The Modern Greek State: 1923–1940 – The Issues of Clientelism

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. In 1922 Greece suffered probably the worst catastrophe of its modern history and the decades that followed brought political instability, economic crisis, and foreign intervention. But, as Thomas Papageorgiou explains, clientelism caused significant issues in the country.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, and part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here.

Eleftherios Venizelos in 1935. He was Prime Minister of Greece multiple times.

The previous article of this series on the history of modern Greece concluded the discussion of the first 100 years after the beginning of the War of Independence in 1821. According to G. B. Dertilis we find ourselves at the end of the third period of bankruptcies and wars (1912-1922) – the first being 1821-1880 and the second 1880-1912. Two more will follow (1923-1945 and 1946-2012). (Dertilis, 2020, pp. 11-17) The proposed cyclability indicates specific features present in modern Greece that significantly hinder the escape from the vicious cycles described by Dertilis. (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29) Here I will discuss these features and describe how they affected the developments in Greece during the interwar period. Clientelism is proposed as the main source of Greece’s problems. But let’s start with one of its consequences, that will better suit us to present the major events of this period: namely, division and civil war.

I Division & civil war

Division and civil war are present in modern Greek history already since the War of Independence. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) The latest quarrel we examined that once more divided the Greeks was that between the prime minister Venizelos and king Constantine. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) The division to Venizelists and anti-Venizelists continued even after the king’s resignation, following the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign in September 1922, and eventual death three months later in Palermo.

This period of modern Greek history starts with a gruesome event in November 1922, which is known as ‘the execution of the six’. These were leading figures of the anti-Venizelists including former prime minister Dimitrios Gounaris, that defeated Venizelos in the elections of 1920 preceding the disaster in Asia Minor. The execution took place under a military regime led by the Venizelist colonel Nikolaos Plastiras following a revolt of the defeated Army in September 1922. Despite international reactions calling for an annulment of the execution, Venizelos, at the time negotiating piece terms with Turkey in Lausanne as representative of the dictatorship in Greece (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 29), did very little to prevent it. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 25-35)

The Treaty of Lausanne (Wikipedia, 2022) marked the end of the Great Idea aspirations for Greece (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) bringing the country to its current borders, more or less, as the Dodecanese would be the last territorial gain of modern Greece after the end of World War II. The loss of the territories in Asia Minor and especially Eastern Thrace caused the nagging even of some officers within the military regime like major general Theodoros Pangalos, who criticized Venizelos’ handling. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 65) In fact, it was not unusual for members of the Venizelist or anti-Venizelist space to change sides because of a political disagreement or pure interest.

It was this mixture of political disagreement on an electoral law that favoured the Venizelist candidates in the elections prepared by the regime for December 1923 (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 33-34) and disappointment of officers feeling ignored by the Plastiras’ regime that led to a counter-revolt in October 1923. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 129) This was soon crushed by the Venizelists. The latter found the opportunity to purge the army from their rival officers (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 34) and as the palace identified itself with anti-Venizelism to rid themselves of the successor king George II. After the elections of December 1923, from which the anti-Venizelists abstained (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 35), the National Assembly declared the fall of the dynasty and the establishment of unreigned democracy on the 25 March 1924. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 38)

This decision was further supported by a referendum held in April (70% for the unreigned democracy) (Dafnis, 1997, p. 262) but the anti-Venizelist leader Tsaldaris expressed his reservations for the new status quo. Thus, under the pretext of the protection of democracy, prime minister Papanastasiou passed a law aiming at the silencing of the anti-Venizelist propaganda with severe punishments imposed by military courts. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 42) In his book, Mavrogordatos points out the similarity of the establishment of the unreigned democracy in Greece with that of the Weimar Republic in Germany as the result of the opportunistic partnership of the Liberals (Social – democrats in Germany) with the military. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 39)

Indeed, the grip of the military on the Greek political life during this period is marked by 43 different interventions between 1916 and 1936. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 291-299) Soon after the handover of the government to the politicians in December 1923, major general Pangalos came to power by force in June 1925 exploiting the reluctance of the government and of the leaders of the political parties to act decisively against him. In fact, he managed to obtain a vote of confidence from the parliament and to give this way a lawful mantle to his government. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 162) His turn towards the anti-Venizelists worried the democratic officers and following a series of blunders in domestic and foreign policy, including an invasion in Bulgaria on the occasion of a border incident involving the killing of three Greeks by the Bulgarians, he was finally removed from government and imprisoned in August 1926. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 45-47) He remained in prison till July 1928, when the Venizelists ordered his release. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 350)   

The year 1928 marks the return of Eleftherios Venizelos himself to the premiership. Before that, Greece was under ‘’ecumenical government’’ following a public demand for, at last, collaboration between the parties, after the fall of Pangalos’ dictatorship (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 48) This did not last long though and, apart from some success in laying the groundwork for a sound economic policy (Dafnis, 1997, p. 395), it did not do much to cure the schism between the rival factions. Eventually, the Venizelists won a striking victory during the elections of August 1928: 226 out of 250 seats in the parliament. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 54)

Venizelos’ new term was one of the longest in modern Greek history lasting for 52 months till November 1932. His government is credited with the approach to Italy, that, under Mussolini briefly occupied the island of Corfu in August 1923 (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 83-125), Yugoslavia and Turkey, the retainment of good relations with the Great Powers, and especially Great Britain, the settlement of the war reparations after World War I to the benefit of Greece, an extensive investment program in new infrastructure mostly in the new lands (that is territories added to Greece after 1912), a satisfactory financial situation with consecutive surpluses of the state budget, the strengthening of the rural credit with the creation of the Agricultural Bank, an educational reform focusing on the reinforcement of the productive occupations, the establishment of the Council of State to restrict government arbitrariness, and the continuation of the effort for the integration and assimilation of the refugees that flooded Greece after the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 463-514)

One of Venizelos’ statements though, after his stunning victory in 1928, is characteristic of his intentions towards the opposition at that time. ‘The People of Greece made me a parliamentary dictator’, he said to his wife. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 57) Thus, the most famous law of this time was that of summer 1929 ‘against the pursue of the implementation of ideas aiming at the overthrow of the social regime’. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 58) It was introduced against the declared views of the Communist Party, although there was never a real communist threat during the interwar period (Dafnis, 1997, p. 505) (the Communists never received more than 5-6 % of the votes at the elections that took place between 1926 and 1936). (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 29) Nevertheless, it served, indiscriminately, the purpose of suppressing public protest during Venizelos’ term and later as well. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 58)

The global economic crisis of 1929, that undermined Venizelos’ ambitious program, led to his call for the formation of an ecumenical government in March 1932, (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 59) but the failure, once more, of Venizelists and anti-Venizelists to reach a compromise rendered any such attempt short lived and a failure. Short lived was also Venizelos’ last government in January 1933 and he was finally defeated in the elections of March 1933. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 64)

The military branch of the Venizelists did not take this development well. The former colonel Plastiras, leader of the army revolt in 1922 (see above), now a Lieutenant General, attempted to militarily cancel the passing of power to the anti-Venizelists. He failed and had to flee abroad in April to avoid the consequences. It is suggested that Venizelos did not act decisively to cancel Plastiras’ plans or that he even ordered the action. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 620-622) Nevertheless, he was not prosecuted.

The fact that Venizelos was not prosecuted by the parliamentary and judicial authorities does not mean that he was spared from the vengeful fury of the anti-Venizelists. On the night of the 6th of June 1933, a cinematic attempt on his life took place, when he was returning to Athens from dinner at a friend’s house in Kifissia. Venizelos escaped, but during the manhunt involving the car carrying Venizelos and his wife, his bodyguards’ car, and the attackers’ car, one of his guards was killed, his driver was seriously wounded, and his wife suffered minor injuries. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 636-640)

The acute confrontation between the two factions continued for twenty months after the assassination attempt. The sources of tensions included a systematic government: i) cover-up of the assassination attempt, ii) manipulation of the command of the army to end its control by Venizelist-democratic elements, iii) effort to change the electoral law to its benefit, iv) disregard of parliamentary procedures. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 68) Eventually, in March 1935, Venizelos poured fuel on the flames backing an insurrection across northern Greece and the islands. It failed and Venizelos fled into exile in Paris. He died a year later. (Heneage, 2021, p. 178)

The failed coup gave the anti-Venizelist the opportunity to lead in front of a court martial 1,130 Venizelist members of the army, politicians, and civilians. Sixty of them were sentenced to death of which 55 had already escaped abroad. Of the remaining five, two were finally pardoned and three were executed including generals Papoulas and Koimisis, protagonists during the trial that led to the ‘execution of the six’, that had never been forgotten by the anti-Venizelists. Nevertheless, the latter avoided a wider purge to avoid a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, the executions met the opposition of France and Great Britain. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 772-779)

The same way that a successful Venizelist coup led to the fall of the dynasty in 1924, the unsuccessful coup of 1935 led to its restoration. In fact, it took yet another coup, within the anti-Venizelist ranks this time, led by lieutenant general Kondilis, for the recall of king George II. The restoration was confirmed with a Soviet-style highly questionable referendum, held in November 1935, that gave it 97.8 % of the votes. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 803) The king pardoned the participants in the March coup and elections were called for January 1936. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 811-814)

Venizelists and anti-Venizelists emerged from the elections as equals. Although this was indicative of the public will for a coalition government (Dafnis, 1997, p. 816), the two factions once again failed to work together. Furthermore, the contacts of both with the Communist Party (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 81), holding 5.76 % of the votes and 15 sits in the parliament (Dafnis, 1997, p. 815), for the formation of a government backed by communist votes caused worries in the army. Thus, the king appointed in March major general Ioannis Metaxas, who we have met before as an emblematic figure of the pro-royalists and the anti-Venizelist ranks, minister of the military to restore discipline. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 818) He was promoted to the premiership the next month, when the prime minister Demertzis died suddenly of a heart attack. Public unrest and the need for seamless war preparation, as the clouds of war were gathering over Europe, provided Metaxa with the arguments that persuaded the king to allow for a dissolution of the parliament and the suspension of civil liberties in August. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 837) So began the 4th of August Regime.

The 4th of August Regime was Greece’s rather unconvincing experiment in fascism. There were, for example, organizations like the National Youth Organization, promoting self-discipline for the boys and preparing girls to be dutiful mothers, anti-communism propaganda and political arrests, but at the same time Metaxas was not racist and repealed some of the anti-Semitic legislation of previous regimes. (Heneage, 2021, pp. 179-180) Furthermore, the king remained strong and autonomous (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 85) and the country was not linked to the Axes Powers. On the contrary, Metaxas was a supporter of Great Britain. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 90) Thus, when, on the night of 28 October 1940, the Italian ambassador Grazzi demanded that Greece surrender key strategic sites or else face invasion, Metaxas answered in French, the language of Democracy, ‘Non’, No, in Greek, ‘Ochi’. (Heneage, 2021, p. 183) Greece was at war. Again.

