Few operations are shrouded in intrigue and myth as the raid on the Gran Sasso mountain-top location where Benito Mussolini was being held. At the heart of this mission were the German Fallschirmjäger, the German elite paratroopers, whose planning and execution were pivotal. However, history often credits the mission's success to Otto Johann Anton Skorzeny, a charismatic SS officer who played a small role in the rescue. The mission was meticulously planned and executed by the Fallschirmjäger, however, Skorzeny ensured he was remembered as the mission's mastermind.

Terry Bailey explains.

Mussolini with German forces. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-567-1503A-07 / Toni Schneiders / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

By 1943, the tide of the Second World War was turning against the Axis powers. In Italy, internal dissent reached a crescendo with the overthrow of Benito Mussolini, (Duce). Several of his colleagues were close to revolt, and Mussolini was forced to summon the Grand Council on the July 24, 1943. This was the first time the body had met since the start of the war. When he announced that the Germans were thinking of evacuating the south, Grandi launched a blistering attack on him. Grandi moved a resolution asking the king to resume his full constitutional powers—in effect, a vote of no confidence in Mussolini.

Thus on July 25, 1943, by order of King Victor Emmanuel III, Mussolini was arrested, he was moved to various locations to prevent any rescue attempts by his German allies. His final and most secure prison was the Hotel Campo Imperatore, situated high on the Gran Sasso massif in the Apennine Mountains.

Adolf Hitler was determined to rescue Mussolini, the task was assigned to the Luftwaffe's elite Fallschirmjäger under the command of General Kurt Student. Concurrently, Hitler ordered the SS, represented by the ambitious Otto Skorzeny, to get involved in the operation to track and identify the location where Mussolini was being held. This dual-command structure sowed the seeds for future credit disputes, a situation that plagued many German operations throughout the war, not only concerning credit but in some cases detrimental to a number Nazi operations.

The planning of Operation Gran Sasso began with exhaustive intelligence gathering. The Fallschirmjäger, known for their meticulous preparations, used reconnaissance flights to gather aerial photographs and detailed maps of the hotel and surrounding terrain that Otto Skorzeny had identified. They analyzed weather conditions, altitude challenges, and potential escape routes.

 

Key Elements of the Plan:

1.   Aerial Assault: The only feasible approach to the heavily guarded hotel was from the air. The Fallschirmjäger, experienced in airborne operations, planned a glider-borne assault. Gliders, being silent and capable of landing in confined space in a concentration of force, were ideal for the mission.

2.   Surprise and Speed: The element of surprise was paramount. The plan was to land gliders on the narrow plateau near the hotel, overpower the guards, and secure Mussolini swiftly before any reinforcements could arrive.

3.   Command Structure: While the Fallschirmjäger were responsible for the operational details, Otto Skorzeny, with no prior experience in airborne operations, was included in the planning due to his SS ties and Hitler's directives. His role was ostensibly to assist and ensure SS involvement.

 

However, due to his personality, Skorzeny aimed to use the mission as an opportunity to promote his ideas of unconventional warfare, as he had studied the successes of British special operations.

On September 12, 1943, the meticulously planned operation was put into action. The operation, codenamed Unternehmen Eiche (Operation Oak), commenced with a formation of ten DFS 230 gliders, towed by Heinkel He 111 aircraft, departing from Pratica di Mare near Rome, carrying the elite Fallschirmjäger troops, and Otto Skorzeny with 16 SS assault troops.

 

Key Phases of the Execution:

1.   Aerial Approach: The gliders, piloted by experienced Fallschirmjäger, detached from their tow planes at the precise moment and began their silent descent towards the Gran Sasso plateau. The challenging mountainous terrain required expert navigation to avoid detection and ensure a safe landing.

2.   Landing and Assault: Despite the difficult terrain, the gliders landed with remarkable precision near the hotel. The operational commander, (Oberleutnant Georg Freiherr), led the Fallschirmjäger in a swift assault. They quickly overwhelmed the Italian guards, who were caught off guard by the sudden appearance of German troops. (It is argued later that a number of the guards were pro-Mussolini and some welcomed the German's arrival).

3.   Securing Mussolini: Skorzeny, eager to assert his presence, was among the first to reach Mussolini. Ensuring he was visibly at the forefront, Skorzeny famously declared to Mussolini, "Duce, the Führer has sent me to set you free!" This moment, captured in photographs, was crucial for Skorzeny's later claims of leadership.

4.   Evacuation: With Mussolini secured, the team signaled for the waiting Fieseler Fi 156 Storch aircraft. The rugged terrain made the takeoff challenging, especially since Skorzeny had insisted on accompanying Mussolini even though the plane was only suitable for the Duce and the pilot. However, with great skill Captain Gerlach, managed to lift off with Mussolini and Skorzeny onboard.

 

The operation was a resounding success, achieved with only two Italians killed and two slightly wounded. Mussolini was flown to Vienna and then to Germany, where he was greeted as a hero. However, the real battle was just beginning – the battle for credit.

Skorzeny, with his flair for drama and self-promotion, was quick to present himself as the mastermind of the operation. His SS connections and personal rapport with Hitler gave him a significant advantage. The iconic photographs of him with Mussolini bolstered his narrative. He was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, and his fame soared.

In contrast, the contributions of the Fallschirmjäger, who had meticulously planned and executed the mission, were overshadowed, despite their pivotal role, and received comparatively little recognition. The post-war narratives, influenced by Skorzeny's memoirs and his relentless self-promotion, further cemented his legend.

While Otto Skorzeny's role in Operation Gran Sasso cannot be entirely dismissed, simply because Skorzeny not only identified Mussolini's location, in addition to, the fact that he was present with his men but also because he had suggested the exact landing zone for the gliders. However, it is essential to recognize the contributions of the Fallschirmjäger. The success of the mission was a true testament to their planning, skill, and bravery. Skorzeny's presence, though significant, was more of a political maneuver to ensure SS involvement and claim the glory.

Recent historical analyses have sought to rectify this imbalance. Military historians emphasize the Fallschirmjäger's expertise in airborne operations and highlight the comprehensive planning by General Kurt Student's elite Fallschirmjäger. These reassessments underscore the collaborative nature of the mission, with the Fallschirmjäger's groundwork being crucial to its success.

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, Operation Gran Sasso remains one of the Second World War's most dramatic and daring missions. The successful rescue of Mussolini was a remarkable feat of military precision, courage and flying ability. While Otto Skorzeny emerged as the public face of the mission, it was the meticulous planning and execution by the German Fallschirmjäger that ensured the success of the mission.

In the broader context of military history, Operation Gran Sasso serves as a reminder of the complexities of war, where deeds on the battlefield often become intertwined with political machinations and personal ambitions. The Fallschirmjäger, though overshadowed in popular narratives, remain the true heroes of this audacious operation, exemplifying the skill and bravery that defined Germany's elite paratroopers. These characteristics were true for all airborne operations of the Second World War for both Axis and Allied airborne forces and still are of airborne forces today.

 

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In 1935 Fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolini’s rule, invaded Abyssinia, one of the few independent countries in Africa at the time. The war split opinion in Europe, and caused particular issues for Britain and France as they hoped to ally with Italy against Nazi Germany’s plans. Should they strongly intervene against Italy, or offer a more limited response? Stephen Prout explains.

Italian troops advancing on Addis Ababa during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-37).

Introduction

In 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia). Italy was then under the control of a fascist regime ruled by Benito Mussolini and part of his grandiose plans was to expand Italy’s modest empire. In the immediate years after the First World War’s end there was deep dissatisfaction with the terms of the Paris Peace conference, Vittorio Orlando and Sonnino his Foreign Ministers departed early betrayed by her Western allies. In the 1915 Treaty of London Italy’s former allies, Britain, France, and Russia, promised her territory in the Balkans and North Africa in return for her participation in the war on the Allied side - but these promises were broken and she left empty handed. Mussolini came to power in 1921. His aspiration was clear - it was to make Italy great, respected and feared.  Part of that plan was the expansion of the Italian Empire.

