Bernardo O’Higgins and the Founding of Chile: The Fight for Legitimacy

The improbable lives of Ambrosio O’Higgins and his son, Bernardo, would change the history of South America forever. Two men, father and son, both strivers and achievers. Two men who did not take the traditional paths to power and high office. Two men, who through a series of improbable events, would both become, in their own ways, among the founders of the nation of Chile. The chain of events would begin, of all places, in County Sligo in Ireland.

Erick Redington continues this series on the O’Higgins family by looking at the earlier life and military career of Bernardo O’Higgins.

If you missed it read part one on Ambrosio O’Higgins’ life here.

The charge of O’Higgins at the 1814 Battle of Rancagua.

Bernardo O’Higgins today is seen as one of the founding fathers of Chile and, along with San Martín and Bolivar, is housed in the highest pantheon of South American liberators. Yet from seemingly obscure beginnings, this man who had to fight to be recognized by his own father would fight to make his nation recognized on the world stage.

Bernardo’s story begins with his father Ambrosio O’Higgins. Ambrosio, an unmarried member of the Spanish colonial administration in the Captaincy-General of Chile, had impregnated the daughter of one of his friends, Isabel Riquelme. The young Bernardo would have the last name Riquelme until his father died. This did not mean that Ambrosio refused to recognize his son. As an ennobled Spanish aristocrat, Ambrosio came from a culture that recognized illegitimate children would sometimes arise from liaisons with lower social classes existed and that the father, while not necessarily recognizing the official parentage of the child, could provide for the child in some way without losing too much face. This is what Ambrosio did for Bernardo. 

The Riquelme family was from Chillián, a small city in south-central Chile. During the 18th century, this area was full of rich agricultural land, but was also a backwater of a colonial backwater. Chile was part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, and with little infrastructure and horrific terrain for travel, this was not a place to rise to greatness. Ambrosio recognized this, and decided to fund his son’s education, including paying for Bernardo to leave his hometown, and get a more worldly education. Bernardo would be placed with Juan Albano Pereira, friends of Ambrosio’s in Mendoza (now in Argentina, but then part of Chile) who had mercantile connections with Ambrosio. After some time with the Albanos, Bernardo was sent to a Franciscan Monastery for a short time before going to Lima, the capital of Peru. Although he would make contacts in Lima that would last him a lifetime, Bernardo’s time there was unhappy. Although there are passing reports of the two men meeting, father and son had no confirmed meetings though both were obviously aware of their relationship. An illegitimate child could be supported in this environment but could not be brought too close. After only a year, Bernardo was sent to Europe to both get him out of the way, and to provide him with a better education. 

London

Ironically, Ambrosio chose as the destination for his son Great Britain, the same country he had fled all those years before as a poor, oppressed Irish farmer. London at this time was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. English radicals, French royalists, embittered revolutionaries, and political dissidents of all stripes crowded the coffee houses and pubs of London. Relative freedom of the press allowed for ideas banned in other nations to be widely disseminated. It was also during the French Revolutionary Wars. The ideals of the French Revolution were sweeping Europe, and for a young and ambitious man like Bernardo, the intellectual atmosphere was exciting. As a man with something to prove, the revolutionary times provided opportunities. 

One of the people who would have the most impact on Bernardo’s life at this time was Francisco Miranda. This Venezuelan revolutionary was a man with infinite plots and schemes in mind to liberate the peoples of South America. Called by some as the Moses of the South American Revolutions, his boundless drive and energy would inspire all the great leaders of Spanish America’s revolutionary generation. Miranda would begin corresponding with Bernardo and would write in a teacher-student style that Bernardo, desperate for a father figure, would take to strongly. 

Due to financial struggles, Bernardo was forced to leave Britain and eventually return to Chile. In 1800, he began his journey which became a small epic of attempts to escape the British blockade (Spain, by this time was allied to France against Britain) and contracting yellow fever, during which Bernardo was so close to death he was read last rites. When he arrived, Bernardo was forced to stay with his old friends, the Albanos, to recover his health. Bernardo was not the only one who was in declining health. His father, Ambrosio, would die only a few months after Bernardo’s return. The man he had so much wanted to impress was now gone forever. Ambrosio did not neglect his son in his will. He left Bernardo a hacienda named Canteras at La Laja in Southern Chile, including 3,000 head of cattle. This was not insignificant for a young man who had to live poor in London only a short time before. It was also at this time that Bernardo Riquelme began adopting his father’s last name O’Higgins. When Bernardo took control of the estate, he settled into the life of a now gentleman farmer. It would be the quietest seven years of his life.  Bringing the latest agricultural science he learned in Europe, the hacienda immediately began to prosper greater than it ever had before. Later in life, Bernardo would reflect on the happiness of this time. The times of peace could not last, however.

King Carlos IV

In the first decade of the 19th century, Spain was governed by King Carlos IV and his prime minister, Manuel Godoy. Spain had been an ally of France since the mid-1790s and had come to be dominated by Napoleon’s French Empire. By the middle of the decade, Napoleon began to worry about the reliability of his ally to the south. Carlos IV and Godoy were both incredibly incompetent and cartoonishly corrupt in their administration of both Spain and the global Spanish Empire. The wealth and resources of the empire were wasted though inefficiency and corruption. Napoleon had created the new law code for France, the Code Napoleon, and had turned France into the preeminent military power of the time. He believed that some Napoleonic efficiency brought to Spanish administration would be more helpful to his cause of dominating Europe than the unexcelled stupidity of the current regime.

In 1808, Carlos IV was forced to abdicate the throne by his son, the future Fernando VII. Carlos then appealed to his ally Napoleon, to restore him to the throne. Napoleon, seeing this as an opportunity to rid himself of this pest, agreed to mediate between father and son, promptly detained both, forced them both to renounce the throne, and placed his own brother King Joseph of Naples on the Spanish throne as King Jose I. 

When word reached the people of Spain of the Abdications of Bayonne (where the mediation had taken place), Spain erupted in revolution. An uprising in Madrid, known to history as Dos de Mayo left hundreds of Spanish civilians dead. Stories of French atrocities began to spread. Civil order broke down in the country and armies appeared to resist French occupation and Napoleon’s puppet king. Revolutionary leaders organized themselves into juntas to fill the gap left in administration. The British began aiding these juntas, and they also decided that independence movements in Spanish America could be used to weaken Napoleon’s ally. A Supreme Junta was established in Seville, ruling in the name of Fernando VII and there were now rival governments vying for the loyalty of Spaniards.

Revolution

Revolutionary thought had already reached Spanish America at this time. Enlightenment philosophies and French revolutionary thought were in vogue throughout Spanish America. Another source of revolutionary attitudes was the dramatic increase in the popularity of Masonic lodges, which would play a significant role in South American independence. Bernardo had been first exposed to many of these ideas while in Britain. Now, divided loyalties among the people led to a situation where everyone had to take sides.

The President of Chile (the acting head of government in the colony) was Brigadier General García Carrasco. He was a military man. By 1809, the situation within Chile had become revolutionary. Support for the Supreme Junta and Fernando VII was seen as a way to safely oppose García Carrasco. On May 25, 1810, the military administration moved against the supporters of Fernando VII and arrested several prominent citizens, who were ordered by the general into exile. After a power struggle with prominent Chileans, the general was forced to resign. With this resignation, the people of Santiago, the capital, began preparations for the creation of a junta for Chile. As many reasoned at the time, the colonies in the Americas belonged to the king, not to Spain. Therefore, if Juntas were being created all over Spain to rule in his name, then it would be only natural for them to be created in the colonies as well. In Buenos Aires, a Junta had taken control the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Many in Chile wanted to do the same.

During all this international commotion, Bernardo was civil governor of La Laja. During a previous war scare, he had offered to raise two regiments of cavalry for defense against the British. In 1811, the Junta named him Lieutenant Colonel of the Second Regiment of Cavalry of La Laja. At this time, he was already set on the path that, he believed, a revolution should take. Meeting with other leaders, Bernardo pressed for two immediate objects: the calling of a Congress together and the loosening of restrictions on trade to improve the economy. Freer trade was easily accomplished, and a Congress was called, at this point in the name of Ferdinand VII, to create a new government for Chile. For the new Congress, Bernardo was elected as a member for Los Angeles. With the opening of Congress, many issues came to the forefront. Rivalry between Santiago and Concepción. A failed royalist coup. The most embarrassing for the new Congress was the arrival of HMS Standard, a British warship on a mission for Fernando VII. A message was given to Congress requesting delegates be sent to a new Cortes in Spain. Chile, and the other colonies, were to receive seats in the Spanish legislature. Of course, a large financial contribution was expected to accompany the delegates. The Congress existed and acted explicitly in the name of the king. To accept would be to reaffirm their loyalty to Spain, which not everyone wanted to do. To refuse would be rank hypocrisy. Congress would delay long enough to make the issue moot.

Accompanying the Standard was one José Carrera. Son of a member of the Supreme Junta, he was extremely ambitious, and saw Chile as the perfect field for his ambition. He began conspiring with radicals in Congress, called the Eight Hundred, to remove the moderates to bring forward the cause of independence. On September 1, 1811, the moderates were driven out of Congress, and radicals assumed the positions of power. After the coup, the radicals sidelined Carrera and his family. Now with the precedent set that might, not law, would be the ultimate arbiter of power in Chile, Carrera then arrested men of the Eight Hundred and made himself dictator. Members of Congress then demanded Carrera make an account of himself before them. When he did, Carrera berated Congress and a few hours later disbanded Congress. Chile had had three coups in ten weeks. All Bernardo could do was resign his seat.

The south, and Concepción in particular resisted Carrera. The dictator then turned to Bernardo to help smooth over the situation. Concepción controlled most of the military resources of the country, and Carrera needed this region to solidify his control. Playing on Bernardo’s patriotism, Carrera was able to convince him to go south. After negotiation and a draft agreement which Carrera stalled in implementing, Bernardo realized he was being played and went into open opposition. He placed himself under the orders of the leader of the south, Juan Rozas. When Rozas’ government collapsed, Bernardo returned to his hacienda fed up with the state of affairs. He was an idealistic revolutionary who had run into the wall of practical politics and power struggles. He wanted independence but saw his country falling into infighting. 

Spain returns

This self-imposed retirement did not last very long. In 1813, Spain made its first attempt to reconquer Chile. Invading first in the south, Concepción fell quickly to the Spanish. Of all the colonies in South America, Peru was probably the most royalist. The Viceroy decided now was the time to reestablish control. Carrera called Bernardo to command his cavalry regiment. Bernardo swiftly took command and led a force of troops south to engage the royalists. At Linares, Bernardo’s force encountered the royalists, charged, and drove them out of the town. This was the first battle of the war, and it would bring Bernardo promotion and make his name more well known. 

After Linares, the situation in the south bogged down. Terrain was terrible for the linear warfare of the early 19th century. The three divisions of the reinforced southern army were under different Carrera brothers. The dictator was rapidly losing credibility. After the royalists attacked and defeated the Chilean advanced guard, Carrera was forced to abandon the best defensive positions in front of Santiago. At the Battle of El Roble, Carrera abandoned the field, and a wounded Bernardo rallied the retreating troops and led them to an astounding victory. The junta back in the capital then demanded Carrera give up control of the army. Carrera denounced the junta and his brothers threatened to march on the junta, just as they had Congress previously. The junta was finally able to get enough courage to decree Carrera’s dismissal and made Bernardo the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army. At first reluctant to take the command as he did not believe in the prudence of changing command in the middle of a war, Bernardo was convinced and accepted. 

Although he had reached the highest position in the Chilean army, it was not to last. Bernardo would only command about 1,800 men who were lacking in almost every supply including weapons and ammunition. A lack of horses meant that artillery was pulled by the soldiers. The royalist army, though no better supplied had morale and initiative on its side.                   When a royalist army was approaching another Chilean force under Juan Mackenna, an old friend and also of Irish extraction, Bernardo took his army to relieve Mackenna. When their armies were joined, Bernardo would lead the army in a race with the royalists to reach Santiago. Both sides, by this point, were tired of campaigning. Both sides were exhausted. Negotiations began between the royalists from Peru and the junta governing Chile. Bernardo and Mackenna negotiated for the Chileans. The result was the Treaty of Lircay. In this treaty, the Chileans restated their loyalty to Fernando VII, under whose name they were fighting anyway. They also agreed to send representatives to the Cortes and money to Spain. Chile was to be integrated into Spain. The major concession the rebels were able to get was recognition of the junta. Both sides seemed to be blaming the whole war on a misunderstanding caused by Carrera. 

War returns

This was nothing more than a temporary truce. The Viceroy in Lima denounced his commander who negotiated the treaty. About 5,000 reinforcements were sent to Chile to suppress the rebels. On the Chilean side, the Carreras were offended by the treaty and acted. On July 23, 1814, Jose Carrera overthrew the government, again, and quickly acted to extend his power over the rebel cause. Bernardo was faced with a dilemma. He was not happy with the treaty and wanted to see Chile freed from Spanish domination. As commander-in-chief, he also knew that the country needed a respite from the fighting. There was also the issue of Carrera himself. This was now the third time he had used force to remove his opponents. Bernardo could not abide this. He would march his troops on Santiago and remove Carrera himself. On August 26, only a month after the signing of the treaty, the forces of Carrera and Bernardo met at the battle of Las Tres Acequias. The two forces met in an engagement among the advanced guards with Carrera’s troops pushed back. Bernardo became confident and ordered an attack with his main force. When the attack failed, his troops began retreating in disorder. When Carrera sent in his cavalry to pursue, it broke what was left of Bernardo’s line and the army began to flee south. 

After the battle, Bernardo learned that the royalists had landed their army from Peru and were marching on Santiago. He reached out to Carrera to put aside their differences and unite to defend the country. Both men, after all, believed in the independence of Chile from the Spanish. It was all for naught. When the Chileans united their forces under Bernardo’s control, they were still outnumbered by the royalists. Infighting had sapped their strength. On October 1, what became known in Chile as the Disaster of Rancagua occurred. The Chilean army was a motley assortment of men ill fed and equipped. The royalist army contained veterans of the Napoleonic Wars from Europe, which were now over. These men had been fighting for six years and knew war on a larger scale than the Chileans did. The Chileans were simply no match for the royalists. Nearly surrounded by the royalists, no reinforcements to be hoped for, and the town he was defending on fire, Bernardo was forced to withdraw from battle. It only took a few days for the royalists to make the distance to Santiago and take the city, the Chilean army was so defeated. 

