America’s 2021 Afghanistan Withdrawal – Lessons Not Learned?

Today, when most people think of Afghanistan, they recall the Biden administration’s calamitous withdrawal in the summer of 2021 and the end of what many have termed a ‘forever war.’ Tragically, the Taliban’s victory reversed two decades of effort to establish liberal institutions and women’s rights in the war-ravaged country. Many commentators have compared America’s retreat from Afghanistan to the country’s hasty evacuation of Vietnam in 1975. Indeed, there are similarities in the chaotic nature of the two withdrawals and the resulting tragic effects for the people of Afghanistan and Vietnam, respectively.

Brian Morra looks at the lessons the Biden Administration could have taken from earlier Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan.

Soviet troops atop a tank in Kabul in 1986.

Regarding Afghanistan, Americans are less likely to remember the Soviet Union’s war there and Moscow’s own rather ignominious pull out. This is unfortunate because there are lessons to be learned from the USSR’s ill-fated foray into Afghanistan that US policymakers ought to have heeded during our own twenty-year war. My latest historical novel, The Righteous Arrows (Amazon US | Amazon UK), published by Koehler Books, devotes a good deal of ink to the missteps made by Washington and Moscow in that long-ago war. My intention with The Righteous Arrows is to entertain while providing the reader with a sense of what should have been learned from the Soviets’ failed adventure in Afghanistan.

What was Moscow’s war in Afghanistan all about?

Like many wars, it began with what seemed to be good intentions. The Kremlin leaders who made the decision to go to war thought that it would not really be a war at all but a ‘police action’ or a ‘special military operation’ if you like. The Kremlin leadership expected their engagement in Afghanistan to be sharp and quick. Instead, it turned into a decade-long, bloody slog that contributed to the later implosion of the USSR itself. Talk about unintended consequences!

How did the Soviet foray into Afghanistan start?

It began over the Christmas season in 1979 when the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was convinced to come to the aid of a weak, pro-Russian socialist regime in Kabul. The initial operation was led by the KGB with support from the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) and Army Airborne units. After initial success, the Kremlin quickly became embroiled in a war with tribal militias who did not like either the socialist puppet regime that Moscow was propping up or the Soviet occupation.

What was supposed to be a quick operation became a ferocious guerrilla war that lasted most of the 1980s and killed some 16,000 Soviet troops. The war sapped the strength of the Soviet armed forces and exposed to anyone who was paying attention just how weak the USSR had become. By 1986, the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had decided to get out of the bloody quagmire in Afghanistan. He found it was not that easy to leave and the last Russian forces did not depart Afghanistan until February 1989.

United States’ involvement

Beginning with the Jimmy Carter administration, the United States provided arms to the Afghan Islamic rebels fighting the Soviets. Military support from the US grew exponentially under President Ronald Reagan and by 1986 Washington was arming the Mujaheddin with advanced weapons, including the Stinger surface-to-air missiles that decimated Soviet airpower. America’s weapons turned the tide against the Soviet occupiers, but Washington also rolled the dice by arming Islamic rebels that it could not control.

Not only did the Afghan Islamic fighters become radicalized, but they were also joined by idealistic jihadis from all over the world. The Soviets’ ten-year occupation of Afghanistan became a magnet for recruiting jihadis, as did NATO’s two-decades long occupation some years later. The founder of al Qaeda, Usama bin Laden, brought together and funded Arab fighters in Afghanistan, ostensibly to fight the Russians, but mainly to build his own power base. Although Washington never armed bin Laden’s fighters, he used his presence in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and occupation as a propaganda bonanza. He trumpeted the military prowess of al Qaeda, which was largely a myth of bin Laden’s own creation, and claimed that he brought down the Soviet bear. His propaganda machine claimed that if al Qaeda could defeat one superpower (the USSR), then it also could beat the other one (the USA).

During the 1980s, Washington officials downplayed the danger of arming radical Islamic fighters. It was far more important for the White House to bring down the Soviet Union than to worry about a handful of Mujaheddin. One must admit that the Americans’ proxy war against the USSR in Afghanistan was the most successful one it conducted during the entire Cold War. On the other hand, Washington opened a virtual Pandora’s box of militarized jihadism and has been dealing with the consequences ever since.

The aftermath

The Soviet occupation encouraged most of Afghanistan’s middle class to flee the country, leaving an increasingly radicalized and militarized society in its wake. This was the Afghanistan the United States invaded in the fall of 2001, shortly after bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks on Wall Street and the Pentagon. Policymakers in Washington failed to grasp just how radically Afghan society had changed because of the Soviet occupation.

There was discussion in Washington’s national security circles in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, warning of the dangers of fighting in Afghanistan. Bromides were offered, calling the country the ‘graveyard of empires’, but none of it had much impact on policy. Most officials in the George W. Bush administration did not understand how radicalized Afghan society had become and how severe the costs of fighting a counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan might turn out to be.

