Napoleon's First Major Battlefield Defeat

The Battle of Aspern-Essling, fought on May 21nd and 22st, 1809 marked one of the most significant land engagements of the Napoleonic Wars and the first major setback for Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte on the battlefield.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Battle of Essling, May 1809. By Fernand Cormon.

Taking place on the northern bank of the Danube River near Vienna, this confrontation was part of the War of the Fifth Coalition, wherein Austria, under the leadership of Archduke Charles, sought to challenge Napoleon's dominance in Europe. The battle demonstrated the growing capacity of the Austrian military to resist the previously unstoppable French Grande Armée.

Napoleon's strategic goal was to cross the Danube and strike decisively at the Austrian forces, effectively neutralizing their threat and consolidating French control over Central Europe. The crossing of the mighty river presented logistical challenges, requiring the construction of pontoon bridges. Despite the French emperor's reputation for meticulous planning and tactical brilliance, unforeseen complications and the resilience of the Austrian forces thwarted his ambitions.

Archduke Charles, leading the Austrian army, with his subordinate commanders capitalized on the vulnerabilities created by the French reliance on fragile pontoon bridges. The Austrians launched a surprise counteroffensive, targeting Napoleon's forces as they attempted to consolidate their position in the villages of Aspern and Essling.

Over two days, intense combat unfolded, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. While the French initially made gains, the destruction of their supply lines and bridges by Austrian forces turned the tide of the battle, forcing Napoleon to withdraw, a rare occurrence in his military career.

The battle's outcome was a psychological and strategic turning point. For the Austrians, it was a validation of their renewed efforts to oppose French hegemony. For Napoleon, the defeat underscored the risks of overextension and the challenges of managing a vast empire amidst persistent opposition. Aspern-Essling also highlighted the emergence of Archduke Charles as a capable commander and underscored the shifting dynamics of warfare in the Napoleonic era.

The Battle of Aspern-Essling would set the stage for further confrontations, most notably the Battle of Wagram in July 1809, a decisive yet costly victory for Emperor Napoleon's French and allied army. However, its immediate impact resonated as a demonstration of Napoleon's vulnerability and the fierce resistance of a reformed Austrian army.

The political and cultural lead-up to the battle

By 1809, Napoleon's grip on Europe was tightening. After numerous battlefield victories, his dominance was largely unchallenged. However, Austrian dissatisfaction with French hegemony and the territorial rearrangements of the Confederation of the Rhine led to a resurgence of resistance. Austrian reformers under Archduke Charles modernized their army, introducing conscription and improved training. Encouraged by Napoleon's focus on Spain and the perceived overstretch of French forces, Austria declared war in April 1809.

The Fifth Coalition War was characterized by Austria's attempt to rally German-speaking states to their cause and Napoleon's swift counteroffensive. The French Emperor sought to decisively crush Austrian resistance early to discourage other powers from joining the coalition.

Culturally, the war symbolized a clash of national pride. Austria, as an old European power, sought to restore its waning influence, while Napoleon aimed to consolidate his modern empire.

The strategic context

The Danube River was the lifeline of the theatre, serving as a critical supply route and barrier. Napoleon's strategy revolved around rapidly crossing the Danube to bring Archduke Charles to battle, using his signature approach of speed and decisive action to envelop and destroy the Austrian forces.

Archduke Charles, on the other hand, aimed to exploit Napoleon's reliance on rapid maneuvers. He sought to use the Danube as a defensive advantage, forcing Napoleon into a constrained engagement while leveraging Austria's numerical superiority.

The Commanders

Napoleon Bonaparte: The French Emperor's reputation as a military genius was unassailable by 1809. Known for his bold tactics and ability to adapt to battlefield conditions, Napoleon sought to secure yet another victory to maintain his aura of invincibility.

Archduke Charles of Austria: A reformer and tactician, Charles was Austria's most competent commander. Though often overshadowed by Napoleon, he was well-versed in defensive operations and had a deep understanding of the terrain.

The development of the battle

On the 20th of May, Napoleon initiated his plan to cross the Danube using pontoon bridges constructed by his engineers near the villages of Aspern and Essling. His goal was to establish a bridgehead on the northern bank, a vital step toward forcing the Austrians into a pitched battle. However, the Austrian army, aware of his movements, positioned itself strategically to counter this crossing.

Initial French success (May 21st, 1809)

Napoleon's forces crossed the river and established positions near Aspern and Essling. The French vanguard quickly pushed into Aspern, with fierce fighting erupting as Austrian troops counterattacked. By evening, the French had secured a tenuous foothold but faced relentless Austrian pressure.

Austrian resilience (May 22nd, 1809)

Overnight, the Austrians launched a determined assault on both villages, seeking to isolate the French forces. The Austrian artillery targeted the French pontoon bridges, severing Napoleon's critical supply line and reinforcements. This disruption stalled French momentum and left Napoleon unable to fully commit his reserves.