For Bernardo, there was nothing left. The government had been overthrown. The army, his army, was annihilated. For himself, and the leaders of Chilean independence, their country was lost to them. The leaders began to go into exile, fleeing to other areas not under control of the Spanish. Bernardo would flee across the Andes and into La Plata, not knowing what the future held.

What do you think of Bernando O’Higgins’ earlier life and the war? Let us know below.

Now, read part 3 about the later life of Bernardo O’Higgins and how Chilean independence was earned here.

Further Reading

Clissold, Stephen. Bernardo O’Higgins and the Independence of Chile. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968.

Kinsbruner, Jay. Bernardo O’Higgins. Twayne Publishers, 1968.

Hand-washing in Hospitals: Ignaz Semmelweis’ Great Contribution to Medicine

As individuals in society, we live by structure and regimes that are either taught or acquired through our environments. The practice of hand-washing and the sterilization of surgical equipment in hospitals are procedures that we expect and universally accepted as best practices. The recent Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has reminded us of the importance of sanitation and cleanliness to prevent disease and ultimately save lives. However, the importance of hand-washing was not common practice throughout many hospitals before the nineteenth century. Here, Amy Chandler explains Ignaz Semmelweis’ important discovery about hand-washing in the nineteenth century.

An 1860 copper plate picture of Ignaz Semmelweis.

Physician and gynaecologist Ignaz Semmelweis discovered the importance and life-saving impact of hand-washing within maternity wards in the 1850s. Semmelweis’ “discovery exceeded the forces of his genius. It was, perhaps, the root cause of all his misfortunes”, and in an ironic tragedy, Semmelweis died of the same illness that he devoted his career to preventing.[1]This article will explore Semmelweis’ contribution to medical practice in the nineteenth century and analyze how he failed to achieve public and international support for his discovery. Many contributing factors failed to propel Semmelweis into the sphere of revolutionizing and respecting theories in science and medicine, such as failing to publish his hand-washing theory and methodology, fleeing Vienna and the lack of support from his contemporary doctors. How did Ignaz Semmelweis simultaneously revolutionize surgical procedures and fail to convince his contemporary physicians?

17th century

During the seventeenth century, many hospitals in Europe became overwhelmed with cases of childbed fever (also known as 'puerperal fever') that women contracted during childbirth and suffered from days after birth.[2] Symptoms of puerperal fever included severe abdominal pain, fever and debility, and the result was commonly death for many women.[3] By the start of the nineteenth century, puerperal fever was a common and deadly disease that many women feared when entering maternity wards. The cause of this disease was bacteria infecting women during childbirth, but the understanding of how bacteria and disease spread was non-existent until the 1870s. Throughout history, there have been many different attempts to identify the cause of illness and disease, for example, the widely recognized theory of miasma. Miasma was considered “poisonous emanations, from putrefying carcasses, rotting vegetation or molds, and invisible dust particles inside dwellings” that was understood to be within the air that we breathe.[4] Therefore disease and illnesses were thought to be caused by ‘bad air’ or foul smells. By the end of the nineteenth century, the work of Louis Pasteur and his discovery of Germ theory replaced and progressed thinking around the cause of disease. The lack of knowledge around the causation of disease and the spread of infection made Semmelweis’ discovery imperative to progressing medical and scientific ideology. Semmelweis' ideas were often ignored, apart from support from close colleagues, which eventually led to his professional and personal demise.

Semmelweis’ discovery 

In 1846, Semmelweis was appointed as an assistant professor in the maternity ward at Vienna General Hospital. Semmelweis undertook the challenge to understand and answer why mortality rates were so high within the Vienna General Hospital. The high mortality rates in the maternity ward of Vienna General hospital represented a widespread problem across Europe. Therefore, the cause of the disease was a universal substance and not specific to Vienna medical practice but widespread malpractice of the nineteenth century.

During Semmelweis’ employment in Vienna, mortality cases continued to increase, and so did Semmelweis’ concern and desire to discover the causation of illness. The maternal ward offered two divisions of maternity clinics; male physicians controlled one division, and female midwives staffed the other clinic.[5] In 1846 both of these divisions included similar patients demographics, but the statistics present that the male-staffed clinics had 13.10% of maternal deaths from puerperal fever, while the second division only suffered 2.03% of puerperal fever deaths.[6] From these statistics, it is evident that the cause of the illness originated and increased with the medical professionals within the first division that increased mortality rates. Semmelweis undertook a methodological approach to identify and inevitably reduce mortality rates and, as a result, to improve the lives of his patients, professional practice and contribute to disease theory. Semmelweis’ position as a gynaecologist and physician placed him in an advantageous position to discover the root cause of the mortality rates and implement policies to improve practice. Semmelweis had the opportunity to conduct research, medical knowledge and resources to identify the cause of puerperal fever. Historically, midwifery was recognized as a female role that expanded in the eighteenth century, with an increased number of male physicians and surgeons becoming involved within midwifery.[7]

A turning point in Semmelweis’ thinking was when his friend and colleague, Jacob Kolletschka, died from a puerperal fever after wounding himself during a dissection.[8] The autopsy results confirmed that Kolletschka contracted the same illness that many women suffered in the maternity wards. The contemporary theory of miasma formed the foundations of Semmelweis’ theory by speculating that “decaying animal-organic matter” caused the puerperal fever.[9] The causation of infections became evident to Semmelweis after he observed that student physicians worked in the dissection rooms and then directly, without changing their clothes or sanitizing their hands, entered the maternity wards.[10] The correlation between the two clinic divisions and the student's behavior emphasized that the male physicians were the carriers, to a point, of puerperal fever on their unwashed hands and clothes. 

What did Semmelweis do with his newfound knowledge?

During this period, disinfectants that we are familiar with in contemporary society did not exist, nor was the knowledge of using chemicals to remove bacteria from surfaces. The concept of bacteria was not known or explored until many years after Semmelweis’ death. Therefore, methods to combat the unpleasant odors from miasmas included fire, sunlight, strong aromas and chemicals.[11] Semmelweis utilized his knowledge of miasma theory by attempting to eliminate foul odors transferred between the dissection room and the maternity ward by the physicians. For Semmelweis, the most potent smelling chemical available at the Vienna General Hospital was a solution of chlorinated lime. Under the supervision and authority of Semmelweis, physicians were ordered to wash their hands with this solution before entering the maternity wards. Inevitably, mortality rates in the maternity wards began to decrease, which supported Semmelweis’ theory. However, Semmelweis only understood that the solution reduced the number of cases and was unable to explain why hand-washing was so effective.

Semmelweis’ hand-washing policy was unpopular and faced opposition within the hospital, with individuals complaining of the burning sensations on their hands from vigorously washing and exposing their skin to the chlorinated lime solution.[12]Despite declining mortality rates, Semmelweis could not explain why the chlorinated solution was so effective as he did not realize hand-washing removed the bacteria causing disease. Furthermore, Semmelweis did not publish his findings or share his work for many years, which contributed to the lack of support amongst contemporary physicians for adopting the sanitation procedure. For some physicians, Semmelweis’ discovery lacked evidence to be understood fully, and in 1849 Semmelweis’ position within Vienna General Hospital was terminated. The Ministry of Education also declined the proposal to investigate Semmelweis’ theories further and gain evidence to support using chlorinated lime within medical practice.[13]

By 1851, Semmelweis left Vienna and returned to Hungary to continue his work by implementing his chlorinated lime regime and enforcing good ventilation, sterile linen, bandages and surgical equipment for his patients.[14] Eventually, in 1861, Semmelweis published his findings in The Etiology, Concept, and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever. However, towards the end of Semmelweis’ career, his mental health began to decline, resulting in a mental breakdown in 1865, and his wife admitted Semmelweis into a mental hospital in Lazarettgasse. Unfortunately, Semmelweis died from blood poisoning after appropriate anti-septic methods were not enforced. 

Conclusion

Semmelweis’ tragic death in some way proved that his theory of using a chlorinated lime solution to avoid puerperal fever was effective in preventing severe infection. Semmelweis’ lack of willingness to share his findings with his contemporaries reduced his hand-washing theory's credibility, while also lack of evidence and widespread enforcement of hand-washing isolated his results to be limited and circumstantial. In some ways, Semmelweis’ courage to challenge popular and pre-established views placed him in a difficult and unfavorable position because he was directly criticizing the work of his contemporaries by insinuating that their practice caused the deaths of many patients. This idea in itself was that doctors who dedicated their professional careers to saving lives and being seen as saviors against diseases were also the cause and carrier of such diseases they treated. Hindsight is a valuable asset we possess after years of scientific discoveries, but we have to praise Semmelweis for his work within the boundaries of knowledge of the time. The knowledge of bacteria was non-existent therefore working within the realms of miasma theory and Semmelweis’ methodologically eliminating factors in his study was to some extent revolutionary given the circumstances and knowledge of the time. Semmelweis’ ideas were brushed aside as unsupported ramblings, which contributed to the decline of his professional career. However, Semmelweis has now gained the status that his work deserves as a pioneer of modern medicine and sanitation procedures within medical environments. Semmelweis' work continues to help save lives today.

What do you think of Ignaz Semmelweis? Let us know below.

1.              D. Pittet and  B. Allegranzi, ‘Preventing sepsis in healthcare - 200 years after the birth of Ignac Semmelweis'. Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin, vol .23 (2018), p.2.

[2] J. Simmons, Doctors & Discoveries: Lives that created today’s medicine (New York, Houghton Miffin Company,2002),p.167. 

[3] C. Hallett, ‘The attempt to understand puerperal fever in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the influence of inflammation theory’. Med Hist. vol. 49 (2005), p. 1. 

[4] A. Kannadan,’History of the Miasma Theory of Disease’. Essai, vol. 16 (2018),p. 41. 

[5] Simmons, op.cit.,p.166. 

[6] Ibid.,p.166.

[7] Hallett,op.cit.,p.4. 

[8] Simmons, op.cit.,p.166.

[9] Ibid.,p.166. 

[10] Ibid.,p.166.  

[11] G. Risse. ‘Before Germs: Decay, Smell, and Contagion in the Work of Ignaz Semmelweis on Puerperal Fever’,unpublished,(2015),p.3.

[12] Ibid.,p.3.  

[13] Ibid.,pp.3-4. 

[14] Simmons, op.cit.,p.167. 

Bibliography 

Hallett, C, ‘The attempt to understand puerperal fever in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the influence of inflammation theory’. Med Hist, vol.49, no.1, January 2005, pp. 1-28.

Kannadan, A, ’History of the Miasma Theory of Disease’. Essai, vol. 16, no. 18, 2018, pp.41-43.

Persson, J, ‘Semmelweis’s methodology from the modern stand-point: intervention studies and causal ontology’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences,vol.40, no.3, 2009, pp.204-209. 

Pittet, D and Allegranzi, B, ‘Preventing sepsis in healthcare - 200 years after the birth of Ignac Semmelweis'. Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin, vol. 23, no. 18, May 2018, pp.1-5. 

Risse, G. ‘Before Germs: Decay, Smell, and Contagion in the Work of Ignaz Semmelweis on Puerperal Fever’, unpublished, 2015,pp.1-8. 

Simmons, J. Doctors & Discoveries: Lives that created today’s medicine (New York, Houghton Miffin Company,2002). 

An Introductory History of Women in Cycling

When thinking about the history of cycling, we often remember the glory days of the Tour de France or the Olympics. Unfortunately, this means that too often the history of women's cycling is overlooked. Elisha explains.

Kittie Knox in the 1890s.

Bicycles played an important role in the women's movement of the early 20th century. Bikes gave women a new freedom after being long accustomed to relying solely on men for transport. The innovation of the bicycle gave women more control over where they went and when, bikes were easy to access and relatively inexpensive. What’s more, women soon found that more traditional outfits like corsets, bustlets and long skirts made riding a bicycle a challenge. This prompted a change in women's fashion which included lighter skirts, bloomers and even trousers. Bicycles helped pave the way for women today.

A recognized sport for women

Cycling as a sport (for men) officially began in the summer of 1868 with a 1,200-meter race near Paris between the fountains and entrance of Saint Cloud Park. The first Olympic race took place the following year with a men's individual road race. Women’s road events were not introduced into the Olympics until the summer of 1984 and women’s cycling was barely even considered a sport until the 1990s. Despite this, women were cycling long before then.

The new woman

Bicycles came to symbolize independence amongst women representing the quintessential ‘new woman’ of the late 19th century. In 1895, suffragette leader Elizabeth Candy Stanton said “the bicycle will inspire women with more courage, self respect, self reliance” predicting the power of the bicycle. Echoing Stanton’s claim was Susan B Anthony who played a key role in the suffragette movement. She said ‘’Let me tell you what I think about cycling. I think it has done more to emancipate women than anything else in the world.’’

First woman to adopt bloomers

In the 1890s, many women were still not riding bikes, but this didn't stop Kittie Knox, a young seamstress from Boston. Kittie Knox became the first African American to be accepted into the league of American wheelmen. Unfortunately, in the years that followed, Kittie was largely discriminated against, but this didn’t stop her from riding, in fact she became well known for her unique choice of cycling attire. Cycling led to a shift away from the restrictive and modest fashion of the Victorian era and led to a new era of exposed ankles. Kittie was one of the first women to adopt men’s bloomers which is significant because it was the first step in the right direction toward women eventually proudly wearing bicycle shorts in public with no skirt required.

First woman to cycle around the world

The first woman to ride a bicycle is said to be Annie Londonderry around 1896. Annie reportedly completed the cycling challenge in 15 months, whether she made it the whole way around the world via bicycle is debatable though. Apparently Annie was rather liberal with her use of trains and ferries, which made the expedition significantly easier. Interestingly, she made a bit of money through sponsorship where she attached posters and banners to her bike to advertise various companies.

Earliest female cycling journalist 

In 1891, Beatrice Ethel Grimshaw began her career as the first female cycling journalist (on record). She started her writing career after finishing her studies at 21 years old when she ran away to Dublin. In Dublin she began a career as a journalist for R.J. Mecredy’s Irish cyclist where she went on to become an editor. She participated in cycling when she was out of the office, where she reportedly did casual century rides. After a life in the cycling industry, she traded in her bike for a life of travel.

Women in cycling today

Today, despite the efforts of the bicycle industry to get more women into cycling, women only make up just under 25% of riders. Safety is said to be the number one concern that puts women off cycling. One feminist bicycle influencer is the Cycle Maintenance Academy a team of avid cyclists and experienced bicycle repair experts.

