The Final Meeting of Sir Winston Churchill and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Below is an excerpt from the book "The Third Man: Churchill, Roosevelt, Mackenzie King, and the Untold Friendships That Won WWII” by Neville Thompson. The excerpt focuses on the last meeting between Sir Winston Churchill and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

The book is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Quebec Conference, 1943. In the back row are Mackenzie King and Sir Winston Churchill. In the front sit US President Roosevelt and the Earl of Athlone, Governor General of Canada.

In late 1948, three years after the end of the war and close to half a century after their first encounter, Mackenzie King and Winston Churchill met for the last time. King was no longer the leader of the Liberal party, having care­fully engineered Louis St. Laurent into that position at the convention to choose a successor in August 1948. But he remained as prime minister in order to rep­resent Canada at a Commonwealth prime ministers conference in October. King looked forward to his farewell appearance after quarter of a century of being the crucial figure at such events. He was unquestionably the senior figure in the British dominions.

On his way to London, King stopped in Paris for a session of the United Nations. Eleanor Roosevelt was there as a member of the US delegation and Chair of the Commission on Human Rights which produced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in December. She was stay­ing in the same hotel, in a room close to King’s. They did not spend much time together, but they did reminisce about the past and Eleanor repeated her husband’s affection for King and the many confidences he had shared. At a dinner of dominion representatives, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin gave a toast to King on his retirement. Not having been forewarned, King had no reply prepared but he spontaneously pronounced a benediction on the Commonwealth. During his long years as prime minister, he said that he had tried to keep before him:

The best traditions of British public life. That I realized what the nations of the Commonwealth had derived in that way. Real bonds between nations of the Commonwealth were love of freedom, of liberty which had been inherited from the struggles of Britain, and the example of public men.

In Paris, King had been far more tired than usual, unable to breathe or sleep easily, and perspiring freely, all of which suggests blocked arteries. Shortly after his arrival in London, he felt too unwell to leave the Dorchester Hotel. Lord Moran, Churchill’s personal doctor, diag­nosed heart strain for which he prescribed digitalis, sleeping pills, and morphine, and arranged for a night nurse. He went with King to a heart specialist, Sir John Parkinson, who took an x-ray and a cardiograph and detected edema (swelling) in one leg owing to poor circulation. Moran banned salt and recommended bed rest for two weeks. In fact, King remained there for three. Moran came practi­cally every day, although there was nothing further he could provide other than encouragement. He did not charge for his services but a few months later King sent him £150.8. King was characteristically proud that his illness, indeed his whole stay in London, cost Canadian taxpayers nothing since the expense of the conference was covered by the British government. Since he could not attend the sessions, St. Laurent came by air to represent Canada after all.

Lord Moran’s concern in attending King was not his fee but his literary ambi­tion. He was a prominent practitioner and medical politician (as president of the Royal College of Physicians he was known to general practitioners as “Corkscrew Charlie” for concentrating on the interests of specialists in negotiations over the National Health Scheme) who knew that his real fame depended on producing an account of his association with Churchill. He was reviewing and reworking his diaries to present an attention-catching account to be published after his great patient’s death, which he had no reason to think would be long delayed. King’s confinement was a heaven-sent opportunity to sharpen and increase his knowledge by adding the experience of someone who had been, as Moran had not, at many private meetings and informal discussions with Churchill and also Roosevelt.

On the very first day, they talked about Churchill for over an hour and found themselves in substantial agreement. Moran observed, and King did not dissent, that Churchill had achieved great things despite his faults. He was very strong willed, thought in big terms, and his knowledge of military history was so exten­sive that he could dominate any situation and not leave others much chance to say anything. Churchill recognized the value of experts but did not allow them to control. King was not so indiscreet as to tell Moran that Field Marshall Montgomery had said that he did not want Churchill around during the fighting, and that Field Marshall Harold Alexander (now governor general of Canada) had said that he had to stand up to prevent Churchill’s interference. But King did confirm that Churchill did most of the talking in cabinet and was inconsiderate of others: even Labour’s Attlee and the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, members of the War Cabinet, were treated almost with contempt, and most col­leagues feared to say anything. To get his way, Churchill would work himself into an emotional state.