Abyssinia was Italy’s first major territorial gain and in October 1935 forces of the Italian Army conquered the country isnless than a year. The new League of nations would be outraged and on the surface Britain and France would be disapproving. Although the conflict was on a different continent thousands miles away it had grave significance for European affairs. The outcome would place an isolated Italy in the Nazi Camp and once again divide Europe into two opposing camps.

Abyssinia and its relations with Europe

The imperial powers had always been present and hovering in the background since the late nineteenth century ready to meddle in Abyssinian affairs. Italy had long carried an irreconcilable sense of national humiliation from her defeat by Abyssinian forces in 1896 at Adwa. She had not had the opportunity to repair her international standing in the same way Britain did when the Zulu army overcame British forces at Isandlwana in the 1880s. This had always been a blight to Italy’s new national pride.

As far as other European powers were concerned, in 1906 Italy along with Britain and France formed a Tripartite Pact in which spheres of influence in Abyssinia were established amongst the three powers, and they were ready to enact and occupy in the event of the country’s collapse following a period of turmoil.

Abyssinia was one of two independent countries in Africa in the 1930s (the other was Liberia). That set them apart from the rest of the colonized continent (slight exceptions were South Africa and Egypt who had semi-autonomous roles as either veiled protectorates or Dominion status). Africa was still very much under European domination, mainly Britain and France. Italy was seeking expansion in North Africa, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.  Abyssinia offered that sole opportunity as far as Africa was concerned. Trying to seize British or French territory was militarily out of the question for her.

When compared to European standards Abyssinia was very much behind economically, socially, and politically. Abyssinia entered the twentieth century with many of its medieval ways and customs intact. It operated a slave trade this far into the twentieth century and it did not end until after the Second World War.  The education system excluded much of the population and the army was largely equipped with traditional weaponry. Conversely there was evidence of a nascent modernization as she had access to modest trade with the USA, Germany, Britain, and Italy at the turn of the century. For example in 1906 its exports to the USA amounted to 3 million dollars ($106 million in today’s money). Internally the education system was also progressing as a government edict made education compulsory for all males and it was no longer restricted to religious instruction.    

For Italy there was the unresolved matter of her military defeat in 1896 and the promise to expand the Italian Empire to make good the broken promises of the 1915 Treaty of London. The pretext Italy used to justify the war was a retaliation to border violations after growing tensions supported with a spurious claim to abolish the slave trade that continued in Abyssinia. Mussolini had made it clear that he wanted to build a new Roman Empire and make Italy respected and feared. Abyssinia was his opportunity and he justified the action by believing that he was acting no differently to Britain and France in Africa.  However, his mistake was not realizing that the time of empires and colonies had no place in the mid-twentieth century. Italy was fifty years too late for an African scramble.

The Dilemma for Europe

As far as the British public was concerned, on the surface this was a moral battle. An underdog nation was fighting for its existence against a more powerful aggressor. This hypocrisy seemed to largely ignore the fact that Britain still had a firm grip of its empire and was in some areas supressing with force independence movements. The resolve that was expressed however was clear and it was any action short of war, with no intention or plan for any alternative.  In diplomatic circles in Europe the perspective was very different indeed. The events in Abyssinia from the Italian invasion were more of a side show but how could a developing country some eight thousand kilometres from Europe be a concern to the Western Powers of Europe and indeed Germany?

In truth the British and French were not concerned over Abyssinia. It was public opinion and the state of the League of Nations that forced the appearance of urgency from Britain and France.  Underneath all this Italy was an ally despite its Fascist nature - and more importantly a member of the recently formed alliance that became known as the Stresa Front Alliance with France and Britain that had the aim of maintaining peace and stability in Europe and containing revisionist Germany. It was important that she was not irked or isolated by actions that Britain or France may be compelled to take on direction or pressure from the League of Nations.

Britain only had her own interests in mind and that was security in Western stability and her own colonies. The Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, John Maffey, quickly assured the Government that none of the nation’s British interests were at risk after the Italian invasion. At home not all British politicians shared the public outrage. Within the Conservative Party, Leo Amery expressed his support for the Italian actions. Churchill remained quiet on the matter. The widely held belief of Amery is that he was an anti-appeaser due his famous speech that he would make later in 1940 demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. In fact, quite the reverse was true. Amery voiced support for the Japanese invasion of Manchuria as well as for Italy’s actions in Africa. Amery argued in the case of the former that Japan had a “strong case for her invasion of Manchuria” and that Britain and France should have ceded Abyssinian territory much earlier to Italy and eschew League intervention. More specifically, in 1936 he stated that the Italian intervention would give a “merciful deliverance to be released from Abyssinian control”.

Britain was also concerned with her appearance before the League of Nations and had to balance her own interests with her obligations as a leading member. The Abyssinian crisis showed how impotent the League could be in the face of aggression from a permanent member and also when combined with conflicting interests and agendas of the members. Some diplomats were quite willing to circumvent the League in such cases as Lord Curzon during Italy’s actions in Corfu.  In the background there was the concern that the presence of an independent nation on the borders of Europe’s colonies could also spread nationalistic ideas.  This was especially a worry for Britain who had lost Egypt, Ireland, and Iraq already, while India was showing noisy displays of dissent. Therefore the Italian invasion of Abyssinia would not inconvenience her nor the French too much. Ever since In the Tripartite Treaty of 1906, the three were all prepared to occupy this independent nation if their own interests were threatened or if the situation in the country did not favor them.

For Britain and France Italy was more valuable in keeping on side within the 1935 Stresa front. Italian membership and military support were vital and essential if Germany was to be contained. The Western democracies were making overtures to Mussolini to avoid his isolation while applying very modest and meek sanctions to keep up appearances in the League. Abyssinia would be a small price to pay for their own security and interests, but ultimately the 1935 Stresa Front would crumble.

The Outcome

The outcome of the war was a victory for Italy. Within a year of the conflict ending the new Prime Minister of Great Britain Neville Chamberlain was already exchanging friendly correspondence with Mussolini and in 1937 was ready to acquiesce to Mussolini’s requests for recognition of Italy’s complete annexation of Abyssinia. Spheres of influence that were established in the Tripartite Act of 1906 were forgone, and the Western Powers even passed up the chance to fight for territory in Abyssinia. This displayed not so publicly how quickly the Western Powers could move on but how unimportant the sovereignty of Abyssinia was to them. Britain and France were colonial powers, and the disappearance of a sovereign nation would help to extinguish ideas of independence reaching their own colonies.

Britain and France could potentially have saved some of Abyssinia if they chose to by invoking the 1935 Stresa Front.  By occupying their self-proclaimed spheres, they could have denied much of the country to Italian forces.  This would have been a grander gesture than the mild sanctions applied. It only strengthened the point that the fate of Abyssinia was just not important enough.

Like all wars it had atrocities and more has been focused on the use of poison gas by Italy. Equally, Abyssinian combatants also acted outside of the conditions of the Geneva convention. The International Red Cross reported the castration of Italian prisoners of war by Abyssinian troops. Furthermore, it should be also noted that while under Italian occupation the slave trade was curtailed and outlawed, something which showed no signs of being arrested under the country’s old rulers. During Italian rule two laws were issued in October 1935 and in April 1936 which abolished slavery and freed 420,000 Ethiopian slaves. While not condoning Fascist actions the campaign was not as one sided as some accounts suggest. As far as the rest of the world was concerned the indifference to the fate of Abyssinia fate was shared as only six nations failed to recognise the Italian fait accompli.

The Abyssinians endured ten years of Italian occupation. Europe had now been forced into two camps with Italy now firmly on the side of the totalitarian powers rather than a country that would contain a growing and powerful Germany. Italian actions in Abyssinia along with Japanese intervention in Manchuria were portents. Italy would soon join Germany in intervening in Spain before participating against her former allies in the Second World War. Was it inevitable or was it a diplomatic tragedy?

What do you think of the Abyssinian Affair? Let us know below.