Notably, cycling actually demonstrates a clear inequality between men and women as in some countries women are still forbidden from riding bikes due to concerns regarding modesty. In other countries, women were only recently allowed to cycle. It wasn't until 2013 when women were allowed to cycle in Saudi Arabia and reports show that women still cannot cycle in the streets of Iran. Although there may not be specific laws that prohibit women from cycling, there are ‘religious rules’ that must be respected.

What do you think of women cycling in history? Let us know below.

Henry Ford’s Calamitous Rainforest Utopia: Fordlândia

Fordlândia was an idea of the great carmaker Henry Ford in the 1920s. He set-up a base in the Brazilian Amazon with the aim of producing rubber for car tires. In this excellent piece, Felix Debieux looks at what happened at Fordlândia – and how grand ambitions ultimately turned to failure.

Water tower and warehouse building in Fordlândia, Brazil in 2010. Source: Amit Evron, available here.

What do Ford, Firestone and Goodyear have in common? You would be right to say that they are all major players in today’s automotive industry. What is not so well remembered, however, is their shared historical interest in the Amazon rainforest. In the second half of the 1920s, clandestine explorations were conducted by engineers and geologists from Britain and North America who hoped to find oil, precious minerals, and promising locations for rubber plantations. Each sought to tempt the automotive giants to the jungle with land capable of growing the crucial raw material they needed to make their product: tires. 

Following negotiations with Amazonian state governments for concessions, each speculator was convinced that they had secured the rights to exploit the most valuable territory. By 1927, one speculator successfully acquired 2.5 million acres – an area 82% the size of Connecticut - on the Tapajós River in the Amazonian state of Pará. As an indication of the vastness and remoteness of the area, he not only managed to plant half a million rubber seedlings, but also arranged for an armed security force to protect the operation from rival speculators. Later, this land was acquired by American industrial magnate Henry Ford who set out to grow a new supply of rubber. Rubber, however, is only part of the story. Indeed, this marked the beginning of a bizarre socio-economic experiment in the Amazon spearheaded by America’s premier innovator. In his day, Ford’s name was every bit as evocative as the glimmering promise of technological revolution as Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg, and he planned to build an American city smack in the middle of the jungle. Like other empire builders preceding him, he would name the city after himself: Fordlândia. 

Ford’s motivation: an industrialist in the jungle

Henry Ford’s foray into the jungle was, first and foremost, a pragmatic move. In 1922, exports of rubber from Asian plantations were made much more difficult by the Stevenson Plan. Concocted by British and French planters, the Stevenson Plan created an artificial global rubber shortage and succeeded in inflating its price on the international market. As the consumer of 70% of the world’s rubber supply, manufacturers operating in North America were left with little choice but to seek alternative sources. While Firestone decided to invest in Liberian plantations, and Goodyear planted in Sumatra and the Philippines, Ford cast his eye on South America. 

In growing his own supply, Ford believed that he could establish a rubber autarchy: a system of total self-sufficiency from rubber seedling through to tires. For Ford, this must have seemed entirely feasible. After all, the Ford Motor Company during the 1920s controlled nearly every raw material that constituted the manufacture of a motorcar. The glass, the wood, the iron; everything except latex produced by rubber trees. Alongside Ford’s other innovations, anything must have seemed possible. Indeed, this was the man who:

§  Had by 1926 established the Ford Air Transport Service: the first private contractor to deliver mail for the U.S government.

§  Had transformed a bankrupt Michigan railway into a temporarily successful operation.

§  Had developed revolutionary new glassmaking techniques. 

§  Had improved coalmining technology.

How hard could running a rubber plantation be?

Doomed from the start? A legacy of failure in the Amazon

Preceding Henry Ford’s Amazonian enterprise was a catalogue of foreign projects aimed at extracting the region’s wealth. Many of these schemes were highly problematic but did not register in Ford’s planning. Take Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury as an example. Back in the 1850s, the Director of the U.S. Naval Observatory promoted North American occupation of the Amazon drainage as a dumping group for southern planters and their slaves. At a time when Brazil guarded its northern regions from foreign trade and navigation, Brazilians suspected that Maury’s ideas would mean the forceful opening of the Amazon to U.S. colonialism. 

Suspicions of colonialism continued into the 1860s, when a scientific expedition led by Louis and Elizabeth Agassiz influenced Emperor Dom Pedro II to open up the Brazilian Amazon to international trade and navigation. The threat of foreign exploitation emerged again at the turn of the century, when the Anglo-American ‘Bolivian Syndicate’ put forward an idea to develop a rich rubber territory disputed by Bolivia and Brazil. While Brazilian’s were certainly wary of North American colonialism, there was also a legacy of disappointment rooted in the repeated failure of development projects. At best, foreign projects were over-ambitious and ill-conceived. At worst, they were exploitative.

Ford remained oblivious to the enduring stigma of failure surrounding the region’s development. Indeed, several calamitous infrastructure projects pointed to major geographical and public health obstacles inherent to the Amazon. Perhaps the best example of the difficulties a foreign enterprise might encounter was the 226-mile Madeira-Mamoré Railway. During the construction of what became known as the ‘Devil’s Road’, a combination of malaria, yellow fever and other causes claimed the lives of anywhere between 6,000 and 30,000 men. Of greater relevance to Ford, however, was the bad reputation, which Amazonian rubber production had acquired among Brazilians. Labor exploitation, whether through debt peonage or outright slavery, played a major part in the industry’s notoriety. Again, the region’s history did not bode well for Ford.

Putting the conscience in capitalism

Given the stigma surrounding North American interest in the Amazon, it is not surprising to learn that Brazilians questioned Henry Ford’s motives. Many feared that Ford might use the contractual privileges of his concession to undermine national and state sovereignty. What distinguished Ford from other foreigners, however, were his reputation as a reformer of industry and his enlightened social and economic ideas. Indeed, his biography My Life and Work (published in Portuguese in 1926) went a long way to reassure literate Brazilians that Ford represented capitalism with a conscience. 

Emphasizing Ford’s benevolent intentions for the region were his allies in the Brazilian government and the press, who helped to cultivate the image of Ford as a reformer. It was claimed that Ford would transform the Amazon and bring about unprecedented benefits for its impoverished workers. Ford packaged his offer with a promise to develop the region and to manufacture tires and other rubber articles in Brazil. A little showmanship, too, was considered. Reportedly, Ford toyed with the idea of journeying to Pará with Charles Lindberg, who at the time was planning a 9,000-mile tour of Latin America aboard his famous plane: The Spirit of St. Louis. Ultimately, a combination of lobbying and a careful public relations campaign helped to convince Brazilians of Ford’s honest intentions. 

A sign of things to come

In December 1928, Henry Ford’s freighters – the Lake Ormac and the Lake Farge – arrived at the site of what would become Fordlândia to begin construction. On board the ships were an entire railway, a disassembled warehouse, a tugboat, and an arsenal of equipment needed to build a self-sufficient rubber plantation. It was not long before the first signs of trouble appeared. When the plantation manager quit his post and returned home to the U.S., the project was left in the hands of Danish sea captain Einard Oxholm who knew nothing about growing rubber. Ford, who wholeheartedly believed that any man could quickly master a field outside of his own expertise, decided that the Dane was the right person for the job. Unfortunately for Oxholm, his reputation for integrity gave Brazilian and European entrepreneurs all the encouragement they needed to overcharge the plantation for key supplies and services. 

Just one month later, Ford had already spent more than $1.5 million and had virtually nothing to show for it. What is more, 95% of the rubber tree seedlings planted by the end of 1929 were either dying or dead. These were huge problems which defied a solution. Indeed, even the very land on which Fordlândia was constructed was a poor choice. The site, again chosen by a man with zero agricultural experience, was hilly, prone to erosion, and miles away from any settlement. Instead of kitting his plantation with managers and every piece of available technology, Ford would have been better served had he employed biologists who understood the rainforest. Not a single one was consulted in the planning process.

During this period of waste and incompetent management, Brazilian officials struggled to reconcile Ford’s reputation for efficiency with the chaos on show at Fordlândia. How was Ford, an industrial genius, making such a hash of this project? One observer reported that:

“There is a complete lack of organisation at the property. No one knows what the whole picture should be. Waste is terrible… I can well understand the Minister of Agriculture in Rio should think we are crazy… At present, it is like dropping money into a sewer”.

While the physical plantation reached impressive proportions, this was in reality a façade for a failing operation.

Experimenting with an agro-industrial utopia

While the rubber plantation continued to stutter, Henry Ford pushed for a diversification of activities at Fordlândia. Seeking to deliver his promised social and economic benefits, Ford’s plantation would boast comfortable employee housing, a school, a well-equipped modern hospital, a power plant, a sanitary water supply, thirty miles of road and reportedly the largest sawmill in Brazil. Plans were made to export lumber, to produce wooden auto parts for export, and to manufacture tiles and bricks. In addition, there were also plans for both a tire factory and a city with the capacity for 10,000 Brazilians. By the end of 1930, Fordlândia’s landmark structure was complete: a water tower, which stood as a beacon of Ford’s ‘civilizing’ project. This increased breadth of operations represented key pillars of Ford’s personal philosophy: small-town America, and the marriage of agriculture and industry. 

Ford’s nostalgia for an agrarian, small-town America was a prevalent feature of Fordlândia. While he certainly did promise to develop the Amazon, the improved life he envisioned for his workers was very specific and closely resembled the Midwestern towns of his childhood. Having grown up on a farm, the industrialist believed that there was a symbiotic relationship between agriculture and industry. Mechanization, he thought, would not only reduce the waste and drudgery of antiquated farming, but it would also free up the farmer to work in the factory and provide spare time for agricultural pursuits. Fordlândia presented an opportunity to make his unique vision of an agro-industrial utopia a reality. As Ford himself put it in his Ford Evening Hour Sermonettes, this would be a world in which workers had “one foot in industry and one foot on the land”. However, he would eventually learn that the culture he longed for could not so easily be transplanted into the jungle.

Rumble in the jungle: a clash of cultures

For all their suspicions of U.S colonialism, Brazilians and their dependents living at Fordlândia did receive the amenities and provisions promised to them. Indeed, Fordlândia was always about much more than rubber, with Henry Ford seeking to recreate an idyllic American society founded on his own morals and values. Amazonians employed by Ford received a free home, free medical and dental care, recreational facilities, and a wage ranging from the equivalent of thirty-three to sixty-six cents per day. This was at least twice the wages paid elsewhere in the region. Furthermore, workers were able to buy food and other supplies at prices subsidized by Ford. Other free provisions included pasteurized baby milk and burials at the company cemetery. From cradle to grave, workers could expect to live comfortably under Ford’s paternalism.

On the face of it, Fordlândia represented a capitalist’s paradise. However, Ford never succeeding in imposing his alien philosophy on the Amazon; the region’s ingrained cultural and economic traditions were not so easily replaced. Indeed, Brazilians simply did not understand Ford’s idealized vision of small-town America. One example is Ford’s attempt to supplant the traditional role of patrão, which in Brazilian society served as both boss and indulgent parent to the workers. The patrão not only held workers in debt servitude, but he also supported as a godfather and protector figure. The position certainly did not fit the Ford mold of efficiency, and was not suited to the modern employer-employee relationships which Fordlândia hoped to instill. 

Brazilian work culture remained an enigma to Ford. His obsession with timesaving and efficiency served only to annoy his workers who would not accept a rigid work regime. Most disliked the way they were treated - being required to wear ID badges and work through the afternoon under the sweltering sun - and refused to work. Unfamiliar food, such as canned goods and hamburgers, caused further discontent. The tipping point came in 1930 when the plantation dining hall shifted from waited service to cafeteria-style self-service. This change, intended to reduce lunch breaks, would quickly backfire. Workers queuing in line with their trays complained that they were not waiters. Foremen were equally furious, realizing that the new system meant eating in the same manner as their workers. Anger descended into rioting. Workers, armed with shotguns and machetes, and proceeded to rampage through the plantation and chase Fordlândia’s managers (and the town’s cook) into the jungle for a few days until the Brazilian Army arrived to quash the revolt. 

Not understanding Brazilian dining preferences was one thing, but there were other facets of the local culture which persistently baffled Ford. High wages, for instance, failed to ensure that workers would stick around because there was no consumer society in the Amazon on which to spend hard-earned cash. Workers might commit for a few weeks but would then disappear back into the rainforest to work on their own land. While this infuriated Fordlândia’s managers, the cultural disconnect was just as glaring outside of the workplace. Indeed, Ford had very specific ideas about how a society should function, and the sorts of activities people should enjoy. One example was square dancing. Having met his wife at a square dance, Ford decided it would be a good idea to build a large dance hall at the plantation. Although this proved to be unpopular, it was not as unpopular as Ford’s decision to prohibit alcohol. Even though drinking was perfectly legal in Brazil, Ford was a teetotaller and did not see a place for alcohol in his utopia. Like many cultural impositions in Fordlândia, prohibition failed too. Workers continued to drink their customary cachaça, and many travelled down river to a nearby bar and brothel on the aptly named ‘Island of Innocence’.

A predictable end

What became of Fordlândia? After the riot, Fordlândia experienced somewhat of a change in fortune. At long last a successful manager was found in Archibald Johnston, who pushed forward with the construction of housing, and the roads needed to link Fordlândia to the huge territory Ford had acquired inland from the river. Johnston even managed to implement some of Ford’s social ideas, including an emphasis on gardening and strict diets. None of this, however, could compensate for the elephant in the room: Fordlândia was not producing any rubber. Acre after acre of jungle was cleared to make room for rubber trees, but this yielded very poor results. Even when did trees did take root they quickly succumbed to disease. 

Still, Ford did not give up on his vision of rubber self-sufficiency. He hired James Weir, an expert botanist, whose insistence on extravagant planting methods left Johnston exasperated. The biggest demand on Johnston’s list was the construction of a second plantation within Fordlândia, which meant relocating much of the project downstream to Belterra where better growing conditions could be found. Despite the attempt to inject new life into Fordlândia, Weir abandoned the project without notice just a year later. Around the same time, industry advances in the production of synthetic rubber reduced the global demand for natural rubber. 

The close of the Second World War represented a clear turning point for Fordlândia. By then, Ford himself was in poor health and so management of the company fell to his grandson. Henry Ford II, seeking to rein in the company’s spiraling costs, decided to amputate any underperforming assets. This included Fordlândia, which was sold back to Brazil for just a fraction of the purchase price. Perplexed Brazilian residents looked on as their neighbors quickly packed up and headed back home. In stark contrast to the publicity and excitement surrounding Fordlândia’s creation, the project ultimately died a very quiet death. 

