Was George B McClellan the Most Underrated General of the U.S. Civil War?

Here Jeb Smith argues that General George B. McClellan was the most underrated army commander of the Civil War. While he does not consider him to be a great general or military genius, he thinks the common portrayal of him as a terrible commander is unjust. No other Northern general, people say, exemplifies the stereotype of an incompetent and timid leader as McClellan does. The author argues that this is an unwarranted perception.

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan in the general's tent during the Battle of Antietam on October 3, 1862.

“No other general in the war commanded more respect and admiration from his men than George McClellan.”

-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign

“Remember that your only foes are the armed traitors,–and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided” and later “Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies,–that you are here to protect, not to destroy.”

-George B McClellan May 26 1861 and June 25 1861

Northern Democrats did not see the South as the spawn of Satan but rather as fellow Americans who, in fact, had produced most of the Union leaders up to that point. General McClellan, a Democrat, held tolerant views of the South and sought to avoid needless bloodshed. These perspectives stand in contrast to those of many modern historians and the Republicans of the time, who shaped the narrative to justify the massacres that would follow, as well as the total warfare of 1864 and 1865.

West Virginia and Promotion

“Harley six weeks had elapsed... and in that time he had actually created an army and began the first campaign.”

-George b McClellan Commanding General U.S army May 26 1861

George B. McClellan, nicknamed “Young Napoleon” or “Little Mac,” graduated second in his class of 59 at the U.S. Military Academy in 1846. His class included 20 future full-rank generals, and he later returned to West Point as an instructor.

After the war began, he excelled at organizing militia from three states into a cohesive fighting force and saw his first action as a commander of Union forces in what is now West Virginia. This was a departure from his later reputation as a slow-moving, timid general. During a successful campaign in the mountainous region he launched aggressive attacks, dislodged Confederate forces, and captured key positions. He forced the retreat of Confederate troops fortified in the mountain terrain, all while taking minimal losses and securing large supply bases and many prisoners. This success helped preserve the future West Virginia for the Union and prevented the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. President Lincoln was very impressed, which led to McClellan’s appointment to replace McDowell after the latter’s defeat in the Battle of First Manassas[1], and later as the commander of all Union forces.

Organization of the Army of the Potomac

“In a very real sense, McClellan rescued the Union in these early days from dependency and fear. Someone had to rebuild the army and show the country that there was great hope for the future.”

-S.C. Gwynne Rebel Yell: The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014

The nonmilitary press and President Abraham Lincoln, who was pressured for political reasons, wanted quick action and a fast end to the war. Part of what fueled this was the North's inability (even after First Manassas) to see how determined the South was. They thought this would be a quick, easy conflict. They underestimated the South's resolve to fight and ability to wage war. So, while the press and Lincoln called on Mac for fast action, as a military man Mac understood that the demoralized citizen army needed discipline, training, and organization. He provided these, got rid of poorly-performing generals and instilled spirit and pride in the soldiers while increasing their morale. He came to be loved and revered by his men.

One thing even those who are critical of him admit is that he was a first-rate organizer of the army. Mac took a defeated militia force and turned it into a professional army.

“McClellan had started with…a collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and un-instructed men, who were, as a rule, much demoralized by defeat and ready to run at the first shot. He ended with the finest army ever seen on the North American continent.”

-James V. Murfin Battlefields of the Civil War

Had the North attacked before they were ready, as Lincoln and the press called for, the result would likely have been further defeats and a shattering blow to national morale. As General Sherman stated, Napoléon took three years to build an army, yet “here it's expected in ninety days, and Bull Run is the consequence.”

Mac's offensive plan, as called for by many in the North, was to mass a large army, some said up to 200,000, to march on Richmond and end the war. The Northern people wanted no mistakes after First Manassas. This was Mac's general plan; one that would take time and preparation. Mac also constructed large fortifications around D.C., which had been left almost entirely unguarded by McDowell, including 48 forts and 480 guns. Given that Mac had to train, organize, recruit, and supply a massive citizen army and transform it into a world-class professional army, the time he took to do so was entirely reasonable.

“When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.”

-George B. McClellan 1861

Further, Mac was commander of all armies and planned for a simultaneous synchronized attack across the Confederacy, which would take further time to plan and put in motion. On August 4th, 1861, in a letter to Lincoln, he laid out his plan that included the main attack to be against Richmond but also simultaneously pushing into Missouri and down the Mississippi, and after Kentucky joined the Union to push into Tennessee, seizing Nashville, and also begin capturing coastal cities such as New Orleans, Savannah and Mobile, then move on to Montgomery and Pensacola. Mac wanted one massive assault to wipe out the South and not a prolonged war; this would take time to prepare. In February 1862 he wrote to Secretary of War Stanton, saying “I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves and then seeking for the most decisive results; – I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.” He did not want years of bloodshed to wear down the South, but brief, decisive action to end the war quickly.

Demotion by Lincoln

Just when Mac felt his army was ready, winter had started in, and Mac was bedridden for three weeks around Christmas. Lincoln wanted action now despite the impassable roads (he would not demand Grant move this early in ‘64) and Mac was accused of being timid. This offensive action was attempted in the winter of ‘62 by Burnside, and the results were Fredericksburg and the “mud march,” which ended in Burnside's removal. Grant, in ‘64, would start his spring offensive in April, later than Mac would his Peninsula campaign. As Grant said, the roads in Virginia would not allow large movements of troops before then, leading William Swinton in Campaigns of the Army of the Potomacto write, “It was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation’s ignorance of war.”

So Mac started at the average time for spring offensives. No other Union army was campaigning during this winter. Yet, because of Lincoln's urgency and what he saw as a too-cautious McClellan, he demoted Mac to simply commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln also forced corps commanders he had chosen on the Army of the Potomac. Mac wanted to wait to promote generals until he had seen them in battle. This was not the last time a politician interfered with Mac's plans.

Peninsula Campaign Begins

“Reduced my force by 1/3, after (bless and do not curse) task had been assigned, its operations planned... it frustrated all my plans... it left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible.”

-George B McClellan

“Let me tell you that if your government had supported General McClellan in the field as it should have done, your war would have been ended two years sooner than it was.”

-- General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and one of the leading military experts of the 19th Century

The Peninsula Campaign began with McClellan's strategic plan for an amphibious operation. Leveraging the North's naval superiority to transport and supply his army, he ultimately aimed for Richmond. Mac anticipated having over 150,000 men for the campaign as he set out for the peninsula. However, once he landed, Lincoln would significantly reduce his army with the other troops spread around the valley, D.C., and the Manassas region.

Mac had wanted more men for the offensive, but Lincoln wanted him to hold men back to guard D.C. Lincoln forced Mac to leave McDowell’s I Corps in D.C. along with the garrison already available. Lincoln now had a garrison of around 20,000 in D.C. and up to 74,000 as far as N.Y. that could be shipped/railed/marched to D.C. if it were attacked. Plus, McClellan had set up world-class fortifications. McClellan, McDowell, Winfield Scott, and every corps commander believed this was more than enough men to guard D.C. and supported McClellan's plan to bring more men, but Lincoln would not allow it for fear of D.C. being attacked. Perhaps out of fear of Stonewall Jackson, it was Lincoln, not the general, who, in this instance, was being overly cautious. In Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan (1864), author George Stillman Hillard wrote, “From the moment the Army of the Potomac landed upon the Peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took possession of the minds of the President, the Cabinet, and the members of Congress.”

So Mac landed the army, which was slow-moving because it was massive and carried heavy siege equipment. He faced the largest army the South would field during the war, 88,000 (Grant faced 65,000 in ’64, with a more significant force under him than Mac enjoyed). Once his army landed, he was notified that Stanton had closed all the recruiting depots in the Union. His army would now have to do without either replacements or reinforcements during a major campaign.

This was a massive shock to Mac and the generals in the army. He then was told that McDowell's 40,000 men near Manassas could not be used but must help defend against any possible action towards D.C., despite the fact that Confederates showed no signs of attacking and even burned the bridges south of Manassas as they retreated to defend Richmond. McDowell told McClellan this decision (McDowell protested it) was “Intended [as] a blow to you.” Then McClellan was told the garrison of 10,000 men at Fort Monroe would also be withheld. Even critics of McClellan, like General Heintzelman, said it was a “great outrage” to withhold his army from his command. General Wells said it was the Radical Republicans trying to get Mac to resign. Harper’s Weekly stated, “It is impossible to exaggerate the mischief which has been done by division of counsels and civilian interference with military movements.” Once more, Mac was aggressive, Lincoln and the politicians conservative.

“In General McClellan’s opinion, the way to defend Washington was to attack Richmond; and the greater the force thrown against the rebel capital, the greater the security of our own.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864

Mac was now forced to revise his plans because of Lincoln's caution. In the revised plan, McDowell would advance on Richmond from the north with his 40,000 men and better protect against an attack by Confederate General Joe Johnston if he went north to Washington. However, as Mac argued, the attack on Richmond would force the Confederate army to defend their capital rather than launch a desperate attack on D.C. This disagreement delayed the start of the campaign, with Lincoln getting his way.

“Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended.”

-- Allan Pinkerton, chief of the Union Intelligence Service, 1861-1862

Yorktown

Mac moved up the peninsula towards Richmond and was promised McDowell’s men if D.C was free of threat. His army's first encounter was with Confederate General John Magruder and a small Confederate force at Yorktown. Magruder skillfully deceived Mac into believing his force was larger than it actually was. He accomplished this by repositioning the same troops in various locations, acting aggressively, continuously moving small units, using ammunition freely, and setting up dummy defensive positions. This convinced Mac that the Confederate force was more significant than it truly was, prompting him to settle in for a siege while he awaited the arrival of his heavy artillery. Mac was concerned that his inexperienced troops might fail in an assault during the first battle of the campaign, which could damage their morale. Mac eventually captured Yorktown and 80 heavy guns without losses, but the delay gave the Confederates time to organize troops to defend Richmond.

Advance on Richmond

Mac then started to push toward Richmond, and the Confederates gave way. The Union army captured both supply and ordnance during this advance. Mac is criticized for slow movement with a smaller Confederate force in front of him, yet he relied upon his friend and “expert” spy Alan Pinkerton, founder of the Pinkerton Detective Agency. Whatever the value of Pinkerton’s other information, one area in which he failed was in accurately assessing enemy troop numbers. He gave Confederate force numbers from various agents as 160,000, 123,000, 180,000, and even 200,000 in Richmond. And on August 6, Federal General Halleck gave estimates of 200,000 around Richmond. Some northern newspapers working independently gave even higher estimates than Mac did. Because of this, Mac actually believed he was outnumbered.

This was common during the war, with generals thinking the force opposing them was more extensive than it really was. Since this was his information, he believed he was not being cautious but aggressive and daring to continue the campaign, even if at a slow/careful pace. At the time, the enemy numbers were not certain. Mac also waited for his heavy siege artillery to come up from the back, as it was needed to attack Richmond's prominent forts at the Confederate capital.

But without a doubt, the advance was working. Richmond was preparing to evacuate. It forced the Confederates to scuttle the ironclad Virginia, which caused a loss of morale throughout the Confederacy. Confederate General Joe Johnston called General Ewell from Jackson to help in Richmond. McDowell was advancing unopposed north of Richmond. Mac had achieved better success than McDowell, Burnside, Hooker, or Meade advancing on Richmond.

“It was not until 1864 that another Union army, led by Grant, would get as close to Richmond as McClellan did in the spring of 1862.”

--Great Campaigns: The Peninsula Campaign David G. Martin Combined Books PA 1992

The next time the Federals would get this close was under their top general, U.S. Grant. They also fought against a weakened Southern army in ‘64 with a much larger Federal army.

But this time, three things saved Richmond and stopped Mac from capturing the Confederate capital and being hailed as a hero. All three had to happen to stop Mac; two of them were very unlikely and could not have been foreseen.

1] Jackson in the Valley

“The most significant contrast between the Virginia campaigns of Grant and McClellan is that Early's offensive did not accomplish its ultimate objective–to relieve the pressure on Lee's army at Petersburg, Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah valley did. Unlike McClellan before him, Grant would not be forced to alter his designs on the James River one iota.

-Thomas Rowland George B. McClellan and Civil War History

Unlike Lincoln, Mac saw Jackson's valley campaign as a diversion by Lee (now in command of the Southern Army) to pull federals away to help protect Richmond. Richmond was saved because of Jackson's brilliance in the valley. He outmaneuvered and outfought a force over three times the size of his own (17,000- 60,000), defeating them in multiple battles while also threatening D.C.

Jackson knew Lincoln was concerned with protecting D.C. Hence, he knew that aggressive maneuvers would pull men from the peninsula and help save Richmond. Jackson kept 71,000 additional men away from the Richmond attack with his victories and aggressive maneuvering. Lincoln was constantly scared by what Jackson might do, and this prevented McDowell and other troops from helping Mac; the withholding of McDowell would prove decisive.

2] Lincoln Recalling Troops to the Valley

“[It was] Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror it inspired in Washington, which was the true cause of the failure on the peninsula.”

-Colonel Ferdinand Lecomte, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Because of Jackson, Lincoln recalled troops to defend Washington and the valley. He also held back McDowell's 40,000 from the attack on Richmond. This “Changed the whole nature of the confrontation near Richmond,” and “The Confederacy was truly handed an amazing gift.” Mac would have rather left Jackson to clear out the valley and even attack D.C. if he wished. Mac had built massive forts with a large garrison to protect the capital.

“Here is the true defense of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James.”

-McClellan to Halleck August 4th, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

After Pinkerton reported a large number of enemy forces to McClellan, he paused his attack due to McDowell's absence. McDowell was supposed to launch an assault on Richmond from the north to prevent the Confederates from mounting counterattacks. McDowell described his recall to the valley as “a crushing blow to us.” Even Lincoln told McClellan, “If you believe you are not strong enough to take Richmond, just know that I do not ask you to try. Just know.”

3] Lee Replaces Joe Johnston

General Joe Johnston, the commanding Confederate general, was injured and replaced by Robert E. Lee. This would change the entire campaign. Mac had been slowly pushing Johnston back towards Richmond, but Lee would take the initiative and attack Mac.

Lee vs Mac

Lincoln’s maneuvers significantly reduced the Mac forces near Richmond attempting to trap Jackson in the valley. Heavy rains swelled the Chickahominy River and created a split the Potomac army, and Lee saw his opportunity.

Lee, whom many consider not only the premier general of the South but of the war, recalled Jackson from the valley to help in the offensive vs. Mac, now with a force nearly equal to his.

Lee would strike the smaller portion of Mac's army and threaten its supply line under General Porter. Porter was supposed to be supported by McDowell from the north to meet up with his flank coming south from Manassas. Had Mac's plan been allowed, the attack would not have been possible. However, when Lincoln sent McDowell to the valley to trap Jackson, Porter was vulnerable, and Lee pounced, enabling its strategic success.

“General McClellan wished and had advised that reinforcements should be sent him by water, as their arrival would be more certain. Now that the James River was open, they might have been sent by that route... Richmond could have been approached by the James, and we should have escaped the delays and losses incurred by the bridging of the Chickahominy, and should have had the army massed in one body instead of necessarily being divided by that stream... the capture of Richmond could not be carried out because to the president’s distempered fancy Washington was not safe... McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing to the north of Richmond, in order to establish the communication between himself and General McDowell. This was running a great risk in case General McDowell should not come, because it exposed our right in a way no prudent officer would have done; and, as General McDowell did not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lee attacked in multiple bloody battles, resulting in high losses on both sides. Mac would cause high casualties to Lee during the campaign, inflicting more losses than he received. However, Mac, going from “expert” information, believed he was outnumbered and was in danger of being cut off without help from the north. With Lincoln recalling so many of his troops, he ordered a retreat off the peninsula. Mac telegraphed D.C., stating, “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington...you have done your best to sacrifice this army.”

The retreat on the peninsula was dangerous, yet McClellan and Porter skillfully conducted it to save their forces from disaster. Mac would withdraw by night and defend a favorable position by day. It was a major strategic victory for the South yet a tactical victory for the Union. Lincoln called it a “half defeat.” Given the force size and causalities suffered, Mac performed better than the future Union commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

-Peninsula campaign stats

-Union Forces 105,000 Casualties 23,900 approx.

-Confederate Forces (inc. Jackson) 88,500 Casualties 29,600 app.

Antietam/Mac Takes Command

“I must have McClellan to reorganize this army and bring it out of chaos...there is no man in this army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he can.”

-Abraham Lincoln

“General McClellan has again assumed the supreme command of the army... His reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the most unbounded enthusiasm. In every camp his arrival was greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering... Already his... visit to our camps has wrought a remarkable change in the soldiers. His presence seemed to act magically upon them; despondency is replaced by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will, hereafter direct them.”

-Ellis’s Leaves from the Diary of an Army Surgeon, p. 214, quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln's selection of the aggressive Republican general John Pope to lead the army led to the embarrassment at Second Manassas. Pope was then exiled to Minnesota to fight Indians, and Lee turned his attention to an invasion of the North. Meanwhile, Mac had to reorganize Pope’s defeated, demoralized army that was integrated into his command and try to restore morale. Mac was reinstated in command of Pope's army and the Army of the Potomac on September 2nd.  The effect was immediate:

“The effect of the news was instantaneous. All of a sudden the federals forgot their defeat, weariness, and hunger and exploded into triumphant hurrahs, multitudes of caps were thrown in the air.”

-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign

Slow to Meet Lee?

A common criticism of McClellan during the Antietam campaign is that he was slow to move the army out to confront Lee's invasion, which allowed Lee to enter Maryland. Lee entered Maryland around September 4-7. Mac had just taken control of a disorganized, defeated army on the 2nd, and “worked a minor miracle in the next few days as he restored the army's morale and organization, and equally significant, its pride and sense of purpose.” No other man in the army could have restored morale and cohesion as quickly as Mac did before the Battle of Antietam. He had reorganized his army and marched to meet Lee by September 9th. Lee had expected a longer time for Mac to prepare, and his fast reaction spoiled Lee's plan to capture Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In his article Showdown on South Mountain historian Dennis Frye wrote, “Pennsylvania was Robert E Lee's target in September 1862. But Maryland and George McClellan got in the way.”

Mac had other reasons to be cautious. General Halleck advised General McClellan to be watchful regarding Washington, D.C., and to wait until General Lee's intentions were fully understood. Halleck believed that Lee was attempting to draw McClellan out, rather than planning a direct attack on D.C. Additionally, McClellan received continual reports from his cavalry regarding enemy troop strength, estimating between 60,000 and 120,000 soldiers. General Porter estimated Lee's army to be 100,000, while General Sumner's assessment was 130,000. This information was accepted by the Union high command, who believed that Lee must have been reinforced in preparation for an invasion.

Mac moved west, forcing Lee to fall back to link with Jackson from Harpers Ferry. Mac helped lead the attack at the Crampton’s Gap, Turner’s Gap and Fox's Gap battles—all victories. At Turner's Gap, CSA losses were 2,300 and USA losses 1,800, even though the attack was up a mountain and through rough terrain. On Sep 16th, Mac trapped Lee by a flank maneuver on Lee's left and captured the road to Hagerstown, forcing Lee's northern invasion to end. Frye wrote, “Lee saw his invasion crumbling. The most important matter now was not Pennsylvania, but preservation of the army.” Mac even took the unpredictable and aggressive General Stonewall Jackson off-guard, causing him to say “I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement puzzles me.”

The Battle of Antietam

The two armies met near Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17th. The “cautious” Mac would assault the Confederate lines, leading to the bloodiest day of the war. Mac's plan was to attack both the Confederate left and right simultaneously, followed up with a massive reserve attack in the center.

While not a complete failure the attack failed to destroy Lee, partly due to Burnside's late arrival at the battle. Burnside delayed his assault on the Confederate right, “throwing off the whole plan,” and allowing Lee to shift reinforcements along his line to meet Union forces in the center and left. McClellan sent a half dozen couriers to Burnside to push him to strike more swiftly and threatened to relieve him of command. Yet, Lee's army was nearly breaking in all three sectors.

Mac did not show tactical genius and made some mistakes, but in the end, it was a strategic victory for the North and a tactical draw. He rested on the 18th to resupply (artillery near out of ammo) and gave orders to attack come daylight on the 19th, but the Confederates had left. The battle sent Lee's wounded army back to Virginia and, more importantly, ended any hopes the Confederacy had for European involvement in the war. Thus Frye wrote that “George McClellan saved the union.”

“A man who could take a demoralized army, as McClellan took the combined forces that had been defeated under Pope in front of Washington at the second Bull Run, restore its discipline by the magic of his name and his swift reconstruction of its shattered organizations, and then lead it to victory within fourteen days, after an almost unexampled celerity of movement against the enemy who had crushed it two weeks before--such a man is not to be spoken of or thought of as wanting in the force and vigor of a great general.”

-- George T. Curtis, U.S. Commissioner, historian

Antietam stats

Union Forces 87,000 Casualties 12,401

Confederate Forces 47,000 Casualties 10,316

McClellan Allowed Lee to Escape?

Lincoln heavily criticized Mac for not destroying Lee's army and not following him back into Virginia. However, Mac had sent Porter to harass the enemy retreat, which had initial success, capturing 40 Confederate artillery pieces. However, A.P. Hill counter-attacked, pushing the Union men back across the Potomac. Hill said it was “The most terrible slaughter...a lesson to the enemy, and taught them to know it may sometimes be dangerous to press a retreating army.”

Often, retreating armies fought significant rearguard actions to prevent their own destruction. Civil War battles rarely ended with the destruction of one or other army, only in 1865 when the South was near defeat was an army nearly annihilated. The assumption it could happen in 1862 points more to the expectations of the early-war North than realistic military goals. When the army was criticized for not destroying Lee's forces, a soldier in the Army of the Potomac replied. “Think the rebel army can be bagged? Let them come and bag them. Easy to talk about.” Historian John Cannan said the counter attack showed the federals that the rebels “still had a formidable bite.” Dennis Frye, who studied the Antietam campaign for over 50 years, wrote that ideas that Lee could be easily destroyed were “Myths created by politicians” not accurate judgments based on historical truth.

Further, the Federals were low on supply and had just fought two large-scale engagements. Lee knew where Mac would be unable to supply his army and planned his withdrawal accordingly. Mac was also working off his cavalry’s and Pinkerton's estimates of the Confederate strength. Thinking the Confederates still had equal force, he chose not to push the attack or risk a loss on Maryland soil that would endanger D.C. and the outcome of the war.

Far from defeated, after Lee had fallen back to Virginia he planned to continue the attack again. He sent Stuart’s Cavalry to create a bridgehead at Williamsport, Maryland, to renew the invasion. However, Mac had anticipated this move and sent his own cavalry along with the 6th Corps to prevent such a move. As argued by Dennis Frye, Mac outthought Lee in Maryland.

Later in October, Mac's quick and aggressive move into the Warrenton, Virginia area surprised Lee, splitting Lee's army. Both Lee and Longstreet were concerned. However, Lincoln had given the order two days before, and Mac was removed from command.

Conclusion

“There are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the army of the Potomac ever had.”

-Francis Palfrey Antietam, Fredericksburg

While I would not go as far as the above quote does, I would say Mac was the most underrated general of the war. He does not get credit where he should and gets the blame where he should not. I do not see Mac as cautious to a fault as claimed. It was often Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck being over-cautious about protecting D.C. that interfered with Mac's plans. And his military intel let him down, not his over-cautious nature.

“Look at his campaign in Western Virginia in 1861,–a part of his military career conveniently ignored by his enemies. Here he had a separate command, a defined field of action and was not hampered and trammeled by interference from Washington; and do we see any signs of indecision and want of promptness here? On the contrary, we observe the happiest combination of judgement in design and vigor in execution: one skilful and powerful blow was instantly followed by another, and the result was absolute and permanent military success.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln and the press wanted aggression, and the results were First Manassas, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Pope at Second Manassas, and later Hooker at Chancellorsville. No general of the early war could handle the tandem of Jackson and Lee. Extreme events withheld Mac from the capture of Richmond in ‘62.

A fair critical comparison between Mac and Sherman/Grant is favorable to Mac. Later, when Grant/Sherman gained victories, it was more because of the Confederate armies' reduced capability to offer resistance than their ability to be outgeneral Mac.

I believe the real reason for Lincoln's disappointment with Mac was the North's high expectations. Underestimating the resolve of the South and their leadership, the North desired one battle and one victory in Virginia, which would win the war for them. But it took years for them to realize their error, though doubt began early as Lincoln wrote to his friend Carl Schurz in 1862, “I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our cause rather than in particular generals.”

“McClellan's relationship with Lincoln is central to any understanding of why historians judge him as a flawed personality...Lincoln has attained a stature that sets him apart from other mortals”

-Thomas J Rowland George B McClellan and Civil Har History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman Kent State University Press

Historians may have viewed McClellan negatively because he opposed and disagreed with Lincoln. He committed the “unpardonable sin” of running against Lincoln in the 1864 election on a peace platform aimed at ending the bloodshed. In 1864 George Stillman Hillard wrote, “The real reasons for which General McClellan was removed were political, and not military.” Historian Dennis Frye said “The Republicans could not allow McClellan to be a victor. They could not allow that to happen. They needed to do everything they could to smear McClellan.”

“However patriotic the abolitionist radicals in the north may have been, the very last thing they wanted was for Little Mac to win in the battle for Richmond....the abolitionists would lose their influence.”

-S.C. Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion, and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014

“There is a political element connected with this war which must not be overlooked.”

-Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War Dec 26 1861 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Lincoln acknowledged that he made many errors that undermined McClellan's chances for success. After McClellan, Lincoln refrained from becoming directly involved with his generals. It appears that some historians have unfairly attributed Lincoln's military shortcomings to McClellan.

“At this moment a considerable portion of his countrymen have their minds barred against all arguments and considerations in defense of General McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny him all military capacity is part of the creed of a great political party. Most supporters of the present administration hold it to be a point of duty to disparage and decry him.”

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan 1864

Jeb Smith is the author of four books, the most recent being Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty. Before that, he published The Road Goes Ever On and On: A New Perspective on J. R. R. Tolkien and Middle-earth and also authored Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War, written under the name Isaac C. Bishop. Smith has authored dozens of articles in numerous publications, including History is Now Magazine, The Postil Magazine, Medieval History, Medieval Magazine, and Fellowship & Fairydust, and has been featured on various podcasts.

Major Battles and Casualties of Union Generals vs Lee

Union commander/ Battle/ Union Losses/ Lee loses/ Union causality per confederate causality

Pope- Second Manassas 13,879 Lee 8,353 1.65 per

Hooker- Chancellorsville 17,100 Lee 12,151 1.43 per

Burnside- Fredericksburg 13,353 Lee 4,576 2.95 per

Grant- Wilderness 18,400 Lee 11,400 1.61 per

Grant- Spotsylvania 18,000 Lee 12,000 1.5 per

Grant- Cold Harbor 12,737 Lee 4,594 2.8 per

Grant- Total 49,100 Lee 27,900 1.75 per

Meade- Gettysburg 23,049 Lee 28,063 .82 per

Meade- Total [above/Grant] 72,049 Lee 55,963 1.29 per

McClellan- Peninsula 15,849 Lee 20,133 .78 per

McClellan - Antietam 12,401 Lee 10,316 1.2 per

McClellan - Total 28,250 Lee 30,449 .92 per

McClellan was the only Union general to give more casualties than taken when faced with Lee. His average over two battles was only bested once by a Union commander, by Meade (who performed worse overall) at Gettysburg. Mac fought against Lee with, if anything, less of a manpower advantage than Grant would have later on. He also faced the Army of Northern Virginia while it had Jackson, was well supplied, and the South had high national morale, unlike what Grant faced.

How many other Union commanders can claim over two battles with Lee to have won a tactical victory on the first and a strategic victory and a tactical draw on the second while inflicting heavy losses? It is no wonder Lee said Mac was the best he faced. And famed Confederate John Mosby, the “gray ghost of the Confederacy,” said that McClellan was the best Union commander “by all odds.”

[1] The two battles at the same site were referred to as First and Second Manassas by the Confederacy, First and Second Bull Run by the Union. I will stick to Manassas throughout, except that where quotations from the Union side refer to Bull Run this will be left unchanged.