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Sources

Encyclopaedia of Antislavery and Abolition [Two Volumes] -Greenwood Press, 2006 - Peter P. Hinks, ‎John R. McKivigan, ‎R. Owen Williams

Mussolini- A New Life – N Farrell – 2003 – Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

AJP Taylor – English History 1914 – 1945

Europe of The Dictators

Report of War Crimes and Atrocities Abyssinia – International Red Cross

Leo Amery’s Imperial Attitude to Appeasement in the 1930’s – Richard S Grayson – University of London 2006

Benito Mussolini, the Italian Fascist leader during World War Two, is infamous for many reasons. But do you know what happened to his wife Rachele Giudi and his loyal mistress Claretta Petacci as World War Two came to an end? David Lehmann explains.

A colorised image of Benito Mussolini.

A colorised image of Benito Mussolini.

One of the most notable characters of the Second World War and, indeed, of the 20th century, Benito Mussolini, or as he was better known, Il Duce rarely needs an introduction. The Fascist leader of Italy captivated the world with his bold promises of restoring the Roman Empire, promising to once again return the Mediterranean Sea to its rightful status as Mare Nostorm or “Our sea.” Il Duce’s meteoric rise to power, culminating in 1922, was fueled by his charisma and his bombastic addresses to the public. Using his imposing oratory skills, Mussolini fed the desperate Italian public the steady diet of instilling confidence in his demoralized countrymen and promising a return to Italian glory - ensuring that he was the man who could singularly heal the wounds that had plagued this once great people.

We all know the well-known trope that “opposites attract” in the world of relationships. But when considering a man of Benito Mussolini’s character type, who regularly consumed approximately 98% of the oxygen in the room in order to fuel his ego and oratory style, it was an absolute necessity. Enter Rachele Mussolini or “Donna Rachele”, as she became known to the world. Born Rachele Giudi in 1890, Rachele was first introduced to Benito after being hired to the Mussolini family-owned tavern in Predappio as a kitchen maid. In 1910 the two were joined in less than holy matrimony due to Benito’s anti-clerical stance - but matrimony nonetheless. The two were not formally wed until 1925, well after Benito’s rise to the position of dictator. Rachele resisted relocating to Rome, preferring life outside the capital and would only relocate seven years later. Even then she sustained her avoidance of the limelight, much preferring the life of a homemaker. This contrast to her husband, in addition to a lot of traditional Fascist propaganda, earned her the love and sympathy of the Italian populace who were eagerly consumed by the trope of Mussolini and his traditional wife. Much of what is known about Rachele is understood through the lens of her husband, but her dedication to her children and her husband and commitment to family cannot be overstated. Rachele lived for family and in turn dedicated herself to their care.

 

A less than perfect union

The marriage of Benito and Rachele most often unfolded in the privacy of their own home. Unfortunately Il Duce’s indiscretions often did not. A well-known philanderer, Mussolini wantonly disregarded the fidelity tenet of marriage and regularly absconded from his marital bed. The explicit details of Il Duce’s escapades came to light with the publishing of the diary of Ercole Borrato, Benito’s longtime driver. The diary depicts a man wanton in his lust who possessed all the efficacy of a less physically restricted JFK, often having him stop while driving to pursue a beautiful woman he observed. Benito would regularly retreat to his beach resort, Castel Porziano, in order to properly concentrate on his less than sanctimonious trysts. 

Rachele seemingly tried her best to deal with her husband’s nature. Once stating, “My husband had a fascination for women. They all wanted him. Sometimes he showed me their letters – from women who wanted to sleep with him or have a baby with him. It always made me laugh.”[1] This was a surprisingly cheery view of the situation. However Borrato’s diary also contains a small glimpse into the pain Rachele must have experienced. In one instance, Benito returned to their home only to find Rachele waiting for him to confront him, chastising him for his lack of fidelity. One can imagine his car was symbolic of her husband’s infidelities. Despite the pain his cheating caused it seems Rachele had a harsher view of Benito’s other great pastime, politics. She once remarked: “You can't be happy in politics, never, because one day things go well, another day they go badly." [2]

 

Veni, Vidi, Vici - except the opposite

Mussolini’s bold proclamations of a return to Roman glory were soon exposed as the blustering of an overcompensating tyrant. Fascist Italy’s dreams of conquest quickly came to a sputtering halt. First, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 after months of preparation badly exposed the Italian military. Despite modern weaponry and the use of highly controversial gas bombs, the military struggled to defeat the much more poorly armed Ethiopian forces. Next, after the commencement of the world war and Nazi Germany’s rapid success, Mussolini grew impatient and invaded Greece in 1940. Again, the Italian forces fared poorly against less equipped Greek soldiers. The Italian advance soon flagged and then was shockingly forced to retreat, only to be saved by a Nazi intervention, further shaming Mussolini. One embarrassing defeat after another followed as Mussolini’s image shrunk in the minds of the Italian people. So much so that on July 24, 1943, Mussolini was ousted from power by the Fascist Grand Counsel and imprisoned. The once great man and his family were prisoners of his own populace.

 

The final apple of his wandering eye

Mussolini and his family were soon freed from their captivity after a daring German rescue. Instead of leaving Italy completely under Nazi control, he agreed to lead a newly created puppet state based in northern Italy. Benito was conscious of the inevitability of his impending defeat though, and helpless to affect change as greater powers used his homeland for their battlefield. Benito’s flagging spirits were buoyed by the presence of one Claretta Petacci. A lover of Benito’s since 1936, Claretta was devoted to Benito, sticking by him through his fall from grace. Following him to his new northern base, Claretta transformed into more than just a fling. Claretta attempted to bolster Benito’s confidence, urging him to retake his country and punish his enemies. This was exactly the kind of support a man like Benito Mussolini preferred at the time. So much so, that as the Allies marched north and partisan Italians decided now was the time to do away with their former dictator, it was Claretta who accompanied him via car in his attempted escape. Abandoning his family, Benito, Claretta and a few supporters attempted to make their way north into Switzerland. Unfortunately for the newly formed family unit they did not get far, with Benito’s face being all too familiar to the general Italian population. The pair were captured on April 27, 1945 and after Claretta’s refusal to abandon Benito, both were summarily executed the next day. 

Rachele and her surviving children were soon captured and handed over to the Allies, spared in sharing her husband’s fate. Rachele eventually settled in her native Predappio and never disavowed her husband’s politics and legacy. While her public sentiments to Benito always remained positive we can never truly know what was in her heart. Being abandoned by her husband in his final drive to freedom must have deeply wounded La Donna. After the war, Rachele fought for the proper burial of her husband’s remains and the return of his personal items. However there was one personal item which she refused, a bed which she dismissed with the comment, “Claretta used it.”[3]

 

What do you think of the fate of Mussolini’s wife and his mistress? Let us know below.


[1] Rubert Colley. “Rachele Mussolini- A Brief Biography.” April 11, 2015 

[2] J. Y. Smith “Rachele Mussolini Dies, Fascist Dictator's Widow.” October 31, 1979

[3] ID.

The causes of World War Two are varied, but some factors are more important than others. Here, Seth Eislund explains that fascism was the primary factor that led to World War Two. He considers Mussolini’s fascist Italy, Hitler’s Nazi Germany, and Horthy’s fascistic Hungary.

Seth has previously written an article on whether the Nazis achieved their domestic aims – here.

Miklos Horthy and Adolf Hitler in 1938.

Miklos Horthy and Adolf Hitler in 1938.

From November 1918 to September 1939, Europe existed in a fragile state of peace known as the interwar period. Political frustration and economic woes plagued European countries, especially Germany and Hungary, both of which endured a crippling defeat at the hands of the Allies. Germany and Hungary lost large swathes of territory to the Allies and faced grave economic depression and inflation. Even Italy, which had been on the winning side at the end of the First World War, endured “an inconclusive but costly victory.”[i]Hoping to return their countries to greatness, many Italians, Germans, and Hungarians eagerly adopted an ideology called “fascism,” which was promulgated by a former syndicalist named Benito Mussolini. Fascism emphasized expansionism, extreme nationalism, anti-Marxism, and anti-liberalism.[ii]Ultimately, due to its nationalist, expansionist, and warlike tendencies, fascism was the primary factor that shattered the fragile peace of the interwar period and incited the Second World War.