On the other hand, King attested that Churchill was loyal to his friends, stuck to his word in getting things done, and had great courage, “no fear in the world. In that way gave a powerful example to others.” King also pointed out that many were attracted by the desire to associate with such a towering figure. He claimed not to have liked what Churchill told him about the effectiveness of flattery, although King was both susceptible and not sparing in his own use of it. While no one could say if the war would have been won if anything had hap­pened to Churchill and Roosevelt, King considered that a change of leadership might have shortened the European conflict since the Germans were terrified of Churchill. Both he and Moran considered that unconditional surrender (which was Roosevelt’s and not Churchill’s insistence) had been a mistake since it had closed every door and made the fighting more intense.

Moran also wanted to discuss relations between Churchill and Roosevelt, about which King knew a great deal. He said that Churchill had repeatedly insisted that they must meet the president in every way possible and never forget that he was Britain’s greatest friend. On the difference between them over sharing research on the atomic bomb with the Soviets, King, whose opinion had changed with the Cold War, now thought Churchill had been right that it should be with­held. A couple of days later, Moran told King that he had noticed that Roosevelt was failing at the 1944 Quebec conference and by Yalta was completely used up. This was not surprising for a detached physician and was no revelation to King, but it would have been to the public if it had been publicized on such authority, just three and a half years after Roosevelt’s death.

In addition to Moran, Mackenzie King received a stream of other visitors at his bedside: Louis St. Laurent, of course, Attlee, Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, Ernest Bevin and future British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who wanted to inquire about King’s memoirs which it was assumed the Macmillan company, his family firm, would publish. It must have been a great encouragement that Bevin, who managed to carry on in one of the most demanding jobs in the government, said that his symptoms were exactly like King’s; and more people that Moran implied Bevin’s condition was the result of excessive drinking. This held out the expectation that King’s abste­mious lifestyle would speed his recovery. King George VI paid his Canadian prime minister the great compliment of going to see him at the hotel. So did his uncle, Lord Athlone, who came as chancellor of the University of London with an academic delegation and an honorary degree, for which King got out of bed and dressed. There were also personal friends, notably the social reformer Violet Markham, and three sessions with spiritualists, one of whom contacted Franklin Roosevelt as well as Lord Tweedsmuir. But the highlight, on the second to last day, was Winston Churchill, still leader of the British Conservative Party, whom King would have been sorry to miss.

Churchill arrived with a copy of the British edition of The Gathering Storm. He was sorry to find his old friend in such poor condition but not greatly concerned since he had recovered from worse himself (the next summer he would quickly recuperate from a stroke). King was amazed at how well his contemporary looked—“quite young and strong”—and the quantity of work he was able to do. Churchill said that he relaxed a lot, sometimes painting for three hours a day. He was also buoyed by having just denounced the Labour government’s handling of world affairs in parliament in the same hard terms that he had used at the Conservative annual conference a couple of weeks earlier.  (Prime Minister Attlee, who arrived later, told King that he had been hurt by the accusations of timidity towards the Soviet Union, responsibility for the slaughter following Indian independence, the chaos in Palestine, and the charge that his government would force Northern Ireland into joining Eire which was becoming an independent republic with no ties to the United Kingdom.)

King agreed with Attlee that Churchill’s speech was extreme, even alarming in his claim that Conservative governments would come to power in Britain and all the old dominions and take proper command of the Commonwealth. Many British Conservatives were offended by their leader’s belligerence but kept their heads down and deferred to the international hero who they hoped would carry them back to office in the election that was sched­uled for 1950. This mutinous feeling was expressed to King three months later by the still exasperated Anthony Eden, Churchill’s former deputy, who said that while the great man was mellowing, he still refused to surrender the party leadership.

In their bedside conversation at the Dorchester, King and Churchill did not touch on contemporary controversies but stuck to the tranquilizing triumphs of the past. Churchill declared, although it is not clear how he could have known, that King had been much missed at the Commonwealth conference. He also cheered the invalid by assuring him again of his great services during the war: “You have never failed. You were helpful always. There was nothing that you did not do, that could be done.” He mentioned, in particular, the Commonwealth air training plan and King’s refusal to support Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ desire for the dominions to play a larger part in the direction of the war in order to undermine Churchill. He reiterated that King had been a bridge between Britain and the United States, specifying his help in the possible move of the Royal Navy to the United States. He recalled King’s encouraging telephone call after Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech two years earlier, and could not resist adding that every point in the address had since been borne out. The two parted with emotion, Churchill’s eyes filling with tears, yet King was annoyed that on his way out he asked the high commissioner (Norman Robertson) to ensure that the press was informed of his visit.