While no man better exemplified American ingenuity and industry, Ford’s planned utopia proved to be a colossal error.  It is unfortunate that it took Ford nearly two decades to recognize the error and cut his losses. Left to vandals and to rust in the humid Amazon air were the generator, the sawmill and much of the equipment. The landmark water tower still stands today, although the Ford logo which once represented ‘civilization’ has long since faded. While there has in recent years been a surge in Fordlândia’s population (in 2017 a population of approximately 3,000 people was recorded), the city today is arguably more useful as a parable. As historian Greg Grandin puts it: 

“It’s a parable of arrogance, but the arrogance isn’t that Ford thought he could tame and conquer the Amazon. He had his sights on something actually much bigger. He thought he could tame and conquer capitalism, industrial capitalism. That didn’t happen”.

What do you think of Fordlândia? Let us know below.

References

Industrialist in the Wilderness: Henry Ford's Amazon Venture, John Galey, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2, May 1979, pp. 261-289.

Ever Heard of Henry Ford's Colossal Failed City in the Jungle?, Entrepreneur Europe, 16 January 2019.

Episode 298 Fordlândia, 99% Invisible.

Henry Ford built 'Fordlândia’, a utopian city inside Brazil's Amazon rainforest that's now abandoned — take a look around, Business Insider, 10 February 2020.

Lost cities #10: Fordlândia – the failure of Henry Ford's utopian city in the Amazon, The Guardian, 19 August 2016.

Fordlândia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City, Metropolitan Books, Greg Grandin, June 2009. 

Beyond Fordlândia: An Environmental Account of Henry Ford’s Adventure in the Amazon, Claremont McKenna College, Marcos Colón, 27 April 2021.

Deep in Brazil’s Amazon, Exploring the Ruins of Ford’s Fantasyland, Exploring the Ruins of Ford's Fantasyland, New York Times, 21 February 2017.

Ford Rubber Plantations in Brazil - The Henry Ford, The Henry Ford.

The Amazon Awakens, produced by Walt Disney for the U.S. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 29 May 1944. 

Fordlândia is a reminder of how the Amazon rainforest resists business interests, Financial Times, 3 November 2021.

Fordlândia and Belterra, Rubber Plantations on the Tapajos River, Brazil, Joseph A. Russell, Economic Geography, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1942, pp. 125-145.

The Modern Greek State: 1898–1913 – Glory Days

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1898 and 1913 and looks at what happed in Crete, the Greek political, and scene, the Balkan Wars, and how ultimately it was a positive period for Greece. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here and part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here.

A lithograph of the Battle of Yenidje/Giannitsa in the First Balkan War.

The story narrated so far for Greece is not unique. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) By the turn of the 20th century, all modern Balkan countries (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) had suffered indebtedness and political instability, and the maneuvering of the great powers restricted their foreign policy options. The governments of all three were committed to schemes of territorial expansion, but the restraining influences of disorganized armies, chaotic public finances and great power pressure inhibited them. Only through cooperation with one another could they realize their expansionist dreams.  The cooperation process culminated to the inferno of the first and second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Greeks, these were good wars. (Glenny, 2012)

I. Introduction

Cooperation between the Balkan States was not easy. Under the guiding hand of Bismarck, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan States to three expanding spheres of interest – Austro-Hungarian, Russian and British. This created confusion and resentment in many parts of the Balkans. Especially Bulgaria was reduced from 176,000 square kilometers, after the Treaty of San Stefano, to just 96,000 square kilometers. Serbia’s westwards expansion was also blocked. Thus, they both turned their expansionist ambitions south to Macedonia, claimed also by Greece.

Things became more complicated when in 1885 Bulgaria, violating the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Eastern Rumelia, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Powers accepted the outcome of the Bulgarian intervention. The Serbian king Milan Obrenović knew that the annexation gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the impending struggle for Macedonia. He saw the treaty violation as an opportunity to test his new standing army and attacked Bulgaria but was thoroughly defeated. 

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the victory over the Serbs and with Greece bankrupt, distracted by the Cretan Revolt and finally defeated by the Ottomans in 1897, Bulgaria had indeed an important strategic advantage in Macedonia at the eve of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the realization of the Bulgarian threat by the Ottomans and internal divisions among the Bulgarian parastatal organizations which, like in Greece, were coordinating foreign policy led to a significant decrease of the Slavic influence in Macedonia immediately after the suppression of the Ilinden uprising in 1903. (wikipedia, 2021)

Indeed, Greek guerrillas, under the leadership of officers secretly sent by the government in Athens, used the opportunity and swept through western Macedonia restoring the Greek influence in the region. This renewed activity and the retreat of Bulgarian aspirations hastened a change in Serbian policy, too. Serbia would now be fighting for territorial influence not just against the Greeks and Bulgarians, but also against the Ottomans and Albanians. The situation was so complicated that, at various times, the struggle for Macedonia pitted Slav against Slav (Bulgarians against Serbs); Slav against Hellene (Bulgarians against Greeks); Slav against Muslim (Serbs or Bulgarians against Ottomans or Albanians); Hellene against Muslim (Greeks against Turks or Albanians); and Muslim against Muslim (Ottomans against Albanians). The situation calmed after the Young Turks revolution of 1908, which, in its early stages at least, rejected the path of nationalism and created hope for peaceful coexistence among the different ethnicities in Macedonia. (Glenny, 2012)

The successes in Macedonia restored the confidence of the Greek officer’s corps after the debacle in the 1897 war. The army blamed the Crown Prince Constantine for the defeat against the Turks and the politicians for Greece’s chronic lack of preparedness for war. In August 1909 an army conspiracy, the Military League, launched a successful coup d’etat. This did not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of a junta. The officers involved exercised pressure on the new government from behind the scenes to provide for the necessary restructuring of the army and the obliteration of the influence of the palace on it. They also invited Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan rebel politician outside the old political establishment to lead the effort. (Glenny, 2012) (Malesis, 2018)

II Eleftherios Venizelos

In Crete

Venizelos was born in Mournies, a part of the city of Chania, in Crete in 1864, the year of the first territorial expansion of modern Greece to the Ionian Islands. His father Kiriakos, a merchant, was involved in the local social and political developments and was often prosecuted by the Turkish authorities during the frequent Cretan revolts. Thus, Venizelos spent part of his early life in exile. 

His father was granted amnesty in 1872 and returned to Chania, where he successfully set up his business and provided for the best preparation of Eleftherios as merchant. The latter complied at first, but later managed to convince his father to study law in Athens, where he developed his interest for politics. He also became involved with chieftains and veterans of the island’s revolutions and exiles because of them, who, together with his compatriot students, constituted the core of the Cretan irredentism in the Greek capital. He develops intense activity and soon becomes a leading figure among them.

By the time that Venizelos returned to Chania to practise law in 1887, apart from the respect of the Cretans in Athens, he had the good fame of his father, who died four years earlier, and the help of Kostas Mitsotakis, a local politician and husband of one of his sisters (he had four as well as a younger brother) to rely on for the advancement of his political carrier. He also proved to be an excellent lawyer, which added to his fame and financial comfort.

Thus, it came to no-one’s surprise, when in 1889, he was elected to the Cretan Assembly, a representation body of the semi-autonomous state granted to the island by the Pact of Chalepa in 1878. (wikipedia, 2020) This first tenure did not last long though. A few days after the elections, the old political establishment, proposed the declaration of unification with Greece. Venizelos, as well as the Greek government, immediately realized the dangers of yet another premature revolt and worked to establish a climate of appeasement and moderation. To no avail. The Turks crushed the new revolt and declared martial law. The Pact of Chalepa was no more and Venizelos found himself in Athens once more, this time as an exile.   

His exile does not last long. In April 1890 he returns to Chania, after general amnesty was granted, and in December 1891 he marries his wife, Maria. His happiness does not last long though. After the birth of his second son, in November 1894, his wife died. At the same time Crete was going through one of the worst periods of its history. The martial law and Turkish terror were casting a dark shadow over the island. The Cretan reaction comes with another revolt in May 1896. Venizelos feared a repetition of the harsh measures of 1889 and was against it. The international condemnation of the Hamidian massacres (wikipedia, 2021) though and the pressure exercised by the Great Powers to the Sultan did not allow for a similar reaction. Thus, the movement was successful in forcing the sultan to commit himself for the restoration of the privileges of the Pact of Chalepa.  

Venizelos was not hesitant to get involved in another revolt though, when the sultan did not honour his commitment. Not only as a politician but also as front-line fighter. This is the crisis that culminated to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Although Venizelos was in line with Trikoupis’ approach that foreign policy should be dictated by the national centre and supported unification with Greece, he did not hesitate to disagree with the Greek government after the Greek defeat and opt for the more realistic solution of Cretan autonomy under the condition that the Turkish army withdrew from the island. His insistency and the clumsy handling of the situation by the Turks, with irregulars attacking British forces, resulted not only to Crete’s autonomy, but also to the appointment of the Greek king’s second born prince George as high commissioner. 

In December 1898 prince George arrived in Chania. He claimed excessive powers for himself, and Venizelos supported him as a strong executive authority was necessary for the rebuilt of the devastated island. He also served for two years as minister of justice in the cabinet of the prince demonstrating significant legislative work. Cooperation did not last long though. Venizelos believed that the main aim should be full Cretan autonomy and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ armies from the island, which, in effect, occupied it. Prince George on the other hand was unsuccessfully trying to convince the Powers to accept the unification of the island with the Greek kingdom. When the commissioner used suppressive measures to settle the differences with the politician, Venizelos revolted. 

The centre of the revolt was at Therisos, near Chania, where Venizelos and his supporters declared the unification of Crete with Greece on the 11th of March 1905. This was an attempt to turn the tables as any reaction from the prince would be an act against his own diplomacy that far. In any case, it was the reaction of the foreign armies on the island that would decide the outcome of the revolt. Eventually, Venizelos found himself in a tough spot, but, preferring a realistic approach instead of a fight to the end, he managed to exploit the differences between the Great Powers and by mid-summer managed to achieve: amnesty for himself and his supporters, the establishment of Cretan militia and withdrawal of the Powers’ armies from the island, a loan for the Cretan autonomous state, provisions for the settlement of important pending issues with the Turks, revision of the Cretan constitution. The Greek king would have the right to nominate the high commissioner, but his suggestion was subject to the approval of the Powers. King George decided to withdraw his son and substitute him with former prime minister Alexandros Zaimis. The Powers accepted. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Thus, by 1905 Venizelos had two revolts on his account and a major clash with the royal dynasty and the political establishment supporting it in mainland Greece. No wonder that the officers of the Military League considered him the ideal candidate for the premiership a few years later.

In the Greek political scene

In the elections of the 8th of August 1910 Venizelos was voted member of the Greek parliament for the first time in his career. Contrary to might be expected of him, he did not accept the premiership offered by the Military League. He pointed out that the army officers had committed a serious political mistake: They revolted against the old political establishment and the crown and after gaining control of the situation they trusted the same establishment with the reorganization of the state. Instead, he proposed a compromise: A revision of the constitution of 1864 to introduce the necessary reforms, after which the Military League would dissolve itself. Nevertheless, material provisions of the constitution and especially that concerning the form of government would remain untouched. The crown was safe. Venizelos’ stance served for an improvement of his relations with the palace, especially with king George.

After the king’s invitation to implement the compromise he suggested, Venizelos formed his first government on the 6th of October 1910. But, although the parliament elected in August included 122 independent members, the majority was still with the old parties and Venizelos was not willing to become ‘prisoner’ of this majority. Thus, he convinced the king to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections on the 28th of November. The leaders of the old parties considered this a constitutional coup and decided to abstain from the upcoming elections. As a result, Venizelos’ newly formed Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority of 307 out of 362 seats. 87% of the new MPs were elected for the first time. 

The revision of the constitution introduced important novelties such as a new regime for the expropriation of land, the establishment permanence for the civil servants, compulsory and free elementary education and a ban on the election of army officers as members of parliament. The goal was to address chronic problems of the state like the oppression of the landless, clientism and army interventions in politics. Venizelos actually retained the ministry of the army for himself, and significant compromises were made here. He took as his adjutant the pro-royal captain Ioannis Metaxas, the later dictator during the interwar period in the 1930s, and most importantly restored the crown prince Constantine at the head of the army in June 1911. The reason behind these compromises was the avoidance of an internal front as Venizelos’ concern during this period was the country’s foreign policy. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Nevertheless, he ensured public support with the elections of March 1912 by winning again with an overwhelming majority against the united opposition this time.

Preparation for war

In February 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a defence agreement and two months later a military pact for common action against the Turks regarding their claims in Macedonia. Venizelos actively pursued Greece’s participation to the alliance but was at first met with reservation from the Bulgarian side. (Malesis, 2018) Nevertheless, the Slavs had no navy and Greece was necessary to restrict the capacity of the Turkish fleet to move freely in the Aegean. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) As far as the Greek army was concerned though, after Greece’s defeat in 1897 and considering its financial problems, it was estimated that it counted far below those of the other Balkan States. (Glenny, 2012) Knowing this, Venizelos did not insist on any settlement of the division of the potential territorial gains in Macedonia during the negotiations. Thus, finally Bulgaria felt comfortable to accept Greece in the alliance in May 1912. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Bulgaria completely underestimated the capacity of the Greek army. The international financial control after 1897 helped tiding up the country’s finances and the surpluses of 1910 and 1911 together with loan take outs in the same period created an abundance of cash for the Greek state at the eve of the war. (Kostis, The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day, 2018) Actually, the reorganization effort started in 1904 already with the establishment of the National Defence Fund by the government of George Theotokis. From 1904 till 1912 214 million drachmas were spent on armaments of which 50% during the last two years, when Venizelos came to power. For comparison, the national GDP in 1910-11 was 282.28 drachmas per capita (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) , whereas the legendary armoured cruiser Averof (Carr, 2014) cost 24 million drachmas. Venizelos also materialized the decision of Stefanos Dragoumis’ government in 1910 to invite, following a demand of the Military League, French and British officers to undertake the training of the army and navy. The French mission under general Eydoux arrived in January and the English mission under admiral Tufnell in May 1911.

