Could the 1941 Pearl Harbor Attack have been Averted?

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was a very complex operation that required precise information about the movement and disposition of the US Pacific Fleet, based at Hawaii. This information was gathered on the ground by a spy named Takeo Yoshikawa, who cabled regular reports to Tokyo. These reports proved to be invaluable to the success of the Japanese attack. However, this constant supply of information almost gave the game away.

Here, Alan Bardos, author of a related novel: Amazon US | Amazon UK, considers whether the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been avoided.

During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the West Virginia was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs.

Our Man in Hawaii

The US Pacific Fleet moved from its bases on the West Coast of America to Pearl Harbor in 1940, so the Japanese consequently had very little information about it. The sailing of their fleet over 3,500 miles from home waters to Hawaii was a massive undertaking that required their ships to be refueled numerous times en route. Before taking such a risk they therefore needed to know what was waiting for them when they arrived and the best time to attack.

Bureau 3 (Intelligence) of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s General Staff attached Takeo Yoshikawa to the Japanese Consulate-General in Honolulu. His mission was to gather news about Pearl Harbor. His orders were vague and were constantly refined by further instructions from his superiors in Tokyo.

Yoshikawa meticulously gathered vital intelligence on the movements of the US Pacific Fleet and Hawaii’s defenses. He spent his days travelling between various observation points around Hawaii, reconnoitering airfields and the US Fleet. Changing his clothes several times through the course of the day, he would blend in as anyone from a tourist to a Filipino-American laborer. Yoshikawa even took geisha girls as cover on sightseeing flights over Pearl Harbor. Postcards he supplied were found in the cockpits of Japanese aircraft shot down over Pearl Harbor. Crucially, Yoshikawa was said to have discovered that Sunday mornings were the best time to attack, when the Fleet was home from maneuvers.

Yoshikawa communicated this information regularly to Tokyo through commercial American telegraph companies. In the run up to the attack Tokyo’s need for information increased steadily, to the extent that Yoshikawa was reporting the US Fleet’s movements on a daily basis, leaving a large paper trail of his activities.

The number of cables sent by the Japanese Consulate hadn’t gone unnoticed and Robert L. Shivers, the FBI’s Special Agent In Charge in Hawaii tried to persuade the cable companies to share the coded messages with him but they refused, not wishing to break Federal Law.

Magic intercepts

American Intelligence had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and were regularly intercepting and decrypting Japanese diplomatic traffic, as part of a program code named Magic. This used a machine code named Purple to decode these messages, which were then translated manually. The Americans were therefore aware that war was coming in the Pacific, but only knew as much as Japan’s diplomats, who were not informed in any detail of their Military’s plans. The US Army and Navy Departments in Washington did issue war warnings to their Pacific commanders, but the warnings were consequently vague and did not suggest that Hawaii would be a target.

Faced with an overwhelming amount of decrypted information, American Intelligence focused their efforts on translating the high level communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Washington, which was conducting peace talks with the American government. This did eventually provide a warning of a coming attack, but it did not say where it would be.

Dorothy Edgers and the deferred intercepts

Yoshikawa’s telegram’s to Tokyo gave precisely this information, but as Hawaii was considered a diplomatic backwater, they were left untranslated in the “deferred” pile until one bored newbie in the Naval Cryptographic Section decided to look at them.

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, a former school teacher in Japan, had been working as a translator for two weeks when she found herself in the office on a Saturday morning. She had nothing to do, but was eager to be involved in this strange new world of signals intelligence and started to translate the Hawaii decrypts.

She struck gold immediately realizing the importance of the correspondence between Yoshikawa and Tokyo. Enwrapped, Mrs. Edgers translated telegram after telegram that gave away the military secrets of her country, from real time movements of its battleships, to the lack of torpedo nets protecting them, to the position of the airfields tasked with defending them. This was clearly more than the routine reports of a sidelined diplomat in a backwater, but information for a full-scale attack.

Mrs. Edgers reported her findings to her immediate supervisor Chief Ship’s Clerk Bryant. He saw their significance, but it was Saturday and they were finishing at 12:00pm so he told her it would wait until next week.

Not put off, Dorothy Edgers continued to translate the decrypted messages, waiting in the office for the return of the Translation Branch chief, Captain Alvin Kramer, who had been making his rounds delivering the latest high priority Magic Intercepts. Mrs. Edgers briefed Kramer on what she’d found and was reprimanded for her trouble.

Tired and with a number of other conflicting priorities, Kramer was annoyed that she worked late after the office had closed and was unhappy about the quality of her translation. He dismissed her in no uncertain terms and she was told once again that it would wait until next week.

Ordinarily, Bryant and Kramer would have been right, but on this occasion it was the day before the Pearl Harbor attack.

December 7th 1941 - A date that will live in infamy

The next day, on reviewing the priority daily intercepts between Tokyo and their Embassy in Washington, Kramer saw things were clearly coming to a head. Tokyo had instructed its delegation to end their negotiations at 1pm precisely.

Kramer had been stationed in Hawaii and knew that 1pm in Washington was dawn in Hawaii, and worked out what time 1pm would be at all the US bases in the Pacific, with it being a few hours before dawn in the Philippines.