There was no sense that this was their last meeting. Once he recovered his health, King expected to continue visiting Britain, as he had when out of office in the early 1930s. Churchill hoped to go to Toronto in the spring to receive an honorary degree and wanted King to attend. King in turn invited Churchill to Ottawa. But King would not recover, and they would never meet again.

You can buy The Third Man: Churchill, Roosevelt, Mackenzie King, and the Untold Friendships That Won WWII here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

About the Author 

Neville Thompson is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Western Ontario, where he taught modern British and European history. He is the author of The Anti-Appeasers: Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s, Wellington After Waterloo, and Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream. His latest book The Third Man: Churchill, Roosevelt, Mackenzie King, and the Untold Friendships That Won WWII is released in hardcover in February 2021 with Sutherland House Books. He lives in Ottawa.

Copyright line

From "THE THIRD MAN: Churchill, Roosevelt, Mackenzie King, and the Untold Friendships That Won WWII" by Neville Thompson. Copyright © 2021 by Neville Thompson. Reprinted by permission of Sutherland House Books.

The Greatest Trick of WWII? How Operation Fortitude Fooled Nazi Germany and Enabled the D-Day Landings

Almost anyone with even a passing interest in the Second World War knows of Operation Overlord (D-Day) and its immense importance. Yet, far fewer have heard of another great military operation that helped to ensure Overlord’s success: Operation Fortitude. Here, Nathan Richardson explains what happened in the 1944 operation to fool the Nazis and make them think that the D-Day landings would take place in Calais, France and Norway – and not in their actual location of Normandy.

A dummy British RAF aircraft in October 1943. Source: The National Archives, available here.

In 1944, the combined British and American military chiefs, along with their various allies, were intently planning an invasion of Western Europe. They all knew Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” must be breached if the Western Allies were to bring the war effectively to Nazi Germany and take the pressure off of the beleaguered Russians. Fighting in Italy had taken a terrible toll on the Allied armies. Regrettably, Italy had not turned out to be the “weak underbelly” that Churchill had thought. Though the operations in Sicily and Italy had successfully forced the fascist Mussolini out of power and switched Italy over to the Allied side, German troops barred the Allies from crossing the Alps into Europe proper. The Allies decided that they must find another invasion route into Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied generals made up of both British and American commanders and headed by General Eisenhower, determined that an amphibious assault must be made from Britain into Western Europe. Where and when were the only remaining questions. Ultimately, Normandy, France and June were the location and time decided upon. Yet, keeping this information from the Germans could very well decide the success or failure of the invasion. Churchill, though convinced of the necessity of an invasion, nevertheless greatly feared its results if it turned out to be a disaster, which it very well could have been (Keegan 164-5). 

However, Eisenhower, who held the gut-wrenching last word on when the invasion took place, went to impressive lengths to keep the Germans as much in the dark as possible. That an invasion was coming, the Germans knew for a fact—it was inevitable that the Allies would attempt to retake Occupied Europe. Indeed, Hitler had been making enormous preparations on his coastal defenses, stretching from Norway in the north, down the whole coast, all the way down the English Channel. However, this impressive length of coastline defenses was never completed, and never lived up to its propaganda—nor did it live up to the faith that Hitler placed in it (Esposito 66). Naturally, the Germans knew they must decide which areas were most likely to be assaulted, and to build their best defenses there. Deciding that the Allies must need a port to sustain an invasion, the Germans centered their heaviest weapons and fortifications at port-cities such as Cherbourg, Calais, and Antwerp (Weinberg 685).

Not illogically, the German High Command decided that the most likely invasion point was the Pas de Calais, with its port close at hand, and it being the closest point between Europe and England. Why would the Allies travel farther than necessary? Would not the Allies enjoy greater air cover from their powerful air forces the closer they were to England? Thus, the Germans centered the bulk of their divisions in the West around Calais, and there put their best forces, ready to repel at this likely invasion site (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88). However, this was exactly why the Allies knew they must not attack where the Germans expected them. Eisenhower knew he must keep the Germans from knowing the true invasion point. In order to do that, he made sure the Germans found evidence that seemed to confirm their preconceived ideas. The Germans must be convinced that Calais was the true planned site of the invasion, and that any other attack was just a diversion (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82, 88). To accomplish this trickery, the Allies employed some truly ingenious schemes.