II Clientelism

For division and civil war to flourish, one needs at least two factions, in the case presented here Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, each with members ready to do whatever is necessary to prevail. This, in return for specific benefits. The phenomenon is called clientelism – namely, the distribution of benefits by politicians and political parties to their supporters in return for their votes, campaign contributions and political loyalty. (Trantidis, 2016, p. xi)

The origin of clientelism in modern Greek history goes back to the Ottoman occupation. Indeed, Ottoman oppression strengthened the importance of the family as an institution that more securely guaranteed the protection of its members, relatives, and friends. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 287) The phenomenon expanded when the newly founded modern Greek state, as we have seen in the previous parts of this series, failed to create institutions that would earn the trust of its citizens. Everyday experience taught that a relationship with a powerful patron was better guarantee of service than trust in an indifferent state apparatus. Thus, the individual was connected to the institutions of power through some powerful patron-mediator in order to promote his interest rather than waiting for the state institutions to function properly. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 278-279)

Although individual clients are, more or less, powerless, they can form networks and become important and valued for their patrons. Clients may be members of formally autonomous social institutions such as labor unions. Through this membership, they undertake overlapping roles: they are both political clients claiming individual patronage benefits and members of an organization claiming ‘collective’ or ‘club’ goods. Rather than isolated individuals, clients organized in party bodies, trade unions or other professional organizations can find in them the infrastructure by which they could hold patrons accountable. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 12)

Thus, for the interwar period studied here, the phenomenon of clientelism was probably most profound in the army. Already before the Balkan Wars, the then crown prince Constantine had created a small entourage of officers, which he promoted based not so much on their military performance but mostly on their loyalty to the dynasty. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 21) The ten years war period from 1912 to 1922, though, created a plethora of officers forged at the battlefield, outside of the military academy in Athens and the king’s cycle. In fact, by 1922 these officers made three quarters of the officer’s corpse. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 102) Probably the most astonishing example of rise in the army ranks during this period was the mutineer Plastiras, whom we met in the previous section, and who had started his career as corporal back in 1903.

For the conscripts that made it to the officers ranks the army also became a means of livelihood, but when the wars were over, they had the fewest guarantees of permanence (or further promotion). Thus, patronage was particularly important for those officers that came from the ranks of the reservists. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 102) The officers that could not find a patron within the royalists’ ranks, naturally, turned to the Venizelist – democratic space for protection.

It is certainly a paradox that parties competing for parliamentary rule within a nominally democratic framework possess military client-branches and that that they use these branches dynamically to influence the election process or even to overturn its results, when considered unfavorable. In fact, from the 43 military interventions between 1916 and 1936 only two presented the army as a supporter of liberal reform, a defender of the country’s territorial integrity and a punisher of those responsible for a national catastrophe. These were the revolt of the National Defense Committee in Thessaloniki in 1916 (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) and the army’s revolt of 1922 discussed above. Both gained national significance and were supported by a large portion of the public. The rest were only intended to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of some military faction. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 280)

It should be noted though that the officers do not always work in coordination with their political patrons. Movements like that of 1922, when the military for the first time fully assumes the exercise of government, contribute to the emancipation of some military factions from political patronage towards an autonomous claim of the benefits of power. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 118-119)   

The effect of clientelism on the social, political, and economic life in Greece has been discussed in more detail recently, because of the most recent economic crisis that started in 2010. Thus, we will return to it when recounting later periods of modern Greek history. Before I close this short reference to the subject here though, I further note that clientelism should not be seen as a political choice that is alternative to campaign strategies that seek to attract voters with programmatic commitments and ideology. In addition, clientelism must not be seen simply as a strategy of vote buying. Instead, organized clientelism, as described above, strengthens the capacity of political parties to recruit groups as campaign resources in order to appeal to voters via the conventional means of programmatic and ideological messages. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 10)

Clientelism as a method of political mobilization creates a strong preference for a political party in government to preserve policies that cater to clientelist demands and avoid policies that could limit the allocation of benefits and resources to their clients. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 17) This, in turn, limits the capacity for reform, especially during political and economic crises, as politicians in a highly clientelist system will try to preserve clientelist supply as much as possible. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 19) This will help us understand the problems of the Greek economy presented in the next section.

III Economy in crisis

Although the ten-year war period, between 1912 and 1922, ended with a catastrophe, interwar Greece was different from Greece before the Balkan Wars. Its population and territory had doubled: before the war Greece was made up of 2,631,952 inhabitants and its territory amounted to 63,211 square kilometers. By 1920 the population reached 5,531,474 and its territory 149,150 square kilometers. Finally, the census of 1928 recorded 6,204,684 inhabitants and a territorial expanse, after the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign and the settlements that followed, of 129,281 square kilometers. (Kostis, 2018, pp. 272-273) Of course, most of these gains had already been achieved by 1913 and the expansion of the war period, including internal turmoil, to 1922 simply postponed the integration of the new territories to the country and its economy. Not only that, but it made it more difficult as by the end of the war the country was left much poorer and in a much less favorable international position.

The situation was made worse by the arrival in Greece of more than 1.2 million refugees as the result of the uprooting of the Greek communities in the East, following the defeat of the Greek army there. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 157) The number represented 20 percent of the total national population and the country had to import significant quantities of goods in order to meet the emergency needs of these new populations. (Kostis, 2018, p. 279)

The arrival of the refugees was decisive for the ethnic homogeneity of Greece though. Following the treaty for the obligatory exchange of populations signed between Greece and Turkey in Lausanne in January 1923, and another one, this time for an exchange on a voluntary basis, between Greece and Bulgaria earlier, in 1919, 500,000 Muslims and 92,000 Bulgarians left Greece in the period that followed. (Kostis, 2018, p. 275) Thus, about 70% of the refugees that remained in Greece (about 200,000 left Greece to seek their fortunes elsewhere (Kostis, 2018, p. 275)) was settled in rural areas of Macedonia and Thrace taking up the fields and the houses of the Turks and Bulgarians that left. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 159-160)

The properties of the minorities that left Greece though could make for no more than 50% of what was necessary for the refugees in the rural areas. The other 50% came from a significant reform under the military regime of Plastiras in February 1923. That was the obligatory expropriation of the large country estates and real estate in general, without the requirement that the owners be fully compensated first. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 30, 369-373) This Bolshevik-like approach created many small owners in the countryside and actually kept the refugees away from the grasp of the Communist Party that additionally adopted the policies of the Communist International and promoted the autonomy of Macedonia and Thrace. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 383-391)

In fact, as the catastrophe of the Asia Minor campaign took place under anti-Venizelist rule and the rehabilitation and assimilation of the refugees is credited to the Venizelists, most of the refugees became clients of the Venizelist parties affecting the results of elections to a significant degree. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 134-140,152,154 ) Indeed, when a small percentage of the refugees abandoned the Venizelist camp in 1933, it reshaped the political balance and eventually led to an anti-Venizelist victory.

One more conclusion can be drawn at this point. The inability of a clientelist state for reform explains why, in several cases, this (the reform) comes from authoritarian regimes or dictatorships, like that of Plastiras that brought the agricultural reform. Consequently, these regimes remain practically unchallenged by the political establishment, like that of Metaxas after 1936 (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 880-881), that introduced a full social security plan and imposed compulsory arbitration in labor disputes to prevent social unrest. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 85) In any case, for reform or private interest (see section II), the collaboration between the politicians and the military officers (often based on a patron – beneficiary, that is clientelism, relationship) explains also why many military interventions went practically unpunished or why amnesty was very often granted to the protagonists during the periods of modern Greek history we covered so far.

The agricultural reform alone was not enough to settle the refugee’s problems. The country was lacking raw materials, equipment, and the necessary infrastructure to integrate the new territories to the state. As usual, Greece resorted to external borrowing to cover these needs. A 12,000,000-franc loan was granted to Greece on humanitarian grounds by the Refugee Settlement Commission under supervision of the League of Nations to be spent on rehabilitating refugees (Kostis, 2018, p. 279). Venizelos’ investment program (see section I) between 1928 and 1932 also increased the external national dept from 27,8 billion drachmas to 32,7 billion drachmas. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 77) This insured that a disproportionately large portion of the national budget would be used for debt payments: 25.6% of public revenue in 1927-28, 40.7% in the following year, while in the last of Venizelos’ four years the figure settled at 35%. These figures left little room for flexibility in the government’s budget. (Kostis, 2018, p. 286)

Flexibility was further reduced by the fact that more than 100 years after the establishment of the modern Greek state 70-80% of the country’s export profits was still coming from the cultivation of currant and tobacco. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, pp. 77-78) The industry’s share to the GDP increased from 10% in 1924 to 16% in 1939, nevertheless, this development was carried out under protectionism conditions and did not introduce qualitative improvements in the Greek industry that would prepare it for international competition. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 87) Both remarks are indicative of the effect of clientelism on the lack of economy reforms and as an observer put it, positive developments in economic growth were more the result of the efforts of individual cultivators and industrialists rather than of a planned government policy. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 84)

Eventually, one more of the vicious cycles of the Greek economy, proposed by Dertilis (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29), was repeated in the interwar period. Once again it started with war or preparation for war (military spending took 18% of the GDP between 1918 and 1822 (Dertilis, 2020, p. 99)) and culminated to the suspension of national dept servicing on 1 May 1932. The government also abandoned the gold standard, and the value of the drachma began to fluctuate freely. Strict measure for limitations on currency followed that would affect the Greek economy for many decades. (Kostis, 2018, p. 287)   

The Greek economy then turned inwards and seeked to develop by exploiting its domestic resources and more centralized forms of economic management made their appearance as the state took on a leading role. The economy recovered, but this recovery did not solve the country’s economic woes. (Kostis, 2018, p. 287) By 1937, the deficit in Greece’s trade balance reached 5,649 million drachmas. A year later, Greece imported three quarters of the raw materials used by its industry, one third of the cereals needed for domestic consumption and significant amounts of machinery and capital goods. By March 1940, the nominal public dept had reached 630 million dollars, equivalent to 9.25% of the national income for Greece (this reflected to a great extent the prevailing situation till 1932, as since then borrowing was significantly reduced) compared to 2,98% for Bulgaria, 2,32% for Rumania, and 1,68% for Yugoslavia. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, pp. 88-89) Military spending was reduced to 6.2% of the GDP between 1934 and 1939 (Dertilis, 2020, p. 99) but the imminent second world war did not allow for further reductions. In fact, at the end of 1939, when the war in Europe began, the Greek government spent an additional amount of 1,167 million drachmas for military purposes. This unexpected expense burdened the state budget by 10%. Between July 1939 and October 1940, when Italy attacked Greece, the circulation of banknotes increased from 7,000 million to 11,600 million drachmas and the wholesale price index increased by 20%. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 90)

Thus, the Italian attack in October 1940 found Greece’s economy in a fragile state and as is very often the case, an economy in crisis invites foreign intervention. (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29)

IV Foreign intervention

Foreign intervention refers basically to that of the Great Powers of the time (Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria – Hungary, the German Empire/Germany, Italy, and the United States of America). That is because the interaction of modern Greece with its Balkan neighbors was rather antagonistic, if not hostile, and more often than not determined by the dispositions of the Great Powers. (Divani, 2014, σσ. 82 - 119) Exception is the short period of the Balkan Wars, when skillfully chosen alliances with its Balkan neighbors resulted in the doubling of Greece’s territory at that time. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) A significant improvement in the relation with its neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia, Italy and Turkey, was also achieved, again under the premiership of Venizelos, between 1928 – 1932, allowing     for a significant cut in military spending to the benefit of investments in infrastructure and the rehabilitation of the refugees. (Divani, 2014, pp. 207-208) (see also section I above). In fact, a treaty of friendship was signed between Greece and Turkey in October 1930.

