General George Meade After the Battle of Gettysburg

Major General George G. Meade, a Union general during the American Civil War, has a reputation that has been historically criticized and misunderstood. Despite his important contributions at the Battle of Gettysburg and his cautious approach to warfare, he faced criticism for not aggressively pursuing and defeating Lee's army. Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major General George Gordon Meade.

During the war, Meade’s poor relationships with the press of his time and his secondary role under Grant further damaged his post-war reputation. However, modern appraisals recognize his competence and tactical acumen, including his appreciation for advancements in weapons technology. Meade's campaigns after Gettysburg, such as the Fall 1863 campaigns and the Overland Campaign, showcased his abilities as a general. While Grant's strategy ultimately led to victory, Meade played a crucial role in positioning his army to implement Grant's vision and should be credited for his contributions to the Union's success. It doesn’t help that the Overland Campaign was directed by Grant and that his victory at Gettysburg is typically considered a one-off.  The misunderstanding of the Williamsport circumstance will probably never be repaired.

Meade took command of the Union Army just a few days before the Gettysburg battle. General Meade commanded the Union Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Gettysburg, and is regarded as a competent and capable general. Meade's leadership both preparing for and during the Battle of Gettysburg is often praised. He successfully organized his forces and made critical decisions that ultimately led to a Union victory in that significant battle. His strategic positioning and defensive preparations played a crucial role in repelling numerous Confederate attacks.

He faced Lee in two other campaigns in Fall 1863. They did not succeed.  For this, given that Grant won the war the year after, he is universally, but unfairly, criticized as another Union general hack. Yet few Civil War aficionados have studied these campaigns in much detail.

Meade was a competent general and a modest man. He was thorough, methodical and cautious; his engineering background had made him someone who planned his maneuvers carefully.

However, Meade's tenure as the overall commander of the Army of the Potomac was not without criticism. Some argue that he missed opportunities for more aggressive action and failed to decisively pursue and defeat General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army after the Gettysburg victory. Additionally, his cautious approach in subsequent campaigns, such as the Mine Run Campaign, drew criticism from his superiors.

Overall, while Meade's leadership at Gettysburg demonstrated his ability as a competent general, opinions on his overall performance during the Civil War vary among historians and military experts. A great deal of the bias we today have against Meade has its origins in the Congressional Investigations after Gettysburg. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt

His post bellum reputation was damaged by his poor relationships with the press of his time, and his secondary role under Grant in 1864. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt. The damaging consequences of the controversy arising from Gettysburg with General Sickles has also been damaging. Modern appraisals recognize Meade’s important contributions at Gettysburg.  His tactics in the field were one of the few that showed an appreciation for the improvements in weapons technology in the war:  he entrenched when feasible and did not launch frontal assaults on fortified positions.

Gettysburg Aftermath: Williamsport

Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. The retreat required an active rear guard defense and was mainly carried out in the rain. ,Meade was widely criticized for failing to pursue aggressively and defeat Lee's army after Gettysburg. Although Lincoln and Stanton insisted on his following Lee, Meade may have been justified in not attempting a rapid pursuit.

At the three-day battle at Gettysburg, Meade's forces had suffered heavy casualties, and he needed time to regroup, reorganize, and resupply his army. The Army of the Potomac  (AoP) had sustained over 20,000 casualties including the loss of many of its best officers, including three corps commanders.  Attacking immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on his troops and risked further losses.

Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover,  there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Under the direction of Brig Gen John Imboden, during the Confederate retreat, the wagon trains with thousands of wounded soldiers were escorted back to Virginia., Lee had not reached the town until a couple of days after an important cavalry attack that Imboden defended against. Imboden successfully managed to retreat and gather his forces, despite harassment from Union cavalry, to create defensive works against Union assault. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When Lee arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.

Meade chose not  to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached. Attacking a well-entrenched enemy in this defensive position across a wide open field would have been a highly risky endeavor, potentially resulting in heavy casualties for Meade's forces.

Thirdly, Meade faced logistical challenges and supply issues. His army relied on a long and stretched supply line, and engaging in a major offensive action immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on the already taxed supply system. Meade needed time to replenish his ammunition, food, and other essential supplies before considering another large-scale attack.

Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover,  there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When he arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.

Expecting an attack, Brigadier General John D. Imboden set up defensive positions along the crest of a ridge about one-half mile from Williamsport on July 6. Arriving at Williamsport, Imboden found the pontoon bridge destroyed, and Federal cavalry attacked the wagon train of wounded. On July 6, 1863, the Potomac River flooding at Williamsport, Maryland, trapped Imboden's wagon train. He put together a defensive force that included an artillery battery and as many of the wounded who could operate muskets.

Late in the afternoon of July 6, 1863, Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General John Buford arrived east of Williamsport, flanking the town. Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick took a different route that took him down the main road.  At sundown Union Brigadier General George A. Custer and his Michigan "Wolverines" arrived to fight but were quickly withdrawn.

By July 7, Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden stopped Brig. Gen. John Buford's Union cavalry from occupying Williamsport and destroying Confederate trains. On July 6, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division drove two Confederate cavalry brigades through Hagerstown before being forced to retire by the arrival of the rest of Stuart's command.

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.

On July 16, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Meade chose not  to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached.

Congressional Investigation of Gettysburg

In a 1961 article, The Strange Reputation of General Meade, Edwin Coddington wrote that Sickles’ attacks on Meade “greatly contributed to an unfavorable opinion of him as a commanding general, which has persisted to this day.” Coddington concluded that, “Sickles’ persistence in continuing his feud long after Meade’s death in 1872 had deep and lasting effects on publicists and historians of the battle,” and that “Sickles achieved a large measure of success” in his campaign to sully Meade’s name.

When Meade denied a request by Sickles to return to command, Sickles sought revenge. In February 1864, he went before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a highly influential committee dominated by Radical Republicans, and gave distorted testimony that Meade had handled the army ineptly at Gettysburg—that the Union army had won a great victory despite Meade. Notably, Sickles alleged that on the battle’s second day Meade had been a coward, eager to retreat rather than fight.

The two most important witnesses against him were:

a) Major General Abner Doubleday supported Sickles’ egregious claims by testifying that Meade had played favorites in command assignments. Doubleday in particular was bitter that Meade had ignored army seniority and not promoted him to command of the 1st Corps after its commander, Maj. Gen. John Reynolds, was killed early on July 1—instead choosing Maj. Gen. John Newton as Reynolds’ replacement.

b) Hooker’s Chief of Staff, Daniel Butterworth, who Meade kept on during the battle of Gettysburg (remember, he had just 3 days to prepare!). Butterfield, a close friend of Sickles’ and Hooker’s, falsely testified about the claimed July 2 order to retreat. Sickles elevated his attack on Meade when he (or a close associate) penned an anonymous article by “Historicus” in the March 12, 1864, edition of The New York Herald, the nation’s largest newspaper. Historicus condemned Meade’s handling of Gettysburg while praising the brave and brilliant Sickles. The article claimed Meade had ordered his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Butterfield, to prepare an order of retreat on July 2, the battle’s second day. The Historicus piece set off a firestorm, and stories of Meade’s alleged inadequacies appeared in papers nationwide.

The Joint Committee’s Radical Republicans wanted “Fighting Joe” Hooker back in command of the Army of the Potomac. The committee’s leaders, Chairman Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, demanded Lincoln dismiss Meade even before he had an opportunity to testify. President Lincoln declined to order a Court of Inquiry. The president wanted Meade fighting Confederates, not a political conflict against a fellow general.

The Fall 1863 Campaigns

After the Battle of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee retreated back across the Potomac River to Virginia and concentrated behind the Rapidan River.  Early in September 1863, Lee dispatched two divisions of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's Corps to reinforce the Confederate Army of Tennessee for the Battle of Chickamauga. Meade knew that Lee had been weakened by the departure of Longstreet and wanted to take advantage. Meade advanced his army to the Rappahannock River in August, and on September 13 he moved the AoP forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan. Lee was occupying Culpeper, Virginia, following the Battle of Culpeper Court House. Meade planned to use his numerical superiority in a broad turning movement, similar to the one planned by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker in the Battle of Chancellorsville that spring.

A traditional interpretation of this campaign is that Lee, despite having lost Longstreet’s Corps to the west, nevertheless beat Meade in the Bristoe Campaign. The reality is that on September 24 the Union split its forces as well, sending the XI and XII Corps to the Chattanooga campaign in Tennessee. It is interesting that this critical fact is rarely mentioned. Instead, the importance of Bristoe is nearly always depreciated. Its failure is often portrayed as the reason Grant was brought east, because its shows Meade to be too conservative to win.

In fact, four battles took place: Auburn, Bristoe Station, Buckland Mills, and Rappahannock Station. Every one of these is south of Manassas. Two are not far from Chancellorsville and the location of the Wilderness.

Lee knew of the departing Union corps, and early in October he began an offensive sweep around Cedar Mountain with his remaining two corps, attempting to turn Meade's right flank. Meade, despite having superior numbers, did not wish to give battle in a position that did not offer him the advantage and ordered a withdrawal along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

Lee had been planning to go into winter quarters at Culpepper. Instead, he set up south of the Rapidan. In fact, the AoP occupied  Brandy Station and Culpepper that winter. Meade had escaped allowing a major battle in a disadvantageous location and Lee had lost ground. It was certainly inconclusive – because Meade saw the danger.

Lincoln and Stanton weren’t mollified by the lack of progress in the Bristoe Campaign and pressured Meade to do more. Meade responded by planning a march to strike the ANV south of the Rapidan. He had intelligence suggesting that Lee had made a miscalculation in his positioning. But an incredibly incompetent Union general and an outrageously courageous movement by a Confederate general saved the ANV after a brief but deadly conflict few appreciate. Traditional history suggests Meade was incompetent and ignores this action as having any importance, which is completely wrong: he almost had Lee trapped.

Meade actually planned a rapid movement just west of Chancellorsville and where the Wilderness would be the next Spring. In fact, the Union movements were in the same general vicinity.

Unfortunately, Maj. Gen. William H. French's III Corps got mired in fording the river at Jacob's Ford, causing traffic jams when they moved their artillery to Germanna Ford, where other units were attempting to cross.

Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division was marching along the Raccoon Ford Road to join Early when the head of Gen. French's III Corps made contact in the heavy wooded terrain along the Widow Morris Road. Johnson turned his division about and ordered what can only be described as a reckless double-envelopment assault against a mostly unseen enemy of unknown strength, throwing his 5,500 men against French and John Sedgwick's VI Corps (a combined 32,000).  The fact is, if Johnson had cleared the Widow Morris Road before the arrival of French and Sedgwick, or had been driven away in defeat, the 32,000 Federals could have marched behind Lee's left flank and into his rear.

This battle is called the Battle of Payne’s Farm. Theodore P. Savas, together with Paul Sacra of Richmond, Virginia, set out to locate and map the Payne's Farm battlefield in the early 1990s. Savas believed published articles and books had incorrectly located the fighting area and was determined to test his theory. Armed with extensive primary sources and battle reports, he and Sacra located what they believed was the field and, with the permission from several landowners, used metal detectors to prove it. Within a couple days Savas and Sacra had unearthed hundreds of artifacts, including bullets, a ramrod, bayonet socket, a partial harmonica, belt buckles, buttons, and much more.