During this preparation period Venizelos faced the opposition’s criticism that once again preferred the old ‘wait and see’ tactic determined by public opinion and possible political cost. The palace and general staff were also not pleased with the invitation of the Anglo-French military missions as the crown prince and his officers were trained in Germany and admired the Prussian military tradition. Nevertheless, Venizelos was determined to pursue an active participation to the upcoming war and did not hesitate, against the public opinion, to refuse the admission of Cretan representatives to the Greek parliament in May 1912 that might have triggered a reaction form the Great Powers (and the Turks) that at this point were split regarding their policies in the region and could not undertake coordinated action to prevent the war. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars commenced on the 8th of October 1912, when tiny Montenegro, the fourth member of the Balkan alliance, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Five days later an ultimatum issued by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia was delivered to the Turks, demanding such an extensive number of reforms in favour of the Christian populations of the empire that could not be accepted. Their declaration of war followed on the 17th of October. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Military operations lasted only 10 weeks, but the numbers of combatants involved were huge. The Bulgarians mobilized a full 25% of their male population, just under 500,000 men. (Glenny, 2012) The Greeks and Serbs fielded about 200,000 men each and this at a time when their population was less than 3 million. (Malesis, 2018) The Turks were about 350,000. 200,000 combatants, excluding civilians, were killed. The vast massacres of the soon to come First World War relegated the social and economic impact of the Balkan Wars to the penny place. But those who witnessed or participated in them were given a unique insight into what the 20thcentury had in store for the world. (Glenny, 2012)

During the first phase of the war (First Balkan War) the Turks had just come out of a war with Italy and were obliged to fight in four different fronts: against the Bulgarians in Thrace; against the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia; against the Serbs and Montenegrins in northern Albania (I refer to modern Albania, as this state did not exist at the time of the Balkan Wars) and Kosovo; and against the Greeks in Epirus. (Glenny, 2012) The Greek army made significant gains in southern Epirus, setting the city of Ioannina under siege, and in western and central Macedonia, taking Thessaloniki, after winning the race to the city over the Bulgarians. The Greek navy was proved predominant in the Aegean by blocking the naval transport of Turkish troops from Asia Minor to the different fronts and freed all occupied islands. At the same time the rest of the Balkan Allies neutralized almost every pocket of resistance in Europe stopping only 40 km from Constantinople. Thus, soon the Turks reached for an armistice which was signed with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins in December. The Greeks retained a state of war as Ioannina was still under siege and they also needed to continue controlling the movements of the Turkish fleet in the Aegean. (Klapsis, 2019)   

At the conference of London, in December 1912, the Great Powers tried to regain the initiative in the Balkans with their ambassadors discussing separately from those of the war parts. Nevertheless, Sofia, Athens and Belgrade were no longer prepared to bow to the strategic requirements of the Great Powers. (Glenny, 2012) Furthermore, the Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, although it confirmed the drastic reduction of the Turkish possessions in Europe, contained no specific provisions for the definition of the new borders in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. The incorporation of a new Albanian state complicated things even more.(Klapsis, 2019) It was time for the Balkan states to settle the differences among themselves. 

Meanwhile, Greece, still in a state of war with the Turks, had taken Ioannina and advanced into northern Epirus, before the Treaty of London was signed. Bulgaria, overemphasizing the contribution of its army during the hostilities, was by no means willing to accept any conventional ratification of the status quo after the First Balkan War. (Klapsis, 2019) Realizing the danger, Venizelos turned to Serbia for the formation of a common front against their former ally. The Serbs accepted but demanded that the Greco - Serbian Defensive Treaty includes also mutual support in the case of an Austrian attack against Serbia now that the latter’s ambition on the Adriatic were restricted by the Italo – Austrian push for an Albanian state in the region. Although the Germanophile crown prince Constantine was against this development, later to play a crucial role for the Greek participation to the First World War, the Treaty was signed on the 1st of June 1913. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

The Second Balkan War commenced in mid-June with a sudden Bulgarian attack against Greece and Serbia. After few initial successes, the Bulgarian army was thoroughly defeated by the combined armies of Greece and Serbia (supported also by the Montenegrins). Taking advantage of the situation Romania also entered the war occupying Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. The Turks also retook Adrianople from the Bulgarians. The final settlement took place on Balkan ground with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. For Greece the result was astonishing. The gains in Epirus, west and central Macedonia were supplemented by eastern Macedonia till the port city Kavala. In Bucharest, Crete was also finally ceded to Greece that occupied also the islands of north - eastern Aegean, although their fate was to be decided by the Powers at a later point. Within a year the frightened and despised Greece of the past doubled its territory (from 63,211 to 120,308 square kilometres) whereas its population increased by 80% (from 2.6 to 4.7 million people). (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

III Conclusion

Greece’s expansion before 1912 was rather coincidental. The Ionian islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George in 1864. The annexation of Thessaly was also the result of serendipitous international relations in 1881. It was actually lost to Turkey after the defeat of 1897 and was luckily granted back to Greece, together with the right to appoint the high commissioner in Crete, because of the power play between the Great Powers that the Greek government could barely influence. 

At the beginning of the 20th century things were different. Greece was actively pursuing international alliances. It did not hesitate to change sides when the national interest and not have public opinion dictating it. It capitalized on the painful cumulative growth it had experienced since its establishment and combining military action with diplomacy achieved its greatest triumph to this day. As it was noted ‘For the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Greece was fighting and winning without patrons’. (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Nevertheless, despite Venizelos’ criticism to the Military League that it tried to push reform using the old establishment, he worked with the same establishment. It was probably necessary in view of the imminent developments and the need for internal peace. By restoring the crown prince at the head of the army and pro-royal officers at the general staff though, he revived a power system that the Military League meant to neutralize. Already during the Balkan wars there was significant friction between the politician and the commander in chief regarding the appropriate strategy. The disagreement for the race to Thessaloniki in 1912 (supported by Venizelos) against an advance to Monastir (supported by Constantine) or that on signing the agreement with the Serbs, before the Second Balkan War, are typical examples. King George, who, within a few months, tasted all the joy that was deprived of him during the humiliations of the past, was able to mediate successfully between the two. But in March 1913 he was murdered in Thessaloniki by a paranoid person, according to the official version. It has been commented though that the murder came in handy for the ‘German factor’. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Constantine was now not only at the head of the army but at the head of the state, too.

In short, this was undoubtedly a triumphant period for Greece. But the seeds for another catastrophe to come had also been planted.

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References                                                                                                     

Carr, J. (2014). R.H.N.S. Averof, Thunder in the Aegean. Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Kostis, K. (2018). The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Wikipedia. (2020). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Halepa

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilinden%E2%80%93Preobrazhenie_Uprising

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidian_massacres

The Paraguayan President who Brought his Country to Military Catastrophe – Part 4: How the War Ended

Francisco Solano Lopez was president of Paraguay from 1862 to 1870. He led the country during one of the most devastating defeats in all history – the War of the Triple Alliance. Here, Erick Redington concludes this fascinating series by looking at how a Brazilian leader managed to take Humaita and the capital, Asuncion – and how Marshall Lopez continued to resist even after these captures.

If you missed it you can read part 1 on the early life of Francisco Solano Lopez here, part 2 on the start of the War of the Triple Alliance here, and part 3 on devastating battles for both sides here.

The 1868 Battle of Avay.

Marshal Lopez knew about all the changes in the Allied high command. He was kept informed through an intelligence network of spies and sympathizers. The changes could only have been encouraging. With Mitre gone, and Argentina facing internal dissention and rebellion, their contribution to the war would be diminished at worst, and eliminated at best. Flores' term ending, and then assassination, meant that Uruguay would have another round of internal problems, which could only work to the Marshal's favor. Then the elephant in the room, Brazil. The new commander was probably just some other decadent Brazilian noble with a fancy title, but no match for the Marshal's military genius. 

There were reasons for the Marshal to be confident. Sure his armies were ill equipped, ill fed, and his country was significantly outweighed. But these facts had been true from the start. Yet, despite all this, he had survived. Paraguay had survived. The strategy of making the Allies pay for every step, letting the terrain and disease take their tolls, seemed to be working. The Allies were barely into Paraguay. Tens of thousands had been killed or invalided out. The Argentines and Uruguayans were seemingly withdrawing from the war. There had been no uprising against his rule. The nascent Paraguayan Legion, full of his opponents, was stymied. For the Marshal, all that seemed necessary was just a little more exertion, if the Paraguayan people could give just a little more, then a peace he could live with could finally be achieved.

For Lopez, the seeming successes (or non-failure depending on your perspective) were further convincing him of his own correctness, and the baseness of his opponents. He had done this himself. The American minister to Paraguay once wrote that the Marshal had many flatterers, but no advisors. The Marshal had stymied the Allies, and this led to a further inflated ego. Other issues began to rear their heads. Lopez did not share in the privations of his soldiers. He was a known gourmand, and would eat enormous amounts of food, even specialty cakes that would have been unthinkable for anyone not in the Marshal's immediate family. Worse, Lopez would drink large amounts of alcohol. Prior to modern sanitary methods, drinking alcohol did not carry the risks of disease, such as dysentery, that drinking unclean water did. However, Lopez's consumption of alcohol grew over the years of the war, and when he drank too much, he was known to lash out at those around him angrily. These scenes of anger would not bode well for the future.

When the Marquis de Caxias took command, he trained, organized and equipped his forces. As a veteran of every war of the Empire, he knew the importance of morale and logistics, and was determined to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors. Whereas the Marshal had assumed that Caxias was going to be another dull Brazilian nobleman, it was Caxias who would rebuild the Brazilian forces, and use the newfound unity of command to wield the Allied army and navy as one instrument for the destruction of Marshal Lopez.

Humaitá Falls      

By July 1867, Caxias was ready to move the Allied Army. President Mitre had made some rumblings about wanting to return to the army to reassume command, and Caxias had to move fast to maintain his operational control. The goal was Humaitá. The Marshal had used the months of inactivity to strengthen the Gibraltar of South America. One element that the Marshal had not counted on was the advancements in naval technology of the previous decade. When Humaitá was originally built by Carlos Antonio Lopez, naval vessels were still primarily made of wood, and steam propulsion was new. The bend in the river would slow ships and the guns of the fort would bring their destruction. With ironclad warships becoming more common, even in South America, the position Humaitá was in was not as impregnable as it had been.   

Utilizing terrain and slowing down the Allies, the Marshal wanted to make his enemies bleed for every foot of Paraguayan ground they stepped on. Caxias was willing to accept casualties in order to encircle the Paraguayan fortress. Being outnumbered almost 2-1, however, limited the Marshal's options and he could not afford a pitched battle. For the Marquis, a pitched battle was what he wanted. He was simply unable to achieve it at this stage. Lopez knew his numbers were low, and he had limited prospects of getting more men. Pre-teen boys and old men were being conscripted into the Paraguayan army. These young men would prove some of the Marshal's most devoted followers. The use of child soldiers would be one of the biggest stains on the Marshal's record and is one of the greatest controversies of the war. For the Paraguayans, they felt they had no alternative. According to the Marshal's propaganda, the Allies were going to partition the country and the Brazilians were going to enslave them. These were motivations to get families to freely give up their children for service. And besides, these children would be under the command of the brilliant Marshal Lopez, who would ensure their safety.

The Marquis would order a wide flanking maneuver to surround the fortress, then when close positions were attained, begin land and naval bombardments. If the Paraguayans would not evacuate, Humaitá would be besieged and the Paraguayan army trapped inside, hopefully with the Marshal as well. Mostly, this is what happened. However, due to the terrain, it was impossible to completely surround Humaitá as closely as the Marquis would have liked. Despite this the Allied army was able to take up positions facing Humaitá, and the siege was on. The defense of this place had been built up in the minds of both sides that immediate evacuation by the Marshal was impossible. For both sides, it was the focus of the war. As long as it held out, there was still hope for the Paraguayans. If it fell, the Allies hoped they would have an open road to Asunción.  

As has been seen, Marshal Lopez was not one to sit and wait for anything to happen to him. He would make attacks during the siege, and at times put the Allies back on their heels. Active defense seemed to be the tactic Marshal Lopez excelled at. But his army was also starving. A larger proportion of his solders everyday was made up of children and old men. Weapons were outdated. Ammunition and powder were short. It was amazing the Paraguayans held on as long as they did. But the Marshal could feel the squeeze he was being put under. Slowly, steadily, month after month, the Allies strangled the Paraguayans. The Brazilians showed early in the siege that their ironclads were able to run the guns of the fortress and make it up river, virtually defeating the purpose of the fortress at that location. With the fleet now able to go upriver and shell Paraguayan positions, Humaitá slowly became untenable. Small-scale counter attacks would not be enough. The Allies inexorably closed in. But no matter how many counter attacks, ambushes, and disruptions to the Allied supply line the Marshal made, he could not shake the grip that Caxias had on Humaitá. It became a matter of time. 

Marshal Lopez was not a man to sacrifice himself in the last ditch defense of the fortress. Nor would he allow himself to be captured by his enemies while there were still Paraguayan soldiers left to carry on. Leaving a small force to man the fort and maintain a semblance of their presence, the Marshal ordered his troops to retreat further north. The Marquis was prepared to assault the fortress that for so long had frustrated Allied designs. When the Allies were prepared for the final assault, negotiations began for surrender. Over 1,200 Paraguayan troops surrendered. These men were starving and sick. Their commander, Colonel Martinez, was so starved, by one report his skin had begun to turn yellow. Despite this, surrender by the Paraguayans up until this moment had been unthinkable. To the Allies, the Paraguayans were unthinking automatons in the service of a brutal dictator. Seeing the walking corpses come out of the fort that day reinforced their belief.

Things Fall Apart

For the Marshal, surrender had been unthinkable. He had only left orders for the evacuation of the sick and wounded, not understanding this meant the whole garrison. Although he had held out for longer than anyone had the right to expect, with the fortress gone, he now began to worry about the safety of his capital. Retreat north was a necessity. The Marquis, however, was not willing to rest on his laurels and savor the triumph. Further naval probes were ordered. The advance would continue.

Before confronting his enemies in front of him, Lopez confronted his perceived enemies behind him. This would be the start of one of the greatest black marks against the Marshal’s character. Paraguay was an authoritarian state, and the Marshal was used to instant obedience. It seems that when his orders had been disobeyed and Humaitá surrendered, Lopez began to delude himself with the idea that there was a massive conspiracy against him personally. Massive numbers of arrests were made. Everyone from foreign travelers to government officials were arrested and subject to extreme forms of torture to extract confessions. Priests were used as informants and the confessional was no longer sacred. Families would inform on each other. Even the Marshal’s family was not immune. His brother would be arrested, and his mother would be tortured for the sin of telling him that he was born out of wedlock. Plots to overthrow the Marshal or to surrender to the Allies were allegedly everywhere. Historians have debated whether any of this conspiracy mongering was based in fact, but there is very little evidence. One result did come about. If no one was willing to challenge the Marshal before, now there was no one left in government or the inner circle who would even think of telling the Marshal the truth about the situation again.