General George Armstrong Custer in the U.S. Civil War

George Armstrong Custer is well-known to every American as a Native American fighter following the U.S. Civil War, particularly highlighted by the events of the Last Stand at the Little Bighorn River, which has become a significant part of American folklore. The leadership he exhibited while commanding the 7th Cavalry, often accompanied by the tune of Garryowen, is familiar to many.

Custer's legacy is marked by deep controversy and division, as he has faced severe criticism for his actions against Native Americans, which many view as genocidal. Conversely, he is also regarded by some as a martyr for the cause of American expansionism. Both perspectives hold validity, rendering him a multifaceted and complex historical figure.

Less well known are Custer's military exploits as a young officer during the Civil War. His aggressive tactics, readiness to lead from the front lines, and ability to motivate his troops contributed to his rapid rise in fame and rank, despite the inherent dangers of his approach. However, this same aggressive disposition also resulted in notable failures and precarious situations.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

General George Armstrong Custer. From a photographic negative in Brady's National Portrait Gallery.

West Point

Custer was born in Ohio on December 5, 1839. He spent part of his youth in Michigan, with a half-sister and her husband, and would consider the state his adopted home. Despite his humble background and youthful indiscretions, a Michigan Congressman secured Custer a place at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point when he was 18. Custer entered West Point as a cadet on July 1, 1857, as a member of the class of 1862, which consisted of seventy-nine cadets engaged in a rigorous five-year program. He graduated at the bottom of his class, ranking 34th out of 34, as 23 of his peers had either dropped out due to academic challenges or resigned to join the Confederacy.

Throughout his tenure at West Point, Custer consistently challenged established norms and regulations. Over the course of four years, he accumulated an astonishing 726 demerits, marking one of the most notorious conduct records in the institution's history. Although he possessed considerable intelligence and talent, he largely disregarded the Academy's disciplinary measures and exhibited a lack of diligence in his studies. His behavior nearly led to expulsion on multiple occasions, and he ultimately graduated last in his class, a designation often referred to as the “goat.” With the onset of the American Civil War in 1861, the duration of the course was reduced to four years, allowing Custer and his classmates to graduate on June 24, 1861, a fortuitous moment for an aspiring military leader.

Outbreak of the Civil War

The United States Army faced a critical shortage of officers at the onset of the Civil War. In response to this urgent need, Custer received a commission as a second lieutenant and was assigned to the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment. His initial responsibilities included training volunteers in Washington, D.C., and shortly thereafter, his unit was deployed to the front lines. During the First Battle of Bull Run, Custer served with his regiment, where Army commander Winfield Scott tasked him to deliver messages to Major General Irvin McDowell.

Following the battle, Custer remained engaged in the defense of Washington, D.C., until he fell ill in October 1861, which led to his absence from the unit until February 1862. Upon his return, he participated in the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia with the 2nd Cavalry, remaining active until early April 1862. His involvement during this critical period was significant as the campaign unfolded. 3. On April 5, 1862, Custer transferred to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, which was involved in the Siege of Yorktown from April 5 to May 4, where he served as aide to Major General George B. McClellan. By late May, he was entrusted with a leadership role that he executed with remarkable success, resulting in a promotion to Captain, although he would later face a demotion. Throughout this time, he participated in all the key battles of the Maryland campaign, further solidifying his military reputation.

During the Peninsula Campaign, on May 24, 1862, during the pursuit of General Joseph E Johnston, General George McClellan and his staff were reconnoitering a potential crossing point on the Chickahominy River. Custer overheard General John G. Barnard mutter, "I wish I knew how deep it is." Custer dashed forward on his horse out to the middle of the river, turned to the astonished officers, and shouted triumphantly, "McClellan, that's how deep it is, Genera!".

In his first battle command, He led an attack with four companies of the 4th Michigan Infantry across the Chickahominy River above New Bridge. The attack was successful, resulting in the capture of 50 Confederate soldiers and the seizing of the first Confederate battle flag of the war. McClellan congratulated Custer personally.

Antietam

Custer consistently maintained a positive rapport with his superiors throughout his military career. His collaboration with McClellan marked a significant turning point in his professional development. It is commonly understood that Custer's tenure under McClellan sparked his fascination with personal publicity, a factor that would have lasting implications for both his military engagements and his subsequent life.

During the Battle of Antietam, Custer served on McClellan’s staff, where he was responsible for the strategic placement of troops as directed by the commander. An order issued by McClellan specifically instructed General Sumner to maneuver Sedgwick and French across a creek at fords that "Captain Custer will show you," highlighting Custer's integral role in the operation. (On page 212 of Hartwig’s “I Dread the Thought of the Place”.)

Pennsylvania Campaign

Between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, there were huge changes in the command structure of the US Cavalry. Stoneman was relieved of his command and sent to Washington DC to become Chief of the Cavalry Bureau, which was a demotion. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Pleasonton succeeded him as the commander of the Cavalry Corps. Additionally, Brigadier General John Buford and his brigade were reassigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, while Brigadier General Wesley Merritt took charge of the Reserve Brigade. The death of Colonel Benjamin Franklin “Grimes” Davis at Brandy Station led to Colonel William Gamble assuming command of Buford's 1st Brigade. Kilpatrick was promoted to command of the 3rd Cavalry Division on June 13.

On June 9, 1863, Custer was appointed as aide to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pleasonton, who was tasked with the critical mission of locating General Robert E. Lee's army as it advanced northward through the Shenandoah Valley at the onset of the Gettysburg Campaign. In preparation for the Battle of Gettysburg, Custer played a pivotal role in the Battle of Aldie on June 17, contributing to the Cavalry Corps' operations in Loudoun Valley. His bold maneuvers were instrumental in delaying the Confederate cavalry, which was tasked with monitoring the movements of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. This engagement served as one of Custer's initial opportunities to demonstrate his capabilities in leading cavalry forces.

The Battle of Aldie on June 17, 1863, marked a pivotal moment in the series of cavalry skirmishes that constituted the Loudoun Valley Campaign, serving as a precursor to the more extensive Battle of Gettysburg. During this engagement, Union and Confederate cavalry forces clashed as General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia advanced northward into Pennsylvania. Custer emerged as a key figure in these confrontations, demonstrating his tactical acumen and leadership abilities.

The conflict commenced when Union cavalry, led by Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, sought to locate and confront the Confederate cavalry commanded by Colonel Thomas Munford, who was tasked with screening Lee's advancing forces. At this juncture, Custer, a young officer on the rise, was assigned to lead the 5th Michigan Cavalry regiment within Kilpatrick's division. His leadership was crucial as the Union forces aimed to disrupt the Confederate maneuvers.

As the battle progressed, Custer orchestrated several daring charges against the well-entrenched Confederate troops, who had fortified themselves along strategic roads and ridges. His aggressive strategies not only maintained pressure on the enemy but also resulted in significant casualties for his men. Notably, Custer's audacious charge succeeded in breaching a critical Confederate position, leading to the capture of several enemy soldiers and temporarily displacing Confederate forces from the battlefield. Throughout the engagement, Custer's visible presence and fearless leadership galvanized his troops.  The battle ended inconclusively, with both sides holding their ground as night fell. However, Custer’s regiment and the Union cavalry achieved their tactical objective of delaying the Confederate forces. This was important because it slowed Munford's cavalry, preventing them from fully screening Lee’s army, and allowed Union forces to gather more intelligence on Confederate movements.

On June 22, 1863, Pleasanton was elevated to the rank of major general in the U.S. Volunteers. Following a consultation with George Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac, Pleasanton received directives that would significantly impact the course of the war. He was instructed to replace political generals with leaders who were ready to engage in combat and personally spearhead mounted assaults. Among his aides, he identified three individuals who exemplified the aggressive leadership he sought: Wesley Merritt, Elon J. Farnsworth, both of whom possessed command experience, and George Armstrong Custer. Each of these officers was promptly promoted to brigadier general, with Custer taking command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade, known as the "Wolverines," which was part of Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick's division. Notably, Custer, at the age of 23, became one of the youngest generals in the Union Army, despite lacking direct command experience. The so-called "Boy Generals" were poised to make significant contributions in the days to come, with Merritt and Custer embarking on distinguished careers, while Farnsworth tragically lost his life shortly thereafter.

On June 30, 1863, Custer and the First and Seventh Michigan Cavalry were advancing through Hanover, Pennsylvania, with the Fifth and Sixth Michigan Cavalry trailing approximately seven miles behind. Upon hearing the sounds of gunfire, Custer redirected his forces toward the source of the commotion. A courier informed him that Farnsworth's Brigade had come under attack from Confederate cavalry in the town's side streets. After regrouping his command, Custer received orders from Kilpatrick to confront the enemy to the northeast of town, near the railway station. He skillfully deployed his troops and initiated an advance. Following a brief exchange of fire, the Confederate forces retreated to the northeast.  This might seem surprising because Lee and his army were somewhere to the west, but Stuart was looking for Early who he thought was still at York; but Early had left that morning.  Early had gone west that morning on exactly the road Stuart was now taking east. Though this skirmish in itself was of little consequence, it was a major part of the reason Stuart.

Following the engagement at Hanover on June 30, Custer advanced through Abbottstown, Pennsylvania, in pursuit of Stuart. By July 1, the sounds of conflict from Gettysburg, located approximately 14 miles to the west and slightly south, began to reach them late that morning. On the same day, Custer encountered Confederate Brigadier General Wade Hampton at Hunterstown, where a skirmish ensued.

The following morning, July 2, Custer received orders to advance toward Culp’s Hill with the objective of disrupting enemy communications. As he neared Hunterstown in the afternoon, he learned that Stuart was in close proximity and had not yet detected his presence. Demonstrating exceptional courage, Custer took the initiative to scout ahead alone, discovering that the Confederate forces were unaware of his troops' arrival, which allowed him to conduct his own reconnaissance.

Upon returning to his command, Custer strategically positioned his forces along both sides of the road, ensuring they remained concealed from the enemy. He placed the First and Fifth Michigan Cavalry, along with his artillery, behind a low rise further down the road. To lure the Confederate cavalry into his trap, he rallied A Troop of the Sixth Michigan Cavalry, boldly declaring, "Come on boys, I'll lead you this time!" He charged directly at the unsuspecting rebels, who, as anticipated, pursued him. Despite suffering significant losses and being left on foot after his horse was shot, Custer was rescued by Private Norvell Francis Churchill. Ultimately, Custer and his remaining troops managed to escape, while the pursuing Confederates were repelled by rifle and artillery fire, leading to a withdrawal from both sides.

East Cavalry Field

Custer spent most of the night in the saddle, and reached Two Taverns, Pennsylvania, approximately five miles southeast of Gettysburg, at around 3:00 a.m. on July 3. The cavalry skirmishes that took place on this day in 1863 are noteworthy, even though they were not the central focus of the Gettysburg battle. At East Cavalry Field, located three miles east of Gettysburg, forces led by J.E.B. Stuart engaged with Gregg's division and Brigadier General George A. Custer's brigade from the 3rd Division. This encounter resulted in an extended mounted conflict, which included intense hand-to-hand combat, with both factions asserting they had emerged victorious.

Custer's involvement in the cavalry confrontations on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg stands out as one of his most significant contributions during the war. Commanding a brigade of Michigan Cavalry, he fought valiantly at East Cavalry Field, where he played a pivotal role in thwarting Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart's attempts to launch an assault on the Union's rear during Pickett’s Charge. Custer's renowned charge, accompanied by the rallying cry “Come on, you Wolverines!” ignited a fierce battle that ultimately disrupted Stuart’s strategy and aided in securing a Union victory.

J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry finally arrived on the battlefield late on July 2, but the response from General Lee was less than enthusiastic. Lee instructed Stuart to maneuver behind the Union lines to penetrate their rear. By approximately 11 a.m., just three hours before Pickett’s Charge, Stuart had positioned his forces about three miles east of the Union line, intending to flank the Union left at Cress Ridge. However, Custer's troops, equipped with Spencer repeating rifles, held their ground resolutely, reminiscent of Buford’s brigades on the first day of battle. Consequently, at 1 p.m., Stuart ordered a direct assault led by Fitz Hugh Lee’s 1st Virginia Cavalry.

On July 3rd, Custer was reassigned from Kilpatrick's command to serve under the leadership of Gregg’s division. The overall command structure placed Buford at the helm of the 3rd Cavalry Division, with the majority of his forces positioned far from the conflict occurring in Westminster, Maryland. However, Buford's reserve brigade, commanded by Wesley Merritt, was stationed to the south of Gettysburg. At this juncture, David Gregg had two brigades under his command, one led by McIntosh and the other by Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, his cousin, both of which were deployed along the Baltimore Turnpike. Consequently, Gregg temporarily loaned one of his brigade divisions to Custer’s Michigan Brigade, while Kilpatrick and Farnsworth found themselves southwest of Little Round Top, resulting in a fragmented command structure.

The conventional narrative suggests that the Confederate forces were unaware of the Union cavalry's movements until Stuart signaled Lee with four artillery shots. However, this account raises questions, as Gregg had already established the positions for Custer and McIntosh earlier that day. Furthermore, Pleasonton had informed Gregg of Stuart's proximity, yet he still instructed Custer to return to Kilpatrick. Both Gregg and Custer deemed this order imprudent, leading them to disregard it and prepare for engagement instead.

In response to the situation, Gregg directed Custer and the 7th Michigan to launch a counterattack. Custer took the lead, rallying his men with the call, “Come on you Wolverines.” At that moment, the Virginia cavalry was positioned behind a fence, with over 700 horsemen engaged in combat using sabers, pistols, and rifles. Just as Custer appeared poised to force a retreat among the Virginians, Stuart countered by sending Wade Hampton to launch an attack, compelling Custer to withdraw. During the skirmish, Custer's horse was killed, prompting him to borrow his bugler's mount, which also met a similar fate. In response, Gregg ordered his remaining brigade to charge once more, but after approximately 40 minutes of intense fighting, both sides ultimately retreated. Custer's valor was particularly pronounced as he orchestrated a series of audacious cavalry charges against the Stuart. Despite facing overwhelming odds, His decisive actions were instrumental in thwarting Stuart’s cavalry from launching a surprise attack on Union troops, thereby playing a vital role in securing a Union victory.

This assault was conceived as part of a tripartite offensive that was meant to occur simultaneously, with Early and Pickett launching their attacks in a coordinated manner. This reflects the traditional military strategy of the time. However, a more contemporary interpretation suggests that Stuart was expected to approach Culp’s Hill from the south, while Early’s infantry would advance from the north. It is believed that Lee anticipated that if Pickett’s charge succeeded in pushing back the Union line and Stuart managed to penetrate their rear, it would create significant confusion among Union forces. While Lee recognized the necessity of coordinating his forces for a unified attack, there is no substantial evidence to indicate that he envisioned this operation as an envelopment, particularly given the limited size of Stuart’s contingent.

The casualties incurred during the 40 minutes of intense combat at East Cavalry Field were relatively modest, totaling 254 for the Union—of which 219 were from Custer's brigade—and 181 for the Confederates. Some reports indicate that Custer's losses were as high as 257, marking the most significant cavalry brigade loss in the battle. Stuart commanded approximately 6,000 troops, while Custer had 1,200 and McIntosh had 2,400. Although the engagement did not yield a decisive tactical outcome, it represented a strategic setback for both Stuart and Robert E. Lee, whose objective to penetrate the Union's rear were ultimately thwarted.

Williamsport

The Battle of Williamsport, which lasted from July 6–16, 1863, occurred during Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg. Union cavalry forces, including those under George Armstrong Custer, pursued the Confederate army as it retreated toward the Potomac River, attempting to cross back into Virginia. Custer played a notable role in these engagements, especially in harassing Lee's rear guard and attacking Confederate forces protecting their retreat.

After the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Lee's army began retreating southward toward the Potomac River. Custer, commanding a brigade in General Judson Kilpatrick’s division, was part of the Union cavalry tasked with pursuing the retreating Confederates and disrupting their movement. His orders were to engage the Confederate rear guard, disrupt their wagon trains, and prevent them from crossing the Potomac, buying time for Union infantry to catch up.

Custer and his brigade engaged in several skirmishes with Confederate cavalry near Hagerstown and Williamsport. The Confederate forces were defending their supply trains and attempting to hold off the Union cavalry long enough to repair bridges and establish a crossing point at the Potomac River. Custer led his men in multiple aggressive attacks on Confederate positions, targeting both their cavalry and the wagon trains full of supplies. His boldness was consistent with his typical approach, charging Confederate lines in an effort to force them back.

During one of these engagements near Williamsport on July 6, Custer’s brigade became overextended after a particularly aggressive charge. He advanced too far ahead of supporting Union forces and was nearly encircled by Confederate infantry and cavalry. Custer’s position was briefly precarious, as he faced being surrounded and cut off. Despite this, Custer managed to organize a defense and retreat his brigade to a more secure position, avoiding disaster. His men were able to disengage and hold their ground until Union reinforcements arrived.

Over the course of the next several days, Custer and other Union cavalry units continued to pressure the Confederate forces around Williamsport, making repeated attempts to break through Confederate defenses and prevent Lee’s army from safely crossing the flooded Potomac River. While the Union cavalry, including Custer, succeeded in capturing a number of wagons and prisoners, they were ultimately unable to completely prevent the Confederates from repairing their bridges and making their escape into Virginia.

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.

On July 16, cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Custer was involved in these battles.

The Overland Campaign

When Major General Philip Sheridan moved east, the resulting alliance with Custer as his subordinate would produce huge dividends in many battles. On May 6 at 8 AM, Custer, commanding 1st brigade 1st division received movement orders from a position at a crossroads on Brock Road to attack Longstreet in the flank. But Longstreet wasn’t at that location. A huge battle ensued when it turned out he was moving in the vicinity of Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. The resulting, really unplanned and surprise firefight at Todd’s Tavern led to Lee’s retreat across the field.

The Battle of Trevilian Station occurred on June 11–12, 1864. It was the largest all-cavalry battle of the Civil War, Trevilian Station saw Custer lead his men in an aggressive attack against Confederate cavalry under Wade Hampton. Although the Union forces were ultimately forced to withdraw, Custer's brigade fought tenaciously.

Over 9000 Union troops faced about 6700 Confederates. It is estimated that the Union had over 1500 casualties including 150 killed, most from Custer’s brigade. The Confederates sustained over 800 casualties.

Custer’s participation at Trevilian shows the danger of his aggressiveness. Custer found himself and his division encircled by Confederate cavalry, yet he chose to stand firm rather than retreat. He inspired his men to maintain their defensive position until reinforcements arrived, allowing his unit to escape a precarious situation.  Sheridan was moving to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and create a diversion while Grant crossed the James River. But Hampton beat Sheridan to the station, and what ensued was the largest cavalry of the war. Custer’s mission was to circle into Hampton’s rear. Instead, he got trapped and had to fight desperately to get out of it. This action has been called “Custer’s First Last Stand”.

On the first day of the battle), Custer was assigned to lead a brigade in Sheridan’s cavalry corps. As Sheridan’s force moved toward Trevilian Station, Custer launched an aggressive raid ahead of the main Union force. He moved boldly into the Confederate rear, cutting off General Wade Hampton’s Confederate cavalry from their supply trains and capturing over 800 men and Confederate wagons.

However, this aggressive maneuver placed Custer and his men in a precarious position. Once the Confederates realized Custer was isolated, they encircled his brigade. Custer found himself surrounded by Hampton’s cavalry, with no immediate support from the rest of Sheridan's force.

For several hours, Custer and his men were caught in a desperate defensive situation, with their position effectively cut off. His brigade formed a defensive circle to fend off repeated Confederate attacks, using their wagons as makeshift barricades. Despite being outnumbered and surrounded, Custer managed to hold out long enough for reinforcements from Sheridan’s other divisions to arrive and relieve him. During this time, Custer lost his personal battle flag, which was captured by Confederate forces—a symbolic loss, though he managed to avoid the complete destruction of his brigade.

On June 12, the second day of the battle, Custer’s brigade regrouped and continued to fight fiercely as part of the larger Union cavalry force. Sheridan’s troops launched repeated assaults against the entrenched Confederate cavalry at Trevilian Station, but despite their efforts, the Union cavalry failed to break through Hampton’s defenses.

Though Custer and his men fought valiantly, Sheridan’s overall raid did not achieve its primary objectives. Sheridan eventually withdrew, unable to destroy the railroad or link up with Hunter. While the battle was tactically inconclusive, the Confederates held the field, and Custer's performance, though audacious, had mixed results. His initial success in capturing Confederate supplies and disrupting their rear was overshadowed by the fact that his brigade was nearly destroyed during the encirclement.

Overall, Custer’s actions at Trevilian Station were typical of his aggressive, high-risk style of command. Although he narrowly avoided disaster, his ability to lead under fire and maintain discipline in dire circumstances earned him respect, even if the battle itself was a strategic setback for the Union.

Yellow Tavern

In this battle on May 11, 1864, General Philip Sheridan outmaneuvered and outmanned Stuart. In a surprise counterattack, Stuart was mortally wounded by a retreating Union soldier. Custer’s role in this battle was pivotal. During Sheridan’s raid toward Richmond, Custer’s men were heavily involved in the fighting, and the death of Stuart marked a turning point for Confederate cavalry leadership.

Sheridan amassed over 10-12,000 cavalry and 32 artillery pieces, stretching 13 miles long. This provided him with a two-to-one advantage – Stuart had about 4500 men. He had amassed 3 cavalry divisions to fight against 2 brigades. Moreover, Sheridan’s men were armed with rapid-fire Spencer Carbines. Sheridan’s three divisions were commanded by Brig. Gens. Wesley Merritt, David M. Gregg and James H. Wilson. Stuart’s forces included Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee’s division, consisting of brigades under Brig. Gens. Lunsford Lomax and Williams C. Wickham and a brigade of North Carolinians commanded by Brig. Gen. James Gordon from Brig. Gen. William Henry Fitzhugh “Rooney” Lee’s division.

Having arrived just an hour ahead of Sheridan, Stuart chose to defend a low ridgeline bordering the road. Stuart placed his two brigades, under the commanders Lunsford L. Lomax and Williams C. Wickham, in a “Y” formation along the intersection of the two roads. On the Confederate left, Lomax’s men engaged the Union brigades of Thomas C. Devin, Alfred Gibbs, and George Armstrong Custer, and after intense fighting were driven back to the same ridge line occupied by Wickham. The initial Union charge was halted.

Stuart sent Gordon’s brigade to harass Sheridan’s rear. Sheridan wasn’t interested in outracing Stuart, he wanted to give battle. Stuart beat Sheridan to the crossroads of Telegraph Road and Mountain Road, which was necessary for Sheridan to pass through to get to Richmond. At this intersection was an old hotel called Yellow Tavern. He placed Wickham’s brigade on a high ridge and a right angle to Lomax’s brigade to form a pincher movement when Sheridan arrived. As planned, Merritt advanced toward the ridge and Lomax attacked at the flank. But, Merritt had a brigade led by Devin to flank Lomax, forcing a retreat. To protect the retreat, the 5th Virginia regrouped and Devin charged. This led to a stalemate in the area below the ridge.

After a brief lull, Sheridan renewed his attack. His men, both mounted and dismounted, charged amid the roar of a sudden thunderstorm. Custer’s brigade aimed for the center of the Confederate line. Union troops charged across Turner’s Run—a stream that bisected and ran perpendicular to the Telegraph Road—and up the ridge to the Confederate position. Witnessing the devastating break in his line, Stuart immediately galloped to the position of his old command, the 1st Virginia Cavalry. And then the 1st Virginia Cavalry countercharged, driving the Union troops back.

At this moment, at 4 pm, Custer proposed an attack along a small stream called Turner’s Run. Taking the 1st Michigan along with numerous other regiments, he made an initial lodgment in the Rebel line but was overwhelmed when reinforcements came up. In this retreat, a dismounted soldier shot Stuart in the abdomen, passing through him. As the 5th Michigan Cavalry retreated past Stuart, he was shot with a .44 caliber revolver from a distance of 10-30 yards. Stuart was killed by a dismounted Union private in retreat named John A Huff. Huff was a former sharpshooter with Berdan’s sharpshooters. Fitzhugh Lee took command and prevented a disorderly retreat. Meanwhile, Custer sent more men forward, forcing a full retreat.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864

Custer played a significant role in Union General Philip Sheridan’s efforts to defeat Confederate forces under General Jubal Early. The campaign's objective was to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Confederate control, as it was a crucial agricultural region and an important supply line for the South.

Third Battle of Winchester. In the Third Battle of Winchester on September 19, 1864, also known as the Battle of Opequon, Custer played a key role as a cavalry commander under Major General Philip Sheridan during the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Custer was in command of one of Sheridan’s cavalry brigades. Custer performed several daring charges during the battle. His aggressive cavalry tactics helped to drive Early's forces back. Custer's success in leading repeated cavalry assaults allowed the Union forces to capture Confederate positions and force a retreat. Custer’s cavalry played a key role in routing Confederate forces, and his aggressive tactics helped deliver a decisive victory for the Union. His division broke through Confederate lines and captured many soldiers and artillery pieces, contributing to the campaign's overall success. His role was primarily to flank and harass the Confederate forces under Lieutenant General Jubal Early. The Union cavalry was tasked with cutting off Confederate escape routes and striking the enemy from unexpected angles while the Union infantry pressed the Confederate center and left.

Custer’s cavalry was directed to attack the Confederate right flank. This proved to be crucial as the Confederate line was already buckling under pressure from Union infantry assaults. Custer’s aggressive push on their flank contributed to the eventual collapse of Early’s forces.

As the Confederate line broke, Custer’s cavalry was among the first to exploit the breakthrough. He led his men in a vigorous pursuit of the retreating Confederate soldiers, cutting down those who fled and capturing prisoners, artillery pieces, and other valuable supplies. His men played a significant role in turning the Confederate retreat into a rout.

Custer's cavalry captured several artillery pieces during the battle, further demoralizing Early’s troops and preventing them from re-establishing defensive positions. This loss of artillery was a major blow to the Confederate forces, who were already struggling with inferior numbers and resources.

This battle was a decisive Union victory, and Custer’s cavalry, including his aggressive leadership and ability to inspire his men to press the attack, was a key factor. This victory opened the way for further Union advances in the Shenandoah Valley, helping to secure Sheridan's objectives in the region and weakening the Confederate war effort.

Battle of Fisher's Hill. Following Third Winchester, Sheridan’s forces pursued Early’s retreating army to Fisher’s Hill. On September 21-22, 1864, Custer's cavalry helped to flank the Confederate army, contributing to the Union victory. His rapid movements and aggressive use of cavalry were critical in keeping pressure on the retreating Confederate forces.

Battle of Cedar Creek. Custer's most celebrated actions during the Shenandoah Campaign occurred at the Battle of Cedar Creek on October 19, 1864. Initially, Early’s Confederates launched a surprise pre-dawn attack on the Union army, routing them from their camps and driving them back. Sheridan, who was away from the battlefield at the start of the attack, famously rallied his forces upon his return and began a counterattack in the afternoon.

During the battle, Custer commanded a cavalry division and played a pivotal role in Sheridan’s afternoon counteroffensive. On September 25th, Grant asked Sheridan to send either Torbert or Wilson to Georgia to take over the cavalry there. Sheridan chose Wilson and put Custer in command of Wilson’s 3rd Cavalry Division in time for Cedar Creek.  His leadership helped stabilize Union forces and allowed them to regroup after the initial Confederate assault. As Sheridan’s forces pressed forward, Custer's division launched aggressive cavalry charges that shattered the Confederate flanks. His relentless attacks helped turn the tide of battle, leading to a decisive Union victory. Many historians credit Custer’s bold charges as crucial in breaking Early’s army and turning a near Union disaster into a triumph.

Custer’s role in Sheridan’s Shenandoah Campaign, particularly at Cedar Creek, solidified his reputation as a brave and effective cavalry commander. His aggressive tactics were well-suited to the fast-moving and chaotic nature of cavalry warfare, and his actions contributed significantly to the Union's victory in the Shenandoah Valley, which deprived the Confederacy of a vital region and disrupted their plans to divert Union attention away from General Robert E. Lee's forces around Richmond.