It goes without saying that state characteristics like the ones presented previously (division, civil war, economy in crisis) facilitate, if not invite, foreign intervention. Furthermore, the term (‘foreign intervention’) is perceived, in most cases, with a negative sign. It is synonymous to the limitation (or even loss) of a state’s sovereignty at the interest of a foreign power. Nevertheless, let us remember, at this point, some cases of foreign intervention that we have come across in this series on the history of modern Greece: i) at a critical point of the War of Independence, when defeat seemed imminent, the combined fleets of Great Britain, Russia and France defeated the Ottoman-Egyptian forces at Navarino Bay and later signed the Protocol of London granting autonomy to Greece (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021), ii) the first territorial expansion of Greece to the Ionian Islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George I in 1864, (iii) the second territorial expansion of Greece to Thessaly in 1881 came after the Great Powers intervened to revise the Treaty of St Stefano and cancel the creation of the ‘Great Bulgaria’, and (iv) when Thessaly was retaken by the Ottomans after the Greek defeat in the 1897 Greco-Turkish war the Powers once again intervened to keep Greece’s territorial losses to a minimum. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

Are we then to conclude, following the previous remarks, that foreign intervention was out of pure concern for the well-being of Greece? By no means. Great Britain’s intervention at Navarino, together with France and Russia, intended to the limitation of the latter’s influence in the region. That is why immediately afterwards Great Britain worked to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by keeping Greece’s original territory very limited. The Ionian Islands were also given to Greece at a period when their value for Great Britain was deemed limited and under the condition that they would be rendered demilitarized. The limitation of Russia’s influence in the Balkans was also behind the revision of the Treaty of St Stefano. And there were also cases, as for example during the Asia Minor Campaign, that the Great Powers simply abandoned Greece to suffer a disastrous fate. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) Thus, the remark that foreign intervention is synonymous to the limitation (or even loss) of a state’s sovereignty at the interest of a foreign power remains valid. Indeed, with some exceptions, e.g. during the Balkan Wars, Greece failed to keep its fate in its own hands.  The previous discussion serves only to show that foreign intervention was also positive when, by mere chance, foreign interests coincided with those of Greece.

But is it generally easy for a small state to draw an independent policy? Certainly not. Things are even worse though, when clientelism governs its political, social, and economic life. In fact, during the interwar period, the small states had the chance to participate to an international forum where, for the first time, instead of being subjected to the decisions of the Great Powers, they could, even to a small extent, co-shape them. This was the League of Nations (LoN). (Divani, 2014, p. 134)

Greece’s initial experiences with the first global intergovernmental organization, founded in 1919, were not good though. When Italy invaded Corfu in August 1923 (see section I) the LoN did very little to contain Mussolini. This was the first indication of the flaws of the LoN that eventually failed to work effectively against the fascist aggression that culminated to the Second World War. On the contrary, when Greece, under Pangalos’ dictatorship invaded Bulgaria (see section I) the LoN moved swiftly to condemn and punish it. The feeling of injustice was strong, but Greece, once again at a weak spot, could not do much to expose the handlings of the LoN. It needed the latter for technical and financial support for the rehabilitation of the refugees following the disaster of the Asia Minor Campaign. (Divani, 2014, pp. 159-173)

Indeed, as the former prime minister A. Michalakopoulos’ put it in 1929, regarding the work of the LoN in Greece: ‘if the State attempted to do the work of the Refugee Settlement Commission the errors would be tenfold, and the work imperfect, and there would be multiple embezzlements and the costs would be greater’. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 138) This was because the LoN took special interest in ensuring that the loan money would not be spent for reasons other than the productive and developmental settlement of the refugees. The Financial Committee of the LoN also demanded reforms aiming at the stabilization and modernization of the Greek economy. (Divani, 2014, p. 242) In fact, the financial control of the LoN coexisted with the International Financial Committee controlling the Greek finances already since 1897, after the military defeat by the Ottomans following the bankruptcy of 1893. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

International financial controls mainly aim to serve the interests of Greece’s creditors. No doubt. Nevertheless, even to this end, they often introduce necessary economic, political (and consequently even social) reforms that have been repeatedly postponed and avoided by the local political establishment as they collide with the interests of the stakeholders of the clientelist state. Thus, foreign intervention represents an alternative to authoritarian regimes for the introduction of reform (see section III). Similarly though, it is used as scapegoat from the clientelist establishment, usually under the veil of an alleged insult to national sovereignty or democracy. As such it is hated by the Greeks that, in such a way, miss (or turn away from) the real origin of their troubles. Once again: a satisfactory solution of the refugee problem would have been impossible without the help of the LoN. (Divani, 2014, p. 293) As the Refugee Settlement Commission worked independently though, keeping the available resources (especially the refugee loans) away from the grasp of the local political establishment, its work was repeatedly discredited by the press and the Greek parliament in consecutive sessions discussed accusations against it. (Divani, 2014, p. 299)

V Conclusion

At the heart of all this trouble lies clientelism. The Greeks fought the War of Independence (1821 – 1830) to free themselves from the Ottomans only to become serfs to a clientelism system that significantly hinders their ability to develop and exploit the full capacity of themselves and the resources of their country. This is because the system demands unquestionable loyalty to the party or the ‘clan’. So unquestionable that one should be prepared to harm even its fellow Greek members of the opposite ‘clan’. Thus, civil war is a phenomenon often met in modern Greek history. This often takes the classical form of armed conflict, but, more often than not, is present in the form of ‘exchanges’ in critical administration positions. Members of one ‘clan’ are usually kicked out when the next ‘clan’ comes to power and needs to ‘accommodate’ its own clients. This non-meritocratic system of course guarantees that the country almost never has the needed capacity in these positions and if this, by coincidence, happens, it is never for a long time. Thus, Greece’s ability to keep up with the signs of each time is crippled. After all, with clientelism it is never about long-term planning and reform. Thus, the often bankruptcies. Then reform comes, usually violently, from inside or the outside. Because a divided nation invites foreign intervention.

It is not to be considered that all Greeks participate or are being favored by the clientelism system. Many have individually thrived inland or abroad when they found themselves in a healthier environment. And indeed the country has made progress since its establishment. Nevertheless, I dare to say that this was and remains slow, and it was and still is more coincidental. Sometimes because its interests coincided with those of the Great Powers of the time. Sometimes because it was lucky enough to have great individuals in power.

At this point, as the period we are discussing coincides with the death of Eleftherios Venizelos, some remarks about the Cretan politician are necessary. As we have seen he was not a role model for parliamentarism. He did not hesitate to resort to arms or even divide the country when necessary. So should he be condemned as, at least at times, anti-democratic? Maybe. I propose though that, at the same time, he was simply being realistic. Venizelos knew how the system works. He saw the opportunity for Greece’s expansion and he wanted to take it. He knew that clientelism would slow things down and the opportunity might have gone missing. So he played by the real rules of the game. That of clientelism. Not “parliamentarism” or “democracy”. And if, for example, Napoleon of France squandered French power and prestige leaving France smaller than he found her and is still called ‘The Great’, (Kissinger, 2022, pp. 61-62) Venizelos was proved to be ‘Great’.

So, should the country continue to rely on chance and a few good, or even ‘Great’, men or women for its progress? That would be a great risk. Because clientelism is like the cancer developed in a certain part of the body. If not treated properly, it will soon drag the healthy parts of the body to death as well.

What do you think of the period 1923-40 in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Dafnis, G. (1997). Greece Between Two Wars 1923-1940. Athens: Cactus Editions (in Greek).

Dertilis, G. B. (2020). Seven Wars, Four Civil Wars, Seven Bankruptcies 1821-2016. Athens: Gutenberg (in Greek).

Divani, L. (2014). The Treacherous Caress, Greece and foreigners, 1821 - 1940. Athens : Kastaniotis Rublications (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

Kissinger, H. (2022). Leadership. London: Allen Lane.

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Mavrogordatos, G. (2019). After 1922, The continuation of the schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, May 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/5/20/the-modern-greek-state-19141922-greeks-divided?rq=Papageorgiou#.Yw-AoxxBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, January 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/1/20/the-modern-greek-state-18981913-glory-days#.YhPK6JaxW3A

Trantidis, A. (2016). Clientelism and Economic Policy, Greece and the crisis. New York: Routledge.

Veremis, T. (2018). The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936. Athens: Alexandria (in Greek).

Veremis, T., & Mazower, M. (2009). The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941). In T. V. (Editor), Metaxas and His Era (pp. 73-90). Athens: Eurasia Publications (in Greek).

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lausanne

The Modern Greek State: 1914–1922 – Greeks Divided

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. There was not much to celebrate one hundred years earlier though, when the first centenary was completed. Indeed, in 1922 Greece suffered probably the worst catastrophe of its modern history. Its origin can be traced back to after the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, and part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here.

King Constantine I of Greece in the early 1920s.

I After the Balkan War was over

Defeat is an orphan, whereas victory is claimed by many fathers. King Constantine and his entourage of officers at the general staff, blamed by the Military League for the defeat at the Greco-Turkish of 1897, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) saw their redemption at the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Their approach though was that of complete denial of any credit to the prime minister Venizelos. The latter and his environment, similarly, but more moderately, exalted their contribution against the deficiencies of the pro-royals. (Malesis, 2017)

This was a rather petty quarrel and a bad sign for the future in view of the effort required to integrate the recently acquired territories. Significant minorities (the census of April 1913 shows that in Thessaloniki, for example, out of the 157,000 inhabitants, 39,956 were Greeks, 61,439 Jews, 45,867 Muslims, 6,263 Bulgarians and 4,364 Europeans and other ethnicities) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) constituted a potential problem that could be solved neither easily nor quickly. Furthermore, efficient exploitation of the new lands required the build of infrastructure in areas recently devastated by war. The fiscal sufficiency though was slim. By 1913, expenses for military operations amounted to 411,485, 000 drachmas in addition to 280,000,000 of collateral costs. The nation’s public dept had risen by 755,000,000 drachmas. These were dizzying figures considering the state of the Greek finances at the time (GDP before the war is estimated at 735,000,000 drachmas).

The prevailing expectations in Western Europe about the future of the Greek State, after its victorious military campaigns, allowed for the takeout of a 500,000,000 francs loan in February 1914, under favorable terms, to settle the pending depts. Nevertheless, the budget of the same year amassed a deficit of 170,000,000 drachmas, while immediate needs to be covered (not included in the budget) were estimated at over 300,000,000 drachmas. Thus, even before the outbreak of the First World War, issuance of the whole 500,000,000-franc loan proved impossible. The government turned to the National Bank and internal borrowing to supplement the required funds.

In any case, the needs could not be met with continuous borrowing. Payments of salaries and pensions were not being made on time and this gave room to the opposition to criticize the government. Even basic military needs, like the supply of food to the army, were only possible thanks to the advances from the National Bank. (Kostis, 2018)

II The First World War (WWI)

Thus, the outbreak of WWI found Greece facing significant challenges. These suggested that staying neutral was probably the most preferable option. At the beginning of the war, this was also the preference of the Central Powers and the Entente. Both were wooing Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire to join their ranks and taking up their foe during the Balkan Wars could hinder their efforts. King Constantine favored neutrality also for strategic reasons (exposure to a possible naval blockade by the British Empire in case of an alliance with Germany). (Rizas, 2019)

On the other hand, Greece was bound by an alliance with Serbia (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) which was under attack from Austria-Hungary since July 1914. Furthermore, when the Ottomans and Bulgarians signed treaties of alliance with Germany in September 1914 and September 1915 respectively, (Glenny, 2012) Venizelos, convinced that the British Empire would prevail, saw an opportunity for further territorial gains, if Greece joined the Entente.