Overland Campaign

Often in the telling of Grant’s brilliant strategy of 1864 and the Overland Campaign, one gets the impression that Meade had been so incompetent that he was starting almost from Washington, but the fact is, in early 1864, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia faced each other across the Rapidan River. It was there because Meade had placed it there, and had fought for it to be there.

In the spring of 1864 Meade’s authority was superseded by the appointment of Ulysses S. Grant as general-in-chief of all Union armies. Although he was still technically the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Meade acted as Grant’s subordinate for the rest of the war.

In this capacity, Meade participated in Grant’s aggressive Overland Campaign of 1864, in which the Union army absorbed staggering casualties. Meade took part in in the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. He was also instrumental in the prolonged Siege of Petersburg (June 1864-March 1865), which was launched after Meade’s early assaults on the city resulted in heavy Union casualties.

Meade and Grant

In 1864, Grant was appointed as the overall commander of the Union armies and placed his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Meade. Grant had a high regard for Meade's military abilities and acknowledged his successes, but there were instances where their working dynamics faced challenges.

Grant and Meade had a complex working relationship. Initially, there were some tensions and miscommunications between the two, but over time they developed a professional rapport and worked together effectively.

Meade sometimes felt that Grant did not fully appreciate his contributions and achievements. There were instances where the press assigned to the Army of the Potomac focused more on Grant's role in successes, while downplaying Meade's contributions. This caused frustration for Meade, as he felt he was not given the credit he deserved.

Despite occasional disagreements, Grant and Meade maintained a functional working relationship. They shared the goal of winning the war and coordinated their efforts to achieve military success.

Grant made his headquarters with Meade for the remainder of the war. Following an incident in June 1864, Meade disciplined reporter Edward Cropsey from The Philadelphia Inquirer. He falsely reported that  Meade had wanted to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness. All of the press assigned to the AoP agreed to mention Meade only in conjunction with setbacks. Meade apparently knew nothing of this arrangement, and the reporters giving all of the credit to Grant angered Meade.

Meade wrote to his wife:

“I had a visit today from General Grant, who was the first to tell me of the attack in the Times based upon my order expelling two correspondents. Grant expressed himself very much annoyed at the injustice done to me, which he said was glaring, because my order distinctly states that it was by his direction that these men were prohibited from remaining with the army. He acknowledged there was an evident intention to hold me accountable for all that was condemned and to praise him for all that was commendable.”

Nevertheless, Meade is frequently blamed for specific problems in the Overland Campaign. As the fighting reached Cold Harbor and Petersburg, Meade is blamed for not directing his men to scout properly prior to the former battle and failed to coordinate his corps properly in the opening stages of the latter. During the siege of Petersburg, Meade again erred altering the attack plan for the Battle of the Crater for political reasons. But it is known that Grant approved these plans.

Grant issued orders to Meade who in turn issued them to the army. 

Meade, despite his aggressive performance in lesser commands in 1862, had become a more cautious general and more concerned about the futility of attacking entrenched positions. Most of the bloody repulses his army suffered in the Overland Campaign were ordered by Grant, although the aggressive maneuvering that eventually cornered Lee in the trenches around Petersburg were Grant's initiative as well.

Without question, Grant’s strategy won the war. Without doubt, Grant made the tough decisions and took the criticism of the heavy casualties.  But it was Meade who made Grant’s strategic plan a reality, being the commander who positioned his army to operationalize Grant’s vision.

Conclusion

General Meade was a thorough, methodical man as would be expected of a professional military man and engineer.

What do you think of the General George Meade? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Suggested Reading

• Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.

• Nugent M, Petruzzi JD, Wittenberg EJ. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 - 14, 1863. Savas Beattiem 2011.

• Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.

• Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

• Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715

How did the Confederacy Fund its War Effort in the U.S. Civil War?

Following secession and the onset of the American Civil War, the southern Confederate states needed the funds and infrastructure to wage war. This article addresses the “sinews of war” from the Confederacy’s perspective: where did the money needed for weapons and supplies during the Civil War come from? How its needs were determined,  procured, transported and distributed is a complex story. Lloyd W Klein explains.

Above: George Alfred Trenholm, an influential supporter of the Confederacy and the Confederate States Secretary of the Treasury from 1864-65.

With secession, the Confederate States of America (CSA) recognized that war was a likely possible consequence.  After First Manassas, it was clear that a long struggle was ahead, which posed a series of problems for the CSA as to how it would obtain weapons. A rebellion cannot be sustained without armaments, and money is required to purchase them if your country has no manufacturing capacity, and doesn’t have foundries for their production.  Initially, federal forts were seized and weapons taken, but ultimately, a network of war goods supply would need to constructed.

Where did the Confederacy get financial support to purchase weapons and carry out a war with a limited treasury? Moreover, if there was no existing capacity to produce weapons, and must be imported from overseas, how did European armaments make it to the CSA despite a blockade? When the war began, the CSA had no manufacturing capability to produce artillery tubes. Tredegar was the only major iron foundry south of the Mason-Dixon line. There were no large scale rifle manufacturers. The armaments and weapons the Confederacy used were mostly made in Europe at the start of the war, and brought over despite the blockade.

The Blockade

General Winfield Scott predicted that a civil war would be a long affair when everyone else thought it would be over in weeks. He was a top-notch military strategist who was a hero of the Mexican War. He saw long in advance that the weakness of a Southern nation was its absence of manufacturing, supplies, and weapons production. Therefore, he developed what came to be known as the Anaconda Plan, named after the snake that squeezes its victims and suffocates them to death. The idea was that by blockading the southern ocean ports and the Mississippi River, the CSA military would slowly die as its supplies dwindled and the country isolated from its trading partners elsewhere.

Other Union commanders were not sanguine about the idea, preferring a rapid attack strategy to a slow suffocation. Although Anaconda was not implemented fully, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade in April 1861. This required the monitoring of 3,500 miles of Atlantic and Gulf coastline, including 12 major ports, notably New Orleans and Mobile.

The Union blockade was a powerful weapon that eventually destroyed the Southern economy, at the cost of very few lives, just as General Scott planned it. The river campaigns in the west crushed the CSA and the blockade raised the costs of overseas trade. The measure of the blockade's success was not the ships that slipped through but the thousands that never tried.

At first, the blockade was only partially effective; perhaps only about 10% of freighters attempting to evade the blockade were intercepted. However, the Union Navy gradually became better at the task; by 1864, about one-third of ships attempting to run the blockade were intercepted, and the only ships with a reasonable chance of evading the blockade were blockade runners, which were specifically designed for speed and maneuverability.

Beating the Blockade

Finding a way to deliver supplies and arms despite the blockade was a necessity. The only way its military could be supplied and the economy kept afloat was by international commerce. Therefore, the CSA had to build a fleet of ships to evade the blockade of its ports.

Blockade runners were steam ships built for speed in order to make its way through the Union blockade that extended some 3,500 miles along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastlines and the lower Mississippi River. To get through the blockade, the runners ran at night and if detected, they would attempt to outmaneuver or outrun the ships on blockade patrol. These vessels carried cargoes to and from neutral ports often located in Nassau and Cuba where neutral merchant ships in turn carried these cargoes, usually coming from or destined to England or other points abroad. Inbound ships usually brought badly needed supplies and mail to the Confederacy while outbound ships often exported cotton, tobacco and other goods for trade and for sale.

How did the CSA obtain the money to purchase these ships?

Charles Kuhn Prioleau was the most highly placed and influential supporter of the Confederacy in Britain. He was the sole British partner and representative of Fraser, Trenholm, & Co., the unofficial bankers to the Confederacy in Europe, which helped supply the South with arms throughout the war. He was a South Carolina cotton merchant who was the senior partner of the firm, based in Liverpool, acting as the European banker for the CSA. As such, this firm purchased military armaments, transported them to the US through the blockade, and extended the CSA credit when it couldn’t meet its obligations.

Prioleau was a partner in Fraser, Trenholm. He had moved to Liverpool in the early 1850s to establish a steamship line from England to Charleston. With his connections to Fraser, Trenholm, he became very well respected in Europe. When the war broke out, the CSA deposited large amounts of funds with his firm. Prioleau became the sole CSA agent in England, purchasing armaments and shipping them on blockade runners financed by Fraser, Trenholm.  Prioleau made a huge fortune on these transactions.

Who Made the Arrangements?

James Dunwoody Bulloch was the Confederacy's primary foreign agent in Great Britain. In 1861, almost immediately after the attack on Fort Sumter, he traveled to Liverpool to establish a base of operations. Britain was officially neutral in the conflict between North and South, but private and public sentiment of most of the English people – although not the monarchy -- favored the Confederacy. British firms were eager to purchase cotton smuggled past the Union blockade.  The proceeds provided the South with its only real source of hard currency.

His primary mission was to sell Confederate cotton, then use this currency to purchase arms and ammunition, uniforms, and other supplies for the war effort. Bulloch arranged for the purchase of Confederate cotton by British merchants, paid in cash, then purchased (mostly by credit) and transported armaments and other war supplies to the South.

Bulloch was employed by the shipping firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Company to buy and sell Confederate cotton, using this currency to purchase arms and ammunition. Fraser Trenholm & Co. became, in effect, the Confederacy's international bankers.  He operated blockade runners and commerce raiders. Bulloch arranged for the construction and secret purchase of commerce raiders as well as many of the blockade runners that acted as the Confederacy's commercial lifeline. In essence, Bulloch was the most significant international Confederate operative. His half-sister Martha was the mother of President Theodore Roosevelt and paternal grandmother of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt.

Bulloch worked with John Laird Sons & Co. in Birkenhead, across the Mersey River estuary from Liverpool, to build warships for the South. John Laird was the main ship builder in Liverpool. His business built the CSS Alabama and most of the other blockade runners. He was mayor of Birkenhead, across the river from Liverpool.

Warships could not legally be built in Britain for the Confederates as a consequence of its neutrality.  Bulloch circumvented this problem by ensuring that the ships, while clearly designed for battle, were not actually fitted with armaments in Britain. Through this strategy, the ships could be presented as civilian vessels when they left British jurisdiction, but they would then travel to Terceira, a Portuguese island located in the Azores, where they were re-fitted and armed. This blatant subterfuge successfully confused the legal definition of what could be defined a warship in Great Britain.

In 1862, Bulloch arranged for the CSS Florida and the CSS Alabama to cross the Atlantic and join the Confederate Navy. Other British-built ships soon followed. Bulloch's smokescreen, the British Government’s reluctance to become involved, and the complicity of Liverpool's port officials, who were Confederate sympathizers, allowed the CSS Alabama to successfully sail through. Confederates used the CSS Alabama to attack Union merchant and naval ships for two years, before the ship sank in 1864.

Who Did They Work With?

Although the British government remained neutral, the local government and port in Liverpool strongly favored the Confederacy. Businesses in the city tended to be favorable to the Confederate cause and had a long tie with slave trading. Liverpool had been the primary slave trading port and its ships and merchants were strongly associated with the slave trade. These businesses and owners formed what was called The Southern Club. Some were families with historical involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Nearly all had homes located in a single area called Abercromby Square. PM Gladstone also had a home there. There was a business and political conspiracy in Liverpool favoring the CSA, and it’s existence is clear. Prioleau lived at 19 Abercromby Square. The individuals who lived in Abercromby Square designed and built the ships. This included: improved propelling navigable vessels and the construction of metal, wood, and iron ships. sold arms to the Confederacy and built many of the blockade running ships.

