US Anti-Imperialism in the Middle East: The Suez Crisis

Do you know about the time that the USA went against Israel and the Western powers in the Middle East? Here, Andrew Patterson tells us about the 1956 Suez Crisis, when the US did not support Britain, France, and Israel’s ambitions against Egypt.

A picture of Egyptian military vehicles that have been damaged in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Suez Canal Crisis was like a high-stakes poker game of global power. Imagine Egypt’s leader, Nasser, suddenly nationalizing the Suez Canal, basically a lifeline for world trade. This move freaks out London and Paris, sparking a secret buddy-up with Israel to snatch it back. Then struts in the USA, led by Eisenhower, looking to shake up the global power playlist. It was a showdown that not only reshaped the Middle East’s role in the Cold War but also turned the US into the surprise superhero for Egypt against the old-world colonial vibe. Diving into the Suez Crisis, we see the US playing the role of an unlikely hero, championing Egypt in the epic struggle to shake off colonial chains.

The Suez Canal’s a big deal—key for shipping oil and goods, and in the 1950s a colonial chess piece for way too long. Enter Egypt's bold move to nationalize it. This wasn't just about owning a canal; it was Egypt shouting from the rooftops that they were done being a pawn in the global game of thrones.

During the Cold War's peak, with the world split between capitalism and communism, the U.S. hit a fork in the road. Under Eisenhower, America ditched its old gunboat diplomacy for a surprising new look: anti-imperialism. Suddenly, the U.S. started sounding like it was rooting for the underdog, aligning its playbook with nations tired of colonial hangovers. It was a game-changer, showing the world that the U.S. was ready to mix things up and support countries carving out their own destinies.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Eisenhower's foreign policy was like walking a tightrope—with the U.S. juggling the need to curb Soviet spread while ditching the old-school, imperialist tactics of its European buddies. The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 was his way of saying, "We've got your back" to Middle Eastern countries fighting off communism, but the Suez Crisis was the real litmus test, pushing the U.S. to flex its anti-imperialist muscles sooner.

In 1956 Egypt's President Nasser Declaring the canal as Egypt’s own was a game-changing moment, throwing down the gauntlet against old colonial shadows and ushering in a fresh chapter of independence and self-rule.

Old Powers Collude

Britain, France, and Israel didn't waste any time cooking up a military response. Their plan? Israel would kick off an invasion, with British and French troops jumping in under the guise of keeping the canal open. But let's be real, their eyes were on the bigger prize: knocking Nasser off his pedestal and taking back the canal. This move was straight out of the old colonial playbook—an attempt to turn back the clock to a time when gunboat diplomacy and empire-building were the order of the day.

When Britain, France, and Israel moved on Egypt, the U.S. threw a curveball by condemning the invasion, stunning its usual pals. This was a loud and clear signal from America: the days of imperialist playbooks were done. Eisenhower and crew, sticking to their anti-imperialist guns, viewed the invasion as a potential spark for a much larger fire, possibly drawing the Soviet Union into a broader conflict that could destabilize the Cold War's delicate balance.

New Boss New Rules

Breaking with tradition, the U.S. stood firm against old friends Britain and France, plus Israel, over their joint military move. Eisenhower didn't just talk a big game; he backed it up with the threat of economic sanctions against Britain, who at the time was pretty much banking on U.S. financial aid.

In this era, the U.S. didn't just stand by; it dove into some serious diplomacy to stop the fighting. By defending Egypt's right to manage the Suez Canal, the U.S. was basically broadcasting a new rulebook to the world: national sovereignty was in, and old-school colonial aggression was out. This stance was a global announcement, especially aimed at the Soviet Union, that the U.S. had zero patience for imperialist antics, even from its best buddies.

The U.S. used the United Nations as a stage to rally global opinion. By advocating for a resolution that demanded a ceasefire and the retreat of the invaders, America emerged as a peacemaker, pushing for diplomacy over force. This move not only boosted the U.S.'s rep as a champion of international law and the UN but also showed it as a superpower ready to back smaller nations against colonial leftovers.

The crisis ended with Britain and France yielding to the pressure, mainly from the U.S., and pulling out their troops—a win for Egypt and a face-palm moment for the European duo. The landscape of global politics was forever altered. This wasn't just about who controlled a crucial waterway; it was a turning point, signaling the end of European colonial clout and the beginning of an era dominated by U.S. influence. The retreat of British and French troops, nudged along by the U.S., waved goodbye to the age of empires stretching their borders too far.

The U.S. walked away taller, having stuck to its guns on national sovereignty and a clear no to go-it-alone military moves—a big leap from the days of showing force first and asking questions later. Emerging with a reputation for valuing sovereignty and shunning solo military ventures, the U.S. marked a departure from centuries of Western might-makes-right tactics. For Egypt and Nasser, it was a clear win, boosting Nasser's standing as an anti-colonial hero and igniting nationalist passions beyond the Middle East.

The crisis also reshaped global power balances, underscoring the dwindling might of Britain and France while spotlighting the Middle East as a self-determining region, increasingly important on the world stage, often with superpower support or interference. Reflecting on the Suez Crisis, we're reminded of diplomacy's value, the importance of supporting the underdog, and the dynamic forces that mold our world. It's a narrative of transformation, confrontation, and hope for a fairer international community.

Andrew Patterson is an amateur history enthusiast who writes for https://easternchronicles.me/ , a website dedicated to Middle Eastern history, Travel writing & archeology.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 – How did it affect the Jewish and other Mutamassirun Populations of Egypt?

