War Photography Through the Ages

War photography and Photojournalism are an essential part of war reporting and have been in every conflict since the art of photo-taking was invented. As Susan Sontag notes in her seminal work Regarding The Pain of Others, ‘war-making and picture-making are congruent activities.’ But why do we have such a fascination with photos and footage of war? What is Photojournalism? And how has Photojournalism changed over the years? Let us first put photojournalism into context.

Chris Fray explains.

Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima by Joe Rosenthal.

A photojournalist is a reporter who uses photos or film to tell a news story. Every war since the first photographed conflict - the Mexican-American War (1846-48) - has been photographed and recorded by images.(1) Images can have a decisive effect on public opinion and perceptions of war. A photograph is a snapshot of a memory, frozen in time, allowing those un-connected to the situation to view the conflict up close and personal.

I would like to take you on a journey spanning over a century, detailing the way in which Photojournalism has progressed and what this means for war photography and for us, the public. I will touch on photography in the major conflicts of the 20th and 21st Centuries, beginning with the First World War (1914-18). We will then explore the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the Second World War (1939-45), Vietnam (1959-75), the Gulf War (1990-91) and finally the use of photojournalism is our own time using the devastating examples of the ongoing Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts.

First World War

At the start of the 20th Century, cameras were large and cumbersome. Immobility was an issue and the heavy camera required tripods. The fragile glass negative plates were easily broken and darkroom chemicals were required by the photographer to be immediately on hand in order to develop the negative quickly after exposure.(2) Obviously, this did not lend itself to conflict photography.

By the start of the First World War, however, handheld cameras such as the Vest Pocket Kodak were being produced, a favourite of soldiers in the First World War.(3) The quality of the images produced was poor and the camera was prone to blurring, but the negatives had much quicker exposure times than before and most importantly it was small enough to carry in an army pack. War photography was progressing at a fast pace yet the command structures of both sides of the conflict were suspicious of the technological progress.

Almost as soon as war was announced, both the Allies and Germany set hardline policies in place to limit photographer’s abilities to publish images related to conflict and access conflict zones. Each side were deeply concerned with the effect that photography could have on spy-work and espionage as well as domestic morale. Professional photographers were restricted from war zones and could only gain access with written and signed agreements of the war council although censorship was lightened later into the war. The images which were taken have had a lasting impact on the memory of the war and shows the value of photography as a means of mass communication- elements of which have been replicated in every conflict since.(4)

Servicemen were banned from owning or using cameras. But as we know, as soon as rules are made, there are those who are willing to break them. The pictures taken by servicemen on the front lines, in the trenches make up some of the most haunting and evocative photos of the First World War. Many photos show the horror of war in the trenches, soldiers staring up at the camera amongst the mud and barbed wire. Some pictures on the other hand depict daily life- soldiers making tea and playing cards showing that life went on as well, even under the rattle of machine gun and crack of artillery shells.

Spanish Civil War

It was only in the 1920s following the invention of small portable 35mm cameras such as the Leica and Ermanox that war photography fully developed (no pun intended). These cameras were faster and more compact, permitting exposure without a flash which allowed for night time and indoor photos to be taken.(5) With the technological developments of photographic equipment, quick, fast-paced snapshots of battle became possible, revolutionising photography. As a result, audiences were able to experience the heat of battle in their own living rooms.(6) Wireless transmissions of photos and the introduction of affordable, high quality printing paper also allowed photojournalists to have their work published in a matter of days. This quick turnaround was essential to the public relations effort for both sides.(7)

The Spanish Civil war, therefore took place at a turning point for modern photography. The impact of ‘in conflict’ photos on the audiences in Britain, France and the United States should not be understated. Action shots of war had rarely been seen and certainly not on a scale such as this. ‘Photographs of Spain became images not just of conflict but in conflict.’ This was a shocking statement and certainly caught the attention of the world.(8) The war also came at the height of the picture magazines of the 1930s, such as Vu, Life, Picture Post, Regards and Match. These magazines focused mainly on images and adverts. These magazines had an exceptionally far-reaching readership and all of them featured the civil war to some extent, making the Spanish Civil War the first war to be covered and photographed for a mass audience.(9)

Left leaning photojournalists such as Robert Capa, David Seymour and Augusti Centelles began to use their platforms as photographers in the picture magazines to influence readers in the UK, France and the USA to contribute to the Republican war effort. Photographs were becoming weapons of influence. A number of photographs taken during the Civil War have taken on iconic roles in representations of the fight against fascism. Possibly the most famous is Robert Capa’s ‘Fallen Soldier.’ It depicts a Republican soldier at the instant of death, as a bullet hits him in the head, knocking him backwards. It is a tragic depiction of the brutality of war, so close you can almost hear the fatal shot. By the end of the Civil War, war photography was firmly established and exceptionally popular. Due to the way in which Nationalism was progressing in Europe, however, many Europeans were to themselves face conflict, not only through the pages of a magazine but at their own front doors.

Second World War

Many of the Civil War photographers who had cut their teeth in the 1930s were seasoned photojournalists by the start of the Second World War in 1939, with strong links to well-read magazines. However now the scene of conflict was not just a single country, but now spanned across the whole world as photographers from Europe to Africa, Russia to Asia were capturing unbelievable pictures of worldwide conflict. With more people shifting between countries than ever before, war was now a global affair, and therefore so to was photography.

The Spanish Civil War photographers were taking photos and sharing with audiences as a call to action. Now war was first and foremost in the public mind. Western photographers were using their skills in support of the Allied mission against the evil Nazi threat. This was a war in which both sides would employ photography effectively as a propaganda tool; as General Dwight Eisenhower wrote, ‘Correspondents have a job in war as essential as the military personnel.’ Media and reporting had an enormous effect of public opinion, and ‘public opinion win wars.’

Censorship of photography was considered highly important and only certain photos were published in the press. Photos such as dead or dying Allied soldiers were considered bad for moral and suppressed for the majority of the war. It was only towards the end of the conflict that President Roosevelt, faced with strikes and opposition to Americans fighting and dying in Europe, decided to allow a clearer and more violent image of the war to be published. Real images of dead and wounded soldiers were shown to the public which roused US citizens to overwhelming support of the war.

In the 1940s, along with the advancement of weapon technology came the improvement of photographic technology. Long-range cargo planes could transport thousands of rolls of films and negatives between Europe and America, allowing the pictures to be shown in papers and magazines within days. Cameras in the 1930s which took 4 X 5 inch negatives were superseded by smaller and faster 35mm, 2 ¼ X 2 ¼ Rolleiflex, Contax rangefinder and Leica cameras. Not only this, but they could be fitted with telescopic lenses, allowing for close-up and zoom shots. More photographers than ever before were braving the battlefield to capture battlefield heroics. As Robert Capa famously remarked, “if your pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough.”

Perhaps some of the most moving photos from the Second World war are those of Robert Capa’s landing on Omaha Beach in the first wave of troops. As the only photographer to land on the beach, we have direct and close-up documentation of the landings. The pictures are blurry, as Capa himself admits, because his hands were trembling so much with fear on the mortared beach.

Vietnam

At the end of the Second World War in 1946, around 8,000 American households owned a television set. By 1960, just under 45 million households had a television.(10) The war which raged in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos captured the public and was beamed to millions of households all over the world, giving the Vietnam war the epithet, ‘the living room war.’ The prominence of television had started to push the press photographers from their prime reporting position. Viewers were now able to see much more than a snapshot of conflict. They were able to see the true horror of the uncompromising cruelty of war, frame by frame in video.

As images of US soldiers fighting for freedom in the previous war had mustered public support, their portrayal in Vietnam had an entirely opposing effect. An American public, expecting images of democratic US Marines fighting Communists were faced with a continuous tirade of film and images showing the mud, squalor and death their sons and fathers encountered, every day on the news. Photographers and journalists were given such freedom in Vietnam never seen before, or since. There was little to no censorship. Instead, the US army command intended to recruit the press into sharing their own perspective of the war. However, as the war developed into the 1960s, more US servicemen were losing their lives in a decade long conflict which many at home found hard to relate to. A cultural and moral revolution in the USA swung much of the public towards peace and as the US high command rapidly lost control of the situation in Vietnam, conditions in the army worsened, professionalism laxed and this was all captured on camera.

Many have claimed that the media were responsible in some part for the defeat of the Vietnam war. One of the key photos in this debate is the Saigon street execution, taken by Eddie Adams in 1968. It shows a prisoner seconds away from a shot to the head, at point blank range. It sums up the lawless and brutal nature of the conflict, even away from the battlefield.

It was in the Vietnam conflict that the idea that war photography could have a harmful impact on the perceptions of war at home. The more advanced technology became and the more skilled the photographers became in depicting horror- the more the public came to view war as a sickness. In essence, war reporting moved too far for the public. It presented the tragic truth of conflict.

Falklands & The Gulf War

If Vietnam was over-reported, sickening the public with gore and grit and eventually ending in defeat, conflicts in the subsequent decades were decidedly, and intentionally, under-reported. As a leading member of Britain’s Ministry of Defence asked rhetorically on the announcement of the Falklands War, “are we going to let the television cameras loose on the battlefield?”(11) The Falklands war took place in the 10 weeks between April and June, 1982 in response to the invasion and occupation of the British islands in the South Atlantic by Argentinian forces.

The British Ministry of Defence exercised extreme control over coverage from the conflict. In polar opposition to Vietnam, the images and footage of the conflict hardly featured in British newspapers and only two of the 29 accredited media professionals were photographers. Governments were clearly learning lessons from Vietnam. By the time the conflict was over, only three batches of film had been returned to London.(12) Although by the 1980s, technology had dramatically improved, the press were unable to use it. In a 10-week conflict in which 255 Britons were killed, 777 wounded and an estimated 2,000 Argentine casualties, no images were released. This only fuelled the public’s suspicion of the Ministry of Defence.(13)

In a very similar vein and probably still scarred by the public reaction to the media surrounding Vietnam, when the Gulf War began in 1990, the utmost care was taken in photographic and film representations of the conflict. Subsequently to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, the US led a 42 Nation coalition intervention against Iraq. In the 1990s, photographic technology was incredibly advanced. The coverage of the war however was heavily sedated. Press focus was made on the mechanised technology of war, the enormous guns and steel cannisters, firing bullets and shells from slick fighter jets. Yet there was no indication of what damage these bullets and shells were doing upon impact. It was presented to the public as a ‘painless war of precision.’(14) For the first time a conflict was being told from the perspective not of soldiers, but of weapons.(15)

Reports and briefings from the war council were kept secret from reporters and although there were around 1,600 Western photographers and reporters in the area, they were all isolated from the conflict and supervised by public-affairs managers who made sure they saw only a sanitised view of the conflict. The pictures presented a white-washed version of war which distracted from the real brutalism involved in conflict. Removing the people from the pictures also removed the empathy for the casualties.

