The First Sino-Japanese War: Imperialism at its Worst?

The annexation of territories has always been a prominent way of exhibiting any empire's stature and power. After all, a kingdom becomes an empire only when it acquires dominance over a considerable expanse of land. Many lives are, and have been, lost when conflict arises regarding matters of expansion. When two powers like China and Japan clash over the same piece of land, it's the perfect recipe for a disaster.

Here, Disha Mule explains the First Sino-Japanese War.

A depiction of the Battle of the Yalu River in 1894. By Kobayashi Kiyochika.

Qing China and Meiji Japan

Bureaucracy can weaken even the strongest foundation. Qing China was no stranger to that fact. It became noticeable with the military's incompetence in their Burmese and Vietnamese operations and caused hindrance in proper governance(1). In addition to that, the 1860 occupation of Peking by the British and French invoked hatred in the Chinese public. They started holding the ruling dynasty responsible for all the ill-happenings in the state. The people were immensely dissatisfied with the administration and many conspired to overthrow the Qings, also known as the Manchus, and establish a rule like that of the Hans.

As a result many rebellions broke out during the late eighteenth century. One of the more popular uprisings was the White Lotus Rebellion. An attempt at recovery from the losses caused by these uprisings, called the Tongzhi Restoration, was made. But the government could not restore the disrupted order to its earlier state(2).

The Opium Wars were an important factor in the decline of the Qing dynasty. An 'opium infestation' plagued China as the military and government officials started consuming the drug. In the year 1884 alone, around 81,000 chests of opium were imported in China; whereas the amount was only 1,000 chests in 1773(3). Given the state of these officials, it should not come as a surprise that the Daoguang emperor himself was a fan of opium(4). With the increase in these new difficulties, the continuous anti-dynastic rebellions and the failure of the system, Qing China was already losing its supremacy by the end of the Second Opium War.

Japan, on the other hand, was undergoing major modernization. Earlier, the military generals called shoguns oversaw the functioning of the state while the emperor had no powers. Later, the feudal system would be replaced by an oligarchy, the Tokugawa shogunate would be replaced and pave the way for an imperial state. While some of the measures were exploitative in nature, the educational system flourished during this period. With the increasing literacy rate, the Japanese set the wheels in motion for industrialization. This was called the Meiji Restoration.

Korea

China and Japan have a long history of enmity in which Korea was trapped as the battleground. The Chinese attacks on Japan in the thirteenth century and the attempts made by Japan to invade China were via Korea(5). Then again there were the coal and iron resources and the strategic location of Korea that attracted invaders(6).

Korea was an agrarian society. Agriculture was a top priority. The land was the property of the government and peasants did not care much for politics. However, the land ownership system started deteriorating once foreign powers intervened. The Russians arrived in 1860 and the British in 1861(7). The coming of foreign powers began a struggle for control over Korea and the animosity between two of them was almost palpable. Who were they? Japan and China.

To understand how both states wanted to consolidate power in the Korean Peninsula, the French missionaries in Korea are worth mentioning. In 1855, Siméon Berneux, the third Bishop of Korea arrived. The number of French priests would go on increasing after his arrival. China promoted tolerance towards Christianity in Korea which was then a Chinese protectorate. Most of the missionary activities that were limited to China till the 1860s started in Korea. The occupation of Peking by the British and the French along with the treaties of Tientsin (Tianjin) and Peking gave free reins for the spread of the religion(8). The topic might seem irrelevant for now, because what does this have to do with a war? This would be explained further in the article. Let's see what was happening in Japan.

Japanese newspapers relentlessly wrote about how Japan was the only civilized country in Asia on par with the West and how conservative Qing China was(9). One newspaper published an essay called "Japanese Soldiers Must Demonstrate Their Power to the World" which explicitly said that Japan should go on a war with China and Korea to display its military might(10). In 1884, Japan also supported the Gapsin coup which attempted to bring about reforms in Korea which was still under China's shadow. After the failure of the coup, the Treaty of Tianjin was signed in 1885 which made it mandatory for Japan and China to notify the other when either of them took military action(11).

