The Korean War (1950-53) pitted the capitalist South Korea, backed by the U.S., against communist North Korea. A major offensive by South Korea ultimately led to Communist China becoming involved in the war.

Here, Victor Gamma considers how failures in the U.S. understanding of China’s intentions and over-confidence that China would not intervene led to the U.S. backed forces moving ever closer to China and the eventual Chinese counter-attack.

If you missed it, part 1 on how the U.S. backed forces moving very close to the Chinese border is here.

U.S. soldiers with a tank make their way through the streets of Hyesanjin in November 1950.

“Home for Christmas”

UN forces continued their advance into North Korea, Pyongyang falling to South Korean troops on October 20. MacArthur quickly ordered his forces to continue their advance toward the border with China. The Eighth Army under General Walker advanced along the West Coast and the X Corp moved up the eastern side of the peninsula. The Chinese watched this advance warily. They decided that the UN's goal was now to invade China and overthrow the communist government. For his part, MacArthur demonstrated his complete disregard of Chinese capacity to disrupt his plans by neglecting basic rules of military science. He allowed his forces to become divided and advance toward a potentially significantly larger enemy army. The Chinese, in fact, had up to 500,000 troops massed in Manchuria. The potential enemy was close to his base of supplies, while his own men had now outrun their own. In addition, the Eighth Army and X Corps were divided by a thirty-mile gap of extremely hilly terrain that made communications by phone impossible. Despite this, MacArthur urged his men forward until some units began to reach the Yalu River. The Chinese commander, General Lin Piao, now gathered his strength and waited for the UN forces to come within striking distance. In late October, 1950, the Chinese launched a series of probing attacks to gauge enemy strengths and reactions. The positive results convinced the Chinese that they could be successful in a major offensive. They withdrew their forces, giving the illusion of a retreat. American commanders accepted this as a fact, noting the drubbing the 7th Regiment gave to the Chinese and assumed they were in headlong retreat back to China. The reduction of fighting convinced many that the war was over. The misgivings of General Walker, commander of the Eighth Army concerning the supply situation, which was becoming critically short of needs for his widely scattered forces, were ignored.

Also reflecting the lack of concern over the Chinese, the contingency plans of the UN failed to follow sound principles of military intelligence. The enemy's capabilities, not his possible or probable intentions, are supposed to form the basis for contingency plans. By the time the Chinese had begun to infiltrate troops into North Korea to begin their First Phase Offensive, the United States-dominated UN command decided that if the Chinese had wanted to intervene, they would have done so earlier. By the time UN forces approached the Yalu River, it was held that the Chinese had missed their chance. The monitoring for possible Chinese intervention was therefore reduced. The capability of the Chinese to intervene was not considered. The massive buildup in Manchuria and the infiltration into North Korea was mostly missed by intelligence. In late October the first clashes with Chinese units occurred. However, this did not result in a major revision of contingency plans.Increasing reports of a Chinese buildup were spurned by senior intelligence and higher level commanders. American generals were focused on the Yalu River and ending the war. They did not want to consider the possibility of a protracted conflict. On November 24 MacArthur visited the front and repeated his promise that the troops would be home for Christmas once they reached the Yalu. Coupled with this massive failure of intelligence were the considerable abilities of the Chinese to remain unobserved. The Chinese secretly infiltrated divisions into the barren wastes of North Korea to the tune of 100,000, undetected by the UN forces. This success owed much not merely to American intelligence failings but Chinese skill at concealing their movements. Chinese troops had been trained to avoid any movement at the sight of enemy aircraft. They moved mostly at night. They moved mostly by foot. Since they did not use motorized vehicles on a large-scale, they were harder to spot. In contrast, UN units raised huge clouds of dust with even one vehicle as they moved along the unpaved roads of Korea.

The End Result

For the location of the attack, the Chinese wisely chose an area that would reduce the technical superiority of UN forces: the rugged terrain between the divided UN forces. The Eighth Army and X Corps should have been linked in a strong defensive line, but MacArthur deemed such a plan overly cautious. Additionally, the Supreme Commander believed that this terrain was too rugged for military operations. The battle was fought in a terrain that made communications and operations difficult. Ch'ongch'on River valley features a landscape so hilly that a mechanized army was effectively hindered in its movements. Thus, the UN superiority in equipment was largely overcome. The lack of flat places made setting up command posts or medical stations difficult or impossible. The endless hills also blocked vision and hearing. It became almost impossible for units to effectively support one another. Units often fought in isolation. UN forces also had not been trained to cope with harsh winter conditions. Many made the mistake of crossing streams or rivers in their pants. As a result some units had to have their clothing cut off because it had frozen solid.