The Man Behind the Curtain

George Alfred Trenholm was the principal partner of Fraser, Trenholm, manipulating all of the levers that allowed the building of blockade runners and the purchase of arms.  He was without a doubt the role model Margaret Mitchell used for Rhett Butler.  He was tall, handsome, fearless, crafty, highly intelligent, and very rich. This shipping and banking magnate from Charleston, South Carolina masterminded and made a fortune during the war.

Trenholm’s grandfather was a major slave owner in Haiti before the slave revolution.  Trenholm inherited large holdings of land and slaves. At age 16 he joined a cotton brokerage based in Charleston called John Fraser and Co. In 1853, he rose to partner and became its managing partner when Fraser died. He was one of the wealthiest men in the US, owning ships, hotels, docks, plantations, and cotton.  When secession happened, he moved his firm’s HQ from NYC to the West Indies and built an ironclad and 12 ships for the Confederacy. He owned 60 commercial ships running the blockade and he became even wealthier.  He worked directly with the Confederate government to supply their military needs, including arranging for funding for the building of blockade runners in England.

Fraser, Trenholm & Company was originally a commercial firm based in Charleston, S.C., with offices in New York City, that shipped cotton to Great Britain, among other ventures. When secession was declared, Trenholm saw a substantial business opportunity and moved his firm’s headquarters from to the West Indies.  During the war, the firm served as the overseas banker of the Confederate States of America, financing the supply of weaponry and essential goods in exchange for cotton, tobacco, and turpentine. His firm initially financed an ironclad and 12 ships for the Confederacy. Fraser, Trenholm and Company diversified to become an international bank representing the CSA, eventually owning 60 commercial ships running the blockade and he became even wealthier.

How did Fraser, Trenholm profit? Behind every one of these clandestine transactions for arms, supplies, and blockade running, military or commercial—stood Fraser, Trenholm, & Co. and its overseas director and Abercromby Square resident, Charles Prioleau.  Remember that Prioleau was in Liverpool and he was the one who contracted for building ships using designs for blockade running made by British firms, all of which were members of the Southern Club. A profit was made at every step by the business and its principals. So, on  the outward bound trips, cotton and other products were transported and sold for profit, and on the inbound trips, armaments, and all on ships built and owned by Fraser, Trenholm. The firm collected service fees on every transaction, received credit and cash internationally, and pocketed the proceeds.

Trenholm also served as Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederacy during the last year of the Civil War, an obvious choice since was building the fleet of ships on credit for the South. In essence, this private firm WAS the Confederate Navy, WAS the military supply line, and WAS the main fleet of blockade runners. The CSS Alabama was the most successful of these. Fraser, Trenholm remained highly respected until the end of the war when it went “bankrupt”.

The Supply Network

Prioleau worked directly with the Confederate government to supply their military needs. On board the ships were the weapons and armaments that the CSA needed for the war effort. But how did the agents in Europe know what was needed at any moment on the battlefield on this side of the pond? The answer was Brig Gen Josiah Gorgas, the Chief of Ordnance.  His experience made him the perfect man to serve as the linkage between industry and the military.

Born in Pennsylvania, he graduated from West Point and immediately served in the ordnance department. During the Mexican War, his job was to ensure that the army was supplied appropriately  from arsenals in the US. He routinely sought positions in the South because of his opposition to Republicans and abolitionism. By the time of the Civil War, he had served in almost every arsenal in the country. President Davis immediately hired him and he moved to Richmond. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines. His job was to create an armaments supply system literally from nothing and without much money.

He interacted directly with Prioleau to assure stockpiling of supplies and timely transport of the needed goods on blockade runners. Fraser, Trenholm arranged for the purchase and transportation of weapons on Gorgas’s order. Gorgas estimated in 1863 that Fraser Trenholm had made $9 million running the blockade. And they imported $4.5 million in cotton to England. The Confederate Army never lacked weapons. It was said that the only two things that worked well in the Confederacy was General Lee’s Army and General Gorgas’s supply lines. By 1863 Gorgas had several factories producing rifles. There was also a small foundry in Selma, AL.

After the War

As the southern economy tanked, Prioleau used his reputation to extend substantial credit to keep the war machine going. When the CSA collapsed and its credit called, Prioleau moved to Belgium.

Trenholm as CSA Treasury Secretary was in charge of the Confederate gold when Richmond fell. So, the part of the movie at the end of the war where the dashing Rhett Butler is in jail and accused of making off with the gold of the Confederacy? Not so far-fetched. Except there was no Scarlett involved; he was married with children and remained so forever (her name was Anna, FYI.) It would not be surprising if whatever Confederate Gold there was found its way into his pockets. Trenholm was captured and arrested escaping from Richmond, and his firm went bankrupt.

Trenholm never faced legal actions to make him responsible for treason, despite the fact that in essence, he bankrolled the Confederate war machine. Unquestionably, he hid his money overseas, in the Caribbean and London, and that his agent Charles Prioleau funneled the money here and there during and probably after the war.

How did Trenholm get out of taking responsibility for these obviously treasonous acts? Trenholm, just like Rhett Butler, was imprisoned for treason. Just like Rhett, he was believed to have possession of the Confederate gold.  Just like Rhett, he used his charm and influence (and surely his money), which extended into the United States Army and the White House, to get out of prison and secure a pardon. The pardon was especially clever since he never officially asked for it, nor did he ever admit that he had done anything wrong to deserve one.

After his release, Trenholm fought the Federal government in lengthy lawsuits. The government claimed Trenholm and his partners had illegally converted today’s equivalent of billions of dollars in Confederate assets. He disingenuously claimed he was bankrupt, saying he had lost everything in the war. And just like Rhett, he was cleared and completely exonerated.  But he reorganized, made another fortune after the war in phosphate mining and railroads, and became a philanthropist funneling money to black education. And then lived a lavish life until his death in 1876. Trenholm died a very wealthy man at age 69. Tomorrow is another day.

Prioleau moved back to London and died in 1887. He is buried in London. He was never held to account for his activities or war time debts.

Who Ultimately Paid for the Confederate War Machine?

In the international admiralty law, a foreign power cannot build a navy for an unrecognized combatant. After the Confederate surrender, the U.S. government filed suit against Great Britain for its conduct during the Civil War. The claim was heard at the Tribunal of Arbitration in Geneva in 1871. The US claimed direct and collateral damage against Britain. The US sued for the covert assistance given to the Confederate cause in the form of construction of commerce raiders and cruisers built or equipped in British ports for the Confederacy. Since the CSS Alabama was the ship that caused the US the most damages, the name given to the case was the "Alabama Claims".

The most serious charge was that the English allowed the Confederate cruisers "Alabama", "Shenandoah", and "Florida" to be armed in British ports. These ships created significant “damage” to the American merchant marine. Early attempts to resolve this dispute were unsuccessful. At one point, US Senator Charles Sumner stated that England was responsible for half of the cost of the war, and that the US would consider Canada as payment made on such a claim. This shocked the British and they realized that they had better come to some agreement.

In the Treaty of Washington, on May 8, 1871, it was agreed that the "Alabama Claims" should be referred to 5 arbitrators: one to be named by the US, one by England and one each by the King of Italy, the emperor of Brazil and the president of Switzerland. A commission was formed and met in Geneva on December 15, 1871.

The decision was given on September 14, 1872. England was held liable for the Alabama (unanimous), Florida (4-1), Shenandoah in part (3-2) and the tenders of both the Alabama and Florida (unanimous). The total amount of damage to be re-paid was $15,500,000, the US being left to settle with private claimants. This was a high reward at that time. In fact, by 1882 only 3/5 had been paid, requiring yet more adjudication. The British also lost their investment of $1,100,000 in Confederate Bonds.

Conclusion

How the Confederacy financed and constructed its blockade running and developed its war supply production network is rarely discussed.  Fraser, Trenholm and Company, working through its agents Charles Prioleau and James Dunwoody Bulloch, created an entire banking and military supply network, including a navy. A single privately held merchant company, a cotton export business, which diversified to become an international bank representing the CSA and then built and operated ships to run the blockade was the central mechanism. Trenholm had direct connections to the CSA Government and military. His business contracted and built the ships, took the orders for arms, arranged and took the risk to transport the cargo in both directions, acted as CSA banking agent in Britain, and represented the CSA government, all for profit. Huge profits were made at every step, in which the business received actual cash but paid in CSA credit. The business represented the CSA in European circles, and had ties to British businesses and its prime minister, Gladstone. None of this money was ever recovered, and the principals were never brought to justice, although many years later the British did have to pay damages.

What do you think of how the Confederacy funded itself during the American Civil War? Let us know below.

References

Abercromby Square and The Southern Club.

https://ldhi.library.cofc.edu/exhibits/show/liverpools-abercromby-square/abercromby-southern-club

James D. Bulloch: Secret Agent and Mastermind of the Confederate Navy By Walter E. Wilson, Gary L. McKay.

George Alfred Trenholm and The Company That Went to War 1861-1865 By Ethel Trenholm Seabrook Nepveux

Trauma during War: Part 1 - The American Civil War

The US Civil War was the first modern war in which the productive capacities of the industrial state were completely integrated into the war effort. This has significant impacts on the ability to kill and injure the enemy. Here, Richard Bluttal starts a three-part series on the impacts of trauma during wars by looking at the American Civil War.

Clara Barton, a nurse and founder of the American Red Cross, in the 1860s.

In early May 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-85) launched his Overland campaign, in which his Army of the Potomac clashed with Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in a series of battles in Virginia. Lt. J. E. Mallet of the Union army distinctly remembers the sensations experienced upon being hit.” I imagined that a cannonball had struck me on the left hipbone, that it took a downward course, tearing the intestines in its course, and lodged against the marrow of the right thigh bone. I fancied I saw sparks of fire, and curtains of cobwebs wet with dew, sparkling in the sun. I heard a monstrous roar of distant cataracts. I felt my teeth chatter, a rush of blood to my eyes, ears, nose and to the ends of my fingers and toes. I tried to get up, fell, and "became completely insensible” He described his wait on the battlefield (at least a day) and the journey to the hospital transport ship quite matter-of-factly. Men in his regiment on the ards. The heavy soft, unjacketed lead bullet flattened out on impact, which produced severe wounds and carrying pieces of clothing into the wound.

The number of combat engagements during the American Civil War was the largest in history to that time, and exponential increases in the killing power of weapons produced rates of casualties beyond the imagination of military medical planners. In a four-year period, 2,196 combat engagements were fought, in which 620,000 men perished—360,000 in the Union Army and 260,000 in the Confederate Army. Some 67,000 Union soldiers were killed outright, 43,000 died of wounds, and 130,000 were disfigured for life, often with missing limbs; 94,000 Confederate soldiers died of wounds. Twice as many soldiers died of disease during the war than in combat. During the 1860s, doctors had yet to develop bacteriology and were generally ignorant of the causes of disease. Generally, Civil War doctors underwent two years of medical school, though some pursued more education. Medicine in the United States was woefully behind Europe. Harvard Medical School did not even own a single stethoscope or microscope until after the war. Most Civil War surgeons had never treated a gunshot wound and many had never performed surgery. Medical boards admitted many "quacks," with little to no qualification. Yet, for the most part, the Civil War doctor (as understaffed, underqualified, and under-supplied as he was) did the best he could, muddling through the so-called "medical Middle Ages." Some 10,000 surgeons served in the Union army and about 4,000 served in the Confederate. Medicine made significant gains during the war. However, it was the tragedy of the era that medical knowledge of the 1860s had not yet encompassed the use of sterile dressings, antiseptic surgery, and the recognition of the importance of sanitation and hygiene. As a result, thousands died from diseases such as typhoid or dysentery.