He passed his findings onto Commander McCollum and Captain Wilkinson, his superiors in the Office of Naval Intelligence. They took them to Admiral Stark the Chief of Naval Operations, who was not overly impressed, but after further discussion and consulting with General Marshall, his opposite number in the Army, Stark agreed to issue an alert to his bases in the Pacific. However, due to atmospheric conditions, they were unable to send the warning to Hawaii and it was sent as a low priority telegram and arrived just after the attack had finished.

They believed that the main threat they were facing was an amphibious landing in the Philippines, where it would be the optimum time for that type of attack and there were also reports of Japanese ships moving in that direction. Had Yoshikawa’s reports been more widely distributed, a very different conclusion might have been reached.

Admiral Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the man blamed for the attack categorically argued that had he been aware of the Hawaiian decrypts, he would have been better prepared to counter the surprise attack. That was certainly the findings of a subsequent congressional investigation.

Many of the events depicted in this article inspired my novel ‘Rising Tide’, which can be purchased here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Book full name: Rising Tide (Daniel Nichols Spy Thrillers Book 1) eBook : Bardos, Alan : Kindle Store

References

Japan's Spy at Pearl Harbor: Memoir of an Imperial Navy Secret Agent, Takeo Yoshikawa, McFarland (2 Mar. 2020).

The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor, Ladislas Farago, Westholme Publishing; Reprint edition (25 Oct. 2012).

A Matter of Honor: Pearl Harbor: Betrayal, Blame, and a Family's Quest for Justice, by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, Harper; Reprint edition (15 Nov. 2016).

Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack, by Steve Twomey, Simon & Schuster; Illustrated edition (1 Nov. 2016).

Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness, by Craig Nelson, Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 1st Edition (10 Nov. 2016).

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1960/december/top-secret-assignment

Was a World War 2 Japanese Offensive in 1944 a Master Stroke?

The 1944 Japanese offensive of “Operation Ichigo” is one of the more under reported offensives of World War Two. However, this offensive would have an important effect on the outcome of the Pacific theater. This operation took place in China and accomplished some important Japanese military objectives. It would have a direct consequence on the U.S. bombings over Japan, and was a major Japanese military victory.

Daniel Boustead returns to the site and explains.

Japanese forces invading Henan, China in 1944.

In April 1944, the Japanese launched their first major offensive in China since they captured Hankow in 1938 ([1]). The operation was code named Ichigo meaning “Number One”. The plan involved Japanese forces in north China who were ordered southward to take the main north-south rail lines and the capture the U.S. Army Air Force’s east China Air bases. At the same time, other forces holding an enclave in the far south around (Canton and Hong Kong) were instructed to drive to the west and clear a line to the French Indochina border. This separate action was designed to open a direct line of communication between the Japanese in China and those Japanese forces in Southeast Asia.

The principal objectives for Operation Ichigo were as follows: seize the north-south rail line, a series of key towns, and the air bases. These were built by General Claire Chenault in 1938 and 1939. Chenault built these air bases for the Chinese Air Force and would be subsequently expanded to accommodate his Fourteenth Army Air Force.

This Japanese force consisted of 15 Imperial Japanese Army Divisions, plus five independent Imperial Japanese Army brigades. This force was commanded by General Shunroku Hata.

Early success

The Japanese achieved one of their first goals early in the operation. As the Japanese advanced the Chinese Army of 300,000 men simply capitulated to them ([2]). Japanese units consisting of only 500 men routed thousands of Chinese. In the resulting panic, Chinese officers commandeered most of the available trucks to escape with their families and possessions. It took only three weeks from April to May, 1944, for the Japanese to capture their first important objectives of the Yellow and the Yangtze Rivers. It was soon after the Japanese captured the Yangtze River in May 1944, that they pushed forward to General Chennault’s air bases. The Chinese city of Changsa barred the Japanese from Chenault’s air bases.

Changsha was defended by Chinese General Hsueh Yueh, who would soon make a fatal mistake that sealed the fate of the city. Right before the attack, General Yueh moved his headquarters 100 miles to the south to prepare the defense of Hengyang, China, where General Chenault’s northernmost air bases were located ([3]). This resulted in no one being able to coordinate the defense of Changsha. When the Chinese army artillery commander of Changsha asked General Yueh for infantry to protect his artillery, General Yueh refused. The outcome of these fatal decisions was apparent. The Japanese quickly destroyed the unprotected artillery and then swept away the unprotected infantry as Changsha fell to Japanese control in May 1944.

Advances

The Japanese Army then turned their attention to capturing Hengyang, China ([4]). It surrounded Hengyang by June 1944 and captured it by August, 1944(5).  On August 26, 1944 6,000 Japanese counterattacked at Lungling, China and the Chinese Y-Force was forced to retreat (22). In September 1944, the Imperial Japanese Army captured the Fourteenth Air Force base at Lingling, 80 miles southwest of Hengyang, China (6). By October 1944, Imperial Japanese Army forces were threatening Kweilin, China, home of the largest of General Chennault’s air bases. On November 10, 1944 the Imperial Japanese Army captured Kweilin, China (7).  In the aftermath of the fall of Kweilin in November 1944, Imperial Japanese forces began advancing towards Kunming, China (13). The Kunming advance further threatened General Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force bases. The Japanese forces then moved to take over Chennault’s base at Liuchow, some 100 miles to the southwest of Kweilin. It was soon after this they pushed southward to take four bases around Nanning. They then drove southwest for a link up with other Japanese forces in French Indochina.