The UN forces began to encounter Chinese tactics as they neared the Yalu River. The Chinese tactics were the result of the conditions in China. They were hopelessly outgunned by UN forces, lacking equipment both in quality and quantity. Many Chinese soldiers attacked without a firearm and were expected to obtain captured or abandoned equipment from the enemy. Some even fought with spears improvised from enemy vehicles. However, they made up for these deficiencies with a number of devices. First and foremost, the Chinese took full advantage of their enormous reserves of manpower. They favored attacks by masses of men who rushed a smaller enemy unit from all sides. The Chinese 'human wave' was a reflection of manpower strength and a disregard for human life the UN forces found shocking.

On November 24 MacArthur ordered a general offensive toward the Yalu River of his already tired and battered forces. In defiance of President Truman's specific orders, American units were ordered to advance along with Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. Forward units of the Eighth Army, including the American Second Division, began crossing the Ch'ongch'on River on the morning of November 24th. Due to the difficult terrain and probable overconfidence, they left most of their supplies south of the River including extra grenades and overcoats. On November 25-26 the Chinese attacked along the entire Korean front. As a part of a larger Chinese operation termed the Second Phase Campaign Western Sector, the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) 40th Army attacked across the Ch'ongch'on. These forces were reconstituted to avoid official war with the United States - officially, they were “volunteers” helping the North Koreans. At this time the Eighth Army was not in a good defensive posture. The advance units attacked by the Chinese were strung out. The ROK division on the right flank of the Eighth Army disintegrated and was now in danger of envelopment. A halt order was given to the Eighth Army but a panicked retreat soon developed. Despite this, the Eighth Army command continued to underestimate the seriousness of the situation and so failed to take effective counter measures such as ordering retreating troops to strategic points. Air attacks against the Chinese took a huge toll but did not stop the retreat. On November 27, the U.S. divisions retreated south of the Ch'ongch'on River and ultimately south of the 38th Parallel.

Long-term consequences

The battle permanently ended hopes for an early victory to the Korean conflict. A conflict limited to the Korean Peninsula now involved the world's most populous nation, threatening to explode into global war. Politically the battle led to the abandonment of United Nations efforts to achieve a unified Korea and a subsequent proposal to continue the division of the peninsula along the 38th Parallel to the Chinese by December 11. Had UN forces been expecting a large-scale Chinese attack and had the officials in charge taken measures to prepare for it, the battle either would not have occurred or at least the magnitude of the disaster could have been reduced. Possibly, the on-going difficulties with the North Korean regime would not exist. Nor would the presence of so many U.S. forces be necessary.

In retrospect, senior U.S. military and political leaders often failed in their ability to evaluate and act on quality intelligence. A soldier is often only as good as his commanding officers. The men closest to the action, including field commanders such as General Walker of the Eighth Army and General Almond of X Corps and their troops, had a much more accurate view of the situation, but their repeated warnings were dismissed. The same condition existed in intelligence with excellent information being interpreted as a bluff or simply ignored.

Now, you can also read Victor’s article on Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon here.

Finally, why do you think many in the U.S. did not think China would join the Korean War? Let us know below.

References

Aid, Matthew. The Secret Sentry, the Untold History of the National Security Agency. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009.

Alexander, Bevin R. Korea: The First War We Lost. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1986.

Bacharach, Deborah. The Korean War. San Diego: Lucent Books, 1991.

Conway, John Richard. Primary Source Accounts of the Korean War. Berkeley Heights: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 2006.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963.

Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New York: Hyperion, 2007.

Halberstam, David. The Fifties. New York: Fawcett Books, 1993.

Hammel. Eric Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press. 2018.

Harry S. Truman, ed. by Laura K. Egendorf. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2002.

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Hammel, Eric. Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press,1981.

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command. McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1997.

Litai, John and Xue . Uncertain Partners, (Stanford University Press), 1995.

Paul Lashmar, New Statesman & Society; 2/2/96, Vol.9 Issue 388, p24, 2p, 1bw

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Year of Decisions. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955.

Truman, Margaret, editor. Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private writings of Harry S. Truman. New York: Warner Books, 1989.

"Analysis:The Foreign Interventions:Stalin and USSR" www.mtholyoke.edu/~park25h/classweb/worldpolitics/analysisstalin.html‎)

PostedJuly 14, 2020

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, Blog Post

TagsKorean War, US Army Korean War, China Korean War, The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River

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You can also read Victor’s article on Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon here.

Fighting with the 2nd Inf. Div. north of the Chongchon River, Sfc. Major Cleveland, weapons squad leader, points out an enemy position to his machine gun crew. November 20,1950.