Throughout the day, the battle seesawed, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Napoleon personally led counterattacks, attempting to retake Aspern and secure the river crossing, but Austrian resistance, bolstered by their superior numbers and entrenched positions, held firm.

By late afternoon, Napoleon realized his precarious situation. With his forces dangerously exposed and his supply line compromised, he ordered a retreat across the Danube, marking the first time he was forced to abandon a battlefield under direct opposition.

The influence and outcome of tactics

French tactics

Napoleon's strategy hinged on rapid crossing and overwhelming force, but his reliance on hastily constructed pontoon bridges proved a critical vulnerability. His characteristic use of concentrated artillery and massed infantry attacks faltered due to supply disruptions and Austrian counter-battery fire.

Austrian tactics

Archduke Charles's decision to engage the French immediately after their river crossing was pivotal. He leveraged his superior numbers and defensive positions to great effect. Austrian engineers and artillery played a crucial role, repeatedly targeting the French bridges and disrupting Napoleon's logistical base.

The Austrian use of flexible defensive lines and coordinated counterattacks demonstrated their improved tactical doctrine and underlined their determination to resist French dominance.

The aftermath

The Battle of Aspern-Essling was a pyrrhic victory for Austria. While they successfully halted Napoleon and inflicted heavy casualties (37,000 combined), they could not capitalize on their success in delivering a decisive blow. For Napoleon, the battle was a sobering experience that exposed vulnerabilities in his strategy and his army's logistical operations.

The immediate aftermath saw both sides preparing for the inevitable rematch. Just six weeks later, Napoleon reorganized his forces and decisively defeated the Austrians at the Battle of Wagram. However, Aspern-Essling tarnished his image of invincibility and emboldened resistance movements across Europe.

In conclusion, the Battle of Aspern-Essling stands as a defining moment in the Napoleonic Wars, a clash that tested the limits of Napoleon's strategic brilliance and Austria's resolve. While not a decisive strategic victory for either side, it marked a significant psychological shift in the war and the perception of Napoleon's invincibility on land.

For Austria, the battle symbolized the fruits of military reform and demonstrated that even Napoleon's formidable forces could be thwarted with preparation, determination, and tactical ingenuity. Archduke Charles's leadership, the precise targeting of French supply lines, and the Austrians' effective use of defensive positions and counterattacks revealed the vulnerabilities in Napoleon's reliance on speed and maneuver.

For Napoleon, Aspern-Essling was a sobering reminder of the risks inherent in overconfidence and the perils of logistical weakness. The loss of pontoon bridges and the resultant supply line collapse illustrated the growing complexity of sustaining a large, modern army in the field. While he would swiftly recover and triumph at Wagram, the psychological and symbolic implications of this defeat reverberated across Europe, inspiring his adversaries and energizing resistance movements.

Strategically, the battle highlighted the increasing role of engineering, logistics, and coordination in early 19th-century warfare. The lessons learned on both sides would shape subsequent engagements, influencing military thought and practices for years to come.

The Battle of Aspern-Essling is not merely a story of tactics and bloodshed but a tale of the evolving nature of war. It serves as a powerful reminder of the interplay between leadership, preparation, and adaptability, a narrative that continues to resonate in military studies and strategic planning to this day.

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The Battle of the Nile: Turning the Tide of Napoleonic Ambition

The Battle of the Nile, fought from the 1st of August to the 3rd of August, 1798, stands as one of the most decisive naval engagements in European history. It marked a turning point in the French Napoleonic expansion, showcasing the strategic brilliance of Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson, 1st Duke of Bronte, (Rear Admiral on the dates of the Battle of the Nile), in addition to the tactical vulnerabilities of the French Mediterranean fleet under Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers.

This confrontation occurred in Aboukir Bay, off the coast of Egypt, where Napoleon Bonaparte's expeditionary force had recently landed to secure French dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and disrupt British access to India.

Nelson's victory at the Battle of Nile shattered French naval power in the region, isolating Napoleon's army in Egypt, and shifting the balance of power in favor of Britain and its allies. The battle not only demonstrated Nelson's innovative approach to naval warfare but also underscored the critical role of sea power in determining the outcome of continental conflicts. Its implications rippled far beyond the waters of Aboukir Bay, influencing the geopolitical dynamics of Europe and the Middle East for years to come.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Battle of the Nile, 1 August 1798. By Nicholas Pocock.

Lead-Up to the Battle

The late 18th century saw Europe embroiled in the Napoleonic Wars, with France seeking dominance both on land and sea. Napoleon's Egyptian expedition aimed to disrupt British access to India and the broader Eastern trade network. Politically, this was part of a broader strategy to diminish British global influence. Culturally, Napoleon sought to emulate Alexander the Great by casting himself as a liberator and modernizer in the ancient land of Egypt.