Why did so many have to die? The deadliest thing that faced the Civil War soldier was disease. For every soldier who died in battle, two died of disease. In particular, intestinal complaints such as dysentery and diarrhea claimed many lives. In fact, diarrhea and dysentery alone claimed more men than did battle wounds. The Civil War soldier also faced outbreaks of measles, smallpox, malaria, pneumonia, or camp itch. Soldiers were exposed to malaria when camping in damp areas which were conductive to breeding mosquitos, while camp itch was caused by insects or a skin disease. In brief, the high incidence of disease was caused by inadequate physical examination of recruits, ignorance, the rural origin of soldiers, neglect of camp hygiene, insects and vermin, exposure; lack of clothing and shoes; poor food and water.

The Germ Theory, which states that microscopic bacteria and viruses caused disease, was not yet understood (Sohn). These pathogenic microorganisms thrived in filthy environments, and the conditions soldiers lived in were horrendous. Because of water shortages in camps, items were rarely cleaned. This includes all medical tools. If scalpels or forceps were dropped on the ground, they were "only washed in tap water," according to one Civil War surgeon (Ledoux). Between operations, tools were not sterilized. Doctors rarely washed their hands, and even less often were their garments cleaned. No one yet knew why these post-surgery infections took place, nor how to prevent them.

Organization of Battlefield Medical Care

On July 16, 1861, Clara Barton watched more than 30,000 “noble, gallant, [and] handsome” Federal soldiers, “armed to the teeth,” march out of Washington to confront a Confederate army near Manassas Junction, this was the first engagement, Battle of Bull Run, against confederate forces. Many around the country, soldiers and citizens alike, naively expected a short conflict with no need to prepare for large numbers of wounded. In the days before the First Battle of Bull Run, as the US Army neared contact with the enemy, the army’s medical department made no preparation to set up hospital sites until after the battle began. No permanent military hospital sites had been established in the city. Instead, sick soldiers were languishing in abandoned warehouses, churches, schools, and other public buildings. That meant Washington’s “hospitals” were already overflowing when the army left for battle. There was simply no space for more patients in these makeshift facilities. A significant number of Union wounded were left on the battlefield because the medical department didn’t have authority over most of the ambulances. The medical disaster at Bull Run in July 1861 convinced Clara Barton, ordinary citizens, and even the Union medical department to take the medical needs of the US Army in the aftermath of a battle more seriously,

How medical care was delivered on and off the battlefield changed during the war. Early on, stretcher bearers were members of the regimental band, and many fled when the battle started. There was no military ambulance corps in the Union Army until August of 1862. Until that time, civilians drove the ambulances. Initially the ambulance corps was under the Quartermaster corps, which meant that ambulances were often commandeered to deliver supplies and ammunition to the front.

If a soldier was injured during battle, volunteers took the howling victim behind the front lines using a stretcher made from canvas and wooden poles. From there, a horse-and-buggy-type wagon would cart them to the nearest field hospital. The "stretcher-bearers" would assess the condition of the patient, dividing them into three main categories: mortally wounded, slightly wounded, and surgical cases. They would then assist the patient to the best of their ability in the back of the jostling horse-drawn vehicle. This process was called "Letterman's Ambulance," devised by the director of the Army of the Potomac, Jonathan Letterman. His system evacuated the injured more efficiently and paved the way for our modern ambulance system.

Combat Related Injuries

In order to be reported, a soldier had to be either transported to or make it back to a field hospital, and this may have resulted in an underreporting of deaths from cannon fire.  Most injuries resulted from the Minié ball invented by the French officer Claude-Etienne Minié in 1849. The Minié ball is a 0.58-caliber bullet that is slow moving and is made from soft lead. It flattens on impact and creates a wound that grows larger as the bullet moves deeper into tissues. It shatters bone above and below impact and usually does not exit. Because of its relatively slow muzzle velocity, it brought bits of clothing, skin, and bacteria into the wound. The majority of gunshot wounds occurred in the upper and lower extremities, but the fatality rate from these wounds was low. Only 18% of wounds were to the abdomen, but these were more often fatal from intestinal perforation in the preantibiotic era.

Non-Combat Related Death and Illness

A variety of factors contributed to a high rate of noncombat-related illness, including overcrowded and filthy camps. Latrines were often not used or were drained into drinking water supplies or not covered daily. Food quality was poor from several standpoints. It was poorly stored, poorly cooked, and lacked enough vitamin C to prevent scurvy. The Army of the Potomac eventually added a number of rules: camps had be pitched on new ground and drained by ditches 18 inches deep, tents had to be struck twice a week to sun their floors, cooking had to be done only by company cooks, all refuse had to be burned or buried daily, soldiers had to bathe twice a week and change clothing at least once a week, and latrines had to be 8 feet deep and covered by 6 inches of dirt daily.

There were few useful medications at the time, and about two thirds of all drugs were botanicals. In 1860 Oliver Wendell Holmes stated at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Medical Society, “I firmly believe that if the whole material medica, as now used, could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind,—and all the worse for the fishes”. Medications that were helpful included quinine for malaria, morphine, chloroform, and ether, as well as paregoric. Many others were harmful. Fowler's solution was used to treat fevers and contained arsenic. Calomel (mercurous chloride) was used for diarrhea. Mercury is excreted in high concentration in saliva. This led to excessive salivation, loss of teeth, and gangrene of the mouth and cheeks in some patients.

Battlefield Wounded and Surgery

Battlefield surgery was also at best archaic. Doctors often took over houses, churches, schools, even barns for hospitals. The field hospital was located near the front lines -- sometimes only a mile behind the lines -- and was marked with a yellow flag with a green "H". Anesthesia's first recorded use was in 1846 and was commonly in use during the Civil War. In fact, there are 800,000 recorded cases of its use. Chloroform was the most common anesthetic, used in 75% of operations. In a sample of 8,900 uses of anesthesia, only 43 deaths were attributed to the anesthetic, a remarkable mortality rate of 0.4%. Anesthesia was usually administered by the open-drop technique. The anesthetic was applied to a cloth held over the patient's mouth and nose and was withdrawn after the patient was unconscious. Surgeons worked all night, with piles of limbs reaching four or five feet. Lack of water and time meant they did not wash off their hands or instruments. Bloody fingers often were used as probes. Bloody knives were used as scalpels. Doctors operated in pus-stained coats. Everything about Civil War surgery was septic. The antiseptic era and Lister's pioneering works in medicine were in the future. Blood poisoning, sepsis or Pyemia (Pyemia meaning literally pus in the blood) was common and often very deadly. Surgical fevers and gangrene were constant threats. One witness described surgery as such: "Tables about breast high had been erected upon which the screaming victims were having legs and arms cut off. The surgeons and their assistants, stripped to the waist and bespattered with blood, stood around, some holding the poor fellows while others, armed with long, bloody knives and saws, cut and sawed away with frightful rapidity, throwing the mangled limbs on a pile nearby as soon as removed." If a soldier survived the table, he faced awful surgical fever. However, about 75% of amputees did survive.

Amputation was the most successful method used to halt the spread of deadly infections, like gangrene, caused by battle wounds during the Civil War. Contrary to popular belief, the process was not as barbaric as it seemed. The process was efficient and effective. After a soldier was injured on the battlefield, he was immediately bandaged by medical volunteers. He was shuttled to either the nearest field hospital or medical tent at a camp using the new ambulance system. On the way, the wounded soldier was given whiskey to ease his shock. Once the patient, still in great distress, was set on an "operating table," a chloroform- soaked cloth was held onto the patient's nose and mouth. Tourniquets were tightly secured above the amputation area to prevent the patient from bleeding out. A long, though often dull, blade was used to sever tissue and ligaments, then a serrated saw was used to cut through the bone. One man who witnessed an amputation said this: "Tables about breast high had been erected upon which the screaming victims were having legs and arms cut off. The `surgeons and their assistants, stripped to the waist and bespattered with blood, stood around, some holding the poorfellows while others, armed with long,  bloody knives and saws, cut and sawed away with frightful rapidity, throwing the mangled limbs on a pile nearby as soon as removed.” An experienced field surgeon could perform an amputation in under ten minutes.

Medical advances and improvements leading up to World War 1

The contributions to medical care that developed during the Civil War have not been fully appreciated, probably because the quality of care administered was compared against modern standards rather than the standards of the time. The specific accomplishments that constituted major advances were as follows. 1. Accumulation of adequate records and detailed reports for the first time permitted a complete military medical history. This led to the publication of the Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, which was identified in Europe as the first major academic accomplishment by US medicine. 2. Development of a system of managing mass casualties, including aid stations, field hospitals, and general hospitals, set the pattern for management of the wounded in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. 3. The pavilion-style general hospitals, which were well ventilated and clean, were copied in the design of large civilian hospitals over the next 75 years. 4. The importance of immediate, definitive treatment of wounds and fractures was demonstrated, and it was shown that major operative procedures, such as amputation, were optimally carried out in the first 24 hours after wounding. 5. The importance of sanitation and hygiene in preventing infection, disease, and death among the troops in the field was demonstrated. 6. Female nurses were introduced to hospital care and Catholic orders entered the hospital business. 7. The experience and training of thousands of physicians were upgraded, and they were introduced to new ideas and standards of care. These included familiarity with prevention and treatment of infectious disease, with anesthetic agents, and with surgical principles that rapidly advanced the overall quality of American medical practice. 8. The Sanitary Commission was formed, a civilian-organized soldier's relief society that set the pattern for the development of the American Red Cross.

In August of 1862, a physician named Jonathan Letterman set up the first ambulance system in the Union’s Army of the Potomac. With the support of Hammond, he instituted a three-step system for evacuating soldiers from the battlefield and established the Ambulance Corps. Their first stop was a field dressing station, where tourniquets were applied, and wounds were dressed. Then they moved to a field hospital, where doctors performed emergency medical procedures. Finally, ambulances would transport patients to a large hospital far from the battlefield for long-term treatment. The U.S. military uses the same basic system today.

What do you think of trauma during the US Civil War? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s piece on the history of slavery in New York here.

American Civil War Line Tactics: Brilliant, Stupid, or the only Option?

Infantry line tactics in the American Civil War can perplex the mind. Hundreds of years of line infantry tactics seem to be perfected to horrifying effect. Casualties from the outbreak of the war shocked the American public. Dead and wounded amounting to greater than all the previous conflicts combined, would fall in a single day. Many have often pondered the question, maybe they should have changed their tactics? Austin Duran explains.

Battle of Shiloh by Thure de Thulstrup.

The Minie ball surely would have caused the need for a change right?

Invented by Claude-Etienne Minie in 1846, the Minie ball changed the battlespace in 19th century warfare. The Minie ball was a hollowed out conical shape, with multiple grooves near the rear. The hollow portion in the rear of the round caused the round to expand. This expansion would press the bullet grooves into the sides of the barrel, catching the rifling and inducing a spin. A spinning round is far more accurate than a non-spinning round. Think of it as a spiraling football versus a shotput. Not only is it more accurate, it will travel much farther, and faster. Additionally, the conical shape was far more aerodynamic further adding to its lethality.