 

Italian Fascism

Benito Mussolini’s fascism promoted a love of warfare, nationalism, and expansionism, values which were implemented in Italian foreign policy and helped instigate World War II. In 1932, Mussolini wrote that fascism “believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace… War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have courage to meet it.”[iii]Mussolini stated that fascism was inherently violent, and that violence unleashed peak human potential. Peace, on the other hand, neutered human potential and was therefore detrimental to humanity as a whole. Thus, in Mussolini’s worldview, war was a moral good that must be constantly waged to further human progress. Mussolini linked this line of reasoning with imperialist rhetoric, saying that “the expansion of a nation… is an essential manifestation of vitality.”[iv]To Mussolini, fascism was centered around a “nation,” or a “people,” which needed to expand their territory through any means necessary. Unsurprisingly, Mussolini’s fascism saw the Italian people as destined to expand throughout the world. These expansionist and nationalist motives explain why he invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and ultimately sided with Hitler in his conquest of Europe. Hence, Italian fascism aimed to foment conflict, and, as such, it exacerbated the tensions that ignited World War II.

 

German Nazism

Similar to Italian fascism, German Nazism combined a policy of nationalism, expansionism, and racism that aimed to start another war on European soil. Like Mussolini’s fascism, Adolf Hitler’s Nazism was a nationalist and expansionist ideology. Nazism claimed that Germans needed to conquer new territory and supplant the people who lived there. This was because Germans were members of the Aryan race, which was superior to all other races.[v]Days before he invaded Poland, Hitler articulated his desire to obtain more “living space,” or lebensraum, for the German people. He emphasized that war was necessary to obtain land for the survival of the Aryan race, and only by exterminating the Poles “shall [Germans] gain the living space which [they] need.”[vi]Hitler’s words show that the invasion of Poland, and consequently World War II, were inextricably linked to his Nazism. Waging war enabled the Aryan race to take the land it so desperately needed, purge “inferior races,” and achieve hegemony over the world.

 

Hungarian Fascistic Ideology

While not as fascist as Italy or Germany, Hungary adopted a fascistic ideology that contributed to the outbreak of World War II. Suffering tremendous territorial losses following World War I, Hungary became “barely one-third of its prewar size.”[vii]Consequently, many Hungarians were enraged at the punitive peace imposed upon them by the Allies, vowing to restore Hungary’s territorial and political status. Fascistic ideas gained traction, and under the auspices of Admiral Miklós Horthy and Captain Gyula Gömbös, Hungary became increasingly authoritarian during the interwar period. Gömbös allied Hungary with Italy and Nazi Germany, since he wanted to restore the territory Hungary lost after 1918.[viii]As a result, Hungary participated in the German annexation of Czechoslovakia by annexing regions with Hungarian nationals, which drew international outrage and panic.[ix]Ultimately, by abetting Germany’s dissolution of Czechoslovakia for its own gain, Hungary helped destabilize the already fragile peace in Europe and initiate World War II.

 

In Conclusion

Fascism was primarily responsible for causing the Second World War, as its emphasis on nationalism, expansionism, and warfare escalated tensions in interwar Europe. Mussolini’s fascism saw war as a moral good and proclaimed that the Italian people needed to expand their territory, which led Italy to invade Ethiopia in 1935. Similarly, Nazism viewed Germans as members of the “master race” which needed “living space” to survive, a belief that led Adolf Hitler to invade Poland in 1939 and start World War II. Lastly, Hungary aligned itself with Italy and Nazi Germany, annexing parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Therefore, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and fascistic Hungary plunged the continent into the most devastating war in history.


What do you think was the primary cause for World War Two? Let us know below.


[i]Robert O. Paxton and Julie Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth Century, 5th ed (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth - Cengage Learning, 2012), 180.

[ii]Paxton and Hessler, 179.

[iii]Benito Mussolini, “Benito Mussolini: What is Fascism, 1932,” Internet Modern History Sourcebook, edited by Paul Halsall (New York, NY: Fordham University, 2019), accessed May 5, 2019, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/mussolini-fascism.asp.

[iv]Ibid.

[v]Paxton and Hessler, 284.

[vi]Louis P.  Lochner, What About Germany?(New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1942), 1-4.

[vii]Paxton and Hessler, 191.

[viii]Paxton and Hessler, 302.

[ix]Paxton and Hessler, 345.

 

 

 

Bibliography

Lochner, Louis P. What About Germany?New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1942.

Mussolini, Benito. “Benito Mussolini: What is Fascism, 1932.” Internet Modern History Sourcebook, edited by Paul Halsall. New York, NY: Fordham University, 2019. Accessed May 5, 2019. https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/mussolini-fascism.asp.

Paxton, Robert O., and Julie Hessler. Europe in the Twentieth Century. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth - Cengage Learning, 2012.

 

Rich and powerful people are prone to buying properties in the world’s most attractive places, whether that be the south of France, London or the Hamptons. Here, Christopher Benedict looks at one such property hot spot. He tells the fascinating story of King Zog I of Albania and how he purchased a mansion that he never visited in Long Island.

King Zog I of Albania.

King Zog I of Albania.

The Gold Coast

The handful of hamlets and villages which comprise the Hamptons are collectively associated with Long Island’s go-to getaway spot, second home, or den of iniquity for contemporary celebrities. An all-inclusive VIP playground with a guest list reading like a who’s who of the well to do and the ne’er do wells. Faces familiar from movie screens and television sets, concert stages and the rear flaps of dustjackets. Personalities whose images with accompanying tales of achievement and debauchery alike are routinely spread throughout the pages of Vogue and Variety, Rolling Stone and Sports Illustrated, Fortune and Time.

The Hamptons are a relatively recent phenomenon and not at all relevant to the not too distant past when Long Island’s North Shore was the place to be and be seen (or not be seen, depending upon one’s desire for privacy and seclusion) for those who could afford such ostentatious status symbols as the mansions and sprawling estates built on what came to be known as the Gold Coast between just before the birth of the 20th century with its financial windfall created by the Industrial Revolution and the sobering death knell for the inebriated obliviousness of the Jazz Age (which turned blissfully blind eyes away from the horrific aftershocks of the First World War and flaunted their ill-gotten alcoholic party favors in the absurd face of the Volstead Act) sounded by Black Tuesday and the Great Depression.

Among the original occupants of these opulent, custom-built dwellings were luminous names such as William Vanderbilt, Alfred DuPont, J.P. Morgan, the Guggenheims, Lewis Tiffany, Frank Woolworth, William Robertson Coe, Otto Hermann Kahn, Henry Clay Frick, and John S. Phillips. Sagamore Hill in Oyster Bay served as Theodore Roosevelt’s permanent domicile and ‘Summer White House’ while president. Oscar Hammerstein, W.C. Fields, Ring Lardner, Eugene O’Neill, Groucho and Chico Marx, not to mention their father and mother Sam and Minnie, all maintained addresses up and down the Long Island Sound for varying lengths of time and frequent visitors like Charlie Chaplin, Ethel Barrymore, Dorothy Parker, Herbert Bayard Swope, and Winston Churchill, to name but a few, came and went as they pleased. 

The Gold Coast is most famous for its fictional depiction in The Great Gatsby, authored of course by short-term Great Neck denizen F. Scott Fitzgerald, who lived with Zelda on Long Island from October 1922 through April 1924 and based the novel’s East Egg and West Egg on Port Washington’s Sands Point and Kings Point of the Great Neck peninsula respectively. Lands’ End, the manor many consider to have been Fitzgerald’s inspiration behind Daisy Buchanan’s home in Gatsby, was demolished in 2011, the property sold off for a five-unit sub-division. In fact, it is estimated that fewer than 400 of the approximately 1,200 mansions constructed from the 1890s to the 1930s remain standing, with some functioning today as national landmarks, historic sites, state parks, public gardens, and museums.