The French fleet, transporting Napoleon's army, had eluded Nelson's pursuit across the Mediterranean. Arriving in Egypt, they landed troops and established a foothold near Alexandria. The French strategy relied on maintaining naval superiority in the region to secure supply lines and support the occupation. Nelson, recognizing the broader strategic stakes, relentlessly sought the French fleet, finally discovering the fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay.

The commanders and strategic preparations

Nelson, one of Britain's most innovative naval tacticians, had a clear strategic aim: destroy the French fleet to isolate Napoleon's army. His aggressive approach, favoring close-quarters combat and surprise, contrasted with the more cautious French commander Brueys, who opted to anchor his fleet in a defensive crescent formation in Aboukir Bay. The French commander assumed this position would protect his ships' flanks and benefit from shore-based artillery support.

However, Brueys underestimated Nelson's ingenuity and the capabilities of the British fleet. Nelson, commanding from HMS Vanguard, planned a daring assault to outmaneuver and envelop the French crescent formation.

The Battle unfolds

On the evening of the 1st of August, Nelson's fleet approached Aboukir Bay under cover of dusk. Exploiting the French assumption that the bay's shallow waters were impassable, Nelson directed several ships to sail around the northern end of the French line, attacking from the landward side. This maneuver caught the French off-guard, allowing the British to double their firepower against some French vessels.

The battle developed into a series of brutal, close-quarters engagements. By nightfall, the French flagship L'Orient, a massive 120-gun ship, caught fire and exploded in a catastrophic blast, dealing a psychological blow to the French morale. Over the next two days, the British systematically captured or destroyed the majority of the French fleet, with only a few ships escaping.

Tactical considerations and strategic outcomes

The British victory was the result of superior tactics, aggressive execution, and Nelson's ability to exploit French vulnerabilities. The French defensive anchorage, though formidable on paper, left little room for maneuver and failed to anticipate a two-pronged assault. Nelson's audacity in navigating uncharted waters and using surprise as a weapon decisively tilted the scales.

The destruction of the French fleet isolated Napoleon's forces in Egypt, cutting them off from reinforcements and supplies. Politically, the battle re-energized Britain's position in the Mediterranean and emboldened other European powers to resist French expansion.

Aftermath and Legacy

The Battle of the Nile was a turning point in the Napoleonic era, and Napoleon's ambitions in the East were effectively stymied, forcing him to focus on continental Europe. For Britain, the victory cemented Nelson's reputation as a national hero and affirmed the Royal Navy's supremacy.

The battle's tactics influenced naval warfare by highlighting the importance of mobility, surprise, and exploiting weaknesses in an enemy's formation. Nelson's approach became a textbook example of decisive leadership and innovative strategy, inspiring generations of naval commanders. In the broader scope of history, the Battle of the Nile not only reshaped the course of the Napoleonic Wars but also underscored the enduring importance of naval power in global conflicts.

In conclusion, the Battle of the Nile stands as one of the most significant naval engagements in history, epitomizing the decisive influence of maritime supremacy on geopolitical outcomes. Through a combination of bold strategy, meticulous execution, and unrelenting determination, Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson and his fleet delivered a devastating blow to French aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean. This victory not only derailed Napoleon's Egyptian campaign but also reasserted British dominance at sea, altering the balance of power across Europe.

Strategically, the battle underscored the critical role of naval control in projecting and sustaining military power. Nelson's innovative tactics, marked by his ability to think unconventionally and take calculated risks demonstrated how naval engagements could decisively shape the trajectory of broader conflicts. The destruction of the French fleet left Napoleon's forces isolated, transforming what had begun as an ambitious campaign into a protracted struggle for survival in an unfamiliar land.

The psychological and symbolic ramifications of the British triumph reverberated across the continent. For Britain, it was a moment of profound national pride and a rallying point for further resistance against French expansion. For France, the defeat shattered illusions of invincibility and exposed vulnerabilities in its strategic planning. Moreover, the battle encouraged the coalition of European powers opposed to Napoleon, reigniting their resolve to challenge French hegemony.

The legacy of the Battle of the Nile extends far beyond its immediate effects. It solidified Nelson's place in the pantheon of great military leaders and elevated the Royal Navy to an unparalleled status, ensuring Britain's dominance at sea for much of the 19th century. Furthermore, the lessons drawn from the engagement, emphasized adaptability, the element of surprise, and strategic foresight, which continue to resonate in military doctrines to this day.

Ultimately, the Battle of the Nile was not merely a clash of fleets but a transformative event that shaped the course of history. It affirmed the enduring importance of naval power as a determinant of global influence and left a legacy of leadership and innovation that continues to inspire. Nelson's daring victory serves as a timeless reminder of how ingenuity and resolve can change the fate of nations.

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Notes:

Napoleon was a master tactician, and strategist, in addition, his expert use of field artillery gave him many victories on land, however, Napoleon was no seafarer and was reliant on his Admirals and navy to perform maritime duty to support his army.