This Minie ball could kill out to 800m while the round ball of decades past could only be lethal to 200m. Even though no soldier could intentionally hit anything at that range, the range of battlefield lethality nevertheless increased 400%. As anything within the 800m was within lethal range. A three thousand man brigade, firing just 2 rounds a minute, could empty its 40-60 round allotment in just 20-30 minutes, putting 120k-180k rounds out in the process. While these numbers would have been the same prior to the invention of the Minie ball, the increased lethal range added significantly to the lethality on the battlefield – especially with continued use of compressed line infantry tactics. 

If not the Minie ball, maybe the mass casualties?

From the very outset of the war the casualties were aggressive. The first major battle, the Battle of Bull Run with around 5,000 casualties, was the single bloodiest day in American history up to that point. A horrid record that would be surpassed at Shiloh and Antietam with around 23,000 casualties each. Despite the mounting losses on both sides, little in way of tactical change would happen until Robert E Lee adopted defensive trench tactics as manpower began to dwindle.

The primary reason for the aggregation of manpower in line formation was to consolidate firepower. Concentration of effort has always been a military tenet. However, the increased range of the Minie ball should have allowed for some dispersion of effort given some assumptions. First, the user of the rifle would have to be trained. Despite the increased accuracy of the Minie ball, the soldier would still need to be precise with their shots as they could no longer rely on massed volleys. This required training which was often not given. Notably at the Battle of Shiloh, many troops on both sides fired their weapons for the first time in combat. The levy style recruitment often left training to wayside in effort to amass sheer numbers. 

Murderous technological advancements and massive causalities, beg the question: maybe we should do things differently? Fire and maneuver in smaller squads of men? Perhaps moving from cover to cover, as opposed to massing ranks in front of one another? But I submit to you there is one thing that prevented the modern light infantry tactics that we know today from being used: smoke.

Smoke

Black powder was invented by the Chinese and first used in combat in the 900s AD. And from its inception it produced a tremendous amount of smoke. There are many reasons why small unit tactics would not work in the American Civil War, but the primary was gunpowder smoke.

Even if training was given, the problem of smoke from black powder arises. First, it’s rather difficult to do anything covert, or quickly without being seen when giant puffs of smoke rise from your position. If you have ever seen a reenactment or decide to look one up on YouTube after this article, note that re-enactors often use one-quarter charges when firing. The amount of smoke produced was enormous. Second, assuming you have a trained rifleman, they will only be able to get a few shots off before their vision is likely clouded due to the smoke present. Also, with their smoke signal advertising their position it would be likely only a matter of time before massed volleys could be directed their way. This would render them either dead or hopelessly stuck behind cover.

Another example of how smoke affected the battlefield lay with Picket’s Charge. Prior to the assault by the confederates on the third day of Gettysburg, General Lee ordered a massive artillery bombardment. It is well known that the majority of the rounds sailed over the intended target by several hundred yards, rendering the bombardment ineffective. This shelling lasted over an hour yet no adjustments to fire were made; why? Smoke. They couldn’t see that they were missing their targets.

The burnside carbine, and other repeating rifles were available early in the war, why not invest solely in these sorts of firearms? While the increased fire rate of this sorts of carbines would certainly have unleashed devastation on the battlefield (and did when in properly trained hands—cavalry typically), in the arms of untrained, massed infantry, the smoke would have rendered the commanders blind in record time. This would squelch all hope of command and control in an age of limited command and control as is.

Smokeless powder would not be invented until decades after the American Civil War. With the blinding presence of black powder, commanders continued to use line formations and massed volleys. The drawbacks of smoke outweighed, even nullified, the benefits of new tactics. This led to murderous effects on the battlefield despite technological advancements.

What do you think of the importance of smoke in the American Civil War? Let us know below.

President James Buchanan and the American Civil War: Part II: Preparing for Secession

James Buchanan was US President from 1857-1861. He is often considered one of the worst presidents of the US, with his presidency leading up to the US Civil War. Here, Ian Craig continues his look at Buchanan’s presidency. He argues that Buchanan had prepared for the possible secession of states in the South – and that it was almost impossible for him to avoid South Carolina’s December 1860 secession following Abraham Lincoln’s election victory in November 1860.

You can read the first article in the series on James Buchanan and Bleeding Kansas here.

President James Buchanan’s cabinet, circa 1859.

Perhaps the most trying period in James Buchanan’s career came when South Carolina seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860 a month after Abraham Lincoln was electedpresident.  It has often been recollected that the nation’s fifteenth president simply let the nation dissolve under his watch - that the nation’s president was too weak and tired from age to effectively stop the secessionist threat in the South as President Andrew Jackson had thirty years prior during the Nullification Crisis. However, this was certainly not the case as President James Buchanan had prepared for such a scenario in October 1860.

Preparing for Succession

Before Lincoln was elected, Buchanan knew that if the Illinois Republican became president the South would most likely secede.  On the election he stated that, “throughout the presidential canvass, the cotton states openly declared their purpose to secede should Mr. Lincoln be elected.” This caused much alarm for Buchanan, who turned to General Winfield Scott, the commander-in chief of the armed forces for a review of the military and its outposts in the South. This was not the action of a weak president. At the time, the President only had sixteen thousand troops to defend against secession should the South decide to do so.  When General Scott completed his review, he warned Buchanan that many of the forts in the South including Fort Sumter and those along the Mississippi River lacked sufficient troops to defend against secession.  He writes that “Fort Moultrie and Sumter, (in) Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any…should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise ridiculous.” General Scott also advised Buchanan to send five available companies to reinforce five of the eight forts that he mentioned in his report. However, they would still be understrength in repelling an attack against their station.  

Buchanan recognized the threat to the nation but being a man of the Constitution, realized that he had little power to move troops without the approval of Congress.  If he did so without congressional approval, he feared that he would only provoke the South and start the secession movement.  Buchanan did not want to start a war that he knew he was ill prepared for. He sent a request for Congress to raise five additional regiments that could be used to reinforce the Southern garrisons, but his request was ignored by Congress. Leaning on the advice of his Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, he did not pursue the matter to find out why. However, Floyd was being investigated by Congress for spreading troops thinly throughout the South to render the army useless if war did break out. The trial was suspended for lack of evidence.  Just before he resigned, Buchanan recalled that Floyd had ordered federal artillery sent to a Southern fort, but the President himself stepped in and revoked the order. Floyd had resigned because Buchanan refused to order Major Anderson from Fort Sumter after South Carolina seceded. 

Buchanan’s Dedication to the Constitution

In his December 3, 1860 annual message to Congress, Buchanan put emphasis on the impending desire of South Carolina to secede from the Union upon Lincoln’s election that November.  He stated that the “election of any of our fellow citizens to the office of president does not itself afford just cause for dissolving the Union…how then, can the result justify a revolution to destroy this very Constitution.” In a deep effort, Buchanan tried to clarify the seriousness of secession to the integrity of the Union and what the Constitution represented.  He also stated, “in order to justify secession as a Constitutional remedy, it must be on the principle that the Federal Government is a mere voluntary association of states, to be dissolved at pleasure by any one of the contracting parties.” At this point, Buchanan called out the legality of secession as unconstitutional, but his role as president gave him no power to take action against it.  This again, demonstrates his sincere dedication to the Constitution and the powers it gave.  As Buchanan explains, “apart from the execution of the laws, so far as they may be practiced, the Executive has not authority to decide what should be the relations between the federal government and South Carolina…he possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less acknowledge the independence of that state.”

In Buchanan’s defense he was correct, his oath of office required under Article Two Section One of the Constitution states that the president will “faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of (their) ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.” James Buchanan lived by the oath he took as president and executed the laws of United States as given to him by the Constitution, no powers were given against slavery and secession.  If those actions were considered acts of war, only Congress would intervene to put an end to that situation.  Buchanan urged the nation to put an end to the secessionist cry but felt as if his actions were misinterpreted. As Buchanan recalls of himself, “his every act had been misrepresented and condemned, and knew that whatever course he might pursue, he was destined to encounter their bitter hostility.  No public man was ever placed in a more trying and responsible position…without giving offence both to the anti-slavery and secession parties, because both had been clearly in the wrong.” At that point, in December 1860, only a few weeks before South Carolina officially declared its secession, James Buchanan, the Fifteenth President of the United States, felt powerless to prevent the impending Civil War.

What do you think of James Buchanan’s actions before South Carolina’s secession? Let us know below.

The Role of Women in the Confederacy during the American Civil War

The US Civil War (1861-1865) changed America in many ways. With many men fighting in the war, one such change was the role of women in society. Here, Kaiya Rai considers the role of women in the Confederate States, including a look at feminine ideals at the time, Belle Boyd, and Mary Chestnut.

Mary Chestnut, author a well-known civil war diary.

Women’s lives in the Confederacy were dramatically changed right from the breakout of war in April 1861. The very notion of womanhood underwent a transformation, as men were called up to fight in the army, and women from the upper-class were forced to look after slaves, women from the middle-class were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge, and women of the lower-class and widows gained social standing as a result. The idea of women having to takeover on the home front during a war is not a new one, but in the case of the American Civil War, this was an entirely new concept. Furthermore, women held no previous social standing. There was no growing suffrage movement as there was in World War One (WWI), it was the first time such an event had occurred, in contrast to World War Two (when many remembered WWI), and women from the upper reaches of society, did not generally have significant difficulties in their lives.

Much of the information gained about women in the Confederacy, and their changing identities, has come from the diaries that the majority of upper-class women wrote in. They provided a new way of self-discovery, as such writing required self-description as a result of self-understanding. Even when women began writing letters to officers, and even Jefferson Davis, it meant claiming a public voice, and so was incompatible with their definition and understanding of themselves as ‘women’.

Feminine ideals

The fragility of feminine ideals existing in the antebellum period appears to have served the women well, as it seems that ‘feminine weakness served as the foundation of female strength’ (Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War) in this case. Many women did what they could to play their part in the war, albeit covertly sometimes, as it wasn’t seen as being ‘feminine.’ Belle Boyd shooting the Union soldier entering her house is a key example of this; escaping punishment by claiming feminine fragility and fear was fundamental to the patriarchal nature of war. The hoop skirts that many upper-class women wore were used to hide jewelry, as they had no fear of being searched as women. This lack of threat is displayed in a Union soldier’s comment that ‘if she was a man I would whip her.’ The Nancy Hart regiment in La Grange, Georgia displayed a similar idea. When a Union regiment approached the town, the women-only regiment refused to back down, invited the soldiers in for tea and thus evaded the capture of the town! Elite women, in particular, hated the occupation of Confederate towns by Union soldiers, and were noted to have stepped in gutters to avoid passing Union soldiers on the pavement, and even wore thick veils to avoid eye contact with the officers! Students at a girl’s school in Georgia were recorded as emptying their chamber pots out of the windows onto soldiers’ heads, and Flag Officer Farragut was also subjected to this, in New Orleans. This hatred of the officers fuelled many women into action; despite their view of femininity, many wanted to play their part in forming a new nation and playing patriotic games against the country they believed had oppressed their ideals for so long.