The Imperial Japanese Army had succeeded in their twin objectives: capturing the east China airfields and securing the main railway line to the south. As part of this Ichigo advance the IJA’s Eleventh Army (under the command of Lieutenant Isamu Yokoyama), began operating under his own his initiative, and quickly captured the American Chinese air base. This air base was located on the northwest trail towards the Chinese city of Kweiyang. The Chinese who were defending this air base quickly capitulated to the Japanese. This was due to their lack of supplies and weapons.

By early December 1944, the only thing that stood in the way of the Japanese Eleventh Army and the Ichigo offensive were Chennault’s air force. The Japanese forces also were facing the Chinese Army forces in their drive towards Kunming and Chunking China. Chennault’s air force was operating east of the Ichigo advance. The Japanese 11thArmy stopped its advance towards Kunming in December 1944. They had outrun their supply lines and retreated back slightly to garrison for the winter.

Operation Ichigo was such a success that American General Wedemeyer estimated that it would result in the Japanese Army releasing 25 divisions to fight elsewhere. General Wedemeyer also estimated that if the Japanese captured all of China, they could hold out for years, long after the Americans invaded the Japanese Home Islands.

Allied air strikes

On February 15, 1944 at an Allied meeting in New Delhi, General Wolf presented General Order No.16 (14). In General Order No.16, it stated that General Chennault and his Fourteenth Army Air Forces would be responsible for fighter defense of B-29 bases in China. The Japanese knew it was only a matter of time before the B-29 Bombers would be using the Fourteenth Army Air Force bases. The first B-29 Bombers took off from Chengtu, China, to bomb the Coke Ovens at the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata, Japan (8). The first B-29 Yawata raid lasted from the nights of June 15 to June 16, 1944. The photoreconnaissance results of the raid were disappointing. Only a single bomb wrecked a small building about three quarters of a mile away from the Coke Ovens. On July 7 to July 8, 1944, B-29 Bombers took off from a base near Chengtu, China to strike the Japanese Naval base at Sasebo, Japan (9). The raid was a failure because the bombs had missed the port facility by as much as 12 miles. This was due to mechanical problems with the radar bombing system. On August 10, 1944, 24 B-29 Bombers flew from Chengtu, China to Nagasaki and dropped 63 tons of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs on the city’s shipyards (10). On August 20, 1944, B-29 Bombers launched from Chengtu China caused little damage to the coke ovens at the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata Japan (11). On October 25, 1944, 78 B-29 Bombers took off from Chengtu, China and bombed Omura, Japan (12). According to strike photos and later reconnaissance on November 6, 1944, the Omura raid did a considerable amount of damage on the target, especially in the aluminum fabrication industry of the city. B-29 raids based out of China and India would end in early 1945 (21).

The early B-29 raids from the Mariana Islands on Japan produced varied results. On November 24, 1944, a group of B-29 bombers took off from Saipan island (15). The group of 111 B-29 Bomber’s target was the Nakajima Musashino aircraft-engine plant in northwest, Tokyo (16). This raid resulted in only 24 B-29 Bombers who managed to make a hit on the Nakajima Musashino aircraft engine plant. This bombing raid was severely weakened by the 130 MPH Jet Stream wind that blew the bombs off course. On November 27, 1944, a group of B-29 bombers took off from Isley Field Saipan and tried to hit the same target again (17). The results of this second raid were not very good due to poor aiming over the target, and that was only slightly mitigated by radar (18). On December 3, 1944, 86 B-29 Bombers took off from the Marianas Islands to hit the same target (19). The results of this raid were that only 26 bombs hit the target area and the damage to the factory was negligible. On December 13, 1944, a group of B-29 Bombers (based out of the Mariana Islands) struck at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, Japan (20). The results of this raid (according to strike photographs) were one-fifth of the plant’s huge roof was blown in. Furthermore, the plant’s engine production was cut from 1,600 engines per month to 1,2000 engines per month and some vital parts of the factory were completely destroyed (20).

Conclusion

The Japanese capture of the American air bases severely reduced the damage to Japanese cities. The early B-29 raids from China and the Mariana Islands produced sparse results. They would have devastated Japan if they had been better coordinated, lasted longer, and had better weather intelligence. Even if the Japanese did not capture the air bases that directly house the B-29 Bombers, the Japanese military offensive along with America’s decision to concentrate on bombing missions from the Mariana Islands, made the Americans realize that bombing from China was no longer a viable option.

“Operation Ichigo” is an often-overlooked military operation. However, it had a strategic and tactical impact on the course of the war.  The operation captured key air bases, railways, and allowed for a link up with forces in Indochina. In addition, it drove the Allies to use nuclear weapons and Operation August Storm to negate the effects of this operation. “Operation Ichigo” was a very successful Japanese offensive.

In Loving memory of my Grandfather Richard Strayer Shue, a World War II veteran, a published Historian, and my inspiration. Born March 9, 1923 and died July 23, 2023.

[1] Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 179.

[2] Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 180.

[3] Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 180 to 181.

[4] Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 181.

5 Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 172.

22 Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 183.

6 Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 188.

7 Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1978. 190.

13 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982.71.

14 US Air Force, Office of Air Force History. The Army Air Forces In World War II: The Pacific: Matternhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945., Volume No.5. Edited  Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. 1983. 46.

8 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 57 to 59.

9 Dorr, Robert F. Osprey Combat Aircraft .33 : B-29 Superfortress Units of World War 2. Edited by Tony Holmes. Oxford,  Osprey Publishing Limited, United Kingdom, 2002, (2003 reprint). 20.