The CIA-led operation to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s with small numbers of Americans was the game plan Washington also used in the fall of 2001 to defeat al Qaeda and bring down the ruling Taliban regime. The playbook worked brilliantly in both cases. Unfortunately, for the United States and our NATO allies, the initial defeat of the Taliban did not make for a lasting victory or an enduring peace.

For twenty years, the United States fought two different wars in Afghanistan. One was a counter-terror war, the fight to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and to prevent them from reconstituting. The other war was a counterinsurgency against the Taliban and their allies. The reason the United States and NATO went into Afghanistan was to prosecute the first war – the anti-terror war. We fell into a counterinsurgency conflict as the Taliban reconstituted with help from Pakistan and others. This was a classic case of ‘mission creep’ and it required large combat forces to be deployed, in contrast to the light footprint of the counter-terror operation. The first war – the counter-terror war – prevented another 9/11 style major attack on the United States, while the second one required the US and NATO to deploy massive force and – ultimately – depended on the soundness of the Afghan government we supported.

The sad fact is that the successful campaign against the Taliban and the routing of al Qaeda in 2001 and 2002 led to an unfocused twenty-year war that ended with the Taliban back in charge and a humiliated United States leaving hundreds of thousands of vulnerable Afghan allies behind. In sworn Congressional testimony, General Milley, who in 2021 was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General Mackenzie, who was Commander of Central Command, have stated that they forcefully advised President Biden to leave a small footprint of US forces and contractors in Afghanistan to prosecute the counter-terror war. Our NATO allies were willing to stay and in fact increased their forces in Afghanistan shortly after Biden was inaugurated. Not only did President Biden not heed his military advisors, but he also later denied that they ever counseled him to keep a small force in Afghanistan. Some have described Biden’s decision to pull out of Afghanistan as ‘pulling defeat from the jaws of victory’.

President Biden further asserted that, by withdrawing, he was merely honoring the agreement President Trump had made earlier with the Taliban. This claim does not stand up to objective scrutiny because the Taliban repeatedly violated the terms of the Trump agreement, which gave the White House ample opportunity to declare it null and void.

What are the lessons the United States should have learned from the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan?

1. Keep your war aims limited and crystal clear.

2. Fight mission creep and do not allow it to warp the original war aims or plans for a light footprint of forces.

3. Beware of the law of unintended consequences. Consider the downside risks of arming the enemy of one’s enemy.

4. Be willing to invest for the long-term or do not get involved. The United States still has forces in Germany, Italy, and Japan nearly eighty years after the end of World War II. Some victories are worth protecting.

5. Ensure that the Washington tendency toward ‘group think’ does not hijack critical thinking. Senior policymakers must think and act strategically, so that ‘hope’ does not become the plan.

Footnote on Ukraine

I will close with a footnote about the Russian war in Ukraine. The Soviet war in Afghanistan has dire similarities with Russia’s ‘special military operation’ underway today in Ukraine. In Afghanistan, Soviet forces killed indiscriminately and almost certainly committed numerous war crimes. The war also militarized Afghan society – a condition that persists to this day, and one that had a profound impact on America’s war in Afghanistan. In Ukraine, Russia’s invasion has been characterized by war crimes, mass emigration, and the militarization of Ukrainian society.

Much as in Iraq and Afghanistan, senior US policy in Ukraine is failing to identify clear strategic outcomes. It is the role of our most senior policy officials to focus on strategic outcomes and an exit strategy (if one is warranted) beforecommitting American forces or treasure to foreign wars. Too often, platitudes have masqueraded as strategy. When one thinks of great wartime presidents like Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, the trait they shared was a singular focus on strategic outcomes and on how to shape the post-war environment. The Soviets failed to do so in their war in Afghanistan. The US also fell short in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the banalities that pass for foreign policy strategy we hear in Washington today indicate that we have not learned from the past.

Brian J. Morra is the author of two historical novels: “The Able Archers” (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and the recently-published “The Righteous Arrows” (Amazon US | Amazon UK).

More about Brian:

Brian a former U.S. intelligence officer and a retired senior aerospace executive. He helped lead the American intelligence team in Japan that uncovered the true story behind the Soviet Union's shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983. He also served on the Air Staff at the Pentagon while on active duty. As an aerospace executive he worked on many important national security programs. Morra earned a BA from William and Mary, an MPA from the University of Oklahoma, an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, and completed the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School. He has provided commentary for CBS, Netflix and the BBC. Learn more at: www.brianjmorra.com

How America Supported the Anti-Soviet Mujahideen Rebels in 1980s Afghanistan

At the end of 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to support the Communist-inspired Afghan government. This led to a decade-long conflict in which the anti-Soviet Islamic Mujahideen rebels were supported by the United States. Here, Daniel Boustead tells us about the conflict and some of the negative unintended consequences of American support for the rebels.