However, their feminine helplessness has also been seen, to a large extent, to have been perpetrated by the women themselves. One of the first requirements for women in the Confederacy was as nurses and teachers, seen as traditionally female roles today, ironically! Yet, upon this call for help, many were writing to their husbands asking them to be forbidden to go. One woman even started addressing letters to her husband as ‘dear papa’ and ending them from your ‘daughter.’ Here, it seems that the patriarchy, whilst perhaps initiated by men, seems to have been upheld and continued by women. As McCurry noted that “no one, apparently, believed in women’s non-partisanship as fervently as the women themselves.” The need for protection was a big issue when men were called up to fight, and many made it a condition of them joining the war effort; they would do so, if the state could offer support for their families. 

Belle Boyd’s Role as a Spy

Belle Boyd, also known as ‘the Siren of the Shenandoah,’ was one woman who played a particularly noteworthy role for the Confederacy. A die-hard secessionist, she spied for the Confederacy during the Civil War and was able to use her role as an upper class ‘lady’ to cover her actions, and claim ignorance when needed. When she and her mother denied entry to some Union officers wanting to raise a Union flag over their house, and when one assaulted her mother as a result, Belle shot and killed the soldier, and became infamous as a result. Despite being a spy for the majority of the Civil War, the usefulness of her intelligence work is not nearly as significant as the symbolism of her doing the work itself. She informed General Jackson of the Union intentions to set fire to the bridges in Front Royal (Virginia) as they retreated, and also reported on Union action in the Shenandoah - these are considered by most as the only outcomes of her intelligence work to have had major effect. However, the uncertainty of women’s roles, especially upper-class women’s roles during the Civil War was hugely compounded by Boyd’s actions, and perhaps it can be argued that she represented an icon for the helpless Confederate woman. Their femininity was, to an extent, reliant on the view that women were husbands’ wives, not individuals in their own right. Boyd used this fragile need for women to her advantage, and many stories of her outrageous flirtations circled among Union and confederate officers alike. These, however, played an important role as Boyd identified in one diary entry, "I am indebted for some very remarkable effusions, some withered flowers, and last, but not least, for a great deal of very important information.” The notion of womanhood as dependency on a man, and the objection, to some part, of women, that men perpetrated by bringing flowers and ‘remarkable effusion,’ actually allowed Boyd to gain all the information she needed to effectively spy on the Union for her cause.

Belle Boyd, a Confederate civil war spy.

Mary Chestnut as the more common female experience

Mary Chestnut conversely played the role of the conventional, helpless Confederate woman abandoned by her husband, but she held real devastation in this, and truly felt lost. Many women in the Confederacy had similar experiences to Chestnut, as they were left with a plantation and possibly hundreds of slaves to manage. There was also the constant fear of servile insurrection, aggravated by abolitionist John Brown’s raid in 1859 in which he wanted to start an armed slave revolt. Chestnut was the embodiment of women’s beliefs that, as Faust identifies, the feeling of ‘a new sense of God’s distance and disengagement combined with a distrust of the men on whom they had so long relied,’ and as such, the necessity of war that forced Confederate women to behave in new ways, became the driving force behind the changing of their identities. The lives of the confederate women, not having undergone the innovations of society that were occurring in the north, had been so focused on marriage and child-bearing, with their identities so tied up with visions of themselves as wives and mothers, that when war overturned these norms, it meant that their fundamental self-definition was altered. Moreover, their emotional relations and experiences were so fixed on privacies of heterosexual love that the countless examples of female homosexuality recorded in diaries, were not seen as anything other than close female friendship, probably in part because the identity of a woman was so ingrained as part of a larger patriarchal sphere.

Related to this is the renewed view of the identities of widows during the war. As a result of huge casualties, with 260,000 Confederate deaths at the end of the war, many women became widows, and this notion became romanticized as they were seen as having ‘loved and suffered’. Widows were seen as the settlers of ‘the rejuvenating club’ of women who became self-confident in themselves and eligible for a state pension of $30 per year, on certain conditions. This brought with it a sense of independence for many women, as they no longer had the choice of relying on a husband, and now owned money themselves, an opportunity which most would not have previously had. Widows therefore became essential for women all over the Confederacy, in questioning the very nature of being a woman, because women actively seeking romance redefined marriage conventions. The stereotype of the faithful, heartbroken wife, and therefore the assessment that women only lived for their husbands, was deconstructed, as they showed that they would continue to live their life even without a husband. To court and remarry was to assert a claim to happiness, preceding the self-abnegation and altruism expected from a woman.

To conclude

It can be seen that, as Faust argues, necessity may have been the ‘mother of invention’ for women in the Confederacy during the Civil War, as the romantic notions of war and patriotism had been replaced with a selfishness due to a need to survive. The women themselves could have also been the ‘mothers of invention’ themselves, though, and the women’s property law of 1860, embodied a new ‘vision of masculine irresponsibility’ (Lebsock), perhaps consequential of the new gender ideology introduced as a result of the Civil War.

What do you think about the role of women in the Confederacy during the US Civil War?

Nurses in War – Clara Barton, the US Civil War Nurse who Started the American Red Cross

Legendary American Civil War-era nurse Clara Barton was extraordinary in many ways. Not only was she an important nurse in the US Civil War, she also played a key role in bringing the Red Cross to America. Here, Matt Goolsby follows his first ‘nurses in war’ article on Cornelia Hancock (available here) and tells us about the life of Clara Barton.

An engraving of Clara Barton from 1867. Engraving by John Sartain.

Humble Beginnings

The United States was a very agrarian based nation in the early part of the 19th century. Travel and communication were typically slow and arduous.

By the time of the Civil War, the northeast region of the U.S. was experiencing the growing pains of the Industrial Revolution that had started in England in the 1700s. Railroad lines were expanding at an exponential rate as the demand for goods transversed the entire region of the rapidly growing country.

Communication was also becoming a transcontinental medium to rapidly transmit information from one region to another through the use of telegraph lines. Newspapers began publishing stories next day instead of relying on couriers delivering accounts that took days if not weeks to send and receive.

One would assume that the rapidly expanding use of technology and industry would have affected how the medical profession cared for the sick, wounded, and dying soldiers who were the casualties of the Civil War during this time. In reality, it exposed the glaring weaknesses and woeful practices utilized in treatment that spawned a desire for improvement of those who were most vulnerable. Against this backdrop, a formidable leader and role model emerged.

Clarissa Harlowe Barton was born on Christmas Day, 1821 in North Oxford, Massachusetts to Captain Stephen Barton and his wife Sarah Stone. She was the youngest of five children: Dorothy - 17, Stephen - 15, David - 13, and Sally – 10 at the time.

Coming from very unpretentious beginnings, Clara as she was fondly known by, was a timid and shy child. Her elder brother David spent much time with Clara riding horses and enjoying the outdoors which helped to relieve some of the timidity she first felt.

The Barton home where Clara was born still exists to this day in its original location and is a museum to her life and testament to the simple yet solid foundations her family was known for.

The Barton family, whose beginnings can be traced back to 11thcentury England in the Domesday book, otherwise known as: ‘A great survey’ commissioned by William the Conqueror, shows that the family was awarded land due to their loyalty to king and country.

The Barton family in America first appears in 1640 in Salem, Massachusetts after Edward Barton emigrated from England as one of the early colonists. After several moves throughout New England, the Barton family finally settled in North Oxford, Massachusetts and took up daily living with their Universalist religious background.

Of particular note are the facts that Clara’s family established the first Universalist church in Oxford and ordained its first Pastor: Hosea Ballou who is considered one of the fathers of American Universalism. As described in the story of Clara’s life by Percy H. Elper: “Yet her father and mother, however liberal in their creed, never relaxed from the deepest habits of all that was best in Pilgrim and Puritan. No matter how snowy, no matter how the winds hurtled over the hilltops — the Barton family not only drove five miles to church every Sunday, but maintained, during the other six days of the week, the deeper fundamentals of conscience and honor peculiar to their forefathers' faith.”

Foundational Nurse Training

In 1832 Clara and her family experienced a significant medical crisis that helped form her future nursing skills and made clear the talent she innately possessed.

Her brother David was severely injured while working on a barn-raising when one of the boards he was standing on at the peak collapsed under him. He fell to the ground sustaining a severe head injury that laid him up in bed for nearly two years. 

Clara, perhaps from the closeness she felt to her brother while riding horseback in the woods, spent the entire recovery time caring for David. She also was the one who applied the prescribed treatments of the time for him that consisted of: Leeches, setons (stitches to relieve infection), counter-irritating blisters, and blood-letting to relieve his fever. She is quoted as saying: “For two years I only left his bedside for one half day. I almost forgot that there was an outside to the house.”

After David had finally recovered from his injuries, (when the new treatment of steam baths came into use), Clara had to sequester herself for recovery time from the care she had provided. At the tender age of 11, it was a portent of things to come.

Civil War Service

After spending 18 years teaching and then another 5 years living and working in Washington D.C. for the U.S. Department of the Interior and Patent Office, Clara saw firsthand what many of the men who were involved in the Civil War would experience through its long, arduous journey.

In April of 1861, the Massachusetts 6thregiment heeded the call of Abraham Lincoln for 75,000 troops and proceeded to make its way down to the nation’s capital. On their way they passed through Baltimore, Maryland where a crowd of 10,000 opponents of the beginning conflict assaulted them. This left four dead and 30 wounded.

They fought their way through the crowd and arrived in Washington the following day: April 16, 1861. Clara witnessed the regiment as they arrived by train and was there to greet them. 

This was the first time she had worked as a ‘Volunteer Nurse’ and experienced what would become her life’s mission to apply healing to those wounded in conflict. In her own words she testifies: "Among the soldiers, I recognized my own early associates. We bound their wounds, and fed them." There were many from Worcester, Massachusetts including Sergeant J. Stewart Brown and Joseph M. Dyson who she knew by name.

As the war progressed, Clara became acutely aware of the need for frontline care for the wounded and dying. Her desire to care for them put her in mortal danger numerous times. She writes of her time with the soldiers at Antietam in September of 1862: "We were in a slight hollow and all shell which did not break our guns in front, came directly among or over us, bursting above our heads or burying themselves in the hills beyond. A man lying upon the ground asked for a drink, I stopped to give it, and having raised him with my right hand, was holding him. Just at this moment a bullet sped its free and easy way between us, tearing a hole in my sleeve and found its way into his body. He fell back dead. There was no more to be done for him and I left him to his rest. I have never mended that hole in my sleeve. I wonder if a soldier ever does mend a bullet hole in his coat?”

These experiences as gleaned from her writings, demonstrate the conviction of purpose and character that she had developed since her time caring for her brother’s injuries.

There are several key traits of Clara’s personality that are apparent in both her writings and of those who knew her.

The first is that she was never interested in money, only in solving humanities ill fortunes. This is best described later as she would later become the founder of the American Red Cross and would petition the U.S. Government to have its purpose expanded as a humanitarian relief organization for natural disasters as well as their charter to aid the wounded, sick, and dying in war. 

The second trait that also is very apparent is her love for her fellow man and the ability to rise to the occasion when events merit it. I’m reminded fondly of Mother Teresa and her ministering to the poor, sick, and weak ‘untouchables’ of India who she cared for during most of her adult life.

Towards the end of the war Clara was recognized for her gallant service by being named the Superintendent of the Department of Nurses under Surgeon McCormack who was Chief Director of the Army of the James stationed at City Point, Virginia.

As was always the case with Clara, she never settled for comfort in the ‘safe’ zones, but wanted to be attending to the infirm on the frontlines. 

Her oldest brother Stephen would also become a victim of the war and perhaps one of her greatest motivations to fulfill her duty as a nurse.