Needless to say, the French naval gunnery was no match for the Royal Navy who were renowned as the best in the world not only for their accuracy but also for the speed of reloading and firing.

A quote from a French navel prisoner at the later Battle of Trafalgar, 21st of October 1805.

"The Devil loaded the guns for it was impossible for men to load and fire as quick as they [British] did."

Commanders

Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson

Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson, 1st Duke of Bronte, (Rear Admiral on the dates of the Battle of the Nile), (18th of September 1758 (Julian calendar) - 21st October 1805) died at the later Battle of Trafalgar, aboard the Flagship HMS Victory, (21st October 1805), after successfully defeating the combined French and Spanish fleets. This final battle assured Nelson's name would become a naval legend.

Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers

Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers, Comte de Brueys (12th of February 1753 – 1st of August 1798), died at the Battle of the Nile aboard the French flagship.

How effective was the 1815 Congress of Vienna?

The Congress of Vienna took place in 1814-15 in the light of the ending of the Napoleonic Wars. It had the aim of creating a revised European political order in the post-war period. Here, Bilal Junejo considers how effective the Congress was.

Klemens von Metternich. 1815 portrait by Thomas Lawrence.

Whenever it is the effectiveness of something which has to be determined, it invariably helps to be clear at the outset about the criteria in light of which such determination is to be made. In the case of the Congress of Vienna, how effective was it in doing what? What was it supposed to do when it convened? And what did it then go on to actually do? Was it able, by dint of the settlement which it drew up on 9 June 1815, to accomplish all that it had set out to? Or did subsequent events prove by their very occurrence that the Treaty of Vienna had been “ineffective” (because it could do nothing to forestall them)? To learn the answers, we must begin our analysis by examining the principal characteristics of a peace conference in the abstract — before turning to consider the extent to which those characteristics may be said to have been borne by the Congress of Vienna.

Ordinarily, a peace conference opens in the wake of an armistice. That is because the foremost purpose of such a conference is to determine what the postwar settlement will look like, and there is no point in discussing such a settlement until hostilities have at least provisionally ceased, for any such discussion presupposes knowledge of the international environment in which any settlement drawn up will have to operate, and no ascertainment of that environment can take place until fighting has stopped, not least because the lineaments of that environment will themselves be determined by the timing of the truce. What necessitates such a conference, though, is not the nature of the losing side’s surrender (which may be conditional or unconditional), but the fact that the winning side comprises not one participant but several. The victors’ initial lack of consensus as to the principal characteristics of the postwar settlement, coupled with the inability of each of them to settle things unilaterally in their own favor, makes them hold a conference in the hope of finding (some) common ground. As it is a peace conference, any acceptable settlement (for what is not acceptable will not be workable either) in which its deliberations eventuate has to ensure, if the conference itself is to be called “effective”, three things at all costs — the minimization of the losing side’s ability (and, if the victors are sufficiently wise, incentive) to resume hostilities; the material satisfaction of each victor in proportion to their losses during the war; and finally, if the first two requirements have been fulfilled, an overall arrangement of affairs that is calculated to maximize the life of the new peace. Given how the views of each victor are bound to be colored by considerations of their national security, none of the three things mentioned above can ever admit of an easy solution; but what occasionally complicates matters for everyone is the awkward situation where some members of the winning side turn out to have been able to have accomplished all or most of their wartime goals before the armistice was concluded, whilst the rest expect to be able to accomplish theirs as a direct result of the postwar settlement. The former, whom one might call the possessive, will consequently find their bargaining power at the conference to be much greater than that of the latter, whom one might call the acquisitive. Under such circumstances, the acquisitive will normally make their gains only if they first accord recognition to the wartime gains of the possessive. However, it should also be remembered that the possessive will have, in spite of their superior bargaining position, a vested interest in satisfying as many demands of the acquisitive as they possibly can, since any alienation of the latter will only result in potential allies for the side that has lost the war, presaging a regrouping of forces and a consequent undermining of the new settlement even before it officially comes into being.