Appomattox

Custer’s cavalry had a key role in blocking the retreat of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during the final days of the war. Custer’s men captured Confederate supply trains and were among the first to receive Lee’s flag of truce, leading to the surrender at Appomattox Court House, which effectively ended the war. During the closing days of the war, Custer’s relentless pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Robert E. Lee helped to hasten their surrender. When Sheridan's troops overran Confederate defenses at Five Forks on Saturday, April 1, 1865, Lee decided to abandon the Petersburg defenses and, in doing so, to vacate Richmond. Once this decision was made, the war was essentially over.

The prelude to Five Forks was the day before, March 31. Recognizing that Five Forks was the key to control of the Southside RR, Union forces moved around the Confederate left flank. Two simultaneous battle movements, resulting in two separate actions, resulted. At the Battle of Dinwoodie Courthouse, Sheridan attempted a flanking maneuver. At the same time, Warren moved west on White Oak Road, where a battle ensued.

Lee anticipated these movements perfectly. He sent Pickett and cavalry under Fitz Hugh Lee to meet Sheridan. Although surprised, both Union attacks prevailed and the Confederate forces suffered 1500 casualties, a huge loss considering their dwindling numbers. They retreated to Five Forks.

After the Battle of Dinwiddie Court House, V Corps infantry began to arrive near the battlefield to reinforce Sheridan's cavalry. Pickett's orders from Lee were to defend Five Forks "at all hazards" because of its strategic importance. On March 30, Warren had occupied a crucial crossroads at Five Forks where Boydton Plank Road crossed Quaker Road.  Sheridan’s cavalry, meanwhile, was rapidly advancing in a left turn aimed at Five Forks.

Lee knew Grant wouldn’t make a frontal assault, and deduced his opponent’s best option. Lee ordered Pickett’s infantry to attack Warren and Fitzhugh Lee to attack Sheridan. These attacks came as a surprise, as the Union did not see these responses. Although Dinwiddie was a tactical victory for Fitzhugh Lee, by that evening, Sheridan and Warren had merged after having caused over 1500 casualties. At Five Forks, Sheridan had defeated Pickett, who famously was not present at the battle, instead being engaged in a shad bake (because of an acoustic shadow, he never heard the fighting).. The Union force inflicted over 1,000 casualties on the Confederates and took up to 4,000 prisoners while seizing Five Forks, a vital supply line and evacuation route. The end was near, and Custer had played a significant role.

During the closing days of the war, Custer’s relentless pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Robert E. Lee helped to hasten their surrender.  After a truce was arranged, General Custer was escorted through the lines to meet General Longstreet, who described Custer as having flaxen locks flowing over his shoulders. Custer said, “In the name of General Sheridan I demand the unconditional surrender of this army.” Longstreet replied that he was not in command of the army, but if he was, he would not deal with messages from Sheridan. Custer responded it would be a pity to have more blood upon the field, to which Longstreet suggested the truce be respected, and then added “General Lee has gone to meet General Grant, and it is for them to determine the future of the armies.”

Custer was in attendance at the McLean House to witness the surrender. Pictured is the furniture upon which the surrender was signed by Generals Lee and Grant at the McLean House at Appomattox. The White table and wicker chair were those used by Lee. It was purchased by General Ord who donated it to the Chicago Historical Society. it is currently on display at the Chicago Historical Museum. The leather chair and round table were used by Grant. General Sheridan bought Grant’s furniture from the McLeans and presented it to General Custer's wife as a souvenir. She used it for several years in her home, then donated it to the Smithsonian. Sheridan included a note praising Custer's gallantry. Think about how truly awesome that is, and how much Sheridan must have valued his contributions.

On April 15, 1865, Custer was promoted to major general in the U.S. Volunteers, making him the youngest major general in the Union Army at age 25. He would go on to higher glory and a crushing defeat, in the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 1870s. His background with Sherman and Sheridan, who would both go on to become Commanding Generals of the United States Army, positioned him ideally for a leading role in that conflict.

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References

·       Ambrose, Stephen E. (1996). Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors. New York: Anchor Books.

·       "George Armstrong Custer". American Battlefield Trust. November 4, 2009. 

·       Wert, Jeffry D. (1996). Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster.

·       Wittenberg, Eric J. (2001). Glory Enough for All : Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station. Brassey's Inc.

·       https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/george-armstrong-custer

·       https://www.americancivilwarstory.com/george-armstrong-custer.html

·       https://www.historynet.com/george-custer/

·       https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/george-armstrong-custer

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-first-last-stand

Was the Battle of Gettysburg Really a Major Defeat for the Confederacy?

The Battle of Gettysburg during the U.S. Civil War is usually considered a victory for the North; however, alternative arguments can be made. Here, Jeb Smith considers whether Gettysburg was really a major defeat for the Confederacy.

Bayonet charge by the Union’s 1st Minnesota against Confederate forces on July 2, 1863. By Dan Troiani, available here.

In his lecture series on the U.S. Civil War, renowned historian Gary Gallagher explained that the South in 1863 did not perceive the Battle of Gettysburg as a defeat but rather as a draw. Even though it ultimately fell short of its primary objective, to achieve a significant victory over the Army of the Potomac and thus bring about peace talks, many Southern leaders saw the campaign as a success because it pulled the Federals out of Virginia, providing its war-ravaged farmlands much-needed rest. It also maneuvered the war to the North where Confederates lived off of Northern farms and supplies. Famed cavalry general Jeb Stuart wrote his wife, "Gen Lee maneuvering the Yankees out of Virginia is the grandest piece of strategy ever heard of.”

Gary Gallagher mentioned how the Battle of Gettysburg was not driven from the field for the South; they simply failed to remove the Federals from their positions on Day 3. Since they made an orderly retreat rather than being driven from the battlefield, the engagement was viewed by most at the time as a draw. Some Southern soldiers (and the populace, newspapers, etc.) viewed it as a victory since they won day 1, driving the Federals back, and maintained their positions on days 2 and 3. In Jeb Stuart: The Last Cavalier Burke Davis wrote, “There was not a spirit of defeat in the army this morning; men waited hopefully for Federal attack on their hill.”

Battle

Gallagher described Day 1 as one of the great attacking victories of the war, with Southern forces successfully pushing back two Federal corps and inflicting heavy losses. On Day 2, the outnumbered South launched an attack against Federals who were entrenched on high ground, managing to cause more damage than they sustained. Federal General George Meade was so bloodied after Day 2 that he considered retreating and made plans to do so, but his subordinates persuaded him to stay. As Confederate General James Longstreet was quoted as saying in the Ken Burns Documentary on the Civil War, “When the second day's battle was over General Lee declared it a success.”

By the end of the three-day bloodbath, the Federals had suffered such enormous casualties (the largest of any battle of the war) that they did not mount a significant offensive in Virginia for 10 months.

Many see Gettysburg as a major defeat because Lee never invaded the North again. Yet this had more to do with the cumulative loss of manpower to all Southern armies and a drop in morale coupled with larger, more aggressive Northern armies. At the time, nobody knew Lee would not invade again, and some thought he would. General Jeb Stuart wrote his wife on July 13th “We return without defeat to recuperate and reinforce when no doubt the role will be reenacted."

Further, Confederate General Jubal Early invaded the North in ‘64, at one point threatening Washington D.C., and Lee sent Longstreet and two divisions to Tennessee after Gettysburg, enabling Braxton Bragg to take the offensive there and win the battle of Chickamauga. If Lee had just suffered a significant defeat or thought himself in danger, why would he send his top corps with two veteran divisions to the Western theatre? Why not consolidate defensively? Instead, he was still thinking offensively. And Lee showed the South had plenty of fight left in ‘64.

Loss?

Others say the South lost the war at Gettysburg; I don't see how this is so. Gettysburg, combined with Vicksburg, was a big blow to Southern manpower. However, it could also be argued the South was already finished when Stonewall Jackson died. But still, regardless of Jackson and the results of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Lincoln was not likely to be reelected (Peace Democrats would have triumphed) until General Sherman captured Atlanta and Jubal Early (who was making headlines) was defeated in the Shenandoah Valley. Those events, along with Admiral Farragut’s earlier triumph at Mobile Bay, secured Lincoln's reelection and won the war for the North, not Gettysburg. The high casualties of 1864 and battles like Gettysburg (union losses of 23,000) almost cost the Union the war, and the people of the North desired peace, until new Union victories restored popular morale.

Jeb Smith is the author of four books, the most recent being Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty. Before that, he published Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War. Smith has authored dozens of articles in various publications, including The Postil Magazine, History is Now Magazine, Medieval History, Medieval Magazine and Fellowship & Fairydust, and featured on various podcasts.

How the North and South Treated Minorities During the U.S. Civil War

During the U.S. Civil War, the North and South treated minority groups in different ways – and some of these may be surprising to readers. Here, Jeb Smith looks at how the North and South treated Catholics, Jews, and Native Americans during the Civil War period.

Brigadier General Stand Watie.

"Their clergy [Catholic]blessed the flags of Confederate regiments, and their opposition to the federal regime in New Orleans was more uncompromising than that of any other group...A Richmond editor wrote, "Catholic Hierarchy of the South… were warm supporters of the Southern cause, and zealous advocates of the justice upon which this war of defense….was conducted."

-E Merton Coulter The Confederate States of America 1861-1865 Baton Rouge: The Louisiana State University Press 1950

Historian Phillip Tucker wrote, "The South in general was actually far more multicultural and more multiethnic than the North in 1860...the South was in general less racist towards ethnic groups, including the Irish and Jews, than the North." Minorities received better treatment in the South than in the North. Catholicism played a more significant role in the South and was more accepted by the population. Like the old South, traditional Catholicism honored hierarchy, aristocracy, chivalry, and other traditional values. Also, like the South, pre-Vatican II Catholics were traditionalists and rejected modernity. Traditional Catholics had more in common culturally and politically with the South than with the progressive North.

Catholics

Historian James McPherson  shows that Catholics under Pope Pius the IX (Pope from 1846-1878) still maintained much of their older traditional identity. Pius was described as a "violent enemy of liberalism and social reform." In his 1864 Syllabus of Errors, he wrote that it was an error to think the Pope should agree with "progress, liberalism, and modern civilization." Pope Pius X commanded "all clergy, pastors, confessors, preachers, religious superiors, and professors in philosophical-theological seminaries" to take an "oath against modernism." In The Story of Christianity Volume II.  Historian Justo Gonzalez observed "a growing gulf between mainstream modern thought and society on the one hand and Catholicism on the other."

Further, nothing brings groups together like similar enemies. Robert Fogel shows that Republicans viewed "Catholicism and slavery as twin despotisms." They hated Catholics because "The Catholic church was in league with the pro-slavery democratic party to destroy the principles of free government," wrote an 1858 organ of the Republican party in Illinois. James McPherson  wrote, "The Puritan war against popery had gone on for two and a half centuries and was not over yet...hostility to Romanism (as well as rum) remained a subterranean current within Republicanism."

Like the Virginian theologian R.L Dabney, Archbishop John Hughes of N.Y. referred to abolitionists as "Red-republicans." Hughes condemned public schools as godless promoters of "Socialism, Red Republicanism, Universalism, Infidelity, Deism, Atheism, and Pantheism." And while Dabney was no friend of Catholic theology, they were kin in mind when it came to modernity. In Catholics Lost Cause, Adam Tate writes, "Catholics and southern conservatives viewed the North as the locus of American radicalism and took refuge in Jeffersonian conceptions of both the Union and the Constitution."

"Protestants funded Catholic churches, schools, and hospitals, while Catholics also contributed to Protestant causes. Beyond financial support, each group participated in the institutions created by the other. Catholics and Protestants worshipped in each other's churches, studied in each other's schools, and recovered or died in each other's hospitals…Catholic-Protestant cooperation complicates the dominant historiographical view of interreligious animosity and offers a model of religious pluralism in an unexpected place and time."

-Andrew Stern Southern Harmony: Catholic-Protestant Relations in the Antebellum South Cambridge University Press 2018

Kinship

Southerners felt a kinship with Catholics that was absent in the North. According to southern writer Daniel Hundley, "In Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and other portions of the far South, the progenitors of the Southern Gentleman were chiefly Spanish Dons and French Catholics." Compared to the North, Catholics had a much more significant influence on southern society. The Cavalier South was more tolerant and did not seek to conform others to their image as the Puritan North did. As a result, the South was admired by old-time Catholic conservatives like Lord Acton, Hilaire Belloc, and G.K Chesterton, who said: "Old England can still be faintly traced in Old Dixie."

In Catholic Confederates, Gracjan Kraszewski notes that "Catholics made themselves virtually indistinguishable from their Protestant neighbors." He refers to the "Confederatization" of Catholics that occurred to a greater extent in the South than in the North. The South accepted Catholics, and Catholics accepted the South. They became one with each other. Kraszewski writes, "More than one hundred years before Vatican II and JFK, Catholics in the South were fully integrated members of society who, save for their religion, believed the same things and acted similarly to their well-known Protestant neighbors."

When the separation came, southern Bishops almost universally sided with the South. After the fall of Fort Sumter, the local bishop, a rabid secessionist, led Catholics in the celebration by singing a Latin hymn. A number of Confederate generals were Catholics, including James Longstreet and the Confederacy's first general, Pierre Toutant Gustave Beauregard. The secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, was also a Catholic and a member of Jefferson Davis's cabinet.

When federals occupied Natchez, Mississippi, they ordered all pastors and priests to pray for Abraham Lincoln, but Catholic Bishop William Henry Elder refused. He was briefly  imprisoned for his non-conformity and was heralded as a legend across the South. The most popular post-war poem among former Confederates was "The Conquered Banner." This poem -recited in southern schools for generations was composed by Catholic priest and Confederate army chaplain Abram Joseph Ryan.

Catholic priests made devotionals for the soldiers used by all denominations, and nuns served in confederate hospitals. Some Catholic Confederate chaplains could not stay out of the war; despite it being against canon law, John Bannon fired a cannon at the Yankee hordes. The similarities between traditional Catholicism and the South provided an "easy symbiosis" for the thousands of southern Catholic soldiers, writes Kraszewski. When the Confederacy sent Father John Bannon to Ireland, it was his view that devout Catholics of Europe could find in the Confederacy the remnant of Christendom. In the North, Bannon stated, one could only find puritans and anti-Catholic prejudice.

"Roman Catholics and Jews found an accepted place, sometimes a very successful place, in the South when such was unknown in the North....at the time of the war, a high proportion of American Catholics and Jews were found in the South and were loyal confederates. Nearly all Catholics and Jews elected to public office in the U.S. were in the South. The two most famous anti-Catholic incidents in the pre-war period took place in Boston and Philadelphia...no such incidents occurred in the South. The letters of Lincoln supporters are full of anti-Semitic comments, and , notoriously, General Grant was to banish Jews from the Union army lines."

-Clyde Wilson The Yankee Problem An American Dilemma Shotwell publishing 2016

Jews

Jews were clearly more accepted in the Southern states. Robert Rosen, in The Jewish Confederates, tells how the Southern Jewish population were among the most rabid secessionists. They were integrated into Confederate units, and some reached high ranks in the military, such as Col. Abraham C. Myers, quartermaster general of the Confederacy; Maj. Adolph Proskauer of the 12th Alabama; Maj. Alexander Hart of the Louisiana 5th; and Phoebe Levy Pember, chief matron at Richmond's Chimborazo Hospital, are some examples he gives. Judah Benjamin was a Senator from Louisiana before joining President Jefferson Davis' cabinet. He served as Attorney General, Secretary of War, and Secretary of State for the Confederacy. Rosen wrote, "the Confederate South was, contrary to popular belief, the exact opposite of the image of the Old South held by most contemporary Americans."

Union General U.S Grant gave General Order No. 11, expelling all Jews from his military district. He had earlier ordered a subordinate to "Refuse all permits to come south of Jackson for the present. The Israelites especially should be kept out." The following day he issued another command to "Give orders to all the conductors on the [rail] road that no Jews are to be permitted to travel on the railroad southward from any point. They may go north and be encouraged in it; but they are such an intolerable nuisance that the department must be purged of them." Grant said the black-market cotton exports were done "mostly by Jews and other unprincipled traders." General Sherman wrote to the Union Army adjutant-general that "The country will swarm with dishonest Jews who will smuggle powder, pistols." And as with Jews and Catholics, so it was with Native Americans.

"In the Northern States the Cherokee people saw with alarm a violated Constitution, all civil liberty put in peril, and all the rules of civilized warfare and the dictates of common humanity and decency unhesitatingly disregarded. In States which still adhered to the Union a military despotism has displaced the civil power…Free speech and almost free thought became a crime. The right to the writ of habeas corpus, guaranteed by the Constitution, disappeared at the nod of a Secretary of State or a general of the lowest grade…Foreign mercenaries and the scum of cities and the inmates of prisons were enlisted and organized into regiments and brigades and sent into Southern States to aid in subjugating a people struggling for freedom, to burn, to plunder, and to commit the basest of outrages on women; while the heels of armed tyranny trod upon the necks of Maryland and Missouri, and men of the highest character and position were incarcerated upon suspicion and without process of law in jails, in forts, and in prison-ships, and even women were imprisoned by the arbitrary order of a President and Cabinet ministers; while the press ceased to be free, the publication of newspapers was suspended and their issues seized and destroyed ...The war now raging is a war of Northern cupidity and fanaticism against the institution of African servitude; against the commercial freedom of the South, and against the political freedom of the States, and its objects are to annihilate the sovereignty of those States and utterly change the nature of the General Government...the Cherokees, long divided in opinion, became unanimous, and like their brethren, the Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, determined, by the undivided voice of a General Convention of all the people, held at Tahlequah, on the 21st day of August , in the present year, to make common cause with the South and share its fortunes."

-Tahlequah, C. N., October 28, 1861. THOMAS PEGG, President National Committee. JOSHUA ROSS, Clerk National Committee. Concurred. LACY MOUSE, Speaker of Council. THOMAS B. WOLFE, Clerk Council. Approved. J.N.O. ROSS.

Native Americans

The most significant discrepancy in the treatment of minorities is given when we look at Native Americans. The majority of the "civilized" Native American tribes sided with the South during the war. General Stand Watie of the Cherokee was the last Confederate general to surrender on June 23, 1865. He was the only Native American to be promoted to general on either side of the war. Native American tribes sent a higher percentage of their population to war than any state in the Confederacy and lost a higher percentage than any southern state. No one was more devoted to the Southern cause, not South Carolina or Virginia. They sacrificed the greatest and held out the longest.

The Indian Territory mainly sided with the South and sent delegates to Richmond. Richmond sent government officials, food, money, and supplies to the Indian Territory to help and support them. The formation of an Indian State in the Confederacy was offered to the tribes if they desired it. However, the Confederacy gave them complete autonomy for their government and offered a postal service even if they remained autonomous.

"...the several Indian treaties that bound the Indian nations in an alliance with the seceded states, under the authority of the Confederate State Department.. an innovation, in fact, that marked the tremendous importance that the Confederate government attached to the Indian friendship. It was something that stood out in marked contrast to the indifference manifested at the moment by the authorities at Washington...The Confederacy was offering him [the Indian] political integrity and political equality."

-Annie Heloise Abel Ph.D. The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist an Omitted Chapter in the Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy Arthur H Clark Company Cleveland 1915

The Federals attacked and killed women and children of a neutral tribe during the war, driving even more support for the South. In response, the Confederacy sent financial support to displaced families under Union occupation. In General Stand Watie's Confederate Indians, Frank Cunningham quotes multiple tribal leaders' thankfulness for the treatment of their tribes by Richmond and President Davis.

Historian Annie Heloise Abel tells how it was John Calhoun and other Southern men who desired the entire west to be shut off from whites and to allow the Native Americans self-governance, "Southern politicians, after his time, became the chief advocates of Indian territorial integrity, the ones that pleaded most often and most noisily that guarantees to Indians be faithfully respected." As with Catholics, the tribes had more in common with the South in culture and institutions. As slave owners and planters, they tended to be agrarian. For example, on January 29, 1861, Arkansas governor Henry Rector wrote to John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, "Our people and yours are natural allies in war and friends in peace."

"On behalf of the Creek people...the cause of the South is our cause, her hopes our hopes, and whatever her misfortunes may be it shall be our pleasure to bear them patiently with her, even unto death. If she falls we fall, and if she prospers we only desire it to be our privilege to enjoy her prosperity….we are enrolling every able-bodied man in service for war."

-Samuel Checote, Creek Nation

Heneha Mekko, "Principal Chief of the Seminoles," said:

"The Confederate States have not deserted us, we have been provided for, our women and children are fed, our soldiers get all they should expect. The Government is engaged in a great war, she cannot do any more for us now then she is doing...assure the President the Seminoles are yet true and loyal. Their treaty stipulations are sacred. The destiny of your government shall be ours. If she falls we will go with her: if she triumphs no rejoicing will be more sincere than ours."

The western "wild" plains Native Americans did not side with the South, but still fought against the North. The North sent General Pope to deal with the "savages' 'like the Sioux. Lincoln signed off on the hanging of 38 Native Americans in 1862 in Minnesota.

Lincoln's attitude towards Native Americans might have been affected by an earlier time in his life. His close friend Ward Lamon tells of the great impact that the murder of Lincoln's grandfather by Native Americans had on the future president. Lincoln said, "The story of his death by the Indians, and of Uncle Mordecai, then fourteen years old, killing one of the Indians, is the legend more strongly than all others imprinted upon my mind and memory." Lincoln's uncle Mordecai "hated Indians ever after" and even was reputed to murder innocent Native Americans when he had the chance. Lamon tells us "Many years afterward, his neighbors believed that he was in the habit of following peaceable Native Americans as they passed through the settlements, to get surreptitious shots at them and it was no secret that he had killed more than one in that way." So it should not surprise us that aged 23, Abraham Lincoln volunteered for a chance to fight Native Americans in the Black Hawk War.

Attacks from the North

The North then attacked and kicked the wild plains Native Americans off their land in pursuit of a transcontinental railroad to bring their territory under the domain of the industrialists and capitalists. In their book The South Was Right!James and Walter Kennedy document numerous cases of northern abuses of minorities. Federal General Pope ordered that the Native Americans "Are to be treated as maniacs or wild beasts, and by no means as people with whom treaties or compromises can be made." He declared, "It is my purpose to utterly exterminate the Sioux." Professor Thomas DiLorenzo quotes Lincoln's friend Grenville Dodge, Union general and railroad icon, who suggested using captive Native Americans as forced labor (I thought Republicans did not like slavery- though perhaps it was only when they were not master) on the railroads.

Republicans did not care for Native American rights. In the Personal Memoirs of U.S Grant, among his ruminations on the consequences of the conflict was "It is probable that the Indians would have had control of these lands [west] for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good." So the taking of land from the Native Americans was such an excellent "good" that it helped justify the evils of the civil war to our former Republican President and civil war "hero."

In Nothing Like it in the World: The Men Who Built The Transcontinental Railroad 1863-1869, Historian Stephen Ambrose quotes the Chicago Tribune newspaper as observing, "The railroad men...have an infallible remedy for the Indian trouble, that remedy is extermination. These men, most of them tender and gentle with the weak of their own race, speak with indifference of the wiping out of thousands of Papoos and Squaws." Ambrose then quotes General Sherman, "The more [Indians] we can kill this year, the less will have to be killed the next war, for the more I see of these Indians the more convinced I am that they all have to be killed or be maintained as a species of Paupers." Dodge said, "We've got to clear the dumb Indians out." Oliver Ames, President of the Union Pacific railroad, said, "I see nothing but extermination to the Indians as a result of their thieving disposition, and we shall probably have to come to this before we can run the [rail] road safely."

Before the war, northern abolitionist Republicans like William Seward had declared the removal of the Native Americans was necessary. Arthur Ferguson, Union Pacific Railroad surveyor, said, "I have no sympathy for the red devils…. May their dwelling places and habitations be destroyed. May the greedy crow hover over their silent corpses. May the coyote feast upon their stiff and festering carcasses." Drunk on industrial power, Sherman told the Native Americans, "We build iron roads, and you can't stop the locomotive any more than you can stop the sun or moon, and you must submit...we now offer you this, choose your homes, and live like white men, and we will help you all you want."

According to DiLorenzo in The Feds versus the Indians, "During an assault," Sherman instructed his troops, "the soldiers cannot pause to distinguish between male and female, or even discriminate as to age." He chillingly referred to this policy in an 1867 letter to Grant as "the final solution to the Indian problem," a phrase Hitler invoked some 70 years later." DiLorenzo said Phil Sheridan and Sherman popularized the phrase "a good Indian is a dead Indian." Sherman's ultimate objective was to eliminate the tribes. "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux," Sherman wrote to Ulysses S. Grant, "even to their extermination, men, women, and children." The Sioux must "feel the superior power of the Government."

The U.S. superintendent of Indian affairs, Clark Thompson, revealed the mindset of Republicans towards Native Americans and how to make them worship the same god [money] as the Yankees do.

"Many plans proposed to bring about a change of their habits, customs, and mode of living...his whole nature must be changed. He must have a white man's ambition, to be like him…to change the disposition of the Indian to one more mercenary and ambitious to obtain riches and teach him to value the position consequent upon the possession of riches."

-Clark W Thompson Superintendent Indian Affairs United States Congressional serial set, Volume 1117

The North could not allow anything or anyone, no matter what race, to get in its way of building an empire in the worship of its true god, progress. So, they would either exterminate or remake such culture that got in its way, either the South or the Native Americans. The South had experienced it from the Union and prophetically warned the Native Americans.

"Another, and perhaps the chief cause, is to get upon your rich lands and settle their squatters, who do not like to settle in slave States. They will settle upon your lands as fast as they choose, and the Northern people will force their Government to allow it. It is true they will allow your people small reserves—they give chiefs pretty large ones—but they will settle among you, overshadow you, and totally destroy the power of your chiefs and your nationality, and then trade your people out of the residue of their lands. Go North among the once powerful tribes of that country and see if you can find Indians living and enjoying power and property and liberty as do your people and the neighboring tribes from the South."

-Quoted in Annie Heloise Abel Ph.D. The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist An Omitted Chapter in the Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy Arthur H Clark Company Cleveland 1915

Distrust

It should be no wonder that the Native tribes distrusted the North and sided with the South when the war broke out.

"Resolved further.. We shall be left to follow the natural affections, education, institutions, and interests of our people, which indissolubly bind us in every way to the destiny of our neighbors and brethren of the Southern States upon whom we are confident we can rely for the preservation of our rights of life, liberty, and property, and the continuance of many acts of friendship, general counsel, and material support."

-Choctaws Council Resolutions February 7, 1861

The Native Americans, Jews, Catholics, and the South were diverse cultures that held to a live and let live attitude. They did not seek to conform each other to their image but allowed for diversity and self-governance. This was unlike the Yankees, who puritanically thought themselves superior to all and through military force, government coercion, sheer numbers, and forced indoctrination eradicated opposing cultures' ideologies and brought them all under its dominion. There no longer is any such thing as self-governance unless you are a disciple of the Yankee empire in America. This subjugation of opposing cultures and forced conformity seems a perfectly intolerant and discriminatory practice. While Cash is speaking of the South here, it equally applied to all non-conforming societies the Yankee empire came into contact with.

"The Civil War and Reconstruction represent in their primary aspect an attempt on the part of the Yankee to achieve by force what he had failed by political means: first, a free hand in the nation for the thievish aims of the tariff gang, and secondly, and far more fundamentally, the satisfaction of the instinctive urge of men in the mass to put down whatever differs from themselves—the will to make over the South in the prevailing American image and to sweep it into the main current of the nation."

-W. J. Cash The Mind of the South Vintage Books New York 1941

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

U.S. Civil War Hats

The headgear worn by soldiers during the Civil War presents a fascinating topic. Before the adoption of metal helmets for cranial protection, hats played a significant role in denoting rank, indicating branch of service, and serving as a means of personal expression, as exemplified by the distinctive plume worn by JEB Stuart.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Stonewall Jackson in a forage cap.

Kepi & Forage Cap

The kepi had been the most common headgear in the French Army. Its predecessor originally appeared during the 1830s, in the course of the initial stages of the occupation of Algeria, as a series of various lightweight cane-framed cloth undress caps called casquette d’Afrique. These were intended as alternatives to the heavier, cloth-covered leather French Army shako. As a light and comfortable headdress, it was adopted by the metropolitan (French mainland) infantry regiments for service and daily wear, with the less practical shako being relegated to parade use.