10 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 61 to 63.

11 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 63 to 64.

12 US Air Force, Office of Air Force History. The Army Air Forces In World War II: The Pacific: Matternhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945., Volume No.5. Edited  Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. 1983. 140.

21 Dorr, Robert F. Osprey Combat Aircraft .33 : B-29 Superfortress Units of World War 2. Edited by Tony Holmes. Oxford,  Osprey Publishing Limited, United Kingdom, 2002, (2003 reprint). 31.

15 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 101.

16 Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire. New York: New York. Random House. 1999. 53.

17 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 103.

18  Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire. New York: New York. Random House. 1999. 54.

19 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 105.

20 Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books Inc. 1982. 105 to 106.

Japanese Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War 2: A Little Bit of Technology, a Little Bit of Luck

The U.S. submarine campaign in the Pacific during World War II is well known. However, less is known about the Japanese anti-submarine force that faced the U.S. submarines during the war. Daniel Boustead tells us about the Japanese campaign here.

U.S. submarine ace Richard H. O’Kane (right) being awarded the Medal of Honor by US President Harry S. Truman (left) in March 1946.

During World War II, the Japanese had important wins against the Allies. These wins were attributable to some well-developed technology, weapons, and tactics. The Japanese were also helped along  by several American blunders. The Japanese anti-submarine force was more effective than previously thought.

The Imperial Japanese Navy’s anti-submarine forces killed or captured two out three of the top three American Submarine Aces during World War II. The Japanese patrol craft  P-34 captured top American submarine ace Richard H. O’Kane between October 24th and  October 25th, 1944, when O’Kane’s sub-USS Tang was sunk by a circular run of its own torpedoes(1). O’Kane was the top U.S. Sub Ace with 27 ships sunk(11).  He would end up at the Ofuna P.O.W. Camp and the Omori P.O.W. camp in Japan for the rest of the war(12).

The Japanese also killed Number 3 American Sub Ace Dudley “Mush” Morton on October 11th, 1943 after Japanese airplanes sunk Morton’s Sub U.S.S. Wahoo. A total of over 60 depth charges and 40  bombs were expended against the sub at the  Le Perouse Strait(13). Dudley “Mush” Morton had sunk 19 Japanese Ships(14).

The Japanese anti-submarine campaign was beginning to have  a negative effect on the American submarine crewmen’s morale. For example, U.S.S. Harder Exec Tim Lynch said of his skipper Sam Dealey “Sam was showing unmistakable signs, of strain,”, (15). Lynch continued,  “He was becoming quite casual about Japanese anti-submarine measures. “Once, on the previous patrol, I found Sam in a sort of state of mild shock, unable to make a decision” (15).

Technology and tactics

By contrast the Allies  were only able to capture or kill  one out of three  of Nazi’s Germany Top U-Boat Aces during World War II. The British captured Otto Kretschmer on March 17th, 1941, after the British Destroyer HMS Walker brought Kretschmer’s boat U-99 to the surface after a long depth charge attack(2). Kretschmer was the Third Reich Top Scoring Ace with 47 ships sunk. He sent 274,418 tons of shipping to the bottom(3).

A total of 52 out of 288 U.S. subs that were commissioned were lost by the end of war. By September 2nd, 1945, the  loss rate was 18.06%(17). The Japanese sunk 41 out of 52 lost U.S. subs while they were on war patrol or due to enemy action. The other 11 were lost by various other causes.

The Japanese success can be attributed to technology and tactics. First, Japan’s radio direction finder network was very well developed(18). The Japanese were able to intercept almost all U.S. radio transmissions, except for very low or very high frequency calls. Thus, the Japanese could fix the position of a submarine transmitting on the surface within an area of about 100 square miles. This provided a means of keeping tabs on the U.S. subs in various areas, the number on patrol, and the general distribution in the Pacific. Japanese underwater listening gear was also excellent and echo ranging destroyers were always a threat to U.S. Subs. In the fall of 1943, the Japanese High Command organized the Grand Escort Fleet, along with an air escort squadron specifically designed to protect convoys against submarines.

By 1944, the Japanese radio detection system was growing more effective each month. Japanese Radio detection system was so successful it could intercept communications between subs in an American wolf pack. In addition, Japanese anti-submarine forces  were now equipped with electronic devices that could sense U.S. radar beams coming their way and could therefore detect American boats in the vicinity. The effect of Japanese electronic devices forced O’ Kane to keep his radar searches to a minimum and then only in short bursts(16). This development compromised O ‘Kane’s stealth.

Lastly, by early 1944, the Japanese had depth charges with an explosive charge of 1,000 lbs.  These weapons  could be set to explode at depth exceeding 600 feet (17). In 1944, they  were using new airborne radar in their night searches of U.S. subs. U.S. Subs were often subjected to night attacks by the Japanese while they recharged their batteries on the surface. Japanese planes carried standard bombs that were modified for use as an anti-submarine warfare weapon. Small planes were loaded with 150-pound bombs and larger aircraft dropped 625- pound bombs. The bombs were equipped with delayed-action fuses , which were set to explode at predetermined depth (16).

By 1944, the Japanese also began to organize anti-submarine air squadrons. The Japanese  around the same time , were putting up extensive anti-submarine minefields. These were planted in the hundreds in many areas where a U.S. submarine would be operating. The Japanese mined these areas all the time. This made it very difficult for the Americans to locate the mines. During much of the war many submarines were lost trying to locate Japanese minefields. By losing a submarine, it was the only reliable way for them to locate a Japanese minefield (16).