Effectiveness

Having ascertained the raison d’être of a peace conference, as well as the three cumulative requirements for making it “effective”, it should not be too difficult now for us to determine just how well the Congress of Vienna’s chosen means conduced to its own ends. Beginning with the first requirement, namely minimizing the losing side’s ability and incentive to resume hostilities, the Congress performed quite well. Unlike most peace conferences, it had the advantage of having opened (in September 1814) only after a proper treaty of peace (as opposed to a mere armistice) had been concluded with the loser (on 30 May). The Treaty of Paris had confirmed not only the Allies’ recognition of the return of legitimate (i.e. internationally acceptable) Bourbon rule to France, but also the terms upon which France (or at least her new, de facto representatives) had agreed that she should thenceforth peacefully coexist with the rest of Europe. The early advent of this congenial development ensured that the Congress, when it subsequently convened, would remain conscious of the need to draw up no settlement of which the provisions in relation to France would be such as to humiliate the French people, subvert the Bourbons’ shaky hold, incite the return of Bonapartism, and plunge Europe into war anew. And given the decision to exile Napoleon to an island as close to France as Elba, it is likely that nobody foresaw the One Hundred Days in May 1814, as nobody could have known then how quickly the Bourbons, notwithstanding the Charter of Ghent, would resume their traditional misrule (ranging from economic inefficiency to humiliating political opponents) after returning to power (Roberts, 2015: 726-8). But that misrule had nothing to do with the Congress. It could, of course, be argued that since the Bourbons owed their return to Allied military support, the Congress could have ordered them to govern less provocatively than they were doing, but that begs the question of how exactly it was supposed to have realized the provocation prior to Napoleon’s smoothest of returns to power in March 1815. As late as February, Lord Castlereagh’s deputy at the Foreign Office was telling Campbell (the British commissioner guarding Napoleon on Elba) when he met him in Florence that “[w]hen you return to Elba, you may tell Bonaparte that he is quite forgotten in Europe: no one thinks of him now (Roberts, 2015: 730).” This cannot be dismissed as mere hyperbole to dampen Napoleon’s spirits, for the aforementioned proximity of Elba to France and the Allies’ indifference to both that and Bourbon misrule (in spite of Allied forces still being present upon French soil) strongly suggest that such a view was genuinely held at the ongoing Congress. But because Napoleon was soon defeated at Waterloo and exiled to faraway St Helena, the Congress never had to atone for its indifference to Bourbon misgovernment. The Second Treaty of Paris (20 November 1815) — which established a Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia to function principally as a system of collective security for nipping any kind of French aggression in the bud — declared that France was to return to her pre-Revolutionary borders, pay an indemnity of 700 million francs, and have the greater part of her territory occupied by Allied forces for five years. But the French people, notwithstanding the Bourbons’ return, complied; and by 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, reparations had been settled, the occupation was ended after only three years, and the Quadruple Alliance became the Quintuple with the addition of France, which finally restored her to full great power status in Europe. The speed with which France was able to regain equality of status in Europe after 1815 shows how the Congress of Vienna, supplemented by the Second Treaty of Paris, had left her neither desirous of overturning the new settlement nor in a position to do so even if she wanted to.

Material satisfaction

Vis-à-vis the second requirement — the victors’ material satisfaction — the Congress also did well. Indeed, it must have done so, if “it is possible to say [that the Vienna settlement] contained in none of its provisions the seeds of a future war between the great powers, and must thus be rated a better peace than either Utrecht or Versailles (Seaman, 2003: 8).” A complete list of the powers’ individual territorial gains is not necessary, for all that concerns us is the realization that because no power felt cheated or resentful, the third requirement — ensuring the peace’s longevity — may be considered in conjunction with the second, as any durable postwar peace presupposes the victors’ general satisfaction. It should be remembered that since the Congress had opened only after the Bourbons’ restoration, its task was not to achieve peace, but to ensure that it would continue. But because that peace was going to be principally between hereditary autocrats, the lack of domestic accountability had to be compensated for by an international equilibrium of forces, which necessitated not only the erosion of revolutionary ideas, but also the remedying of those weaknesses in the Continental structure which had tempted and enabled French aggression in the first place. Unsurprisingly, the best antidote to revolution was perceived to lie in the concept of legitimacy, which meant that the established monarchies of Europe alone had the right to rule over their respective people(s) merelybecause they were established. It was a return to the status quo ante, as

“After the two World Wars of the twentieth century there was no question of recreating the situation that had existed before the outbreak of hostilities; the statesmen of 1814, on the other hand, were definitely seeking some sort of return to the eighteenth-century system. It was not merely that their pride had been bruised by the impact of Napoleon's armies; the whole basis of the ancien régime had been challenged by the extension of revolutionary principles in the lands adjoining France, and for the Allies the purpose of victory was to restore the political and social framework that had been so roughly shaken since 1789 (Wood, 1964: 6).”

Weak Legitimacy?