Etymologically, the term is a loanword of French: képi, itself a re-spelled version of the Alemannic German: Käppi, a diminutive form of Kappe, meaning “cap”. Modern-day baseball caps are the direct descendant of kepis.

In 1852, a new soft cloth cap was introduced for the campaign and off-duty. Called bonnet de police à visière, this was the first proper model of the kepi. The visor was generally squarish in shape and oversized and was referred to as bec de canard (duck bill). This kepi had no chinstrap (jugulaire). Subsequent designs reduced the size of the cap and introduced chinstraps and buttons.

The kepi became well known outside France during the Crimean War and was subsequently adopted in various forms by many other armies (including the U.S. and Russia) during the 1860s and 1870s.

The kepi emerged as the quintessential hat associated with Union soldiers, largely due to the superior options available to their Southern counterparts. Characterized by its flat circular crown and a prominent visor, the kepi featured a leather or cloth peak and a chinstrap made of either leather or cord.

Among Union forces, a style often referred to as the McClellan cap, was prevalent, with officers frequently embellishing their caps in accordance with French fashion influences. This style had a flat top and squared visor.

The forage cap, or bummer cap, called the McDowell cap, had a curved top based on the model 1858 forage cap This shapeless design was particularly favored by the eastern Union army, while troops in the West tended to opt for broad-brimmed felt hats. Some southern troops also wore a forage cap, most notably Stonewall Jackson.

Regulations established by the U.S. Army mandated that insignia be affixed to the top of the cap, displaying the branch of service—whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery—at the center, with the company letter positioned above and the regimental number below. In 1863, the Army of the Potomac introduced the corps badge as a means to enhance troop morale, which was subsequently incorporated onto the cap. For infantry soldiers, a bugle horn was placed beneath the disk, featuring the regimental number inscribed within the horn, the company letter situated above it, and the corps badge positioned at the top. However, it was common for soldiers to lack this complete set of insignia, and at times, only the branch of service, company letter, or regimental number insignia was displayed. Additionally, some units opted for colored variations of these insignia.

In the Confederate army, a color-coding system was employed to differentiate between various branches of service. The infantry was represented by blue, the cavalry by yellow, and the artillery by red.

These were later changed to a thin band with the color of the branch wrapped around the base of the cap to identify the area of service. All uniforms regardless of being Union or Confederate had prominent markings on them which identified whether a soldier was an enlisted man or an officer.

Slouch Hat

The slouch hat is one of the most enduring icons of the Confederate soldier, ranking alongside his bedroll, shell jacket and pants cuffs tucked into his socks.  Indeed, the slouch hat came to be the quintessential American military campaign headgear by the end of the Civil War. The Confederate slouch hat was adopted for numerous reasons: it was well-liked, practical and available (when caps were not). Despite the regulation prescribing the French kepi-style cap for wear by all soldiers and officers, many were not able to obtain the cap.  They had to use the common citizen slouch hat. Moreover, the slouch hat was found to be more practical: it was comfortable and provided better protection against the elements.

The slouch hat is a wide-brimmed felt or cloth hat often, although not always, with a chinstrap. The name "slouch hat" refers to the fact that one side droops down as opposed to the other which is pinned against the side of the crown. The style is highly variable and personal, with various types of crowns and crown heights, brim widths and degrees of softness.

This style of hat has been worn for many hundreds of years, especially during the English Civil War during the 17th century when it became associated with the forces of King Charles I, the Cavaliers, but it was also fashionable for the aristocracy throughout Europe.

The slouch hat was introduced to this country by a spirited Hungarian patriot named Louis Kossuth. In 1852, Mr. Kossuth completed a speaking tour of our country where he sought and received a great deal of support for Hungarian liberties after his country had become dominated by the Czar of Russia. Louis Kossuth was described by William Cullen Bryant as a man who is “fearless, eloquent, large of heart and of mind, whose one thought is the salvation of oppressed Hungary, unfortunate, but undiscouraged, struck down in the battle of liberty, but great in defeat, and gathering strength for triumphs to come.” From a banquet in honor of Louis Kossuth with the Press of New York, December 9, 1851.

Hardee Hat

The Hardee hat, also known as the Model 1858 Dress Hat and nicknamed the "Jeff Davis", was the regulation dress hat for enlisted men in the Union Army. The Hardee hat was also worn by Confederate soldiers. However, most soldiers found the black felt hat to be too hot and heavy and preferred a forage cap or slouch hat.  The Hardee hat was worn most often by western Union troops, but also by the Iron Brigade, which were popularly known as "The Black Hats".

The hat was named after William J. Hardee, a career officer in the U.S. Army from 1838 until resigning his commission on January 31, 1861. Hardee was Commandant of Cadets at West Point from 1856 to 1860.

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Images

McClellan cap.

Different hats.

Regimental Lt Colonel kepi.

African Americans who Supported the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War

In spite of the Confederacy’s desire to preserve slavery, a number of African Americans actually supported the Confederates during the U.S. Civil War. Here, Jeb Smith looks at a wide range of ways that African Americans supported the Confederacy from financial support to the military.

A picture of Marlboro Jones. He was an African-American servant to a white Confederate soldier.

"These African Americans were real fighting men whose combat performances should not be silenced out of respect for these brave men and their sacrifices, despite the vigorous organized effort of today's politically driven historians and other black confederate deniers." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker Blacks in Grey Uniforms A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865, America Through Time 2019 

"I myself have collected over 1,400 newspaper articles on this subject published between 1861 and 1865. That's a lot of ink spilled over something that some today call a "myth." You will find that these activist historians are not telling you the entire story." 

-Shane Anderson Black Southern Support for Secession and War the Abbeville Institute July 22, 2019 

The existence of black confederates is a debated and controversial subject. A search of the internet will show no shortage of articles, blogs, and videos of radical pro-North author's claiming black confederates are a "myth." They ask why a Southern African American would defend the Confederacy when blacks were treated horribly; rather they desired to run into the arms of the first white Yankee savior they saw. After all, the war was over slavery- the North fighting to liberate the slaves and the South to preserve the institution so southern blacks would jump at the chance to help the North and overthrow their racist masters.  

If anything, I am attempting to show that the winner wrote the history. If the South did not fight to preserve slavery, if the North did not fight to free the slaves, and if slaves were generally well treated and content, blacks supporting the Southern cause and their homeland, friends, and family should not surprise us. Some, for political purposes, seek to deny that blacks willingly sided with the South. Why should we allow these modern whites to tell us who blacks were allowed to support? 

Pro-north authors such as Eric Foner and Kevin Levin will argue that it is a myth that hundreds of thousands of blacks served in the confederate army as armed soldiers. These authors have set up a straw man to knockdown since it is easy to show hundreds of thousands of blacks were not soldiers. They can then ridicule "lost cause" authors and the sons of confederate veterans for claims of hundreds of thousands of black confederates. All in the hopes of disqualifying any other documentation of black confederates. Yet, I have noticed that even those who claim black confederates are a myth will simultaneously admit blacks served in the southern armies. In the live stream conversation Fighting for Freedom the Civil War and its Legacies, Eric Foner said, "There is no question that some small number of African Americans did volunteer and serve in confederate armies." 

Further, having searched the internet, including the hated Sons of Confederate Veterans, and having read many "lost cause" books on the subject, I can say no one claims hundreds of thousands of blacks fought as soldiers for the Confederacy. The Sons of Confederate Veterans website, in the article The Role of Black Soldiers in the Confederate Army, reads, "There was between 50,000 to 100,000 blacks that served in the Confederate Army as cooks, blacksmiths, and yes, even soldiers. "The majority is in the noncombatant form. On every estimate I have read, they always classify noncombatant services as cooks, musicians, etc., as those counted in the estimates.

As modern statists, Foner and Levin count only federally recognized soldiers and then feel free to dismiss the claims of large numbers of southern black soldiers. If cooks, musicians, and those forced into service do not count as actual soldiers, then the southern and northern servicemen drafted (white and black) are not actual soldiers. And since the vast majority of soldiers, North and South, were state volunteers, they were not actual soldiers either, according to these authors. They must fight only for the master, the federal government, to be "true" soldiers. 

One argument presented to deny black confederates is to tell us the many observations of thousands of blacks in service in the southern armies were of noncombatant form. This, of course, is often true. However, a great many observed soldiers as well. The logic they use to counter this is that these observers must be incorrect since the Confederacy (federal) did not approve blacks until late in the war. Once more, only federally recognized soldiers are "true" soldiers in their minds. So when we do see these armed black confederates, these are not "real soldiers" since the Confederacy does not recognize them.

These historians are coming from our modern nationalistic views and looking back to antebellum America. The federal government education had raised them, so it was hard for them to understand the time when the states had authority or where federal law did not control them. Thus only federal soldiers count in their minds, and any documents that say otherwise must be declared false. States or individuals could not have equipped slaves since the federal did not. Thus in Levin's mind, the fact that Confederate General Cleburne and other confederates pushed to arm slaves as Confederate [federal] recognized soldiers in 1864 proves that there were no black soldiers in the Confederacy before this time!!! Otherwise, why push for federally recognized soldiers in 1864?

One argument used by Levin is to point out Southerners' resistance to arming large numbers of slaves and the fear of them running away to northern lines. At most, it only proves that many masters feared losing their property and the loyalty of slaves. Believing not all slaves were or would be loyal to the South. Northern whites had the same fears of arming blacks. And these fears did play a role in why the federal arming of slaves in the Confederacy took so long. However, this does not show that owners and local authorities did not arm southern blacks. 

Levin also points out that Black Confederate soldiers were little known before the internet and that the Sons of Confederate Veterans initiated the recent popularity of the subject in response to the famous movie Roots in the 1970s. Even if this is true, that does not refute that black confederates were a historical reality. If a popular movie that influences public perception is released on any subject, there is usually a backlash from the other side wishing to give a fuller , more accurate portrayal. Because Roots portrayed blacks as heavily mistreated, it is not surprising that in response, the SCV would look through history and use examples to counter. To remove it from a Civil War context, transubstantiation was declared Catholic dogma at Trent in 1551. But this does not prove it was a 16th-century invention; it was the majority opinion down through Christian history, and had been official doctrine since the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215. It was declared dogma in response to the early Reformation denial of the teaching. Likewise, the increase in awareness and books on black confederates is in response to the internet and, as Levin said, Roots. 

Very few of these arguments are about historical data. If you want to see the role of presuppositions and imaginative ways in which we are to "properly" understand newspaper photos and various other examples of black confederates, watch Kevin Levin's speech Searching for Black Confederates: The Civil War's Most Persistent Myth at the US National Archives. One will find politics, philosophy, and worldview are far more important than historical data. If these authors wish only to prove that hundreds of thousands of blacks did not willingly serve the federal government of the Confederacy, then I think they will find no one will object. 

However, I define a soldier as one who willingly took up arms for the Confederacy or fought under a Confederate general regardless of federal recognition. In other words, state militia and individuals are actual soldiers. The Confederacy left it up to the states to decide if slaves were to fight as soldiers. If the South objected to the federal government's involvement with slave property in the old Union, why would they allow the confederate government to do the same in the South? So slaves' involvement was up to the state and, more importantly, the slave and master. Free blacks were also left to local control. 

"Even before the opening of the conflict, Southerners began to enroll free blacks for service with the state militias, sometimes by state law or by purely local action. The use of free blacks in the military was varied, as they saw service as laborers, support staff or in rare instances as soldiers." 

-Frank Edward Deserino University College London A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London Department of History University College London July 2001

This is not intended to show a vast treasure of previously unknown material but as a summary of some of the findings of historians on the subject of black confederates that the general public does not encounter. Firstly, we will look at some examples of how southern blacks supported the Confederacy.

Southern Patriots

"About sixty free negroes volunteered and went down to Fort Macon to do battle for their country, while another gave twenty-five dollars cash to help support the war; and still another, who is a poor man, having just arrived at our wharf with a load of wood for sale, delivered it up to the town auctioneer, with a request to sell it and appropriate it in the same way." 

– Richmond Daily Dispatch, April 19, 1861 

Just as John Brown was mistaken when he believed slaves would join him in revolt against the South, the abolitionists also predicted massive slave revolts during the war. Instead, it could be argued that Southern blacks sided with their own country. In Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, Ervin Jordan wrote that "Black confederate loyalty was more widespread than American historians has acknowledged." And while blacks who volunteered for the Union often had to be protected from whites, Southern blacks needed no such protection. Southerners were excited to have blacks volunteer.

"The free negroes of New Orleans, La., held a public meeting and began the organization of a battalion, with officers of their own race, with the approval of the State government, which commissioned their negro officers. When the Louisiana militia was reviewed, the Native Guards (negro) made up, in part, the first division of the State troops. Elated at the success of being first to place negroes in the field together with white troops, the commanding general sent the news over the wires to the jubilant confederacy: "New Orlean, November 23,1861. "Over 28,000 troops were reviewed today by Governor Moore, Major-General Lovell and Brigadier-General Ruggles. The line was over seven miles long; one regiment comprised 1,400 free colored men."

 -Joseph T Wilson The Black Phalanx African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War Da Capo Press New York 1994

Tens of thousands of Southern blacks, both slave and free, supported the confederate cause. Many southern blacks wanted to defend their country from the Yankee invaders. Many enslaved blacks had deep loyalty and family ties with their masters and followed them off to war. While it might be hard for some to believe today, many African American slaves and slave owners wanted slavery to continue and fought to protect the institution. In The Negro in the South, Booker T Washington writes, "A few colored men, it is said, were actually enrolled and enlisted as soldiers in the confederate army, fighting for their own continued enslavement."

"One may get the idea, from what I have said, that there was bitter feeling toward the white people on the part of my race, because of the fact that most of the white population was away fighting in a war which would result in keeping the Negro in slavery if the South was successful. In the case of the slaves on our place this was not true, and it was not true of any large portion of the slave population in the South where the Negro was treated with anything like decency." 

-Booker T Washington Up From Slavery Value Classics Reprint 1901 

As slave owners, many blacks defended slavery as an institution vital to their financial well-being. One Union soldier described a free black church as "Half-crazed black secessionists." Wealthy colored plantation owners such as South Carolina's William Ellison donated large sums of money to the Confederacy and bought confederate bonds and treasury notes in support. Ellison stopped growing cotton and instead grew food to help feed the confederate armies. Ellison's grandson John Buckner volunteered and fought for the 1st South Carolina artillery and helped defend Ft Wagner from the famous assault made by the 54th Massachusetts colored regiment. 

In the summer of 1861, The Winston Salem NC newspaper, People’s Press, reported that "fifteen free men of color volunteered for state service" and that they were in fine spirits and wore a "We will die for the South emblem." In New Bern, "fifteen to twenty free Negros came forward to volunteer their service to defend the city." A newspaper in Lynchburg, Virginia, reported on the 70 free blacks who enlisted to defend Virginia "Three cheers for the patriotic Negros of Lynchburg." 

Historian Phillip Tucker quotes a statement by the free mulatto population of South Carolina "Our allegiance is due to SO Ca. and in her defense, we are willing to offer up our lives, and all that is dear to us." And on March 21, 1863, the Nashville Daily Union Tennessee reported, "Negro rebel Cavalry pickets on the south bank of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg shows that negroes are ready enough to serve masters on the field, and that the rebels are ready enough to make use of them serve as common soldiers...these negroes are well in the service, as in their sympathy, of the south."

Abolitionist Horace Greeley published The American Conflict in 1866, and he quotes the following wartime newspapers reporting on black patriotism in the South. "A Washington dispatch to The Evening Post (New York), about this time, set forth that—"A gentleman from Charleston says that everything there betokens active preparations for fight…negroes busy in building batteries, so far from inclining to insurrection, were grinning from ear to ear at tile prospect of shooting the Yankees." The Charleston Mercury of January 3 said: "We learn that 150 able-bodied free colored men of Charleston, yesterday offered their services gratuitously to the Governor, to hasten forward the important work of throwing up redoubts wherever needed along our coast."  The Memphis Avalanche joyously proclaimed that - a procession of several hundred stout negro men, members of the "domestic institution," marched through our streets yesterday in military order, under the command of Confederate officers. They were all armed and equipped with shovels, axes, blankets, etc. A merrier set was never seen. They were brimful of patriotism, shouting for Jeff Davis and singing war songs."

"About fifty free negroes in Amelia county have offered themselves to the Government for any service. In our neighboring city of Petersburg, two hundred free negroes offered for any work that might be assigned to them, either to fight under white officers, dig ditches, or anything that could show their desire to serve Old Virginia. In the same city, a negro hackman came to his master, and insisted, with tears in his eyes, that he should accept all his savings, $100, to help equip the volunteers. – The free negroes of Chesterfield have made a similar proposition. Such is the spirit, among bond and free, through the whole of the State." 

 – The Daily Dispatch, April 25, 1861, Quoted in Shane Anderson Black Southern Support for Secession and War Abbeville Institute July 22, 2019

Financial Support

Many blacks supported the Confederacy in a non-military capacity, and "enthusiasm with which many blacks endorsed secession" was widespread. Large-scale demonstrations of blacks were held in Petersburg and New Orleans. In Petersburg, blacks offered to construct fortifications for the Confederacy, telling the mayor of Petersburg:

"We are willing to aid Virginians cause to the utmost extent of our ability….there is not an unwilling heart among us." Charles Tinsley, Spokesman for Petersburg free blacks 1861. When handed a confederate flag he said "I could feel no greater pride."

 - Mrs J Blakeslee Frost The Rebellion in the United States or the war of  1861 Hartford, CT: Published by the Author, 1862

Blacks in Vicksburg, Mississippi, donated $1,000 to the war effort. In General Stand Watie's Confederate Indians, Frank Cunningham tells how it became custom for slaves to hold balls and concerts to give money to the war effort in Arkansas. Free and slave negroes gave a ball at 50 cents ahead for support for the Confederacy and General Hindman of Arkansas, who stated the local blacks "Have displayed much loyalty and patriotism in their donations to the confederate cause." Cunningham also tells of General Albert Pike's slave Brutus, who kept $63,000 safe from the federals during the battle at Pea Ridge. He returned to his master, who gave him his freedom in payment, but Brutus did not accept it and served General Pike instead. James Muschett, a free black store owner in Virginia, donated food, clothes, and blacksmith services to the confederate government. Later he was imprisoned by the Union for being a spy and a confederate sympathizer. 

J K Obatala writes about a slave named Henry Jones who donated $465 in gold to the Confederate government, and the Union Milledgeville, Georgia, on August 26, 1863, reported on the balls all over the South where blacks were donating large sums of money to the cause. In The Unlikely Story of Blacks Who Were Loyal to Dixie. Obatala writes, "Many slaves made financial and material contributions to the Confederacy. In Alabama, William Yancy's slaves brought $60 worth of watermelons to Montgomery for the soldiers." Historian E Merton Coulter wrote, "It became custom for slaves to hold balls and concerts and give the money...to aid soldiers." These were not isolated incidents but common actions throughout the South.

The "Confederate Ethiopian Serenaders" singers used all their funds to finance gunboats and munitions for the Confederacy. Horace King of Alabama gave clothes to soldiers. Just two months before Appomattox, blacks gave dinner to confederate soldiers in Louisburg, Virginia. A Fairfax County free black sold 28 acres of land and donated the money to the defense of Virginia. During the war, blacks gave to help build a monument for Stonewall Jackson. Former North Carolina slave David Blunt said, "Yes mam, de days on de plantation wuz de happy days..he hated de yankees for killing Massa Tom. In fact, we all hated de Yankees." It seems not to have been uncommon for blacks to side with the South.

"All de slaves hate de Yankees an when de southern soldiers came late in de night all de ******* got out of de bed an holdin torches high dey march behin de soldiers, all of dem singin We'll hang Abe Lincoln on de Sour Apple Tree. yes mam, dey wuz sorry dat dey wuz free an' dey ain't got no reason to be glad, case dey wuz happier den dan now." 

 - Alice Baugh North Carolina Slave Narratives, reminiscing about her enslaved mother’s Stories

"The consequential manner of the negro, and the supreme contempt with which he spoke to his prisoner, were most amusing. This little episode of a Southern slave leading a white Yankee soldier through a Northern village, alone and of his own accord, would not have been gratifying to an abolitionist. Nor would the sympathizers both in England and in the North feel encouraged if they could hear the language of detestation and contempt with which the numerous negroes with the Southern armies speak of their liberators." 

-Lt.-Colonel Arthur J. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States 1864

Information From Black Civilians

Southern blacks helped spread vital information to confederates or acted as spies. Former Arkansas Slave James Gill, a young boy at the time, said of his family "Us was Confedrits all de while...but de Yankees, dey didn’ know dat we was Confedrits." Slave Martin Robinson was hanged for falsely leading the federal troops the wrong way during the Kilpatrick- Dahlgren raid in 64. Slaves acting as spies for the South was so common that Union General Halleck gave his "General order number three" that disallowed any blacks into the federal lines because blacks were acting as runaway slaves but, in reality, were southern spies who gave vital information back to the Confederates. On November 20, 1861, Major-General Halleck wrote, "It has been represented that important information respecting the numbers and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil it is directed that no such person be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom." 

Slave Burrel Hemphill refused to give information on his master's hidden money and silverware, so Sherman’s men tied a rope to his ankle and dragged him back and forth by a horse until he died, still never saying a word. Federal soldiers after Bull Run were too trusting of southern blacks when they asked slaves for food; instead, the slaves brought them to confederate lines, and they were taken prisoner. In Thomas Jordan and J.P Pryors The Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, the authors tell of a local negro who helped Forrest capture federal cavalry with information helpful to confederates. Another local black helped General Forrest by leading the federals into a confederate trap. In 1864 a free black named Goler misled union soldiers of his loyalty by providing food and shelter, only then to notify the confederates who captured the federal soldiers in the night. 

Georgia's governor Joseph E Brown is recorded in The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia Volume 2 stating "The country and the army are mainly dependent upon slave labor for support… it is impossible for the women and children to support themselves." With their masters away, slaves worked the plantations. Slaves' work kept the families from starving and allowed whites to fight the war. Federal General M.C Meigs wrote, "The labor of the colored man supports the rebel soldier, enables him to leave his plantation to meet our armies, builds his fortifications, cooks his food, and sometimes aids him on the picket by rare skill with the rifle." Slave Henry Warfield of Warren County, Mississippi, said, "Negroes were used by the Confederates long before they were used by the Union forces...and a large number of these fought by the side of their masters or made it possible for the master to fight." And as US Grant said, slaves "worked in the fields and took care of the families while white able bodied men were at the front fighting." 

Confederate General Richard Taylor [son of President Taylor] said: "Wives and little ones remained safe at home, surrounded by thousands of faithful slaves." With the men gone, slaves could have left for the North or refused to work, yet the overwhelming majority worked so the master could leave to fight. Often masters put a trusted slave in charge of the family while gone. In many ways, this trusted slave took over the master's role.

"In order to defend and protect the women and children who were left on the plantations when the white males went to war, the slaves would have laid down their lives. The slave who was selected to sleep in the" big house" during the absence of the males was considered to have the place of honour. Any one attempting to harm "young Mistress" or "old Mistress" during the night would have had to cross the dead body of the slave to do so...As a rule, not only did the members of my race entertain no feelings of bitterness against the whites before and during the war, but there are many instances of Negroes tenderly caring for their former masters and mistresses who for some reason have become poor and dependent since the war. I know of instances where the former masters of slaves have for years been supplied with money by their former slaves to keep them from suffering."                                           

-Booker T Washington Up from Slavery Value Classics Reprint 1901

After the South officially allowed federal black soldiers in the armies, Abraham Lincoln took the positives away from the action. He said, "There is one thing about negros fighting for the rebels... they cannot at the same time fight in their army, and stay home and make bread for them."

Another way southern blacks supported the cause was in what today is considered an unpardonable sin, moral support by waving the confederate flag. The Central Georgian, April 24, 1861, reported, "Secession flags dot the country along the route from Wilmington, and even the negroes waved the Confederate banner at the cars as they passed." 

Service in the Confederate Military

"The credit of having first conquered their prejudices against the employment of Blacks, even as soldiers, is fairly due to the Rebels." 

-Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-65: Volume II Hartford. Published by O. D. Chase and Company. 1866

"Thousands of black southerners voluntarily supported the Confederate cause, ignoring an offer of federal freedom and, when allowed, to do so, took up arms to defend Dixie."

 -Charles Barrow, J.H Segars and R.B. Rosenburg, Black Confederates Pelican Publishing Company GretnaLouisiana 2004

Blacks, both free and slave, offered their service in the Confederate military. An estimated 58,000 blacks served in Confederate armies in a noncombatant role as cooks, musicians, chaplains, medics, scouts, or manual labor. Unlike the Federal army, Confederate armies gave equal pay to black service members (and soldiers) from the start of the war. The North did not do so until late in the war. Likewise, the southern blacks were in integrated units while the Federal troops segregated black union soldiers.

In Tenting Tonight, celebrated historian James Robertson writes, "Some slaves felt great loyalty to their masters and asked to be allowed to take up arms to defend what was, after all, their homeland too." Slave-owning Southern soldiers often brought along a slave with whom they had a close personal relationship. They had played together, ate together, worked together, and now wanted to defend their family and homeland together. Historian Phillip Tucker quotes from black confederate Tom Phelps who wrote home in June of 1861 "I will leave…today for a scout about the woods for yankees give my love to mistress and master…. Ps goodbye to the white folks until I killed a yankee." Azariah Bostwick of the 31st Georgia Infantry wrote home, "He [southern blacks] is no better to fight for his country than I am, my home is his." Even slaves not loyal to the South showed loyalty to their masters. A slave at Antietam risked his life to pull his master to safety before then running across the battlefield to the federal soldiers and freedom.

"A good many white confederates, who mostly hailed from the yeomentry, or small farmer class, actually considered these black confederates to be best friends and faithful companions and vice versa, because they knew each other so well, after having grown up together since childhood…A general familiar-like sentiment towards blacks was often demonstrated by white confederate soldiers, from lowly private to high ranking officers, and this has been fully revealed in their personal letters that were written from 1861-1865. After all blacks and whites shared a common southern culture and heritage, and especially in regard to love for their homeland that was now under threat." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker Blacks in Grey Uniforms: A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865 America Through Time 2019 

When interviewed decades later, many servants often were proud of their master's ability to fight Yankees "Why mass can whale a dozen of em fore coffee is hot, fair fight." Often the personal slaves would serve as cooks or general servants, but sometimes, they would be armed and join in a fight in various circumstances, or be armed as soldiers by their masters. Isaac Stier of Mississippi said, "When de big war broke out I sho' stuck to my Marster an' I fit de Yankees same as he did. I went in de battles' long side of him an' us both fit under Marse Robert E. Lee." Herndon Bogan of North Carolina told his master, "Ide rather go wid you ter de war, please sur, massa, let me go wid you ter fight dem yanks... old massa got shot one night an pap grabs de gun fore hit de earth an lets de yanks have it." 

Ervin Jordan wrote in Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, "Body servants fought for the south if given the chance and occasionally replaced fainthearted white rebel soldiers." He gives an example where during the Seven Days Battles, Westley, a body servant, took the weapons from a frightened white confederate and killed a Yankee with almost every shot and was "An inspiration to the white soldiers." A servant named Jem was described as "A black fire eater," a strong supporter of secession, and fought at First Manassas. Other servants were thrown in as artillerymen at First Manassas. Historian Phillip Tucker quotes the Evansville Daily Journal of Indiana who mistakenly reported a regiment of confederate negro cavalry at Bull Run when in reality it was 30-40 armed servants who joined in the pursuit of retreating Federals.

Slave Primus Kelly volunteered for  the 8th Texas Cavalry and fought in the battles. Likewise, 12th Virginia Cavalry captain George Baylor's two slaves Tom and Overton "picked up arms" and "Joined in the company charges." Former Mississippi slave Henry Warfield observed "Negroes were used by the Confederates long before they were used by the Union forces...and a large number of these fought by the side of their masters."

On rare occasions, masters would send a slave to serve in their place. Former slave Geroge Kye said, "When the war came along I was a grown man, and I went to serve because the old master was too old to go, but he had to send somebody anyways, I served as Geroge Stover."

