Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy

In Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War, Jeb Smith argues that the winner writes the history. This is evident in many ways and categories. The North propped itself up and vilified its enemy, the South. Today, we will take a look at Abraham Lincoln and race.

This is part 1 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War.

A U.S. Postage stamp issued in 1958. It commemorates the 1858 Lincoln and Douglas debates.

People are taught that Lincoln was a strong abolitionist, a champion of racial equality, and a great emancipator. They portray Lincoln as going to war to free the slaves; Lincoln advocated freedom and liberty for all; he is the savior of the Union and Constitution to boot. Lincoln was a kind, warmhearted, caring person, who never told a lie, and a great leader who united and led America to renown. This image comes perhaps from a desire for who they want him to be rather than who he was. Just as Southerners idolize their heroes, modern statists do the same with theirs, such as Lincoln. What most people think they know about Lincoln is well off the mark. We will look at his views on race below.[1]

"I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in anyway the social and political equality of the white and black races -- that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

 -Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas Debate Charleston, Illinois, September 18, 1858

I understood Lincoln as someone who desired equality for all. Instead, I found Lincoln was a white supremacist who viewed blacks as inferior beings. During a debate with Stephen A. Douglas on August 21, 1858 in Ottawa, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "Free them and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this…We cannot then make them equals." In response to the Dred Scott ruling, Lincoln said, "I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment." At the eulogy of Henry Clay in 1852, Lincoln gave a speech in which he called the declaration of independence the "The white man's charter of freedom."

Fear

Lincoln often used the N-word, and was known for his racist jokes. Abolitionist John Hume described Lincoln as "strongly prejudiced against the black man." According to Bennett's calculations, Lincoln stated publicly, at least twenty-one times, that he was opposed to equal rights for Blacks. Bennett writes, "Lincoln never pretended to be a racial liberal or a social innovator. He repeatedly said, in public and in private, that he believed in white supremacy." Lincolns close friend and biographer Ward Lamon said Lincoln had an "abhorrence of negro suffrage and negro equality." According to Lincoln, God has "Made us separate." Lincoln feared whites and blacks interbreeding. A former slave turned influential abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, spoke of Lincoln as "The white man's president." 

"Abraham Lincoln was not, in the fullest sense of the word, either our man or our model. In his interests, in his associations, in his habits of thought, and in his prejudices, he was a white man. He was preeminently the white man's President, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men. He was ready and willing at any time during the first years of his administration to deny, postpone, and sacrifice the rights of humanity in the colored people to promote the welfare of the white people of this country.…he still more strangely told us that we were to leave the land in which we were born; when he refused to employ our arms in defense of the Union; when, after accepting our services as colored soldiers… he told us he would save the Union if he could with slavery; when he revoked the Proclamation of Emancipation of General Fremont; when he refused to remove the popular commander of the Army of the Potomac, in the days of its inaction and defeat, who was more zealous in his efforts to protect slavery than to suppress rebellion; when we saw all this, and more, we were at times grieved, stunned, and greatly bewildered." 

-Frederick Douglass Oration in memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876 

"If Mr. Lincoln were really an Abolition President, which he is not; if he were a friend to the Abolition movement, instead of being, as he is, its most powerful enemy...Whoever lives through the next four years will see Mr. Lincoln and his Administration attacked more bitterly for their pro-slavery truckling, than for doing any anti-slavery work. He and his party will become the best protectors of slavery where it now is...Slavery will be as safe, and safer, in the Union under such a President, than it can be under any President of a Southern Confederacy. This is our impression, and we deeply regret the facts from which it is derived." 

-Fredrick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

According to Bennett, for over two decades in Illinois as a lawyer and politician, Lincoln never supported abolitionists, rights for blacks, or their progress in that direction. Lincoln never spoke out against the state laws that did not allow blacks to gather in large numbers, learn to read, or play percussion instruments. In 1848 Lincoln supported the Illinois state law of not allowing blacks to migrate to the state and not allowing blacks citizenship. In 1836 Lincoln voted in support of denying blacks the right to vote, and he also voted for an Illinois state law that taxed blacks without representation. In 1858 Lincoln refused to sign a bill that would allow them to testify against whites in court. In Charleston, Lincoln declared, "I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship." and "I will to the very last stand by the law of this state, which forbids the marrying of white people with Negroes"