The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a watershed moment in the history of the post-colonial world. The effects of the ill-fated military plan devised in secret between the forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, to invade and retake the Suez Canal following an invasion by Egyptian forces, would be felt much further than merely on Egyptian soil. Indeed, it is often cited as the event which ended European - and more accurately British - hegemony in international relations. From the Suez Crisis onwards, the United States would almost invariably take the lead in conducting large-scale military operations across the world.

However, the effect that the Crisis had within Egypt itself is less well documented. Here, Conor Keegan gives a brief explanation of the measures taken by Nasser immediately post-1956 to remove the mutamassirun community, with a specific focus on the effects of these policies on the Jewish population of Egypt.

General Nasser (center of picture with hand in the air), Alexandria, Egypt, 1954.

The Mutamassirun

The Suez Crisis, aside from producing an understandable rise in support for President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his regime, had devastating effects for persons living within Egypt who had become ‘egyptianized’ i.e. those who were not Egyptian citizens; or those whose ancestry was not wholly Egyptian, but had attained Egyptian citizenship through various legal statutes.

These people were collectively known as the mutamassirun, and, in the immediate post-colonial period in Egypt (from 1922 onwards) they owned a large share of capital and operated a large number of businesses in Egypt. They were also acknowledged to have made significant contributions to Egyptian cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in the past. Although measures to expel members of the mutamassirun were already underway before the Suez Crisis came to a head, the Crisis is widely seen as giving Nasser the necessary impetus and legitimacy to proceed to make it extremely difficult for ‘egyptianized’ persons to remain in Egypt.

It was a natural step for Nasser to seek to blame the Suez Crisis on the mutamassirun population. After all, Nasser had risen to power on an avowedly pan-Arab, anti-colonial message. As Britain had directly ruled Egypt from the late nineteenth century until 1922, and France had previously invaded under Napoleon in 1798, the mutamassirun were easy targets for blame post-Crisis Egypt, as many were of British or French nationality or extraction. There was also a sizeable population of Jews living in Egypt around the turn of the twentieth century. As the pre-Crisis period coincided with an increasingly confident and assertive Zionist movement, leading up to the creation of Israel in 1948, which led to great discomfort across Arab states, the Crisis only provided Nasser with a further reason to expel large numbers of the Egyptian Jewish population in its aftermath.

Impact on the Jewish Population

For the Jews specifically (including those Jews who also happened to be British or French citizens), Nasser’s policy of removal post-1956 was carried out in two ways: expulsion and ‘voluntary’ emigration. With regard to expulsion, the Egyptian government was able to make the number of Jews removed from Egypt seem much lower than the actual number by statistical sleight of hand: the estimate that at least 500 Egyptian and stateless Jews were expelled from Egypt by November 1956 does not include the expulsion of those Jews that were French or British citizens, nor does it include any member of a family who was not deemed by the Egyptian authorities to have been the ‘head of a family’, but who nonetheless had to leave Egypt along with the head of their family.

Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities used more informal (and ‘voluntary’) methods to expel Jews, which proved to be effective. These measures included widespread intimidation, economic coercion and ‘voluntary’ declarations made by those Jews who were Egyptian citizens renouncing their citizenship. When these methods are included, it is estimated that by the end of June 1957 between 23,000 and 25,000 of Egypt’s 45,000 Jews had left the country.

Making Citizenship Harder to Obtain

In additional to expulsions, the Egyptian government also actively set about depriving the mutamassirun in general of citizenship in the aftermath of the Crisis. In November 1956, Egyptian citizenship law was amended so that only persons who were resident on the territory of Egypt on January 1, 1900, and who had maintained their residence in Egypt from that date to the coming into force of the amendment on November 22, 1956, were entitled to Egyptian citizenship. Therefore, by virtue of this provision, it was a relatively uncomplicated task for the Egyptian government to retroactively deprive the mutamassirun in general of Egyptian citizenship. This policy was only made easier for the Egyptian government to enforce due to the fact that most mutamassirun did not possess official papers of any kind which proved their continuous residence in Egypt between the relevant dates.

The amended law was even clearer when it came to providing for Jewish citizens of Egypt: the amendment clearly provides that citizenship should not be given to ‘Zionists’. Therefore, while the attempt to make uncertain the position of the general mutamassirun population after 1956 was arguably camouflaged by somewhat confusing references to continuous residence in Egypt between two specific dates, the provisions of the legislation left no room for doubt that the Jewish population was prioritized by Nasser’s government when it came to identifying groups from whom they would seek to withdraw rights and privileges.

Therefore, it can be seen that President Nasser and his government used various legal, procedural, formal and informal measures to effectively expel and exclude the mutamassirun from Egyptian society, territory and nationality. While measures excluding this much-maligned group were not unusual in the broad expanse of Egyptian history, the measures enacted after the Suez Crisis of 1956 were more intense and more in the vein of ostracization (as opposed to discrimination) than any previous measures. Therefore, even though the Suez Crisis had far-reaching and important effects across the world, the Crisis also had drastic consequences for ‘egyptianized’ foreigners in Egypt, and most acutely affected the Jewish population.

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Sources

Gorman, Anthony, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the Nation 2003 Routledge Curzon

Harper, Paul, The Suez Crisis 1986 Wayland

Kazamias, Alexander, ‘The Purge of the Greeks from Nasserite Egypt’ 2009 Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 35(2) 13-34

Laskier, Michael M, ‘Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime 1956-70’ 1995 Middle Eastern Studies 31(3) 573-619