American mistakes

Beyond the technology and tactics, the Japanese campaign was helped along by two important American mistakes. First, the Bureau of Ordnance made a fatal mistake right before the war. They did not test fire the Mark VI magnetic exploder, which was used on the warhead section of Mark XIV steam driven torpedo (4).The decision was made out of secrecy and as a cost cutting measure. The Bureau of Ordnance claimed that their Mark VI magnetic exploder would only need one to shot to work. In actuality, U.S. submarines would fire six shots directly at the target, and it would still not work. Instead, torpedoes, weighted down by the magnetic exploder would either run too deep, explode prematurely (because of the intense magnetic field of the target), or fail to explode if they reached the target. The magnetic exploder was at fault for the first two short comings, while faulty contact exploder pins were responsible for the last problem. Consequently, American submarines would pursue daring attacks, only to see their torpedo wakes bubble under a target or prematurely detonate, giving away their position (5). This problem was so bad that not until October 1943, over 21 months after the start of hostilities, could American submariners put to sea and know that their torpedoes would actually work (6).

Even after this point,  there was still cases where there  were fatal torpedo faults that would cost lives. American submarine torpedoes would sadly sometimes do a dreaded a circular run where they would turn back and hit their submarine instead of hitting the target. This was fatally demonstrated between October 24th and October 25th 1944 , when a circular of run of torpedoes sunk U.S.S. Tang commanded by top U.S submarine ace O’Kane (7). This incident was exploited by the Japanese Anti-Submarine forces who picked up O’Kane and his crew (8). According to what he told his Japanese captors, the Destroyer U.S.S. Pruitt and his first Submarine the U.S.S. Argonaut were equipped with equipment to prevent circular runs (9). However early in the war,  for unknown reasons, the Bureau of Ordnance  had done away with anti-circular run devices aboard American Submarines and American  Destroyers. It was during O’Kane’s interrogation with his Japanese captors, that he stated his sub U.S.S. Tang was not the first victim of this fatal design flaw. Had the torpedoes been functioning properly the U.S. submarine force would have sunk more Japanese ships.

The second major mistake for the Americans occurred when an intelligence leak seriously compromised the secrecy of the U.S. submarine force. Congressmen Andrew Jackson May, a 68-year-old member of the House Military Affairs Committee, returned from a junket to the Pacific in the summer of 1943 and held a press conference (10). In that press conference, “He pointed out that the  Japanese claims of sinking U.S. subs were overstated, because their depth charges were set to go off too shallow. U.S. subs could avoid them by diving deep, perhaps deeper than the Japanese thought them capable” (10). The newspaper reports of this catastrophic blunder reached Japan and its Navy reset their depth charges accordingly. The Commander of U.S. sub forces Charles A. Lockwood was enraged by this congressional leak. Privately, Admiral Lockwood blamed Congressmen May’s bombast for the loss of U.S. submarines and lives (10). An incensed Lockwood wrote to a colleague: “I heard Congressmen May say the depth charges are not set deep enough. He would be pleased to know (they) set them deeper now.” (10) Later Lockwood wrote, “I consider that indiscretion cost us ten submarines and 800 officers and men”(10). How deeply a U.S. Submarine could dive was a closely held secret prior to this incident.

Conclusion

The Japanese anti-submarine campaign had important successes owing to strong radio direction technology. They were also assisted by great weapons, tactics, and other technologies. However, they were significantly aided by U.S foibles. Ultimately, the end of the war was brought about with the atomic bomb attacks and the Soviet Intervention in the Pacific War. The Japanese surrender cannot be attributed to the American submarine campaign.

What do you think of Japanese anti-submarine warfare in World War 2? Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

Bibliography

Gruner, William P. U.S. Pacific Submarines in World War II. San Francisco Maritime National Park Association-2010. https://archive.hnsa.org/doc/sbinpacific.htm.

Holwitt, Joel Ira. “Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. College Station: Texas. Texas A& M University Press-William-Ford Military History Series. 2009.

Keith, Don. Undersea Warrior: The World War II Story of “Mush” Morton and the USS Wahoo. United States of America. Caliber Press. 2011.

Paterson, Lawrence. Otto Kretschmer: The Life of the Third Reich’s Highest Scoring U-Boat Commander. Annapolis: Maryland. Naval Institute Press.  2018.

Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006.

References

1 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 315-318 and  334.

2 Paterson, Lawrence. Otto Kretschmer: The Life of the Third Reich’s Highest Scoring U-Boat Commander. Annapolis: Maryland. Naval Institute Press.  2018. 194-204.

3 Paterson, Lawrence. Otto Kretschmer: The Life of the Third Reich’s Highest Scoring U-Boat Commander. Annapolis: Maryland. Naval Institute Press.  2018. 257.

4 Holwitt, Joel Ira. “Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. College Station: Texas. Texas A& M University Press-William-Ford Military History Series. 2009. 162.

5 Holwitt, Joel Ira. “Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. College Station: Texas. Texas A& M University Press-William-Ford Military History Series. 2009. 162-163.

6 Holwitt, Joel Ira. “Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. College Station: Texas. Texas A& M University Press-William-Ford Military History Series. 2009. 163.

7 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 315-318.

8 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 334.

9 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 338.