It is the dilapidated ruins of a massive structure once known as Knollwood in the Incorporated Village of Muttontown, however, and one of its intended residents in particular that concern us now.

 

Bloody Inauguration

Ahmet Zogu was born to a family of feudal landowners in their Burjaget Castle on October 8, 1859 in the Muslim province of Mati which had established an independence of sorts from its Christian neighbors eight years prior. Albania remained, at the time, under the thumb of the Ottoman Empire and young Ahmet was sent off to begin his studies in Constantinople, an academic endeavor which lasted for all of three years. Indeed, Zogu would live out his entire existence as a functional illiterate. His friend and future foreign diplomat Chartin Sarachi alleged in his unpublished memoirs that “Zog never learned Albanian grammar and…is unable to write a line in the Albanian language. He can write in the old Turkish alphabet, but indeed that very poorly.” Sarachi contends that Zogu had only ever read two or three books, and each of them biographies of Napoleon. Which itself speaks volumes.  

Unlettered though he was, Ahmet would not allow this minor nuisance to thwart his ambition and patriotic fanaticism. At the age of sixteen, Zogu succeeded his deceased father as the Mati Governor and would add his signature to the Albanian Declaration of Independence in 1912. After having volunteered for service in the Great War on the side of Austria-Hungary, Ahmet would return home to a country fallen to disorder amidst a revolving parliamentary door of provisional figureheads, all of which Zogu served in some capacity or other.

From out of this chaos Ahmet ultimately emerged as Prime Minister and initiated several progressive if controversial measures such as converting expansive graveyards into public parks, liberating Muslim women from religious and social restrictions, outlawing polygamy, and drawing a firm line between religion and state. Shortly after being shot at by a student representing a radical group of young Albanian intellectuals who plainly saw tyranny dressed as democracy (one of a supposed 55 assassination attempts, as Albanian legend tells it), Zogu was forced into Yugoslavian exile in early 1924. Backed by a group of paid mercenaries 5,000 strong, he fought his way back across the Albanian border and reached the capital of Tirana on December 24 following two weeks of intense battle and much spilled blood. Ahmet almost immediately proclaimed himself President and made his designation official by virtue of a perfunctory election thrown together the following January. Thus did Zogu become not only Albania’s inaugural President but also the first Muslim sovereign of a European nation.

Chartin Sarachi remarked in his unfinished autobiography that Zogu “liked flattery and expected godlike veneration.” Those who failed to comply with these lofty wishes or in any way opposed his autonomy met with lengthy prison sentences or more decidedly grisly fates, prompting the European press to refer to Zog as “Ivan the Terrible of the Balkans.”

 

The Bizarre King

In the wake of his expulsion for criticizing “the fanatical, cross-bred, cringing, corrupt, face-grinding Beys and Moslems”, Albanian newspaper correspondent J. Swire wrote of Zogu in 1933 that “the alarming thing is that this very able man, the ruler of a very able people, is still so insecurely seated on a rickety throne.” Swire went on to suggest, “His death alone would be enough to provoke the break-up of the army, an explosion among the clans, intervention by land and sea and, possibly, a major war.” The root cause of this diagnosis lay in the fact that the country’s financial situation was not only devoid of equity but wildly lacking in accountability.

Zogu treated the extremely finite resources within Albania’s Treasury Department as a bottomless cookie jar from which he helped himself annually to more than twice his self-allotted £35,000 salary. He cut quite the ostentatious figure in an all-white ensemble of military tunic, feathered Cossack cap, gloves, pants, and patent leather shoes and his paramour Francy, a Viennese cabaret dancer with whom Ahmet became acquainted in Belgrade during his pre-presidential banishment, wore gowns produced by the finest Parisian dressmakers complimented by scores of jewels which, as Chartin Sarachi surmised, would have won the envy of Cleopatra.  

When this malfeasance threatened to unravel into a national economic crisis, Zogu first sought relief from Russia’s ambassador in Vienna who refused to take the matter to Moscow much less any further than the consulate itself. With no Communist assistance forthcoming from the Soviet front, Ahmet turned his attention to Fascist Rome which proved much more receptive to Zogu’s entreaties. Having knowingly bought into the lie with ulterior motives already in mind, Benito Mussolini personally approved a £200,000 loan to help stave off what he was informed to be an imminent revolution. There was more than a scarce element of truth behind Zogu’s ruse, surrounded as he was not only by a discontented general population but by sycophants, illiterates, and traitors which Ahmet proudly yet contemptuously referred to as “my circus.”

The creation of an Albanian National Bank, established and kept solvent by international handouts and headquartered in Rome, was a laughable attempt at legitimacy and necessitated the signing of a formal alliance with Italy in 1927. What followed was the coronation of Zog I, King of the Albanians, in what could only have been an eerie procession. The monarch rode in an open-top automobile flanked by armed cavalry, traveling into Tirana past houses all adorned with Italian-made Albanian flags, inside of which the occupants were ordered to remain. The purpose of this was to keep the streets clear, eliminating any risk of assassination.

 

The Puppet Defies Its Master

If Zog was initially thought of as an easy mark who would exist contentedly and be manipulated effortlessly beneath the boot of Italy, Il Duce had another guess coming, particularly when the Balkan King brazenly rejected four of the seven demands included in a 1933 ultimatum drafted by Mussolini. The disputed points of contention called for “the dismissal of all Albanian high officials not of Italian origin, the removal of English officers commanding the police and their replacement by Italians, the reopening of Catholic schools recently closed by the government, and the replacement of the French school at Kortcha by an Italian school.”     

Zog ran further afoul of Mussolini by subsequently entering into a commercial agreement with Yugoslavia as well as initiating diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, growing financial instability and a resulting small-scale rebellion in the city of Fier in 1935 would force Zog to relent to Mussolini’s ultimatum in order to guarantee the continual flow of money into Albania from Rome. Zog additionally sought to curry favor with his benefactor by publicly protesting the sanctions imposed upon Italy by the League of Nations as a penalty for its annexation of Ethiopia.  

Ironically, it would be another annexation order issued by Mussolini - in 1939 against Albania - which would finally cause the two vainglorious dictators to come to loggerheads. Zog’s denial of Italy as Albania’s military protectorate would be his final act of defiance. Mussolini’s vengeful response arrived in the form of a naval bombardment from the Adriatic Sea which cleared the way for a boots-on-the-ground invasion over the Easter weekend. While the Albanian crown transferred to the head of Italy’s Vittorio Emanuel III, Zog escaped to Greece with his beautiful Hungarian bride Geraldine Apponyi and their infant son, Crown Prince Leka. From there, they re-routed to London where the royal family took sanctuary within the luxurious confines of the Ritz Hotel.

 

Knollwood

The famed Manhattan architectural firm of Hiss and Weeks drafted plans for the immense 60-room stone mansion which was constructed sometime between 1906 and 1920 as the centerpiece of Westbrook Farms, a 260-acre estate in Nassau County on Long Island intended for Charles Hudson who amassed his fortune through dealings on Wall Street as well as in the burgeoning steel industry.   

With the purpose of utilizing Knollwood as a by-proxy Albanian kingdom, the exiled Zog purchased the estate in 1951 for a reported amount of $102,800, which today would equate to slightly less than a million dollars. Pillagers and vandals, fueled by speculation that Zog had completed the transaction by means of rubies and diamonds and already had hidden for him within the mansion by low-level Albanian functionaries his money and multitudinous treasures, looted and destroyed beyond repair the vacant premises.

Never having laid eyes or set foot upon the property, Zog sold it four years later and the Town of Oyster Bay declared the unsafe structure condemned and had it all but leveled to the ground in 1959. Accessible - albeit difficult to find - from hiking trails winding through the present-day Muttontown Preserve, the ruins of Knollwood are still today a popular destination for scavengers and curiosity-seekers who may not even necessarily be privy to the story of the obscure Albanian king who very nearly lived there.

