, George Sears Greene's New York Brigade in Defense of Culp's Hill. Wolcott, NY: Benedum Books, 2000.
· Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.
· Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.
· Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-stand-east-cavalry-field
· John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.
Klein, Lloyd W,https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/