10 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 164-165.

11 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 393

12 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 354 and 389.

13 Keith, Don. Undersea Warrior: The World War II Story of “Mush” Morton and the USS Wahoo. United States of America. Caliber Press. 2011. 263-268

14 Keith, Don. Undersea Warrior: The World War II Story of “Mush” Morton and the USS Wahoo. United States of America. Caliber Press. 2011. 312.

15 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 299

16 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 243-244.

17 Gruner, William P. U.S. Pacific Submarines in World War II. San Francisco Maritime National Park Association-2010. https://archive.hnsa.org/doc/sbinpacific.htm.

18 Tuohy, William. The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang. New York: New York. Presidio Press. 2006. 163-164.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and its Legacy: A National Trauma and a Family Tragedy

I was 12 when I went to my great-grandfather's grave in Anhui province, China. Buried under thick undergrowth, the stone coffin bespoke of age with discolouration and cracks. My mother told me that he was a hero, and I didn't know that until I saw the exhibition at a nearby pavilion, detailing his deeds.

Here Jiaxin Liu explains his family’s story amid the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Japanese troops in the ruins of Shanghai in 1937.

Born to a well-to-do family in 1919, my great-grandfather came of age when the Japanese invaded China during World War 2. The Chinese theater was brutal — the Japanese broke through Chinese defense with their technological prowess and committed some of the most unspeakable atrocities. The Yangtze region — where Anhui was situated — was quickly subjugated, and my great-grandfather became a personification of resistance as he led his forces in guerilla battles throughout the countryside. He threatened Japanese control, and a bounty of 8,000 yuan was administered for his capture, dead or alive. In 1942, my great-grandfather was betrayed, resulting in a protracted torture session that resulted in death. Refusing to surrender, my great-grandfather was strapped to the tiger chair, repeatedly whipped, and had his shoulder pierced by screws. It was a storybook sacrifice, and he was memorialized as a local martyr whose valor should be emulated by future generations.

Invasion

Tense relations characterized the war's prelude as a result of Japanese imperialist policy and weakening Chinese authority from civil strife. After controlling Manchuria, the Japanese launched a full scale invasion of China in 1937 after a skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge. Beijing and Tianjin soon fell, and Chiang Kai-Shek—then leader of the Republic of China (ROC)—declared a full-on resistance movement. The Japanese responded by sieging Shanghai, where they encountered heavy air, sea, and naval opposition as the best Chinese troops were stationed there. Failing to achieve air dominance, the battle dragged on for 3 months until overwhelming Japanese firepower overtook the Chinese, who were often poorly equipped with small arms. Nanjing was next, where a brutal massacre of civilians revealed the utmost depravity of mankind. Yet, advances stalled as the Japanese had insufficient manpower to take over key inland cities such as Chongqing, and the mountainous terrain of Western China provided the natural setting for guerilla warfare as the Chinese decided to "trade space for time", engaging in a war of attrition. This was not easy—concurrently, the ROC were battling the Communists, and the temporary alliance of the Second United Front to fight against the Japanese was tenuous at best. My great-grandfather was under the Communist's wing, and there was little cooperation as he conducted raids on an independent scale. It was a messy period in China's history, one that was characterized by internal and external strife. However, like our nonchalance towards ongoing wars in Yemen and Ethiopia in comparison to the Russo-Ukrainian war, most modern audiences in the West are unfamiliar with this immense conflict. Behind Russia, China accrued the greatest number of war casualties, yet people only hear of Bulge and Dunkirk, not of Nanjing or Shanghai.

Animosities towards the Japanese ran deep after the "Asian holocaust" the Japanese committed in China, most notably expressed in the Rape of Nanking, where the Imperial Japanese Army massacred more than 200,000 civilians. Looting, rape, and mass burials were characteristic behaviours of the "Kill All, Burn All, Loot All" policy of Emperor Hirohito. My great-grandfather's death was a personal anecdote that revealed the ultra-aggressive militarism and coercion which dominated Japanese rule. Such hatred is entrenched—to this day, my grandmother is unable to shake off an innate disaffection towards the Japanese. The Second Sino-Japanese War has embedded deeply into the Chinese psyche. Being the last major foreign invasion to take place in contemporaneity, older generations can personally recount this "darkest age" of Modern Chinese history. In a wider context, it was a climatic coda to the Century of Humiliation — a period of foreign interference in Chinese affairs — that tore down a 5,000 year tradition of imperial dynasties. In a sense, the Second Sino-Japanese war ushered in the conscience of Modern China. China had to become a modern nation subscribed to the Western-centric international order, not a civilization that believed in its unequaled superiority of being the "middle kingdom of the universe". The brutal Japanese invasion was the latest in a string of wake-up calls that made the Chinese question their fall from grace. It was an unforgettable lesson.

Turning

By 1939, the tides had turned with Chinese victories at Changsha and Zaoyi. The aftermath of the victory left China's economy in shambles and civil war between the Nationalists and Communists continued. The Communists, who won the heart of the populace with their indefatigable tenacity of grassroots mobilisations, drove the Nationalists to Taiwan, and the conflict remains till today. Their dominance could not have been possible without the Sino-Japanese war, and the invocation of this pivotal event remains etched in state propaganda and TV shows.