A Soviet military offensive against the Mujahideen.

From 1979 to 1989 the Americans supported the Mujahideen Islamic rebels in their fight against the Soviet Union’s invasion. The Americans supported the rebels as a means of inflicting their own “Vietnam” on the Soviet Union. The decision in sending weapons to the anti-Communist rebels helped turn the tide of the war in the rebels favor and doomed the Soviet Union - and later the USA. American support for rebels in Afghanistan, was one of a number of Carter and Reagan’s foreign policy blunders that hurt America and Israel. The U.S. decision to support the rebels in Afghanistan was a strategic miscalculation and the wrong way to overcome our defeat in Vietnam. This was known as “Vietnam Syndrome”, which haunts America to this day.

U.S efforts to support the rebels appeared as far back as March 1979 in classified protocols at the Jimmy Carter White House ([1]). This was done because the U.S. was worried about increased Soviet involvement in propping up the weak pro-Communist puppet state in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979 ([2]). In the very first hours after the Soviet Union invaded, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said “He hoped the Soviets could be punished for invading Afghanistan, that they could be tied down and bloodied the way the United States had been in Vietnam” ([3]). At the start of the conflict the American government started sending the rebels some captured Soviet weapons as a means of getting revenge for the Soviet’s (limited) involvement in the Vietnam War, while keeping their involvement minimal (6). This was a bad decision because the Islamic fundamentalism of the recent Iranian Revolution was also coming to Afghanistan.

Iranian influence

In early spring 1979, in the Shiite Muslim town of Heart, Afghanistan, religious activists started organizing along fundamentalist lines based on the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini’s example ([4]). Even the non-Shia Muslim groups of Afghanistan were beginning to organize along the lines of Khomeini’s religious-political revival (4). 

In late December 1979 an amended top-secret presidential finding was signed by President Jimmy Carter, and it was reauthorized in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan (5). This permitted the CIA to secretly ship weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen rebels ([5]). The CIA would ship these weapons through the help of the Pakistani government‘s secret service, the Inter Services Intelligence or ISI (5). 

In 1983, after a visit to Afghanistan, Congressmen Charles Wilson from Texas, in his role as a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, began procuring  billions of dollars of weapons for the Mujahideen (11). Charles Wilson’s weapons would then pass-through Pakistan’s ISI (11). 

As time went on the weapons the rebels received became more sophisticated, so that they could combat the Soviet attack helicopters. The biggest threat to the Mujahideen was the MI-24 D, which was called by the rebels “The Devil’s Chariot” (14). From 1982 to 1984 the Americans sent the Mujahideen the portable surface to air missiles such as Strela-2 and the Redeye (7). The Mujahideen did use the Stela-2 and the Redeye with some notable successes against Soviet attack helicopters, but further success alluded them due to the fact that the Mujahideen lacked the training required for successful use of these weapons (7). The Heat Seeking Strela-2 and the Redeye were not as effective against the Soviet MI-24 Attack Helicopter, because the MI-24 used two flare dispensers and the AVU system, which blocked a direct view of the hot engine exhausts and swirled the exhaust gases in the rotor streams (7). The MI-24’s began using the AVU from 1983 to 1984 (7). The AVU also increased the MI-24’s weight, which resulted in Soviet crews having, in some cases, to remove the MI-24’s armor, and so making the weapon vulnerable to attack (8). The AVU also would not work under extreme high-altitude conditions and high temperatures and thus it could not always be used in combat (8). Furthermore, the heavy weight of the AVU caused minor reductions in maximum speed and the service ceiling, which could present a problem in combat (8). The MI-24 D attack helicopter’s cockpit was vulnerable to small arms fire - which was how some were lost in combat (9).

Later military supplies

The next weapon that was a “game changer” was the FIM-92 Stinger portable surface to air missile (7). The Afghan Mujahideen started acquiring the Stinger Missiles at the end of 1986 (10). Stinger Missiles started appearing in large numbers in the first half of 1987 and the end result was that Soviet attack helicopter units lost more MI-24’s in the first six months of 1987 then they had in all of the previous year (7). The Stinger Missile was so effective that the Soviet helicopter fleet was temporarily paralyzed (7). The Stinger Missiles also had an unpleasant consequence. When the MI-24’s were escorting passenger or transportation aircraft they were forced to put their MI-24’s in front of the passenger or transport aircraft and take the hit from the incoming missile themselves (7). This resulted in MI-24 helicopter crews being able to protect the transport and the passenger aircraft in the vast majority of cases, but not always (7). The Soviet Special Forces soon captured examples of the Stinger Missiles and they discovered weaknesses in the weapon, so allowing them to develop countermeasures (7). The result of this was that the MI-24 was equipped with infrared jammers, which could be tuned in to jam the Stinger’s seeker head almost perfectly (7). This in combination with the AVU System and flares reduced the effectiveness of the FIM-92 Stinger (7). Even this counter measure was not 100% effective though. The L166V Ispanka infrared jammer was not an all-protection system (8) as it was designed to counter missiles with infrared seeker heads. The Stinger Missile’s effect in the Soviet-Afghan war also sowed fear among the Soviet pilots and troops (12). From 1980 to 1989, according to the Russian periodical Mir Aviatsiya, 122 MI-24’s were irretrievably lost, with 42% of all downed MI-24 helicopters lost to “Dushkas” heavy machine gun, 30% by portable surface to air missiles, 25% by light antiaircraft guns, and the remaining 3% by small arms fire (13).