German Spies Flipped

World War Two was a war of spies and espionage. In an age of rapidly advancing weaponry and innovative tactics, spies were absolutely essential in keeping the commanders on both sides knowledgeable of the enemy’s capabilities and plans. Yet, the Allies were able to effectively deprive the Germans of their ability for espionage, and turn any German spies into Allied agents, who would turn around and feed the Germans false information about the Allies. How was this done? The British Secret Service identified German spies and carefully evaluated them. If German spies were deemed suitable (i.e., most likely to cooperate with the Allies), they were convinced to turn ‘double-agent’, and to report to the Abwehr (the German military intelligence) exactly what the British wanted them to know. Those spies who were not deemed suitable or who did not cooperate were either executed or imprisoned. This system was known as the Double-Cross System. Thus, not only did the Allies control the German spies, but with the ability to intercept German coded radio transmissions due to British code breaking (known as ULTRA), the Allies could confirm that the Germans were receiving the information the Allies wanted them to receive, and could also confirm whether the Germans believed what they were being told (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 77). This system of turning German spies into double-agents had carefully been built up since the beginning of the war. Yet, British intelligence knew that using the Double-Cross System to the Allies’ advantage could likely only be used once, since the Germans would eventually realize they had been duped, and the Allies would never have such an opportunity again. So, the British were forced to sit by and patiently wait to use this weapon until the perfect time. That time was D-Day. Until then, the British carefully fed the Germans true and valuable information to ensure the Germans trusted and valued their agents, while also taking care not to feed them information that would be militarily damaging (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 78).

Operation Fortitude

The last thing the Allies wanted was for the Germans to realize that their spies had become compromised. The Germans must see tangible evidence that what their spies were reporting was true. Enter: Operation Fortitude. Operation Fortitude was designed to fool the Germans into believing that the Allies were attacking at Calais, France and southern Norway, which would hopefully cause the Germans to concentrate their best defensive efforts at these points - and away from Normandy (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82). 

A seaborne invasion, of course, necessitates a massive buildup of men and materials. Shipping of all sorts must be concentrated at the embarkation points. Supplies of every sort, including a massive number of vehicles, such as tanks, trucks, and jeeps. Fighter and bomber aircraft, ready to provide air support for the attackers, must be kept in readiness at airfields close to the invasion beaches. For a Normandy landing, this massive buildup must be assembled in and around ports in the south of England, at important port cities such as Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portland, and multiple others (Esposito 67). How could these preparations be kept hidden? They could not fully keep them hidden, despite the Allies’ best efforts. No amount of care and camouflage could keep German scouting planes from picking up the U.S. 4th Infantry division near Plymouth or the British 50th Armored Division west of Poole or the Canadian 3rd Infantry division near Portsmouth (Esposito 67). The location of these troops, if spotted, would show the Germans that Normandy was a more likely invasion site. Contrarily, the empty fields and ports of southeast England around Dover (the closest point between England and France), would indicate that Calais was not the target. Despite all of the Allied efforts to hide and disguise their readying of forces and to muzzle or flip the German spies, the Germans might still catch on, and the result might lead the Allies to an enormous defeat. 

Thus, the only way to keep the Germans from guessing the true invasion point, was to provide a distraction. This distraction was Operation Fortitude. Operation Fortitude was a dummy Operation, involving dummy formations of troops. In Scotland, the completely fake British “Fourth Army” was stationed, ready to assault southern Norway. In the southeast of England, the bogus First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was stationed, across from Calais, right where the Germans expected to see such an Army Group stationed (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82). To make FUSAG look like a real army group to the Germans (from far enough away at least), the Allies built poorly camouflaged dummy landing craft and fields of papier-mâché tanks. To make the tanks look more legitimate, jeeps were used to drag chains around the tanks to create “tank tracks” and to kick up dust, indicating movement. Hitler’s spies obediently reported all of these fraudulences as the real thing (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84). Fake radio traffic was also broadcast around the assembly areas for these fake armies. The British Fourth Army, which was entirely fictional (FUSAG was made up of some real units, though not all were even in England yet), knew that the Germans, due to their expertise in intercepting and decoding their enemy’s radio transmissions, were able to geographically pinpoint the location of the Fourth Army headquarters (which was Edinburgh Castle), as well as locating and identifying divisional and corps command posts (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82-3, 85). The Allies would use the Germans’ proficiency against them with great effect. 