The Chinese victory has recently passed its 77th anniversary on September 3rd. The newer generation worries more about housing prices and job opportunities rather than death by gunfire. To many of my younger cousins in China, Japan is viewed positively with its huge cultural influence of anime and manga. Times change, and so do perceptions. Yet, the horrors of war—while distant—materializes itself in those late-night conversations I had with grandparents. In their trembling tone, they narrated a life much different from ours: instead of seeking to thrive, they merely wished to survive. My paternal grandfather remembered peeking from behind a bush at a Japanese execution of the village elders. My maternal grandfather told me of air raids that seemed like armageddon. The war left an indelible mark on Chinese history, and even people like me, more than half a century after the war, can obtain a first-hand account. Its subtle influence should be preserved, and it is now my generation’s duty to remind posterity that peace is not an a priori condition we take for granted, but an outcome we should work towards.

What do you think of the impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War? Let us know below.

Biography

My name is Jiaxin, and I am currently residing in Singapore. I am passionate about history, especially cultural history, as well as interactions between civilizations. In my free time, I enjoy playing strategy games such as Europa Universalis IV, as well as playing sports and going to the gym.

The Japanese Yamato Battleship: Could it have been Decisive in World War 2?

The Japanese Army’s Yamato Class Battleship was an extremely powerful battleship that was launched during World War II. The battleship had incredibly powerful defenses, and had it been in use earlier it could possibly have impacted some key aspects of the war. Here, Daniel Boustead returns and considers its effectiveness, ‘what if’ scenarios, and how events turned against the battleship towards the end of the war.

Yamato battleship during trials in October 1941.

The Yamato Class Battleship was the most destructive ship ever constructed in history. The Yamato Class was created to fulfill a specific technological, strategic, and tactical goal. The technical information alone about the Yamato Class leads to the conclusion it could defeat any ship on the seas, and had events gone differently for the Japanese Military the Yamato Class could have been a game changer! The changing situation of the Pacific War ultimately doomed the Yamato Class ‘s fate - it could have helped Imperial Japan win the Pacific War had the military situation been different and had the battleship been deployed earlier.

The Yamato Class was designed to defeat a huge quantity of enemy naval forces.  According to historian and author James Holland, “The Japanese realized they couldn’t possibly hope to catch United States and Great Britain in terms of numbers of warships so the principle behind it was if we can’t get the numbers we will have a qualitative advantage. So, you build an enormous battleship that is basically the equivalent of two or three and which is capable of taking on multiple warships at any one time”([1]). 

The tactical and strategic role that the Yamato Class was built to fulfill was the Imperial Japanese Navy’s belief that the fate of an entire war would be determined by a great naval clash involving Battleships (2). This theory was supported by the Battle of Tsushima which occurred on May 27th -May 28th 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War. Like the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War the Imperial Japanese Navy thought, that the war against the United States Navy would be decided in a single great naval clash involving Battleships ([2]). The Imperial Japanese Navy felt that this decisive naval battle would occur after the Japanese military forces seized the Philippines. The U.S. Military would then mount a military campaign to retake their colony of the Philippines and the Imperial Japanese Navy would then decide to engage the United States Navy in a place somewhere in the western Pacific when they felt the time was right to stop the American advance to retake the Philippines. The Imperial Japanese military forces and their government also wanted to seize the oil and other natural resources of China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, Singapore, French Indochina, Brunei, and Burma. The Japanese Yamato Class was designed to both participate in this decisive struggle and sail across the vast Pacific Ocean.

Technologically advanced

The Yamato Class was a technological marvel that could wipe out any ship by its destructive firepower and was virtually impervious to any ship weapon. It was equipped with 18.1-inch Main Guns which could fire a 3,219 lbs. projectile at a rate of 1.5 rounds per minute (3). The range of Yamato Class’s main gun was 25 miles according to Battlefield historical archaeologist Dr. Tony Pollard (4). No other Battleship’s Main Gun has ever had a maximum range of this distance (5). 

The Yamato Class’s armor and other protection was unrivalled by any other Battleship. The total weight of the armor was 22,534 tons or 33.1% of the design displacement (6). The armored center section featured a main belt of just over 16 inches of armor inclined at 20 degrees, half of which was below the waterline. The lower armor belt was just under 11 inches in the magazines and 8 inches covering the machinery spaces. The ends of the armored citadel was covered by two transverse bulkheads that were covered by armor that was 11.8 inches thick. Deck armor was between 7.9 inches to 9.1 inches, which was thought to be capable of withstanding armor-piercing bombs of up to 2,200 lbs. dropped from 3,280 feet. The front of the barbettes was covered by 21.5 inches of armor plate with sides covered by 16 inches of armor, both specially hardened. The three main turrets had some 26 inches of armor on their face, 10 inches of armor on the sides, 9.5 inches of armor in the rear, and almost 11 inches of armor on the roofs. The conning tower was covered by a maximum of 19.7 inches of steel armor. A torpedo bulge was also fitted, which extended 9.25 feet from the main belt, from the waterline to the bottom of the ship. According to historian Mike Pavelec, Americans brought the Yamato’s 26.1 inches Turret Facing Steel Armor plate, which they found and recovered from a Japanese naval yard after World War II and ran a test on it (7). The conclusion from this test was that they were able only to penetrate the Turret Facing Armor at point blank range. This type of hit would never have occurred under wartime ocean warfare conditions. Therefore, the turret face armor of the Yamato was virtually impregnable. It would have been a suicide mission for any U.S. Battleship to engage the Yamato Class in combat.