Stephen Barton had been mistakenly identified as a Confederate by the Union due to his living in North Carolina and had been neglected for a long period until Clara got word of him being hospitalized in Washington D.C. By this time, his health had deteriorated beyond hope.

Not long before he passed away in 1865, she wrote of hearing one of his final, moving prayers: "Oh God, whose children we all are, look down with thine eye of justice and mercy upon this terrible conflict, and weaken the wrong, and strengthen the right till this unequal contest close. Oh God, save my country. Bless Abraham and his armies.” She also painted a vivid portrait of what the conditions of where he passed were: "And there under the guns of Richmond, amid the groans of the dying, in the shadows of the smoky rafters of an old negro hut, by the rude chimney where the dusky form of the bondsman had crouched for years, and on the ground, trodden hard by the foot of the slave, I knelt beside that rough couch of boards, and, to the patriot prayer that rose above, sobbed 'Amen.'”

American Red Cross Founder

For four years following the Civil War, Clara Barton helped find those men who were missing in action from the official records of the war’s dead. While still living in Washington D.C., she ran the Office of Missing Soldiers to identify those who were killed or missing in action to try to relieve the suffering of family and friends.

During this time, she met and befriended Susan B. Anthony as well as Frederick Douglas. These relationships would leave a lasting impression on her as she championed women’s suffrage and civil rights for the rest of her life.

The years of Civil War work for others had taken their toll on Clara. After seeing her doctor and following his orders to get rest and recuperation from her many travails, she decided to visit Europe in 1869. Her first visit was to Liverpool, England and then on to Paris. Her final stop was to be where her life’s calling was forever changed.

Arriving in Geneva, Switzerland for the end of her vacation period, she was visited by the president and members of the “International Committee for the Relief of the Wounded in the War”, which would later become the International Committee of the Red Cross. Since Clara had such an outstanding reputation even with the international community, she was asked why America didn’t honor the recently signed ‘Geneva Convention’ and why after such a conflict as theirs, they wouldn’t be interested in it? Her answer was simple: “I listened in silent wonder to all this recital, and when I did reply it was to say that I had never heard of the Convention of Geneva nor of the treaty, and was sure that as a country America did not know she had declined.”

Not long after she had arrived in Geneva, the Franco-Prussian war broke out. Clara was able to see first-hand how the Red Cross in Europe was operating and how it contrasted with her experiences in the Civil War: "As I journeyed on and saw the work of these Red Cross societies in the field, accomplishing in four months under their systematic organization what we failed to accomplish in four years without it — no mistakes, no needless suffering, no starving, no lack of care, no waste, no confusion, but order, plenty, cleanliness and comfort wherever that little flag made its way — a whole continent marshaled under the banner of the Red Cross — as I saw all this, and joined and worked in it, you will not wonder that I said to myself 'if I live to return to my country I will try to make my people understand the Red Cross and that treaty.' But I did more than resolve, I promised other nations I would do it, and other reasons pressed me to remember my promise.”

One is struck with the irony of Clara’s timing in situations where war breaks out. It seems that she was called for just a time as these.

In early 1871 the Franco-Prussian war ended, but the battles continued throughout both Germany and France until the late summer of the same year. Clara stayed through this entire time ministering to the sick, treating the wounded, establishing clothiers who would fashion garments for the poorest, and soliciting funds from aristocratic donors who included Grand Duchess Louise of Baden, Kingdom of Prussia. Her willingness to befriend any class of person is another testament to her savviness and skill.

By 1874 Clara was worn out from her time in Europe and lack of recuperation. She was no stranger to loss having found out that her sister Sally had died before she could see her one final time in Worcester. Her only remaining relative in her family circle was her brother David whom she had nursed back to health as a child.

She spent several more years convalescing and writing friends, family, and officials of her intentions to establish the American Red Cross. With great perseverance, she was finally successful in 1881 with President James Garfield’s administration and it was established. An assassin’s bullet struck down the President and delayed the formal establishment of the association while the nation mourned for 80 days. 

Finally, in 1882, the Red Cross was formally established with ratification by Congress and the signing of the Geneva Convention by President Chester Arthur. Its role had expanded from not just treating the wounded and dying from war, but also those who experienced natural disasters.

At a convention of the International Red Cross in Geneva during 1882, the President of the International organization gave Clara the credit for the new American branch: "Its whole history is associated with a name already known to you — that of Miss Clara Barton; without the energy and perseverance of this remarkable woman, we should not for a long time have had the pleasure of seeing the Red Cross received into the United States."

Clara would serve as the President of the American Red Cross until June, 1904. Her tasks of running the organization along with doing fieldwork are unheard of in this day and age. 

As the years went by, Clara would write her autobiography titled: ‘The Story of My Childhood’. But the Clara Barton that I read about was gleaned from the book titled: ‘The Life of Clara Barton’, by Percy Elper who was the only authorized biographer of her life by the family. He used her unpublished war diaries, letters, eyewitness accounts, and conversations to write a truly compelling picture of this unique lady. 

Clara died in her home in 1912 at the age of 90. Her stature and legacy on American society have had a tremendous impact on so many people. We have much to learn from her compassionate and caring nature for those in need.

What do you think of Clara Barton? Let us know below.

References

Percy H. Epler, “The Life of Clara Barton”, The Macmillan Company, New York, July 1915.

 “Evolution of the Railroad”, https://www.history.com/topics/industrial-revolution/videos/evolution-of-railroads

“Nursing History – Clara Barton”, 

https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/enterprise-assets/about-us/history/history-clara-barton-v3.pdf

“Biography of Mother Teresa”, https://www.biography.com/people/mother-teresa-9504160

“The Domesday Book”, http://www.domesdaybook.co.uk/

“Clara Barton – Library of Congress”, https://www.loc.gov/item/2018651854/

Lincoln and The Battle of Gettysburg: How the Joy of Victory Quickly Turned into Agony

With the Union’s Army of the Potomac finally defeating Robert E. Lee, you’d think the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg would have elated Abraham Lincoln. Instead, for him, the battle produced a harvest of bitterness and disappointment. Lamont Wood, whose book Lincoln's Planner: A Unique Look at the Civil War Through the President's Daily Activities (Amazon US | Amazon UK) was recently published, explains why this American Civil War battle produced such feelings.

A depiction of the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg. Hand-colored lithograph by Currier and Ives.

After two years of indecisive yet bloody warfare, Lincoln glimpsed victory in July 1863. Out West, a Union army was besieging Vicksburg and it looked like the Union would soon control the Mississippi River. Another Union army was advancing in central Tennessee, while on the coast the Union siege of Charleston looked promising. With the addition of Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg, surely victory was within grasp.

But there was no follow-through.

As reflected in his collected wartime papers (and recounted in “Lincoln’s Planner”), as the battle unfolded on July 1 and 2, 1863, the president spent a lot of his time in the War Department’s telegraph office, reading dispatches from the front as they arrived.

Independence Day

On July 4, Independence Day, a Saturday, and the day after Pickett’s Charge, both sides at Gettysburg stood in place during the morning, Lincoln put out a press release congratulating his army, asking that, “He whose will, not ours, should ever be done, be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude.” That night he helped mount a fireworks display at the White House.

But that was as upbeat as things got.

Meanwhile, torrential rains began falling at Gettysburg and Lee began pulling his army out of Pennsylvania. From out of left field, the Confederate vice president, Alexander H. Stephens showed up under a flag of truce at Fortress Monroe, asking to come to Washington to talk to Lincoln, supposedly to discuss prisoner exchanges. (Presumably, Stephens’ real motivation was to be on hand should the Administration become favorable to peace negotiations following Confederate successes in Pennsylvania.)

On July 5 (Sunday) Lincoln attended a Cabinet meeting where they discussed Stephens’ request, which Lincoln discounted. Lincoln (accompanied by his 10-year-old son Tad) then visited wounded general (and Republican friend and all-round scandal magnet) Dan Sickles, who had been evacuated to Washington after losing a leg at Gettysburg.

Back at the telegraph office, Lincoln saw a report about a Union cavalry raid the previous day that destroyed a Confederate pontoon bridge across the Potomac at Falling Waters, West Virginia. Lincoln bypassed the chain of command and directly telegraphed Gen. William French asking if the rain-swollen Potomac could be forded. The answer: no.

The enticing implication was that Lee was stuck on the north side of the Potomac, unable to retreat to Virginia, and subject to momentary destruction by the pursuing Federals – a development that could wrap up the war.

Too Quiet on the Potomac

The next day (Monday, July 6) Lincoln attended a morning Cabinet meeting and convinced them to ignore Stephens—if the Confederate vice president really wanted to talk about prisoner exchanges, there were existing channels for that.

And then Lincoln’s hopes were shattered by the arrival of Gen. Herman Haupt, the chief railroad engineer of the Union army, who pulled into town from Gettysburg on one of his trains and rushed to the White House. He told Lincoln that he feared Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, was going to let Lee get away. Haupt had spoken with Meade Saturday and heard Meade say that his army had nearly been defeated and needed rest. Meade noted that since Lee did not have a pontoon train his army would be stuck on the north side of the Potomac, implying that an immediate pursuit wasn’t necessary. Haupt told him that the Confederates could throw together a temporary bridge by tearing down buildings for lumber, but Meade wasn’t impressed.

Lincoln then spent the afternoon back in the telegraph office, and what he saw confirmed the fears raised by Gen. Haupt. He returned to the White House about 7 and wrote to Gen. Henry Halleck, his chief of staff, complaining that the messages he saw indicated a policy of herding the enemy forces across the river rather than trapping and destroying them. “You know I did not like the phrase… ‘Drive the invaders from our soil,’” Lincoln said.

The next morning (Tuesday, July 7) Gen. Meade finally had his infantry march in pursuit of Lee. Lincoln was back in the telegraph office when notice arrived from Vicksburg of the Confederate surrender there on July 4. (Grant’s army did not have a direct telegraph connection with Washington.)

The city erupted into celebration and a crowd eventually gathered outside the White House demanding a speech. Lincoln made his longest-known off-the-cuff address, with themes he would re-use in the speech he gave four months later at Gettysburg, such as, “On the 4th the cohorts of those who opposed the declaration that all men are created equal turned tail and run.”

The day after (Wednesday, July 8) Gen. Meade’s infantry caught up with Lee’s cornered army, but there was no major action. Lincoln was heard to complain that Gen. Meade is “as likely to capture the Man-in-the-Moon, as any part of Lee’s army.”

Thursday was equally frustrating, as Lincoln returned to the tasks of the Executive Branch, while things remained all quiet on the Potomac. Friday, the opposing armies probed each other, while Lincoln sent a telegram to an old friend back in Illinois, saying that the rumors were true and Lee had indeed been defeated at Gettysburg.

Saturday (July 11) Gen. Meade reported that he had decided to attack the trapped Confederates, and Lincoln’s mood was seen to improve.

Then, Sunday, Gen. Meade pushed the attack back a day, saying he needed time for reconnaissance. “Too late!” Lincoln groaned when he read the message.

On Monday, July 13, Lincoln sent a thank you letter to Gen. Grant for his recent victory at Vicksburg, noting that he had been worried about Grant’s plan to operate away from the Mississippi and take the city from the land side, but “you were right and I was wrong.” (Grant took a month to respond.)

Getting away

That night, Lee’s army slipped across the falling Potomac.