The already-famous General George S. Patton was placed in command of this force, giving further credence to the Army Group he supposedly led, since the Germans believed him the best Allied general. In reality, Eisenhower considered Patton more in his element when the time came for an impetuous drive across France, so Patton was given this unconventional role and saved for later (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 85). With control over the German spies in Britain, the Allies could control in large part what information the Germans received, and what they did not receive. Also, with the ability to read the German codes, the Allies could see the Germans’ react to the false reports, and could tell whether the Germans were buying it or not. Even if some information indicating Normandy as the main landing area came into German hands, this information would be buried amidst a far greater volume of reports that said the Allies were getting ready to attack Calais (Weinberg, 682).

Dummy landing craft used as decoys in south-eastern England harbours in the period before D-Day, 1944.

The German Defenses Affected by Fortitude

Operation Fortitude worked so successfully that the Germans believed not only that the Pas de Calais was the main target (which Hitler and General von Rundstedt, the commander in the West, both agreed would be the case), but that the Allies actually had far greater capabilities than they actually possessed (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84, 87). From the intercepted and decoded German radio messages, the Allies could tell that the Germans figured Eisenhower had twice as many forces as he actually had (the Germans counted eighty-nine Allied divisions, rather than the forty-seven Ike actually had), and that he had four times as many landing craft, which were actually in very short supply (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 87, 83). Believing that Eisenhower had so many men and landing craft at his disposal, the Germans easily believed that Ike had enough power for diversionary assaults in addition to the main assault—which, in the end, kept the Germans from reacting swiftly and with enough force against the Normandy assault. In fact, the lie that Normandy was just a diversion for a Calais assault lasted until nearly two months after the Allied invasion, well after the beachhead had been secured and the push inland accomplished (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 100; Esposito 83). Fifteen German divisions, the bulk of the Fifteenth Army, which were the best-equipped the Germans had in France, were kept out of the fight in Normandy altogether, awaiting another threat that never came (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88, 100). The distraction caused by the bogus British Fourth Army was no less successful. Hitler was so convinced that an attack was coming that he reinforced the Norwegian garrisons, leaving them with thirteen divisions—twice as many troops as were needed for the occupation. An additional 90,000 naval and 60,000 air personnel were also left to guard Norway, along with an armored division—all of which would have served a far better purpose in Normandy (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84).

Conclusion

In summary, Operation Fortitude, which masterfully employed the resources that the Double-Cross System provided, managed to utterly fool the Germans into believing that the main attack was coming anywhere but Normandy. It can even be said that if Operation Fortitude had not succeeded, Operation Overlord would have failed. The Allies simply did not have the means to transport enough men to France quickly enough to meet the full force of the German occupation troops in the West if Fortitude failed to hold them back (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88-9). Eisenhower wrote frankly in February of 1944, just months before the great invasion, that “The success or failure of coming operations depends upon whether the enemy can obtain advance information of an accurate nature” (Ambrose, D-Day 83). The success of the Normandy invasion was just the first step in the freeing of all Europe from the terror of Nazi occupation. Thus, Operation Fortitude did incalculable service in the Allied effort to rid the world of Nazism.

What do you think the significance of Operation Fortitude was? Let us know below.

References

Ambrose, Stephen Edward. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Ambrose, Stephen Edward. Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. Doubleday, 1981.

Esposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of War. European Theater. Tess Press, 1995.

Keegan, John. Winston Churchill. Viking Penguin, 2002.

Weinberg, Gerhard. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1994.

The Amazing Story of the Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War Two

The Women Airforce Service Pilots (or WASP) of World War Two played a great role in the American war effort. Here, Mac Guffey tells us about their story – and fight for recognition both during and after the war.

You can also read Mac’s past articles: A Brief History of Impeachment in the US (here) and on Franksgiving (here).

WASP pilots (from left) Frances Green, Margaret Kirchner, Ann Waldner and Blanche Osborn leave their B-17 trainer, (christened ‘Pistol Packin’ Mama’), during ferry training at Lockbourne Army Air Force base in Ohio. They’re carrying their parachutes.