The defeat of Germany, though, was by no means a certainty, especially during the early stages of the war. By the end of 1917 Soviet Russia concluded an armistice with the Central Powers followed by the Treaty of Brest – Litovsk with favorable terms for the latter. It was the late entry of the USA into WWI that tilted the scale in favor of the Entente. (Efthimiou)

Thus, steering the country within this complicated framework of international relations by carefully considering Greece’s fiscal and military capacity as well as its political (diplomatic) options required the setting of clear goals and a close collaboration between the prime minister and the head of state and the army. Venizelos and Constantine did exactly the opposite.

At first, Venizelos suggested that the Greek army should undertake the landing at the Dardanelles in February 1915, in return for territorial gains in Asia Minor promised by the Entente. The king seemed fascinated by the idea (considering a possible capture of Constantinople, where his synonymous emperor Constantine died, when the city was taken by Turkey in 1453), but the pro-royal chief of staff Metaxas considered the campaign too risky, leaving the northern border exposed to a Bulgarian attack and resigned his post. Venizelos then proposed the limitation of the Greek participation to only one division raising the king’s doubts about the success of the undertaking. Finally, Constantine refused to give his approval and Venizelos resigned. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The prime minister’s Liberal Party, though, won again in the elections of May 1915. The opposition, gathered around the king, refused to interpret the result as a vote for the participation to WWI proposing that it only showed the people’s trust to Venizelos. The king’s refusal to complement led Venizelos to resign again in September and abstain from the new elections of December 1915. (Malesis, 2017)

Meanwhile Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and the attack on Serbia was imminent. To implement the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty Venizelos, in the brief period before his resignation, invited the Entente to send troops to aid the Serbians through the port of Thessaloniki. The revocation of the invitation by the pro-royals and Greece’s protest could not prevent the landing of French troops in October 1915. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The presence of the allied forces in Thessaloniki allowed for the formation there of the National Defense Committee by Venizelos’ supporters aiming to confront the Bulgarian threat and align foreign policy with that of the Entente. When the Bulgarians took the Greek fortress of Ruper in May 1916 and later advanced in Eastern Macedonia by August, the government in Athens did not react in the name of a questionable neutrality as foreign armies were now clearly violating national sovereignty. This caused the armed reaction of the National Defense Committee on the 17th of August and when the city of Kavala was lost to the Bulgarians on the 29th, Venizelos, although hesitant at first, decided to lead the revolt. (Malesis, 2017)

Thus, Venizelos was now leading yet another revolt and the country was split in two with one government in Athens in charge of the ‘Old Greece’ and another one in Thessaloniki in charge of the ‘New Greece’ (territories acquired after 1912 except Epirus). (Mavrogordatos, 2015) The military presence of the Entente helped Venizelos to reunite the country though. On November 18, a detachment of 3,000 allied troops landed in Piraeus and advanced to Athens, but they were repelled by forces loyal to Constantine. After that, the royalists turned against Venizelos’ supporters in Athens killing dozens of them, arresting others and committing all kinds of atrocities. On the 26th, the allied fleet implemented a strict naval blockade of the ‘Old Greece’ causing food shortages and other catastrophic consequences for the population. Eventually, the king was forced to leave the country in June 1917 leaving his son Alexander at his place but did not resign. (Malesis, 2017) Venizelos returned to Athens and ‘resurrected’ the parliament elected in May 1915 (thus described as ‘Lazarist’). It was time for his supporters to retaliate against the opposition. Venizelos might have united the country again territorially, but the Greeks were now divided to Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists.

The prime minister’s harsh measures included the exile of this opponents (his former adjutant Metaxas and the leader of the Anti-Venizelists Gounaris, for example, were sent to Corsica) and the cleansing of the public sector, including that of justice and the church, as well as the army from the opposition supporters. Nevertheless, during the last phase of WWI Greece managed to field 10 divisions, that is about 180,000 men, that performed well in the Macedonian front, where they constituted about 1/3 of the total allied forces. To compensate for the late entrance in the war and in order to have the best possible treatment during the peace negotiations in Paris, Venizelos also sent the 1st Army Corps (23,000 men) to fight against the Communists in Ukraine in January 1919. (Malesis, 2017). The campaign was unsuccessful for the allies and they withdrew in April of the same year. The Greek communities in the Crimean suffered the retaliation of the Bolsheviks and many of their members were forced to seek refuge in Greece. Nevertheless, for Greece, the worst was yet to come.

III The Asia Minor Campaign

The story of the Greek expansion to western Asia Minor goes back to 1914. It was offered by the Entente in exchange for Greek concessions to Bulgaria of some of the territorial gains of 1912-1913 so that the latter would join the allies. These amounted to about 5,000 square kilometers including the port city of Kavala affecting 35,000 Greeks living in the area. In return, Greece was claiming a territory of about 125,000 square kilometers with the city of Smyrna at its center and a significant minority of 810,000 Greeks. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) By the end of the war, though, no concessions were necessary as Bulgaria was on the side of the defeated.

Such offers, backed by mostly secret treaties, in order to lure one country or the other to their side, was a standard tool used by both camps during WWI. In April 1915, for example, southwestern Asia Minor was also promised to Italy with the treaty of London. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) The overall situation in the Middle East was further complicated by the antagonism between Great Britain and France as the Sykes – Picot agreement was challenged by the Young Turks of Mustapha Kemal, who was not willing to comply to any agreements of the defeated Ottoman Empire he deemed as harmful for the interests of the Turkish nation. To make things worse, President Wilson, representing the late entrant USA at the peace negotiations of Paris, was not aware of this covert diplomacy and was thus indifferent to any claims over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. (Churchill, 2021)     

Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with the occupation of Antalya in southern Asia Minor. The claims and ambitions of the Italians to lay hands upon the Ottoman Empire resulted to a complete breach between them and President Wilson. This led to a temporary withdrawal of Italy from the peace conference in Paris. When reports reached the conference that the Italians were going to proceed further with the occupation of Smyrna, combined with stories of Turkish maltreatment of the Greek population, it was proposed that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Smyrna at once for the purpose of protecting their compatriots there. (Churchill, 2021) Although Venizelos was earlier warned by the chief of the British General Staff Sir Henry Wilson that he could not rely on any military or financial aid for the undertaking and that this would result in a long war with Turkey  and a rapid depletion of Greece’s financial and human resources, he decided to take the offer. (Richter, 2020)

At the time of the Greek landing in Smyrna, on May 15, 1919, the Ottoman Empire was under the spell of defeat in WWI. It was surrendering arms and munitions. But as soon as Greece, the enemy of generations, landed its troops, Turkey arose and the leader of the Young Turks, Mustapha Kemal, was furnished with the powers of a Warrior Prince. (Churchill, 2021) Not unfairly. Whereas the Greeks had the sea on their backs and Smyrna was not protected by any natural defensible border, Kemal could exploit the strategic depth of Anatolia, where he could safely withdraw, after every strike. (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Furthermore, Italy was clearly hostile to the Greek presence in Asia Minor and France also opted for collaboration with Kemal in exchange for peace in Syria, now under the French Mandate. (Wikipedia, 2022)   

Thus, Greece was alone when the treaty of Sevres was signed in August 1920. The treaty ceded Thrace to Greece, which was also to possess the Gallipoli Peninsula, most of the Aegean islands, and to administer Smyrna and its hinterland until a plebiscite could be held there. The British prime minister Lloyd George favoured the Greeks, but the imposition of the treaty on the Turks was entirely up to the Greek army, now showing signs of strain under the influence of protracted financial, military and political uncertainties. (Churchill, 2021)

The situation was difficult, and Sir Henry Wilson again describes Venizelos as hopeless and desperate during this period. ‘The old boy is done’, he remarked. (Llewellyn Smith, 1999) In the internal front the national schism continued to fuel despicable acts of hate. Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, Venizelos himself narrowly escaped an attempt against his life by two royalist soldiers in a Paris railway station on his way home. His decision to call general elections in November 1920 allowing also for the return and participation of the exiled opposition is still a point of controversy. Venizelos’ opponents claim that he was looking for a way to abdicate his responsibility for the outcome of the Asia Minor Campaign. If this was the case, he was successful, because he lost and now it was the royalists that had to find a solution.

Winston Churchill, who was later to experience himself a surprising electoral defeat after the triumph of WWII (Gilbert, 1991), gives a different account though. On October 2, 1920, Prince Alexander (at this point king of Greece) was bitten by a monkey during a walk in the royal garden. The wound festered and after three weeks Alexander died. It was decided to offer the throne to Prince Paul of Greece. The latter was living with his exiled father in Switzerland and, as Churchill puts it, was inspired to reply that he could only accept after the Greek people had at an election definitely decided against his father. This forced a General Election.

Venizelos, with the Treaty of Sevres that expanded the triumph of the Balkan Wars, felt confident. He was willing that the issue should be put crudely to the electorate: Were they for the restoration of Constantine or not? But he did not make sufficient allowances for the strain to which Greece had been put; for the resentments which the allied blockade to make Greece enter WWI had planted; for the many discontents which arise under prolonged war conditions; for the oppressive conduct of many of his agents, when during his continuous absence for the peace negotiations the Greek people lacked his personal inspiration and felt the heavy hand of his subordinates; for the complete absorption of his opponents to party politics and for their intense desire for office and revenge. Eventually, he lost. (Churchill, 2021)

The only sane policy arising from Venizelos’ defeat would have been to reduce promptly and ruthlessly the Greek commitments in Asia Minor, negotiating also for the safety and well-being of the Greek minority there. The pro-royal officer Ioannis Metaxas made suggestions along these lines. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) After all, the return of Constantine further dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece as the king was a bugbear for them second only to the Kaiser himself. Nevertheless, the new regime, under prime minister Gounaris, was determined to show Greece how little Venizelos had had to do with its successes that far. They would strike Mustapha Kemal at the heart of his dominion. They would have the army march to Ankara. (Churchill, 2021)

What about the army then? Winston Churchill again gives a vivid description of the Greek army during the campaign to Ankara (which partly applies for the Greek people as well). He writes: ‘Imagine an army of two hundred thousand men, the product of a small state mobilized or at war for ten years, stranded in the centre of Asia Minor with a divided nation behind them; with party dissensions in every rank; far from home, and bereft of effectual political guidance; conscious that they were abandoned by the great Powers of Europe and by the United States; with scant food and decaying equipment; without tea, without sugar, without cigarettes, and without hope or even a plan of despair; while before them and around them and behind them preyed and prowled a sturdy, relentless and even more confident foe’. And he continues ‘over the Greek Army in Asia Minor there stole an ever-growing sense of isolation; of lines of communication in jeopardy, of a crumbling base, of a divided homeland, and of an indifferent world’. (Churchill, 2021) Nevertheless, the Greek army remained in martial posture for upwards of three years in Asia Minor. But, after the triumphs of the Balkan Wars and WWI, eventually it was defeated. On September 16, 1922 the last Greek Soldiers left Asia Minor. The Hellenism of Asia Minor followed them to escape the Young Turks’ atrocities.