Seventy years ago, on June 25, 1950 the Cold War turned hot when North Korean forces launched a surprise attack across the 38th Parallel. The communist attempt to violently take-over the entire peninsula was thwarted by the firm U.S. response and General Douglas MacArthur's brilliant counterattack at Inchon that September. Now it was the turn of the U.S.-led UN and South Korean forces to attempt the unification of the Korean Peninsula on their terms. UN forces moved towards the Yalu River and victory seemed within sight. This objective, however, was shattered when massive, skillfully handled attacks by Chinese forces beginning on November 25 caused a disastrous defeat for UN forces, including the longest retreat in U.S. military history. The attacks on what the Chinese called the Western Sector came to be called the battles of the Ch'ongch'on River. These were among the most decisive in the post-World War Two era. How could the world’s premier superpower be taken by surprise? How could the nation with arguably the best intelligence-gathering capacity in the world be completely fooled? The answer is complex. It includes persistent miscalculations from the American military and political leadership, preconceived assumptions regarding communist China, ignorance regarding local conditions and China's interests, the refusal of American officials to deal with the Communist Chinese or to take their government seriously, and the on-going failure to correctly interpret intelligence.

Mistrust and Misunderstanding

Part of the problem can be traced to the atmosphere of heightened tension and suspicion that existed between East and West. This suspicion led to a breakdown in communications and effectively clouded understanding. The West viewed the communist world in a monolithic sense. The bickering between China and the Soviets was unknown to Western decision-makers. The Korean attack was viewed as an attempt by Russia to gain advantage and it was to the Russians the United Nations had to resist. The West's suspicions are understandable; had not Kim Il-Sung been an officer in the Red Army? Hadn't the Soviets accumulated a track record of forcing 'friendly' regimes on every state that came under their dominance? Hadn't the Red Army left behind a hardline communist state devoid of free elections in North Korea? However, documents declassified in 1992 fail to support the contention that Kim Il-Sung was merely a puppet acting under Stalin's orders. In contrast, the post-Cold War research revealed that although Stalin ultimately gave his approval and was willing to aid Kim, he was not the initiator of it. Valentin Pak, Kim's translator who read Stalin's communications to Kim, stated emphatically that Stalin did not encourage an attack on the South.

Dr. Katherine Weathersby examined declassified Soviet documents and affirmed that Stalin thought it unwise to initiate hostilities in Korea. This knowledge was unknown to U.S. policy-makers because American intelligence failed utterly to investigate the nature of the Soviet-Korean relationship. The reasons for Stalin's final go-ahead to Kim are still unclear. Whatever he may have hoped to gain by a communist victory, his contribution to the effort was relatively meager and he did not want to associate himself too closely with it. U.S. intelligence failed completely to investigate the relationship between the Soviets and Kim. Instead, the Americans went into the conflict viewing Kim as a Soviet proxy.

At first, China did not appear strongly concerned. The Chinese had several motives for intervening in Korea. First, they were alarmed by the rise of anti-communist sentiment in the West and thought the UN advance toward Manchuria was a military expression of this. North Korea was also deemed vital to the Chinese leadership, which had plans for large-scale industrial growth. Hydroelectric resources in North Korea were deemed essential to these plans. U.S. officials failed to grasp these local conditions and took little interest in Korea beyond the view of Korea as merely one more piece in the massive chess game against Soviet expansionism.

But rather than conduct talks with the Chinese, the animosity and mistrust that characterized East-West relations not only thoroughly poisoned any attempt at accommodation but effectively disrupted clear interpretations of Chinese or Soviet intentions. Throughout the period before open Chinese intervention (June 25 - November 25, 1950), communication between China and the West was hampered by the fact that there were no formal relations with Communist China. Any knowledge about Chinese intentions had to be gathered from reading the cables of foreign ambassadors stationed in China or by Signal Intelligence (SIGIN). The Armed Forces Security Administration (AFSA) had the responsibility for intelligence gathering. Information collected would then be passed on to the appropriate officials for evaluation. These leaders would then act on the information accordingly. There was sufficient intelligence during the summer and autumn of 1950 to alert Western officials that China had a vital interest in Korea and would back up their interests with force. China had communicated its approval of a pro-Western regime in Korea if it did not involve direct Western intervention and if it occurred at the expense of the Russians. This communication was ignored or misunderstood. Cable traffic to and from the office of the Indian Ambassador at Beijing, Dr. Kavalm Madhava Panikkar, was being read by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Dr. Panikkar was probably the most well informed diplomat in Beijing and had built good relations with high-ranking Chinese officials. He was thus a quite valuable source of information regarding Chinese diplomacy. In July and August 1950, cables revealed that Panikkar had been informed that China would not intervene in Korea. However, decrypted cables began to reveal a dramatic change following the Inchon landing and the turn of the tide against North Korea. For example, the cables of the Burmese ambassador now revealed that China intended to intervene militarily. A week later, on September 25, Panikkar cabled New Delhi that China would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. This information was transmitted to Washington, where officials dismissed it due to Panikkar's supposed pro-Chinese sympathies. Less than a week later, on October 1, 1950, Mao Tse Tung publicly declared: "The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside if the imperialists wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor". Mao continued by warning that if non-Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the Chinese "will send troops to aid the People's Republic of Korea." That same day South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel. Accordingly, on the following day the Chinese Politburo made the decision to intervene in Korea. Mao Tse Tung ordered 260,000 troops to cross into Korea by October 15.