Two years before America entered the Second World War, a pioneering group of more than a thousand, relatively unknown, veteran pilots stepped forward and volunteered to be a part of the solution for what they could see as a looming manpower problem in the air-arm of the U.S. military.

 “…at the height of World War II, [they] left homes and jobs for the opportunity of a lifetime – to become the first in history to fly for the U.S. military…these women became the Women Airforce Service Pilots – better known as the WASP.” [1]

This is the story of that long unrecognized and underappreciated group of determined pilots and their uphill struggles to be accepted as the soldiers they were. And it all began with a letter – woman-to-woman – because Jacqueline “Jackie” Cochran recognized a kindred soul in Eleanor Roosevelt – the First Lady.

BACKSTORY

It was 1939, and WWII had just exploded across Poland.

Realizing America’s eventual involvement, the country’s most famous female pilot wrote a letter to the most progressive First Lady in American history with a startling suggestion – use women pilots in non-combat roles to compensate for the coming manpower demands of the military. [2]

Recognizing the wisdom and prescience in Cochran’s proposal, Eleanor Roosevelt introduced her to General Henry “Hap” Arnold, head of the U.S. Army Air Force. Cochran’s plan, however, was initially rejected. Arnold expressed the misbegotten sentiments of most Americans – especially men – when he said in 1941 that “the use of women pilots serves no military purpose in a country which has adequate manpower at this time.” [3]

But the manpower necessary to fight this coming world-wide war was far greater than Arnold (or anyone else for that matter) ever expected, and by September 1942, Nancy Harkness Love and Cochran, with Arnold’s support, independently founded two separate flying programs (Women’s Auxiliary Ferrying Squadronand Women’s Flying Training Detachment). On August 5, 1943, these were merged to become the WASP – Women’s Airforce Service Pilots - a civilian squadron under the aegis of the U.S. Army Air Force. And it was composed of only women pilots. Cochran was chosen to serve as the director of WASP and its training division, while Love was appointed director of the ferrying division. [2]

Nancy Harkness Love.

Jackie Cochran surrounded by WASP trainees.

QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING[4]

The military trained male civilians with no flying experience to be pilots for jobs ferrying aircraft from the factory to various military airfields all over the U.S. and even abroad. But Cochran and Love knew the bar for women pilots – even “civilian” women pilots – had to be a higher one. 

The qualifications Cochran and Love set for a woman just to be an applicant for the WASP were stringent: Potential recruits had to be between 21 and 35 years old, in good health, already possess a pilot’s license, and 200 hours of prior flight experience! 

In the sixteen months that the WASP squadron existed, more than 25,000 women applied for training. Only 1,830 of them (spread over eighteen training classes), were accepted as candidates. In the end, 1,074 of those candidates successfully completed the grueling four-month (Army way) training program at Avenger Field in Sweetwater, Texas.

Despite their advanced experience as pilots, WASP recruits were required to complete the same primary, basic, and advanced training courses as the inexperienced male Army Air Corps pilots. In addition to learning the superfluous - like marching and close order drill - they also spent roughly twelve hours a day at the airfield. Half the day was spent doing stalls, spins, turns, take offs, and landings – and all of it in very crowded airspace. The other half of the day was spent in what they called “ground school.”

By graduation, all WASP had 560 hours of ground school and 210 hours of flight training (in addition to the 200 hours required for them just to apply). They also knew Morse code, meteorology, military law, physics, aircraft mechanics, and navigation (and, of course, how to march).

Their previous level of flying experience allowed a large number of these pilots finished their WASP training with such stellar marks that they qualified to go on for specialized flight training. Many of them, by the end of their time as WASP, had flown every single plane in the American arsenal – including jets!

Despite the stiff entrance requirements and all of the additional training these female pilots endured, the WASP were still considered just “civil service employees”. Cochran, director of the WASP, and General Henry “Hap” Arnold, who was now the head of the U.S. Army Transport Command, pressed for full militarization of these female pilots, and for the WASP to be commissioned directly as service pilots, a procedure the Air Transport Command used routinely with male civilian pilots. But because of the considerable opposition to the program, both in Congress and in the press, Cochran’s and Arnold’s requests were denied. [5]

‘THOSE DAMN W.A.S.P.‘

As a WASP, Betty Archibald Fernandes’s primary job was to pick up a plane at the factory where it was built and fly it to the east coast so it could be shipped abroad. During her wartime service, Fernandes flew 30 different kinds of military planes, including fighters, bombers, transport, and training aircraft. But her number one love was fighters. “I flew every kind of fighter plane, including P-30s, 51’s, 39’s, 63’s, 47’s and 40’s,” Fernandes proudly boasted. [6]

In addition to ferrying aircraft and cargo from factories to stateside military bases and transporting military cargo all over the country, WASP also trained male bombardiers and provided instrument training to male cadets; they participated in simulations to help train radar and searchlight trackers, and they even towed targets for live anti-aircraft gunnery practice. [4]

The WASP were even used as motivators.