The Tonghak Rebellion

The Tonghak (or Donghak) Rebellion was one of the triggers that started the first Sino-Japanese War. Tonghak was a religion that wanted to see the flourishing of "Eastern Learning" - the literal meaning of the name. The promotion of Christianity and the onslaught of Europeans on their land, mentioned in the previous section, had the entire Korean state in turmoil. In the light of the inefficient rule of the monarch, the revolt got enthusiastic support as they saw the religion as a way to establish their identity.

As the movement grew stronger and spread like wildfire throughout the entire state, the Korean crown asked for help from China. Chinese troops arrived in Korea in 1894. The Japanese saw this as a violation of the the Treaty of Tianjin, also known as the Li-Ito Convention, and sent their own troops.

On August 1, 1894, war was declared and both the armies clashed at sea in Asan striking the final match.

Japanese Victory

The two states fought for nine long months before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed which stated that Korea would be a Japanese protectorate(12). The bloody war resulted in China giving up territories like Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula. It was also agreed that China would give certain privileges to Japanese traders and pay for the huge war losses with 200 million taels of silver(13).

The modernization of Japan was a major factor in their victory. The war was mostly fought at sea and the foresighted Japanese state had definitely benefited from an advanced navy, thanks to the Meiji Restoration. China, however, had used its naval funds for updating the Beijing's Summer Palace under Empress Cixi's orders(14).

The world saw the war as Japan's attempt at joining the European and American powers as a modernized country(15). The end of Chinese influence made it easy for Korea to be a Japanese colony, which it eventually became in 1910.

Even if the matter seemed to be settled for the time being, China and Japan would go on to fight again in 1937 - that would prove to be just a prelude to hard times that were yet to come.

What do you think of the First Sino-Japanese War? Let us know below.

Now read Disha’s article on the Hitler Youth here.

References

1 S.C.M. Paine, The First Sino-Japanese War: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, 'The Decline of Order in China and Korea', 24

2 Ibid., 26

3 Peter C. Perdue, "The First Opium War - MIT Visualising Cultures", https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay.pdf

4 Ibid.

5 Kallie Szczepanski, "The First Sino-Japanese War", thoughtco.com/first-sino-japanese-war-1894-95-195784

6 "First Sino-Japanese War", https://www.britannica.com/event/First-Sino-Japanese-War-1894-1895

7 Key Rey Chong, "The Tonghak Rebellion: Harbinger of Korean Nationalism", http://www.jstor.org/stable/23849478

8 Daniel C. Kane, "Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23719212

9 Kyu Hyun Kim, 'The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895): Japanese National Integration and Construction of the Korean “Other”'

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Szczepanski, "The First Sino-Japanese War"

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Douglas Howland, "Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)." Journal of the History of International Law Revue d’histoire du droit international Volume 9, Number 2, (2007),  200

Bibliography

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "First Sino-Japanese War". Encyclopedia Britannica, 25 Jul. 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/First-Sino-Japanese-War-1894-1895

Chong, Key Ray. “The Tonghak Rebellion: Harbinger of Korean Nationalism.” Journal of Korean Studies (1969-1971), vol. 1, no. 1, 1969, pp. 73–88. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23849478

Howland, Douglas. "Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)." Journal of the History of International Law Revue d’histoire du droit international Volume 9, Number 2 (2007): 179-201.

Kane, Daniel C. “Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea.” Korean Studies, vol. 23, 1999, pp. 1–23. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23719212

Kim, Kyu Hyun. 'The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895): Japanese National

Integration and Construction of the Korean “Other”' International Journal of Korean History (Vol.17 No.1, Feb.2012).

Paine, S.C.M. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Perdue, Peter C. "The First Opium War - MIT Visualising Cultures" https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay.pdf

Szczepanski, Kallie. "The First Sino-Japanese War". ThoughtCo, Aug. 28, 2020, thoughtco.com/first-sino-japanese-war-1894-95-195784.

Collaboration: The Foreign Forces who helped to build the Japanese Empire

During the 1930s and into World War 2, the Japanese Empire was expanding its reach. Here. Felix Debieux returns and looks at five foreign forces who helped the Japanese from China, Myanmar/Burma, indigenous Taiwanese people, Inner Mongolia, and India.