There is a belief that over saturating the public with images of death and destruction will ultimately dull society into accepting these images as the norm, gradually shocking less and less until they are ignored altogether. However as Torie Rose DeGhett says, never showing these images at all absolutely guarantees that understanding of the images will never develop. (16)

Syria & Ukraine

So where does this leave us now? Are we able to trust the photographs we see of conflict? With the invention in the past 20 years of social media and camera phones in every pocket, it could easily be argued that each person recording and sharing material could be considered a photojournalist. The process of free un-filtered, un-sanitised and un-censored material being captured by millions per day in various perspectives, angles and mediums provides an overwhelming change to what was previously considered photojournalism. Of course, photojournalists still exist and provide the world with moving images of conflict and pain all around the world. However, the range of material is so large now, that photojournalists are a tiny proportion of those on the ground, experiencing war.

When the Syrian conflict began in March 2011 and turned into a full blown Civil War in 2012 to 2013, foreign photographers and journalists were banned from entering the country. The danger was exceedingly high following the deaths of several foreign reporters including Marie Colvin of The Sunday Times and so the images and footage which was released was shot by local people. Amateur photographers and the average person- anyone with a camera-phone, expressing themselves through photography and film and appealing to the wider world for help. This produced a revolution in photojournalism, with minute by minute live-reporting of conflict via Facebook and Twitter. This is something which was never before possible.

Is this a positive outcome for war journalism? We might be tempted to say, yes. The wider the audience, the more likely the world is to see and connect with the pain of those living through war. However as Swiss photographer, Mattias Bruggmann has said, lack of journalists and increased use of public media opened the floodgates to propagandism from every side in Syria. “Every opposition group and every rebel battalion set up its own unit to produce photographs and videos.”(17)

The most recent and equally harrowing world conflict, the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has also produced a tidal wave of images and videos. Again, as technology improves, so does the capacity for ordinary people and individual soldiers on the ground to document their own personal perspective of the conflict. Courageous acts of covert filming of Russian soldiers and troop movements by occupied Ukrainians are being used by the Ukrainian military in some cases and shared on social media, giving the conflict the epitaph, ‘the first tik-tok war.’

The nature of this is certainly not as fun as it sounds. Given the brutalness of this current invasion and the overwhelming number of alleged war crimes committed, organisations such as the United Nations are already compiling photographs by renowned photographers, military footage, local amateur photographers and footage from social media to be used as evidence for prosecuting these crimes in the future.

Throughout its history, war photography has contributed to a truly humanitarian mission. Photographs stand as a testament to conflict. A snapshot of History which says, “this happened,” and “this cannot be forgotten.” It holds those in the wrong, accountable and has always provided a voice to those who are unable to provide their testament. It is the hope of many organisations that these photos will result one day in the prosecution of the perpetrators of war crimes, providing justice for those who were at the receiving end and for the families of those who died. Photos are therefore an essential element, not just to war reporting but to justice and humanity.

What do you think of war photography in different periods? Let us know below.

References

1 Payne, Carol and Brandon, Laura. Guest Editors’ Introduction: Photography at War. P.1.

2 Griffin, Michael. ‘The Great War Photographers: Constructing Myths of History and Photojournalism.’ P.135.

3 https://blog.scienceandmediamuseum.org.uk/the-vest-pocket-kodak-was-the-soldiers-camera/#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20first%20and,years%20ago%2C%20in%20April%201912.&text=The%20Vest%20Pocket%20Kodak%20camera,model%20was%20discontinued%20in%201926.

4 https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/photography

5 Brothers, Caroline. War Photography: A Cultural History. P.6

6 Payne, Carol and Brandon, Laura. P.3.

7 Faber, Sebastiaan. Memory Battles of the Spanish Civil War: History, Fiction, and Photography. (2018). p.16-17.

8 Brothers. p.2.

9 Brothers, Caroline. p.2.

10 https://www.elon.edu/u/imagining/time-capsule/150-years/back-1920-1960/#:~:text=Approximately%208%2C000%20U.S.%20households%20had,million%20had%20them%20by%201960.

11 Brothers, p.205

12 Brothers, p.206

13 Brothers, p.209

14 Brothers. p.211

15 Bruce. H. Franklin, ‘From Realism to Virtual Reality.’ P.110

16 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-war-photo-no-one-would-publish/375762/

17 https://newlinesmag.com/photo-essays/shooting-the-war-in-syria/

Reflections on the Vietnam War: George S. Patton and the Reasons for the Vietnam War

George S. Patton, son of legendary World War II general of the same name, served three times in the Vietnam War. In this major piece, Robert McBroom considers Patton’s thoughts on the Vietnam War, including the reasons for the conflict and how to fight the Viet Cong. To produce the article, Robert has worked closely with the Patton homestead archive in Hamilton, Massachusetts and met and interviewed George Patton’s wife Joanie Holbrook Patton.

George S. Patton in 1977.

“The war in Vietnam was unwinnable lost before the French expeditionary force fired its first shot, before the south fielded its first soldier in the national Army of Vietnam, before the first U.S. advisor set foot in country.  An idea independence and unity would triumph over bullets. “[1] Colonel William C. Haponski, who served with Major General George S. Patton would go on to explain what he believes is the result of the conflict in Vietnam.  When the White House got involved in Vietnam, they had zero control during the conflict and had no real foundation of why our boys were fighting in a foreign land.  George would later reflect on Vietnam by saying, “There was an absence almost total of a national strategy.”[2]  Despite victories on the battlefield, the conflict in Vietnam had no end goal.  The Vietnam conflict has had many different perspectives and historians for years have tried to develop an understanding for all.  Historian Mark Philip Bradley would explain the Vietnam conflict as “there were many Vietnam wars, among them an anti-colonial war with France, a cold war turned hot with the United States, a civil war between North and South Vietnam and among southern Vietnamese, and a revolutionary war of ideas over the vision that should guide Vietnamese society into the post-colonial future.”[3]  The Vietnamese people had been fighting a war of independence since the very start of their existence and have used guerrilla warfare to their success against colonial powers.  The separation of North and South Vietnam started with French missionaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and would rule Vietnam.  While the French would rule the South, China and other communists’ countries supported the revolutionary groups in the North, thus the separation was created at the 17th parallel which was a boundary created by the military in 1954.  All of this would make the conflict in Vietnam like nothing this country had seen before, historian Christian G Appy would say that “there has never been a war quite so frustrating as Vietnam.”[4]  However, Congress had not technically declared a war since 1942.  His frustration is one that is felt by historians of Vietnam.  Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. who was a graduate and an illustrious man of the Army War College, while also being a veteran of Korea and Vietnam would go on to explain to Nguyen Don Tu that, “you know you never beat us on the battlefield.”[5] While his counterpart of the North Vietnamese Army, Colonel Nguyen Don Tu would say “That may be so, but it’s also irrelevant.”[6]  Creating this frustrating for all who were a part of Vietnam and the scholars who study the conflict.  This paper will examine his experience as a United States advisor in Vietnam, which would end up being his first of three tours involving the conflict.  Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton would reflect on the Viet Cong and their guerilla warfare, and how the United States could find a weakness but also what made the North Vietnam Army so strong along with their leaders and their philosophy in his Army War college thesis.

Major General, George S. Patton IV, was the son of old blood and guts, Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. who was a veteran of both World Wars, would go on to explain what he believes is a cause of the conflict in Vietnam and the history of the area is a direct result of the French rule over time in the region and a lack of leadership from America political leaders.  The Major General was born December 24th, 1923 and would later drop the IV legally in 1947 after his father’s passing.  George would explain to historian Bill McCloud that, “Lyndon Johnson failed to mobilize either the armed forces or the people at home.”[7]  In any time period of war and or conflict, the President of the time must mobilize both the efforts at home, as well as being clear cut orders for the military, which Lyndon Johnson failed miserably at doing so.

After his graduation at West Point a man is famously known for saying “You’ll never be the man your father was but congratulations.”[8]  Never less Patton would become a veteran of two significant military conflicts during the second half of the century, the conflict in Korea and the conflict in Vietnam.  Historian Lewis Sorley would discuss an incident with General Abrams and Patton to show how understanding a person and soldier George was.  “When he arrived Patton could see he was in a foul mood…When he neared it, he asks Patton, you got any whiskey?  Paton said he did and got Abrams a scotch and soda.”[9]  George knew not to antagonize General Abrams; he was simply there to listen and support his fellow soldier who had just returned from the combat zone.  James Dozier, a friend of George's who served with him in the 11th Armored Cavalry regiment known as the Blackhorse regiment would later reflect on Patton’s career by saying, “he just had an instinct for doing the right thing at the right time in combat and many American soldiers are alive today because George Patton was their boss.”[10]  George had the instinct that many military leaders of his time did not have and many veterans of the conflict are thankful for George for being their boss.   

Vietnam became a large cemetery because of their history of conflict with outsiders was the reason for that.  The only way the American political leaders and some military leaders could see success was by body count of the enemy.  “To obtain the attrition rate, enemy bodies had to be counted.”[11]  Chief intelligence William Westmoreland stated.  The Vietnamese wanted nothing more than their culture and lifestyle, but with the strong outside forces controlling the Vietnamese people, Major General George S. Patton would describe it as an open door for communism.  “These powerful forces set up the stage for the entry of communist ideology.”[12]  A long history of injustice for the people of Vietnam was the issue at hand while George would go on to say that “Most humble were confronted by Frenchman holding exact the same or lower jobs but being paid two or three times more.  Thus, the French janitor at Hanoi received a base pay that was slightly higher than that of a Vietnamese professor with a PHD from Paris.”[13]  This George believes is one of many reasons for a communist ideology to spread in a place like Vietnam and also a cause for a revolution for the Vietnamese people, the disbalanced democracy that favors a person’s background and not the education of an individual who went to school in a western country.  “The French concept of divide and rule which kept the five colonial dependencies politically separated, were contributory to today’s dilemma.”[14]  Having the separation between North and South Vietnam all these years, George believes is also a direct cause of the conflict America had become a part of.  Vietnam was unlike anything his father had faced before along with military personnel of his time. “In Vietnam there were no lines, Patton pointed out.  “It was more a war of the people.  And we did not understand that war nor did we have a clear-cut national strategic objective.  It was not clearly defined by the leadership of this country.”[15]  Our military members during the time did not have a understand why we were their just like the American people watching in their living rooms. 

I. Leaders of the Vietnam Conflict

Patton would write several versions of his Army War College thesis on the Viet Cong forces and how they endured their history, and how he viewed success in Vietnam along with his beliefs on the Vietnamese people.  Unlike Westmoreland, George did not believe that a body count of the enemy was the simple solution with the conflict in Vietnam. Patton would state that “This early failure to establish a viable political base which would include these important ethnic minorities was to prove costly.”[16]  The idea of counting the enemy in body bags, was a cover up for American political problems with not creating a political base for the South Vietnam People.  Thus, Communism which was an easy quick government to set up, seeps through and into the Vietnamese lives. 