American battleships

The American Battleships were thinly armored and outgunned by comparison to the Yamato Class Battleship. The Iowa Class Battleship was only equipped with a 16 inch Main Guns (8). The Armor on the Iowa Class Battleship was between 12 inches to 1.6 inches on the belt, armored deck was between 6 inches and 1.5 inches of armor, bulkheads were equipped with 11.3 inches of armor, and the main turrets were equipped with 19.7 inches of armor. It was considered the best American Battleship of World War II simply because it had a top speed of 33 knots. In contrast the Yamato Class only had a top speed of 27.5 knots (9) - although the Yamato Class could have still engaged and destroyed the Iowa Class Battleship as it was trying to run away because of the long range of its guns.  The reason for this is that the Iowa Class Battleship was so thinly armored.

What if?

The Japanese Military missed many opportunities to utilize the Yamato Class Battleship. It could have been a decisive war-winning weapon. Two examples of this were: Japanese airpower did not destroy two tank farms which contained millions of barrels of fuel oil and they did not destroy the indispensable ship-repair facilities during the Pearl Harbor Attack on December 7, 1941 (10). If the Japanese had destroyed the two tank farms and the ship-repair facilities at Pearl Harbor on that day, and then combined that with an air bombing and submarine shelling campaign led by the Yamato Class on the oil production facilities on the West Coast, and by a knockout sea and air strike on the Panama Canal, it would have crippled the USA’s ability to make war.  If the Japanese had commissioned the Yamato Class sooner, then they would have participated in this theoretical strike, and it would have made a decisive difference. Also, if the Japanese Military and Government had decided to both not attack Pearl Harbor and not invade the Philippines but decided to just focus on taking the British Colonies of Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies, then the American Isolationist political movement may well have prevented the USA from entering both the War in the Pacific and the War in Europe. Japan still would have succeeded in controlling most of Asia and had their decisive naval battle with the British - and not the Americans. However, all of this did not happen. The Yamato was not considered combat ready until May 27, 1942, and her sistership the Musashi was not commissioned until August 5, 1942 (11). By the time the Yamato Class entered combat the seeds for both the destruction of the Yamato Class and the Imperial Japanese Empire were being sealed.

Less effective?

The changing nature of warfare in the Pacific War ultimately doomed the Yamato Class. The Aircraft Carrier became the dominant and most effective weapon in the Pacific War. The effectiveness of the Aircraft Carrier was brutally demonstrated at such battles as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea. These and other such battles caused the Battleship’s influence to be substantially reduced. In addition, the appearance of American Fighter Planes such as the F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, P-38 Lightening, P-47 Thunderbolt, and the P-51 Mustang from the period of 1942 to 1945 marked the end of Japanese air supremacy in the Pacific. The fact that the Japanese no longer had air supremacy made the Yamato Class now very vulnerable to air attack. Lastly, in 1943 the Americans introduced a new explosive called Torpex, with twice the explosive power of TNT (12). This made the Yamato Class’s Anti-Torpedo defenses obsolete because the previous calculations of how much damage they could absorb was based on a warhead that was full of TNT and not Torpex (1). These factors would spell the destructive end of the Yamato Class. 

The sister ship of the Yamato, the Musashi, was sunk by American air power during the Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 24, 1944 (13). 1,376 Japanese survivors from the Musashi were rescued; however 1,023 Japanese sailors were lost during the American air attack (14). On April 7, 1945, the Yamato was sunk on its way to attack the American invasion off Okinawa (15). 3,063 Japanese sailors were lost during the American air attack on the Yamato, with only 269 survivors. The Americans losses during the air attack against the Yamato were ten aircraft and 12 aircrew.

No other battleship in history compares to the destructive power of the Yamato Class. The Yamato was created to meet the Imperial Japanese Navy’s need for a battleship to play a key role in their decisive battle strategy scenario. Unfortunately, the Yamato was not ready for Pearl Harbor.  The engineering marvel of the Yamato meant it could wipe out any ship opponent on the sea. If the Imperial Japanese Military had not made some fatal strategic miscalculations on the seas, then the Yamato Class would have been a war-winning weapon! However, this did not happen, and the advent of aircraft carrier warfare spelled an end to the Yamato Class. The Yamato was denied the chance of being a war-winning weapon because of military blunders committed by the Imperial Japanese Military. 

What do you think of the Yamato class battleship? Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Holland, James. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

[2] Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 12. 

3 Stille , Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 137. 

4 Pollard, Tony. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016.

5 Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons: Battleship Yamato. Darlow Smithson  Limited Productions.  PBS and National Geographic Channels International. 2016. 

6 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 133. 

7 Pavelec, Mike. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

8 Hewson, Robert. The World War II Warship Guide. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc. 2000. 44 to 45. 

9 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 141. 

10 Van Der Vat, Dan.  Introduction by Senator  McCain, John. Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy-An Illustrated History. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc. 2007. 138. 

11 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War.  New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 138. 

12 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 136. 

13 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 139 to 140. 

14 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 140. 

15 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 141. 

References

Hewson, Robert. The World War II Warship Guide. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc.  2000. 

Holland, James. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016.

Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons: Battleship Yamato. Darlow Smithson Limited Productions. PBS and National Geographic Channels International. 2016. 

Pavelec, Mike. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

Pollard, Tony. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 

Van Der Vat, Dan. Introduction by Senator McCain, John. Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy-An Illustrated History. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc, 2007.