IV Conclusions

Carl von Clausewitz in his classic On War defines the ‘Culminating Point of the Attack’ as that at which the forces remaining are just sufficient to maintain a defensive, and to wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns, there is a reaction; the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow. Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of judgment. (Clausewitz, 1997) His fellow Prussian Otto von Bismarck did exactly that, when, after fighting against the Danes, then the Austrians and finally the French to achieve the unification of Germany in 1871, he stayed put in spite of expectations to storm the rest of Europe. (Steinberg, 2011) A more recent example is Menahem Begin, who, instead of provoking a civil war during Israel’s War for Independence, decided to take the blows of David Ben-Gurion without responding and remained in political exile for thirty years until he became prime minister in the end of the 1970s. (Gordis, 2016)

Obviously, the Greeks did not posses such qualities. As we have seen, civil wars were common during their War of Independence (and more came after that), and now political party quarrels that led to the national schism brought Greece beyond its culminating point of attack, deep in Asia Minor, after ten years of mobilization and war starting in 1912 with the Balkan Wars.

Who was responsible in the present case? Churchill criticized the United States, Britain and France for requesting the presence of the Greek Army in Anatolia, where it had been the foundation of allied policy against Turkey for three years only to fall victim to inter-Allied intrigues at the end. The way for the dissolution of all Allied loyalties to Greece was paved by the Greek people’s choice, at the moment of their greatest hopes and fears to deprive themselves of Venizelos, the commanding personality who had created the situation Greece found itself into and who alone might have carried it to success. (Churchill, 2021)

Several Greek commentators take the same stance (Mavrogordatos, 2015) although there are cases of harsh criticism against Venizelos and his policies and more favourable for the king (Kakouri, 2017). Others blame both Venizelos for his disregard of hard facts (e.g., Greek minority of only 20% of the total population in the disputed area, lack of natural defences etc.) that led to the disaster and the king for not opposing the advance to Ankara - even though he was convinced that the whole undertaking of the Asia Minor campaign would be fatal for Greece. (Stamatopoulos, 2020)

Indeed, in the period discussed here both Venizelos and the king (personally and as head of the anti-venizelists) offered bad service to their country. We have seen in previous parts of this short history of modern Greece that division, violence and civil war characterized its early years. Parliamentarism helped relax the tensions, but now the two rivals were resorting to the old methods again. Not only did they allow/cultivate violence for the (also physical) extermination of the opposition, not only did they allow/pursue foreign intervention for the support of their cause, but they did it with a ‘messianic’ attitude of infallibility that resulted in a complete disregard for the consequences on Greece and its people. This legacy, as we will see, tormented Greece in the following years. In contrast, in the short period of two years (1912-13) that Venizelos and Constantine managed to work together Greece triumphed.      

What do you think of the period 1914-22 in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Churchill, W. S. (2021). The world crisis, Volume IV, The aftermath 1918-1928. London : Bloomsbury.

Clausewitz, C. (1997). On War. Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited.

Efthimiou, M. (n.d.). Global History IV: The Man Against Himself - Part B. Center of Open Online Courses (www.mathesis.cup.gr). Crete University Press, Heraklion (in Greek).

Gilbert, M. (1991). Churchill, A life. London: Heinemann.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Gordis, D. (2016). Israel, A concise history of a nation reborn. New York: Collins Publishers.

Kakouri, A. (2017). The two beta. Athens: Kapon.

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Llewellyn Smith, M. (1999). Ionian vision, Greece in Asia Minor 1919 - 1922. Michigan: The Univeristy of Michigan Press.

Malesis, D. (2017). Defeat - Triumph - Catastrophe, The army in the Greek State from 1898 to 1922. Athens: EPICENTER (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, January 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/1/20/the-modern-greek-state-18981913-glory-days#.YhPK6JaxW3A

Richter, H. A. (2020). The Greco-Turkish war 1919 - 1922, From the dream of the ''Great Idea'' to the Asia Minor disaster. Athens: Govostis Publications (in Greek, also available in English by Harrassowitz Pub. - 2016).

Rizas, S. (2019). Venizelism and antivezinelism at the beginning of the national schism 1915-1922 . Athens: Psichogios publications S.A. (in Greek).

Stamatopoulos, K. M. (2020). 1922 How we got to the catastrophe. Athens: Kapon Editions (in Greek).

Steinberg, J. (2011). Bismarck, A life. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Syria_and_Lebanon

The Modern Greek State: 1863–1897 – Bankruptcy & Defeat

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1863 to 1897 and looks at the instability that Greece and the wider region felt over the period before bankruptcy and military defeat came for Greece in the 1890s. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on 1827-1862 here.

A photo of influential Greek politician Charilaos Trikoupis.

Acemoglu and Robinson describe why the establishment of a virtuous cycle of inclusive political and economic institutions is a prerequisite for the prosperity of nations. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) In the previous article though, it was shown that in the first thirty years after its independence, the Modern Greek State did little to suppress the remaining tradition of the extractive institutions of the Ottoman occupation. (Papageorgiou, 2021) It tried to speed up after that by doing too much too fast in a turbulent political scenery. The result was bankruptcy in 1893 and military defeat in 1897.   

Introduction

After the deposition of King Otto I in 1862, the search for a new king of the Greeks begun. Several candidates were considered including the nephew of the Tsar Nikolao and Alfred, the second born son of the English Queen Victoria. British foreign policy was especially interested in avoiding another champion of the Great Idea, namely, the liberation of all Greeks under Ottoman rule by all means, including war. Finally, it was Prince William of Denmark who ascended to the throne under the regal name of George I. To increase its influence, Great Britain ‘offered’ George the Ionian Islands under the condition that they would be rendered demilitarized. This infuriated the locals, but a compromise restricting neutrality to the islands of Corfu and Paxous, facing mainland Epirus still under Ottoman occupation, allowed for the integration of the islands to Greece in 1864. This was the first expansion of Modern Greece. The Ionian Islands added 1,813 square miles to the Greek territories and increased the population by 236,000, among which were significant intellectuals and politicians. A key figure during the negotiations for the integration of the new territories was the debutante 32-year-old politician Charilaos Trikoupis. (Divani, 2010)   

Charilaos Trikoupis

Trikoupis was a shining example of the Greek political oligarchy. (Kostis, 2018) His father Spyridon and uncle A. Mavrokordatos were former prime ministers. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) This is a ‘tradition’ that lasts to this day. The current prime minister of Greece is also the son of a former prime minister. Other members of the Mitsotakis family serve(d) as ministers, members of parliament and mayors of Athens. The father Georgios, the son Andreas and the grandson, also Georgios, of the Papandreou family have all also served as prime ministers in the period from the Second World War to the beginning of the 21st century. The last prime minister of the Papandreou family succeeded Konstantinos Karamanlis who is the nephew of another former prime minister with the same name. So much for the inclusiveness of Greek political institutions.  

Following his service at the Consulate in London and the negotiations for the Ionian Islands, Trikoupis was elected Member of Parliament in 1865. His appointment as minister of foreign affairs in 1866 coincided with another crisis of the early years of modern Greece, the Cretan Revolution. Trikoupis believed that Greece was unable to undertake any military initiative on its own. On the contrary, Athens ought to look for allies in the Balkans and beyond and coordinate its diplomatic and military actions with them. (Klapsis, 2019)  Politically, this is a particularly turbulent period though. Between 1863 and 1875 twenty-two governments were formed. (Malesis, 2018) The system of government after 1864 was Crowned Democracy with the power for the appointment of the government resting in the hands of the king. The latter did not necessarily consider the balance of power in parliament, and it was not unlikely that minority governments were appointed. Thus, coordination for internal and external affairs was lost.   

The gap was filled by National Associations, similar to the Society of Friends (Filiki Eteria) that prepared the War of Independence. They had a diversified membership including university professors, journalists, bankers, politicians and officers of the army pervaded with the Great Idea. (Malesis, 2018) These associations substituted the official state in the conduct of foreign policy. They supplied the Cretan rebels with material resources and organized the dispatch of volunteers so the island. This infuriated the Ottomans as well as the European Powers, although the Greek State officially did not approve of the Associations’ actions after the debacle of 1854, during the Crimean War. At the same time though no action was undertaken to restrain the Associations in fear of the political cost. (Klapsis, 2019)

Trikoupis was describing the National Associations as ‘the fungus of national policy’ and believed that all resources of the nation should be subject to the national center. Foreign policy was to be mandated by the government and not by ‘irresponsible clubs’, he said. (Malesis, 2018)  Thus, as minister of foreign affairs, Trikoupis contributed significantly to the signing of the Greek state’s first alliance treaty with Serbia against the Ottomans (Vöslau, August 1867). (Kostis, 2018)Nevertheless, the king was skeptical, opting for a more moderate approach and refused, at first, to ratify the treaty. (Klapsis, 2019) Furthermore, a few months later George I married the Grand duchess Olga of Russia. This enraged Trikoupis. The Ionian Islands were given as a dowry to the king upon his ascendance to the throne, but now the British and the French had absolutely no reason to endow with Crete the Tsar’s niece. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) By the time the Cretan crisis was settled in 1869 at the Paris Conference, with no gains for Greece, Trikoupis had long resigned his post (December 1867).

1870s

By 1872 Trikoupis was the leader of the ‘Modernist Party’ pursuing political stability. His most famous action to this end is the publication of the article ‘Tis ptaiei?’ (Whose fault, is it?), accusing the king of a lack of respect for the terms of parliament and holding him responsible for the country’s political situation. The king succumbed to the pressure and in August 1875 declared that the principle of declared confidence of Parliament would govern the appointment of the government from that point on. This did not help much though as between 1875 and Trikoupis’ retirement in 1895 another 21 governments were formed. (Kostis, 2018)     

Thus, the quirky foreign policy continued after 1875 during another Balkan crisis initiated by the revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This expanded to Bulgaria in May 1876. Serbia and Montenegro considered that the circumstances were favorable and went to war against the Ottoman Empire in June. Nevertheless, the Ottomans suppressed the revolt and defeated the joint forces of Serbia and Montenegro. Russia intervened and an armistice was signed in November. A conference was held in Constantinople in December, where the Great Powers envisaged increased autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The crisis was not resolved though because the Ottoman government rejected the decisions of the conference.

The intransigent stance of the sultan caused yet another Russo-Turkish war in the spring of 1877. After all, Russia’s intervention in the first place was the result of a secret treaty with Austria–Hungary in July 1876, which, in the case of Serbian victory that year, provided for significant territorial gains not only for the cosignatories, but also for Serbia, Montenegro, the independent Bulgaria and Greece. The latter was to receive Epirus, Thessaly and Crete. Eventually, the content of the treaty became known to Greece, and this caused significant excitement to the public. (Klapsis, 2019)

Greece’s response was similar to that of 1866–69. The realistic policy of neutrality was opposed by the pro-war and anti-ottoman stance of the public forged by the activity of National Associations. The compromise reached by the universal government of the elderly admiral K. Kanaris included military preparation, instigation of revolts in the Ottoman territories and the development of diplomatic initiatives. (Malesis, 2018) In fear of the political cost, the successor of K. Kanaris, A. Koumoundouros, decided to invade Thessaly in early 1878 under the pretense of the protection of the Greek populations in the area. This came to the dismay of both Great Britain, which demanded Greek neutrality, and Russia, which signed an armistice with the Ottomans two days before the Greek invasion and was hoping that this would have come much sooner.