While not official in the ranks of the units, some of these body servants would serve as sharpshooters. Ervin Jordan documents Federal soldier George Hapman of the 89th NY reported killing a "Rebel sharpshooter negro" in June of 1863. Herman Clarke of the 117th NY wrote home that he was ambushed by a "****** sharpshoter." Tucker gives many examples of this class of southern soldiers.

One southern black sharpshooter around Yorktown earned a reputation for his aim among union soldiers who wrote of, "A rebel negro riflemen, who through his skill as a markeman, had done more injury to our men than any dozen of his white compeers." This sharpshooter was so good he eventually had to be taken out by the Federals' famous sharpshooter "California Joe," as reported in the NY Herald under "Sniper duels with black confederates." In June of 1862, George Hapman of the 89th NY wrote home that he had a ring made out of the tree that "Joe shot the rebel sharpshooter ****** out of."

Servant snipers became so common that on January the 10th, 1863, Harper's Weekly did a front-page illustration of two black confederate snipers titled "Rebel negro pickets as seen through a fiberglass." Tucker again quotes the Daily Sun of Columbus, Georgia, reporting on a servant soldier at Belmont. "In the recent battle at Belmont, Lieutenant Shelton [13th Arkansas]…had his servant Jack in the fight. Both Jack and his master were wounded, but not till they had made the most heroic efforts to drive back the insolent invaders. Finally, after Jack had fired at the enemy 27 times, he fell seriously wounded in the arm. Jack's son was on the field and loaded the rifle for his father, who shot at the enemy three times after he was upon the ground." Tucker quotes James G Bates of the 13th Indiana vol infantry writing home, "The rebels have negro soldiers in their army. One of their best sharp shooters, and the boldest of them all here is a negro." Thomas Knox, a journalist for the NY Herald, reported on the battle of Chickasaw Bayou "On our right a negro sharpshooter has been observed whose exploits are deserving of notice. He mounts a breastwork regardless of all danger, and getting sight of a federal soldier, draws up his musket at arm's length and fires, never failing of hitting his mark."

Black Confederate Soldiers

"As a matter of fact, it was in the Confederate armies that the first negro soldiers were enlisted. During the latter part of April, 1861, a Negro company at Nashville, Tennessee made up of "free people of color" offered its services to the Confederate Government. Shortly after, a recruiting office was opened for free Negroes at Memphis Tennessee."

-Booker T Washington, The Story of the Negro; the Rise of the Race from Slavery  New York, Doubleday 1909 

"It is now pretty well established, that there are at the present moment many colored men in the Confederate army doing duty not only as cooks, servants and laborers, but as real soldiers, having muskets on their shoulders, and bullets in their pockets, ready to shoot down loyal troops, and do all that soldiers may to destroy the Federal Government and build up that of the traitors and rebels. There were such soldiers at Manassas, and they are probably there still." 

-Frederick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, September 1861 

Thousands of Southern blacks loyal to Dixie fought as soldiers in Confederate armies. Southern states and local militia allowed blacks into service from the outset of the war, while the North initially rejected the idea. Virginia and Tennessee, in particular, set up recruitment stations for all able-bodied blacks. The colored Tennessee militia was described as "Brimful of patriotism, shouting for Jeff Davis and singing war songs." In Memphis, Tennessee. Two black regiments were raised in September, becoming the first state to authorize black soldiers. 

"The legislature of Tennessee...enacted in June, 1861, a law authorizing the governor—"To receive into the military service of the State all male free persons of color, between the age of 15 and 50, who should receive $8 per month, clothing and rations." 

-Joseph T Wilson The Black Phalanx African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War Da Capo Press New York 1994

The "Native Guards, Louisiana" consisted of 1,500 free colored volunteers from Louisiana who supplied themselves. They stated they were fighting because "The free colored population of Louisiana …own slaves and they are dearly attached to their native land … and they are ready to shed their blood for her defense. They have no sympathy for abolitionism; no love for the North, but they have plenty for Louisiana …They will fight for her in 1861 as they fought in 1814-1815." Swearing to the Louisianan Governor to defend the Confederacy, they became the first civil war unit to appoint black officers. On May 12, after the capture of New Orleans, Bailey Frank of the 34th NY volunteers wrote: "There is no mistake, but the rebels have black soldiers for I have seen them brought in as prisoners of war, I saw one who had the stripes of an ordinary Sargent on his coat." 

The very first land battle of the war in Hampton, Virginia, on June 10, 1861, involved a black confederate. Tucker reports that Sam, a servant soldier of Captain Richard Ashe, was the hero of the battle. Sam shot Union major Theodore Winthrop, stopping the advance of the federals. Winthrop was the first Union officer killed in battle. (Note: three different white soldiers also claimed to have killed Winthrop.) Tucker also reports on the battle of New Market, Virginia, where local black militia helped win the day. The NY Herald, on December 28, 1861, reported, "The rebels have an entire company of infantry composed of negroes." And "The skirmishers of the 20th NY vol regiment discovered the enemy, consisting of three companies of infantry. Among them one company of negroes, who appeared in the front, and made the attack." The local militia fought so well defending their home state, the Milwaukee Daily News headlined in January, "white soldiers outdone by blacks." One federal officer they quoted from the battle said, "Fifty armed negroes flanked the whites formed the center, and they fought better than their white fellows." And "Negro infantry opened fire on our men...the wounded men testify positively they were shot by negroes, and that not less than 700 were present, armed with muskets." On December 23, 1861, NY Tribune wrote of the "Attack on our soldiers by armed negroes." In all, six patriotic southern blacks were killed defending their homeland in the battle. After the battle, Ervin Jordan quotes a NY soldier who wrote, "If they fight us with negroes, why should we not fight them with negroes too?.... let us fight the devil with fire."

Likewise, Jordan reports the 1st Ohio Volunteer were was attacked on June 17, 1861, by the 1st South Carolina, accompanied by "A body of 150 armed negroes." Black members of the 1st Regiment Virginia Cavalry company H killed a Union soldier on July 2, 1861, at Falling Waters. Phillip Powers wrote to his wife that an armed black in his company shot and killed an escaping federal. General D.Stuart was quoted in the Army and Navy Gazette reporting, "The enemy, and especially their armed negroes, did dare to rise and fire, and did serious execution upon our men. The casualties in the brigade were 11 killed, 40 wounded, and 4 missing; aggregate, 55." 

Black fought with units at Petersburg. Bull Run, Vicksburg, Seven Days, Brandy Station, and Antietam. Frank Cunningham tells of armed negroes with no uniforms who fought for the Confederacy in Arkansas under a McIntosh regiment in March 1862. Both free and enslaved blacks fought under general Forrest, who after the war said: "Better Confederates did not live." In his book The Appomattox Campaign, Chris Calkins reports a skirmish on April 5, 1865, when black and white Confederate soldiers defended a confederate wagon train but were eventually captured by the 1st Pennsylvania and 24th NY cavalry. The federals reported that among the captured black prisoners some were termed "teamsters." After Gettysburg, the NY Herald, July 11, 1863, "Reported among the rebel prisoners were seven blacks in Confederate uniforms fully armed as soldiers." 

Thomas Tobi, a black man, served with the Army of Northern Virginia as a volunteer from May 12, 1861, to April 16, 1865,. A free man of color, Charles Lutz of the 8th LA volunteer infantry, was a two-time POW during the war. He fought at major engagements in Virginia and was first captured at Chancellorsville. Six blacks joined the Goochland light artillery and fought at Chaffin's Bluff. In August 1861, near Hampton, Virginia, Union army Colonel John W. Phelps of the 1st Vermont Infantry reported artillery manned by Negroes. 

"The most liberal calculation could not give them more than 64,000 men. Over 3,000 Negroes must be included in this number. These were clad in all kinds of uniforms, not only in cast-off or captured United States uniforms, but in coats with Southern buttons, State buttons, etc. These were shabby, but not shabbier or seedier than those worn by white men in the rebel ranks. Most of the Negroes had arms, rifles, muskets, sabers, bowie-knives, dirks, etc. They were supplied with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, etc and they were an integral portion of the Southern Confederate army. They were seen riding on horses and mules, driving wagons, riding on caissons, in ambulances, with the staff of generals and promiscuously mixing it up with all the Rebel horde."

 -Union Sanitation Commission Inspector Dr. Louis Steiner, Sept. 1862 

"William Colen Revels was twenty years old when he volunteered for Confederate service, and was one of the first men of any color in Surry County, North Carolina, to march off to war. He spent the greater part of the war in the 21 North Carolina Infantry, and is listed on the rolls as a "Negro." He was wounded in the leg at Winchester, and caught a bullet in the right thigh at Gettysburg, probably on East Cemetery Hill on July 2 1863." 

-Frank Edward Deserino University College London A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London Department of History University College London July, 2001

How Many Black Confederates Fought?

"We were defeated, routed and driven from the field. ... It was not alone the white man's victory, for it was won by slaves. Yes, the Confederates had three regiments of blacks in the field, and they maneuvered like veterans, and beat the Union men back."

-William Henry Johnson, 8th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry at Manassas Quoted in Kari A Kornell African Americans in the Civil War Abdo Publishing 2016

"At least nine documented blacks….served in the ranks of the 6th Louisiana Calvary...another company of enthusiastic blacks Louisianan troopers hailed from a vibrant free black community of Catholic mulattoes whitch was known as Isle Brevels these hard riding black cavalrymen...slashing with sabers at a target dummy with the appropriate name of "abe lincoln." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker, Blacks in Grey Uniforms; A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865 America Through Time 2019 

After researching the question, Harvard professor John Stauffer concluded, "Thousands of Southern slaves and freedmen fought willingly and loyally on the side of the Confederacy." There is no question blacks willingly fought for the South; Historian Phillip Tucker writes, "To deny the fact that these courageous black rebels, free and slave, risked their lives in fighting on the battlefield has been a great injustice rooted in personal agendas that have little to do with history." 

However, it is impossible to tell how many blacks fought for the South as not all the records survived the war, nor were they all recorded. Estimates range from a few thousand to 10,000. Historians Stauffer and Tucker both estimate between three and ten thousand in total. Historian John Winters estimates that 3,000 black and mulattoes came from Louisiana alone, the state that provided more colored troops to the Confederacy than any other. Of course, we must define what a soldier is. If we only count those after the confederate congress officially recruited black soldiers in the regular army in 1865, then less than 1,000 served. If we accept a black man armed as an individual, in mixed regiments, or in-state militia units, fighting under a confederate general, then I would guess at least a few thousand. In some cases, blacks might have been forced by their master or white officer to help fight in battle; these would not count as soldiers, in my opinion.

However, there were a great many slaves who wanted to fight, but their masters would not allow them. Masters would send their sons to die, but not their slaves. In a speech given on February 9, 1865, Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin said, "Let us now say to every negro who wishes to go into the ranks on condition of being free, go and fight—you are free. My own negroes have been to me and said, 'Master, set us free and we'll fight for you." 

The Slave Narratives provide many examples of slaves wanting to go to war with their masters, but either their masters were unwilling to send them, or they were too young. Many free mulattoes had to sneak into the service to fight. One Confederate who pushed for the freeing of slaves and their enlistment by the Confederate federal government, was General Lee, who said he "Regrets the unwillingness of owners to permit their slaves to enter the service." And Charles Marshall wrote to General R.S Ewell on March 27, 1865, "The state authorities can do nothing to get those negroes who are wanting to join the army, but whose masters refuse their consent."

Large numbers of southern blacks wanted to join but many stubborn slave owners were unwilling. In fact, some slaves, like William Rose of the 1st SC Infantry, ran away to join the army as a musician.

"Every precaution should be taken to insure proper and kind treatment of the negroes and to render them contented in the service...there should be a system of rewards too, for good conduct and industry...most of the negroes are accustomed to something of this sort on the plantations." 

-J.F Gilmer Major-General and Chief of the Engineer Bureau 1864 

When the Confederate Congress did authorize the enlistment of federal black confederates, they did so with fair treatment in mind as statements like "primary importance that the negroes should know that the service is voluntary on their part" and "harshness...or offensive language or conduct to them must be forbidden." Southern blacks receive fair treatment from the outset of the war. They received equal pay and worked in integrated units, but they were also treated fairly otherwise.

On April 29, 1862, Secretary of War George Randolph heard rumors the slaves doing manual labor for the Southern army were in dire conditions on the Peninsula. He wrote to confederate general John Magruder who responded, "The soldiers, however, have been more exposed and have suffered far more than the slaves. The latter have always slept undercover and have had fires to make them comfortable, while the men have been working in the rain, have stood in the trenches and rifle pits in mud and water almost knee-deep without shelter, fire or sufficient food." Hard to detect any racism and discrimination there. 

Other minorities fought for the South as well. Jews were the largest minority group of soldiers to fight for the Confederacy, with an estimated 10,000 soldiers who fought. Other minority groups who supported the Confederacy with thousands of soldiers were Native Americans, Chinese and Mexicans. As DiLorenzo points out, those who desire to make the civil war one of slavery and white supremacy of the South vs. tolerance and freedom from the North must stop to consider that federal units with slave owners fought against non-slave-owning southerners through the entire war. And black southerners volunteered to fight while white southerners, both slave-owning, and non-slave-owning, avoided the war.

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

The U.S. Civil War’s “Kill-Cavalry” Legend: General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick

Hugh Judson Kilpatrick was a Union cavalry commander who was notorious for sending his men into difficult situations but continued to be promoted despite his lack of military sense or personal integrity. It turned out that this was precisely the sort of leader the Union army needed in its cavalry arm. He was a determined and fierce fighter, which were good and necessary qualities in a cavalry leader. Still, he also had a propensity for shady dealings. Moreover, he often ordered suicidal cavalry charges against infantry. The rifled musket had rendered the cavalry charge outdated and dangerous. By the Civil War, the value of cavalry was essentially limited to screening, raiding, and reconnaissance, a lesson that Kilpatrick never seemed to grasp.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick.

Early Years

Kilpatrick graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1861, shortly after the war began, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the 1st U.S. Artillery. In just three days he was a captain in the 5th New York Infantry On June 10, 1861, Kilpatrick gained notoriety by becoming the initial US Army officer injured in the Civil War when he was hit in the thigh by canister fire while commanding a company in the Battle of Big Bethel.

He was promoted to Lt Col of the 2ns New York Cavalry Regiment. For months he was relegated to staff jobs and minor skirmishes. That changed at Second Manassas when he was sent on a raid that culminated in a cavalry charge with consequences that became all too familiar to Kilpatrick’s leadership. He raided the Virginia Central Railroad early in the campaign and ordered a twilight cavalry charge the first evening of the battle, losing a full squadron of troopers.

His men despised him due to his arrogant attitude and disregard for their safety. He earned the unflattering nickname "Kill Cavalry" due to his reckless and impulsive style in the beginning. His camps lacked sanitary facilities and were not very comfortable, often visited by prostitutes who came to see him. He was first arrested for profiting from selling confiscated Confederate goods. The second occasion involved accepting bribes in exchange for obtaining low-quality horses for his soldiers. He was imprisoned in 1862 for corrupt activities, and later for a night of drinking. His soldiers noticed that despite his many failures and misconducts, and the fact that his official dealings were often ethically challenged, he continued to be promoted primarily due to his skill in political maneuvering, but also because he was a West Point graduate who was fearless under fire.

Promotion to Brigade Command

In February 1863, Major General Joseph Hooker established a Cavalry Corps led by Maj Gen George Stoneman, with Kilpatrick in charge of its 1st brigade, 2nd division.

In April of 1863, General Hooker began moving his troops to compel General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to vacate their positions at Fredericksburg. He dispatched a 10,000-strong cavalry led by Major General George Stoneman to maneuver between Lee and the Confederate capital, Richmond. At the same time, he was aiming to maneuver past Lee's defenses, a plan that led to the Battle of Chancellorsville. Stoneman's expedition shares some intriguing similarities with Stuart's raid in the month prior to Gettysburg.

Hooker's intention in sending the Union cavalry to raid instead of serving as a screen for Lee was to disrupt Lee's supply lines, sabotage railroads, and divert attention away from Hooker's main operation across the Rappahannock. Hooker anticipated that Stoneman would cut off Lee's supply route by destroying the crucial Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Gordonsville. Hooker hoped that this action would force Lee to pull out of Fredericksburg, isolating him from supply and transport.

The main cavalry brigadier of this raid was Brig Gen John Buford, a popular and effective officer. He sought out a field command and joined the Reserve Brigade in battle, where most of the Regular Army cavalry units in the east were stationed. Buford's Brigade, consisting of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Cavalry, departed from their base at Falmouth, Virginia, to start their bold and ambitious raid. The very next day, they found themselves in battle with the enemy at Kelly's Ford.

However, the weather shifted and heavy rain fell for 16 days, causing the river to swell to the point where the ford was impassable. Some of his horses had broken down by the time he was able to cross. Stoneman found himself trapped in the enemy territory and was unable to cause as much chaos as expected, resulting in Hooker being unaware of Lee's movements due to Stoneman's absence.

Despite these setbacks, Kilpatrick stood out as the star of the raid. While the cavalry overall did not succeed in diverting Lee as planned, Kilpatrick gained renown for boldly seizing wagons, destroying bridges, and circling Lee, nearly reaching the outskirts of Richmond.

Promotion to Brigadier General

Kilpatrick also was conspicuous at Brandy Station, where he led one of Gregg’s brigades in a charge up Fleetwood Hill. He was promoted to Brig Gen on June 13, 1863 just 2 years after graduating from West Point.

In the middle of June 1863, General Lee was maneuvering his troops towards the west before heading north through the Shenandoah Valley, utilizing the Blue Ridge Mountains as cover. Hooker was receiving a barrage of messages from Lincoln and Stanton, instructing him to locate Lee and launch an attack. To achieve this, he needed to find a way to penetrate the strategic cavalry defense established by Jeb Stuart and Wade Hampton. Despite having fewer soldiers, the Confederate cavalry understood the importance of securing the mountain passes due to the significant consequences.

After Chancellorsville and before Gettysburg, there were major changes made in the cavalry command structure. Stoneman was sent west, and General Alfred Pleasanton took command of the Cavalry Corps. Brig Gen John Buford and his brigade were transferred to the 1st Cavalry, and he took command of the Division. Brig Gen Wesley Merritt took command of the Reserve brigade. Grimes Davis had been killed at Brandy Station, and Col. Gamble was assigned command of Buford's 1st brigade. Kilpatrick is promoted to Division command, with George Armstrong Custer promoted to brigade command.

The Union's nearest approach was during the Battle of Aldie on June 17, 1863, just 2 weeks before Gettysburg. Aldie was a town where a road passed through that connected Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap. Following four hours of fierce combat, the Confederate troops retreated but maintained control of the mountain passes. Kilpatrick was in charge of the advance, following the lead of division commander Brig Gen David McM. Gregg. The Confederate officer Thomas Mumford led a brigade that successfully halted the Union forces. The initial skirmish at Aldie marked the beginning of a sequence of minor battles on Ashby's Gap Turnpike, during which Stuart's troops effectively stalled Pleasanton’s advance through Loudoun Valley, preventing him from discovering Lee's army. Hooker got dismissed, but Pleasonton was the one who didn't succeed.

Gettysburg

In the Gettysburg Campaign, Judson Kilpatrick participated in several cavalry clashes against Confederate Major General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry, such as the Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863), the Battle of Middleburg (June 11–June 19, 1863), and the Battle of Upperville (June 21, 1863). Judson Kilpatrick was promoted to the rank of major in the regular army for his "Gallant and Meritorious Services" at the Battle of Aldie.

During his time at Upperville, he was briefly taken prisoner but managed to escape. On June 29, 1863, Major General George G. Meade appointed Judson Kilpatrick as the leader of the 3rd Division of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. He battled Stuart in Hanover on June 30. On July 2nd, he was still in the midst of a struggle with Wade Hampton at Hunterstown. On July 3rd, he eventually arrived at the Gettysburg battlefield. George Armstrong Custer's brigade was told to go to East Cavalry Field to join Gregg's division, while Kilpatrick and his single brigade were sent to the west side of the field.

It was clear that the end of the battle was near after Pickett’s Charge failed. Undoubtedly, Kilpatrick believed that he had been absent from the major fight. However, he then commanded a cavalry attack on the infantry positions of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's Corps on the Confederate right flank, located just to the west of Little Round Top. Trying to outmaneuver the retreating Confederates at Big Round Top and disrupt their withdrawal, Kilpatrick asked one of his commanders to attack the enemy skirmish line between Big Round Top and the Emmetsburg Road. Following the unsuccessful attempt by the 1st West Virginia Regiment to break the line, Kilpatrick insisted that another regiment, the 1st Vermont which had already suffered casualties, be brought into the fight.

But a cavalry charge against massed infantry was well known at that time to be futile.

This was truly a pointless, self-destructive assault that went against all the principles of war during that era. Kilpatrick's lone brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move. Kilpatrick essentially challenged his courage and supposedly provoked him to attack. Farnsworth replied, “General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry. The 1st Vermont has already been fought half to pieces. These are too good men to kill.”

“Do you refuse my order?” snapped an angry Kilpatrick.” If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it.” Demanding a retraction, the equally furious Farnsworth turned in the saddle. “General, if you order the charge, I will lead it,” he said, “but you must take the responsibility.”

The following assault unfolded exactly as Farnsworth had predicted - a complete disaster. Confederate riflemen took cover behind rocks, trees, and fences and dismounted numerous Union riders, including Farnsworth, who was struck by at least five fatal wounds. The rebellious Farnsworth, when asked to give up, decided to end his own life, as reported by Confederate Colonel William C. Oates. However, this version has been challenged by other witnesses and dismissed by the majority of historians.

Kilpatrick received much criticism for ordering the charge, but no official action was taken against him. There were no consequences for his outrageous order, and actually, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the regular army effective July 3, 1863, for “Gallant and Meritorious Services at the Battle of Gettysburg.”

Farnsworth was a rising star, one of the 3 “boy generals” who had just been promoted to his generalship despite his young age with 2 others  -- Custer and Wesley Merrtit – both of whom would go on to illustrious military careers. Famously, Merritt had engaged in a fistfight with Kilpatrick while they were undergraduates at West Point, and despised his vainglorious superior.

Kilpatrick, having lived up to his nickname all too well, showed no remorse. He pointed out that the Union infantry had not capitalized on the distraction created by the mounted diversion he had offered them. As for Farnsworth, he gushed sentimentally: “We can say of him, in the language of another, ‘Good soldier, faithful friend, great heart, hail and farewell.”

The Retreat From Gettysburg

Following the Battle of Gettysburg, Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry harassed Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s retreating Army of Northern Virginia at the Battle of Williamsport (July 6–16, 1863) and the Battle of Boonsboro (July 8, 1863).

Upon reaching Williamsport, Confederate cavalry Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden, leading the operation, discovered that the pontoon bridge had been destroyed, and the wagon train carrying wounded soldiers was attacked by Federal cavalry. The Potomac River overflowed at Williamsport, Maryland on July 6, 1863, causing Imboden's wagon train to get stuck. He assembled a defensive unit comprising of an artillery battery and as many injured soldiers as possible who were able to handle muskets. In the afternoon of July 6, 1863, Buford led Union cavalry to the east of Williamsport, surrounding the town. Kilpatrick chose an alternative path that led him along the main thoroughfare. At sunset, Custer and his Michigan "Wolverines" came to battle but were promptly withdrawn.

There were insufficient healthy soldiers around to man the defenses. Imboden asked his wagoners (wagon drivers) to join the fight with walking wounded, and over 600 readily volunteered. This hastily organized force turned back attacks from Union cavalry generals  Buford and Kilpatrick, saving the wagon train. Imboden, with the river at his back, put on a stubborn defense until General Fitz Lee's cavalry arrived and the Federals were driven off

Imboden fooled the enemy by advancing a line of infantry about 100 yards beyond the crest of the ridge and then slowly pulling the men back out of sight.

On July 6, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division drove two Confederate cavalry brigades through Hagerstown before being forced to retire by the arrival of the rest of Stuart's command.

By July 7, Imboden stopped Buford's Union cavalry from occupying Williamsport and destroying Confederate trains.

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.

On July 16, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Meade chose not to attack Lee, who was entrenched, believing the position could not be successfully breached.

The Richmond Raid

In the spring of 1864, Judson Kilpatrick led a failed cavalry raid against Richmond, Virginia. This event is likely the most intriguing military initiative Kilpatrick participated in, and to this day, its true purpose remains a mystery.

Early in February 1864, Kilpatrick consulted with President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton. He received permission for a raid that, in conjunction with an infantry feint and another cavalry raid near Charlottesville, would approach Richmond from the north, destroying rails, canals, and Confederate infrastructure along the way. There may also have been a plan to free prisoners of war from Belle Isle.

At a social gathering on February 23, Kilpatrick encountered Ulric Dahlgren and asked him to participate in the mission. Dahlgren was the son of noted Union rear admiral John A. Dahlgren. Ulric was prepared to return to the battlefield despite losing his right leg at Gettysburg the summer before. The idea was for him to command a smaller group, circle around Richmond, and attack the capital from the southern direction.

The Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid (February 28–March 3, 1864) lived up to the “Kill-Cavalry” legend. Kilpatrick and Dahlgren set out from Stevensburg, Virginia, on the evening of February 28. The following afternoon, Kilpatrick and his detachment of 3,500 men reached Beaver Dam Station and began ripping up rails and destroying Confederate property. They failed, however, to prevent an approaching train from reaching Richmond and spreading the alarm. Confederate home guard units mobilized around the capital, and late that evening Confederate cavalrymen under Major General Wade Hampton set off in pursuit of the raiders.

By March 2, after slow progress through sleet, snow, and rain, Kilpatrick reached the inner defensive lines of Richmond. But there was no sign of Dahlgren inside the city, so Kilpatrick waited. On the night of March 2, Kilpatrick considered another attack on Richmond, but the arrival of Hampton’s troopers foiled these plans. Kilpatrick finally reached the safety of Union lines at Yorktown on March 4.

The raid turned into a fiasco when Kilpatrick’s men were stopped northwest of the city. The supporting group was routed when it could not cross the James River. Dahlgren and his detachment of about five hundred men had made it to the James River at Dover Mills but were unable to cross because of recent rains. After turning to approach Richmond from the east, Dahlgren encountered stiff resistance at the Battle of Walkerton. He retreated toward Union lines on the Peninsula, but Confederate cavalrymen and bushwhackers ambushed and killed him.

The raid accomplished nothing except minor damage to railroads and buildings. The death of Dahlgren, however, led to one of the most controversial episodes of the war when documents were found on his body and were subsequently published by the Richmond press. The papers detailed plans to assassinate Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. Public opinion in both the North and the South was aggravated, and only a disavowal by General Meade to General Lee settled the incident.

It is still unclear under whose authority the Dahlgren Papers were generated or if they were authentic. A thirteen-year-old member of Richmond’s home guard, William Littlepage, searching for valuables, instead discovered on the Union colonel’s body handwritten orders to free Union prisoners from Belle Isle, supply them with flammable material, torch the city of Richmond and capture and kill Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. The papers were eventually forwarded to Fitzhugh Lee, who brought them to Mr. Davis and Mr. Benjamin.

Outraged Confederate authorities published them in the press. Dahlgren’s father, among many others in the North, insisted they were fabrications, while the Richmond Examiner waxed indignant: “The depredations of the last Yankee raiders, and the wantonness of their devastation equal anything heretofore committed during the war.”

It has been suggested that Booth’s assassination plot was motivated by this event. It has never been determined if the papers were forged or if they written by Dahlgren, Kilpatrick, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton or President Lincoln.Some have suggested that the papers were forged and intended to justify the numerous plots by the Confederate Secret Service to kidnap Lincoln or to blow up the White House. Nevertheless, a handwriting study performed on the papers by the Smithsonian Channel seemed to confirm that the documents are authentic and that Edwin Stanton was the originator of the assassination order.

The Western Theater – Atlanta Campaign

During his tenure as a cavalry commander in the East, Judson Kilpatrick developed an unsavory reputation as a braggart, womanizer, and reckless leader who tolerated lax discipline amongst his troops. He had been arrested for bribery at least twice. You’d expect that his military career would soon be over. Following Judson Kilpatrick’s failed raid against Richmond, Virginia in 1864, Union General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant demoted Kilpatrick from divisional to brigade command.