As a lawyer, Lincoln helped defend the fugitive slave law, publicly supported the fugitive slave law, and spoke out against its repeal. Nathaniel Stephens said Lincoln had a "wholehearted, one might say, serene, support of the fugitive slave law." Ward Lamon said Lincoln was the "steady though quiet opponent of abolitionist Owen Lovejoy." Donald Riddle said: "He did not make any attempt to advocate or support anti-slavery or abolitionist messages." In 1858 Lincoln declared, "I have said a hundred times, and I have now no inclination to take it back, that I believe there is no right, and ought to be no inclination in the people of the free States to enter into the slave States, and interfere with the question of slavery at all." 

When asked what he thought of having abolitionists in his party, Lincoln said: "As long as I'm not tarred with the Abolitionist brush." Bennett quotes multiple sources, such as Lincoln's close friend General James Wadsworth saying the welfare of Blacks "didn't enter into his policy at all." Donn Piatt said Lincoln "Laughed at the abolitionist as a disturbing element easily controlled." Eli Thayer said Lincoln spoke of abolitionism "In terms of contempt and derision." Abolitionist Sumner said Lincoln "does not know how to help or is not moved to help" and "I do not remember that I have had any help from him... he has no instinct or inspiration." Abolitionist John Hume stated, "The president was in constant opposition" to abolitionism. The abolitionist Journal The Liberator editorial on July 13, 1860, called Lincoln "The slave hound of Illinois" for his support of the fugitive slave law. Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered states plainly, "Abraham Lincoln was not an abolitionist."    

Bennett argues Lincoln has received the glory that the white and black abolitionists, citizens, newspaper editors, churches, members of Congress, and pastors had worked decades for. The most prominent abolitionists in the political sphere were men like Senator Sumner, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Salmon Chase, Wendell Phillips, etc. They deserve the glory that Lincoln was falsely given. Congress were the ones that abolished slavery in the territories and authorized black troops. And the people of the states, both North and South, passed the amendment to outlaw slavery after Lincoln's death.

Forever Free From African Americans

"I wish to make and to keep the distinction between the existing institution, and the extension of it, so broad, and so clear, that no honest man can misunderstand me, and no dishonest one, successfully misrepresent me." 

-Abraham Lincoln Peoria, Illinois: October 16, 1854

Lincoln never intended to end slavery where it already existed, only the extension out into the West. In December 1860, Fredrick Douglass said, "With the single exception of the question of slavery extension, Mr. Lincoln proposes no measure which can bring him into antagonistic collision with the traffickers in human flesh, either in the States or in the District of Columbia." Lincoln did not want the West to become "An asylum for slaves and n******." On October 16, 1854, Lincoln stated, "The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these [new western] territories. We want them for the homes of free white people." 

The West was to be kept for whites to be segregated from blacks' presence, live off Republican federal land grants, and become industrial. Southern agrarians were to be fenced into the South; otherwise, they would bring their despised black slaves along. Robert Fogel summarizes the abolitionist stance by quoting William Seward and Owen Lovejoy, among others, as "They were quite sincere when they assured voters that as "True republicans" they "Cared nothing for the N*****" and that the republican party aimed to make white labor respectable and honorable by keeping negroes, free and slave, out of the West." In Lincoln Unmasked, Professor Thomas DiLorenzo quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson saying, "It is the black man whom the abolitionist wishes to abolish, not slavery."

Western expansion

Ward Lamon said that originally Lincoln was not against slavery in all the western territories, only those north of the 36°30′ degrees line. However, abolitionists threatened to pull support for his election unless he stood against all western expansion. Lamon also tells us that Lincoln would rather see slavery expanded than "See the union dissolved." Lamon said of Lincoln, "It was therefore as a white man, and in the interest of white men, that he threw himself into the struggle to keep blacks out of the Territories. He did not want them there either as slaves or freemen…" Bennett quotes Lincoln warning whites that if slavery was allowed in the territories, "Negro equality will be abundant, as every white laborer will have occasion to regret when he is elbowed from his plow or his anvil by slave n******." According to DiLorenzo, Indiana (which voted for Lincoln) despised blacks so much that they gave out a $500 fine to anyone who encouraged blacks to come within their state. And ten years of prison for marrying a black. Illinois senator Lyman Trumbull, quoted by DiLorenzo, said, "Our people want nothing to do with the negro." It seems Republicans believed in a form of secession based on race rather than states.