After his first tour in Vietnam, George S. Patton would examine his enemy, the Viet Cong and how Vietnam has been shaped over time and in history.  “The very existence of Vietnam as a separate country and the survival of the Vietnamese as a distinct people must be regarded as a miracle for which scores of historians have satisfactory solution.”[17]  Vietnam had been under colonial rule since the French got there in 1887 and continued to be under rule for much of their history, yet the people of Vietnam were never going to give up.  “Vietnam has everything that others want both geographical and historical should have made the absorption of Vietnam by the Chinese empire and inescapable fate.”[18]  The Vietnamese people had no problem with outsiders coming to their homeland, they just did not want to be controlled.  George would go on to explain that “They did not mind the French so very much.  They just didn't like always being occupied and working for the French.”[19]  If the Vietnamese people and the French could have lived together with equal opportunity, they’d be no conflict.  Let the Vietnamese have their culture and ways of life, that had been taking away from them for so many years.  This unbalance democracy allows for Communists countries to intervene on Western beliefs in Vietnam both North and parts of the South.   

II George’s view on the Conflict

When the French backed away and the United States would now take over with the help of the Democratic party of South Vietnam, that had now been established.  It was still not going to kill the Viet Cong heart and soul, that their leader Ho Chi Minh and others have put forth to them with Propaganda and radio broadcasts over the years to get the outsiders out, a tactic known as psychological warfare.  Revolution had been a part of Vietnam’s history since the people could remember and the Viet Cong used that to their advantage.  Their country had been under foreign rule whether it was the Chinese empire, or the French or America acting for western democracy ideology.  ”From the perspective of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, it was a war to end foreign domination and reunite the two Vietnams.”[20] The people in North Vietnam were under a nationalistic uprising, while the people of the south was in conflict within the Saigon government.  Both the North and the South had major issues within their own governments.  The United States military was simply trying to make life better and help get the Chinese out of Vietnam, as they were supporting the North Vietnam army.  “You fools Don’t you realize what it means if the Chinese stay? Don’t you remember your history?  The last time the Chinese came, they stayed for one thousand years![21]  Ho Chi Minh would explain to his pro Chinese counter part of the North Vietnam Government.  “As for me I prefer to smell French shit for five years, rather than Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” This confusion within the government led the Vietnamese people to a conflicting point of view on both sides of the government in both North and South Vietnam.  Some of the Vietnamese people saw American’s as the enemy because of the psychological pressure put on the people by propaganda, put forth by the communist party in North Vietnam.  Patton would discuss a situation about his men helping a local village.  “Our generosity was often overlooked, “says Patton. 

“One time, in a village called Bing Co, elements of the 919-engineer company, which was organic to Blackhorse, were laying foundation for a new school and playground.  As a vehicle carrying water and food for the army troops approached, it hit a mine buried in the road, wounding two soldiers and destroying the vehicle.  The mine location must have been well known to some of the villagers. Yet, within thirty minutes of the incident other dedicated engineers were back outside to finish the playground job even without orders.”[22]

Despite the political views on either side, the military had developed a reason to be there in Vietnam, and that was helping the people.  Try to fix the constant destruction upon it because of the country’s history.  Helping the South Vietnamese people was not put forth by the United States government, but rather acts of kindness by Veterans.  “Few American’s arrived in Vietnam with a deep-seated commitment to help the people of South Vietnam, but most were convinced that helping the South Vietnamese was a central purpose to their mission.”[23]  The simple act of helping them build schools and Patton would go on to say that any operations that was happening in Vietnam, was a chance within itself.  “These were very delicate operations and any time one realized that the chances of success were perhaps 50 percent or less.”[24]  The Military members never asked questions, and always did what they were told and no matter how difficult the operation sounded, they did it with no questions asked.  Marine Lance Corporal Steven Shircliff who was a member of the Third Reconnaissance Battalion, would reflect on a call to battle his platoon got to return to the battlefield where they’d just fought, by saying “I can still remember those insane words to return.  Not only I, but everyone else who was left were in tears, shock, and disbelief.  It was unbelievable that we were being ordered back into the same hell we had just managed to survive.  But we followed orders.”[25]  Whether the political leaders of the time, kept sending our military service members back into the Jungle, or the massive media hit the service members got by having the war televised in America’s living room.  They could not see what Patton and many other veterans of Vietnam, saw before the conflict ended, including the North Vietnam leaders, one being Bao Dai who said “I saw Ho Chi Minh suffer.  He was fighting a battle within himself.  Ho had his own struggle.  He realized communism was not best for his country, but it was too late.  Ultimately, he could not overcome his allegiance to communism.”[26]  Communism was the best fit for the Vietnamese people to come together as one people and for the nationalistic side of individual’s became the forefront of their lives.  The North Vietnamese Army was not going to give up anytime soon and nothing was going to beat the belief in independence, even if communism was not the right answer, it was a solid starting point for the hope of combining to create one Vietnam.

 III. Fighting the Viet Cong

In George’s writings about the conflict, did he ever reflect on how the United States could be successful in Vietnam against the Viet Cong forces?  Fighting the North Vietnamese Army was an issue that was very complex.  George would explain in his thesis that the “the main force Viet Cong may be of either sex, in our out of uniform and of any age.  He may or may not be a communist party member.”[27]  The Vietnamese had been in this conflict for a very long time and it became a war of not only communist members, but the people of Vietnam.  Viet Cong forces, Patton wrote, were commanded by those before who have survived a western influence over the years and those leaders have used propaganda to gain the trust of mostly peasants.  “Communist ideology was not a significant motivating factor other than being the force that developed the propaganda that emerged as the primary weapon of this conflict.”[28]  The leaders of North Vietnam over the years, developed a strong hatred, grievances and a sense of adventure for their people to join against the westerns and their beliefs.  Although communism would not be good for the people in the long run, to reunite the two Vietnam’s it was the best fit.  They did not care if they were poor or rich, they just wanted to live in peace in their corner of the world.  

The Major General would go on to explain that the leaders of the Viet Cong, were a heroic figure for the people of Vietnam because they were “effective, dedicated, experienced and product of the law of survival.”[29]  Thus they have stood the tests of time and are true Vietnamese patriots.  The General would discuss the strong influence of self-criticism for a Vit Cong solider in Mai Xuan Phong’s diary states that “In my heart, I keep loyal to the party and people.  I am proud and happy.  For two days we have been short of food and had only glutinous rice.  The sun is burning hot.  Not enough drinking water.  But our patriotism and our determination to liberate will help us overcome all.”[30]  The General would go on to explain that “these extracts and reports merely demonstrate that complaint continues as a handmaiden of soldiering, and cannot be discounted as an influencing factor”[31]  George would explain that when things for the United States did not look good in Vietnam, examine the enemy and find what is not working for them as well for what is working for them.  “In the words of our greatest ally, “when things look bad and one’s own difficulties appear great, the best tonic is to consider those of the enemy.”[32]  When your plans are not going as the way you wanted them too, George believes that taking a deeper look at the enemy situation and status is a good way to figure out how to overcome one’s own difficulties in warfare.

The North Vietnamese Army never stopped training, no matter if that meant military or political training their minds.  “Main force military training consists of forty-five days with five days extra for cadres.  Fifteen days are for general military items and ten days are for tactics.  There is a separate training schedule for politics, this is about 20 days.”[33]  George would explain that in one of Ho Chi Min writings, unknowingly would write what he believes was a “western shortcoming in training for guerrilla war.”[34] In that the North Vietnamese knowingly knew what and how westerns trained for battle.  “To Train everybody for guerrilla warfare.  But in many localities time is devoted only to training or parade.  This is like practicing music for putting out a fire.”[35]  However, George believes that is was a political tactic for Ho Chi Minh and for his spread of communist propaganda as the main objective to reach the people and gain their support, since this was a major factor for the Viet Cong forces.  “Always returning to the importance of effective propaganda…but encourages go to the people to give them explanations.”[36]  He was a man of the people, much like most of the North Vietnam military leaders.  Patton also believes that there was nothing new and nothing about the Viet Cong military training that would make them super revolutionary.  “There is nothing starkly revolutionary about the Viet Cong military training.  On the other hand, it is training for revolutionaries, realistic and simple, reflecting the simple character of the trainee.”  That the main Viet Cong forces had not done anything new or different when it came to those before him.  The Vietnamese people were fighting for independence and would not stop because the North Vietnam government had made a “big promise”[37] to the people.  Another strong belief for the Viet Cong forces Patton believes is that to keep secrets and never reveal information.  “The Viet Cong are fairly good at security operations in general, and yet there are the diaries heretofore cited.”[38]  The Diaries of fallen Viet Cong forces would be a helpful tip inside of what they were thinking, planning and even sometimes their next moves Patton believes.

The Viet Cong soldier had the idea drilled into them, that to bear torture if captured.  Since the North Vietnam army refrains from believing in torture and to not torture others as well, Patton would explain that “Although it is certain that both sides have indulged in some cruelty, especially after sharp engagements, constant RVN efforts have achieved some improvement.”  Thus, torture and integrations are a part of warfare, so it some way or from it will make its way onto the battlefield.  After intense fighting and both sides are still filled with hate, anger and all kinds of emotions.  

When it came to supplies and weaponry, The Viet Cong forces did not have much.  George believes that “The Viet Cong are a have not force.  Therefore, what they do have they will secure and maintain, paying special attention to ordnance material, critical foodstuffs, and medical supplies.”[39]  As the conflict continues, they would try to capture the weapons and supplies they need and had been successful doing so.  The Vietnamese people had been in a conflict with each other and had been under a foreign rule for so long, that the need for supplies was always a need as the North Vietnam army would have to rely on civilian population and help.  George would explain that for the Viet Cong to have success in the future, they would have “to respect and help the civilian population.”  However, this was not always true because the survival of the Viet Cong was so important, George would explain that “The insurgent enemy is a combination of many things.  He is known to be a mixer of terror with days of help, murder with general education and falsity with kindness.  He is a pillager and a thief, yet sometimes a philanthropist.”[40]  The Viet Cong had to be all of this George believes, because they had to hide the political side of their mission, while being for the people like Ho Chi Minh and other Viet Cong leaders.  

While reflecting on her husbands’ military career, along with his War College Thesis Joanne Holbrook Patton would say that “My husband was always aware that there could have been other things done.  If we had gone further as a government to get to know Ho Chi Minh, might have been possible something better could have happened, wouldn’t have said he was all communist because first he was all Nationalist.”[41]  The United States propaganda put forth by the political leaders and their scare of the spread of communism, along with the media had turned Ho Chi Minh into a full blown Communist when in reality, he was all nationalist and wanted to unify the two Vietnam’s anyway he could, as this was the main objective for him.  