Lopez looked for a defensible position from which to stymie the Allied advance. He settled on the banks of the Piquissiri River south of Asunción. It was here the Marquis would show himself a superior general to the Marshal. Caxias would cross the river, enter the terrible terrain of the Gran Chaco and flank the Paraguayan army. Then he could take the Marshal from behind and destroy him before he could retreat further north. This is exactly what happened. At the Battle of Avay, much of the remaining Paraguayan army was destroyed. With this, there was nothing stopping the Marquis from taking the Paraguayan capital, which was done on New Year’s Day 1869.

The Fall                   

Although the Allies hoped that taking the Paraguayan capital would end the war, that would not be signaled until the Marshal was removed from the board. Ever the survivor, Lopez fled north into the wilderness and the mountains. He would take whatever boys and old men were left, form a new army, and fight a guerilla war against the Allies and their newest ally, the Paraguayan Provisional government. This group was set up by the Allies to govern the country. For Lopez, this group of men was even worse than Brazilians, they were traitors. Many Paraguayans would see them the same way. The war would continue.

For over a year, the Marshal would fight his guerilla war. The Marquis de Caxias would leave the war zone, to be replaced by the Emperor’s son-in-law, the Comte d’Eu. There were more battles, but the primary result was more needless suffering by the Paraguayan people. The battles of the last year of the war would see whole villages burned to the ground and brutal reprisals and counter reprisals by both sides. D’Eu was determined to destroy the support system that sustained the Marshal’s armies and would brutally punish any area that gave the Marshal support. The Marshal would launch deadly attacks on anyone who aided the Allies or would not actively support him. Unlike many dictators who can allow passive acceptance, the Marshal required active participation in his activities by his people. The Marshal had no hope of victory, yet he would order the instant death of Paraguayans who even spoke of surrender. The Paraguayan people probably knew they were doomed, but what else could they do? The habituation of obedience had been with them since the days of Dr. Francia. There was nothing left for the Paraguayan people to do but to fight and die. 

The Comte d’Eu would order continuous campaigns to root out the Marshal. Finally, after all these years of war, Marshal Lopez was cornered. The Allies launched an attack on his camp and cut down his aides and camp followers. The Marshal, believing in his own importance to his cause, jumped on his horse and attempted to ride away. Due to the muck, getting away was not possible. Through the entire war, the Marshal had pointedly not exposed himself to danger. His supporters would say that due to his role as commander in chief and president, it would be irresponsible to expose himself. His detractors would call him a coward. At this moment, when all was lost, and escape was impossible, the Marshal found the courage to face his enemies. He was called upon to surrender by the Brazilians. He not only refused but insulted and swore at his attackers. He would curse and damn them for what they had done to Paraguay. The Brazilian commander, General Câmara, would order his men to capture the Marshal alive. No order could save the Marshal. Not only did the Brazilian troops have their blood up and adrenaline pumping, but the Emperor had offered a reward of £110 sterling for the man who would take the Marshal down. The Marshal, covered in wounds was shot in the chest and fell in the swamps of Northern Paraguay on March 1, 1870. His last words, spat with his last breath, were “I die with my country.”

Legacy

The memory of Marshal Francisco Solano Lopez Carrillo is complicated. To the Paraguayan people who he ruled over with an iron fist for most of a decade, he is a hero, a symbol of national resistance against overwhelming odds. He had defied the superpowers of South America, and though he lost, it was through his sacrifice that Paraguay was able to survive the worst war the continent had ever seen. Supporters say that the fact that Paraguay earned the respect of its’ enemies through its heroism and were moved to allow the country to survive is a testament to the Marshal. To detractors, he was a brutal dictator who launched a war that no sane person could have imagined for one moment he had a chance to win. This view is reinforced by the casualty figures. Of a prewar population of approximately 525,000, over 300,000 died. It is estimated that 90% of men in Paraguay died. This casualty figure surpasses the most brutal of wars, even the Eastern Front of World War II. 

Insane brutal dictator, or enlightened leader who was suppressed by his neighbor. These two positions polarize historians to this day. One thing the Marshal achieved, which he would have enjoyed, was eternal fame. The fame of leading one of the most epic campaigns in military history, fighting against impossible odds, and enacting a true Götterdämmerung will make his name live forever.

What do you think of how he War of the Triple Alliance ended? Let us know below.

Now, read about General Juan Peron , The Famous Argentine President who had 18 years between his two Presidencies here.

References

Saeger, James Schofield. 2007. Francisco Solano Lopez and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, Volume 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2005. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Edited by Hendrick Kraay. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2017. The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866-70. University of Calgary Press.

The Paraguayan President who Brought his Country to Military Catastrophe – Part 3: Devastating Battles for Both Sides

Francisco Solano Lopez was president of Paraguay from 1862 to 1870. He led the country during one of the most devastating defeats in all history – the War of the Triple Alliance. Here, Erick Redington continues this fascinating series by looking at the events in the War of the Triple Alliance, including the Battle of Tuyutí and the Battle of Curupayty.

If you missed it you can read part 1 on the early life of Francisco Solano Lopez here and part 2 on the start of the War of the Triple Alliance here.

A depiction of the Battle of Curupayty.

With Marshal Lopez's advance into Corrientes stunted, he knew that pushing all the way to Uruguay was no longer possible. He had achieved much by aggressively invading the Allied Powers. Their armies had been thrown back on their heels, causing increased dissention between the Brazilians and Argentinians, Lopez's only real hope of victory. A wealth of materiel was captured by the Marshal's army aiding the war effort immensely. The small Paraguayan industrial base would have difficulty throughout the war supplying the army with the materiel it needed to fight. The small Paraguayan nation was proving itself to be very dangerous to its larger neighbors. To some, Lopez looked brilliant. To no one more so than the Marshal himself. 

The Allies knew they would have to control the rivers in order to maintain their supply chain. The first Allied target was Humaitá, called the "Gibraltar of South America." They knew that as long as the fortress held out, they would not be able to advance further into Paraguay and take the capital, Asuncion. The Marshal knew this as well. He was determined to use every effort to defend the fort. But he knew that Humaitá needed further reinforcing. Therefore, the best strategy would be to delay the Allies as long as possible in order to improve the fortifications. In the process, the Allies would further bleed, and potentially, greater dissention would grow between the Brazilians and Argentinians. 

The Marshal also knew that Argentina was fragile at this time. President Mitre had assumed office only a few years before, after yet another civil war. Lopez knew that there were many elements within Argentina who were very sympathetic to him and were perfectly happy to see Marshal Lopez create a strong Paraguay. To these Argentinians, Paraguay was the wrong enemy at the wrong time. The right enemy would always be Brazil. The war would be used throughout as a weapon to attack those in power in Argentina. President Mitre himself was tired of the condescension with which he was treated by the Brazilian officers. They saw him as just another caudillo in a long string of caudillos ruling Argentina. The Marshal hoped that if he could inflict a few further defeats on the Allies, one or both would be willing to come to the peace table and Lopez could get a peace he could live with, rather than the partition and exile that the Treaty of the Triple Alliance called for.

The Marshal Counters

The Brazilian naval commander, Baron Tamandaré would use his fleet to advance further up the river system to allow the Allies to invade Humaitá. When the Allies made a landing at the town of Riachuelo, Lopez sensed an opportunity. The Marshal was not a man to sit back and just take what was coming, so he ordered his fleet to attack the Brazilians. The Paraguayan navy was heavily outnumbered.  The Brazilians had better armored ships with more guns. None of this mattered. What mattered was élan. Lopez would fling his navy in a night attack against the Brazilian fleet and in one brilliant move end the threat of an Allied offensive by having his sailors board the Brazilian ships under the cover of darkness, capture them, and then sail the new prizes back up the river to reinforce the Paraguayan fleet.

Of course, this is not what happened. The ships arrived after sunrise. The Paraguayan commander ordered his ships to pass the Brazilian ships and fire on the ground troops. The Paraguayans would lose more ships and have to retreat upriver. It was a disaster for the Paraguayan navy. Marshal Lopez impetuously ordered his fleet to attack an enemy that heavily outnumbered him with a confusing and frankly ridiculous battle plan to not only defeat the Brazilians but also augment his own fleet. Why did he do this? As we have seen, it was in the nature of the man to take risks and wager everything on bold, Napoleonic, plans. As someone who believed he was a military genius, he believed his plans could work. As a brutal dictator in charge of a police state, no one was brave or foolhardy enough to tell him otherwise. Due to this, a sizable part of the Paraguayan fleet that could have been used in the defense of Humaitá was lost, and future defenses were weakened.

By 1866, the Allies were finally prepared to begin what they saw as the war-winning offensive. The Allies crossed the Paraná River and entered Paraguay. The Marshal was a believer in the offensive-defensive strategy. He did not make a general, theater-wide offensive, but he began launching localized counterattacks to make the Allies keep their guard up and slow their advance. This was in keeping with the Marshal's character, but it was also the sound military move. The Marshal knew this would be a war of attrition. He had to make the Allies bleed. He needed to cause further dissention. Passively waiting to be strangled would only lead to being strangled. He had to fight. 

The local counterattacks, while not leading to battlefield victories, worked their intended purpose. The Paraguayans were able to slow down the Allies, stopping their advance at Estero Bellaco for a time. The Marshal began to grow more confident. He had been mostly successful in his strategy so far. With his increasing confidence grew his willingness to gamble. He now began to envision knocking out the Allied army with one decisive blow. When the Allies began advancing again, Lopez decided to strike the blow. The bloodiest battle in the history of South America began, the Battle of Tuyutí.

Tuyutí

With the Brazilians on the left, the Uruguayans in the center and the Argentines on the right, the Allies were drawn up in a flat, swampy area. The Marshal decided to focus his attacks on the Brazilians and the Uruguayans. Lopez had a very low opinion of Brazilians, and the Uruguayans were the smallest contingent. Initially, the Paraguayans made gains, however the Brazilian artillery would seal the fate of the Paraguayan army, and the Allies came away with the victory. The importance of the victory was not that the Allies won the battle, but that it had been so deadly.

Statistics from the Paraguayan army at this time are problematic at best. Due to the dictatorial nature of the country, and the importance that Lopez placed on propaganda, reported casualty figures from the Paraguayans can be taken sometimes with a grain of salt. The best estimates for battlefield losses were 6,000 dead and 7,000 wounded out of an army of about 25,000 men. The Allies lost over 5,000 men out of about 35,000. For the Allies, the losses were terrible, though replaceable. For the Paraguayans, this was a national catastrophe. Based upon prewar population, the losses in this battle represented over 3% of the people in the entire country. These men represented the cream of the large pre-war army the Marshal had accumulated and led into Argentina and Brazil. His army would never recover. Never again would the Marshal order a mass attack on the Allies. 

With victory comes overconfidence. The Allies, having achieved a major victory now began to advance more rapidly against the Marshal. Where other men would draw back in the aftermath of such a catastrophic defeat, Lopez was as defiant as ever. The Paraguayan army would go on to defend itself well against Allied advances. However, at the Battle of Curuzu, the Paraguayans were defeated again and finally Marshal Lopez was growing concerned. He decided to try a different tack, one which he had not utilized so far: diplomacy.

The Marshal Tries Diplomacy     

With the Allies on the move, and getting closer to Humaitá, the Marshal hoped to capitalize on the war-weariness of his opponents. He unexpectedly invited the Allied leaders to a conference to try to end the war. The Brazilians wanted nothing to do with this conference and refused to negotiate with the Marshal. President Mitre, however, decided to meet his enemy. For Mitre, beset by political opposition at home, facing rebellion in outlying provinces, and weary over his own conduct of the campaign (he was supreme Allied army commander, after all), Mitre wanted to find a way to end the war. For Lopez, this represented a wonderful opportunity. Despite his reputation as an insane warmonger, it was said that in person the Marshal could be very charming and a great conversationalist. He was very well read and quick-minded. For Lopez, this was finally his chance to divide the Allies, get Argentina to leave the war, and then take on the enemy he hated, the Brazilians. And he failed miserably. 

Accounts of the meeting vary, with some saying that the conversation was amicable, and others saying the two men got into an argument. Either way the conference was a failure. President Mitre told President Lopez of his determination to abide by all clauses of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. This included the article demanding the removal of the Marshal from power before any peace could be had. Lopez could have agreed and lived a comfortable life in exile in Europe or North America. Instead, he refused. He would fight on to the bitter end. And that is exactly what would happen. No peace, but war, war to the knife.

After the failure of the conference, Mitre decided to restart the offensive and attempt to deal the killer blow, reach Humaitá, and from there to Asunción. The invasion of Paraguay was on. The Allied army approached the Paraguayan army entrenched at Curupayty. The Paraguayans had used the truce to improve their fortifications and build further defenses. They had brought in artillery and reinforced the trenches. The Paraguayans only numbered about 5,000 men, a quarter of the advancing Allied force. In their confidence after Tuyutí, many in the Allied camp believed the Paraguayans were on their last legs and ready to fall apart. This overconfidence led to Mitre preparing a battle plan whereby the Brazilian navy would shell the Paraguayans from the river, and once softened up, the Allies would launch a grand assault to rout the enemy. Once the fleet had finished the bombardment, Mitre ordered the men in. 

The Battle of Curupayty can be likened to other thoughtless slaughters like Cold Harbor or the Somme. Allied troops went in and were massacred. The Paraguayans only lost about 50 men in the battle. The Allies, however, lost about 9,000, according to the best estimates. It was a shocking and devastating loss, but it could have been worse for the Allies. The commander of the Paraguayan army was not Marshal Lopez. He would never expose himself to battlefield danger. That was not his way. The field commander was General José Diaz, a good commander in his own right, but he operated within the Paraguayan system of nothing is done without the dictator's permission. Even considering the casualties, the Paraguayans were still outnumbered and outgunned, but they had morale on their side. If they had counterattacked and pursued the Allies, a decisive, perhaps war turning victory could have been achieved. Diaz was not stupid. He was not going to take the initiative and incur the wrath of the Marshal. The Allies were allowed to withdraw back to their entrenchments. Here the war would sit for longer than any of the participants had anticipated. For the Allies Humaitá would have to wait. Recovery from the embarrassment of Curupayty would take far longer than anyone expected. They had much bigger problems at hand.

On the Pale Horse

Part of the original defense plan of Marshal Lopez was utilizing the geography of Paraguay to slow the Allies. Much of the country is located in tropical, low-lying swamps. These swamps bred interminable swarms of mosquitos and other insects. The mosquito was, and still is, a primary vector to transport infectious disease from person to person. For the Paraguayan troops, malnourished and under equipped, disease was a fact of life. For the Marshal, there was no ability to import medical supplies. The traditional Paraguayan cure-all for everything was yerba mate, which was obviously ineffective against infectious disease. Every man lost to disease was a man out of the gun line for the Marshal. There was very little he could do to stop the epidemics though. 