"We, the Republican Party, are the white man's party. We are for the free white man, and for making white labor acceptable and honorable, which it can never be when Negro slave labor is brought into competition with it." 

-Lyman Trumbull Illinois Republican, United States Senator Quoted in The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War by Kenneth M. Stampp Oxford U Press 1981

Republicans did not care for equality with blacks, and they wanted separation from them. The Northern whites worked hardest to be segregated from the presence of blacks, while southerners worked with, ate with, lived with, played with,  and went to church with blacks.

"Many of those attaching themselves to the Republican party...were not in sympathy with Abolitionism. They were utterly opposed to immediate emancipation, or for that matter, to emancipation of any kind. They wanted slavery to remain where it was, and were perfectly willing that is should be undisturbed. They disliked the blacks, and did not want to have them freed, fearing that if set at liberty they would overrun what was then free soil."        

-John F Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

The fight over the extension of slavery was political. Northern industrialists needed the West free of blacks and agricultural interests. Dr. Charles Pace wrote in Lincoln As He Really Was, "Lincoln was an abolitionist when it suited him." And "Abolitionist activity was rising fast, fueled by northern capitalist and political interests needing an issue to neutralize the agrarian south." Lincoln and northern whites would fight against its extension into the West when it was politically helpful. Secretary of  State William Seward said: "The motive of those who protested against the extension of slavery had always really been a concern for the welfare of the white man, and not an unnatural sympathy for the negro." They had less concern with slaves in the South; as John Hume wrote of Lincoln, "He was opposed to slavery more because it was a public nuisance than because of its injustice to the oppressed black man."

"To protect, defend, and perpetuate slavery in the states where it existed Abraham Lincoln was not less ready than any other President to draw the sword of the nation. He was ready to execute all the supposed guarantees of the United States Constitution in favor of the slave system anywhere inside the slave states. He was willing to pursue, recapture, and send back the fugitive slave to his master, and to suppress a slave rising for liberty, though his guilty master were already in arms against the Government. The race to which we belong were not the special objects of his consideration."                                   

-Frederick Douglass Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln April 14, 1876

Before military defeats and public opinion began to change, abolitionists were condemned by the President. When Union general John Fremont emancipated slaves in federal occupied Missouri, Lincoln recalled the orders and relieved Fremont of his command. When Union general David Hunter issued general order number 11, declaring all slaves in SC/GA/FL to be "Forever free," Lincoln revoked the proclamation. Hunter was then pressured into disbanding the regiment made up of freed slaves he had begun to form. Late in 1862, Lincoln supported slavery continuing in Union-held territory in V.A and L.A and encouraging the slave owners to peacefully come back into the Union. Mark Neely JR wrote that in 1861, "He more than once actually forced others who were trying to free slaves to cease doing so." Not surprising when Lincolns' wife, Mary, was from a slave-owning family in Kentucky. In August 1862, Adam Gurowski summer up Lincoln's actions writing in his diary, "The president is indefatigable in his efforts to save slavery." 

Even after the war, Lincoln, the North, and the Republicans maintained slavery in states like Delaware and Kentucky. Lincoln had no problem calling on men from the slave states of the Upper South to suppress the rebellion in the Cotton States. 

"The Republican party does not propose to abolish slavery anywhere and is decidedly opposed to Abolition agitation. It is not even, by the confession of its President-elect, in favor of the repeal of that thrice-accursed and flagrantly unconstitutional Fugitive Slave Bill of 1850." 

-Frederick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, December 1860

In his book Battle Hymns; the Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War, Christian McWhirter quotes Federal general Phillip Kearny who said, "I think as much of a rebel as I do of an abolitionist." Today we have presented to us the idea of Northern tolerance and southern bigotry, but the reality was something else entirely. 

Abraham Lincoln the Great Emancipator? 

"If Mr. Lincoln had been told, when he entered on the Presidency, that before his term of office would expire he would be hailed as "The Great Emancipator," he would have treated the statement as equal to one of his own best jokes."