To make things worse, the Treaty of St Stefano in March 1878 between the Russians and the defeated Ottoman Empire attempted to set in motion the plans for the creation of Great Bulgaria and provided for significant gains for Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bosnia–Herzegovina. This would significantly increase Russia’s influence in the Balkans and Greece was to face significant competition in the face of the pan-Slavic movement.

1880s

Luckily, the other Great Powers reacted to the Russian plans and the Treaty of St Stefano was revised in Berlin in the summer of 1878. Despite its disorientated policy, Greece was to negotiate with the Ottoman Empire for the settlement of their borders in Thessaly and Epirus. The Powers intervened once more to overcome the obstructionist tactics of the Ottomans, which delayed the settlement for another two years. Finally, in July 1881 most of Thessaly but only a small part of Epirus around the city of Arta was ceded to Greece. Crete remained under Ottoman rule and Great Britain, for its diplomatic services to the sultan, acquired the right of ‘temporary’ administration of another very important island for Greece, that of Cyprus. (Klapsis, 2019)

At about this time Trikoupis formed, as prime minister, the first ‘long term’ government of Greece from March 1882 to April 1885. This was followed by another one from May 1886 to October 1890. By that time (1882) clientelism weakened the state institutions (Hazony, 2018). In response, Trikoupis expanded the election districts to break the bonds between politicians and their supporters. He also took measures to discourage the participation of army officers in the elections. Stricter rules for hiring and promoting public servants aimed for an increased effectiveness of public administration. 

The most striking feature of Trikoupis’ government though was his extensive program of public works. This included the construction of roads and railways, bridges and ports, the Isthmus of Corinth and land reclamation. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis and the Public Works, 2001) These were prerequisites for the development of the economy and allowed for a rapid deployment of the army. 

Trikoupis took special care of the latter with measures for better training, the reorganization of the officers’ schools and the utilization of the reservists. He also carried out an extensive rearmament program including the construction of several new battleships. (Malesis, 2018) In short, Trikoupis aimed for efficient representation at international level based on a well-administered state of justice, with an efficient economy and strong armed forces. (Klapsis, 2019)

It was very risky. Trikoupis relied on external and internal borrowing to go through with his reform. From 1879 to 1890 Greece took out external loans amounting to 630 million drachmas plus 65 million from internal loans. Although Greece had settled the loans that led to the bankruptcy of 1843, the new ones were agreed under very unfavorable terms with only 72% of the nominal value collected at the end. (Eleftheratos, 2020)   

It was crucial that the economy would grow fast enough to allow for consistent loan servicing. But Greece remained an agricultural country and after the recovery of the French vineyards from phylloxera in 1890, currant exports, which after 1860 accounted for 50–60 % of the total value of Greek exports, decreased dramatically. (Eleftheratos, 2020) The exploitation of the fertile lands of Thessaly also did not bring much for the peasants. Wealthy expatriates bought the large manors from the Ottomans and the feudal system of the empire remained in place. This prepared the way for the peasants’ revolts at the beginning of the 20th century. (Divani, 2010) Trikoupis did not actually get the help he was hoping for from the expatriates’ investments. Although many of them developed philanthropic activity in the country, some were also involved in financial scandals, e.g. that of the Lavrio silver mines, with devastating effects for the general public. (Eleftheratos, 2020) The growing financial problems led to an unprecedented immigration wave, mainly to the USA. (Klapsis, 2019) So much for the inclusiveness of the Greek financial institutions.   

 Thus, the amount of public expenditure going to the service of public debt grew from 9% in the period 1871-1878 to 53% in the years 1887-1892.  Considering that military spending remained high during this period (100 million of the 460 million drachmas of foreign loans that reached Greece were spent on military equipment), it comes as no surprise that from 1887, 70% of the new loans were used to serve the older ones. Taxation was another measure used by Trikoupis to support his program at the cost of his popularity among the people. (Eleftheratos, 2020)

It was the disagreement for taking out yet another loan, for the service of older ones, between king George and Trikoupis that led to the latter’s resignation in 1890. He became prime minister two more times after that (out of seven times in total between 1875 and 1895) but could not prevent state bankruptcy in December 1893. Interestingly, when comparing with recent experience, at the time of the bankruptcy the public debt was 200% of the GDP, somewhat higher than the 182% that led to Greece’s ‘rescue’ by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF in 2010.[1] (Eleftheratos, 2020) Trikoupis suffered a devastating defeat at the elections of 1895, when he was not elected member of the parliament, retired and died the next year. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016)

From bankruptcy to defeat 

Trikoupis’ archrival was Theodoros Deligiannis. The two alternated in the prime minister’s office, inaugurating bipartisanship in Greece. Deligiannis was often described as anti-Trikoupis aiming to systematically cancel the latter’s work (e.g., the expansion of the election districts, the discouragement of army officers to enter politics and the rules for hiring and promoting public servants) and for this he is blamed by some authors as the main culprit for the bankruptcy of 1893. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) One should keep in mind though that Trikoupis’ governments ruled four times as long as those of Deligiannis and that it was he that took out seven colossal loans. (Eleftheratos, 2020)

There can be no doubt though that Deligiannis’ foreign policy was catastrophic. Back in 1885, when he succeeded Trikoupis for a brief period of one year, he had to handle another Balkan crisis. That was the annexation of Eastern Roumelia by Bulgaria. Under public pressure and with parliamentary support, Deligiannis mobilized the army, but for months he was taking no military initiative, apart from some skirmishes in Thessaly because of some hotheaded army officers. At the same time the Great Powers demanded that Greece demobilize its army and abstain from any war effort. Deligiannis’ indecisiveness finally led to another naval blockade by Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy and Russia and his resignation in 1886. (Malesis, 2018)

By 1895, when he was again prime minister, it was Crete’s turn to rise once more. Greece had regained confidence after holding the first Olympic Games of the new era in 1896 and the pattern was once more the same: public pressure under the propaganda of a National Association (Ethiniki Etaireia) for military action, demands for self-restraint from the Great Powers and the government trying to balance in between. To that end, Deligiannis sent the fleet and an army detachment to the island hoping for another naval blockade that would help him save face on the internal front and avoiding, at the same time, war with the Ottoman Empire. (Klapsis, 2019) Things did not go that way though. The Powers asked for a withdrawal of the armed forces of both the Greeks and the Ottomans and opted for an autonomous Crete under the rule of the Sultan. The Ottomans accepted. Deligiannis attempted a catastrophic maneuver: he withdrew the fleet, but not the army suggesting this way that Greece preferred the union with Crete. At the same time guerrillas were sent into Thessaly under the command of officers of the army. (Malesis, 2018) This gave the Ottomans the opportunity they were looking for. In April 1897 they declared war on Greece and having overwhelming numerical superiority the Ottoman army had retaken most of Thessaly within days, stopping only thanks to the intervention of the Powers. In a sign of weakness, Greece was not invited to the peace negotiations of the Powers with the Ottomans and luckily it had to make only small territorial concessions. On the other hand, war reparations to the amount of four million Turkish lira were imposed and to make sure that Greece would honor its obligations to the lenders the Powers set up an international committee to oversee the fiscal policy. (Klapsis, 2019) The International Financial Committee remained in Greece for 81 years - until 1978.

Conclusion

A critical juncture is a major event or confluence of factors disrupting the existing economic or political balance in society. It is a double-edged sword that can cause a sharp turn in the trajectory of a nation. On the one hand it can open the way for breaking the cycle of extractive institutions and enable more inclusive ones to emerge. Or it can intensify the emergence of extractive institutions. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) The 19th century included several such junctures for Greece. Revolution, independence, expansion to the Ionian Island, Thessaly and part of Epirus. Political and economic developments though did not allow for the emergence of inclusive institutions.  

Exclusive institutions do not rule out growth. And indeed, Greece was (inevitably) slowly growing. Cities were developing and the distribution of GDP in different economic sectors was changing. Whereas in 1861, 74% of the economically active population were employed by the primary sector, by 1881 the figure dropped to 69.9% with the secondary sector employing 11.8% and the tertiary sector 18.3%. (Kostis, 2018) The expansion of the road and railway network and the rest of the public works would be Trikoupis’ legacy for the future. However, growth under extractive institutions has moderate results, as it does not allow for creative destruction through innovation. It is therefore not sustainable. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)

Social and political ills discussed previously (Papageorgiou, 2021) were not cured by the end of the 19th century. To this we can add, new ones like the establishment of para-statal organizations playing a significant role in political developments and officers’ mentality that they constitute a special group increasingly autonomous from the political leadership and with support from the palace. (Malesis, 2018)

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

[1] The word ‘rescue’ is in brackets because of the conflicting views regarding the necessity and effectiveness of the implemented policies whose analysis is beyond the scope of this work. 

Bibliography

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail. London: Profile Books ltd.

Divani, L. (2010). The Territorial Completion of Greece (1830-1947), An Attempt at Local Lore. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Eleftheratos, D. (2020). An Oblique Look at History, 200 Years of Modern Greek Laughter and Cry. Athens: Topos (in Greek).

Hazony, Y. (2018). The Virtue of Nationalism. Basic Books: New York.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Tricha, L. (2001). Charilaos Trikoupis and the Public Works. Athens: Kapon (bilingual in Greek and French) .

Tricha, L. (2016). Charilaos Trikoupis. Athens: Polis (in Greek).

The Modern Greek State: 1827-1862 – A Bad Start

On March 25, 2021, the modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1827, when Ioannis Capodistrias was appointed governor of the New Greek State, until 1862, the year of the deposition of King Otto I. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

A depiction of King Otto I, leader of Greece from 1832 to 1862.

Introduction

Following the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, the Greek world did not dissolve. It remained organized around its church, with its own aristocracy in Constantinople, serving in the Ottoman administration, and in local communities, responsible for maintaining order and collecting taxes. It also had its own armed groups of kleftes and armatoloi, men that had served in foreign armies, experienced sailors and war ready navy.

This organization of the Greeks was utilized before and during the War of Independence initiated in 1821, when an internal crisis of the Empire required Ottoman forces to fight against the ambitious Ali Pasha of Ioannina. Despite the Ottoman crisis, the time was not favorable. The turbulent period after the French Revolution and the horror of the Napoleonic Wars that followed, made the European powers hostile against any movement that could reignite the previous turmoil. 

Nevertheless, astonishing Greek victories during the first two years of the war and Ottoman atrocities against civilians caused a wave of support for the Greeks among many Europeans. These Philhellenes collected and disposed money and other resources for the success of the war or even came to Greece to fight side by side with the Greeks. In their eyes the rebels were children of antiquities’ Greats, fighting to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. (Kakouri, 2019) (Kostis, 2018)

The bad start begins

One would expect that the Greeks would try to build on this favorable turn of events. They did not. After 1823, the leading groups of the war (repatriates, local elites and chieftains) engaged in a civil war, fighting for privileges and power in a state that did not even exist yet. At the same time, the sultan agreed with Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt to send the latter’s son Ibrahim to suppress the revolt in Greece. 

The Greeks, preoccupied with their own rivalries, had very little to oppose Ibrahim. The turn of events though is another lesson in the primacy of the dynamics of the international system over the forces at the disposal of one of its lesser members. Conflicting interests between Russia and Great Britain regarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the Protocol of London, co-signed by France, granting autonomy to the Greeks.

