Logistics Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign

The intelligence and logistical problems of the Army of Northern Virginia emerged as critical determinants during the Battle of Gettysburg. The Confederate Army faced severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The generals at Gettysburg: Union Major General George G. Meade (left) and Confederate General Robert E. Lee (right).

Confederate Supply Network

The Confederate Army invaded the north despite facing severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. These limitations made it challenging for Lee to fully address and overcome intelligence and logistical issues during his planning process. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Several potential strategies and actions could have been considered to alleviate problems that could have been expected. Lee could have made efforts to shorten and secure his supply lines. Lee could have used several additional resources history shows that he didn’t have in planning his invasion in June 1863:

1. Spies on the ground to reconnoiter

2. Cavalry in his front and sides to know where the enemy was.

3. Pontoons over the Potomac that he could get across in an emergency.

4. Sufficient long range artillery ammunition to sustain multiple attacks in a long offensive campaign.

5. A functioning supply line to move captured goods retrograde to any advance.

6. Improved command and control, with sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders at all times.

7. With Stonewall Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville, Lee had two new corps commanders. The Confederate Army's command structure was dispersed, with multiple corps and divisions operating somewhat independently. This fragmentation made it challenging to consolidate and synthesize information from various sources and hindered the efficient gathering and analysis of intelligence.

Intelligence Flaws

General Lee faced challenges in obtaining accurate and timely intelligence regarding the location and movements of Major General Joseph Hooker and the Army of the Potomac. The lack of reliable intelligence about the enemy's positions and intentions affected Lee's decision-making and ability to plan his own movements effectively and placed Lee at a disadvantage. Confederate intelligence efforts were hampered by various factors including limited reconnaissance capabilities especially the absence of JEB Stuart. The combination of limited reconnaissance capabilities, dispersed command structure, Union defensive measures, communication limitations, and unfamiliar terrain contributed to the challenges faced by Lee in obtaining accurate intelligence about Hooker's army.

The ANV suffered from limited reconnaissance capabilities. The Confederate Army had limited cavalry resources for conducting reconnaissance and gathering information about the enemy. The cavalry, traditionally responsible for scouting, was stretched thin, and their ability to penetrate Union lines and gather reliable intelligence was hampered. Lee instructed Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia informed of the movements and activities of the Union Army, maintain communication, and act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gaining intelligence on Lee's own army. Lee's orders emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information. Allowing Stuart to circumnavigate the Union army rather than be his eyes and ears must rank among Lee’s greatest mistakes. Using what cavalry he had in guarding passes behind him was his second biggest mistake.

Lee had no formal intelligence service like General Sharpe and the Bureau of Military Intelligence of the Union army. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north, as opposed to the south, where the citizens favored him. This is a bit surprising given the large number of KGC and Copperheads; but western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania were solid pro-Union, another factor Lee may have overlooked.

Operational Manifestations

The Confederate Army relied on a limited and overburdened transportation system to move men, equipment, and supplies. The lack of adequate railways and the reliance on horse-drawn wagons slowed down the movement of troops and hindered the delivery of essential provisions. Maintaining a constant supply of ammunition, weapons, and other necessary equipment was a challenge. The long supply lines made it difficult to ensure a steady flow of these vital resources to the troops on the front lines.

The Union used railroads and rivers to transport their supplies. But where Lee wanted to go strategically, behind the Blue Ridge Mountains to screen his movement, there was no railroad and no river. He had to move everything over land. So Lee employed a wagon train. Consequently, Lee had a 125-mile route for supplies to traverse to get to Gettysburg and more to Harrisburg. The massive wagon trains limited Lee’s ability to maneuver and to bring troops from the rear in case of an unexpected need, as happened on July 1. Moreover, the priority he placed on protecting them required the remaining cavalry units after Stuart left, leaving him without the necessary reconnaissance.