 -John Hume The Abolitionists 1830-1864 G.P Putnam's Sons NY London Knickerbocker Press 1905 

"Never did a man achieve more fame for what he did not do and for what he never intended to do," writes Bennett. Today we are brought up to believe the Emancipation Proclamation (E.P.) was part of the desired agenda to end slavery by Abraham Lincoln. Or worse, we are told with this presidential Proclamation; that all slaves were made forever free. Thus Lincoln was the great emancipator who ended slavery. But that story is far from the truth. 

The E.P. did not apply to slavery within the United States, and it did not free a single slave. According to Hume, Missouri abolitionists wanted the Proclamation applied to their state, and Lincoln refused the request. Instead, the E.P. applied only to Confederate-controlled areas and not to the Northern slave states still in the Union. A Confederate state only had to rejoin the Union, and slavery would be protected. Hume writes, "It was not ...intended to help the slave but to chastise the master. It was to be in  punishment of treason…The proclamation, it will be recollected, was issued in two parts separated by one hundred days. The first part gave the Rebels warning that the second would follow if, in the meanwhile, they did not give up their rebellion. All they had to do to save slavery was cease their treasonable practices." William Seward said of Lincoln's proclamation, "Where he could, he didn't. Where he did, he couldn't." The London Spectator, on October 11, 1862, read, "The Union government liberates the enemy's slaves as it would the enemy's cattle, simply to weaken them in the conflict. The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States." 

The Proclamation would end with the war, and any slave freed by it would become subject to local state laws. The document did not apply to the legality of slavery. Lincoln wrote, it was "Merely a war measure" and "Have effect only from its being an exercise of war power." Lincoln stated, "It would have no effect upon the children of the slaves born hereafter."

The Proclamation was given at the end of 1862 after the North suffered multiple setbacks. Some viewed it as an act of desperation. Lincoln gave the Proclamation as a war measure, "As a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion." The war lasted longer than anticipated, and abolitionists put pressure on Lincoln; states threatened to withhold men and their support unless Lincoln helped the Northern war effort by going after slavery to weaken the South. Lincoln and his cabinet were concerned that a rebellion would start in the North if they did not begin emancipation and certainly did not want to lose some of their most ardent supporters.

Others said its purpose was to encourage slave revolts in the South. To encourage slaves to arise and kill women, children, and masters in a revolution while the men fought at the front. The Harrisonburg Patriot and Union newspaper called it a "Cold-blooded invitation to insurrection and butchery." Of course, many slaves, innocent women, and children would be killed if an uprising happened, but it was endorsed so long as it helped bring traitors under the master's authority in D.C.

The Emancipation Proclamation

The E.P. was not Lincoln’s desire, but he was "forced into glory," as Bennett would say. Bennet quotes Lincoln, "I am driven to it." And he said he had great "reluctance" about beginning emancipation. Abolitionists set up a meeting for September 24 with a plan to withhold support for the war and to call on Lincoln to resign. Knowing this meeting and the growing feeling amongst various state governors and the people, Lincoln issued the preliminary Proclamation just two days before the meeting. Lincoln said on July 12, "The pressure in this direction [immediate emancipation] is still upon me and is increasing." Lincoln said, "For a length of time, it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure." Lincoln scholar David Donald in Lincoln Reconsidered quotes Lincoln writing an admirer, saying, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess that events have controlled me." In his diary, Adam Gurowski wrote, "The patriots of both houses... the American people whipped Mr. Lincoln into the glory of having issued the emancipation proclamation." Bennett described the E.P in complete contradiction to how many school children understand it when he wrote, “The high point of a brilliant campaign in favor of slavery not freedom, and was designed not to emancipate all slaves immediately but to protect the emancipation of all slaves." 

As Bennett shows in his book, the E.P. was a conservative pushback against the radicals. On July 17, 1862, congress passed the second confiscation act. This act declared all rebel slaves in the confederacy "Forever free." On September 22, 1862, Lincoln signed the preliminary emancipation nullifying the emancipation act of congress, re-enslaving slaves. The emancipation proclamation did not free slaves in the United States, and it did not free any slave that the confiscation act would not have. It was a reaction to the radical abolitionists in congress. As Bennett writes, "The proclamation had as its purpose and effect the checking of the radical [abolitionist] program." 