And, so, what of Zog? Rather than Long Island, he and his family relocated to Paris where he died in 1961 and was buried in the Thiais Cemetery. In 2012, the Albanian government - including Zog’s grandson Leka, a political advisor to President Bujar Nashani - commemorated the centennial of the nation’s independence from the Ottoman Empire by having Ahmet Zogu exhumed and repatriated to Tirana.

Committed to a specially built mausoleum, Zog’s remains have fortunately received far more reverential treatment than those of the Gold Coast’s ransacked and bulldozed mansion. 

 

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Sources

King Zog of the Albanians: The Inside Story by Chartin Sarachi (Unfinished and Unpublished Manuscript, 1940)

King Zog’s Albania by J. Swire (Liveright, 1937)

Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After by R.J. Crampton (Routledge, 1997)

In Albania, Mussolini’s Interference (Sunday Times of Perth, Australia-August 27, 1933)

Invasion of Albania by C. Peter Chen (World War II Database)

King Zog I of Albania by Richard Cavendish (History Today, 2014)

Bizarre King Zog’s Remains Repatriated to Albania by Robert Myles (Digital Journal-November 12, 2012)

Stumbling on the Abandoned Ruins of King Zog’s Long Island Estate by Nick Carr (Scouting New York-March 4, 2013)

Helen Saker-Parsons tells us the story of how Mussolini’s Italy systematically undermined Germans in South Tyrol, a region of Italy with a German majority – at a time when Italy and Germany were close Fascist allies. The article looks at Italian ethnic cleansing, the ban on the German language, the land of stolen treasure and counterfeit pounds.

 

In 1920s Europe, fascism was gathering strength. In Germany, the National Socialists were winning support on the basis of their belief in German superiority. Hitler published Mein Kampf in 1925 and wrote of the supremacy of the Aryan race. But in one German-speaking region of Europe all references to the German language were banned. This was not a socialist or communist led country, hostile to the ideas of Fascism: this was Fascist Italy. The region itself had removed its Germanic title of South Tyrol and had reinvented itself as Alto Adige. For 500 years it had belonged to Austria but after the First World War and the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919, Tyrol had been divided in two and the southern part handed to the Italians as ‘spoils of war’ in gratitude for Italy’s co-operation with the Allies during the war. Thus began a twenty-five year period in its history which saw it experience ethnic cleansing, local martyrs, and concentration camps - and ended as it became a dumping ground for Nazi lootings and the home to the production of counterfeit British pounds.

Following the rise of Fascism and Benito Mussolini in 1922, a policy of Italianization in the area was introduced, driven by Italian ultra-nationalists, such as Senator Ettore Tolomei who on July 15, 1923, presented his 32-point program for Italianization: Provvedimenti per l'Alto Adige ("Measures for the Alto Adige"), which he claimed was aimed “to clean the area which had been polluted by strangers for centuries.” Mussolini said in February 1926: “We shall Italianize this territory, because it is Italian, geographically and historically.” In fact 70% of the population spoke German and only 25% Italian. Amongst the measures were: the introduction of Italian as the only official language; the establishment of Italian kindergartens and schools; the dismissal of German-speaking civil servants and teachers; a complete stop on German immigration in South Tyrol; Italian as the juridical language; the closure of German banks; the Italianization of the names of places (towns, roads, rivers, mountains etc. – except Gries) as well as the Italianization of Germanized family names, with the list of new names being printed in 1926 in the Gazetta Ufficiale. Tolomei acquired the nickname ‘grave digger’ as he also proposed prohibiting the use of German in cemeteries and ordered that German words should be deleted from gravestones.

Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler together in Munich, Germany. 1937.

Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler together in Munich, Germany. 1937.

A BATTLE OF IMPLEMENTATION

These measures met with varying degrees of success. The settlement of Italians from other regions was encouraged through the building of thousands of new houses, especially in Bolzano. However the tricky terrain of high mountains and deep valleys hindered repopulation and prevented the new arrivals, especially from the south, warming to their new environment. The planned substitution of the German clergy with Italians failed because of the opposition from the Vatican. Another move that met with opposition was the ban on teaching in German - either in schools or in private lessons. School books were ‘cleansed’ of everything referring to German customs, traditions or history. The singing of German ‘Lieder’ was considered dangerous to the Kingdom of Italy. German teachers were systematically dismissed on the grounds of ‘insufficient didactica’, or transferred to the south, from where Italian teachers were recruited instead. One vehement critic of this policy was the priest, Canon Michael Gamper, long time editor of the newspaper Volksbote. In 1925 he used his paper to call for a continuation of German education, writing that it was their duty to imitate the early Christians who found refuge in the catacombs of Rome.

The clandestine establishments he encouraged became known as ‘Katakombenschulen or ‘catacomb schools’. A shortfall in suitable teachers was overcome by recruiting young women, without families or responsibilities. The first group of 25 teachers received training in Bolzano in 1925 under the auspice that they were part of a sewing circle. More young girls were approached until around 500 volunteers were eventually trained, usually by local clergymen and often in secret. Most of the teaching took place in barns, attics, kitchens or ‘stube’- the living rooms of rural houses. Up to five children at a time, sometimes 30 per day, received instruction in reading and writing in German. Often girls would arrive with knitting to disguise their true intentions but would leave having learned a new Tyrolean song. Books of fairy tales and songs were supplied by German cultural societies, and were smuggled from Austria, hidden in religious buildings and then taken from school to school. For the children of the catacomb schools, who also attended Italian public schools, there was a confusion of identity that lingered long in to their lives. 

After initial difficulties, secret seminars for the instruction of teachers were organized throughout the province, usually under the protection of the Catholic Church and from 1931 were also held as far afield as Munich. Despite the risks, there were many prepared to take them. One such teacher, Angela Nikoletti, has been hailed as a regional Joan of Arc. She received several warnings to stop but continued to teach undeterred. She was arrested on May 14, 1927 and sentenced to 30 days in prison. During her imprisonment she contracted tuberculosis, which worsened when she was banished from her home community on her release and forced to hide in a cave. Only once her weak condition had been diagnosed was she allowed to return home to live with her aunt. However, she was to die from her illness and her death created an almost myth-like legacy. In October 1930 her funeral turned in to a public rally and five years later a newspaper wrote:  “She had given her life for her homeland. Her German heart could bear no bonds.”

 

RESISTANCE

Between 1928 and 1939 various resistance groups formed to fight the fascist Italian regime and its policy of suppressing the German language. Catholic media and associations resisted the forced integration under the protection of the Vatican. The underground resistance movement, the Völkischer Kampfring Südtirols, was formed by a Nazi Party member and tailor from Bolzano, Peter Hofer. Then on October 21, 1939, Mussolini reached an agreement with Hitler that all inhabitants had until December 31, 1939 to choose between remaining in the region, accepting complete Italianization, or emigrating to Nazi Germany (including annexed Austria), the so-called "Option für Deutschland" (option for Germany). The population was deeply divided. Those who wanted to stay (Dableiber) were condemned as traitors; those who left (Optanten), the majority, were defamed as Nazis. Hitler commented on a plan to relocate the ‘Optanten’ to Crimea (annexed to Greater Germany) in 1942: “the transport of South Tyrolese to Crimea offers no special physical or psychological difficulties. They need only make a voyage down a German stream, the Danube, and they’d be right there”. But most were to be resettled in German-annexed western Poland.

The National Socialists put their successful propaganda machine into action, launching a campaign to encourage the South Tyrolean population to ‘opt’ for resettlement. Lies were deliberately spread amongst the people to incite hatred against one another, resulting in entire families being ripped apart and resentments resonating for many decades. The majority of people succumbed to Nazi pressure with 86% choosing resettlement - thus began a program of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The Optanten banded together in the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Optanten für Deutschland (Association of optants for Germany or ADO) that was founded on January 30, 1940 under the ubiquitous Peter Hofer. Those who chose to stay, the Dableiber, mainly banded together around local Catholic priests. The first families left their homeland in 1939, and up to 1943 a total of around 75,000 South Tyroleans emigrated (the original numbers curtailed by the outbreak of war), of which 50,000 returned after the war.