“When men were less willing to fly certain difficult planes, such as the YP-59 and B-29 Super Fortress, General Arnold recruited two WASP, Dorthea Johnson and Dora Dougherty Strother, to fly these aircraft. Arnold believed that if men saw women fly these planes successfully, they would be “embarrassed” into taking these missions willingly. Johnson and Strother flew to Alamogordo, New Mexico in the B-29s. There was a crowd waiting to see them land. General Arnold’s plan worked, “From that day on, there was no more grumbling from male pilots assigned to train on and fly the B-29 Super Fortress.” [7]

‘Those damned WASP‘ became a familiar refrain.

SOME WASP FACTS AND PILOTS

Collectively, the WASPflew every conceivable type of American military aircraft and logged over 60 million miles during their sixteen months of existence – often flying seven days a week. [8] Thirty-eight WASP lost their lives, and one – Gertrude ‘Tommy’ Tompkins-Silver – disappeared while ferrying a P-51 from LA to the East Coast. She is the only WASP whose fate today remains unknown. [9]     

Although the majority of the pilots were Caucasian, five pioneering women of color did break the racial barrier. Two of them were Chinese-Americans (Hazel Ying Lee and Maggie Gee ); one was Native American (Ola Mildred Rexroat, a Oglala Sioux woman from the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, South Dakota), and two were Hispanic-Americans (Verneda Rodríguez[**] and Frances Dias). [10]

The number of black women pilots who applied for WASP training is unknown. However, several African-American pilots did make it to the final interview stage.

Mildred Hemmans Carter was one of those finalists. In 1940, at age 19, she earned a Bachelor Degree from the Tuskegee Institute, and a year later, she earned her aviation certification. In 1943, Carter was among the first to apply to be a WASP. Like the other black pilots, she was rejected, largely because of her race. Finally, Carter’s extraordinary qualifications and her unfair rejection were acknowledged. She was retroactively recognized as a WASP– seventy years after the fact. [11]

Hazel Ying Lee.

‘THE AAF WILL MISS YOU…’

By 1944, America and its allies dominated the skies over Germany, and the air war in Europe was winding down. The Allied leaders now planned a massive ground assault to put the finishing touches on Nazi Germany. Accordingly the Army Air Force cut back its training forces and revoked civilian male training pilots exemptions from serving in ground combat units. [12]

A brouhaha ensued.

Fearing the draft, the men complained – as a group – to Congress, the media, and accused the War Department of favoring female pilots over male pilots. Congress listened and on December, 20 1944 – five months before the end of WWII and sixteen months after their formation – the WASP, as a squadron, were disbanded. [12]

And rudely.

In fact, here is part of General Arnold’s letter of notification and thanks to the WASP for their service:

When we needed you, you came through and have served most commendably under very difficult circumstances, but now the war situation has changed and the time has come when your volunteer services are no longer needed. The situation is that if you continue in service, you will be replacing instead of releasing our young men. I know the WASP wouldn’t want that. I want you to know that I appreciate your war service and the AAF will miss you… [5]

There were 915 women pilots on duty with the Army Air Force at that time, and they were scattered on bases around the country. Since they weren’t military, there was no “mustering out” time after Arnold’s notification arrived, and the women pilots were released outright. Some WASP members were allowed to fly on board government aircraft from their former bases to the vicinity of their homes – but only as long as room was available and no additional expenses were incurred. Others, however, had to arrange and pay for their own transportation home. [11]

EPILOGUE

Records of WASP were classified and sealed by the government after the war, so historians minimized or ignored the women pilots.

The WASP, however, deserved more respect and recognition than a condescending thank you note tied to an immediate eviction notice back in 1944 or being ignored by history. Thirty three years later, they took matters into their own capable hands.