The Die is Cast

On October 2 the Indian ambassador was roused from sleep shortly after midnight and ordered to meet with Chou En-lai, China's premier and foreign minister. Chou informed the Indian Ambassador of China's intentions regarding Korea, which information was passed to the West on October 3. Additionally, the Dutch charge d' affaires also cabled The Hague quoting Chou en Lai's comments that China would fight if U.S. forces crossed the 38th Parallel. These warnings were dismissed in Washington as a bluff.

Meanwhile the first U.S. forces crossed the 38th Parallel on October 5 and advanced on Pyongyang. MacArthur had not been totally incognizant of the possibility of Chinese intervention. In fact, in the days and weeks following Inchon, he repeatedly inquired of his subordinates if any sign of Russians or Chinese had been noted. Since no reports of their presence were forthcoming, he assumed that the Soviets and Chinese had decided to withdraw at America's demonstration of will. The United Nations mandate of June 27 read in part; "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the areas." It was widely held that the only way to accomplish this objective was the complete removal of the Kim regime as a threat to the south by occupying the north and reunifying the entire peninsula.

Not everyone shared this sanguine hope, however. Several doubts about an advance into the north had been voiced. The Policy Planning Staff in Washington had also expressed grave doubts about the ability to invade the north without provoking a war with China. In addition, a National Security Council 81 report was circulated on September 1 emphasizing the risk involved but also pointed out the unlikeness of Soviet intervention. It recommended that only Republic of Korea (ROK) forces should cross the 38th Parallel.

MacArthur harbored no such doubts, though, and the advance continued with non-Korean forces in support. On October 15 Chinese General Pen Dehuai received the order from Mao Tse Tung to begin moving his forces across the Yalu River into Korea. That night, the 372 Regiment of the 42nd Army crossed into Korea. Before long, more than 300,000 Chinese troops moved into North Korea, completely undetected by AFSA. However, other warnings did occur. SIGINT observed changes in Soviet, Chinese and North Korean military activity, indicating some kind of major operation was impending. The CIA sent a top secret coded memo (still only partially declassified) to President Truman. The memo stated that intelligence sources indicated that the Chinese would intervene to protect their interests in the Suiho Hydroelectric complex in North Korea. The memo also noted an increase in fighter aircraft in Manchuria. On October 21 AFSA reported from Chinese radio traffic that no less than three Chinese armies had been deployed along the Yalu River and reported heavy troop train movement from Shanghai to Manchuria. All of this information was dismissed because it contradicted the dominant opinions of the U.S. intelligence community. For an example of this view, an article in The Review of the World Situation dated October 18, stated: "Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason that Peiping does not think that war with the U.S. would result from open intervention in Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not openly intervene in North Korea." In Tokyo, Lieutenant Colonel Morton Rubin went over the intelligence indicating Chinese intentions to intervene with General MacArthur and his intelligence chief General Charles Willoughby. Neither MacArthur nor Willoughby was convinced of the reality of the threat. In fact, the UN side also suffered from an atmosphere that discouraged healthy challenges to official decisions. Surrounding MacArthur, especially after Inchon, was an aura of infallibility that effectively wilted any suggestions for greater vigilance against possible Chinese action. In this atmosphere, the disregarding of the Chinese threat became the “party line” and a healthy exchange of views was discouraged. Matthew Ridgway, who was soon to replace MacArthur, added: "the great fault over there was poor evaluation of the intelligence that was obtained. They knew the facts but they were poorly evaluated. I don't know just why this was. It was probably in good part because of MacArthur's personality. If he did not want to believe something, he wouldn't."

Now, read part 2 on how the U.S. backed forces moved ever closer to China and the eventual Chinese counter-attack here.

Why do you think many in the U.S. did not think China would join the Korean War? Let us know below.

Sources