With the defeat at Curupayty, the Allies needed to rest and regroup before another advance. Camp life at this time was dull and unsanitary. Given the geography of the area the Allies found themselves, and the filth of the camps, it is no surprise that epidemics began amongst the Allied troops. Dysentery, cholera, and yellow fever were some of the worst. The conditions in the camps, coupled with the terrible defeat the Allies had taken, would lead to much needed changes within the Allied army, but this was small comfort to those who had been stricken.

Out With the Old…

After Curupayty, the squabbling between the Brazilians and Argentinians only grew worse. The Allied field commander, President Mitre, was called a bungler for directing one of the most lopsided losses in modern military history. Mitre was not happy either. He was growing tired of field service. Rebellions were breaking out against his rule in the outer provinces of Argentina. Many within his own government wanted peace. He believed in the necessity of the war still, but he did not believe that he would be the man to lead it. In January 1868, Mitre would leave his army and return to Buenos Aires.

Also out at this time was the President of Uruguay, Venancio Flores. He was also worn down with campaigning and would leave the army. His term as president was ending anyway, and he was to turn over his powers to a new leader from his Colorado Party. He would be assassinated four days after leaving office. The crime was never solved. 

For Marshal Lopez, these changes symbolized a weakening of his enemies' resolve to make war on him. What he did not know was that with Argentina mostly out of the war, and Uruguay effectively out of the war, the Allies would finally have solved the one major disadvantage they suffered through compared to the Paraguayans: unity of command. And that unity would come in the form of Luís Alves de Lima e Silva, the Marquis de Caxias.

What do you think of the devastating battle for Paraguay and then the Allies? Let us know below.

Now read part 4 on the end of the War of the Triple Alliance here.

References

Saeger, James Schofield. 2007. Francisco Solano Lopez and the Ruination of Paraguay: Honor and Egocentrism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, Volume 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2005. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870. Edited by Hendrick Kraay. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 2017. The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay versus the Triple Alliance, 1866-70. University of Calgary Press.

The British Leader at the Height of Empire: Lord Salisbury

Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister of Britain at the peak of its power. He was Prime Minister on and off during the period from 1885 to 1902 and had a great influence on the country’s foreign policy at its colonial height. Avan Fata explains.

Lord Salisbury in 1886.

At the turn of the 20th century, the British Empire seemed to be at its zenith. Its colonial holdings far surpassed the second largest imperial power, the French, and the City of London was the trading capital of the world. Yet as the Victorian age gave way to the Edwardian, many in Whitehall and the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that these heights of economic and political might would not be easy to maintain, let alone to increase further. The economic-industrial disparity between Britain and other European great powers was closing, and from the New World the United States was also narrowing the gap.

In foreign politics too, there were signs of a storm on the horizon. The competition between imperial states had also reached a crossroads; large swathes of the globe had already been partitioned between imperialist European states, and some feared that the next “Scramble” would be over the dying carcass of an empire at the end of its tether; not for nothing was the Ottoman Empire termed the “sick man of Europe”. Britain had reluctantly taken up the task of helping to secure the Sublime Porte - as the Ottoman capital at Constantinople was known - from foreign encroachment and possible invasion.

Russia remained the perceived enemy of British foreign policy; its expansion eastwards and into Central Asia had been dubbed “The Great Game” by a British officer and later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim. But Britain also faced the rising ambitions of a newly-created German Empire, whose Kaiser Wilhelm II had dismissed Bismarck as Chancellor in favor of pursuing a more expansionist foreign policy, dubbed Weltpolitik (world politics). 

Enter Salisbury

It was in these circumstances that Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, became Prime Minister. First elected to 10 Downing Street in 1885, he would go on to serve two more terms (1886 - 1892, 1895 - 1902); leading Britain for a total of 13 years and 252 days - only Robert Walpole, William Pitt the Younger, and Lord Liverpool served longer. Curiously however, Lord Salisbury also served as his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; a realm which he had considerable experience in.

Salisbury’s first foray into foreign affairs came in 1876, when he was chosen by then prime minister Disraeli to represent Britain at the Constantinople Conference. Despite the conference’s failure to secure greater rights and land for Bulgarian and Herzogvinian subjects in Ottoman territory, it catapulted Salisbury into the political spotlight. Two years later during the Russo-Turkish War, when Disraeli’s Cabinet protested the Treaty of San Stefano, Salisbury was chosen to succeed Lord Derby (who had resigned as Foreign Secretary due to the protest). Even before his official appointment on 2 April, Salisbury single-handedly drafted a circular calling for a congress of European nations to re-examine the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, which was duly approved and dispatched to the great powers.

At the resulting Congress of Berlin (1878), Salisbury was overshadowed publicly by Lord Beaconsfield, but it was apparent to all the plenipotentiaries that he had been the architect of the Congress and the subsequent settlement. The Congress overruled many of the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, reducing the size of a new Bulgaria and returning Russian-conquered territories back to the Ottomans, whilst also securing Cyprus for the British - ostensibly for use as a naval base to dissuade any future Russian aggression into the Straits.

Despite being a Conservative, Salisbury was not particularly supportive of the Empire. He questioned its actual economic benefits, and would come to prefer maintaining the status quo as opposed to seizing any new territory. In a speech as Prime Minister after the Diamond Jubilee of 1897, he remarked that ‘our first duty is towards the people of this country, to maintain their interests and their rights; our second is to all humanity.’ In his foreign policy, he eschewed these priorities, placing the security of the Empire first and foremost.

Foreign policy

To Salisbury, managing foreign policy demanded a calm and unwavering statesman. ‘Sleepless tact, immovable calmness and patience’ were, he deemed, the qualities which would allow a diplomat to succeed. Perhaps more significant to his government and those in Europe, he refused to entangle Britain in any alliances. Much like Gladstone, Salisbury did not prefer to enter Britain into any mutual defense pacts, viewing them as commitments which would seriously hinder Whitehall’s ability to act independently of its continental counterparts. When his government and public opinion pressed for an Anglo-German alliance, Salisbury was reluctant to permit talks with Berlin. When it became clear that the Germans were unwilling to support Britain in the Far East against Russia, whilst simultaneously asking for British colonial concessions, Salisbury remarked to German ambassador Paul von Hatzfeldt that ‘you ask too much for our friendship.’

This commitment to a lack of commitment was seen by Salisbury’s Conservative colleagues not as a deliberate choice, but rather a continuity of a longstanding preference in British - and prior to 1707 English - foreign policy. As far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, they argued, ensuring a balance of power in Europe and remaining independent of embroilments on the continent was the modus operandi. In 1896, Salisbury’s adherence to this doctrine earned a name: ‘splendid isolation’, after a Canadian politician and later Joseph Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) popularized it in debates. Salisbury’s critics were more inclined to use the term ‘terrible isolation’.

For his own part, Salisbury took disdain with the term, deriding it as ‘jargon about isolation’, and mentioned to Queen Victoria that isolation ‘is much less danger [sic] than the danger of being dragged into wars which do not concern us.’ In hindsight, non-intervention seems a more apt term to use, as Britain was far from isolated from the various quarrels taking place at the fringes of its empire: Russia in the Far East and Central Asia, Germany in Africa and the Pacific, and France in Northern Africa as well as the Sudan. In each case, Salisbury balanced the interests of London and the other powers with great skill and, as with the case of Portuguese claims in South Africa (1890), with military pressure if need be. It was during Salisbury’s reign that the Royal Navy adopted the ‘Two Power Naval Standard’, the policy that the British fleet should be equal in strength to the next two largest navies combined. 

Conclusion

Salisbury’s power declined following the Second Boer War, which broke out against his will in 1899. His own health was failing, and in 1900 he finally handed over the reins of the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne. At the end of his political career, he had managed to usher the British Empire into the 20th century with great diplomatic skill and tact. Far from being preyed upon by the other great powers,  Salisbury had defended British interests across the world and expanded the “red on the map” by six million square miles, a feat unmatched since the days of Pitt the Elder. His policy of splendid isolation however, was judged by his successors to be a relic of a bygone Victorian age, and Britain would enter into her first mutual defense pact with Japan in 1902. 

Let us know what you think of Lord Salisbury below.

Now read Avan’s series on First World War historiography here.

Sources

Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970.                                     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Howard, Christopher. “Splendid Isolation.” History 47, no. 159 (1962): 32-41. Accessed August 22, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24404639.

Leonard, Dick. British Prime Ministers from Walpole to Salisbury: The 18th and 19th Centuries. New                   York: Routledge, 2021. 

MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World                                     War. London: Profile Books, 2014.

Margaret M. Jefferson. "Lord Salisbury and the Eastern Question, 1890-1898." The Slavonic and East                                European Review 39, no. 92 (1960): 44-60. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab                               le/4205217.

Penson, Lillian M. "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy." Cambridge                                               Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1935): 87-106. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab             le/3020834.

Roberts, Andrew. Salisbury: Victorian Titan. New York: Phoenix Press, 2006. 

The Modern Military History of India: Part 1 - The Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry

India’s military history is rich, long and storied yet there is criminally little written about it and it is hideously ignored in many debates on military history of the 19th century. This perhaps is because Indians themselves know very little about what the Indian Army did in the years between 1858 and 1910. In these few decades, the Indian Army became one of the most combat experienced forces in the world as it fought alongside the British Army from Egypt to Afghanistan. The Indian Army (though officially known as the British Indian Army, it was always referred to as the Indian Army), which was already one of the most professional and most well-equipped forces in the world, by the time the Great War rolled around, had become arguably the single most experienced armed force in the world alongside the British Army.

Siddhant A. Joshi starts his series of the modern military history of India by looking at Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry.

Subadars (Sikhs) and Gunners (Punjabi Muslims) in the 1890s..

Introduction

Since the British and Indian Armies rarely fought alone, the technologies, techniques and tactics used by either one of them became commonplace in both. Not only that, but their military history also became inextricably interlinked and both armies developed processes that were born of their shared experience – processes and doctrines and traditions that stand to this day. The British Army commemorates the many contributions, sacrifices and stories of Indian soldiers with just as many memorials to Indians as there are to Brits. The Indian Army too does the same and has, in fact, kept many units that were raised by the British.

However, not many outside the armed forces know of this. That is the aim of this – to bring to light that which should long ago have been known.

The Frontier Campaign – Beginnings

To understand this little-known campaign, one must first understand an area of the Indian Subcontinent that was then called the North West Frontier Province or the NWFP. It was an area that had formed just south of the intersection of the Karakorum and Pamir Mountains and just north of the Hindu Kush Mountains and had long been used as a gateway for invasions since it stood between mountains that have been impassable for large armies for centuries. It quickly became the frontier of British India – lands ungoverned by any state and occupied only by tribes of armed Pashtuns.

It was the natural path into India from Afghanistan and its existence posed a threat to the existence of British Rule in India for one reason alone – the Great Game. During this period, the Russians and the British were playing a long-running and high-stakes chess match in Afghanistan for control of the country. Whoever controlled Afghanistan would control not only India’s North Western border but Russia’s southern border.

Afghanistan quickly became the linchpin for the two powers’ plans and prospects in Asia. And, sure as the sun rises every day, one of the most important chess pieces became the North Western Frontier Province. And, in the NWFP there stood a mountain pass – the infamous Khyber Pass –which was of immense strategic value in safeguarding the approach into the subcontinent (a value it still holds!). To guard this pass, the British had recruited a small regiment composed entirely of Pashtun Tribesmen from the neighbouring Tirah and Malakand regions since they knew the land the best.

However, Tirah itself was not of much importance. Colonel T. H. Holdich, writing a few months after the end of hostilities in the campaign, says ‘It is a species of cul de sac, possessing little or no strategic value.’[1] And Malakand was much the same.

If that were true, why did the British and Indians spend months fighting the tribesmen of the regions and mobilise well over 100,000 troops for the cause? It is simple. The tribes guarding the Khyber Pass revolted, attacked their own men and took up positions all along the Khyber. While of utmost importance was the Khyber Pass, securing it was of no use unless the rebellion was put down.

The Frontier Campaign – 1897-1898

‘Our little wars attract far less attention among the people of this country than they deserve. They are frequently carried out in circumstances of the most adverse kind. Our enemies, although ignorant of military discipline, are, as a rule, extremely brave and are thoroughly capable of using the natural advantages of their country.’ These were words written by author G. A. Henty when describing the Tirah and Malakand Offensives.[2]

Neville Chamberlain (yes, that Neville Chamberlain) wrote on the matter and Winston Churchill (yes, that Winston Churchill) was a young Second Lieutenant in the campaign and he too wrote on the matter extensively. It is their works that the remaining part of this article will rely upon.

The thing that is of utmost importance to understand is that the Tirah Campaign was one part of a larger conflict referred to as the ‘Frontier Matter’ by Churchill, with the entire conflict revolving around suppressing tribal rebellions in the NFWP. The Tirah Campaign which was an offensive against the Afridi tribes would take place simultaneously with the offensives against Pashtun tribes in Malakand and the offensive against the Mohamand tribes.

To tackle these rebellions, the Indian Army set up 2 distinct forces – the Tirah Field Force and the Malakand Field Force.