But on April 26, 1864, Kilpatrick was sent west and placed in command of the 3rd Division of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Cumberland. He participated as a division commander throughout the Atlanta campaign against Joseph E Johnston.

General Sherman was “mistrustful of cavalry.” Yet as one of the finest military thinkers of the Civil War, he knew only too well how critically important that arm of the service was to any large-scale campaign. He was a “nervous and somewhat careless rider,” which may have colored his opinion of his cavalry. David Evans has written that Sherman “had no affinity for horse soldiers, no grasp of their capabilities, and no patience with their limitations.”

All this became painfully obvious during Sherman’s Atlanta campaign (May-September 1864). While his infantry columns eventually triumphed and captured Atlanta after a series of hard-fought battles, his cavalry fumbled most of its strategic assignments. Some of the blame lay with Sherman, who persisted in sending his riders against the Rebel railroads that converged on the Gate City, operations for which they were ill-prepared. Wrecking iron track is not easy for lightly equipped riders, and most of the damage they inflicted was quickly repaired. Sherman’s inability to choke off Atlanta using only his cavalry was one of the great frustrations he experienced during that campaign.

On May 13, 1864, Judson Kilpatrick suffered a severe bullet wound to the thigh fighting in the Battle of Resaca. He was brevetted to colonel in the regular army for “Gallant and Meritorious Services”. Kilpatrick assisted in the capture of Atlanta in 1864.

Kilpatrick had the good fortune to receive this minor wound early in the Atlanta campaign. He was absent during many of the underachieving cavalry expeditions that so annoyed Sherman, though soon after his return in late July he undertook his own railroad wrecking operation, which delivered much less than expected.

On August 13, 1864, General Sherman issued directives for the XX Corps to retreat to the railroad bridge at the Chattahoochee River. Their primary responsibilities included fortifying the crossing, safeguarding the trains, hospitals, and artillery reserves, while the remainder of the Army was to advance collectively towards the Macon railroad situated south of East Point. In the subsequent days, Sherman's admiration for Cavalry Division Commander Judson Kilpatrick grew due to Kilpatrick's enthusiasm, initiative, and confidence, which stood in stark contrast to his other cavalry leaders. Consequently, Sherman tasked Kilpatrick with a mission to disrupt the Macon railroad near Jonesboro. After a four-day reconnaissance around Atlanta, Kilpatrick returned to report that repairs to the Macon road would require approximately ten days.

In his Memoirs, Sherman recounts a telegraphic communication sent to Halleck, stating, "Heavy fires in Atlanta, caused by our artillery. I will be all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of us. I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee bridge by way of Sandtown. The XX Corps will hold the railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the Army, provisioned for 20 days." This marked the initiation of Sherman's Great Left Wheel maneuver towards the railroads south of Atlanta, setting the stage for the Battle of Jonesboro and the subsequent evacuation of the city.

March to the Sea

Sherman's March, spanning approximately 300 miles across Georgia, was completed within a mere 36 days, with 25 of those days dedicated to actual marching. Despite common misconceptions, this remarkable feat was not achieved without opposition. Sherman encountered several skilled cavalry units along the way, resulting in skirmishes that required strategic camouflage of his movements and intentions.

To execute his plan, Sherman divided his army into two distinct "wings," each following separate but parallel routes that were spaced 20-60 miles apart. The southern column, known as the Army of the Tennessee, marched alongside the Georgia railroad and the Macon and Western railroad. Meanwhile, the northern column, led by the Army of Georgia, followed the Georgia railroad in a coordinated effort to advance through the region.

General Henry Slocum was in command of the left wing, composed of the newly created Army of Georgia, (XIV Corps and the XX Corps) The Army of the Cumberland. Gen. Oliver O. Howard commanded the right wing, consisting of the XV and XVII Corps of the Army of the Tennessee. Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick commanded the cavalry.  Under the leadership of General Henry Slocum and General Oliver O. Howard, the left and right wings of Sherman's army, respectively, made significant progress. Despite initial setbacks in the east, these generals proved their capabilities in the western theater, showcasing their strategic prowess. Additionally, Sherman's decision to detach armies under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to address Hood's threat in the Franklin-Nashville campaign further demonstrated his adept command of military operations. Sherman also detached two armies under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to deal with Hood in the Franklin–Nashville campaign.

Sherman faced a difficult decision when it came to selecting a cavalry leader for the March to the Sea campaign. He opted for a complete reorganization of the mounted corps under his command and brought in Major General James H. Wilson, an outsider, to take on the role. However, Wilson was needed in Tennessee to accomplish another task, leaving Sherman with the challenge of choosing a commander for the mounted force that would accompany his foot soldiers. After considering officers who had previously failed him, Sherman ultimately selected Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick, a choice that many would have considered unlikely.

Asked to describe Kilpatrick, Sherman said "He's seven kinds of damned fool, but he's a good cavalry commander". Sherman decided that for his march to Savannah, he would only take one cavalry division and he picked Kilpatrick to command it because he figured "a damned fool" would be perfect for the job. Another source reports this quote as Sherman saying, “I know that Kilpatrick is a hell of a damned fool, but I want just that sort of man to command my cavalry on this expedition.”

Kilpatrick's reputation as a cavalryman was far from favorable, with one of Sherman's staff officers describing him as vain, conceited, and ungraceful. Despite these negative perceptions, Kilpatrick performed well during the March to the Sea, a feat that may have been attributed to Sherman's close supervision. This decision to appoint Kilpatrick, despite his shortcomings, proved to be a strategic choice that contributed to the success of the campaign, probably because he was closely monitored by Sherman personally.

During the March to the Sea campaign, Kilpatrick led approximately five thousand troopers, who were divided into two brigades. In the initial phase, he was assigned to the Right Wing under Major General Oliver O. Howard, who was also a veteran of the Army of the Potomac, just like Kilpatrick. His primary responsibility was to protect Howard’s exposed right flank as his columns advanced from Atlanta towards Macon, which was to be bypassed. A trooper in the 9th Ohio Cavalry was well aware that the cavalry's role was to always be positioned between the infantry and the enemy. After Stoneman, who was now also part of Sherman’s army, was captured, Kilpatrick led a raid against Macon.

Reports of violence against southern citizens during the March have been exaggerated in modern times. However, Sherman was on the verge of ordering an increase in violence after receiving a specific report from General Kilpatrick. There were several reports of Union soldiers being killed and mutilated by Wheeler’s men. General Kilpatrick had included several of these reports in his official correspondence with Sherman, who monitored the situation but did not respond to the cavalry chieftain until Thursday, December 1, 1864. Kilpatrick had been informing Sherman of numerous instances of murder and mutilation of his men after they had been taken prisoner.

Sherman wanted to ensure that Kilpatrick had communicated his concerns to Confederate cavalry commander General Joseph Wheeler before issuing any retaliatory order. Once Kilpatrick had alerted Wheeler, if he obtained substantial proof that Rebel soldiers were committing any excesses, he would receive official approval to retaliate. In such a situation, Sherman’s command was: “You may hang and mutilate man for man without regard to rank.” The killings stopped for unknown reasons. It is worth noting that almost 40 years later, Filipino soldiers opposing Wheeler in that conflict were mutilated, and Wheeler claimed that the Filipino army was responsible.

The Shirt-Tail Skedaddle

During the spring of 1865, Judson Kilpatrick was by the side of Major General William T. Sherman as they engaged in skirmishes with Confederate cavalry throughout the Carolinas Campaign. One particular event that stood out was the Shirt-Tail Skedaddle, which became a legendary and humorous moment amid the campaign.

The allure of flirtation and suggestion is not a modern phenomenon reserved only for the present day. Marie Boozer, a prominent figure during the Civil War era, was known for her captivating charm and beauty. She was considered the "it" girl of her time, captivating the attention of many suitors with her coquettish ways.

Mary "Marie" Boozer's reputation as the most beautiful lady in Columbia, SC, preceded her and continued to flourish despite the turmoil of war. Her beauty was so renowned that even prominent figures like General John S. Preston and General Sherman were captivated by her charm. The scandalous tales surrounding Boozer and her ambitious mother, as depicted in  Tom Elmore's book “The Scandalous Lives of Carolina Belles Marie Boozer and Amelia Feaster: Flirting With the Enemy” tells the story of Boozer and her ambitious, Yankee-supporting mother, who was herself considered a beauty, married four times. Essentially, the mother was promoting her daughter in a social-climbing scheme.

Following Wade Hampton's departure from Columbia SC on February 17, 1865, the town succumbed to Sherman's forces and was engulfed in a devastating fire, vividly depicted in Royster's The Destructive War. Within three days, 1400 establishments and residences were reduced to ashes. Realizing that a war-torn, burnt-out town was not conducive to their aspirations, Marie's mother made the decision to accompany the Union army, with her daughter in tow. The soldiers, naturally, were more than willing to have two attractive women join their ranks. Despite the attention from the soldiers, Marie and her mother had already chosen a particular officer to look after them: Judson Kilpatrick. Kilpatrick and Marie were frequently seen together.

Judson Kilpatrick narrowly avoided capture by Wade Hampton during the Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads on March 10, 1865. General Hampton, along with Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s Cavalry Corps, surprised Kilpatrick’s camp in an attempt to delay Kilpatrick’s cavalry and allow Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee’s infantry to cross the Cape Fear River at Fayetteville, North Carolina. Due to Kilpatrick’s overconfidence and failure to post enough cavalry pickets, Hampton and Wheeler’s attack caught the Federals off guard. Kilpatrick had to flee into a swamp wearing only a nightshirt to escape capture. Marie was left behind, reputedly in a scanty nightdress, to be cared for by the Confederate cavalry, who were (naturally) only too pleased to liberate her from the Yankees.

Despite the embarrassing incident, Kilpatrick managed to regroup his troops and recapture his camp after intense dismounted fighting. Hampton, upon learning that infantry reinforcements were on their way, decided to withdraw, having achieved his objective of keeping Kilpatrick’s cavalry occupied for a significant amount of time. The Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads left a mark on the federal commander’s reputation, but Kilpatrick’s escape in his nightshirt became a subject of ridicule known as Kilpatrick's Shirt-tail Skedaddle.

Marie overcame this minor setback to become a celebrity. She eventually made her way north, married a wealthy Northerner, and later married a French count after a dramatic divorce. Further sordid tales continue from there. Her life story became legendary, with tales of her reign as a queen of international society in Europe. Despite the initial misfortune at Monroe’s Crossroads, Marie’s resilience and subsequent adventures added to her intriguing narrative.

End of the War

On March 13, 1865, Judson Kilpatrick took part in the capture of Fayetteville, North Carolina, for which he was brevetted to brigadier general in the regular army.

• Effective the same date (March 13, 1865) Judson Kilpatrick was brevetted to major general in the regular army “for Gallant and Meritorious Services” during the Carolinas Campaign.

• Judson Kilpatrick led his cavalry during the Battle of Bentonville (March 19–21, 1865), the largest Civil War engagement fought in North Carolina, and the final battle of the Carolinas Campaign.

• In early April 1865, Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry served as Major General William T. Sherman’s escort when Confederate General Joseph Johnston surrendered his troops at Bennett’s Place.

• On June 18, 1865, Judson Kilpatrick was promoted to the rank of major general of volunteers.

• He later became the US Ambassador to Chile, marrying a lady from a wealthy family.

One last story about Judson Kilpatrick that you just could never make up. Lieutenant General Wade Hampton, the highest-ranking cavalry officer in the history of the Confederacy, and Major General William T. Sherman's chief of cavalry, Kilpatrick, had a long history of clashes on various battlefields during the Civil War. From Brandy Station to the Atlanta campaign, these two adversaries had faced off multiple times before the Carolinas Campaign.

Following Lee's surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, General Johnston led his troops to Greensboro and then sought to make peace with Sherman. Convinced that further bloodshed was unjustified, Johnston arranged to meet Sherman at James Bennett's house near Durham Station on April 17. The two officers, along with their entourages, gathered at the appointed time for negotiations.

As Sherman and Johnston conducted their discussions inside the Bennett house, General Hampton and his son relaxed outside. Hampton, dressed in his finest uniform and sporting a black felt hat with gold braid, exuded an air of confidence. Despite carrying a switch instead of his usual broadsword, Hampton's presence still conveyed a sense of authority and readiness to defend his beliefs.

Determined to end the fraternizing among his men, Hampton snarled, “Fall in!” When Kilpatrick approached to protest, remembered one witness, “Wade Hampton looked savage enough to eat ‘Little Kil’”, which prompted his antagonist to return “his looks most defiantly.”

“The war is over,” proclaimed Kilpatrick to his old adversary. “Let the men fraternize.”

“I do not intend to surrender,” snapped Hampton. He added that he would never fraternize with the Yankees, “but would retaliate with torch and sword” to avenge the style of war the North had waged. With a stern tone, Hampton again snarled at his troopers, “Fall in!”

The dialogue swiftly transitioned into a series of insults, blending humor with genuine animosity. Hampton initiated the exchange by mentioning Monroe’s Crossroads, prompting Kilpatrick to retaliate with accounts of battles where he had emerged victorious. The conversation escalated into a heated argument, drawing the attention of a crowd of officers and journalists. Johnston and Sherman eventually intervened to diffuse the confrontation.

Following the conclusion of the conflict, Hampton went on to serve as governor and later as a US Senator representing South Carolina. Kilpatrick became involved in politics and served as US Ambassador to Chile, where he met his wife. They went on to raise a family of several children.

In 1881, President James A. Garfield nominated Judson Kilpatrick to resume his role as ambassador to Chile, a decision that required Senate approval. Wade Hampton, despite their past rivalry, presented Kilpatrick's name to the Senate, leading to his unanimous confirmation for the position.

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References

https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/kilpatrick-dahlgren-raid/

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-dahlgren-affair-kilpatrick-dahlgren-raid-on-richmond/

https://www.battlefields.org/visit/heritage-sites/dahlgrens-cavalry-raid

https://civilwarmonths.com/2024/03/02/the-kilpatrick-dahlgren-raid-takes-a-sinister-turn/

https://www.historynet.com/kill-cavalrys-ride-sea/

https://www.wistv.com/story/22292427/columbias-it-girl-in-the-1860s-as-notorious-as-todays-celebrities/  

https://discover.hubpages.com/education/A-Southern-Belles-Notorious-Tale

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2017/02/16/wade-hampton-and-judson-kilpatrick/#:~:text=Beginning%20in%20the%20spring%20of%201863%2C%20Wade%20Hampton,Sherman’s%20chief%20of%20cavalry%20for%20his%20Carolinas%20Campaign.

Was Southern Secession and the U.S. Civil War Fought to Preserve Slavery?

An introduction by the author Jeb Smith: I have often engaged in discussions with both lay people and academics on the various causes of Southern secession. I have also read many books from both sides' perspectives of the war. I consistently hear the same arguments used to support the claim that the South left the Union to preserve slavery. I will respond here to the most common arguments and, hopefully, explain why the evidence does not support this conclusion.

This is the final part in a series of extended articles from the author related to the US Civil War. Part 1 on Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy is here, part 2 on the Causes of Southern Secession is here, part 3 on whether the Civil War was fought for slavery or States’ rights here, and part 4 on the Confederate Constitution here.

John S. Mosby.

Slave Owners Rebellion?

It is said that the most robust support for secession came from the areas that had the most slaveowners. Based on this information, some would argue that the cause of withdrawal was slavery. High federal support in areas with limited slaveowners, such as West Virginia, Western North Carolina, and Eastern Tennessee, are prime examples to support this claim. But first, we must ask the following questions: What about the non-slave owners in Eastern Virginia who supported the South? What about non-slaveholding Western Tennesseans and Deep South voters who supported secession? Should we claim they prove secession was in support of abolishing slavery? What about the slave states that stayed in the Union? 

 In Confederate Arkansas, 20% of their households were slave owners, while Kentucky, which remained primarily loyal to the Union, had 23% of their households that were slave owners. In North Carolina, near-unanimous support for secession was given after Lincoln's call for volunteers when only 27% of the households in the state were slave owners. Arkansas voted 65 to 5 for secession after Lincoln's call for volunteers, yet only 20% of households were slave owners. Although there were few Southern Jewish Confederates slave owners, a large portion of the group supported secession. Further, thirteen percent of the Virginia delegates from high slave-owning counties voted against secession.

A closer look shows that politics, not slavery, drove the secession movement. For example, in Western Virginia, many areas with a low percentage of slave owners supported secession, while many areas that were politically supporters of the Whigs did not. James McPherson , [who used the argument we are discussing] acknowledges, "A good many low slaveholding Democratic counties voted for immediate secession, while numerous high-slaveholding Whig counties cooperation." In his book, Reluctant Confederates, Daniel Crofts looks at this argument and finds that while slave ownership influenced secession votes, political party associations were far more critical.

"A high slave-owning country in eastern Virginia was far more likely to poll a strong secession vote than a low slave-owning county in western Virginia. But a whig county in eastern Virginia was more likely to show more union strength than a Breckinridge country, just as a Breckinridge county in western Virginia was more likely to show pockets of secession support than a whig county." 

-Daniel W. Crofts Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis University of North Carolina Press reprint 1993

Further, the area that would become West Virginia had long opposed unfair tax rates within Virginia.[1] West Virginia, like today, was more an extension of Pennsylvania and did not share the southern culture of Virginia. Immigrants from Pennsylvania mostly inhabited West Virginia. In Clouds of Glory: The Life and Legend of Robert E. Lee, Michael Korda wrote, "Mountainous northwestern Virginia...was largely populated by settlers from Pennsylvanian who were instinctively pro-union." The Appalachian areas of Western Virginia, Western North Carolina, and Eastern Tennessee had very different ethnic, political, and cultural histories. 

West Virginia supported the Confederacy more than commonly believed. Many of the Virginia votes against secession did come from the western part of the state, but that does not make them supporters of the Union. These counties were surrounded by federal territory and not so anxious to jump into a war. The most robust support for the Union came from the northern panhandle or around the railroads who had a financial interest in remaining in the Union. The rest of the state was decidedly pro-South. Further, many Ohio and Pennsylvania troops went to West Virginia recruiting stations [this was common] and formed union regiments, so the actual number of units supporting the North is inflated. 

Western Virginia's support for the Union is overstated for many reasons. Early in the conflict, much of western Virginia was controlled by the Union, and a pro-union "restored government of Virginia" was instituted. Elections were only held in areas of Union control, as pro south civilians and soldiers fled the state and thus, were not allowed to vote on whether or not to join the Union. Lincoln decided to recognize this pro north government that met in Wheeling. This Government was not officially recognized by the state of Virginia but was rather an unconstitutionally created, militarily controlled area. Therefore, basing conclusions on this occupied territory is not a fair judge of western Virginia's loyalties. 

The Union support in Tennessee seems to be exaggerated and possibly based on a limited number of Union newspapers during the war. As in Virginia, Daniel W. Crofts shows that counties that were "traditionally Democrat," the low-level slave-owning middle and western Tennessee counties, voted for secession. It was only in the Eastern area of the state where spare slave-owning counties held a strong pro-Union stance. 

Maryland's southern and eastern areas were similar in culture and politics to the rest of the South. In contrast, the pro northern areas of Maryland were heavily influenced by socialist immigrants from Europe and thus supported the North. Overall, support for the Union in Maryland also seems overstated.[2] The truth is that Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Western North Carolina remained Republican areas after the war. In contrast, the planter areas remained Democratic after the war.[3]

Lastly, if the Government did oppress a particular group, specifically slave owners, violating their rights, wouldn't we then expect strong resistance from that sector? For example, if today's politicians decided that pizza is unhealthy for us and outlawed it, then most pizza shop owners would likely be among those who would resist those efforts. Others may agree with the pizza owners but not be so willing to leave the country over it. So it should not be a surprise that slave owners were among the most dedicated secessionists. 

The Confederate Constitution did not allow States to abolish Slavery

The first argument one often hears is that the Confederate Constitution made it impossible to abolish slavery. It is true that the central Confederate government could not abolish slavery; however, neither could the federal government under the U.S. Constitution in 1861, as Lincoln accepted in his First Inaugural Address. Confederate Constitution scholar Marshall DeRosa points out that freeing slaves was a state issue in the C.S.A. just as it was in antebellum America. Some have misread Article 1 Section 9 Clause 4 of the C.S.A. Constitution, claiming it outlaws the freeing of slaves; however, this section applies only to Congress and not to the sovereign states.

As DeRosa argues that the clause even demonstrates that its authors believed non-slave states would join the Confederacy. This is also shown in Article 4 Section 2 Clause 1 and Article 4 Section 3 Clause 1. Many in the Confederacy, including vice president Stephens, thought  the non-slaveholding upper Midwest would join the Confederacy because its free trade laws would encourage states connected to the Mississippi River to join. In his infamous Cornerstone Address on March 21, 1861, Alexander Stephens said, "We made ample provision in our Constitution for the admission of other States...Looking to the distant future, and, perhaps, not very far distant either, it is not beyond the range of possibility, and even probability, that all the great States of the north-west will gravitate this way." 

Professor DeRosa shows that the South wanted border states and the free Midwest states to join the Confederacy. During the constitutional convention, the delegates rejected Howell Cobb of Georgia's proposal that all states be required to be slave-owning. Senator Albert Brown of Mississippi stated, "Each state is sovereign within its own limits, and each for itself can abolish or establish slavery for itself." The state of Georgia declared, "New States formed out of territory now belonging to the United States, or which may be hereafter acquired, shall be admitted into the Union with or without slavery as the people thereof may determine at the time of admission." So while slavery was optional, states' rights were applied in the C.S.A., regardless of their choice. In The Confederate Constitution of 1861, DeRosa summarizes, "Thus, slavery was not a constitutional prerequisite for admission, and once admitted, a state could either reorganize or prohibit the institution." 

Slavery was the "Cornerstone" of the Confederacy 

The first argument I am usually given is that Alexander Stephens declared slavery to be the "Cornerstone of the Confederacy." Although his speech has been named the "Cornerstone Speech, "he focuses also on tariffs, internal improvements, and economic issues. So why is most of his speech ignored and only a few sentences pulled out and attacked? The focus is on the portion that mentions slavery because slavery is what we want to be remembered as the primary cause of secession.

His speech was unprepared and given in the deep South state of Georgia. But I also think that there are other reasons to be cautious about the importance and understanding of the speech. 

For one, it is only a transcribed piece. According to the newspaper reporter who transcribed it, it "Is not a perfect report, but only a sketch of the address of Mr. Stephens." It is simply an interpretation of a portion of his actual speech. According to Stephens, in writings after the war, the speech was misinterpreted and misunderstood. He claimed he was simply restating what Judge Baldwin of the United States Supreme Court had said. The following, written in 1884 by Richard M Johnson, summed up Stephens’ speech and his use of the term "cornerstone." 

"On the subject of slavery there was no essential change in the new Constitution from the old as Judge Baldwin [of Connecticut] of the U.S. supreme court had announced from the bench several years before, that slavery was the cornerstone of the old Constitution [1781-89], so it is of the new" [1833] .

-Quote in Lochlainn Seabrook , Everything You Were Taught About American Slavery Is Wrong Sea Raven Press 2014

Later, Stephens wrote that what caused secession was a dispute over  centralization. Stephens' speech simply clarified disputed subjects in the U.S. Constitution that are now clearly defined and beyond dispute in the C.S.A. Constitution. These subjects include tariffs, internal improvement, and slavery. He was trying to assure the audience that the states would decide on these issues, not the central government.

As the Kennedy twins argue, if anyone should have been seen as speaking for the whole country, it ought to have been the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis. His three most essential speeches (Farewell to Congress, First Inaugural in Montgomery, Second Inaugural in Richmond) all speak to the causes of secession. He mentioned that the reasons for secession were liberty, state's rights, tariffs, the Constitution, and preserving the Union from Northern Democracy. Jefferson Davis said, "I love the Union and the Constitution, but I would rather leave the Union with the Constitution than remain in the Union without it." Davis does discuss slavery in the first of those speeches, but stresses more the sovereign right of his state, Mississippi, to secede.

Fugitive Slave Laws

Some critics claim that the South only cared for states' rights when slavery was involved. To support this claim, they point out that the South objected to Northern states nullifying the federal fugitive slave laws. This objection seems reasonable on the surface but stems from a misunderstanding of both the purpose of states' rights and the Union of 1860.

Even if we assume the premise for the sake of argument, it will only prove that the South did not care for the rights of the states in the North, not their state's rights. Since the rights of the people of each state were in place to secure its individual states citizen's rights and not another’s, this would make sense. And if one state decides not to follow the compact or contract [Constitution], disagreement will occur. This is also why the right to secession is vital to self-government. 

However, a proper understanding of states' rights is not lawlessness or states ignoring the Constitution; it is, in fact, the opposite. States' rights are in place to prevent the current politicians in power from violating the Constitution or overstepping its bounds. In this case, the northern states were violating the Constitution because, in their minds, slavery was wrong in God’s eyes. As William Seward put it, "There is a higher law than the constitution." 

Within the Constitution, southerners were already granted the right to have their property returned. Northern states were violating this. Therefore states’ rights, as Jefferson said, are the best way of preserving the authority of the Constitution over elected politicians in D.C. who would seek to abolish it. The Constitution, not men, was the authority. The wording of the United States "supremacy clause" is set out below, occurring in Article VI. The wording of the Confederate equivalent, also occurring in Article VI, is identical apart from the substitution of "Confederate" for "United."

This Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or to be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Only the Slave States joined the Confederacy

"Had Buchanan in 1860 sent armed forces to prevent the nullification of the fugitive slave law, as Andrew Jackson threatened to do so in 1833, there would have been a secession of fifteen northern states instead of thirteen southern states. Had the Democrats won in 1860, the northern states would have been the seceding states, not the southern." 

- James R. and Walter D. Kennedy, The South Was Right! Pelican Publishing Gretna 2008 

Some believe it is self-evident that slavery caused secession because only slave states joined the Confederacy. So if I am defending the causes of the South and saying slavery was not the sole cause of secession, then why didn't any free states join? 

Keep in mind that when the Confederacy was first formed, there were more slave states still in the Union. Furthermore, if secession was driven by slavery, why didn't all the slave states join the South? Many volunteers fought for the South from the non-slave state of California. New Jersey produced two Confederate generals, Gen. Samuel Gibbs French and Gen. Julius Adolphus de Lagnel.[4] 

Many free states nearly left the Union as well. NY almost left the Union, and a middle confederacy might have formed, which could have included Penn, NY, NJ, MD, and D.E. On March 13, 1861, a report from A R Wright Esq of Georgia said Gov Hicks of Maryland was already corresponding with New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey governors about forming a central confederacy. Delaware, Virginia, Missouri, and Ohio were also later mentioned. The rise of a radical Republican party[5] to national prominence caused all sorts of upheavals. 

The South originally planned for the northwest to join them. When Robert Smith addressed the citizens of Alabama, he believed Indiana and Illinois would join the Confederacy. He desired the entire Union (excluding New England) to eventually be drawn under the new Confederate Constitution, restoring the Union of the founders. However, when Lincoln called for war, many were unwilling to face an uphill battle against the might of the North. Further, nationalism and patriotism drove many to volunteer for the Union. 

Also, consider that the states most influenced by the Jeffersonian tradition did leave the Union. And we must not forget the North maintained slavery during the war in MO, KY, DE, Washington DC, MD, Western Virginia, northern controlled sections of the Indian territory, and Union-controlled LA and Virginia. 

John Mosby said Secession was about Slavery 

The "Grey Ghost" of the Confederacy, John Mosby, said that the South was on the side of slavery during the war. Here, critics say, we have an admission from a former confederate informing us of what we all already knew, the South left to preserve slavery. Yet we are also told that post-war southerners are part of the "lost cause" and should not be listened to. Unless, of course, it is Mosby who was telling certain historians what they wanted to hear. Highlighting one statement made after the war by a southerner turned Republican trying to gain favor does not negate the factual purposes of southern secession.

Another argument used is not historical but rather philosophical. The argument is that the South could not care for freedom since they denied that freedom to others. However, this at most shows inconsistency in how they apply liberty. It also seems to assume the South left to preserve slavery. 