The weakness inherent in choosing legitimacy as the basis of the Vienna settlement was that it was based upon the memory of the French Revolution and Napoleon (Kissinger, 1994: 88). Inevitably, as that memory faded with the passage of time, respect for legitimacy (which had only grown as a result of that memory) would diminish, and conflict erupt anew. But in 1815, there existed no other belief upon which to base a consensus. For the settlement to work, every power had not only to make the territorial gains for which she had fought the protracted Napoleonic Wars (and which would constitute her price for acceding to the settlement), but also to rest assured that those gains would not be subsequently snatched from her by a jealous rival. After decades of war, the decision to uphold legitimacy would mean that the incentive for one autocrat not to encroach upon the territory of another could easily lie in the understanding that the latter would reciprocate such forbearance in kind. Indeed, Russia, Prussia, and Austria went a step further, and developed between themselves what would come to be known as the Holy Alliance, which obliged its members to assist one another in the suppression of insurrectionary activity in each other’s dominions. But if legitimacy could keep the powers from exploiting their respective geopolitical opportunities merely for the sake of reciprocity, it did not eliminate the existence of those opportunities. They would be exploited as soon as anyone felt strong enough to do so (as eventually happened in the Crimean War). The principal achievement of the Treaty of Vienna — or rather of its foremost defender, Metternich, who remained Austrian foreign minister until 1848 — was to keep Prussia and Russia, the foremost Continental powers, convinced for over thirty years that their best interests lay in peace rather than war. It helped, of course, that these countries were autocracies, where Metternich only had to convince the monarch and no one else. But throughout his tenure, Metternich’s task had been to keep them from acting, rather than from reacting. One wonders, therefore, whether even Metternich, had he remained in office, would have been able to stave off conflict after the advent of the ‘illegitimate’ and provocatively domineering Napoleon III in 1852. It was Metternich’s luck that no meaningful challenge to the peace arose until after 1848 — and his accomplishment that he kept both Prussia and Russia from challenging it throughout his time in office. Navarino had not challenged the peace because Russia had fought it in concert with the ‘legitimate’ Bourbons and London — and against a non-Christian power, assisting whom was in no way stipulated by the Holy Alliance. Consequently,

“After the Congress of Vienna, Europe experienced the longest period of peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great Powers for forty years, and after the Crimean War in 1854, no general war for another sixty (Kissinger, 1994: 79).”

Good luck

It was the spirit of Vienna’s good luck that it did not die (in 1856) until the rejuvenation of France under Napoleon III (which was shortly eclipsed by German unification under Bismarck) had taken place, restoring something of a military balance on the Continent to counter the end of legitimacy (which was crucial in postponing the outbreak of a general war until 1914). It had taken the combined forces of Great Britain, France, and eventually Piedmont-Sardinia (plus the decisive ultimatum from Austria) to bring Russia to the negotiating table in 1856!

But for the forty years that it lasted, the post-1815 peace also owed something to the Continental restructuring that had taken place at Vienna, and which the precepts of legitimacy subsequently preserved from unilateral change. In the first place, British determination to prevent the recrudescence of Continental subservience to one state had resulted in the creation of a united kingdom of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg to keep the Low Countries’ ports, which were perilously close to Dover, from falling into a Continental power’s hands. Catholic Belgium was united with Protestant Holland not from lack of foresight, but because it was impossible then to confirm future French docility (Seaman, 2003: 4) — not least because Napoleon had yet to be defeated when the Treaty of Vienna was signed on 9 June. Even after Belgium’s secession from the union in 1830, Great Britain was able to have Belgian sovereignty guaranteed by all the great powers under Article 7 of the Treaty of London of 1839 — with the result that thenceforth, until 1914, she could remain comfortably aloof from all disputes in western Europe (particularly at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870), resulting in their automatic reduction to manageable proportions and preventing the outbreak of a Continental conflagration.

German Confederation & Russia

Another (Austro-) British achievement was the establishment of the German Confederation. An association of thirty-nine German states (including parts of both Prussia and Austria) in the center of Europe with no central administration but under the nominal presidency of Vienna would prove to be too strong to be attacked by a neighboring power, but too weak to attack anyone itself (Kissinger, 1994: 81). Checking both French and Russian expansion, as well as maintaining an equilibrium between Prussia and Austria in central Europe, the Confederation promised to be the cornerstone of the Continental equilibrium for which Lord Castlereagh had been straining every nerve.

The cause of peace was also helped by appeasement of the foremost Continental power in 1815 — Russia (Kissinger, 1994: 140). By acknowledging Russian suzerainty over Poland — which the Tsar had captured from Napoleon in the war’s final stages, making Russia a possessive power in the Polish context — the Allies, and especially acquisitive Austria, won Russia’s crucial support for legitimate rule across the Continent. It was the Congress of Vienna because, among the great powers, Austria’s desire for one had been the greatest (Roberts, 2015: 726). Her military weakness meant that her European wishes could only be fulfilled if they also became international decisions. Winning indispensable Russian support at that decisive hour preserved the peace for nearly forty years.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Congress of Vienna was considerably effective because it ushered in an unprecedentedly long era of (general) peace. But because that peace had been inspired by a common fear, it was bound to be lost once that fear had evaporated. Even so, legitimacy’s survival until 1856 allowed the Continent to regain something of a military balance — which helped to postpone the next European war until 1914.

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Bibliography

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Roberts, A. (2015) Napoleon the Great. Penguin Books.

Seaman, L. (2003) From Vienna to Versailles. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Wood, A. (1964) Europe 1815-1945. Longmans, Green and Co Ltd.