Either 4 horses or 6 mules pulled the supply wagons. They could carry 2000-2500 pounds but moved only at marching pace, about 3 miles per hour, and less if the roads were muddy or rocky. Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile-ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

Wagon trains moved at a relatively slow pace compared to other means of transportation, such as railways. This hindered the army's ability to swiftly maneuver and respond to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Long wagon trains stretched over a significant distance and were vulnerable to attacks from enemy forces. Union cavalry units often targeted these trains, aiming to disrupt supply lines and inflict damage on the Confederates. Wagon trains had a limited capacity, both in terms of the amount of supplies they could carry and the number of troops they could transport. This constrained the amount of provisions and equipment that could be transported to the front lines, potentially leading to shortages.

Animals need to be cared for, fed, and rested, which added to the logistical burden and increased the strain on resources. The animals themselves required massive forage. Mules needed 9 pounds of grain 10 of fodder and 12 gallons of water daily; horses needed 14 pounds, 14 pounds and 10 gallons respectively. They needed horseshoes, and men to apply them. The waste disposal problem is mind- boggling: every day, a single animal produced 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine. Unless animals are optimally cared for, they can’t burden the loads; they move more slowly and carry less until they break down and the army is immobile.

Wagons, like all vehicles, required regular maintenance and repairs. This included fixing damaged wagons, replacing worn-out wheels, and addressing other mechanical issues. Finding the necessary resources and skilled personnel for these tasks added to the logistical challenges.

Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

This was a logistics nightmare. It would directly impact when Longstreet would reach the field, what weapons and armaments would be available, coordination of the 3 corps in battle and of course, the ultimate retreat after the battle. And the fact is, Lee lost this critical battle for precisely these reasons. The logistical limitations faced by Lee's army had a significant impact on their arrival and readiness on the field at Gettysburg. Reliance on slow-moving wagon trains caused delays in the arrival of Lee's troops. The stretched supply lines and the need to coordinate the movements of dispersed units slowed their progress, affecting their timely arrival at the battlefield.

Battlefield Impact

The extended marches and inadequate provisions necessitating foraging combined with the strain of traffic jams and slow movement, took a toll on the Confederate soldiers. Many suffered from fatigue, diminishing their physical condition and overall readiness for battle. Additionally, some soldiers straggled or fell behind due to exhaustion or the inability to keep up with the army's pace. Many Confederate soldiers were sleep deprived and fatigued when they reached the battlefield after night and forced marches, diminishing their overall effectiveness.

July 1. Major General Henry Heth commanded a brigade under AP Hill. He is traditionally assigned blame for unintentionally commencing the Battle of Gettysburg. He did send half of his division toward the town; he later claimed that he was looking for supplies, including shoes.  He apparently did not know that Early’s division had been through the village a few days previously, and any supplies were long gone. On June 30th he encountered mild resistance on the road but it was thought to be a volunteer militia, not regular army. This lack of intelligence would be the real reason the battle would start.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike to perform a reconnaissance-in-force. At about 7:30 am 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The order of march was not the one a commander would choose if a battle was imminent. Pettigrew deployed his men without cavalry in front; there were no pickets and no vedettes and in fact the first enemy he ran into were Union vedettes. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades.

Lee's army was spread out over a significant distance due to the wide deployment of his troops during the march north, from south of Cashtown to Harrisburg. This dispersal made coordination and concentration of forces more challenging, impacting their ability to concentrate their strength. The splitting of the ANV during the march north meant piecemeal arrival of Confederate troops on the battlefield, which affected the initial coordination of Lee's forces. This resulted in a fragmented Confederate attack on the first day of the battle, as units arrived at different times and were not able to coordinate their efforts effectively. The arrival of troops at unplanned times and locations posed challenges to the  reinforcement and maneuverability of troops, resulting in a hindering to exploit opportunities and  limiting the flexibility of his response to Union movements. These issues were most apparent when General Ewell concluded that he lacked the resources (manpower and supplies) to attempt an attack on Culp’s Hill in the late afternoon.