IV George’s view on Viet Cong philosophy

Patton would describe the Viet Cong philosophy for government as something to be conflicting within its own ideology.  That the United States could use the North Vietnam propaganda and beliefs as counter propaganda if it was placed in the hands of an expert.  “It’s is Questionable as to whether the reputation of either Ho or his government is indeed founded on fact.”[42]  Ho Chi Minh and his government relied on their Propaganda to gain a foundation for nationalism and a movement towards unity, as this was their main objective and hid communism from the people.   

Vietnam was being influenced by foreign countries in both the North and the South, while the United States was in the South, the North was facing two different enemies, the Chinese and the Soviet Union, George believes that a weakness could be found if the United States exploits those two countries.  “The Chinese intervention problem and this nation’s basic ideological disagreements with the Soviet Union might, if properly pressed and exploited by the free world, enfeeble the insurgency.”[43]  The Soviet Union and China had now placed the small nation of North Vietnam and their government into a dilemma, due to the Sino-Soviet split, Patton believes that it will “Force the small nation to cast her lot with one side or the other or follow an independent course which may be economically undesirable.”[44]  Doing this will open a weakness within the North Vietnam Government and allow the South and the United States to try to bring North Vietnam to the discussion table which is the only way George believes will be the only way North Vietnam can come out of the conflict with some form of victory.  That if the conflict was to continue.  The United States military, with the help of South Vietnam would over run the Viet Cong Military force.  George would write about how the Viet Cong “Must bring us to the conference table to win because a military victory is completely beyond their power”[45]  When it comes to military strategy, George would explain that we must fight the Viet Cong with their own tactics, Beat them at their own game and that the only way for this conflict to end was to meet at the table.  The time for that meeting, was never to happen as American political leaders pulled troops out of Vietnam in March 1973.

V. Conclusion 

“Find the Bastard and Pile on!”  was the standing order that George S. Patton gave his men who were a part of the 11thArmored Cavalry regiment.  George was hopefully that this conflict could be turned around with the right leaders in charge.  Joanne Holbrook Patton would go on to say “George was hopefully his favorite general Abrams, when appointed to take the place of Westmoreland, he would be able to turn things around.  But he hardly got started when everything was shut off.”[46]  When General Abrams finally got the command to lead, it was too late.  As troops returned home to an unpleasant welcome by American citizens.  “George was frustrated by the press showing that the Tet offensive was such a success for the North…not the whole story.”[47]  Success in Vietnam is very complex and frustrating, general Abrams finally got his chance to lead, but the effort in Vietnam had to come to an end, because of the pressure from the people at home and media not showing the whole conflict is something that George would take with him for the rest of his life.  George was a beloved soldier by so many and a fantastic father.  “He was a tolerant father, one time or another one of our children did something that was not what he wanted them to do but never deserted them.”[48]  Even after the conflict in Vietnam was over, the veterans who returned home took most of the blame for it because of the media and press of Vietnam.  He never let his feelings toward the conflict and political leaders get in the way of what meant more to him in life.  His duty to serve his country, and his duty to be the best father and husband he possibly could be.  True American hero.   

What do you think of George S. Patton and the Vietnam War? Let us know below.

[1] Autopsy of an unwinnable war Vietnam colonel Ret William C. Haponski with colonel Ret Jerry J. Burcham foreword by lieutenant General Ret Dave R. Palmer pg.241

[2] Bill McCloud, What Should We Tell Our Children? Norman: (The University of Oklahoma Press) 1989. Pg.98.

[3] Mark Bradley, (Vietnam at war New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) pg.8

[4] Christian G Appy. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Pg.237

[5] Ibid pg.236

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Brain Sobel, George Smith Patton, and Joanne Holbrook Patton. The Fighting Patton’s. Bloomington: (Indiana University Press, 2013) pg.7  

[9] Lewis. Sorley Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. Bloomington, IN: (Indiana University Press, 2008) Pg.300

[10] Ibid pg.120

[11] Gregory A. Daddis No Sure Victory Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. New York: (Oxford University Press)2011

[12] (George S. Patton Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.4

[13] Ibid pg.14

[14] Ibid pg.15

[15] The Fighting Patton’s pg.xv 

[16] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.10

 [17] Briefing on my AWC thesis (the VC) 19 September 1964 1st version Patton family homestead archive file 02.289.02 

[18] Ibid 

[19] Ibid  

[20]James Stuart, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-2010. Malden (Mass.): Wiley Blackwell, 2014. Pg113

[21] William Appleman. America in Vietnam: a Documentary History. W.W. Norton, 1985. Pg.94

[22] The Fighting Patton’s by Brain M. sobel pg.146

[23] Working Class War by Christian Appy pg.212

[24] The Fighting Patton’s. Pg.104

[25] Lawrence C. Vetter JR Never without Heroes Marine Third Reconnaissance Battalion in Vietnam. pg250

[26]Williams, William Appleman. America in Vietnam: A Documentary History. W.W. Norton, 1985. Pg.94

[27] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.4

[28]Ibid pg87

[29] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.84

[30] Ibid pg.67

[31] Ibid pg.68

[32] Ibid 

[33] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.69

[34] Ibid pg.28

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid 

[37] Ibid pg.94

[38] Ibid pg.71

[39] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.73

[40] Ibid  

[41] Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service.  In person with author February 28th, 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton at 4:40

[42] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.94

[43] Ibid pg.92

[44] Ibid pg.92

[45] Ibid pg.97 

[46] Personal interview Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service. 28th February 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton 8:09

[47]Ibid 8:36

[48] Ibid 12:02

Bibliography

Patton Family Homestead, Wenham Museum, Hamilton, Ma

Patton Family Archive collection  

Sobel, Brian, George Smith Patton, and Joanne Holbrook Patton. The Fighting Patton’s. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Personal interview Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service. 28th February 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton

Published Secondary Sources:

Appy, Christian G. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Bradley, Mark, and Marilyn Blatt. Young. Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bradley Mark Vietnam at war New York: Oxford University Press, 2009

Conley, Michael Charles. The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy. Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 1967.

Daddis, Gregory A. No Sure Victory Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Duiker, William John. Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. Boston: McGraw Hill, The Pennsylvania State University press, 1995.

Herring, George C. Americas Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

McCloud, Bill. What Should We Tell Our Children? Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

McKenna, Thomas P. Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.

Palmer, Bruce. The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington University Press Of Kentucky, 2002.

Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1981.

Morningstar, James Kelly. Patton's Way: a Radical Theory of War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017

Olson, James Stuart, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-2010. Malden (Mass.): Wiley Blackwell, 2014.

Sorley, Lewis. Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 (Modern Southeast Asia Series). Lubbock TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004.

Sorley, Lewis. The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnams Generals. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2010.

Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.

The Draft Lottery in the Vietnam War and its Impact on America

The Vietnam War is remembered for many reasons: the military and civilian casualties; the turmoil and bitter division of American society; the ignominious outcome. From 1965 through 1972, the military draft profoundly affected the lives of millions of young men, inducting nearly two million and pressuring many more into volunteering for service. Often overlooked in the legacy of the war is the long-term impact of the draft system on the young men who escaped military duty, often by changing their lives to deliberately manipulate the Selective Service System.

Here, Wesley Abney tells us how the draft lottery worked and the wider impact on society and millions of young American men.

You can also read Wesley’s book on the Vietnam War Draft Lottery, available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Congressman Alexander Pirnie (R-NY) drawing the first capsule as part of Selective Service System draft, Dec 1, 1969. Available here.

NIGHT OF THE LOTTERY

December 1, 1969.  Nearly two million young American men were asking the same question: what will my number be? That evening the Selective Service System held the first draft lottery of the Vietnam era, to determine who would be next to fight in the distant and unpopular war. Overnight, arbitrary chance forced the "winners" to make a choice that helped shape the future of a generation, from combat to conscientious objection, from teaching to prison, from the pulpit to the Canadian border, from public health to gay liberation.

Despite the potentially life-changing drama of the drawing, the ceremony at Selective Service System (SSS) headquarters employed only a drab stage with a large tote board, some folding chairs and a cylindrical glass bowl to hold the lottery dates. Each of the 366 days of the year (including the extra leap year date of February 29) had been printed on a small rectangle of paper, tucked inside a blue plastic capsule, and placed in a box to await the lottery. The SSS had chosen “youth advisory” delegates from across the country and brought them to Washington, D.C. to draw out the capsules, to show that men of draft age were involved in the process.

The 1969 lottery was the first to be nationally televised, as CBS pre-empted the regular broadcast of Mayberry RFD to join news correspondent Roger Mudd for live coverage. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, long-time director of the SSS, introduced the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee (which had oversight responsibility for the SSS), Rep. Alexander Pirnie, R-New York. After the capsules were dumped from the box into the glass container, Congressman Pirnie drew the first capsule which contained the date of September 14. That date was stuck to a tote board beside the numerals 001. Thus every man in the lottery born on that date would be in the first group called for duty in 1970. Then the youth delegates took over the task of drawing the capsules, until all 366 random sequence numbers (“RSN”) were affixed to the board. According to Roger Mudd, four or five of the youth delegates refused to pick numbers on the grounds they were being used by the Nixon administration to give a false appearance of approval by American youth.

Later probability studies of the 1969 lottery results indicated that the selection process was not as entirely random as intended, in that birth dates occurring late in the year were disproportionately likely to be chosen early. This was due most likely to insufficient mixing of the capsules. A court challenge ensued but the lottery results were upheld. The SSS procured the expertise of statisticians for the subsequent lotteries of 1970, 1971 and 1972, which were fully randomized.

DRAFT LAW CHANGES

President Nixon signed changes to the draft law on November 26, 1969, just days before the drawing. In the year since his election, the war effort remained bogged down, while the public had grown increasingly doubtful of its outcome and skeptical of its worth. His presidency was as troubled by protest and dissension as Lyndon Johnson’s before him. He wanted to eliminate the draft as soon as possible and transition to an all-volunteer force, but had no immediate means to scale back troop strength in an amount sufficient to permit that change. In the meantime, he took several steps to ameliorate widespread criticism of the draft.

In May, 1969, in a message to Congress, he proposed to adopt two long-debated changes to the draft system: reversing the age-order of call such that 19-year-olds would be inducted first; and implementing a process of random selection by lottery. Congress approved both changes in draft law amendments passed in late November 1969.

Nixon viewed the lottery as a means to return at least a perception of fairness to the draft as well as deflate campus-based peace demonstrations. At first glance, an impartial method to set the order of call, such that every man of draft age, rich or poor, black or white, would be assigned a priority number based on a random drawing of birthdates, appeared fair and unbiased. Yet the lottery itself did nothing to change the draft law’s existing system of deferments and exemptions, and so did nothing to equalize the draft vulnerability between a man with a deferment and a man without. By this time, deferments for most graduate students had been eliminated, as well as deferments for married men, but many protected categories remained. A deferred undergraduate student, farmer, father or trained scientist could draw a low number and still avoid the draft, at least as long as the deferment continued, while someone with no deferment who drew the same low number was bound for service. Thus the new random selection process mainly affected those men without a deferment or whose deferment was ending, deciding among only them who would be drafted and who was safe.