The critical issues of the definition of the borders of the autonomous state and obtaining resources for its organization would be tackled by Ioannis Capodistrias, the first governor of the modern Greek State. He was elected by the third National Assembly on April 6, 1827 for a term of seven years. (Evaggelidis T. , 1996) (Divani, 2010)

Ioannis Capodistrias

Ioannis Antonios Capodistrias was born in Corfu in 1776 to a noble family of the island and was a distinguished diplomat at the service of Russia. He arrived in Greece in January 1828 knowing that he had to act fast. The European Powers were proceeding with their plans and French forces were to drive Ibrahim out of the Peloponnese. If Greece wanted to have a say on the definition of its borders, Greek forces had to pursue gains in Central Greece also. Furthermore, law and order had to be restored and basic state functions needed to be established so that Greece could claim (some) self-determination. 

The new Governor worked hard and in a short time managed to reorganize the army, so achieving significant territorial gains in Central Greece. (Malesis, 2018 ) At the same time Great Britain opted for an independent Greece to work as a counterbalance to the Russians who emerged victorious out of a new Russo – Ottoman war (April 1828 to September 1829). Indeed, with another protocol signed on February 3, 1830 Russia, France and Great Britain recognized the independence of the modern Greek State.  

Capodistrias did not only sow the seeds for a national army and navy or deal with foreign policy. In a very short time, he managed to eliminate piracy and improve public safety. He created a national bank and issued national currency, the phoenix. He introduced the farming of maize and potato, products unknown to Greeks at the time, and established an Agricultural School. He also established a Military Academy, monitorial schools and orphanages. He oversaw the imposition of taxes and tariffs. Justice was to be administered by State Courts.

Capodistrias’ was aware of the power games between local elites and anticipated their reaction. In order to restrict their freedom of movement, he succeeded in suspending the force of the constitution voted during the 3rd National Assembly in 1827. The reorganization of the army also aimed at breaking the bonds between the soldiers and local chieftains. At the same time, although Capodistrias made sure that entrusted persons, like his brothers, assumed key positions in the state mechanism, he also appointed some of the elite members to government bodies, like the Senate, or as officers in the army in order to gain their support. 

The Greek notables were seeing ulterior motives in most of the governor’s actions though. He wanted to cut the bonds between the soldiers and their leaders (reorganization of the army). He wanted to keep the people uneducated (Capodistrias considered that, during the first years of the New State, it was more important for the Greeks to learn to read and write and established monitorial schools, but not universities). And finally, he wanted to become a lifelong leader of Greece (suspension of the constitution, appointment of family members to key government positions). Capodistrias’ position was further undermined by the Protocol of 1830, commanding that the independent Greek State would be ruled by a hereditary monarchy. Thus, his rule was temporary. 

 The opposition did not restrain itself to verbal accusations against the government. In fact, it undertook surprisingly harsh actions that were against the interests of Greece - and not only its government. The most striking perhaps was the seizure of principal ships of the Greek fleet by admiral Andreas Miaoulis, a hero of the War of Independence. In order to limit Capodistrias’ abilities for naval operations, in July 1831 Miaoulis blew up the ships bought with the limited resources of the State to guarantee its security. 

Another revolt took place at Mani, in southern Peloponnese, where Petrobey Mavromichalis, another hero of the war was a key figure. Relations between the Mavromichalis clan and Capodistrias were tense because of the attempts to create a centralized state. Mavromichalis was arrested by Capodistrias, found guilty for high treason and put in to jail. The imprisonment of Petrobey brought Konstantinos and Georgios Mavromichalis, the son of Petrobey, to Nafplio, where they were put under police supervision. Nevertheless, they managed to bring their guards to their side and on the morning of September 27, 1831 they assassinated Capodistrias at the entrance of St. Spyridon Church, where he was going to attend Sunday mass.

After the Governor’s assassination the country fell into chaos. The struggle for power intensified as the politico-military factions were antagonizing to better position themselves in view of the arrival of Otto, the second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, who was appointed by the Great Powers as King of Greece. (Evaggelidis T. , 1894)

King Otto I

What exactly was the state that the Bavarians were called to rule? At the eve of its independence, Greece’s area was 47,500 square kilometers, which is 35% of today’s area. Its population was about 800,000. Out of 30,000,000 hectares of arable land, only 500,000 were cultivated. With the exception of the island of Naxos’ emery, the rest of the country’s mineral wealth (marble, lignite, porphyry, silvery lead etc.) was also not exploited. 

After ten years of war, Greece was also lacking the necessary infrastructure to support its economy (roads, bridges, railways etc.). The merchant fleet was strong but transporting the goods to and from the ports was expensive.  It goes without saying that the country’s industry was also non-existent. However, small investments would suffice to boost sectors like the textile industry, where spinners could be substituted with imported machines.   

Thus, the continuation of Capodistrias’ work was necessary for the country’s potential to be realized. The administration’s mechanisms should set a stable framework to boost domestic and attract foreign investments (organization of the banking system, rationalization of taxation, creation of land registry, restoration of order etc.). The Bavarians, upon arriving in Greece, had a loan of 60,000,000 francs at their disposal, which could help this effort. Their undertakings had poor results though. (About, 2018)    

The struggle between the previous regime and the local elites was known to the Bavarians. King Otto, therefore, distrusted the Greeks. When he arrived, he brought with him his own army of 3,500 German mercenaries and filled the state mechanisms with foreign officials.      

Otto relied on the army for the consolidation of his sovereignty. During the first decade of his reign, military spending made up 50% of total public expenditure. With another 26% going to the repayment of the public debt there was not much left for social policy, e.g., education, or public works to boost the economy. In fact, in 1843 Greece was no longer able to serve the public debt and strict fiscal controls were imposed by the lenders. (Kostis, 2018)

With the army and state mechanism full of foreigners, the Greek chieftains turned to banditry for a living. They often enjoyed the protection of the politicians who used them to embarrass the government on a local scale, portraying their actions as acts of resistance against a repressive monarchy. This kind of political patronage extended to officers of the regular army who were underprivileged compared to their foreign colleagues.

The result was the first major intervention of the army in politics. The Revolution of September 3, 1843 was initiated by units located in Athens. The movement did not aim to overthrow the monarch. The participating military and political elites demanded the removal of the Bavarians from the state institutions and a constitution limiting royal power. Otto had no option but to comply. (Malesis, 2018 )    

The years of constitutional monarchy did not change much though. The Greek elites gained better access to state institutions (Parliament and Senate) and the monarch used the same ‘clientele’ approach against them. All elections after 1844 were won by the government that staged them, an indication that constitutional rights were violated by the parliament majority (e.g., by annulling rivals’ votes) for the promotion of their own interest. There were incidents where state sponsored violence was used by the monarch to promote his preferred candidates, in which case, the opposition often resorted to banditry to ensure their political survival.

To defuse the situation internal problems needed to be ‘exported’ somehow. This is the time of the Great Idea (Megali Idea), when the Greek State portrayed itself as the champion of all still enslaved Greeks with the mission to free them by conquering the territories remaining under Ottoman occupation. Ironically, at the same time, during the meetings of the National Assembly for the adoption of the constitution of 1844, special care was taken to expel and exclude heterocthons (Greeks from abroad settled in the New State) from government positions as their education and distance from local elites made them hard to manipulate. (Kostis, 2018) (Malesis, 2018 )

Thus, the King supported uprisings of the Greeks in Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia during the Crimean War (1853 – 1856). As a result, France and England, now allies of the Ottoman Empire against Russia, identified Greece with the latter and occupied Piraeus and Athens in April 1854. The Greek insurgents eventually withdrew from the Ottoman territories and the humiliating occupation ended in February 1857. The three political parties of the time, carrying the names English, French and Russian, from the corresponding power they relied on for support, were dissolved after 1854.

The opposition against Otto reached its culmination point in 1862. In October, mainly low-ranking non-commissioned officers of the army supported the uprising that led to the overthrow of Otto. The king was touring the country at the time to gather support, as he was aware of the opposition’s movements. He never made it back to the capital. After consulting with the ambassadors of the Great Powers, he was persuaded to leave the country. Doubts were cast regarding the people’s participation in the uprisings of 1843 and 1862 though. Indeed, it would not be surprising if the common people, also systematically abstaining from the national elections, were preoccupied with a much more important issue at that time. Namely, their survival. (Kostis, 2018) (Malesis, 2018 )   

Conclusion

Bad use of available resources, very moderate attempts to develop the country’s economy, oligarchy conflicts, distanced citizens and ‘clientelism’, overweening ambitions and foreign intervention. These are the main characteristics that undermined Greece’s potential during the War of Independence and the first thirty years of the modern Greek State. Their effects remain to this day.

What do you think of the early years of the modern Greek State? Let us know below.

Now read part 2 on the Modern Greek State - 1863-1897, bankruptcy and defeat here.

References

About, Edmond. Otto’s Greece. Athens: Metaixmio (in Greek), 2018.

Divani, Lena. The Territorial Completion of Greece (1830-1947), An Attempt at Local Lore.  Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek), 2010.

Evaggelidis, Triffon. History of Otto, King of Greece (1832-1862). Athens: Aristidis Galanos (in Greek), 1894.

Evaggelidis, Trifon. Ioannis Capodistrias, The history of the Governor of Greece. Athens: Livanis (in Greek), 1996.

Kakouri, Athina. 1821 The Beginning that Was Not Completed, When and How the State that We Live Today was Created. Athens: Patakis (in Greek), 2019.

Kostis, Kostas. History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London : Hurst & Company, 2018.

Malesis, Dimitris. “… let the Revolution Begin”, Great Idea & the Army in 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek), 2018.

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War: A Minor War with Major Consequences

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War took place over 32 days from April to May 1897. Greece and the Turkish Ottoman Empire fought, primarily over the question of the status of Crete. However, the war had lasting consequences. Rama Narendra explains.

The Battle of Domeke in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. Painting by Fausto Zonaro.

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War is a war few remember or even know about outside of the countries involved. The war was relatively short, involved two relatively minor players in the European Concert, and is completely overshadowed by wars and crises happening shortly after it like the Agadir Crisis, the Italo-Turkish War, The Balkan Wars, and World War I. However, the war still had major, but subtle consequences for both countries which, like dominoes, led to the Balkan Wars in the 20thcentury.

Background

Just like other Empires at the time, the Ottoman Empire was troubled with nationalist revolts in the 19th century. One particular hotbed for nationalist fervor was Crete, with its Greek-speaking majority demanding autonomy or even self-rule. To escalate the situation, King George of Greece was of one mind with Greek nationalists in wishing to annex the island, and frequently sent arms and men to support Cretan nationalists. 1897, however, would prove to be a fateful year as the over-confident Greek leadership saw the chance to annex Crete or even expanding on the mainland further north. This overconfidence was fueled by the humiliation of the Ottoman armed forces back in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War, and an exaggerated view of the internal problems of the Ottomans, especially regarding the Armenian rebellions.

The Ottoman military, though, was far from what the Greek leadership had imagined. Sultan Abdülhamid II has been working closely with German advisors to reform and improve the Ottoman army. The mission led by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz in 1886 had particularly lasting effects on Ottoman leadership and planning. He not only drastically improved the Ottoman education and training system, but also changed the overall status of the general staff officer corps within the army. Close cooperation with German firms also ensured that the Ottomans were armed with modern bolt-action rifles.