 

SWEET REVENGE?

In September 1943 Mussolini was deposed and Italy surrendered to the Allies who had invaded the country from the south. From the north the German Wehrmacht poured in its troops. On September 10, 1943 the Operation Zone of the Alpine Foothills was established, incorporating South Tyrol. The ADO was dissolved and joined with the Deutsche Volksgruppe. Peter Hofer was chosen as the Volksgruppenführer. Many German-speaking South Tyroleans, who had suffered years of linguistic oppression and discrimination by Fascist Italy, wanted revenge upon the ethnic Italians living in the area, particularly in the larger cities. There were also attempts to arrest fleeing Italian soldiers and attacks on the Dableiber. However, wide scale retribution was discouraged by the occupying Nazis who feared alienating Mussolini and the Italian Fascists. The man once described by Hitler as a ‘strutting peacock’ had been rescued from his high altitude imprisonment on the Gran Sasso by German paratroopers and had been instated as the puppet head of an Italian Social Republic in Salo. One sector of the community not considered safe, however, was the Jewish population, especially the large contingent of foreign Jews living in Merano. On September 16, 1943, the Nazis sent the first group of Merano Jews to Auschwitz.

Owing to its mountainous terrain and its remoteness, the region managed to escape much of the fighting between Allied and German forces as the former swept through the country. But the history of this tranquil region remained troubled. In summer 1944, a concentration camp was established in Bolzano, hosting around 11,000 prisoners. The area also became an extension of Switzerland as a dumping ground for Nazi lootings. The US 88th Infantry Division which occupied South Tyrol from May 2, 1945 uncovered vast amounts of precious items and looted art treasures. Among the items reportedly found were railway wagons filled with gold bars, hundreds of thousands of meters of silk, the Italian crown jewels, King Victor Emmanuel's personal collection of rare coins, and scores of works of art looted from art galleries such as the Uffizi in Florence. Furthermore, from this mountainous area, the Nazis attempted to wreck the British economy. Castello Schloss Labers (located above Merano) was used by an SS Task Force for ‘Operation Bernhard’, a plan to undermine the British economy by the mass production of fake pound notes using inmates of concentration camps as counterfeiters.

Fears the Germans might use the region as a last-ditch stronghold to fight to the bitter end were not forthcoming and following the German surrender in May 1945 Austria and Italy came to an agreement ratified under the Paris Peace Treaty that Austria would give up its claim to the region on the condition that Italy took steps to redress some of the cultural damage perpetrated under Fascism. None of the ADO leaders were tried for their crimes. Peter Hofer himself was killed during an Allied bombing raid on Bolzano in December 1943. Amongst the plethora of wreaths sent to his funeral was one from Hitler. Alto-Adige is now the wealthiest province of Italy, proud of its bi-lingualism, its diverse architecture, culture and traditions, yet for some the divisions are still raw and its troubled history too recent.

 

Helen Saker-Parsons is the author of a book about an Allied soldier who is captured and held prisoner in Italy during World War II. The fascinating book, A Captive Life, is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Helen has also written a historical fiction book related to World War I, Searching for Cecil. It is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

 

As always, your feedback is welcome below. Alternatively, like the article, tweet about it, or share it by clicking on one of the links below.

References

http://www.accenti.ca/online-archive/rocky-roads-northern-italy-s-jewish-heritage-by-deborah-rubin-fields

South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century By Rolf Steininger

http://www.fembio.org/english/biography.php/woman/print_bio/angela-nikoletti

A Comparative Study of the Northern League, Plaid Cymru, the South Tyrolese People‟s Party and the Scottish National Party Emanuele Massetti

 http://www.roughguides.com/destinations/europe/italy/trentino-alto-adige/italianization-tyrol/#ixzz32uPFtv8t

The Italian Military Governorship in South Tyrol and the Rise of Fascism  By Giuseppe Motta

 The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley  By John W. Cole, Eric R. Wolf

This is the second article we have chosen as we end the year by re-publishing some of our top blog posts.

In a follow-up to articles on the initial Italian colonization attempts and Mussolini’s bloody conquest, we continue the story of how Italy brutally conquered Libya here. 

 

Going a few years back from Mussolini’s invasion of Libya, one of the main reasons for the original Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya was to expand Italy’s comparatively small colonial empire. Another concern was the rapid emigration of Italians to the United States and other countries (650,000 were estimated to have migrated to the US in 1910 alone). After the end of the Italian-Ottoman war, the Italians began to create plans to transport thousands and thousands of Italian colonists into the country’s newest territorial acquisition.

An photo of the 1937 Tripoli Grand Prix

An photo of the 1937 Tripoli Grand Prix

State-sponsored colonization

It formally began in 1913 with the establishment of the Ufficio Fondario (the Land Office), which had the job of assigning land to would-be Italian colonists. The Land Office initially assumed that all uncultivated land was private property and only assigned public lands to the colonists. However on July 18 1922, the Italian governor of Libya, Giuseppe Volpi (who would later order the Reconquista of Libya), issued a decree declaring all uncultivated land to be in the public domain, increasing the amount of land available to Italian colonists tenfold.  Further decrees issued caused the confiscation of land owned by rebels or those aiding the rebels, in an effort to crackdown on dissent.

In 1928, de Bono (Volpi’s successor) issued subsidies and additional credits to help attract more colonists. Despite these measures, Italian immigration rates were much lower than what the government had expected, with little capital being invested in Libyan lands.

The situation changed in the early 1930s as a result of the Great Depression. A negative balance of trade, rampant unemployment and a strong lira encouraged mainland Italians to emigrate. Libya provided the perfect solution. With Omar Mukhtar executed and the rebels defeated, many public-works and infrastructure project ideas could finally be undertaken, in addition to resettlement projects. Indeed, all of these projects required manpower. It was the perfect region for the typical poor Italian patriot.

In 1934, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were merged together to form a Tripoli-based province. Four years later, Mussolini would declare Libya an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, forming the country’s nineteenth region, dubbing it La Quarta Sponda d’Italia (Italy’s Fourth Shore).

Mussolini, who was imprisoned in 1911 for his criticism of the original Italian invasion, had visited Libya three times; in 1926, 1937 and 1942. His 1937 visit was to open what was described as the largest public works project in Libya, the 1,132 mile long strada litoranea (coastal highway), which ran from the Tunisian border to the Egyptian frontier. Though the Italians insisted it was only to help improve tourism in the region, contemporaries saw the strategic military value of such a road. Indeed, this road proved to be crucial to victory in the North African front of World War II (and more recently, the Libyan Civil War). The press in Italy hailed it as a feat of Italian engineering, despite it being built on the back of Libyan laborers.

Two major waves of immigration occurred in the 1930s; one in October 1938 and the other in 1939. Both were organized by the Italian governor Balbo - he led a convoy of around 10,000 Italians to Libya in 1938 and another 10,000 in the following year. His plan was to settle 20,000 colonists annually for five years, with the ultimate goal of reaching 500,000 colonists by 1950. In what could be seen as a precursor to reactions against Jewish migration to British Palestine, Italian migration evoked resentment and protests in the Muslim World, with agitations against it appearing as far away as Baghdad.

More support for colonists emerged in the form of the agricultural corporation Ente which was meant to attract farmers. Using confiscated land, the colonists (numbering 50,000 in the late 1930s) worked on 2,000 farms. By 1939, the Italians had built 400 kilometers of new railroads and 4,000 kilometers of new roads. Until 1940, there was even a Tripoli Grand Prix organized annually, while Italian archaeologists excavated the ruined Phoenician settlement of Leptis Magna and sent artifacts to museums in the mainland.

 

The Libyan Side

Many of the colonists were poor, but were generally better off than the native Libyan population. Libyans, mostly paupers, resented Italian development, still remembering the virtual genocide committed by them. It was only in September 1933 that the concentration camps were finally shut – and they left a horrifying toll. 40,000 of the 100,000 total internees died in the camps. Though Libyans resented the foreigners, Italian propaganda portrayed a very different story. In Mussolini’s 1937 visit, he declared Libya to be “morally and profoundly Italian”, to which the Muslims of Tripoli greeted him by addressing him as “the greatest man of the century and a sincere friend of Islam.” He was even awarded the ‘Sword of Islam’ (a Florentine sword with a fabricated history) and was declared the “Protector of Islam.”