A perhaps more significant change in the draft law was reversing age priority and limiting the period of time during which a man would be vulnerable to the draft. Instead of taking the oldest men first from the 19-to-26-year-old eligible range, the revised draft would take the youngest men first. Most men’s uncertainty over draft status would be considerably shortened. Instead of waiting up to six years to learn his draft fate, every man would get a lottery number by age 19, and would be primarily vulnerable only during the year to which the lottery applied. Anyone whose number was not reached in the course of that year would be clear of the draft and free to move ahead with normal plans for work and family without the lingering cloud of possible induction. Likewise, those with a deferment would be vulnerable only for the year after the deferment expired.

For the transition-year lottery of 1969, which set the order of call for 1970, everyone aged 19 to 26 (born from 1944 through 1950) who were already classified as available for induction (I-A and I-A-O), or were emerging from deferred status, or were not yet classified, participated in the lottery, a total of 1,893,651 men. The next lottery in 1970 applied only to men born in 1951; in 1971 only to men born in 1952; in 1972 only to men born in 1953. Because the draft was abolished in 1973 without any draft calls that year, no one subject to the 1972 lottery was drafted.

MAKING A CHOICE

Men whose lottery number fell into the definite-to-probable range for call-up had to immediately choose among the few available options: 1. Get drafted for two years’ active duty, often in the combat zone; 2. Volunteer for service in the military or National Guard (and probably avoid combat duty); 3. Try to qualify for a deferment; or 4. Defy the law and hope to avoid a felony draft evasion charge by going “underground” or leaving the country. 

At the time of the first lottery, deferments were still available for those who flunked the fitness test, or worked in various jobs deemed to be essential (including agriculture, teaching, the ministry, and defense industries), as well as for students (undergraduate and certain graduate schools), fathers with a child at home, and conscientious objectors.

GENERATIONAL IMPACT

The hard choices forced on young men by the draft and the lottery steered the major life decisions of millions, helping shape the future of a generation.

Work. Jobs with a likely deferment, such as engineering and teaching, exerted a magnetic pull on draft-age men, such that those fields became glutted with recent college graduates by the late 1960s. In 1969, 85% of New York City teaching trainees were draft-age men. A survey in the 1970s found that the career choices of 10% of draft-age men were influenced by the availability or lack of a deferment.

Education. The U.S. Census Bureau in 1984 observed that men who came of age during the Vietnam War accumulated more college education than those maturing before. A detailed study in 2001 concluded that the rate of college attendance in the late 1960s rose by 4% to 6% due to draft avoidance alone, affecting about 300,000 young men. A separate study of enrollment in Protestant seminaries showed an increase of 31% from 1966 to 1971, compared to a rise of only 3% from 1960 to 1966.

Paternity. Before the war in Vietnam, the U.S. birth rate declined steadily each year after the peak baby boom year of 1957. However, with the draft system back in effect, including the paternity deferment, the pace of decline slowed between 1966 and 1968, and the birth rate actually rose again in 1969 and 1970 before resuming its decline in 1971.

Conscientious objectors (COs). During World War II, when the military inducted 10.1 million men, only 37,000 (or .36%) were classified as COs, and were required to serve either in a non-combat military role, or perform alternative service. During the Vietnam War, when 1.86 million men were inducted, 171,700 (or 9.23%) were classified as COs, a rate 25 times higher than during WWII. Only about one-third of all COs performed alternative service rather than active military duty during WWII. During the Vietnam War, 80% of COs chose alternative work, usually in a hospital or forestry project at least 50 miles away from their home town, performing menial, low paid tasks for the required two years.

Draft evasion. During the course of the war, 209,517 young men were referred by the SSS to the Department of Justice for prosecution in the federal courts, due to violation of the draft laws. However, the DOJ had to dismiss over half of those cases due to procedural errors by the SSS, and another 76,000 men agreed to accept induction in lieu of criminal prosecution, such that only 25,279 were actually indicted. Even so, draft evasion offenses were the fourth largest category on the federal criminal docket by late 1969, and made up 21% of all pending federal prosecutions nationally by June 1972. A total of 10,055 draft offenders went to trial, where 8,750 were convicted by verdict or guilty plea. Of those, 3,250 served time in prison, for an average of twenty-two months. As convicted felons, those men lost the right to vote and were often disqualified for desirable job opportunities.

Immigration. Some men made the momentous decision to flee the country, leaving behind their homes, friends and family. The best government estimates show that about 40,000 young men left the U.S. during the war, with the majority crossing the border into Canada, at an average of 5,000 to 8,000 per year. After the war, an estimated one-fourth to one-half of the exiles chose to remain in their adopted country, even after they were granted amnesty by President Carter in January, 1977.

What do you think of the Vietnam War draft lottery? Let us know below. 

You can also read about the stories of men who were subject to the draft at Wesley’s site: vietnamwardraftlottery.com.

References

“Amnesty: Repatriation for Draft Evaders, Deserters,” CQ Almanac 1972, 1.

Baskir, Lawrence M. and Strauss, William A., Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam        Generation(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

Card, David and Lemieux, Thomas, “Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended Legacy of the Vietnam War,” The American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001), 101.

“CBS News Special Report: The Draft Lottery 1969,” YouTube video, 9:41

“College Enrollment Linked to Vietnam War,” New York Times, September 2, 1984.

Dennis, Lloyd B., “Draft Law Revision.” Editorial Research Reports 1966, vol.1, 431-69.

Fletcher, John C., “Avoidance and the Draft,” Washington Post, February 25, 1992.

Hagan, John, Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Kamarck, Kristy N., The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R44452), 2016.

“Living in Peace in a Time of War: The Civilian Public Service Story,” Mennonite Central Committee, March 28, 2017.

Mansavage, Jean A., “Obvious Inequities: Lessons Learned from Vietnam War Conscientious Objection,” (Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M, 2000).

 “President’s Draft Lottery Approved by Congress,” CQ Almanac 1969, 350-55.

Selective Service Act of 1948 (Elston Act), Pub. L. 80-759.

Selective Service Amendment Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-124.

Selective Service System, “Induction Statistics.”

Selective Service System, Semi-Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Period July 1 to December 31, 1969; July 1 to December 31, 1972.

Starr, Norton., “Nonrandom Risk: The 1970 Draft Lottery,” Journal of Statistics Education, vol. 5, no. 2 (1997).

32 C.F.R. 1622 (1967).

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1968, Table 194; 1969, Table 188; 1971, Table 198; 1973,Table 211, 1974, Tables 67, 68.

Van Sant, Rick, “Paying Price Every Election Day,” Cincinnati Post, September 21, 1993.

Zeidler, Maryse, “40 Years Later, Remembering Jimmy Carter’s Pardon for Draft Dodgers,” CBC News, January 21, 2017.

Nurses in the Vietnam War – Trauma Nurse Deanna McGookin

The Vietnam War remains probably the most important war for America since World War Two. In the battle to contain communism, hundreds of thousands of American soldiers went to Vietnam – and many nurses were closely involved with them. In the concluding article of the ‘Nurses in War’ series, Matt Goolsby tells us about trauma nurse Deanna McGookin.

The previous articles in the series are on US Civil War nurses Clara Barton (here) and Cornelia Hancock (here), World War One nurse Julia Catherine Stimson (here), World War Two nurse Reba Z. Whittle (here), and the Chief Nurse for the US in the Korean War, Eunice Coleman (here).

A US Army hospital in Vietnam.

The Years before a ‘Police Action’

After the Korean War had ended, an unstable peace existed in Asia. America was reeling from the McCarthy probes that seemed to take place under every nook and cranny, the purpose of which was to expose potential communists.

The United States had helped stop the communist aggression in South Korea. Now there were two independent countries on the Korean Peninsula, and an uneasy truce.

The threat of nuclear war was also very real as the Soviet Union possessed radioactive material and had built, as well as detonated, multi-kiloton platform devices. 

As China and the Soviet Union were expanding their territories, the United States was highly concerned about the potential fall of nations to Marxist doctrines. 

The heightening tensions of a further ‘Red Scare’ increased both locally and globally.

Americans were not ready for another declaration of war, so a looming ‘Police Action’ was on the horizon.

French Occupation in Southeast Asia

During World War II the Japanese had met with strong resistance from the Viet Minh when they invaded Southeast Asia. The Viet Minh had been assisted by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States with arms and military training since they had a shared purpose.

Once the war had ended, the Viet Minh set their sights against the French occupying forces. Ho Chi Minh, himself a communist, was the leader of these guerilla armies.

French Indochina, which was largely comprised of modern-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, had been a French colony since the late 19thcentury. As many countries learn the hard way, nations often don’t want to be under the rule of a foreign occupier.

From 1946 until 1954, the French battled the ever-strengthening forces of the Viet Minh, who had been trained by the People’s Republic of China from 1950. This was called the First Indochina War.

American involvement with Vietnam had started back in 1946 to thwart the ever-expanding communist influence.

The French forces had been bruised and battered by the Viet Minh for almost a decade and finally surrendered at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu on May 7th, 1954, negotiating peace as well as granting sovereignty to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Vietnam was still considered two independent nations by this time as the Geneva Accord signed by the belligerents split the country at the 17thparallel for 300 days with the guarantee of a ‘free’ election being held.

This sounds eerily reminiscent of the Korean peninsula. The oft-quoted words that Winston Churchill said in a 1948 speech to the House of Commons: “Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it”, has been demonstrated repeatedly in East and Southeast Asia. 

America’s ‘Police Action’ Begins

On November 5th, 1955, the United States’ conflict, or what is known as the Second Indochina War, began. 

Just two years after the Korean War ended, America was again involved in an armed ideological conflict with communism. Many Americans were highly concerned and tense because of nuclear proliferation and the growing ‘commie’ scare.

The belligerents on the communist side were: North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union along with their allies. The allies involved on the anti-communist side were: South Vietnam, South Korea, the United States, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and several others.

Since this war was never officially declared by the United States Congress, it remains a military ‘police’ action that has caused much angst and a continued rift to this day.

History will eventually render a judgment as to whether or not this conflict was necessary, but in my opinion, as somebody who has met many people who participated in the war, it has left an indelible scar permanently on America’s national psyche.

As an example of the wounding it caused, many veterans either became mired in drug abuse to escape the pain or took their lives because of the moral conflict it caused.

America as a nation must continue to help and wisely counsel those who fought in this war so that they can experience some level of healing.

United States’ involvement escalates

In December of 1960, the Viet Cong or what was officially called the National Liberation Front, was created to be the anti-government disrupter of South Vietnam and to disrupt and render ineffectual American military advisors. Their aim was also to drive out foreign influence with the eventual goal of uniting the North and South under communist rule.

The Republic of South Vietnam at this time was being governed by Ngo Dinh Diem, who had been appointed Prime Minister during the 1954 Geneva treaty. Mr. Diem was a Roman Catholic, anti-communist, nationalist, and social conservative.