What if Napoleon Bonaparte had won the Battle of Waterloo?

Napoleon Bonaparte was famously defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 by British and Prussian forces. But what if that never happened? How would European history have changed if Napoleon had won? Here, Nick Tingley explores why history may have ended up repeating itself…

A picture of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The battle between France and Prussia in 1870 was all but decided at the Battle of Sedan on September 1. As Napoleon III was led through the French countryside for the nearest port, he knew that this battle would spell the end of the Empire. As he was sailed across to England for exile, a unified Germany was created off the back of French territory - and the landscape of Europe would be forever changed.

Had he been more like his uncle, Napoleon Bonaparte, the fall of Napoleon III’s government might never have happened. Bonaparte had known when to give up. Even as the British troops of Wellington and Blucher’s Prussians fled from the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, Bonaparte had known that he had to pursue peace in order to survive. Bonaparte had even offered clemency to the British troops by aiding their evacuation from France after the battle, essentially bringing about a new era of peace in Europe championed by the two enemy nations. Bonaparte had developed so much since 1813 when he had refused a favorable settlement in defeat that he was able to bring about the longest lasting peace that Europe had seen in centuries…

But Napoleon III had not learnt from his uncle’s mistakes and the horrendous defeat at the Battle of Sedan would haunt him until his death in 1873…

When ‘What If’ Collides with History

Ironically, for a ‘What If?’ scenario, this version of history is not remarkably unlike our own. Whilst Napoleon Bonaparte did not win the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815, his nephew did eventually become Emperor of France as a result of the 1848 revolutions that sprung up around Europe. His last act as Emperor was to lead French forces against Prussia in the War of 1870. He was captured at the Battle of Sedan and forced into exile in Britain, where he was forever haunted by the destruction of his Empire. His actions that year effectively allowed the creation of Germany that was, in no small part, responsible for much of the tension between the two countries over the next seventy-five years.

And yet, this event in history may well have occurred regardless of whether Bonaparte had won the Battle of Waterloo. If we suppose, for a moment, that Napoleon had managed to defeat the British and Prussian forces at the battle and maintain control of France thereafter, it is not beyond reason to suppose that, as Bonaparte’s nephew and heir, Napoleon III would have inherited the Empire anyway. Had that happened, the Battle of Sedan would almost certainly have occurred in the same way, leading to his downfall and the beginning of the tensions that would contribute to the outbreak of the First World War.

But what scenario would allow such a divergence from historical fact and yet still arrive at the same point fifty-five years later? Rather than looking to Napoleon III, our attention must be drawn to Bonaparte, the man whose decisions would ultimately determine the future of France and the rest of Europe.

Bonaparte the Warrior

At first we must address Bonaparte’s character. The Bonaparte of 1796, the year that he began his conquest of Europe, was a war leader to the greatest degree. Had he managed to defeat Wellington and Blucher at Waterloo, he would almost certainly have urged his officers to press after Wellington and Blucher’s scattered armies until every last one of them had been captured or killed. He would have then have turned his attention to the armies of Russia and Austria who, whilst not involved in Waterloo, were slowly advancing across Europe to address this resurgence of power.

This would have presented Bonaparte with a serious problem. In the first instance, Austria and Russia had armies of approximately 200,000 men working their way across Europe. In the second, Alexander I, the Tsar of Russia, was particularly keen to eliminate Bonaparte, as he believed that Europe would never remain at peace with him alive. Finally, French conscription, from which Bonaparte had been gathering troops during his previous campaigns, was not currently a policy in France. This meant that he didn’t have access to the same amount of reserves that he had previously.

In this scenario, Bonaparte would probably not have enjoyed any significant success for more than a week or two. With the arrival of the Austrians and Russians, Bonaparte’s armies would have stood little chance at all, and history would have certainly continued down the path that we are most familiar with.

Bonaparte the Stubborn

The Bonaparte of 1813 may have lasted even less time. In 1813, Bonaparte had refused any kind of settlement at all, even though he had been completely defeated at the Battle of Leipzig that year. In that battle, Bonaparte’s armies were effectively expelled from the rest of Europe and forced to retreat back in to France. Had Bonaparte sued for a peace at that time, he might well have retained his title and control over France. The result of his failure to do so was the invasion of France by the Coalition of Russia, Austria and Prussia and his own removal from the throne.

Had he treated his victory at Waterloo with the same refusal to negotiate, Bonaparte would have probably attempted to retake parts of Central Europe immediately following the Battle of Waterloo. Once again, Bonaparte’s failing would have been signaled by the arrival of Russian and Austrian troops which would have led to yet another disastrous retreat back in to France, if not the destruction of his entire army.