Escalating Tensions

On February 15, 1897 two regular Greek battalions, joined by local rebels landed on the shores of Crete. Within two weeks, Greek semi-official gangs, called the Ethnike Hetairia, reinforced with regular officers and soldiers, began to launch raids into Ottoman Thessaly. On April 9 Greek raiders, with some Italian volunteers, attacked Ottoman border towers and defeated a border company in Kranya. They were repulsed by Ottoman border guards the next day, and even though the Ottoman government were reluctant to enter a full-blown war, intense public pressure eventually pushed the Ottomans to declare war on Greece on April 17.

The war was fought in two separate theaters: Alasonya-Thessaly and Yanya-Epirus. However, most of the fighting was done in the Thessaly Front. During the war, the Ottomans used plans devised by none other than Von der Goltz himself. The plan was to force the Greeks to overstretch their defensive lines, which were very near to the border. The main body of the Ottoman Army at Alasonya would then try to encircle the Greeks before they were able to retreat back to the Yenisehir line. Von der Goltz expected that the Great Powers would not let the Greeks be beaten and would intervene in the conflict in less than 15 days. So the Greek army had to be crushed in less than two weeks.

The War

The first stage of the war (April 16–22) was marked by border clashes and the occupation of mountain passes. This stage also shows that despite the reforms the Ottoman army still had glaring shortcomings. Officers and soldiers sometimes ran towards the enemy as if in a race without paying attention to combat tactics and techniques, and as a result officers suffered abnormally high casualty levels. Instead of conducting the encirclement maneuver as planned, most units simply tried to push the Greek defenders back by frontal assaults. Confusion, delay, and lack of coordination and communication were the norms until the Ottoman forward units reached weakly defended Yenisehir two days after the Greeks withdrew from the town.

The second stage (April 23–May 4) was marked by the battle of Mati-Deliler and the occupation of Tırnova and Yenisehir. The second stage proceeded almost the same way as the first stage, with Ottoman units pushing the Greek defenders back without attempting encirclement maneuvers, and the Greeks safely evacuated their defenses and retreated to their last defensive line.

The third and last stage (May 5–17) was marked by the decisive battles of Velestin, Catalca, and Domeke, in front of the last Greek defensive line. The first battle of Velestin was a disaster for the Ottomans. In this encounter, a forced reconnaissance turned into a futile and bloody assault, and the Greek lines held firm against Ottoman cavalry and infantry charges. However, the Ottomans eventually pushed through Greek lines in the second battle. The Ottoman army finally decisively beat the Greeks at the battles of Catalca and Domeke. The Greek defenders were thoroughly beaten and the road to Athens was opened.

Conclusion and Consequences

However, as Von der Goltz had predicted, the Great Powers intervened and Greece was saved from further humiliation. Even though the Ottomans militarily won the war, they did not gain much from the victory. The Great Powers forced the Ottomans to give Crete autonomy and refused an Ottoman plea to obtain the region of Thessaly, previously lost in the aftermath of the 1877 Russo-Turkish War. Greece, however, was required to pay a heavy war indemnity to compensate the Ottomans for the territory won by them in Thessaly and returned under the terms of the peace. The victorious Ottoman troops retreated as if defeated, and Abdülhamid spent several tense months trying to explain to the public why the war had been won in the battlefield but lost at the diplomatic table.

So what were the consequences of this short war? As it turned out, they were big. In the Ottoman Empire, despite the disappointing result, the victory gave the Ottomans a public morale boost and confidence after being humiliated by the European powers for decades. This confidence is what eventually drove an overwhelmingly pro-war public opinion on the eve of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars. If their armed forces had beaten Greece in 1897, what prevented them from doing it again? Yaşasın harb! (Long live War!), cried the pro-war demonstrators in 1912.

In Greece, the defeat was seen as disgraceful and humiliating, mostly due to the rapid and unexpected advance of the Ottoman army. This defeat though, fueled the country’s irredentist policy of the Megali Idea (Greater Greece) and led Greece to reform its politics and economy, redefine its international alliances, and prepare the military and naval forces that helped Greece double its territory over the next 20 years.

If you enjoyed this article, you can read about the Megali Idea and how it shaped the modern Greek state here.

References

Ginio, E. (2016). The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katsikas, S., & Krinaki, A. (2020). Reflections on an" Ignominious Defeat": Reappraising the Effects of the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 on Greek Politics. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 38(1), 109-130.

Uyar, M., & Erickson, E. J. (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk: From Osman to Ataturk. ABC-CLIO.

5 Weird Facts about the Ancient Olympics

The Ancient Olympics were held in Greece from 776 BC until they were stopped in 393 AD; however they were very different to the modern Olympics. Here, Adrian Burrows returns and tells us five odd facts about the Ancient Olympics.

You can read a past ancient history article from Adrian on The Weapon that Conquered Ancient Egypt here.

A 19th century depiction of Olympia, Greece in ancient times.

Notwithstanding a short break (what’s a millennia and a half between friends ay?), the Olympics have been a part of humanity’s story for the last 2,800 years – ish. The start of the Ancient Olympics is usually attributed to the year 776 BC - that’s when the first Olympic Games took place in the town of Olympia; situated somewhere between the city-states of Elis and Sparta on the west coast of the Peloponnese. The first Games consisted of only one event, the Stade race, in which runners had to run 280 meters (or a Stadion, the word we derive ‘stadium’ from). The race was unremarkable, should 20 competitors decide to run a Stade race today it would be remarkably similar to a modern sprint – other than the fact that male competitors would all be naked of course. Which would certainly make for some unflattering media coverage, or perhaps a 21st century resurgence of the Stade race would make the Olympics more popular than ever? 

There are many other ways that the Ancient Olympics differ to our modern Olympics but this list represents by far the weirdest.

Only Men Could Compete

The Ancient Olympics was both primarily a religious event and also a strictly man only affair. That’s not to say that women couldn’t take part in their own sporting events - they could compete in the Heraean Games, though many of the finer details of this event have been lost to the mists of time – but they were forbidden from entering the Olympics. In fact, if you were a married woman you were prevented from even watching the Olympics. The punishment for ogling the jiggling glutes of the male competitors for a wed woman was severe - if you were caught you’d be thrown off a mountain.

That’s not to say that a woman never won the Olympic Games however. Who achieved this seemingly impossible feat? That would be a Spartan woman called Kyniska, daughter of the Archidamos. Oddly, the winner of a chariot race was not the rider, rather it was the owner of the horses who received the glory – enabling Kyniska to win the event, without actually being there. The rider - despite being in command of a rickety chariot pulled by four muscle bound horses over some 12 laps and 14,000 metres – received a grand total of zilch for their efforts. 

They Were Stinky. Very Stinky

Today, a country fortunate enough to hold the Olympics must invest millions into creating custom built stadiums. Not only are they perfectly constructed in every conceivable way, providing the ideal environment for the athletes competing within them, they also offer comprehensive comfort for the spectators. Offering food, drink, seating and – most importantly – lots and lots of toilets. 

The spectators of the Ancient Olympics had no such luxury, Every four years (that’s an Olympiad) over 50,000 people descended on the ordinarily virtually uninhabited Olympia (a few priests kept things ticking over but that was about it). 50,000 people sat in the hot sun with only a river to poop in. Just imagine the stench. Add to that the fact that 100 oxen would be sacrificed and burnt on the Alter of Zeus in the middle of the festival. There’s one thing for certain though - no candle manufacturer will ever be making an overpriced candle infused with the scent of the Ancient Olympics.

A Dead Person Won the Olympics

The Ancient Olympics were a brutal affair, boxing and wrestling were much more violent than the modern versions we are used to seeing on our televisions today. Though both these blood soaked spectacles paled in gore levels compared to Pankration – the mixed martial arts of the Ancient world. Pankration had only two rules, no biting and no poking out anyone’s eye. Other than that, anything went!

One remarkable account details the final fight of Arrhichion of Phigalia. Arrhichion was trapped in the vice like grip of his formidable opponent. Arms like steely vein covered greasy oil coated pythons were wrapped around his neck, and try as he might Arrhichion could not free himself. As his vision began to fade Arrhichion stamped as hard as he could on his opponent’s foot. The pain was so intense that this unknown fighter released Arrhichion and submitted. The crowd went wild, Arrhichion had overcame the odds and won. But while the crowd went bananas Arrhichion remained unmoving on the sand and dirt. He was dead.

That didn’t dampen the celebration however. Despite being very deceased, Arrhichion was crowned the victor and returned to Phigalia a hero.

More Gore than Ever Before

Arrhichion’s final victory was not the goriest event to take place in the Ancient Olympics, instead that honour would fall to the boxing match between Damoxenos and Creugas. In Ancient Boxing there were no weight classes and the matches were randomly picked. So you could end up with a bout in which one fighter had a significant size and weight advantage over the other. Which reportedly was the case when these Damoxenos and Creugas, two undefeated champions, went up against each other. 

Damoxenos was a massive slab of humanity, whilst Creugas was smaller but incredibly nimble. And a good thing too, with no boxing gloves fighters instead just wrapped their fists in leather; one punch from the giant Damoxenos would have levelled Creugas, and with no rules stating otherwise, the bigger man could keep on punching Creugas in the head – regardless of whether or not he could defend himself. Either way power vs agility had led to a draw, meaning a ‘klimax’ was enforced. Here each man takes it in turns to hit the other with full force; this is an unprotected blow taking at their liberty. Like some sort of blood soaked penalty shootout the fight ends when only one man is left standing. 

Creugas went first, he punched the bigger man in the head as hard as he could. But to little avail, Damoxenos just shrugged off the assault. Then it was Damoxenos’ turn, Creugas braced himself as this terrifying beast punched him with full force with straight fingers into the bread basket. Damoxenos clearly needed a manicure as his sharp nails ripped at Creugas’ skin. Damoxenos then ripped his fingers once more along Creugas’ abdomen, gutting the fighter like a pig and causing his innards to come tumbling out like meat and potato from a freshly bitten pie. 

It was all over, Creugus had won. That’s right, Creugus. Damoxenos had been disqualified as the rules of the ‘Klimax’ state one punch at a time only. Sure, Creugas’ guts were getting a sun tan but it was all worth it for that laurel wreath.

The World’s Greatest

These days, in every Olympic event, multiple world records are smashed. Athletes are lucky to hold on to their world record for a decade but it is rare for a competitor to hold a record for fifty years, let alone a hundred. Yet there was one ancient athlete who held his record for over two thousand years. Yes, TWO THOUSAND YEARS. This phenomenal specimen of a Homo Sapien was Leonidas of Rhodes. 

He first competed in the Olympic Games of the 154th Olympiad in 164 BCE, where Leonidas captured the laurel wreath in three different races; the stadion, the diaulos (a foot race of 400 metres) and the hoplitodromos (a diaulos where the runners wear armour – talk about exhausting!). He then went on to win these three events over the next three consecutive Olympiads. Bear in mind that in the Ancient Olympics there was no second or third place, you were either a winner… or a massive loser.

This astonishing act, of winning twelve individual Olympic victories, was unmatched until 2016; when Michael Phelps, the American swimmer, won his 13th Olympic Gold.

Adrian is a co-owner of Imagining History workshops. Imagining History provides educational history workshops for primary schools that captivate and entertain.

Their interactive sessions combine role-play, storytelling, demonstrations and drama and performance to bring history to life for students.

Imagining History offer loads of free digital history resources for teachers and parents. You can find content on Ancient Greece, Ancient Egypt and more at www.imagininghistory.co.uk/blog.

You can also check out their biweekly Youtube series ‘Headlines from History’.