Wang Jingwei, leader of the Reorganized Government of the Republic of China.

While domination is a core aspect of all empires, most empire builders would not have succeeded without establishing collaborative links with the populations they aimed to subjugate. The Roman Empire, for instance, closely collaborated with local elites who effectively did the Empire’s dirty work. Likewise, the establishment of collaborative relations with indigenous elites formed a vital part of the maintenance of the British Empire. Meanwhile, historians have tended to locate people’s responses to Nazi domination on a scale between outright resistance at one pole, and active collaboration at the other. While the reasons for collaborating are very broad – opportunism, coercion, necessity, ideology – the fact remains that all empires have relied on at least some degree of collaboration.

The Japanese Empire is no exception to this rule. Indeed, even before the decision was taken to bomb Pearl Harbour, intelligence officers across the Empire had been working hard to cultivate links with nationalists, freedom fighters and independence movements who Tokyo thought could help realise its expansionist objectives. To the people of Asia, Japan propagated an image of itself at the helm of a so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere – an imagined bloc of self-sufficient Asian nations freed from the shackles of the Western powers. Like all empires which came before it, Japan found that there were collaborators across the continent who were willing to fight under the banner of the Rising Sun in hopes of one day achieving independence. At the same time, Japan learned quickly that its outnumbered military would have to rely on collaborators for policing, guard duty, insurgency, infiltration and for sheer manpower in some of the war’s most important operations.

The five examples provided here are by no means exhaustive. However, they are enough to illustrate the key role which collaborators played in Japan’s war effort.

Collaborationist Chinese Army

It might come as a surprise to learn that China, the country that perhaps suffered the most under Tokyo’s expansionism, provided the largest contribution of soldiers to the Japanese Empire. The origin of these collaborationist forces can be traced back to as early as 1937, when the occupying Japanese established local police and fighting forces to tighten their hold over the country. By 1940, these were combined into what was formally known as the Reorganized Government of the Republic of China under Wang Jingwei. A long-term rival of China’s generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Wang is typically remembered as a traitor of the anti-Japanese resistance – and not without good reason.

On March 30, 1940, Wang became the head of state for the Reorganised National Government. Later that year, Wang’s puppet government signed the “Sino-Japanese Treaty”, which contained a wide range of economic, political and military concessions. This collaborationist relationship was solidified when Wang visited Tokyo in June 1941, where he gave a public radio address. Wang’s broadcast praised the Japanese Empire, pledged to support Japan’s fight against communism and Western imperialism, criticised the government of Chiang Kai-shek and, crucially, affirmed China’s subordination to Japan.

In terms of military support, the new collaborationist Chinese army had by 1943 pledged forty-three divisions – approximately 500,000 men – to the Japanese Empire. Of the 500,000, the only men which Japan considered reliable and combat-ready were those assigned to Wang’s 30,000 strong guard division, and the army of his close associate, Zhou Fohai. Most of the collaborationist forces fell under the command of former warlords, whose loyalty was doubted by both Wang and his Japanese overlords. As such, they were not provided with expensive modern weaponry, and they were trusted with only a limited role in the war effort. Indeed, the bulk of the collaborationist soldiers found themselves assigned to anti-partisan operations or to the defence of military installations. While unglamorous, this had the benefit of freeing up Japanese forces and enabling them to carry out offensive operations elsewhere.

What became of the collaborationist Chinese forces? Very few units remained loyal to the fragile Reorganised National Government, which was unable to survive the surrender of its Japanese master in 1945. Among those which continued to serve the government were the Central Military Academy cadets, who attempted to fortify Nanjing before internal skirmishes broke out. Most of the collaborationist units, however, peacefully surrendered to – and eventually joined - Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang forces. Some would even go on to distinguish themselves during the Chinese Civil War.