Consequences

The decision to arm Afghan Mujahideen rebels and other non-Afghan rebels during the conflict would have disastrous consequences for Israel and the USA. By the time Taliban had taken Kabul, Afghanistan in 1996, an estimated 600 of the approximately 2,300 Stingers distributed by the CIA during the Soviet-Afghan war remained missing (15). The Iranians were buying as many Stinger Missiles as they could, and CIA officers roughly estimated that Tehran had acquired about 100 Stingers by 1996 (15). In that same period the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, had possessed 53 Stingers missiles that had been collected by various Pashtun warlords that were loyal to the Taliban (15). By the end of the Soviet-Afghan war the CIA was worried that the Stinger Missiles could fall in the hands of terrorist groups or hostile governments such as Iran for shooting down American civilian passenger planes or military aircraft (12). Many Stinger Missiles went to Mujahideen commanders who were associated with anti-American radical Islamist leaders (12). In my view, the U.S. government should not have sold Stinger Missiles or any weapons to Mujahideen groups. The USA should have also stayed neutral during the Soviet Afghan conflict.

President Carter failed to resolve the Iran Hostage crisis (1979-81). In February 1982 the US government removed Iraq off the list of states, ‘supporting international terrorism’ and reopened diplomatic relations with Iraq in December 1984 (16). From December 1984 the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad provided the Iraqi Military much needed military intelligence (16). Conversely, U.S. relations with Israel were especially hurt after the Israeli Air Force’s raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor on June 7, 1981(17). The raid resulted in the delaying of a shipment of American aircraft to Israel that had already been authorized, as well the U.S. voting for a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel (17).

Conclusion

The American government supported Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Many historians believe that the American government did this as a means of inflicting a “Vietnam” on the Soviet Union. The decision to send weapons to the rebels defeated the Soviet Union but created a breeding ground for terrorists in Afghanistan. The decision also made Iran more dangerous to American national security. The U.S. decision to support the Mujahideen was one of a series of foreign policy disasters during the Carter and Reagan years. Support for the rebels was an egregious and ill-advised decision by the American government. 

Now, you can read some World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, and “The Navajo Code from World War Two: Was it Unbreakable?” here.

[1] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 42. 

[2] Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2012. 13. 

[3] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 50-51. 

6 Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: New York. Harper Perennial. 2009. 210. 

[4] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 40. 

[5] Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001.  New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 58-59.

11 Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979 -89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing, Ltd. 2012. 49. 

14 Normann, Michael. MIL Mi-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 176. 

7 Normann, Michael. MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 178-179.

8 Normann, Michael . MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 152-153. 

9 Normann, Michael. MIL  MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present: Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 28. 

10 Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2012. 30. 

12 Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 11. 

13 Normann, Michael. MIL MI-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present:Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 179-181. 

15 Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004. 336- 337. 

16 Karsh, Efraim. Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2002. 43-44. 

17 Operation Opera-Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed on January 31st, 2021. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-oprea-raid-on-iraqi-nuclear-reactor

References

Barnes-Freemont, Gregory. Essential Histories: Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing, Ltd. 2012.

Coll, Steve. GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001. New York: New York. Penguin Press. 2004.

Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: New York. Harper Perennial, 2009. 

Karsh, Efraim. Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2002. 

Normann, Michael. MIL Mi-24 Attack Helicopter: In Soviet/Russian and Worldwide Service: 1972 to the Present. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2019. 

“Operation Opera-Raid on Iraqi Reactor”. Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed on January 31st, 2021. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-opera-raid-on-iraqi-nuclear-reactor. 

Cold War History Series - Episode 9 - Renewed Cold War

The Renewed Cold War, episode 9 in itshistorypodcasts.com’s Cold War series is here..

The episode looks at how relations between the super-powers fell to levels not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Following growing tensions in the late 1970s, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. This led to a large increase in US defense spending from US President Carter. But this wasn’t enough for many in the US, and a much more aggressive US-government led by Ronald Reagan came in to power. The consequences were a world where fear once again dominated people’s thinking.

Enjoy the podcast!

George Levrier-Jones

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