July 2. Improved transportation and supply arrangements could have allowed General James Longstreet's troops to position themselves more swiftly on July 2.  Improved communications would have facilitated better coordination between Longstreet and Ewell. Better communication with his division commanders could have expedited the movement of troops and improved the response to General Sickles’ unwise move to the Peach Orchard.

Adequate logistical support would have facilitated the swift movement of wagons and artillery pieces, enabling them to reach positions in a timelier manner. Had coordinated attacks been organized, the battles in the Wheatfield and Little Round Top might have gone differently.

More effective reconnaissance and intelligence operations would have provided Longstreet with timely and accurate information about the enemy's positions, enabling him to make more informed decisions regarding the deployment of his troops, especially the fact that Little Round Top was occupied by Union forces.

July 3. The supply problems and logistical challenges faced by the Confederate Army had significant repercussions for Pickett's Charge. The movement of the ANV away from its railroads to create a screen with the mountains also caused the loss of the capacity to replenish its long-range artillery ammunition. Recognizing the limited transportation capacity imposed by a wagon train, compromises were necessary regarding the amount of artillery ammunition that could move with the army. The long-range artillery necessary to support offensive action was different from the canister and grapeshot used in defensive battles. Since Lee had no idea what the nature of the battle would be, he brought some of each, but this proved to be insufficient. Lee did order delivery of additional artillery ammunition with the Ordinance department as he moved farther north, but it never arrived. Consequently, the Confederate forces were unable to provide adequate artillery support for Pickett's Charge. The lack of artillery firepower weakened the overall impact of the assault and increased the vulnerability of the advancing Confederates.

The Bormann fuses used by the Confederate Army during Pickett's Charge were also a significant issue that further exacerbated the challenges they faced. The fuses were designed to control the timing of the explosion of artillery shells, and their malfunction or improper functioning had detrimental effects. The origin of the logistical fuse problem was an explosion and fire at the Richmond arsenal on Brown’s Island on March 13, 1863. The explosion resulted temporarily in ordnance supplies originating from Selma and Charleston. These fuses were designed with a resin filler that made them explode about 1 second later than those manufactured in Richmond. This filler softened and mixed with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July, causing longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells. These "new" fuses burned slightly slower than what the artillerists were accustomed to.

The CSA artillerymen had no forewarning that there was a difference in these fuses that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond.

Consequently, in many instances fuses malfunctioning or burning at an unpredictable rate were noted. This meant that some shells exploded too late, reducing their effectiveness and impacting the intended timing of the artillery barrage preceding the charge. The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target.

What do you think of the Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Suggested Reading

• Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.

• Wittenberg, Eric J and Petruzzi, J David. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg. Savas Beatie, 2006.

• Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.

• Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

• Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715.

• Hartwig, D Scott. The Army of Northern Virginia and the Gettysburg Campaign. 2010 Gettysburg Seminar. Pages 40 – 65. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/13/essay3.pdf

• https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

• https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

• Klein LW. Why Pickett’s Charge Failed. The Civil War Center.  https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/

The Gettysburg Campaign: Where was General Jeb Stuart?

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was General Jeb Stuart’s absence until late in the battle. Stuart had been surprised by the Union cavalry at Brandy Station, and his ego was hurt by the criticism he received in the southern newspapers. Through early June, he had done a magnificent job screening Lee’s movement to the northwest. Stuart hankered to circumnavigate the Union army once again. Nevertheless, Lee gave Stuart orders on June 22, which have been controversial ever since. Lloyd W Klein explains.

J. E. B. (Jeb) Stuart.

The absence of Stuart's cavalry during critical stages of the Gettysburg Campaign contributed to a lack of crucial intelligence for Lee and resulted in a crucial communication gap.  Stuart's absence during the early stages of the Battle of Gettysburg left Lee without cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence, depriving him of valuable information about the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions. This lack of intelligence significantly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial phases of the battle. It is frequently speculated that had Stuart been present to screen the front of Lee’s army, Lee wouldn’t have been surprised by the proximity of the Union army and the Battle of Gettysburg would have been much different.