In response, the South said that its citizens had more rights and were allowed more freedom than the North. The majority of states in the North did not allow individuals the freedom to own or buy human property as the "slave optional"[6] states did. All men were created equal; southerners had rights like anyone to own their property, including slaves. This is also why African-Americans, Native Americans, Jews, and others had equal rights to own slaves in the South. States had maintained legal slavery since before the Union was created. The world had accepted slavery for thousands of years. African slaves had no rights in Africa when they were enslaved.

Slavery also offered the owner freedom of another sort that we will discuss later. During an interview with historynet.com over his latest book on Lincoln, distinguished historian Eric Foner said, "To most white Southerners, owning a slave was not a contradiction to the idea of freedom, indeed rather the opposite, owning slaves made a person more free, it and enabled you to achieve the economic independence that all Americans thought was very important to freedom." 

States' Rights were just to protect Slavery

"The doctrine of States’ rights was never a mere pretense for slavery, but reflected a deep passion for self-government rooted in Southern culture as well as an earnest understanding of the Constitution rooted in Southern history."

-James Rutledge Rosch, From Founding Fathers to Fire Eaters; The Constitutional Doctrine of States Rights in the Old South Shotwell Publishing Columbia SC 2018

The claim that states' rights were just an excuse to preserve slavery is a common one. This claim was covered earlier, but additional information is needed since it is repeated so often. State's rights were vital to our Union, self-government, and our whole political system. Therefore, the next chapter also will be dedicated to this topic, and after reading it, this objection should dissipate. 

As with the U.S. Constitution, the Confederate Constitution did not allow the central Government to abolish slavery. If the South had left to preserve slavery alone, why did they also add additional powers to the states? If states' rights were to protect slavery, and slavery was protected, why the need for an even more decentralized Constitution? If the intention was to protect slavery, then the United States Constitution would have sufficed, and there would have been no need to create a document ensuring more vital states' rights.

When the Confederate government overreached into state matters on non-slavery issues during the civil war, states resisted it. This resulted in states like Georgia threatening to secede. After slavery had ended in the United States, the South still maintained the most robust states' rights philosophy in the country. 

The first state's rights advocates in the U.S., many of whom spoke out against slavery, were Southern men such as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, St. George Tucker, George Mason, Patrick Henry, John Taylor of Caroline, and John Randolph. Patrick Henry called slavery "a lamentable evil,"but then said, "I deny that the general government ought to set them free." George Mason said, "Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant." John Taylor of Caroline said, "The fact is that negro slavery is an evil which the United States must look in the face." 

 States' rights were also crucial to northern states before the civil war. There were Democrats in the North who were both for states' rights and against slavery. These two came together in the northern states' nullification of the fugitive slave laws. During the Civil War, Republicans wished to institute national banking, and many northern Democrats objected. Lazarus Powell stated, "The result of this course of legislation is to utterly destroy all the rights of the States. It is asserting a power which if carried out to its logical result would enable the national Congress to destroy every institution of the States and cause all power to be consolidated and concentrated here." No matter the issue, states had pushed back against federal overreach; slavery was simply one more area where the federal was intruding on the states' rights in 1860.

Preserving slavery was far from the primary goal of secessionists. During the war, Southern General Patrick Cleburne wanted to free all the slaves. Near the end of the war, Jefferson Davis sent diplomats to France and Britain, offering to end slavery if they would recognize the Confederacy.  Some Northern generals, like General George Thomas, were wealthy slave owners who fought for the North despite saying during the war, "I am wholly sick of states' rights." State's rights did not equal slavery. This misunderstanding comes from a post-war nationalistic approach to antebellum America. The next chapter will detail states' rights before the Civil War to help us understand why they were considered vital to self-government and the Union. 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1]           See George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864

[2]           For more info, see Jeb Stuart; The Last Cavalier by Burke Davis.

[3]           See "Man Over Money" the Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism by Bruce Palmer.

[4]           De Lagnel was appointed Brigadier General in the Confederate forces but for unknown reasons declined the rank, eventually rising to Lieutenant Colonel.

[5]           A party that has not changed in its modern form.

[6]           As the Kennedy’s described them.

Was the U.S. Civil War Fought for Slavery or States’ Rights?

When it comes to slavery's involvement in secession, most everyone fits comfortably within one of two groups, neither of which is correct. The first argues that slavery had nothing to do with secession; the other claims slavery was the sole cause. Jeb Smith explains.

This is part 3 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War. Part 1 on Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy is here, and part 2 on the Causes of Southern Secession is here.

General John Gordon.

"Slavery is only one of the minor issues and the cause of the war, the whole cause, on our part is the maintenance of the independence of these states....neither tariffs, nor slavery, nor both together, could ever been truly called the cause of the secession.... the sovereign independence of our states. This, indeed, includes both these minor questions, as well as many others even greater and higher." 

-Daily Richmond Examiner August 2, 1864, quoted in Rosch, From Founding Fathers to Fire Eaters Shotwell Publishing 2018

"In his message, Mr. Lincoln announced a great political discovery. It was that all former statesmen of America had lived, and written, and labored under a great delusion that the States, instead of having created the Union, were its creatures; that they obtained their sovereignty and independence from it, and never possessed either until the Convention of 1787."

-Edward A Pollard The Lost Cause : A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates E. B. Treat & Co. Publishers NY 1866

Slavery had varying degrees of influence on the Deep South's decision to secede.[1] There is no question that some in the South were willing to leave the Union to preserve slavery if it came to that. Southern slave owners viewed northern abolitionists as foreign invaders dictating their lives. To Southerners, slavery was a constitutional, Biblical, and state right, and no Northern radical was to have greater authority. Thomas Jefferson said that slavery was "The exclusive right of every state." 

The Cotton States had great economic importance riding on slavery, Mississippi alone had four billion dollars’ worth of value invested in slaves, and almost the whole economic system of the state depended on slavery. They wished to defend the financial system that had brought them so much prosperity. Yet even in Mississippi, slavery was not the sole cause of secession. James McPherson quotes the Jackson Mississippian, "Let not slavery prove a barrier to our independence...although slavery is one of the principles that we started to fight for... if it proves an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of our liberty and separate nationality, away with it."

As I have already mentioned, I think that many causes led to the secession of the Deep South. Yet, I would not wholly disagree if someone were to say that slavery was the leading cause of withdrawal in the Deep South. But there is a vast difference between saying that the South left solely to keep slaves in bondage and saying that the federal intrusion on the states' rights over the issue of slavery was the leading cause of separation. Many overstate slavery's involvement in the Deep South secession because slavery was the "occasion" to which the fight over the nature of the Union was fought.

"That institution is not a cause of this war, but simply an occasion of it. It is only the object against which the radicalism of the North has arrayed itself in Abolitionism. Had not this object existed, that Dragon from the bottomless pit, would have discovered some other eminence of Southern life, on which to expend its fury. We are leading the great battle for the sum of modern history--for the regulated liberty and civilization of the age. It is conservative religion against atheism--constitutional law against fanatical higher law--social stability against destructive radicalism."

-Rev. William A. Hall, The Historic Significance of the Southern Revolution Printed by A. F. Crutchfield Petersburg Virginia 1864

The leading cause of separation was not preserving something these states already had legal protection for, that is, slavery. Instead, it was the federal expansion past its constitutional limits and encroachments upon the states' rights. Is the federal government restricted to the powers given in the Constitution? Or was it released to step outside of its delegated powers, thus nullifying the Constitution and limited government? In 1864 Confederate general Patrick Cleburne said, "Between the loss of independence and the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the latter. Give up the negro slave rather than be a slave himself."

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

-10th amendment U.S. Constitution

"The Constitution... contains no grant of power to the Federal Government to interfere with this species of property...slave property rests upon the same basis, and is entitled to the same protection, as every other description of property." 

-Isham G. Harris Call for a Referendum on a Tennessee Secession Convention January 7, 1861

In 1862 Rose Greenhow wrote, "Slavery, although the occasion, was not the producing cause of dissolution." R.L.Dabney wrote, "Slavery was not the cause, but the occasion of strife...Rights of the states were the bulwarks of the liberties of the people, but that emancipation by federal aggression would lead to the destruction of all other rights." Just as decades earlier, John Calhoun had identified the tariff of abominations as "The occasion, rather than the real cause" of dispute. The real issue was over a limited central government.

Where you stand on the "real cause" will necessarily cause disagreement on any issue that arises; a national bank, internal improvements, slavery and so on. If the two sides fundamentally disagreed on the Constitution and the purpose of the central government, they could then never agree on any of these side issues. In Virginia Iliad, H.V Traywick quotes an article in the N.Y. Times on April 8, 1861, saying, "Slavery has nothing whatever to do with the tremendous issues now awaiting decision...The question which we have to meet is precisely what it would be if there were not a negro slave on American soil." 

Since the ratification of the Constitution, a conflict had been fought over whether we were to maintain a federated republic as understood by the states or if we were to become a centralized nation to benefit the most powerful interests and political parties. This debate raged politically on many battlefields before 1860. However, slavery was the chosen battleground of the nationalists in the fight to transform the Union in 1860. Instead of just a political issue, they would transform it into a moral issue.

The Republicans violated the Constitution and the Dred Scott v. Sandford 1857 Supreme Court ruling by trying to decide the fate of slavery by federal rather than state and individual control. Democratic plank 9 of the 1852 elections plainly stated that an attack on slavery was an attack on states' rights; you cannot separate the two issues. You cannot have the federal government decide on slavery without it greatly exceeding its original intent and purpose. 

That the federal government is one of limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution, and the grants of power made therein ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of the government; and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers. 

Democratic Plank 1 1852

That Congress has no power under the constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists or others made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences.  

Democrat Plank 9 1852 

The South viewed slaves the same way they did any other legal property. If the Government interfered with slaves, what would stop them from doing the same with any other property? If this violation by the Federal Government were allowed to happen, no rights would be safe: The Constitution would then be of no value. The Union of states that delegated certain limited powers to the Federal Government would be destroyed. And finally the Government would become limitless in power.

If the government was allowed to abandon any of its limitations, it would begin to dictate all manner of regulations and exert jurisdiction it previously was never considered to have. After a quick look at our lives today, who can say the South was incorrect in their assessment? The effects of the federal government stepping into areas past its jurisdiction delegated by the states are commonplace today. The Constitution is set aside so long as the masses' emotions are stirred over any one topic. Politicians and media provoke the mob, and no Constitution or ideas about limited Government can stop them. We have become an unlimited democracy ruled by a mob; the North destroyed the old Republic and Constitution in 1860. As a result, most outlaws in America today are found among elected officials and judges, and we simply accept their lawlessness because we have grown accustomed to servitude. 

Well before the war, on July 4 1854, famed abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison publicly burned a copy of the Constitution and spoke of it as a "Covenant with Death,  an agreement with Hell." Abolitionist John Brown seceded from the Union and created his own anti-slavery provisional Constitution. In the book, The South Vindicated from the Treason and Fanaticism of the Northern Abolitionists 1836; former South Carolinian congressman William Drayton wrote, "The abolitionists in urging their designs against the South, are guilty of infringing the acknowledged rights of those states ...it looks to revolution, it teaches that the constitution "is null and void" when opposed to their schemes." In other words, whatever the issue was, the Constitution could take a back seat if it impeded the political agenda of the day. 

An unregulated democracy, such as our Government today, has more power and violates our rights more than when we were under King George; it is not even comparable. In Red Republicans and Lincoln's Marxists, Al Benson Jr and Walter Kennedy write, "By focusing upon slavery, the bona fide story of the death of real states’ rights and the beginning of Imperial America is overlooked...we stand naked before the awesome power of our federal master."

Unlike today, antebellum America was a time when the federal government did not spread into the dominion of the states. Through the states, people were allowed self-rule and self-governance. Southerners understood that if the federal government was allowed to infringe on the states' rights on the issue of slavery, it would become an authoritarian body that no longer followed its limitations under the Constitution. These were the costs of the South's defeat in the Civil War; self-governance, and limited government. 

To desire a limited government and maintain the Constitution as handed down for generations, one did not need to be pro-slavery. Northerner writer Frederick Law Olmsted opposed slavery but objected to abolishing it "by federal edict." In 1864, Vermont Bishop John Henry Hopkins wrote, A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery, where he supported the South and the compact theory of the Union, arguing for gradual and consensual abolition.

Southerners heeded the warnings of the Founders. In a letter to Charles Hammond on August 18, 1821, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "When all Government domestic and foreign in little as in great things shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one Government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the Government from which we separated."

"I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people. To take a single step beyond the boundaries, thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition."

– Thomas Jefferson, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank" February 15, 1791 

A government of unlimited or undefined powers will eventually become totalitarian. This was widely known amongst Southerners. Thomas Jefferson believed that states' rights were the best protection to preserve liberty and a republican form of Government. John Taylor of Caroline warned, "If a government can take some, it may take all." St. George Tucker taught, "Power when undefined, soon becomes unlimited." In the first annals of Congress, James Jackson said, "We must confine ourselves to the powers described in the Constitution, and the moment we pass it, we take an arbitrary stride towards a despotic Government." James Rosch quotes John Randolph of Roanoke addressing Congress "If they begin with declaring one law of one state unconstitutional, where were they to stop? They might go on until the state governments, stripped of all authority...a great consolidated empire established upon their ruins...in such a contest the states must fall, and when they did fall, there was an end of all republican Government in the country." 

In other words, the only method to prevent an unlimited government is to counter all minor steps it takes beyond its authority. To do so, there must be a check from outside the government itself since it will not limit its own powers, only expand them. In our federated Republic, this check was the state governments who were to maintain the Founders’ principles for their peoples. Future president John Adams, a Massachusetts federalist, agreed that arbitrary power could not be left unchecked;

"Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud, is the only maxim which can ever preserve the liberties of any people. When the people give way, their deceivers, betrayers, and destroyers press upon them so fast, that there is no resisting afterward. The nature of the encroachment upon the American Constitution is such, as to grow every day more and more encroaching. Like a cancer, it eats faster and faster every hour. The revenue creates pensioners, and the pensioners urge for more revenue. The people grow less steady, spirited, and virtuous, the seekers more numerous and more corrupt, and every day increases the circles of their dependents and expectants, until virtue, integrity, public spirit, simplicity, and frugality, become the objects of ridicule and scorn, and vanity, luxury, foppery, selfishness, meanness, and downright venality swallow up the whole society. "

– John Adams, Novanglus Letters, 1774 

The claim that the Deep South left the Union to preserve slavery does not make sense; no one was trying to abolish slavery within those states. In his book, The Yankee Problem, Clyde Wilson quotes Horace Greeley at the 1860 Republican convention saying, "An anti-slavery man per se cannot be elected, but a tariff, river-and -harbor- Pacific Railroad, free homestead man, may succeed although he is anti-slavery." Historian David Donald wrote, "No responsible political body in the north in 1860 proposed to do anything at all about slavery where it actually existed." On Tuesday, March 5, 1861, the N.Y. Times editorial (which celebrated Lincoln's inaugural) said the president’s address was "explicit and emphatic in its guarantees to the alarming interest of the southern states." Lincoln "Disavowed all thought" of "interfering with slavery in any state where it exists."

On September 23, 1862, the N.Y. Times printed the preliminary emancipation proclamation with a headline that read, "the war still to be prosecuted for the restoration of the union." And in a letter to the federal minister in Paris, the secretary of the state William Seward wrote, "The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the same, whether it succeeds or fails. The rights of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will remain subject to exactly the same laws and form of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." Union generals such as McClellan and McDowell returned fugitive slaves to their masters during the war.  

Since slavery wasn't being threatened where it existed in the Union, it would be hard to accept that Southerners would fight a war and leave the country just to have slavery extended into new territories. In fact, if slavery were extended, it would provide more competition to the southern slave state's monopoly on cotton. In 1843 many wealthy southern planters and men, such as John Calhoun, voted against Texas joining the Union because they said it would reduce the price of cotton. Furthermore, the South forfeited federal protection for their runaway slaves under the fugitive slave laws by leaving the Union. They were also giving up their right to bring slaves into the territories of the United States. 

If the South fought only to preserve slavery, with no regard for states' rights, they could have remained in the Union. During the war, Lincoln told southerners if they laid down arms, they could come back into the Union with slavery intact. Even the Emancipation Proclamation was an attempt to reconcile slave states back in the Union. John Cannan in The Peninsula Campaign writes, "The emancipation proclamation was actually an offer permitting the south to stop fighting and return to the union by January 1 and still keep its slaves," and the South understood it as such. In July 1863, a Raleigh newspaper stated, "Peace now would save slavery, while a continued war would obliterate the last vestiges of it." Confederate Major General John Gordon wrote, "At any period of the war from its beginning to near its close the South could have saved slavery by simply laying down its arms and returning to the Union" Yet, for other reasons mentioned, the South chose to continue the fight.

Slavery was permitted in the South, but that does not mean it was always celebrated. Today we have legalized abortion, perhaps some view abortion as many southerners viewed slavery, as a necessary evil. 

Virginia freed more slaves before the Civil War than New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New England combined. South Carolinian Mary Chestnut said that slavery was a curse, yet she supported secession. She and others hoped the war would end with a "Great independent country with no slavery." But for the typical Southerner, the issue over slavery was much more profound as it involved states' rights and the nature of the Union.

"When the Government of the United States disregarded and attempted to trample upon the rights of the States, Georgia set its power at defiance and seceded from the Union rather than submit to the consolidation of all power in the hands of the Central or Federal Government." 

-Joseph E Brown Georgia Governor to Jefferson Davis over the Conscription act 1862

In antebellum America, the states resisted federal expansion in various ways. The first issue between central and state governments arose over the alien and sedition acts. Later problems involved internal improvements, national banking, conscription, protective tariffs, land disputes, freedom of speech, free trade, state control of the militia, fugitive slave laws, etc. No matter the subject, states generally held firm and fought against federal expansions. The South was doing what states had done in antebellum America, resisting national expansion when it went past its constitutional bounds. The outcomes of the Republican victory have resulted in our current overbearing government, which has no regard for its ostensibly limited powers, proving the South correct.

"The South's concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North's had. With complete sincerity, the South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the Founding Fathers--a government of limited powers that protected the rights of property, including slave property, and whose constituency comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white race undisturbed by large cities, heartless factories, restless free workers, and class conflict. The accession of the Republican party, with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian, free-labor capitalism, was a signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably toward this frightening future."

-James M. McPherson  Ante-bellum Southern Exceptionalism A New Look at an Old Question Kent State U Press 1983

South Carolina Secession Document

"The one great evil, from which all other evils have flowed, is the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States. The Government of the United States is no longer the government of confederated republics, but of a consolidated Democracy... the limitations in the Constitution have been swept away; and the Government of the United States has become consolidated, with a claim of limitless powers in its operations."

-Address of South Carolina to Slave-Holding States, Convention of South Carolina 1860

South Carolina was the first state to secede from the Union. If the state declaration of the causes of secession is read in full, it gives an excellent example of slavery as a state's rights issue. In the document, quoting from a resolution of the state convention of 1852, it was declared "That the frequent violations of the constitution by the United States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State in then withdrawing from the Federal Union." At that time they had refrained, but their situation had only worsened and they could no longer remain. In their declaration of the causes of independence, the writers wanted it known that state rights were the true motivator of secession. That is why at first glance through the text, you will see "FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES," with minor variations in the phrasing, capitalized three times in the document.

The document goes into the history of states' rights in America. It mentions the federal government's failure to uphold the Constitution and the government's interference with the rights of the states. South Carolina stated that if they were to stay in the Union, the "guaranties of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost" and that the federal government would become its enemy. While slavery is mentioned six times, states' rights, independent states, and state sovereignty are mentioned sixteen times. States' rights are discussed without any connection to slavery, yet slavery is always mentioned in connection with states' rights. Just as Southern democrats had been saying for decades in their political party planks, an attack on slavery was an attack on states' rights.

"For more than thirty years the people of South Carolina have been contending against the consolidation of the government of the United States...the United States Government has steadily usurped powers not granted- –progressively trenched upon States Rights." 

-Charleston Mercury South Carolina April 20, 1861

Slavery in the Territories

"The struggle in our territories...has not been a struggle for the emancipation of slaves. It has been a contest for power...The Northern people, in attempting to preclude the Southern people, by the legislation of Congress...a party hostile both to the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court, have been placed in control of the Government...Whether all the States composing the United States should be slaveholding or non-slaveholding States, neither the Northern nor Southern States ought to have permitted to be a question in the politics of the United States."

-Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs C.S.A 1861- Provided by the Abbeville Institute September 4, 2014

The fight over the expansion of slavery into the new western territories was a political battle. Were the states coming into the Union allowed their state rights as all previous states had been, or was the federal Government allowed to infringe on those rights and command them? Were states sovereign or subject to federal control? The South fought for these new states coming into the Union to be allowed to decide on their own about slavery regardless of the outcome. 

Further, was the federal Government allowed to command where slave owners were allowed to go within the Union? Could they prevent their migration to the western territories, thus giving political control to the Republican party? Were Southerners full citizens in their own country with the same rights as non-slave owners? Would the Federal Government be allowed to discriminate against any minority group that lacked the powers to defend themselves? 

But the southern objection was more than a fight for seats in Congress, as slavery was very unlikely to extend west. According to David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered, "Slavery did not go into New Mexico or Arizona, Kansas, after having been opened to the peculiar institution for six years, had only two negro slaves." To many Southerners, the fight was to maintain states’ authority in the Union and preserve the Constitution and people's self-government.

That when the settlers in a Territory, having an adequate population, form a State Constitution, the right of sovereignty commences and being consummated by admission into the Union, they stand on an equal footing with the people of other States, and the State thus organized ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its Constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery. [Emphasis added.]    

-Southern Democrat Party Platform 1860 

 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Vicksburg Campaign: Part 2 - Grant Devises a Solution

The Vicksburg campaign was a key series battles from 1862 to 1863 in the US Civil War. The fighting was focused on Vicksburg, Mississippi. In part two of a two-part series, Lloyd W Klein looks at how Grant devised a solution.

See part 1 on the strategic problem of Vicksburg here.

The Battle of Big Black River Bridge, as shown in Harper’s Weekly in June 1863.

General Ulysses Grant had surreptitiously moved his army and navy south of Vicksburg and created diversions to keep the Confederate commander Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton from knowing his whereabouts. But now, he had to cross the Mississippi River to be on the same side of the river as Vicksburg. Porter effectively managed to relocate steamships and transport vessels from the northern region of Vicksburg to where Grant's troops were stationed, ready for transportation across the river. Grant's infantry had advanced southward, and with an abundance of supplies and river transports, the Union Army was finally able to cross the Mississippi River. The Federal landing at Bruinsburg, Mississippi, on April 30, 1863, and the ensuing victory at the Battle of Port Gibson the next day were the start of Grant’s movement toward Vicksburg.

However, the crossing did not unfold as smoothly as anticipated.

Grant's initial strategy to land at Grand Gulf was thwarted by a Confederate division that had fortified the area, and even a bombardment by Union ironclads failed to dislodge them. Consequently, Grant instructed Porter and McClernand to facilitate a crossing at Grand Gulf, Mississippi. On the morning of April 29, McClernand embarked his troops on transports at Hard Times, awaiting Porter's gunboats to weaken the Confederate stronghold. Following a five-hour battle, the Confederate forces emerged victorious as Porter's vessels retreated, sustaining casualties in the process. The Battle of Grand Gulf ended in a Confederate victory when Porter's vessels withdrew after losing 19 killed and 56 wounded.

McClernand unloaded his soldiers and marched them south to De Shroon's (or Disharoon) plantation, located about 5 miles north of Bruinsburg on the west bank of the Mississippi River. That night, Porter's gunboats and the transports ran the Grand Gulf batteries and joined McClernand's men at De Shroon's.  Grant arrived on April 29 and devised a new plan to disembark his soldiers at Rodney, Mississippi, located around 12 miles downstream. However, a fortuitous encounter with an escaped slave led Grant to Bruinsburg, a port with excellent steamboat facilities and a convenient road leading up the bluffs east of the river. Upon arrival, the soldiers found the port nearly deserted, with only a local farmer as a witness to their invasion.

Battle of Port Gibson

The Battle of Port Gibson began with the landing of 17,000 Union soldiers at Bruinsburg,  Grant's army, after successfully crossing the river, proceeded towards their initial target, Port Gibson, located approximately ten miles east of Bruinsburg. This strategic location held control over the local road network, making it a crucial objective for the advancing Union forces. The skirmishes between the Union army and Confederate outposts lasted for three hours on May 1, before escalating into a full-fledged battle at dawn.

The challenging terrain initially favored the Confederate defense, characterized by flat-topped ridges and steep ravines. The ridge-tops were devoid of trees, while the ravines were densely covered with vegetation, making off-road movements arduous. Centers Creek, situated between the Bruinsburg and Rodney roads, posed a significant obstacle due to its near-impassable nature. McClernand, overseeing the attack with Porter's assistance, navigated the challenging terrain to lead the Union forces toward their objective.

Under McClernand's command, the Union forces encountered solid Confederate defense, with Brig Gen Martin Green leading the main brigade. However, the tide turned when Logan managed to flank the Confederate right, compelling the defenders to retreat. The unexpected arrival of Union forces in the evening led to a rare night battle, with Green requesting support from the Rebel right flank. Just as reinforcements arrived from Vicksburg, Osterhaus launched an attack on the Confederate right flank, further destabilizing their defense. The Confederates continued to fall back and establish new defensive positions at different times during the day. Eventually, they conceded and left the field in the early evening. The collapse of the Confederate line following Logan's assault prompted a retreat, ultimately resulting in the fall of Port Gibson and Grant's subsequent advancement inland. Grant was now in control of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.

Grant’s defeat of the garrison at Port Gibson forced the abandonment of the defenses at Grand Gulf. Pemberton was caught with his army scattered and could only oppose Grant with inferior forces at Port Gibson. The battle allowed control of the entire area where the Union army needed to cross the river and start its movement.

Grant was faced with a critical decision at this stage, as he had multiple options available to him. One possibility was to launch an attack on Vicksburg from both the south and the east. Another option was to collaborate with General Banks, seize Port Hudson, and then proceed to march on Vicksburg as a combined force. However, Grant was well aware of Banks' incompetence and had no intention of allowing him to disrupt their operations. If Grant had chosen to join forces with Banks, he would have been subordinate to him, which he strongly opposed.

Consequently, Grant had to carefully consider his next move. Although his orders, or at least Halleck’s plan, were to rendezvous with General Banks and capture Port Hudson before jointly assaulting Vicksburg, Grant decided to deviate from these instructions. Instead, he sent a message to Halleck, informing him that Banks was currently engaged in his own operations, and that waiting for him to finish would require waiting another month. Instead, Grant made the deliberate choice to advance independently, fully aware that it would take approximately 8 days for his message to be received and a response to be given. By avoiding the collaboration with Banks, Grant was able to pursue his own plans without any hindrance. As a result, he found himself in a favorable position to accept the surrender of Pemberton, while Banks remained stationed at Port Hudson.

The Move Inland

Once the areas on the river crossings were in Union control, Confederate forces situated between the Big Bayou Pierre and the Big Black River found themselves in a compromised position. Recognizing this vulnerability, the Confederate troops swiftly moved towards Hankinson's Ferry across the Big Black River. At this juncture, Grant's original plan was to feign a move north along the same path as a diversion to threaten a direct advance toward Vicksburg. However, reconnaissance revealed that Pemberton had established formidable defensive positions to the south of the city.

Consequently, on May 7th, Grant made a strategic decision that would later be regarded as one of the most brilliant maneuvers of the war. He opted to disrupt the city's supply line by capturing the railroad connecting Jackson to Vicksburg. This route involved a shift towards the east, with the ultimate objective of turning west to launch an assault on Vicksburg. By cutting off the town's supply lines, its strategic advantages were transformed into vulnerabilities.

Rather than taking a direct approach towards Vicksburg from the southern front, Grant led his army in a northeasterly direction, utilizing the protection of the Big Black River on his left flank. The plan was to target the Southern Railroad of Mississippi between Vicksburg and Jackson. Severing this vital transportation link would cut Pemberton's supply chains and communication networks, effectively isolating Vicksburg. As the Union forces advanced inland, each corps was strategically positioned, with McClernand's on the left, Sherman's in the center, and McPherson's on the right. However, the further Grant's army moved inland, the more susceptible they became to potential attacks.