Burmese National Army

Unlike China, the Japanese Empire paid little attention to Burma before 1940. This changed, however, when Staff Officer Keiji Suzuki was given the task of devising Japan’s strategy for South East Asia. Suzuki would later come to be known as the “Japanese Lawrence of Arabia” for his advocacy of Burmese independence from the British Empire. This reputation began in 1940, when he convinced the nationalist Aung San to allow Japan to train his followers for espionage and guerrilla warfare. On 28th December 1941, the Burmese Independence Army was officially founded and aided the Japanese conquest of the region. The army played an important role in rallying support from the local Burmese population, its numbers swelling to 23,000 men by May 1942.

As the Japanese experienced in China, foreign auxiliaries could be of questionable effectiveness. Indeed, the Burmese Independence Army was disorganised, lacked experience, and had not been trained for regular warfare. Its soldiers not only committed atrocities against Indian forces and Burma’s ethnic minority groups, but they also suffered heavy casualties in their struggle against the British Army. Furthermore, the army proved difficult for the Japanese to control once its goal of independence had been achieved.

Indeed, in August 1943 the campaign against the British ended and Burma declared itself an independent nation. Almost immediately, tensions boiled between Tokyo and Burma’s nationalists over the question of independence. Aung San now commanded more than 15,000 trained and well-equipped light infantry under the newly reconstituted Burmese National Army, but was dissatisfied with the limited sovereignty granted to Burma by the Japanese. Not wanting to back a losing side, Aung San opened independence talks with the British which ultimately led to a merger with Allied forces. When in March 1945 the Burmese National Army was ordered to confront the Allied advance into central Burma, the time had come to switch sides. The National Army rallied yet another nation-wide rebellion, turning against their Japanese occupiers by cutting off supply lines and seizing control of huge swathes of territory. Just as Japan had used Burmese forces to weaken the British, Aung San used the Japanese in his country’s struggle for independence, abandoning the alliance when it no longer suited his goals.

Takasago Volunteers

Not to be confused with ethnic Chinese Taiwanese volunteers, the Takasago were indigenous Taiwanese peoples recruited into the Imperial Japanese Army. Also known as Taiwanese aborigines, the Takasago had been the target of a Japanese policy of cultural assimilation ever since Taiwan’s annexation in 1894. Of great interest to the Japanese was the deployment of the Takasago in the tropical and sub-tropical regions of South East Asia, sweltering conditions seen as more suited to the hunter-gather culture of the Takasago than their Japanese counterparts. Indeed, the Takasago volunteers were renowned for their jungle survival abilities, and training therefore focused on insurgency, infiltration, demolitions, camouflage, and guerrilla warfare more generally.

In the build-up to the Second World War, the Japanese military recruited somewhere in the range of 1,800 to 5,000 young men from friendly indigenous groups. Initially, the Takasago were assigned to transport and supply units. However, the gradual deterioration of Japanese forces necessitated an increasingly important role for the Takasago. Indeed, volunteers were deployed across the frontlines of the Pacific theatre. In the Dutch East Indies, the Solomon Islands, New Guinea and the Philippines, units made up entirely of Takasago volunteers served with distinction in ferocious clashes with the Allies.

One particularly notable contribution of the Takasago to the Japanese war effort was a daring suicide attack on a US landing strip in Leyte, Philippines, which consisted of fifteen officers and forty-five enlisted Takasago volunteers. The greatest embodiment of Takasago bravery and dedication, however, surely belongs to Teruo Nakamura. Nakamura goes down in history as the last soldier of the Japanese Empire to formally surrender in 1974. Incredibly, Nakamura spent almost twenty solitary years in the jungles of Indonesia, before being lured out of hiding by searchers who waved the Japanese flag and sang the country’s national anthem.

Inner Mongolian Army

Among the earliest supporters of the Japanese Empire were the nationalists of Inner Mongolia. Their relationship with the Japanese can be traced back to the 1920s, and to talks which followed the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1932. Believing that an alliance was the surest way to secure his people's freedom from China, the ambitious Prince Demchugdongrub elected to side with the Japanese. In 1939, Demchugdongrub was rewarded with leadership over the puppet state of Mengjiang. Eventually, however, the prince had little choice but to submit to the incorporation of Inner Mongolia into the Japanese-run Reorganised Government of China. Submission to China, even to a China dominated by Japan, must surely have pained the prince. Given the historic poor performance of Mongol troops, however, Demchugdongrub had no choice but to acquiesce.