For the native Libyans, life was not easy. All Libyans, of whatever faith, were expected to give the Fascist salute. Most wore black shirts during Mussolini’s 1937 visit to Tripoli. And in an effort to spread the wonders of Fascism, the Italian government ordered the formation of a Fascist group for Libyan youths, the Gioventu Araba (Arab Youth), modeled after Italy’s Opera Nazionale Balilla.

In 1939, the Italians allowed Libyans to apply for Cittadinanza Italiana Speciale (special Italian citizenship) effectively relegating Libyans to second-class citizens. At the time, Libyans were not allowed to work professionally in jobs involving Italian subordinates. That said, it seemed unlikely to be a great problem anyway as soon enough there were only 16 Libyan university graduates in the country. All told, even if the Italian occupation led to significant improvements in infrastructure and agricultural output, it left behind a native Libyan population that was not skilled and largely uneducated, while the country lacked effective political institutions. The effects of this would be apparent in the following decades.

With the outbreak of World War II, Balbo’s plan was in tatters. Most of the fighting occurred on farms allocated to the colonists. By 1941, only 8,426 colonists remained. Within a year, this number had halved. Following the end of subsidies and government support, the colonists abandoned Libya. The Allied forces occupied Libya in 1943. Libya was to declare its independence in December 1951.

 

By Droodkin, the owner of the international history blog – click here to see the site.

 

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References

 

Further reading

If you would like to read in more depth about what life was like in Italian Libyan, I recommend Brian McLaren’s Architecture and Tourism in Italian Colonial Libya: An Ambivalent Modernism.

In a follow-up to articles on the initial Italian colonization attempts and Mussolini’s bloody conquest, we continue the story here..

Going a few years back from Mussolini’s invasion of Libya, one of the main reasons for the original Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya was to expand Italy’s comparatively small colonial empire. Another concern was the rapid emigration of Italians to the United States and other countries (650,000 were estimated to have migrated to the US in 1910 alone). After the end of the Italian-Ottoman war, the Italians began to create plans to transport thousands and thousands of Italian colonists into the country’s newest territorial acquisition.

Arab Lictor Youth, a Fascist youth organization in Italian Libya

Arab Lictor Youth, a Fascist youth organization in Italian Libya

State-sponsored colonization

It formally began in 1913 with the establishment of the Ufficio Fondario (the Land Office), which had the job of assigning land to would-be Italian colonists. The Land Office initially assumed that all uncultivated land was private property and only assigned public lands to the colonists. However on July 18 1922, the Italian governor of Libya, Giuseppe Volpi (who would later order the Reconquista of Libya), issued a decree declaring all uncultivated land to be in the public domain, increasing the amount of land available to Italian colonists tenfold.  Further decrees issued caused the confiscation of land owned by rebels or those aiding the rebels, in an effort to crackdown on dissent.

In 1928, de Bono (Volpi’s successor) issued subsidies and additional credits to help attract more colonists. Despite these measures, Italian immigration rates were much lower than what the government had expected, with little capital being invested in Libyan lands.

The situation changed in the early 1930s as a result of the Great Depression. A negative balance of trade, rampant unemployment and a strong lira encouraged mainland Italians to emigrate. Libya provided the perfect solution. With Omar Mukhtar executed and the rebels defeated, many public-works and infrastructure project ideas could finally be undertaken, in addition to resettlement projects. Indeed, all of these projects required manpower. It was the perfect region for the typical poor Italian patriot.

In 1934, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were merged together to form a Tripoli-based province. Four years later, Mussolini would declare Libya an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, forming the country’s nineteenth region, dubbing it La Quarta Sponda d’Italia (Italy’s Fourth Shore).

Mussolini, who was imprisoned in 1911 for his criticism of the original Italian invasion, had visited Libya three times; in 1926, 1937 and 1942. His 1937 visit was to open what was described as the largest public works project in Libya, the 1,132 mile long strada litoranea (coastal highway), which ran from the Tunisian border to the Egyptian frontier. Though the Italians insisted it was only to help improve tourism in the region, contemporaries saw the strategic military value of such a road. Indeed, this road proved to be crucial to victory in the North African front of World War II (and more recently, the Libyan Civil War). The press in Italy hailed it as a feat of Italian engineering, despite it being built on the back of Libyan laborers.

Two major waves of immigration occurred in the 1930s; one in October 1938 and the other in 1939. Both were organized by the Italian governor Balbo - he led a convoy of around 10,000 Italians to Libya in 1938 and another 10,000 in the following year. His plan was to settle 20,000 colonists annually for five years, with the ultimate goal of reaching 500,000 colonists by 1950. In what could be seen as a precursor to reactions against Jewish migration to British Palestine, Italian migration evoked resentment and protests in the Muslim World, with agitations against it appearing as far away as Baghdad.

More support for colonists emerged in the form of the agricultural corporation Ente which was meant to attract farmers. Using confiscated land, the colonists (numbering 50,000 in the late 1930s) worked on 2,000 farms. By 1939, the Italians had built 400 kilometers of new railroads and 4,000 kilometers of new roads. Until 1940, there was even a Tripoli Grand Prix organized annually, while Italian archaeologists excavated the ruined Phoenician settlement of Leptis Magna and sent artifacts to museums in the mainland.

1937 Tripoli Grand Prix. Source: Rossana Bianchi

1937 Tripoli Grand Prix. Source: Rossana Bianchi

The Libyan Side

Many of the colonists were poor, but were generally better off than the native Libyan population. Libyans, mostly paupers, resented Italian development, still remembering the virtual genocide committed by them. It was only in September 1933 that the concentration camps were finally shut – and they left a horrifying toll. 40,000 of the 100,000 total internees died in the camps. Though Libyans resented the foreigners, Italian propaganda portrayed a very different story. In Mussolini’s 1937 visit, he declared Libya to be “morally and profoundly Italian”, to which the Muslims of Tripoli greeted him by addressing him as “the greatest man of the century and a sincere friend of Islam.” He was even awarded the ‘Sword of Islam’ (a Florentine sword with a fabricated history) and was declared the “Protector of Islam.”

For the native Libyans, life was not easy. All Libyans, of whatever faith, were expected to give the Fascist salute. Most wore black shirts during Mussolini’s 1937 visit to Tripoli. And in an effort to spread the wonders of Fascism, the Italian government ordered the formation of a Fascist group for Libyan youths, the Gioventu Araba (Arab Youth), modeled after Italy’s Opera Nazionale Balilla.

In 1939, the Italians allowed Libyans to apply for Cittadinanza Italiana Speciale (special Italian citizenship) effectively relegating Libyans to second-class citizens. At the time, Libyans were not allowed to work professionally in jobs involving Italian subordinates. That said, it seemed unlikely to be a great problem anyway as soon enough there were only 16 Libyan university graduates in the country. All told, even if the Italian occupation led to significant improvements in infrastructure and agricultural output, it left behind a native Libyan population that was not skilled and largely uneducated, while the country lacked effective political institutions. The effects of this would be apparent in the following decades.

With the outbreak of World War II, Balbo’s plan was in tatters. Most of the fighting occurred on farms allocated to the colonists. By 1941, only 8,426 colonists remained. Within a year, this number had halved. Following the end of subsidies and government support, the colonists abandoned Libya. The Allied forces occupied Libya in 1943. Libya was to declare its independence in December 1951.

 

By Droodkin

Droodkin owns the international history blog – click here to see the site.

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References

Libya: From Colony to Revolution by Ronald Bruce St. John, pages 1936-1939

Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie by Geoff Simons, pages 12-13

 

Further reading

If you would like to read in depth about exactly how Italian Libya life was, I recommend Brian McLaren’s Architecture and Tourism in Italian Colonial Libya: An Ambivalent Modernism.