However, the entire affair came with a very heavy dose of irony.

In the 1970s, the Air Force announced that it would begin accepting women for pilot training, and the media reported the story as if this would be the first time women could fly for the US military. The WASPsthen began to push for the recognition that they deserved.  U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater (one of those male transport pilots in WW2) along with General Arnold’s son – Colonel Bruce Arnold – helped these women pilots lobby Congress for their long overdue recognition. [8]

In 1977 — the same year the Air Force graduated its first post-WASP women pilots — Congress granted veteran status to those who had served as WASP, and in 1979 issued official honorable discharges. [12]

Thirty-three years after that, in 2010, President Barak Obama signed the law that gave these brave, pioneering Women Airforce Service Pilots the highest civilian honor given by the U.S. Congress – the Congressional Gold Medal.

But less than 250 surviving WASPwere on hand to receive their long-overdue thanks. [8]

Veterans deserve better treatment – especially while they’re still alive to enjoy it.

QUOTES

“Already my big worry is that I might wash out. It’s going to be plenty tough to come up to Army standards. Several from W-7 ‘washed’ today. Everyone gets depressed when they go; tonight the Recreation Room was like a morgue–you just can’t help wondering “Will I be next? “ ~Adaline Alma Blank, WASP Class 43-8, Avenger Field Sweetwater, TX [*]

“Glamour, hell; it was hard work!” ~ Florence Shutsy-Reynolds, W.A.S.P.Training Class 44-w-5 [*]

 “The P-63 was quite an airplane. I just loved it. I flew as many as I could, as far as I could, as fast as I could.”  ~ Betty Archibald Fernandes, Class 43-3 [*]

WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE WASP? LET US KNOW BELOW.

WORKS CITED

[*] All quotes are from https://www.thestoryoftexas.com/discover/campfire-stories/wasp

[**]Rodríguez, who died on March, 19, 1982, was the first of the WASP to be buried with full military honors in Arlington National Ceremony. From http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2007/3tri07/ashcrofteng.html

[1] Texas Woman’s University Library. “Women Airforce Service Pilots Official Archive.” Texas Woman’s University. (Denton, TX) @ https://twu.edu/library/womans-collection/collections/women-airforce-service-pilots/

[2] Texas Woman’s University Library. “Gateway to Women’s History: Women’s Airforce Service Pilots Digital Archive.” @ http://cdm16283.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/p214coll2

[3] Cornelsen, K. (2005). “Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War II: Exploring Military Aviation, Encountering Discrimination, and Exchanging Traditional Roles in Service to America.” Journal of Women’s History 17(4), 111-119. Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved March 31, 2019, from Project MUSE database.

[4] All the information used under this heading came from one source: Texas Woman’s University. “Training.” Woman’s Collection – Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP). @ https://web.archive.org/web/20180728221611/https://twu.edu/library/womans-collection/featured-collections/women-airforce-service-pilots-wasp/training/

[5] “Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP).” Women in the Army @ https://www.army.mil/women/history/pilots.html

[6] Binz, Larry E. “Airport Day provides nostalgia for crowd, local veteran aviatrix.” Clarksdale[Mississippi] Press Register – October 20, 2010.

[7] Monahan, Evelyn M.; Neidel-Greenlee, Rosemary (2010). A Few Good Women: America’s Military Women From World War I to the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A Knopf. pp.136-137.

[8] Texas Woman’s University. “Women Airforce Service Pilots Digital Archive – WASPFacts and Stats.” Gateway to Women’s History. @ http://cdm16283.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/p214coll2

[9] Baylor University. “Above and Beyond.” Wings Across America. @ http://www.wingsacrossamerica.org/above—beyond.html

[10] Steck, Em. “Women Airforce Service Pilots Aided American War Efforts With Help From These Women of Color. TeenVogue –December 24, 2017. @ https://www.teenvogue.com/story/women-airforce-service-pilots-aided-american-war-efforts-with-help-from-these-women-of-color

[11] Cornelsen, Kathleen (2005).”Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War II: Exploring Military Aviation, Encountering Discrimination, and Exchanging Traditional Roles in Service to America”. Journal of Women’s History. 17 (4): 111–119. – via Project MUSE.

[12] Wackerfuss, Dr. Andrew T. “Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASP).” Air Force Historical Support Division. @ https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458964/womens-airforce--service-pilots-wasp/