Both DiLorenzo's Lincoln Unmasked and Bennett correct multiple false quotes attributed to Lincoln or those taken out of context to claim he was an abolitionist or desired equality among the races. I would recommend both authors to those interested. I will let Lincoln's close friend and admirer Ward Lamon sum up Lincoln's opinions on the emancipation proclamation.

"He did so with avowed reluctance...he never at any time favored the admission of negroes into the body of electors...he claimed that those who were incidentally liberated by the federal arms were poor-spirited, lazy and slothful...he longed to see them transported to Hayti, central America, Africa, or anywhere so that they might in no event, and in no way, participate in the government of his country...he was no Abolitionist in the popular sense."

-Ward Lamon The Life Of Abraham Lincoln From His Birth To His Inauguration As President James R. Osgood And Company, 1872

The Corwin Amendment

As Professor DiLorenzo points out, the previously proposed 13th amendment was called the Corwin Amendment; and it was something Lincoln supported. The amendment would forever allow slavery in the United States and make it unconstitutional to abolish it. It reads:

No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

In Lincoln's first inaugural address, he supported the amendment saying, "holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." According to DiLorenzo, Lincoln then sent a letter to the governors of the states transmitting the approved amendment. He told New York Senator William Seward to advocate for it in the Senate. He also instructed Seward to pass a federal law that would repeal the personal liberty laws in some Northern states used to nullify the federal Fugitive Slave Act. DiLorenzo sees Lincoln's inaugural address as the most pro-slavery speech given by a president. 

"Lincoln's first inaugural address...is probably the most powerful defense of slavery ever made by an American politician. In the speech Lincoln denies having any intention to interfere with Southern slavery; supports the federal Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, which compelled citizens of non-slave states to capture runaway slaves; and also supported a constitutional amendment known as the Corwin Amendment that would have prohibited the federal government from ever interfering in Southern slavery." 

-Thomas DiLorenzo The Lincoln Myth: Ideological Cornerstone of the America Empire LewRockwell.com 

Lincoln the Ultimate Segregationist

"Horrified at the thought of the mixing blood by the white and black races: agreed for once---a thousand times agreed... A separation of the races is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation...Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization; ... Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be."

-Abraham Lincoln Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 2 Speech at Springfield, Illinois June 26, 1857

Lincoln never wanted slaves freed and made equal. Instead, he wanted to make America white from "Sea to shining sea," as Bennett stated. He promoted the removal of slaves from America back to Africa. In his July 17th 1858 speech in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln stated, "What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races." The same year at Ottawa, he declared, "If all earthly power were given  me...my first impulse would be to free all the slaves and send them to Liberia."

It is true that Lincoln disliked slavery, but not as much as white and blacks living together. So Lincoln spent many thousands of tax dollars on his colonization plan to send the future freed slaves back to Africa. He either wanted them deported or in their all-black state. While in the White House, he held a meeting with free blacks; he asked them to lead by example for future freed slaves. 

"You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffer very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side….It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated…You may believe you can live in Washington or elsewhere in the United States the remainder of your life [as easily], perhaps more so than you can in any foreign country… an extremely selfish view of the case. There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain with us."

-Abraham Lincoln Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes August 14, 1862, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Volume 5.Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865

Conclusion

According to our "greatest" president, for the good of humanity, free blacks should lead by example and go live in a foreign country. As a member of the Illinois legislature, Lincoln urged the legislature "To appropriate money for colonization in order to remove Negroes from the state and prevent miscegenation." In 1853 Lincoln gave a speech to the Springfield colonization society; his colonization plan would "Free slave holders from the troublesome presence of free Negroes." When pushing for his colonization plan, he said, "Where there is a will, there is a way." 

He promoted three aspects of his agenda. Gradual emancipation, compensation to slave owners, and colonization in Africa or Central America. His friend Henry Whitney said there was nothing besides preserving the Union that Lincoln felt more important. Ward Lamon said Lincoln "Zealously and persistently devised plans for the deportation of the negro." In the diary of Gideon Welles, we read, "Following the preliminary Proclamation, and as part of the plan…was the deportation and colonization of the colored race."