The Vietnamese people were mostly followers of Buddha and had a deep suspicion of Diem’s government. Unfortunately, many of their suspicions were proved correct as Diem governed with more of an autocratic bent and whose administration was rife with corruption.

In 1961, after the election of John F. Kennedy, who decided to draw a ‘line in the sand’ against communism, troops began to be authorized for the increasing conflict between the North and the South. 

By 1963, there were 16,000 U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. This was in contrast to the 900 ‘advisers’ that President Eisenhower had sent starting in 1955.

Also in 1963, the Army Nurse Corps (ANC) established Operation Nightingale to recruit nurses for the ever-increasing conflict.

The Nursing Field expands

Deanna McGookin was born on February 1st, 1941 in Toronto, Ontario, Canada to Samuel and Violet McGookin. She was the oldest of three girls, which included Violet and Judith.

The family immigrated to the United States through Detroit, Michigan in June 1950

They settled in Phoenix, Arizona where she went to West Phoenix High School, graduating in 1958.

By 1965, Deanna had become an Assistant Head Nurse in the local Phoenix hospital emergency room. This experience helped her learn how to take care of traumatic injuries and assist with the associated shock.

She joined the Army Nurse Corps (ANC) in 1968 and was given an assignment to Vietnam because of her Emergency Room experience. 

Deanna, like many women during the Vietnam War era, felt an obligation to serve others who may not have had a choice as to whether to go to war or not.

The Vietnam War had more than 5,000 American nurses who served during its entirety. For the first time, 21% of them were men serving as officers in the ANC.

Of these more than 5,000, most had less than 2 years of practice in their profession. The average age of a nurse during the war was 23.6 years. 

The horrors of war must have compounded the already difficult task at hand, especially for those who hadn’t experienced traumatic injuries.

Deanna’s experience was the exception: “. . . I spent my year in Vietnam at the 67th evac in Qui Nhon, which was the headquarters of II Corps. The conditions were pretty much what I expected - but not the bulk, the quantity of the wounded. In Phoenix [Arizona, hospital emergency room], we were used to seeing one or two come in at a time. Now you were talking 50 or 60 at a time, with a wide variety of traumatic wounds. I had seen traumatic amputations of extremities from cotton-picking combines in Arizona. So that was not a horrendous sight for me, as it was for some others. The bulk . . . that there were just so many of them coming in at once . . . that was the issue for me. You had these helicopters land and there could be 60-70 casualties with various stages of injuries. Some of them might not have been as serious as others. It depended on the season. In Tet of '69 we were getting 200-300 patients coming in a day.”

As her tour progressed, Deanna, like so many others had before, began to question the sanity and morality of the Vietnam War: “We all had questions as to what we were doing in Vietnam, why we were there. We didn't seem to be getting anywhere. Day after day, things seemed to be pretty much the same . . . they'd take a hill, lose a hill, take a hill, lose a hill. Being in the age group where motherhood and children were a big factor, I think you do think: "What are we doing to the future generations of this country? What sort of genius would this blond young man have been had he been allowed to go about his life and do his own thing?" Most of the time you were so busy, just literally, physically busy that--although these thoughts stayed with you for awhile--you soon forgot about them, because it always seemed like there was someone else coming in to take the previous patient's place.”

In salute to the ‘Nightingales’

American nurses found different ways to deal with their pain and the emotional wear and tear they experienced. Some found solace in sex, drugs, or alcohol. Most of them just suppressed the pain until they could deal with it later. 

One of the more positive ways of dealing with pain was the way Deanna handled it: “It wasn't so depressing all the time, I must admit. We went on medcaps, medical missions to remote villages, places where there was no regular medical care. We did reconstructive surgery on children, gave them false limbs, and taught them how to get around. These kinds of things helped relieve some of the frustrations I was feeling.”

After her tour had ended, Deanna came back to the states and settled back in Phoenix, Arizona. As with all veterans of war, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) haunted her. 

She describes the affects PTSD had on her: “the young boy down the block had a car that backfired all the time. Every time it backfired, I was on the floor and under the bed."

Deanna would go on to serve in Afghanistan and attain the rank of Colonel in the Army Nurse Corps. There’s no evidence that she ever married, a common thread with the other nurses researched for these articles. 

Colonel Deanna McGookin passed away on September 14th, 2013 at the age of 72, having served her country for many years. 

She represents the best of what America has to offer and her life is a tribute to the sacrifices that so many made to help the men and women who’ve faithfully served our country.

May they never be forgotten.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

References

Dan Freedman and Jacqueline Rhoads, editors, “Nurses in Vietnam: The Forgotten Veterans.”, Austin, Texas: Texas Monthly Press, Inc., 1987.

“The Vietnam War and its timeline”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War

“Nursing and Medicine in the Vietnam War”, https://ceufast.com/blog/nursing-and-medicine-in-the-vietnam-war

“Find a Grave: Deanna McGookin”, https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/119126532/deanna-mcgookin#source

“Deanna McGookin on Family Search”, https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:33SQ-G5MV-9S4Y?i=5451&cc=1916040

“Women and War”, http://issues.texasobserver.org/pdf/ustxtxb_obs_1987_07_17_issue.pdf

“Winston Churchill 1948 House of Commons speech”, http://www.whiteboardbusiness.com/those-who-fail-to-learn-from-history-are-doomed-to-repeat-it-sir-winston-churchill/

Cold War History - The Complete History – From World War 2 to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War to Reagan and Gorbachev – 1945-1991 (Required History)

Do you know why the world nearly destroyed itself in a catastrophic nuclear war?

Two words – ‘Cold War’.

Get the book on Amazon

The Cold War was international affairs for the second half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons testing, civil wars in all corners of the globe and the race for economic dominance were all key spheres of the Cold War, although they were just a few elements of an intriguing global puzzle. More so than the great battles between Carthage and Rome in Ancient times or the Napoleonic Wars, the Cold War defined our world. But, there was one key difference between the Cold War and earlier major wars. Due to advances in technology and communications, the Cold War touched most countries on earth.

This introduction to the Cold War tells the story of the great clash between the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist USA. It covers the period from 1945 to 1991 in one combined edition, neatly breaking the Cold War up into three parts.

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The book starts by describing how two super-powers emerged out of the rubble of World War Two and includes the following:

·      How the Soviet Union and the USA quickly went from war-time allies to enemies

·      Events in East Asia - the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War

·      The most dangerous event of the early Cold War years, the Cuban Missile Crisis

·      The Vietnam War and its impact on the Cold War

·      The shocking power of nuclear weapons – and attempts to control them

·      Uprisings on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain

·      The super-powers as friends? Détente, Richard Nixon, and Leonid Brezhnev

·      The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

·      The rise of Ronald Reagan and his aggression in the early 1980s

·      How Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader

·      Glasnost, Perestroika, and how the Cold War ended

The approximately 250-page book is the perfect complement to the Cold War History audio series that is available as part of the ‘History in 28-minutes’ podcasts.

So come and join the past – get the book now!

Required History

The aim of the 'Required History' book series is to create approachable, succinct written introductions to some of the most interesting topics in history. They are designed for those:

·      That want to quickly learn about some of the world’s major historical events

·      Studying history. The books act as a perfect complement and overview to those undertaking high school and introductory college courses in history

·      Who enjoyed the audio podcasts and want to reinforce and further their knowledge

·      Learning English. The language and level of detail in the books are perfect for those in advanced English classes

All of the Required History books are designed to build on the audio podcasts available on the publisher’s website. They provide an extra layer of detail to the major historical events that the audio podcasts cover.

Cold War History - Are we friends or enemies? – From the Vietnam War to Détente – Part 2: 1962-1979 (Required History)

In an unstable world, how do you know who your friends and enemies are?

You don’t.

The Cold War was international affairs for the second half of the 20th Century. Nuclear weapons testing, civil wars in all corners of the globe and the race for economic dominance were all key spheres of the Cold War, although they were just a few elements of a very complex global puzzle. More so than the great battles between Carthage and Rome in Ancient times or the Napoleonic Wars, the Cold War defined our world. But, there was one key difference between the Cold War and earlier major wars. Due to advances in technology and communications, the Cold War touched most countries on earth.

Get the book on Amazon

This introduction to the middle years of the Cold War tells the story of the great clash between the Communist Soviet Union and the capitalist USA. It considers events in an intriguing age for international relations. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, there were calls to avert the risk of another nuclear near-miss, and this did lead to an improvement in the super-power relationship; however, underneath this improvement, there remained great tension. To further complicate the situation, China and Europe both became increasingly powerful and assertive. In the world of the 1960s and 1970s, it was hard to know who to trust and who to fear.

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The topics in the book include:

• The Vietnam War and its impact on the Cold War
• Decolonization and the opportunities that arose from it for the super-powers
• The growing power of Western Europe and a major change in Czechoslovakia
• The historic changes in the relationship between Mao Zedong’s China and the super-powers
• The super-powers as friends? Détente, Richard Nixon, and Leonid Brezhnev
• The major nuclear agreements and the arms race
• How serious tensions emerged once more

The approximately 90-page book is the perfect complement to the Cold War History audio series that is available as part of the ‘History in 28-minutes’ podcasts.

A Revolution of Values - Martin Luther King’s Beyond Vietnam Speech

Martin Luther King, Junior was assassinated almost 47 years ago to this day - on April 4, 1968. But exactly one year before his assassination he gave a very memorable speech – Beyond Vietnam. It was a fascinating speech that discussed America and the Vietnam War. Christopher Benedict explains…

Martin Luther King, Junior in 1964.

Call to Conscience

Even to the secular citizen, New York’s Riverside Church is an architectural and historical wonder. Situated on Manhattan’s upper west side, this interdenominational place of worship, conceived and funded by John D. Rockefeller Jr., straddles the Hudson River and is mere blocks away from Columbia University. Grant’s Tomb, located at the northern-most tip of Riverside Park, can be found almost directly across Riverside Drive.

Its spiked, ornately carved gothic tower dominates the Morningside Heights skyline and makes it the tallest church in the United States, twenty-fourth in worldwide rankings. The cavernous nave and altar are quite a sight to behold owing to the dozens of vibrant stained-glass windows, low-hanging circular chandeliers, sculpted religious icons, and the massive arrangement of organ pipes. These encircle the pulpit from which Nelson Mandela spoke just four months after his 1990 release from prison on Robben Island, South Africa.

Fidel Castro, Cesar Chavez, Bishop Desmond Tutu, former president Bill Clinton, and Jesse Jackson (delivering the eulogy at Jackie Robinson’s funeral in 1972) likewise have uttered sage words (a patience and posterior-fatiguing four hours’ worth, in Castro’s case) which have resounded throughout Riverside Church’s hallowed halls.

On April 4, 1967, one year to the day until he would be murdered in Memphis, Martin Luther King Jr. would issue from this same stage what he already knew would be a controversial and divisive plea to a “society gone mad on war” for “radical departures from the destruction of Vietnam”.