The Early Stages of the Campaign

In the early phase of the campaign, Stuart brilliantly screened Union cavalry from determining the location and strength of Lee’s army and hence its direction and ultimate destination in several battles:
Battle of Brandy Station (June 9, 1863): This was the largest cavalry battle of the Civil War and took place near Brandy Station, Virginia. It occurred in the vicinity of the Rappahannock River.

Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.

Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.

Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.

With this portion of the campaign over, Lee was ready to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. How he would deploy his cavalry was essential to his plan.

What did Lee Order?

The narrative begins on the morning of June 22, 1863, when Stuart asked Lee for guidance as to which route he should take while following the infantry into enemy territory. If he moved down the Shenandoah Valley west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, he might alert Union cavalry to Lee’s carefully screened advance. The alternative was to move east from Rector’s Cross Roads and cross the Potomac between Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s Union army and Washington, D.C. which  might throw the Federals into confusion.

In fact, two written orders were given to Stuart:

On June 22, the first written order instructed Stuart to take 3 brigades and cross into “… Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."

On June 23, a second order was sent to Stuart, which gave further orders for movement depending on whether or not Hooker was moving.

On the night of June 23, a letter was sent. This letter has never been found, but it was received by Stuart’s adjutant, Major Henry B McClellan, who recalled the contents in detail after the war which gave Stuart discretion and even encouragement  to pass behind the Union army. The letter told Stuart he could move “if General Hooker’s army remains inactive” and simultaneously advised Stuart to enter Maryland west of the Blue Ridge Mountains or “pass around” the Federals east of the mountains and then “feel the right of Ewell’s troops.” Besides giving Stuart two different routes to take, Lee no longer was emphasizing the link up with Ewell and guard his flank.

Lee's instructions to Stuart were somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation. Moreover, the conflicting nature and ambiguity surrounding the route Stuart was expected to take contributed to the resulting misunderstanding.  Stuart was expected to guard the mountain passes with part of his force while the ANV was still south of the Potomac, and then to cross the river with the remainder of the army and screen the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. Lee's specific orders to Stuart were to move northward, screen the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain contact with Lee's forces. Lee expected Stuart to gather information on the enemy's location, strength, and intentions, and to report back promptly.

Lee instructed Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia informed of the movements and activities of the Union Army. Lee's orders emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information. He clearly wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and cover Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. The order didn't give specifics how to do this, leaving Stuart much discretion as to how to accomplish these goals.

Stuart chose to accompany him his three best brigades, commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (replacing the wounded Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee). The brigades Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade temporarily attached to the army and more used to partisan activity and the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was considered the weakest cavalry commander and Jones, while good, was appropriately nicknamed "Grumble" because he was not easy to get along with. Lee did not trust these brigades or their commanders as much as Stuart and the three brigades he took with him. Stuart sent General Robertson very specific orders as to what he was supposed to do.

Stuart sent his request for guidance to Lee through I Corps commander Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, who gave his recommendation on June 23: “I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the enemy.” Later that day, Lee responded with his second order, stating: “If you find that he [Hooker] is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General [Richard] Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.”

Stuart's interpretation of these conflicting orders, combined with his own decisions, led to his prolonged absence from Lee's main army and the subsequent lack of reliable reconnaissance and communication. Lee expected Stuart to gather information on the enemy's location, strength, and intentions, and to report back promptly. However, Stuart's interpretation of the orders, combined with his desire for personal glory and the allure of circumnavigating the Union army, led him to engage in an extended raid around the Union forces rather than maintaining close contact with Lee's army as Lee had intended.

Stuart Starts Out

Stuart and his three brigades departed Salem Depot at 1 a.m. on June 25. At this moment, the Union army's movement north had begun. Thus, his route was blocked by Hancock’s II Corps, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell, which was part of his mission.