Composition of British Indian Forces

1.     Tirah Field Force - General William Lockhart, KCB[3]

a.     1st Division – Brigadier General William Symons

                                               i.     1st Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Derbyshire Regiment
- 1st Bn The Devonshire Regiment
- 2nd/1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 30th (Punjab) Regiment 
- No. 6 British Field Hospital
- No. 34 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     2nd Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment
- 1st Bn Royal West Surrey Regiment
- 2nd Bn 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry
- Sections A, B No. 8 British Field Hospital
- Sections A, C No. 14 British Field Hospital
- No. 51 Native Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- Gurkha Scouts
- No. 1 Mountain Battery 
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery 
- No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 28th Regiment, Bombay Infantry (Pioneers)
- Two companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners
- Karpurthala Regiment
- Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers
- No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 63 Native Field Hospital

b.     2nd Division – Major General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs

                                               i.     3rd Brigade
- 1st Bn The Gordon Highlanders
- 1st Bn The Dorsetshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 15th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment
- No. 24 British Field Hospital
- No. 44 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     4th Brigade
- 2nd Bn, The King's Own Scottish Borderers
- 1st Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 36th (Sikh) Regiment Of Bengal Infantry
- Sections C, D No. 9 Field Hospital
- Sections A, B No, 23 British Field Hospital
- No. 48 Native Field Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery
- Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 21st Regiment Of Madras Infantry (Pioneers)
- No. 4 Company Madras Sappers And Miners
- Jhind Regiment 
- Sirmur Sappers
- Section B Of No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 43 Native Field Hospital

2.     Malakand Field Force – Major General Bindon Blood[4]

a.     The MFF had no divisions

b.     1st Brigade
- Royal West Kent Regiment
- Highland Light Infantry
- 31st Punjab Infantry
- 24th Punjab Infantry
- 45th Sikhs
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

c.     2nd Brigade
- The Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment)
- 35th Sikhs
- 38th Dogras
- Guides Infantry
- 4 Company Bengal Sappers
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

d.     3rd Brigade
- The Queen’s Regiment
- 22nd Punjab Infantry
- 39th Punjab Infantry
- 3 Company Bombay Sappers
- No. 1 Mountain Battery

e.     Cavalry
- 11th Bengal Lancers

 

The Tirah Field Force – Bravery of the Sikh Troops

To get to Tirah, the Force had to march through demanding terrain and the feats of bravery in combat and mountaineering of the Indian Army have been well recorded. In one instance, some 250 men of an unspecified Indian artillery regiment were told to move their guns across a mountain pass. G. A. Henty, referencing the event, describes it as a ‘splendid feat’ when the 250 Indians led by 2 British officers brought the guns by hand (their horses having gone lame or died) through the mountain pass in just a few days through immensely deep snow.

In another incident, Chamberlain describes an attack by two unspecified Indian infantry brigades on a ridgeline (Dagrai Heights) thought to be impregnable on October 18, 1897. It took the two brigades a few hours to link up but when they did, it was found that they had only taken 9 or 10 casualties. He describes also the action of 3 regiments on October 20, 1897 – the Gordon Highlanders, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the 15th Sikhs whom he credits with saving a retirement of an infantry brigade from an overwhelming counterattack by the tribesmen saying ‘the retirement was only saved from being a disaster by the coolness under fire of those fine regiments’. 

It is here worth noting that the 15th Sikhs and the Gordons had taken heavy losses in a surprise attack that very day suffering some 250 casualties among them. [5]

In another instance of bravery and complete dominance by Indian troops, a Sikh battalion was given the order to secure another height from the tribesmen. Led by a Punjabi officer with a British 2IC (2nd in Command), the Battalion overwhelmed the enemy position though they were outnumbered 5 to 1.

The Malakand Field Force – Sikh Troops Shine Again

Churchill[6] – known for his admiration of Indian and ANZAC troops in WW2 – narrates an amazing incident where a 62-man Sikh unit was surrounded and outnumbered by the enemy. The only nearby friendly force, some British cavalry, was unable to breakthrough and rescue the Sikhs. It appears that having accepted death, the bugle sounded charge and the outnumbered men rose out of their positions and – swords drawn – charged the pathans (general word for Afghan tribesmen). Not expecting this, the pathans simply ran for no known reason and the small Sikh unit cut down hundreds of the retreating Pathans.

Churchill also describes in detail the actions of a company of the 35th Sikhs which, during a defence, had become surrounded by the pathans. With the assistance of a squadron of cavalry, the Sikh troops of the 35th broke the encirclement and drove the vastly outnumbering Pathans into a small mountainous gulley where they were massacred by the Sikhs and the cavalry.

Henty, regarding the Malakand Campaign, relays the famous story of the handful of men from the 36th Sikhs that defended Fort Saragarhi against 10,000 tribesmen. However, that story deserves its own article!

 

In Conclusion

First things first; while I have only discussed Sikh troops here, they by no means were the only brave soldiers. They were simply the ones I chose to focus on. Many different regiments were named and many soldiers were equally as brave. Secondly, the point of this article, as ever, is simply to shine a light on that which was not known and to exemplify the bravery of those unsung heroes.

What do you think of the Indian Campaigns of 1897? Let us know below.

[1] Col. T. H. Holdich, ‘Tirah’, The Geographical Journal, 12:4 (October, 1898)

[2] G. A. Henty, A Story of Chitral, Tirah and Ashantee (Blackie and Son; London, 1904)

[3] https://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/indiancampaigns/tirah.htm

[4] Churchill’s work

[5] Neville Chamberlain, ‘The Tirah Campaign’, Fortnightly Review, 63:375 (March, 1898)

[6] Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (Longmans; London, 1898)

The ‘Scramble for Africa’ – Then and Now

When European nations ‘scrambled’ for territory in Africa in the 1800s, the results were catastrophic for its indigenous peoples. A new scramble is now on and the jury is still out on whether Africans will actually benefit this time. Dan McEwen looks at ‘The Scramble for Africa’, then and now.

The 1884 Berlin Conference, as illustrated in "Illustrierte Zeitung"

‘Scrambling’ Everywhere But Africa

Blame Portugal. Ranked 109th by size, little Portugal was the first European country to make it big as a colonial power. Under Prince Henry the Navigator, Portuguese merchants were well ahead of the curve in the so-called ‘Age of Exploration’. Their trading ships had long been slowly feeling their way along Africa’s west coast and by the mid-1400s, their crews were making fortunes trading in slaves, sugar and gold. 

While Christopher Columbus was famously sailing across the Atlantic in 1492 with visions of Oriental sugarplums dancing in his head, the intrepid Portuguese were defeating the Ottomans in a power struggle for control of the lucrative Arab/Indian trade routes. Victorious, they continued east, becoming the first Europeans to arrive by sea in China and then Japan. So toxic was their contact with the shogunate however, Portuguese traders were expelled in 1639 and Japan sealed itself off in two hundred years of self-imposed isolation from the West!

Another small nation, Holland, replaced the Portuguese, enabling The Dutch East India Company [VOC], to become the largest company to ever have existed in recorded history! Next came the Spanish, venturing westward from their possessions in Central America, laying claim to several Pacific islands, including the Philippines. The French, latecomers to the rush, established outposts in Indochina, Vietnam and on a sprinkling of Polynesian islands before being lapped by the British. Their world-class navy would resort to gunboat diplomacy to forcibly establish colonies in China. Later, the Germans, Americans and Russians likewise bullied their way into the Pacific. 

Back in the western hemisphere, the British and French went head-to-head for supremacy in North America even as Spanish explorers, conquerors and settlers following Columbus’ lead, headed for the Caribbean and Central and South America. In their quest for "gold, glory, and God", in that order. Hernán Cortés conquered the Aztec empire in Mexico, at a cost of 240,000 Aztec lives and Francisco Pizarro followed suite, nearly wiping out the Incas by 1572.  

"What happened after Columbus was like a thousand kudzus [weeds] everywhere,” laments author/historian Charles C. Mann.“Throughout the hemisphere, ecosystems cracked and heaved like winter ice.” 

Indeed, the impact of all this “exploration” on native populations was apocalyptic. Between 1492 and 1600, 55 million people, 90% of the indigenous populations in the Americas, died from European diseases like smallpox, measles and influenza. This traumatic population loss caused chaos among the indigenous tribes, making them even easier prey for technologically-advanced European powers. And now it was Africa’s turn.

The First ‘Scramble’

History books call it ‘The Scramble for Africa’, making it sound like an innocuous party game.  Africans call it ’The Rape of Africa’. By the mid 1800s, the European nations were elbowing each other aside in their headlong rush to plant their flag on African soil. Mostly it was about money.

As history professor Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor at New York’s City University frames it; “The European scramble and the partition and eventual conquest of Africa was motivated by ...the imperatives of capitalist industrialization, including the demand for assured sources of raw materials, the search for guaranteed markets and profitable investment outlets.”

All this ‘scrambling’ made the imperialist governments as nervous as cats that a war would breakout in Europe over some far off colonial territory. To prevent this, wily, old Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of a newly-united Germany, hosted a conference that still stands as an unparalleled act of racial and cultural arrogance. At the 1884 Berlin Conference, six European powers - Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Belgium - sat around a table and divided the so-called “Dark Continent” among themselves, redrawing the map of the continent to create 30 new colonies. 

The 110 million Africans who lived in those colonies were never consulted about the new borders. No Africans were invited to attend the conference and; “African concerns were, if they mattered at all, completely marginal to the basic economic, strategic, and political interests of the negotiating European powers,” says historian/author Thomas Pakenham. Between 1870 and 1914, “A motley band of explorers, politicians, evangelists, mercenaries, journalists and tycoons blinded by romantic nationalism or caught up in the scramble for loot, markets and slaves,” increased European control of African territory from 10 per cent in 1870 to almost 90 percent by 1914. Resistance was futile. 

Although most African rulers bitterly contested being handed over to unknown foreign powers, they were no match for rapid-fire rifles, gatling guns and field artillery. Their many battles frequently turned into one-sided massacres. Despite a stunning defeat at Isandlwana, British redcoats rallied and crushed the two million-strong Zulu nation in nine weeks. The Boers conducted a campaign of genocide against the natives who resisted their occupation, driving 24,000 of them into the desert to starve. As many as 300,000 Namibians died in a famine engineered by the German colonizers to bring them to heel. Eight million inhabitants of the Congo were exterminated by their Belgium overseers through a barbarous system of forced labor dedicated to supplying rubber for European vehicle tires. [Ethiopia and Liberia were the only countries not colonized - Ethiopia defeated an inept Italian army at Adwa in 1896, and Liberia became a country that some of the Black populations of the Americas moved to.]

From ‘Civilizing’ to Conquering

The motives the colonizers ascribed to this flagrant land-grab were rooted in a bedrock belief in their racial supremacy over the non-white, 'lesser' races of the world. “The French colonial ideology explicitly claimed that they were on a "civilizing mission" to lift the benighted natives out of backwardness to the new status of civilized French Africans.” But it was the British who proved especially adept at this pernicious snobbery, believing they had some higher calling to drag their Africa colonies into the modern world. Like the Spanish, they had a slogan: ‘Commerce, Christianity and Civilization.’ [Note its money first, civilizing last, just like the Spanish.] And it seems they still believe that. In 2014, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was unapologetic in his defense of the country’s tarnished record. “The days of Britain having to apologize for its colonial history are over. We should celebrate much of our past rather than apologize for it.” 

Tragically for Africa, it wasn’t just the Brits. “Almost without exception... [the colonization of Africa] is a story of the rankest greed enforced by disgusting levels of violence against the native Africans. In colony after colony, all the brave talk about white man’s civilization and justice and religion turned out to hypocritical garbage,” accuses professor Patrick Bond at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban.

Still other African scholars contend the partitioning of tribal lands into those 30 colonies had the most enduring affects on the African peoples. A 2016 study found that, “by splitting ethnicities across countries, the colonial border design has spurred political violence. Ethnic partitioning is systematically linked to civil conflict, discrimination by the national government, and instability. The study, which included more than 85,000 households across 20 African countries found that “members of partitioned groups have fewer household assets, poorer access to utilities, and worse educational outcomes, as compared to individuals from non-split ethnicities in the same country.” Furthermore, conflicts in partitioned lands are deadlier and last longer.

After World War Two, the victors assumed that decolonization would solve all these problems, and between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers. Alas, in state after state, the transition to independence led to violence, political turmoil, and organized revolts that only added to the misery of endemic poverty, hunger and disease. Tellingly, a comparison of 18 African countries found that only six saw economic growth after achieving independence.

Regrettably, most of the continent’s 54 countries remain devastated by; “...crippling rates of poverty, hunger, and disease.” 62% of Africans have no access to standard sanitation facilities. Only 43% have access to electricity and the internet. According to the World Health Organization, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the highest under-5 mortality rate in the world. Yet there’s a cautious optimism that Africa’s fortunes are finally about to change for the better.

The New Scramble

By the usual standards of measurement, Africa is poised on the cusp of greatness. In 2019, six of the world’s 15 fastest growing economies were in Africa. The continent has a booming population of 1.3 billion and will soon outnumber the Chinese. This brings with it a “demographic dividend”: the average age in Africa is 19, meaning there’s a huge and growing pool of labor at a time when labor forces in more advanced countries are aging fast. Importantly, a major impediment to economic development is finally being addressed.

The continent’s colonial-era infrastructure remains one of the biggest drags on economic growth. “Africa’s new national states were so small and economically weak that they could not, without giant loans, even begin to embark on the policies of national development they eagerly promised,” writes investigative journalist Lee Wengaf. No nation had the economic wherewithal resources to take on the kind of major projects – highways, railroads, power dams and sea ports – needed to compete in the global marketplace. “Hobbled with weak infrastructures...and insufficient capital to technologically advance, these economies fell increasingly behind.” 

China is changing all that. The bottomless pockets of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have already shelled out billions in funding for 200 major infrastructure projects that promise to truly modernize the continent. Beijing’s willingness to invest in Africa long-term is particularly embarrassing to those ‘civilizing” European powers who never quite got around to it. Governments and businesses from all around the world are rushing to strengthen diplomatic, strategic and commercial ties. From 2010 to 2016, more than 320 embassies were opened in African nations. Facebook and Google are madly laying rings of cables around the continent to improve internet connectivity. 

However, to many, the new scramble looks a lot like the old one. The Financial Times commented that China’s pattern of operation in Africa, “draws comparisons with Africa’s past relationship with European colonial powers, which exploited the continent’s natural resources but failed to encourage more labor-intensive industry.”

Dylan Yachyshen of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agrees, warning that; “Accompanying its ambitious infrastructure projects, Chinese state banks made massive loans to African states, employing debt-trap diplomacy that renders states subservient to Chinese interests if they cannot pay. Though China has not established colonies, the trajectory of its activity in Africa parallels that of the infancy of the ‘Scramble for Africa’.”

Iranian-American journalist and historian John Ghazvinian put it much more forcefully in Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil. “Foreign oil companies have conducted some of the world’s most sophisticated exploration and production operations…but the people of the Niger Delta have seen none of the benefits. While successive military regimes have used oil proceeds to buy mansions in Mayfair...many in the Delta live as their ancestors would have done hundreds, even thousands of years ago.”

What is to be done? Patrick Lumumba, a lawyer specializing in African laws argues persuasively that the continent’s nations must unite in a pan-African economic union similar to the EU with a single passport, a single currency and a single army as essential prerequisites for African nations to take control of their own destinies.

“We [African nations] are weak politically, we are economically weak, socially we are disorganized, culturally and spiritually we are confused. As long as we remain as we are Africa will be re-colonized in the next 25 years.” 

What do you think of the ‘Scramble for Africa’? Let us know below.

Now, read Dan’s article on the lessons from World War I here.