Bonaparte the Diplomat

There is, however, one scenario by which Bonaparte may have been able to win at Waterloo and still maintain control of France. If Bonaparte had granted clemency to the retreating British forces of Wellington, history could have taken a completely different turn. The British forces had granted something similar seven years previously at Sintra, where French forces had been allowed to evacuate from Portugal after several disastrous battles. Such an act of honor, whilst completely removed from Bonaparte’s character, may well have been enough to convince the British that there might be a peaceful solution to the French problem.

In the event that Bonaparte had sued for some sort of peace, before the arrival of the Russian and Austrian armies, they may well have found a new ally in the form of Britain. With the two former enemies working together to bring about a new era of peace, it is not beyond reason to suggest that the rest of Europe might have been tempted to follow suit. The Congress system that was prevalent in Europe for the years following Bonaparte’s downfall may well have still existed but with a stronger leader speaking on behalf of France.

However, all of this would rely heavily on Bonaparte being able to disregard all the previous behaviors that had come to define his reign. In order for this scenario to work, Bonaparte would have had to cease behaving like some sort of power-hungry megalomaniac and become a reasonable diplomatic presence in Europe. One can even imagine that, had Bonaparte become the diplomat that Europe needed him to be, the rise of Germany might have been significantly delayed.

The revolutions of 1848 might have been a significantly smaller affair as there would have been no antagonism towards a French monarchy, which would have disbanded with Bonaparte’s renewed rise to power, and therefore no revolution in France. The French revolution, which was one of the larger and more explosive of the 1848 revolutions, would not have existed to encourage the others across Europe. Without the discontent across Europe, we can easily see a scenario in which a united Germany never comes in to being, effectively removing the threat of World War One in 1914 and, therefore, the subsequent World War twenty-five years later.

The Likely Scenario

Unfortunately, Bonaparte’s actions were, by and large, a result of his psychological compulsions and the environment in which he came to power. He was very much a child of the French Revolution; his rise to power had been as a result of one of the bloodiest events in French history. The idea that a man, who owed so much of his power to man’s compulsion towards war, would be content at sitting around a conference table with the other leaders of Europe is improbable at best.

Had he been given the opportunity to make this decision, it is unlikely that he would have taken it, opting instead for the allure of battle. In the event that he had sued for peace, it would almost have certainly been a blind to allow himself time to build up his armies before making another attempt at conquering the continent. In all likelihood, rather than delaying the onset of a World War in Europe, he would almost have certainly caused one in his own right.

However, Bonaparte would not have had long to enact his plans. Barely six years after his victory at Waterloo, he would have succumbed to the pain of stomach cancer and his throne would have been left to his then thirteen-year old heir and nephew, Napoleon III. What chaos would have gripped France as a result of his death is almost unfathomable and not within the remit of this discussion. However, two scenarios present themselves. Either, under the influence of the rest of Europe, France would have returned to a monarchy-led government and once again would have continued down the course that we already know from history, or else the young Napoleon III would have taken to the throne, probably starting a civil war in the process. If Napoleon III were to survive such a period of unrest in France, he could have reigned for nearly fifty years, never having the opportunity to learn from his uncle that the best direction for Europe was towards peace…

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You can also read Nick’s previous articles on what if D-Day did not happen in 1944 here, what if Hitler had been assassinated in July 1944 here, and what if the Nazis had not invaded Crete in World War Two here.

Sources

• Blucher: Scourge of Napoleon - Michael V. Leggiere (2014)
• If Napoleon had won the Batter of Waterloo - G. Macaulay Trevelyan (1907)
• Napoleon: The Last Phase - Lord Rosebery (1900)
• Napoleon Wins at Waterloo - Caleb Carr (1999)
• The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme - John Keegan (2004)
• Trafalgar and Waterloo: The Two Most Important Battles of the Napoleonic Wars - Charles River Editors (2014)

The Russian Peasant who attacked Napoleon’s War Machine – Image of the week

The tough Russian peasant who attacked Napoleon’s forces in 1812 is our image of the week.

We’ve had a number of articles related to Russia on the site this week, so thought we’d make the image of the week Russia-related too.

The 1812 Russian Campaign, or the French invasion of Russia, relates to Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Russia during the Napoleonic Wars. The campaign was led by a huge French-led force of well over 500,000 troops. All did not go quite to Napoleon’s liking though, and the Russians were able to overcome the French to devastating effect. The defeat was a catastrophe for Napoleon and his dreams of control over Europe.

Our image is related to the Russian Campaign and says: “A Russian peasant loading a dung cart.” In the image, a hardy Russia peasant is about to attack a dainty French soldier with his pitchfork. The French soldier is terrified, even though he has a sword. In the background we can see why he is horrified – there is a dung cart full of the bodies of French troops among hay. A boy is also in the background, happily looking at the man’s attack on the French soldier.

This print is from March 1813.

What else Russia-related have you missed this week? Our article on famed Russian Grigori Rasputin is here and a podcast about Gulags is here.

George Levrier-Jones