The next day, Lincoln wrote a thank you letter to Gen. Meade, as he had done to Gen. Grant. But the tone was radically different. “I am very – very – grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country… I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely... Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.”

He filed the letter away, and never sent it.

As Lincoln feared, the war did drag on, lasting nearly two more years. The main impact of Gettysburg was that Lee would never again launch a major offensive.

What do you think of this article? Let us know below.

Lamont Wood is a journalist and history writer. He has been freelancing for more than three decades in the history, high-tech, and industrial fields. He has sold more than six hundred magazine feature articles and twelve books. He and his wife, Dr. Louise O’Donnell, reside in San Antonio, Texas. His book, Lincoln's Planner: A Unique Look at the Civil War Through the President's Daily Activities (Amazon US | Amazon UK), is available here.

Did Ulysses S. Grant really have a Drinking Problem?

Ulysses S. Grant, famous American Civil War General and the 18th president of the United States, led a very full life in many ways. But are the stories that he was an alcoholic true? Stephen Bitsoli separates the fact from the fiction…

Ulysses S. Grant on a cover of Grant's Tobacco.

In one of his classic phone call comedy skits, Bob Newhart imagines a conversation between President Abraham Lincoln and his press agent shortly before the Gettysburg Address. Among the many topics they discuss is General Ulysses S. Grant.

“You’re getting complaints about Grant’s drinking? Abe, I don’t see the problem. You knew he was a lush when you hired him.” Asked for a “squelch” for the press, Lincoln’s gag writers come up with: “Tell them you’re going to find out what brand he drinks, and then send a case to all your other generals.”

Supposedly Lincoln did say something like that. Even if he didn’t, he did think highly of Grant. Even after a near disaster at the Battle of Shiloh, when there were calls for Grant to be dismissed, Lincoln said, “I cannot spare this man; he fights.”

Grant’s Reputation

Ask most people what they “know” about Ulysses S. Grant today, and they’ll probably say three things: he was a great general, a lousy president, and a drunk.

A great general? Well, after being forced to resign his commission as captain (or else be court-martialed) in 1854, he rejoined the army in 1861 at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War. There he restored discipline to a problem regiment, won battle after battle, rising through the ranks to become commander of all Union forces. He succeeded – despite political and military enemies and a sometimes hostile press – on the strength and number of his military victories. So, by most conventional measures, he seems to have been a great general.

A lousy president? Well, I guess that depends on how you define lousy. He wasn’t thought of as one at the time, and neither do most of today’s historians. He was easily elected to two terms, and almost won nomination for a third. There was a lot of corruption during his administration, but none was traced back to him. And he was a strong advocate for protecting the rights of the former slaves, especially in the South. He even broke the Ku Klux Klan, and made human rights a national concern. Just before his death he published his wartime memoirs, considered one of the finest by any former president, and it was a best-seller. So, sure, his presidency wasn’t perfect, but lousy seems to be an overly harsh judgment.

What about a drunk? Well, he did resign his commission in 1854 after allegedly being drunk on duty. And there are numerous other anecdotes about his drinking. Even one of his defenders, Civil War biographer Edward G. Longacre, wrote that while “Grant did not fit the stereotype of the falling-down drunk” – he could refuse a drink or drink moderately – “he was, in the clinical sense of the term, an alcoholic.” There are also reports that he sometimes fell down or off his horse, and at least once he was reported to have vomited in public.

But while falling over or vomiting can be indicative of excessive drinking, they can also be caused by eating crappy army rations in unsanitary battlefield conditions. He also had crippling migraines which might have been mistaken for hangovers, especially since alcohol was prescribed for them. Grant did have throat cancer, which can be a physical sign of alcohol abuse, especially when paired with tobacco (and Grant did smoke a lot), but based on the more cosmetic consequences – prominent sores, spidery red veins on the skin, especially the nose and cheeks – there is little evidence that Grant abused alcohol.

Myth and Reality

Why anyone cares that Grant drank is an interesting question in itself. As has been said, he was a successful, even brilliant soldier. If he did that while drinking, or maybe because he was drinking, then Lincoln’s alleged anecdote might even be a sound strategy.

Actually, in those days everybody drank a lot more than we do today. “In 1825, Americans over the age of 15 consumed on average seven gallons of alcohol — generally whiskey or hard cider — each year (today that figure is about two gallons, mostly of beer and wine).”

More likely, according to most sources, is that he was (at least early in his career) a binge drinker who mostly drank when separated from his family or out of boredom. According to his friend Lt. Henry Hodges, “He would perhaps go on two or three sprees a year, but was always open to reason.” Reports that he drank to inebriation during or before his Civil War battles seem entirely fanciful.

So, where did the claims that Grant routinely drank to excess come from? According to Civil War historian and archivist Michael B. Ballard, “Almost all, if not all, the stories about various drunken states are apocryphal.”

Grant's purported drinking problems are largely the result of a smear campaign against him by his rivals and political enemies – both “Lost Cause” Southerners still smarting from their defeat in the Civil War and his political opposition – that began after his two terms as Commander in Chief. In part they were upset over his attempts to enforce Reconstruction and protect the freedmen’s rights. In particular, his use of federal troops to enforce the 14th and 15th amendments and confront the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacists was seen as tyrannical and imposing “black domination.”

Then there are those who find it romantic to consider Grant (as one website article dubs him) “a drunken fighting machine from American History.” Even novelist Susan Cheever, the daughter of a famous alcoholic, falls into this fallacy in Drinking in America: Our Secret History, proclaiming that Grant “was known to have a serious drinking problem,” but that this was a time “when alcohol may have had a positive effect.” As if his victories were attributable to the physical signs of alcohol abuse!

And finally there are the journalists, who in those days were far more willing to invent things than journalists in the present. Sylvanus Cadwallader, a newspaper reporter, wrote down one such story (though not printed until after his death three decades after the war), claiming that Grant had a barrel of whiskey in his tent for his exclusive use. No one else ever mentioned it.

It would be foolish to state that Grant never drank, or never drank to excess, but the myth of his being either a pathetic drunk or a hard-drinking man of action isn’t borne out by the evidence.

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Stephen Bitsoli blogs about addiction, recovery, mental health, and wellness. He has asked us to link to a rehabilitation center here.

The Southern Belle… And Spy in the American Civil War

During the American Civil War, one bold woman in the heart of the Confederacy dared to support the Union cause by freeing her slaves, aiding captured soldiers, and leading a spy ring that extended into the Confederate White House itself. Though her story may be obscure, her boldness and courage during the toughest years in American history tell the tale of a true American hero. Chloe Helton explains.

The Battle of Seven Pines, Virginia May 31, 1862. The battle took place near Richmond where Elizabeth Van Lew was from.

John Van Lew, Elizabeth’s father, was the owner of a wildly successful hardware store when he married Eliza Baker, the daughter of a former Philadelphia mayor. No doubt the prominence and wealth of the Van Lew family created the circumstances which allowed for Elizabeth’s successes in aiding the Union during the war. A well-rounded education and cushy wealth made for an outspoken and independent young woman in Elizabeth, and the distaste for these traits among the Richmond elite may account for some of the reason for an attractive, wealthy young woman like Elizabeth having never married. That is not to say, however, that she did not use her charms: often she was able to persuade high-ranking Confederate men to heed her requests, which allowed the success of many of her anti-Confederate actions during the Civil War.

When Virginia announced its secession from the Union, a celebratory parade marched through Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. Perhaps every citizen in the whole city was present for the festivities except Elizabeth and her mother, Eliza. Elizabeth, an ardent Union supporter who after her father’s death had used her considerable inheritance to buy and free the families of her emancipated slaves, soured at the prospect of secession and considered fleeing the city. Not one to flee from unfriendly situations, and much too attached to her beloved family home, she eventually decided to stay, vowing to instead help the Union in any way she could.

Growing opposition

At first her actions were not hotly opposed within the city. Southerners expected swift victory in the war and initially Northern prisoners were treated well, so even when Elizabeth requested that a captive Northern Congressman who had fallen gravely ill be treated in her own home it was easily allowed, and not much suspicion was aroused. The Congressman, Calvin Huson, Jr., died soon after his relocation despite tender care from the Van Lew ladies, but Elizabeth received a thank-you letter from Union soldiers in Richmond which she kept with her until her death. As the war dragged on supply shortages ravaged the South, and when Elizabeth requested permission to visit the infamous Libby Prison she was told - by the First Lady’s half-brother (a Confederate officer), no less - that a lady like her should not be fraternizing with the enemy. Elizabeth redirected her plea to the Secretary of the Treasury, C.G. Memminger, and after she turned some of his own famous arguments about Christians proving their love for each other through aid even to those who did not deserve it he did grant her request. She used her considerable fortune to buy produce for enemy prisoners in a time when most common city folk could scarcely afford to eat, and the result among her peers was social isolation and death threats.

Van Lew’s induction into espionage did not begin intentionally. Many of the prisoners had acquired pieces of information from the Southerners they came into contact with - guards, doctors, and deserters mostly - and when these bits of hearsay were all compiled it was considerably useful. Elizabeth simply passed it on to Union officers, and because part of her family’s farm was outside the city walls she was easily able to pass on information there without arousing suspicion. Some issues did arise: at one point her pass to visit the prisons was rescinded, but with more manipulation she was able to receive permission again. The prison guards also became wary of her and banned her from speaking to the prisoners. However, this did not discourage her from soliciting information: she poked messages into cloth with pins and slipped pieces of paper into the bottom of a food dish.

Supporting the other side

Despite her valiant and charitable efforts in the prisons, Elizabeth’s real claim to fame began when Jefferson Davis, the Confederate President, began asking for reliable servants for the Southern White House. Van Lew was apparently unable to pass up this opportunity and offered one of her freed slaves for hire, and Davis, who had known her father, accepted. When Mary Bowser began work in the White House, Davis didn’t think she even knew how to read, much less that she had been educated in the North and had photographic memory, so he was careless with his papers around her - too careless. Word soon got out that there was a leak in the White House, but nobody ever suspected the unassuming former slave.

Elizabeth did see other excitement during the war. In 1862 Union forces were tantalizingly close to capturing Richmond, and the feisty Southern belle even prepared a room in her house for General McClellan to stay as her guest. After a powerful speech from Robert E. Lee, however, the Confederates were able to drive them away. Until the next and final invasion of Richmond, Elizabeth bided her time by directing the spy ring she was now leading, which ran so smoothly and efficiently that despite frequent house checks by a suspicious Rebel officer no evidence could be found of her treason. She did protest these annoying visits, eventually housing a Confederate officer as a guest in order to ease suspicion. Van Lew also helped Colonel Paul Revere (a descendant of the Revolutionary Paul Revere) escape certain execution by helping him escape and housing him in her attic.

At the conclusion of the Civil War, as Richmond prepared for the march of Union soldiers into the city, Elizabeth proudly raised the American flag above her home. This bold action caused a mob to descend upon her mansion and she quashed it with feasible threats. After the war, though, Elizabeth’s pro-Union actions were revealed and she faced social isolation throughout the rest of her life. After a stressful stint as postmaster in Richmond and the death of her mother she fell into a depression which lasted the rest of her life. Her bold actions and unrelenting dedication to her cause cemented her in history as one of the most famous spies during the war, however, and her story is an inspiration.

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Reference

• Karen Zeinert - Elizabeth Van Lew: Southern Belle, Union Spy