Stuart's decision to capture a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was based on several factors. Stuart believed that seizing the wagon train would yield valuable supplies and provisions for the Confederate army. It could have provided them with much-needed food, ammunition, and other resources that would support their operations. Rockville is indeed extraordinarily close to the city limits even today, about 20 miles. Stuart claimed that that were it not for his fatigued horses "he would have marched down the 7th Street Road [and] took Abe & Cabinet prisoners.

Additionally, Stuart may have viewed the wagon train capture as an opportunity to disrupt Union supply lines and create panic and confusion among the Union forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Furthermore, capturing such a large wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It might have been seen as a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and regain his reputation, which had suffered due to the earlier criticisms in southern newspapers.

However, it's worth noting that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train instead of gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would be a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as placing importance on gathering supplies. This is entirely consistent with Lee’s objectives and goals of the campaign, and his own actions.

Stuart then attempted to ride around the Union army, starting in its rear, which to his surprise, turned out to become its east flank as the Union army moved north to meet the threat.

What happened to Stuart?

Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army. From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day.  Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes occurred at Thoroughfare Gap June 25 , Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2.. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride explains that he wasn’t lost or just lollygagging; he was in fact in real trouble and it took great shrewdness merely to get to Gettysburg at all with his command intact. His men marched incessantly for 8 days and nights.

Hooker’s movements during this time should not have been a surprise to him, Stuart sent a dispatch to General Lee on June 27 that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River. It never reached General Lee, but a copy did reach Richmond; no one there bothered to confirm this with the Commanding General.

Moreover, at least 5000 cavalry had been left behind with Lee. General Robertson the commander of that force knew that Hooker had crossed the Potomac June 25-27 but failed to inform Generals Longstreet and Lee. Further, despite the direct order by Stuart to join Lee in force when Hooker advanced, Robertson instead guarded mountain gaps and the baggage train and never arrived at the battle.

The ANV moves North

By June 27, 1863, General Lee had accomplished his objective of wrecking the B&O RR and was moving up the Cumberland Valley.  JEB Stuart had torn up telegraph lines and rail north of DC. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s  forces, moving ahead of the main body of Lee’s army in south-central Pennsylvania, had already disrupted railroad operations on the Gettysburg Railroad east of Gettysburg and on the Northern Central Railway near York.

On June 30, Jubal Early, who would go on to blame every other Confederate general at Gettysburg for its loss, and was one of Stuart’s most vociferous critics after the war, heard the sound of the battle at Hanover. Yet, he did nothing to discover who was fighting, despite knowing that Stuart was supposed to be finding him. Maps show that Early was within 5 miles of the battle, and that had contact been made, Stuart could have been present at Gettysburg July 1.

Conclusion

General Lee gave Stuart vague and conflicting orders which modern historians believe he could not have achieved given Hooker’s interim movements. Had he given Stuart a specific route, though, or recognized that he would require the cavalry to perform reconnaissance, he should not have allowed Stuart to stray behind the Union lines.

Within the discretion General Lee gave to Stuart, Stuart can not be blamed entirely for his choice of mission or how he tried to accomplish it. No one had any idea that the Federal position was so fluid at precisely this time. The raid itself was somewhat successful, and in accordance with Lee’s orders.  Stuart was fortunate to be able to fight his way out of a trap of his own making.

However, the loss of the cavalry as reconnaissance at this critical moment must be blamed on Stuart.  He was not located to fulfill his obligations to inform Lee of the movement of the Union army. Lee, by his own fault, was as unaware of Hooker’s position as Hooker was of his as he moved north into Pennsylvania.

Stuart followed Lee’s orders but not perhaps in its spirit. Stuart’s raid did not deprive Lee of the cavalry needed to monitor his opponent’s movements. However, he left in command an officer who was not skilled enough to do so successfully.

He must share the blame for having affected the course of the campaign and the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg in his quest for glory and redemption.

What do you think of General Jeb Stuart’s absence? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.