Already derided as an antiquated ‘Uncle Tom’ first by Malcolm X and then by Stokely Carmichael, who was busy preparing the factions of his Black Power movement to congregate as “groups of urban guerillas for our defense in the cities”, King would come under attack not only by black radicals who mistook his non-violent teachings for a kind of manacled pacifism, but by his own constituencies within the Morehouse College alumni, NAACP, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Their main point of contention involved what they feared to be Martin’s gradual philosophical shift from civil rights to foreign policy, a concern shared by the country’s ‘moral majority’ who, as it was, had little to no tolerance for King’s dream of an integrated nation and even less, it seemed, for his unsolicited opposition to the administration’s ongoing and escalating military intervention in Southeast Asia.

And why, fretted many of his friends, advisors, and advocates, risk alienating or infuriating Lyndon Johnson, who had signed the Civil Rights Act and publicly called out the Ku Klux Klan, in the process?

Despite his rapidly declining popularity, which was responsible for a prolonged and deepening depression, Martin Luther King nonetheless clung to the unfaltering belief that “a time comes when silence is betrayal.”

Time to Break the Silence

“I come to this magnificent house of worship tonight because my conscience leaves me no other choice,” Dr. King begins somberly.

The pews are filled to capacity, black audience members, in a stark reminder of how far society had yet to go despite the progress previously made, barred from the first several rows. Additional improvised seating proves inadequate, the overflow crowd choking the sidewalk of 120th Street.

“Men do not easily assume the task of opposing their government’s policy,” he continues. “Nor does the human spirit move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within one’s own bosom and in their surrounding world. Moreover, when the issues at hand seem as perplexing as they often do in the case of this dreadful conflict, we are always on the verge of being mesmerized by uncertainty. But,” he insists, “we must move on.”

A preacher by vocation and by nature, King’s reputation and tradition was that of an extemporaneous speaker. This oration would prove to be the lone exception. Drafted, redrafted, and drafted time and again, the ‘Beyond Vietnam’ speech would ultimately have as much preparation and surgically precise execution devoted to its construction as the very building in which it was recited.

Vincent Harding was its chief architect. It was a prominent role that would plague him with guilt and grief in equal measure one year later. Harding befriended King in 1958, during Martin’s convalescence back home in Atlanta. He had been stabbed in the chest with a letter opener by a deranged woman named Izola Curry during a Harlem book signing for Stride Toward Freedom, leaving him, as he was fond of telling it, “just a sneeze away from death”.

“He and I understood each other, recognized that we were very close to each other on issues having to do with Vietnam, with war and peace, and with the dangers of America becoming an imperialist power in the world,” Harding told Democracy Now! hosts Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez in 2008. “And so he asked me if I would do a draft of the speech, because he knew that I would not be putting words into his mouth. I would simply be speaking as my friend would want to speak, and that was the way that I went about the task that he asked me to do.”

Shouldering both the burden and the privilege to “speak for the weak, for the voiceless, for the victims of our nation, for those it calls enemy”, Martin Luther King was tasked with representing the collective views of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

“This speech is not addressed to Hanoi or to the National Liberation Front,” King stated. “It is not addressed to Russia or to China.” Neither was it an attempt to paint them as “paragons of virtue” nor to delegitimize their suspicion of the United States’ sloppy attempts to color itself as such, virtuous intent betrayed by roughhouse tactics.

Invoking the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s motto “To save the soul of America”, Dr. King refused to withhold his denunciation of the nation’s arrogant preference for confrontation over contemplation, specifically to the detriment of the young, the poor, and the black, “crippled by our society and sending them eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in southwest Georgia and East Harlem.” 

Compassion, however, must also be extended toward and encompass “the people who have been living under the curse of war for almost three continuous decades now.” Otherwise, observed King, “there will be no meaningful solution there until some attempt is made to know them and hear their broken cries.”

Giving Voice to the Voiceless in Vietnam

“They must see America as strange liberators,” said King of the Vietnamese. “We have destroyed their two most cherished institutions, the family and the village. Now there is little left to build on, save bitterness.”

He dedicated the bulk of the speech’s middle portion to fleshing out most Americans’ skeletal knowledge of Indochina and clarifying, in the process, our country’s complicity in stitching together the flags of discontent that the Vietnamese had unfurled and which we then sought to shred and scatter in the mud.

Led by Ho Chi Minh, free from Chinese influence, and having “quoted from America’s Declaration of Independence in their own document for freedom”, the Vietnamese proclaimed their sovereignty from beneath the oppression of French and Japanese occupation in 1945. France was keen to recolonize Vietnam and sought to see it through with American-supplied financial aid with the addition of military advisors and weapons.

“It looked as if independence and land reform would come again from the Geneva Agreement,” explained King. “But, instead came the United States, determined that Ho should not unify the temporarily divided nation.”

Soon enough, the U.S. was not content to simply drop propagandist leaflets on the peasants in support of their handpicked dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, and rained down bombs on their hamlets instead. The Vietnamese children were rendered homeless and hopeless, “running in packs on the streets like animals…degraded by our soldiers as they beg for food…selling their sisters to our soldiers…soliciting for their mothers.”

King hoped that the more sophisticated among our soldiers and citizens would recognize and atone for the fact that “we are on the side of the wealthy and the secure, while we create a hell for the poor.”

Thich Nhat Hanh

Having already drawn upon a passage from Langston Hughes, King would also relate a message written by an unnamed Vietnamese spiritual leader, which bears repeating in full here.

“Each day the war goes on, the hatred increases in the hearts of the Vietnamese and in the hearts of those of humanitarian instinct. The Americans are forcing even their friends into becoming their enemies. It is curious that the Americans, who calculate so carefully on the possibilities of military victory, do not realize that, in the process, they are incurring deep psychological and political defeat. The image of America will never again be the image of revolution, freedom, and democracy, but the image of violence and militarism.”

Words that echo loudly today in the wake of Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo, Benghazi, and targeted drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although their source was not disclosed during King’s speech, they in fact stemmed from Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. A peace activist, scholar, and writer, he founded the Van Hanh Buddhist University of Saigon and the School of Youth and Social Service, as well as the La Boi publishing house. Thay (or ‘teacher’, as he is commonly known) also established the Engaged Buddhism movement, which aided Vietnamese victims of American carpet bombing and scorched earth policies, and later the Order of Interbeing, a group of laypeople devoted to taking and living according to the Bodhisattva vows, walking the path of the Buddha with mindfulness and compassion for all sentient beings.

Excommunicated by both North and South Vietnam during an extensive tour of the United States and Europe, in the course of which he tirelessly yet fruitlessly implored world leaders to end the war and fronted the Buddhist delegation at the Paris Peace Talks of 1969, Thay would ironically find a new home in France, of all places. There, he would build and lead Plum Village, which grew over time from a simple farmstead to the largest Buddhist monastery in the Western hemisphere, from where he continues to write and conduct retreats.

Thich Nhat Hanh would cross paths with Martin Luther King Jr. during his aforementioned global peace-seeking mission, the civil rights icon so enamored with the Vietnamese monk that he referred to him as “an apostle of peace and non-violence” and personally nominated him for the 1967 Nobel Peace Prize, for which no one was awarded.

The Brotherhood of Man

King acknowledged his own 1964 Nobel Peace Prize as “a calling which takes me beyond national allegiances.”

“The Good News was meant for all men, for communist and capitalist, for their children and ours, for black and for white, for revolutionary and conservative,” he asserted. “What then can I say to the Vietcong or to Castro or to Mao as a faithful minister of this one? Can I threaten them with death, or must I not share with them my life?” After all, King correctly diagnosed America’s “comfort, complacency, morbid fear of Communism, and our proneness to adjust to injustice” as the chief culprits responsible for the festering sores now oozing amongst the “many who feel that only Marxism has a revolutionary spirit.” It stands to reason then, he prognosticates that, “Communism is a judgment against our failure to make democracy real and follow through on the revolutions that we initiated.”

King hits his full stride near the end of the speech employing his favored and very effective leitmotif of recurring refrains, this time structured around the thematic foundation of “a true revolution of values.” But not before first tearing down the decaying façade of the present ideological infrastructure built above a nation “approaching spiritual death” with the following words of warning, which may well be the most poignant ever spoken on the subject, by King or any other human being.

“We must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights, are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.”

Tomorrow Is Today

There is an urgency, not only to Vincent Harding’s written words, but also in Martin Luther King’s bombastic voice, when he conjures the imagery of “an invisible book of life that faithfully records our vigilance or our neglect.” This speaks to the great question of how we wish to be remembered. What legacy we would like to leave behind individually, but even more importantly, as an interconnected society, in which we all have some say in the choice between “non-violent co-existence or violent co-annihilation.”

“If we make the right choice,” King finishes with a flourish, “we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our world into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood…when justice will roll down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream.”

Did you find this article fascinating? If so, tell the world. Tweet about it, like it, or share it by clicking on one of the buttons below…

Sources

• The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. edited by Clayborne Carson (Warner Books, 2001)
• Interview with Vincent Harding from Democracy Now! broadcast February 28, 2008
• Fragrant Palm Leaves: Journals 1962-1966 by Thich Nhat Hanh (Riverhead Books 1999)
• A Call to Conscience documentary, produced by Tavis Smiley for PBS, March 2010 

Cold War People – Episode 9 – Ho Chi Minh

In this episode of Cold War People, we look at one of the greatest Communist revolutionaries of them all, Ho Chi Minh.

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Much like the man we looked at in the last podcast, Mao Zedong, Ho was an East Asian Communist revolutionary. He was involved in the Communist movement and had wanted to create a Communist Vietnam for many years even before he got close to having his wish fulfilled. Previously, we have seen him play a key role in the Vietnam War, but in this episode we briefly look at his wider life.

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See you soon,

George Levrier-Jones

email: info@itshistorypodcasts.com

web: www.itshistorypodcasts.com

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Cold War History Series - Episode 5 - Vietnam War

The Vietnam War, episode 5 of itshistorypodcasts.com's series on the Cold War is out now.

It’s on that generation-defining war, a war that spanned the central years of the Cold War. We are going to be looking at a war in which US involvement lasted more than double the whole length of World War II, and one that spans over a quarter of a century. It also involves many key trends in the Cold War – decolonization, the ever-changing role of China, and the US policy of containment. The podcast is on the Vietnam War.

And remember - you can connect with us on facebook by clicking here.

Happy listening!

George Levrier-Jones

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Lyndon B Johnson – The CIA and the Vietnam War

This is the fourth in a series of articles that explore the iconic CIA and its use as a tactical weapon by the US presidents of the Cold War (1947-1991). Here we look at Lyndon Johnson and his decisions to escalate the war in Vietnam. The Central Intelligence Agency – In the Beginning, The Central Intelligence Agency – Eisenhower and Asia’s Back Door, and Kennedy’s Central Intelligence Agency are the preceding posts.