Indeed, it is doubtful the Mongol army could have broken free of Chinese rule without Japanese backing. In 1936, for example, Demchugdongrub suffered a catastrophic defeat in an ill-conceived attempt to expand into northern China. Heavy casualties were suffered again during a joint Japanese-Mongol offensive at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War just a year later. Despite being reorganised several times, the effectiveness of the Mongol army was extremely limited. By 1945, the army consisted of four light infantry divisions, two calvary divisions and three Chinese brigades totalling 10,000 men. Yet a lack of training and modern equipment hindered the army’s combat readiness and manoeuvrability. It had no mobile or heavy weaponry, and was armed with only a pitifully small stock of field artillery, light machine guns, and antiquated rifles. Unable to serve as much more than an auxiliary force, the Mongol army met its end when in 1945 the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, brushing aside the few units which tried to resist.

Indian National Army

Distinct among Japan’s auxiliaries is the experience of the Indian National Army. Unlike the territories ruled (directly and indirectly) by Tokyo, the Japanese Empire did not conquer India, and did not envision the Indian subcontinent as part of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan, however, could not ignore the fact that Britain’s resistance to its territorial ambitions depended heavily on Indian soldiers. Nor could Japan pass up the opportunity to undermine Britain’s presence in South East Asia by supporting various factions of Indian nationalists.

Prior to 1941, Japanese intelligence officers made contact with Indian nationalists exiled in Thailand. Once British resistance in Burma and Malaya had crumbled, a campaign was launched to recruit Indian POWs. Simultaneously, Japan raised an Indian National Army under the command of Mohan Singh, and established a Bangkok-based Indian Independence League under the Bengali Rash Behari Bose. Unfortunately for Japan, the League was reluctant to take direct military action against Britain without an explicit order from the Indian National Congress. While this was no doubt a setback for Japan, the League was not the only influence it held over Indian nationalism.

One such influence was Japan’s relationship with the radical nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, whose anti-British credentials were well-known to the Japanese. Indeed, the nationalist returned to Asia from Nazi Germany in 1943 having helped the Wehrmacht to establish the “Tiger Legion”, a force of around 4,500 Indian POWs and expatriates in Europe intended to topple British rule in India. Bose came to terms with the Japanese, and declared the independence of a Singapore-based Provisional Government of Free India in October 1943. The army at its command consisted of three lightly armed infantry divisions totalling approximately 40,000 men. A small number of volunteers were even sent to Japan for aviation training.

In terms of service, the Indian National Army participated in the 1944 Indian Offensive, one of the last major Japanese offensives of the Second World War aimed at the Brahmaputra Valley. While the army’s 1st and 2nd divisions saw heavy fighting in Arakan and Imphal, their wider objective – to advance into the Northern Indian Plains and spark a guerrilla conflict – did not have the desired effect. An anticipated mass defection of Indian soldiers serving the British Empire never took place, and the Japanese offensive was eventually pegged back. Nevertheless, the Indian National Army continued to fight alongside the Japanese in Burma until the end of the Second World War.

What do you think of the foreign forces who helped the Japanese Empire? Let us know below.

Now read Felix’s article on Top Secret World War 2: Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and their Submarine Trade Missions here.

Further reading

Fighting for the Empire – Meet Japan’s Foreign Volunteers of WW2, Florian Heydorn, 2019.

Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan's Asian allies, 1931-45. Volume 1: China and Manchuko, Philip S. Jowett, 2001.

Collaborators with Imperial Japan, Wikipedia.

Collaborators and National Memory: The Creation of the Encyclopedia of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea, Jeong-Chul Kim and Gary Fine, 2013.

The Imperial Japanese Army’s Takasago Volunteers, Glenn Barnett.

Collaborationist Chinese Army.

The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence 1942-1945, Peter Ward Fay, 1994.

Burma Independence Army.

The Puppet Masters – How Japan’s Military Established a Vassal State in Inner Mongolia, Florian Heydorn, 2017.

Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Empire, Vesna Drapac and Gareth Pritchard, 2017.