The Supply Line

The crucial question of the whole campaign is how Grant would supply his army. Grant established a base at Grand Gulf on the Mississippi River to support the army's advancement inland. This supply base played a crucial role in sustaining the Union Army's movements in Mississippi. However, it is important to note that Grant did not completely sever his supply line when he reached Vicksburg and reconnected with the fleet on the Yazoo River. It is a misconception, often perpetuated by modern narratives, that Grant was without a supply line. Grant actually established and effectively maintained a main supply route throughout his movement toward Vicksburg.

General Sherman expressed apprehensions regarding Grant's logistical planning, deeming it insufficient and vulnerable to attacks. Grant, in opting for an indirect approach to Vicksburg by targeting the railroad east of the city. necessitated a longer and riskier supply route. This choice prompted Sherman to caution Grant about the potential challenges of maintaining such a large army with limited resources. Grant's response reflected his reliance on utilizing available provisions and sourcing the rest from the surrounding area. Sherman on May 9 warned Grant: "There are over 500 wagons across the river ... Stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quickly as possible, for this road will be jammed as sure as life if you attempt to supply 50,000 men by one single road." Grant replied,  "I do not calculate the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf ... What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance."

The myth of Grant's cutting loose from his supply base began when Charles Dana, a former reporter who accompanied Grant's army as an observer for the Secretary of War, wrote back to Washington on May 4, 1863: "As soon as Sherman comes up and the rations on the way arrive, he [Grant] will disregard his base and depend upon the country for meat and even for bread." In 1867 Adam Badeau, a former Grant staff officer, published the first volume of his three-volume Military History of General U. S. Grant. Badeau wrote that "[Grant] at once decided to abandon his base altogether, to plunge into the enemy's country with three days rations, trusting to the region itself for forage and supplies." A year later, in The Personal History of U. S. Grant, Albert Richardson compared Grant's Vicksburg Campaign with "Scott's brilliant campaign from Puebla to Mexico," and wrote that Grant "determined to abandon his base."

However, Grant himself refuted these claims during an interview in 1879 with a New York Herald reporter, clarifying that he did not sever ties with his supply base during the Vicksburg Campaign. Grant said that, as his troops crossed the Mississippi on April 29 and 30, he "had rations in abundance on board the transports, but no transportation for them into the interior." He said he did not abandon his base but "directed the officers to gather all the wagons and teams they could from the plantations as we moved on." He explained that while his troops had ample rations upon crossing the Mississippi, there was a lack of transportation for these supplies. Grant emphasized the importance of maintaining a supply line for essential items that could not be procured from the local environment, such as ammunition, coffee, bread, salt, and sugar.

But, when writing his Personal Memoirs in 1885, more than 22 years after the conclusion of the Vicksburg Campaign, his account of the supply line issue added to the confusion. Grant supported the myth that he had decided to abandon his supply base at Grand Gulf on May 3 by stating, "I determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in Vicksburg and invest or capture the city." This statement was almost identical to one he had previously written for an article in Century magazine in July of 1884, which was published in 1885 and later included in the four-volume Battles and Leaders of the Civil War in 1887. Grant's use of the phrase "cut loose from my base" at Grand Gulf on May 3, often cited by authors and historians, contradicts his own words eight pages later. Grant recalled that on May 12, at Dillon's farm, he decided to redirect his columns towards Jackson. He wrote, "But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none — to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I turned quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear." Therefore, it becomes clear that Grant intended to secure his communications, rather than solely focusing on food supplies.

The Battle of Raymond

Grant devised a new strategy on May 7th, opting for an indirect approach rather than a direct assault on Pemberton's forces south of Vicksburg. Instead of crossing the Big Black River and heading north, Grant planned to reach the railroad east of Vicksburg and approach from that direction. This plan, however, came with its own set of risks and challenges, as it required a longer line of supply. Despite the potential difficulties, Grant's army continued to move northeastward towards the railroad on May 11th, while General McClernand expressed concerns about the enemy isolating the Union army by cutting off their supply line.

Grant intended to first cut off the railroad before launching an attack on Vicksburg. As his forces drew closer to the railroad, Grant discovered that Pemberton had already begun constructing fortifications to protect it. It became evident that Vicksburg had strong defenses in the southern part of the city and a well-established supply line from Jackson via the railroad. Grant believed that the enemy was positioned to the north, defending the railroad.

Pemberton suspected that Grant's primary target was the railroad. In response, he strategically positioned his troops along the entire line from Warrenton to Bovina, constructing fortifications at key points. As Grant's intentions became more apparent, Pemberton extended his line of defense to Edwards Station and fortified that area as well. However, this left the rail centers at Bolton and Clinton vulnerable. To address this, Pemberton ordered reinforcements arriving from the south and east to march to Raymond, where they would form the left wing of his army, guarding the north-south roads that connected the rail line from Jackson to Vicksburg. Pemberton planned to strike Grant in the flank if he attacked Edwards Station or the Big Black Bridge. If Grant turned toward Jackson, Pemberton would strike him in the flank and rear as he passed.

Many renderings of the Battle of Raymond suggest that Johnston was in command in Jackson at this time. In fact, on May 10, he is not present in the vicinity, having just been appointed commander. He was en route; Johnston wasn’t even appointed until May 9 and didn’t arrive until May 13; at that point, McPherson was already positioned between the two Confederate armies.

Pemberton knew that reinforcements were gathering in Jackson. So, on May 10 he ordered them all to a small town called Raymond about 20 miles southwest of Jackson.

General John Gregg led a brigade to Raymond with the intention of ambushing a Union advance party, despite his limited military experience as a Texas politician. However, faulty intelligence led him to believe he would only face a small contingent of Union troops. After an exhausting 200-mile march from Port Hudson, Gregg's 3,000-man brigade arrived in Jackson on May 9th, only to be ordered to march 19 miles to Raymond after a day of rest. Arriving late in the afternoon on May 11th, his men were so fatigued that they dropped to rest where they stood.

Meanwhile, Grant had authorized McPherson to begin his march toward Jackson on the same day. Gregg, under explicit orders to not engage a larger force, was supposed to withdraw slowly toward Jackson while alerting Pemberton for a coordinated strike. However, McPherson's strategic deployment of troops lured Gregg into a pitched battle by concealing his forces and showing only Logan's 2nd Brigade up the road. This tactical maneuver led to Gregg's brigade being drawn into a confrontation, McPherson then had the 1st and 3rd Brigades march through the woods unseen. Once Logan’s entire division was in place, he ordered the men forward.

At approximately 10:30 am, McPherson issued the command to move forward. The 23rd Indiana, known for their skills as skirmishers, defied orders and crossed the creek ahead of the federal line, unknowingly setting off the Confederate ambush. Overwhelmed by the two Confederate regiments, the Hoosiers fled with the Confederates in pursuit. The Confederates, in turn, chased the Indiana troops across the creek only to be met by a hidden federal infantry brigade. A complex and chaotic engagement developed as three Confederate regiments emerged from the woods after chasing away a cavalry picket only to find that the force they had been ordered to encircle was two federal brigades. Although some accounts suggest McPherson sent in his men in waves, perhaps due to weather conditions, others say he was hiding his deployment from Gregg to deceive him.

Gregg found himself in a challenging situation as he attempted to disengage from the fight. By 4 pm, he finally managed to regroup his forces and ordered a retreat. However, amid the chaos, Gregg failed to communicate the unfolding events to Pemberton, leaving a gap in the Confederate command structure and strategic coordination.

As Gregg retreated through Raymond, reinforcements began to arrive to cover his withdrawal, including cavalry regiments, infantry units, and a brigade from Georgia. With approximately 5,000 men on the field, McPherson's forces were consolidating towards the fortifications being constructed in Jackson. The opposing forces clashed at Fourteen Mile Creek, where Gregg attempted to halt the Union army's advance. Despite initial success in causing heavy casualties, the Confederate troops were eventually outmatched by the Union's superior numbers and firepower, leading to a strategic retreat back to Jackson.

General Joseph Johnston and Jackson MS

Grant's strategic plan revolved around disrupting the railway supply route that connected Vicksburg to Jackson. The primary objective was to prevent potential attacks from General Johnston, who was stationed in Jackson, that could have resulted in Grant's forces being trapped between Johnston and Pemberton. To execute this plan, Grant made adjustments by instructing McClernand and Sherman to hold Pemberton in position while McPherson swiftly advanced from the rear to capture the state capital. This tactical maneuver aimed to sever Pemberton's supply line and weaken the defenses of Vicksburg, ultimately allowing McPherson to rejoin Grant's forces.

On May 14, 1863, Grant redirected his army towards the east to force General Johnston's forces away from Jackson. Johnston, with the majority of his army, retreated along the Canton Road. This retreat prevented Johnston from joining forces with Pemberton, who was now isolated in Vicksburg. With Johnston out of the picture, Grant shifted his focus back to Vicksburg. Once the Union forces gained control of the capital, communication between Pemberton and General Johnston was severed, further isolating Pemberton's troops.

In response to Johnston's orders, Pemberton, commanding approximately 23,000 men divided into three divisions, was instructed to leave Edwards Station and launch an attack on the Union troops at Clinton. However, Pemberton and his generals believed that Johnston's plan would likely lead to disaster. Instead, they decided to divert their attention and attack the Union supply trains en route from Grand Gulf to Raymond. On May 16, Pemberton received another message from Johnston reiterating his previous orders. Unfortunately, Pemberton had already set off after the supply trains and found himself on the Raymond-Edwards Road, with his rear positioned at a crossroads just south of the crest of Champion Hill. As a result, when Pemberton obediently ordered a countermarch, his rear, including the supply wagons, inadvertently became the vanguard of his attack.

Battle of Champion Hill

The Battle of Champion Hill, which took place on May 16, 1863, marked a significant turning point in the Vicksburg Campaign. It was a critical moment for Pemberton, as he had one last opportunity to fend off Grant's forces. However, his confusion during this crucial juncture ultimately sealed his fate. With his troops outnumbered 32,000 to 22,000, Pemberton formed a defensive line along a ridge that overlooked Jackson Creek. This defensive position covered the Middle Road and Raymond Road to the south.

In the early morning of May 13, the three divisions of Generals Bowen, Loring, and Stevenson marched out from the Black River fortifications and began their strike toward what Pemberton hoped was the rear supply line of the Federal Army. More importantly, Grant knew Pemberton was coming. One of the messengers between Johnston and Pemberton was actually a Union operative who turned over his messages to General McPherson, who in turn reported the information to Grant. On the morning of May 16, 1863, the rebels met, not Grant’s supply line as expected, but most of his Federal Army at a place known as Champion’s Hill.

The situation became precarious for Pemberton when General Stephen D. Lee, stationed atop Champion Hill, alerted him to a Union column advancing on the Jackson Road. This Union movement threatened to cut off the Southern forces from Edwards Station and the vital route to Vicksburg. In response, Pemberton shifted his troops northward to protect the hill and the Jackson Road.

Grant, on the other hand, ordered attacks by Logan and Hovey, while John A. McClernand's corps launched an assault on Pemberton's left flank, and James B. McPherson's corps attacked from the right. Despite the excellent defense provided by Stephen Lee, the Union forces managed to seize the crest of the hill around 1 PM. McPherson's corps continued to advance, capturing a crucial crossroads and effectively closing off the escape route via the Jackson Road.

Although a counterattack by Bowen's division briefly pushed the Federals back beyond the Champion Hill crest, they were unable to maintain their position due to insufficient numbers. Recognizing the dire situation, Grant launched a counterattack, committing all of his forces. Pemberton's men were unable to withstand this assault, prompting him to order his troops to utilize the only remaining escape route, the Raymond Road crossing of Bakers Creek.

McPherson on the right (north) flank fought the lion’s share of the battle. His casualties constituted the bulk of the Union losses, about 2,500. The Confederates suffered about 3,800 casualties, perhaps half were captured. Grant criticized the lack of fighting spirit of McClernand, his rival for Union Army leadership. McClernand had delayed his attack and then was stopped by a smaller force. McClernand's casualties were low on the Union left flank (south). Sherman and the others wanted to see him gone, but Grant counseled a different course of action.

The decision made by General Pemberton regarding the abandonment of Vicksburg, as ordered by General Johnston, remains a pivotal question in the context of the entire war. This question not only fueled a post-war dispute between Pemberton and Johnston but also subjected Pemberton to enduring criticism. On one hand, General Johnston displayed little confidence in defending Vicksburg and instead advocated for the merging of Pemberton's forces with his own. By uniting their armies, Johnston believed they could confront Grant's troops in an open battle and subsequently allocate their forces to other vulnerable areas of the Confederacy. Conversely, Confederate President Jefferson Davis consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Vicksburg at all costs, leaving Pemberton torn between conflicting directives. It is crucial to acknowledge the challenging position Pemberton found himself in, torn between the expectations of his military and civilian superiors.

However, fair criticism can be directed towards Pemberton for his slow response, failure to anticipate Grant's movements and lack of coordination with Johnston. Attempting to appease both his military and civilian superiors proved to be an impossible mission. The complexities of the situation, coupled with the pressure to please conflicting authorities, hindered Pemberton's ability to make swift and strategic decisions. While it is understandable that he could not simply disregard the orders of his president, the consequences of his indecisiveness and lack of proactive measures were significant. Pemberton's retreat from Vicksburg ultimately resulted in continuing censure and placed him at the center of scrutiny for years to come.

Battle of Big Black River Bridge

Pemberton realized that his army was at a numerical disadvantage, prompting him to make the strategic decision to retreat towards the Big Black River Bridge. To buy time for the Confederate army to regroup, he assigned General William W. Loring's division to hold Raymond Road while the rest of the troops moved north. The division under Bowen and the brigade of John C Vaughn were tasked with defending the works at the bridge, with the advantage of natural barriers such as swampy terrain and a bayou in front of them.

On the Union side, Major General John McClernand led the pursuit of the Confederates and engaged Bowen's rear guard. A swift Union charge managed to break the Confederate position, leading to a rout during the retreat and river crossing. Many Confederate soldiers were captured in the process, while the remaining troops sought refuge within the fortifications at Vicksburg, Mississippi, marking the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg the following day.

Grant had initially planned for General Sherman to surprise Bowen and Vaughn at the Big Black River crossing at Bridgeport, seven miles away, where he could reach the west bank of the Big Black River and take Bowen and Vaughn by surprise. Meanwhile, his subordinate Gen. Michael K. Lawler had a different idea.

Martin Green’s Brigade held the Confederate left without any artillery support, while Lawler’s brigade was positioned nearby in the tree line. A scout informed Lawler of a sunken area close to the Rebel line, allowing his men to charge across open ground with minimal risk from artillery fire. Recognizing a strategic opportunity – no one was covering the river – his brigade charged a sunken area that was bisected by a marsh.

The following morning, Lawler’s Brigade took the initiative to charge the Confederate lines without explicit orders, disappearing from view after advancing 50 yards. During the charge, both sides engaged in intense artillery exchanges, resulting in General Osterhaus of Grant’s command being wounded by a Confederate shell. Meanwhile, Gen. Eugene Carr’s Division began to assemble opposite the Confederate lines.

By 9 o’clock, Lawler identified an opportune location to strike the Rebel defenses and ordered his men to charge. The Federal troops, who had seemingly vanished from sight, reemerged and swiftly advanced the remaining 50 yards to assault the gap between Martin Green’s Arkansas Brigade and Vaughn’s Tennessee Brigade. Despite facing fire from infantry and artillery as they crossed the bayou, the Federal soldiers managed to breach the Confederate breastworks and engage in close combat. Witnessing the success of Lawler’s charge, the rest of the Union line followed suit and joined the assault. Overwhelmed by the increasing number of Union infantry, the Confederates retreated, leaving behind their cannons and approximately 1,700 men who surrendered.

The significance of this small battle cannot be understated. The Confederates suffered heavy losses, with 1,751 men killed or captured, the majority of which were taken as prisoners. On the other hand, the Union casualties were relatively low, totaling around 235. This defeat at the Big Black River Bridge marked the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg.

Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman was killed in this action. To help save the army, Pemberton tasked Lloyd Tilghman's brigade to provide a rear-guard action that cost Tilghman his life. However, this action allowed Pemberton to retreat from the area.

The general was killed by artillery fire. His teenage son was on the field and hugged his father as he died.

Following their defeat at Champion Hill, General John C. Pemberton's forces retreated to the bridge at Big Black River, just before reaching Vicksburg. During the battle at Champion Hill, General William Loring disobeyed orders to advance, resulting in his separation from the main Confederate troops. Loring attempted to rejoin his comrades at the bridge, but the difficult terrain forced him to abandon most of his supplies and artillery. Local civilians warned Loring that a large Union force stood between him and the rendezvous point at Big Black. Instead of engaging Grant's forces, Loring decided to redirect his path and join the Confederate forces at Canton. Unbeknownst to Pemberton, who was unaware of Loring's change in direction, he ordered John Bowen's Division and John Vaughn's Brigade to defend the works at Big Black River Bridge, to buy time. Had Pemberton been aware of Loring's retreat, he may have reconsidered engaging in battle at that location, as it was intended to serve as a rear guard action for Loring. Loring's strained relationship with Pemberton was well-known, as he had difficulty working with his superiors. Despite this, Loring consistently displayed courage and honor in battle, proving himself time and time again. Instead of retreating to Vicksburg, Loring eventually reached Johnston's army. The feud between Loring and Pemberton over these actions persisted long after the war had ended.

Retreat into Vicksburg

Following the resounding Union victories at the Battle of Champion Hill and the Battle of Big Black River Bridge, Pemberton found himself cornered within the City of Vicksburg. With Sherman's corps threatening to flank him from the north, Pemberton had no choice but to either engage in battle or entrench himself within the city. The siege of Vicksburg commenced on May 18 and lasted about 6 weeks.

As the Confederates retreated, they resorted to burning the railroad bridge over the Big Black River and a steamboat serving as a bridge. By detonating incendiary devices on the bridges, they thwarted Grant's pursuit attempts. Although Vicksburg had not yet fallen to Grant's forces, the city was effectively cut off from the outside world. Pemberton and his troops were trapped within the confines of Vicksburg, buying them time but offering no escape route.

With dwindling troops and no external connections, Pemberton's situation grew increasingly dire. Grant's superior numbers and strategic control over supply lines posed a significant challenge to the Confederate forces. Despite hopes of Johnston launching an attack from the east, the advice to surrender the town and save the troops prevailed. Grant's decision to initiate a prolonged siege, following unsuccessful frontal assaults, marked the beginning of a grueling period of bombardment for Vicksburg.

Grant initially attempted to overpower the Confederate army by leveraging his larger numbers. Despite Grant's efforts to assault the trenches on May 19 and May 22, these two frontal assaults aimed at capturing the city proved unsuccessful. The defensive line surrounding Vicksburg spanned approximately six and a half miles, taking advantage of the varying terrain that included hills and knobs with steep slopes. These natural features posed a challenge for attackers, who would have to ascend them while under enemy fire. The formidable perimeter of the defensive line consisted of numerous gun pits, forts, trenches, redoubts, and lunettes, which perfectly took advantage of the natural features.

The failure to take the Confederate works by assault led Grant to initiate a prolonged siege on May 25. As part of the siege, a significant bombardment was conducted. Union forces constructed their own network of earthworks and trenches that ran parallel to it. These trenches, referred to as ditches, marked the beginning of trench warfare. The situation within the besieged city worsened as the air became polluted by the stench of dead horses and soldiers, while the wounded often lay in the space between the opposing lines. Eventually, Grant agreed to a truce in order to clear the resulting mess. Recognizing that even with 50,000 soldiers, he would be unable to fully encircle Vicksburg due to unguarded roads leading south, Grant sought assistance from Major General Henry W. Halleck. Union troops in the West were subsequently shifted, and the front line was reinforced not only with heavy artillery from massive cannons but also with naval guns that targeted the city from the river.

Grant had expressed his dissatisfaction with McClernand's lack of determination at Champion Hill, as he had failed to eliminate or capture Pemberton's entire force. McClernand's casualties were minimal on the Union's southern flank, suggesting a lack of engagement, Sherman and others believed it was time for him to be removed from his position. Grant firmly believed that if the XIII Corps had launched a vigorous attack, Pemberton's army could have been annihilated and the Siege of Vicksburg could have been avoided. However, Grant advised a different approach from his subordinates. Then, a newspaper article published an order in which McClernand praised his troops despite their unsuccessful assaults on Vicksburg. Grant saw this as an opportunity and seized it. While the order itself was acceptable, it undermined the efforts of others and contradicted both a departmental order and one issued by Grant, which stated that official papers should not be published. Consequently, Grant relieved McClernand of his duties on June 19th.

The Siege of Vicksburg

Daily bombardments began and were devastating. Union gunboats lobbed over 22,000 shells into the town and army artillery fire was even heavier. As the barrages continued, suitable housing in Vicksburg was reduced to a minimum. A ridge, located between the main town and the rebel defense line, provided lodging for the duration. The citizens of the city were unable to walk the streets or live in their houses. All above-ground homes and shelters were unsafe or destroyed.

Over time, Grant moved 77,000 Union soldiers into positions completely encircling Vicksburg, cutting off their supply line. Although surrounded and without access to food, weapons, and ammunition, Vicksburg’s Confederate soldiers and civilians continued their defense.

Confederate troops ate horses, dogs, and vegetables from the gardens of Vicksburg residents.  Towards the end, some were eating rats and tree bark.  As the siege wore on, fewer and fewer horses, mules, and dogs were seen wandering about Vicksburg. Shoe leather became a last resort of sustenance for many adults.

By the end of June, half of all of the Confederate soldiers were suffering from malnutrition including scurvy, caused by lack of Vitamin C. Others suffered from unsanitary conditions and developed dysentery, diarrhea, dehydration, and malaria. The lack of food, combined with the epidemics of malaria and dysentery, took a heavy toll on the Confederate forces. By the end of June, half were unable to report for duty and were sick or hospitalized. The poor diet was telling on the Confederate soldiers.

The townspeople were forced to build and live in caves.  Many of their homes were destroyed by artillery bombardment, and those that remained were targets. Residents and soldiers dug over 500 caves into the hillside to escape the bombardment, hiding in their basements.  During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union Over 500 caves, known locally as "bombproofs", were dug into the yellow clay hills of Vicksburg. Both soldiers and citizens were boxed in with plentiful munitions but little food.

During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union experienced 638 casualties with 94 deaths, vs. the Confederate loss of 3202 casualties with 875 deaths. Additionally, there were 380 deaths at the Battle of Champion Hill on May 16. More than 10,000 of Pemberton’s soldiers were rendered unfit for duty as a consequence of various illnesses, combat wounds, and malnutrition by the end of June. There was essentially no functional army by early July.

The Confederate Army’s struggle with malaria was a significant contributing factor to the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign and hence the war. One of the reasons the Union siege of Vicksburg was successful was because the Confederates were debilitated by an outbreak of malaria, without access to quinine. It has been estimated that 3900-8850 of Pemberton’s 30,000 men were suffering from active cases of malaria, and minimally over 200 died directly from this disease. An illness of this severity experienced in this magnitude would have rendered the Confederate military combat ineffective.

On June 28, Pemberton received a petition from his troops which stated in part, “If you cannot feed us you had better surrender.” On July 1, he queried his division commanders whether they should surrender or attempt an evacuation. All 4 of his corps commanders wrote to him of the need to surrender. The Confederates, after a long siege, beset with malnutrition and disease, were not in a condition to fight. The consensus was that disease and starvation had physically impaired so large a number of the defending army that an attempt to cut through the Union line would be disastrous; the men were too “enfeebled” to attempt an evacuation. On July 4, 1863, after a 47-day siege, Pemberton surrendered to Grant.

General Ulysses S Grant: An Analysis

The fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, just a day after Pickett’s Charge, certainly seems in combination to represent a catastrophic turn of events for the Confederacy that summer after victories that winter and spring seemed to hold so much promise.

General Grant has been demeaned as the worst POTUS in history, a drunkard, a dimwit, and most incorrectly, a butcher. While his reputation has improved lately thanks in large part to Ron Chernow’s biography and Donald Miller’s book about Vicksburg, he is routinely ranked behind Lee, Jackson, and Forrest as a Civil War general by many. Yet the truth is, General Grant did more to win the Civil War than anyone not named Abraham Lincoln.  The story of how Grant solved the conundrum that was Vicksburg should convince even the most cynical LCer of his imagination, willpower, and perspicacity. Grant tried myriad strategies before finding the one that worked. The Vicksburg campaign was an unmistakable sign of the man’s steely determination and shrewd mind. Grant failed over and over, but he never gave up.

Practically everything about the campaign was innovative. Practically everything about it. James M. McPherson has called it “the most brilliant and innovative campaign of the Civil War” and T. Harry Williams called it “one of the classic campaigns of the Civil War and, indeed, of military history.” The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (May 1986) describes the Vicksburg campaign as “the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil,” one which “exemplifies the qualities of a well-conceived, violently executed offensive plan.” Edwin C. Bearss has said. “Failure in this venture would entail little less than total destruction. If it succeeded, however, the gains would be complete and decisive.”

It was definitely a risky plan. But we can see retrospectively that it makes perfect sense. Grant made the connection that the way to attack Vicksburg was by the train route west from Jackson, which was also the target of his Autumn foray on the Mississippi Central RR route. Then he combined that with the fact that he couldn’t maneuver on the east bank north of the town due to swamps and bayous, and after Arkansas Post, he’s on the west side. So, then it’s “just” a matter of technical procedure: you have to cross someplace and you have to head to Jackson first.  When to do it? Well, he knows he’s got ground to cover and will need supplies. He has to calculate river level, rain and muddy roads, and foraging. But before mosquito season. Winter isn’t a good time. Late spring is.

Grant had endured repeated political and military setbacks, watched his soldiers and sailors sicken and die by the thousands in the malarial lower Mississippi Valley, faced two armies at the same time, and solved incredible technical and logistical obstacles. He was now the top Union general, and his self-confidence as well as what others thought would carry him to fame. It’s inconceivable to me that his reputation as a general was denigrated for 120 years.

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Further Reading:

·       Donald L Miller, Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon and Schuster, 2019.

·       Grant’s Memoirs

·       Sherman’s Memoirs

·       Grant by Chernow

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/vicksburg

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg

·       https://civilwarmonths.com/2023/04/15/vicksburg-grant-and-porter-assemble/amp/

·       https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/achenblog/wp/2014/04/25/ulysses-s-grant-hero-or-butcher-great-man-or-doofus/

·       https://www.historynet.com/vicksburg-the-campaign-that-confirmed-grants-greatness/

·       https://www.vicksburgpost.com/2003/01/27/water-returned-to-citys-doorstep-100-years-ago/?fbclid=IwAR1X5nFZ8F-l_0sbr3Ki1HBygBiPb-GCgxl4aBCznjSOgKAvVdURVJUvJDA

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/nature/river-course-changes.htm?fbclid=IwAR3mflQUgR8JaUEIcrm2v_lLlfdGup44_XwzxIcJ1mTAyyCT2h_umfcT2Sc

·       https://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-colonel-benjamin-griersons-cavalry-raid-in-1863/

·       https://www.historynet.com/griersons-raid-during-the-vicksburg-campaign/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/major-general-benjamin-grierson-2360423

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/04/29/that-other-cavalry-guy-benjamin-h-grierson/

·       https://www.historyonthenet.com/grant-vicksburg

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-gibson

·       https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/battle-of-port-gibson/

·       https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battleportgibson.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/grants-vicksburg-supply-line

·       https://www.historynet.com/mississippi-nightmare/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-champion-hill-2360280

·       https://www.rebellionresearch.com/battle-of-raymond?fbclid=IwAR1L1PcCwGRCFLg-Bv7neO1tG6cv7RsnmZO8kNvv5XVjUBkM6t3CiPtu96c_aem_th_AaSypV4shWeio-QbLLXIuILea41vtkZsruFEMGykenl_kK8dPEuWWYZiUP44s9G8ws4&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

·       Klein LW, Wittenberg EJ. The decisive influence of malaria on the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign. Surgeon’s Call: The Journal of the National Civil War Medicine Museum. 2023; 28(1): 4 – 14.