Lyndon Baines Johnson, the 36th President of the United States, was not an easy man.  Bill, a colleague with whom I worked on Johnston Atoll in the 1980s, was on the Johnsons’ security detail during their Texas visits.  He spoke of loud, embarrassing, drunken fights between the Johnsons and crude behavior like throwing dishes of jelly beans and popcorn and expecting the security detail to pick it all up immediately.  Ronald Kessler’s book, In the President’s Secret Service: Behind the Scenes with Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents They Protect, confirms much of what Bill told me then.  Regardless of his personal behavior, Johnson was a political sophisticate who understood power at a fundamental level.  By all accounts, Johnson’s rise to power was steady and ruthless.

President Lyndon B Johnson greets troops in Vietnam. December 1967.

The dichotomy among historians becomes apparent once Johnson assumes the presidency following President Kennedy’s assassination.  The gulf widens through the nine years of the Johnson presidency.  Was Johnson a model for business executives and a great progressive leader as portrayed by historian Robert A. Caro, who has studied Johnson for the better part of three decades?[1]  Or, at the other end of the spectrum, was Johnson a dangerous, paranoid individual?  According to former Kennedy speech writer and author Richard N. Goodwin in his 1988 book Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties, Johnson’s behavior drove two presidential assistants to separately seek opinions on Johnson’s mental stability from psychiatrists.[2]

What can be said with certainty is that, as president, Johnson drove social engineering to new heights with his ‘War on Poverty’ and ‘Great Society’, which included legislation for public broadcasting, Medicare, Medicaid, environmental protection, and aid to education.  Johnson did not confine his activity to just the home front, though.  He was busy with the CIA, too; the US Dominican Republic intervention in 1965, the Vietnam War, the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, and efforts to reduce tension with the Soviet Union.

The DCI

It took three tries to land a Director of Central Intelligence, DCI, he wanted, but Johnson finally got the job done.  Johnson inherited DCI John A. McCone from Kennedy.  Kennedy asked McCone to head up the CIA following Kennedy’s termination of Allen W. Dulles, a remnant of Wild Bill Donovan’s OSS, after the Bay of Pigs disaster.  McCone was reputed to be an excellent manager and returned balance to an agency enamored of covert activities and nation-building.  Under McCone, the CIA redistributed its organizational energy between analysis and science and technology in addition to its well-known covert actions.  Not everyone in the CIA was a happy camper with this intelligence outsider, but McCone earned his spurs during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Johnson and DCI McCone parted ways in 1965 over disagreements about the Vietnam build-up.

President Johnson, a former naval officer, replaced McCone with DCI William A. Raborn, a career naval officer whose claim to fame was managing the Polaris Missile program (submarine launched missiles).  Other than brushes with Naval Intelligence, Raborn had no directly related experience.  It appears that Johnson selected Raborn to keep the DCI seat warm while Richard M. Helms matured his administrative skills as Deputy DCI.  Raborn, according to prevailing wisdom, never really adjusted to being the DCI and offered his resignation sixteen months after assuming the role.  Without ado, Johnson quickly accepted Raborn’s offer to resign.

Richard M. Helms, the heir apparent and another of Wild Bill Donovan’s OSS operatives, became DCI in June 1966.  Helms reveled in espionage.  Between the OSS and the CIA, Helms was a very active operator.  During WWII, Helms worked out of London and shared a flat with William J. Casey, the charismatic Irish lawyer who would head the CIA under Reagan.  Together, Helms and Casey were up to their proverbial ears in WWII cat and mouse spy games. During the Cold War, Helms kept both his espionage and operational skills sharp.  He had his fingers in the Iran pot, the Soviet forgeries, Operation Mongoose, and the Diem regime in Vietnam.  Although Helms preferred espionage and stated that assassinations rarely worked in the US’s favor, he was nothing if not a company man and certainly was party to many.

Johnson was not overly impressed with the CIA and, initially, did not see much value in intelligence.  Then, too, DCIs McCone and Raborn had each bucked Johnson on ramping up American involvement in Vietnam on more than one occasion.  Johnson’s lack of respect for the CIA was reflected in the number and type of meetings to which the CIA was not invited.  In Helms, Johnson found a DCI that, if not a kindred spirit, was at least a more accommodating one.  The CIA, however, still did not come up on Johnson’s radar until the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967.  The accuracy of CIA intelligence estimates, timing, and outcome of the 1967 Six-Day War earned Helms his DCI service stripes and a seat at Johnson’s regular Tuesday lunch meetings with his advisors to discuss foreign policy.

Vietnam

What was it about Vietnam that propelled Johnson so hard that he eventually broke up on its shoals?  Vietnam drove Johnson’s relationship with the CIA, his advisors, and congress.  For example, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mt), Senate Majority Leader during the Johnson administration championed Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programs and legislation but fought bitterly with Johnson against the Vietnam War.  The frying pan that was the Vietnam War got so hot that in July 1968 Johnson flew to Central America to meet with the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.[3]   According to an interview I taped with Raul Castro in 2003, on short notice Johnson’s staff requested that Castro pull together the meetings because he needed a break from the pressures of Vietnam.  The staffers wanted adoring crowds, good press and a rest for the embattled president.  Raul Castro was appointed US Ambassador to El Salvador by President Johnson in 1964.   All three staff objectives were met.

Until recently I subscribed to the traditional perspective that Johnson knew exactly what he was doing as he amped up the Vietnam War.  In 1965, it appeared that Johnson was resolute in his decision to support the American configured South Vietnamese government against the threat of Communist takeover.  Johnson used the alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident to garner the congressional ‘blank check’ from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to do what he wanted. By February 1965, the US military’s Operation Rolling Thunder was bombing North Vietnamese targets and the Ho Chi Minh trail and Agent Orange along with napalm was defoliating the jungle.  In March 1965, General Westmoreland asked for more troops.  About 189,000 American troops were stationed in Vietnam in 1965. The following year, the number doubled and casualties escalated at an alarming rate.  And, the Vietnam War got much worse.  I expected to find old familiar friends in the defense contractor community at the root of the escalation but I was wrong.

Anything but linear

Mark Lawrence makes a case that Johnson’s Vietnam decisions were anything but linear.  Lawrence states, “Where scholars once saw certainty and confidence, they now see indecision and anxiety.” In his article LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation, Lawrence cites a May 1964 telephone conversation between Lyndon Johnson and McGeorge Bundy[4],[5] that illustrates the level of Johnson’s ambivalence:

“…In his conversation with Bundy, LBJ expresses deep anxiety about what would happen if the United States failed to defend South Vietnam from communist takeover – evidence that bolsters the older, conventional view of U.S. motives for escalation. Fearing what historians would later dub the “domino effect,” Johnson suggests that the communist powers – the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China – would be emboldened by a communist victory in South Vietnam and might make trouble elsewhere. The communists, in fact, “may just chase you right into your own kitchen,” the president says in his typical down-home manner. LBJ also provides evidence for the older interpretation by breezily dismissing other powerful Americans who urged him to negotiate a settlement and withdraw U.S. power from South Vietnam. He shows special contempt for Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, charging that the Montana Democrat, a strong advocate of winding down the U.S. role in South Vietnam, had “no spine at all” and took a position that was “just milquetoast as it can be.”

In other parts of the conversation, however, LBJ heaps doubt on the idea that defending South Vietnam was crucial to US security. “What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me?” he asks Bundy. “What is Laos worth to me? What is it worth to this country?” Most chillingly, Johnson shows keen awareness that victory in Vietnam was anything but a sure thing. He worries that full-fledged US intervention in Vietnam would trigger corresponding escalation by Communist China, raising the horrifying specter of a direct superpower confrontation, as in Korea a few years earlier, between Chinese and US forces. “I don’t think we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and ever get anywhere in that area,” LBJ asserts. Moreover, the United States, once committed to a war, might find it impossible to get out. “It’s damn easy to get into a war, but … it’s going to be awful hard to ever extricate yourself if you get in,” LBJ asserts with remarkable prescience….”[6]

Johnson, as I said in the beginning, was not an easy man. It took him more than three of his six years in office to find a DCI he respected and would back him on Vietnam.  Even after Johnson warmed up to the CIA, his use of the agency was as enigmatic as his leadership style.  In many ways, Johnson’s choice of Helms to lead the CIA was a reflection of the contradictions exhibited by Johnson himself. Helms was smooth and adept at politics but beneath his ‘James Bond’ coolness, Helms was a ‘company man’.  He liked the freewheeling CIA style that the ‘plausible deniability’ cloak offered.  Helms became the first and only DCI to be convicted of lying to the US Congress in 1977 regarding the ousting of the elected President of Chile and the installation of the dictator Salvador Allende.[7] Note: Helms was the only DCI convicted of lying to congress.  Many of his predecessors and successors lied to Congress as the need, in their individual opinion, arose.[8]

Johnson and his relationship with the CIA really goes to the question of who Johnson was.  Was he the headstrong leader portrayed by Caro or a leader that became unbalanced, afraid, and insecure that Goodwin paints?  Probably, he was both.  We will need much more data to determine which LBJ occupied the White House for nine years.

This article is provided by Barbara Johnson from www.coldwarwarrior.com.

Want to find out more about another US President from the 1960s? Click here for our podcast on Richard Nixon.

References

[1] The Harvard Business Review; April 2006; A Conversation with Historian Robert A. Caro by Diane Coutu; Lessons in Power: Lyndon Johnson Revealed; http://hbr.org/2006/04/lessons-in-power-lyndon-johnson-revealed/ar/1

[2] Los Angeles Times; September 14, 1988; ELIZABETH MEHREN; Richard Goodwin’s Account of a ‘Paranoid’ L.B.J. Riles Some Ex-Colleagues; http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-14/news/vw-1970_1_richard-goodwin

[3] Lewiston Evening Journal; Frank Cormier; July 5, 1968; http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1913&dat=19680703&id=KrcgAAAAIBAJ&sjid=U2gFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1096,396753

[4] Listen to the Johnson-Bundy conversation; (Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Anguish, May 27, 1964: Conversation with national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. 27 May 1964. History and Politics Out Loud. Ed. Jerry Goldman. 30 Sept. 1999. Northwestern University.) http://web2.millercenter.org/lbj/audiovisual/whrecordings/telephone/conversations/1964/lbj_wh6405_10_3522.wav

[5] Transcript of the conversation (Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 27, 1964, 11:24 a.m.. Source: U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia: Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 53. Original Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between the President and McGeorge Bundy, Tape 64.28 PNO 111. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.); https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/lbjbundy.htm

[6] Not Even Past; Mark Atwood Lawrence; LBJ and Vietnam: A Conversation; http://www.notevenpast.org/listen/lbj-and-vietnam-conversation

[7] George Washington University National Security Archives; September 11, 2013;  Peter Kornbluh; National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 437; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/

[8] The American Prospect; Adam Serwer; May 15, 2009; THE CIA LIE TO CONGRESS? IT’S HAPPENED BEFORE; http://prospect.org/article/cia-lie-congress-its-happened