In Lincoln’s first state of the Union address, he suggested free blacks be included in his colonization plan when he said: "It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization." Lincoln called for three constitutional amendments for gradual emancipation, compensation, and colonization in his second inaugural address. He stated, "I cannot make it better known than it already is that I strongly favor colonization." On December 31, 1862, Lincoln signed a contract to send 500 American-born Negroes to an island off the coast of Haiti; many died, and the survivors were brought back to America. Until his death, Lincoln negotiated with European nations to deport blacks to Africa. 

"Mr. Lincoln is quite a genuine Representative of American prejudiced and negro hatred and far more concerned for the preservation of slavery...showing all his inconsistencies, his pride of race and blood, his contempt for Negroes and his canting hypocrisy…Mr. Lincoln takes care in urging his colonization scheme to furnish a weapon to all the ignorant and base."

 -Frederick Douglass The Life and Writings of Fredrick Douglass International Publishers Co 1950

In short, Lincoln was the ultimate segregationist. He didn't just want blacks removed from schools, restaurants, and work areas; he wanted them removed from the country. 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Collapse of the Bison Population in the US: Evaluating the Legislation of HR. 921

Over the course of the 19th century a significant environmental cataclysm befell the United States’ Great Plains. The bison which roamed the plains for millennia went from a population ranging between 30-50 million in the early 1800s to less than 1,000 at the turn of the century. Multiple historiographical traditions exist in attempting to discern what occurred and what ultimately spelled the death knell for the great buffalo herds, however, the importance of consulting primary sources can still elucidate greater understanding in comprehending the complexity of the rapid downfall of the bison.

Roy Williams explains.

Indians hunting the bison by Karl Bodmer.

For the last century, images of bison carcasses and skeletons piled high have haunted the memories of American conservationists. Artistic renderings such as American Progress by John Gast which shows the steady retreat of the bison and the Native Americans who depended upon it at the march of civilization as a hallmark of the ideology of manifest destiny. Artistic renderings also show the wanton mass killing of bison from settlers shooting the animals from trains for cheap thrills. What then caused this massive collapse of the bison populations? The answer, like most of is buried within a labyrinth of complex interactions.

Popular mythology has created a narrative built upon the legacy of the Indian Wars and the genocidal heritage of United States policy towards Native Americans in arguing that the Reconstruction era United States government willfully and intentionally sought to destroy the bison as a form of ecocide and biological warfare against Great Plains Native Americans tribes in attempting to cut off their primary form of subsistence and force them into state sponsored subservience in reservations. While Native Americans of the Great Plains had always depended on the bison as a supplemental source of food, before the introduction of European horses and diseases, they primarily depended upon agriculture. The addition of European diseases such as smallpox forced Great Plains Native Americans to adapt and reconfigure their way of life to nomadic sole dependence upon the bison for subsistence, trade, and political autonomy. This change put additional stress on an animal population which already had to contend with the dynamic and volatile nature of the Great Plains environment. Each year natural factors such as wolf predation, disease, and drought significantly reduced bison numbers. The introduction of European horses also dramatically increased hunting efficiency leading to greater harvests and additional pressure on herd populations. These numbers could rebound with steady levels of human predation but could not endure multiple upheavals which would ultimately lead to their near extinction.

Phillip Sheridan

One of the most frequently cited primary source examples of United States government complicity in destroying the bison is the 1875 speech of Phillip Sheridan before the Texas legislature. Supposedly, the Texas legislature was considering conservation measures and protections for bison to reduce the number of market hunters who were driving the southern herd to near extinction. Phillip Sheridan is cited as appearing before the legislature to oppose these protections arguing that,

 “These men [buffalo hunters] have done more in the last two years, and will do in the next year, more to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular Army has done in the last thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary; it is well known that an army losing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage. For the sake of lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated. Then your prairies can be covered with speckled cattle and festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of an advanced civilization.”

The only problem with this primary source rests in the reality that Phillip Sheridan never appeared before the Texas Legislature in 1875 because there never was any consideration by the Texas legislature to protect the southern bison herd. No archival data supports this primary source as being legitimate, the only appearance of this source rests in the memoirs of a hide hunter named John Cooke, with The Border and the Buffalo multiple years after the supposed encounter. More troubling however, is the reality of another primary source which flies directly in the face of historiographical traditions claiming a conspiratorial link between United States government’s policy against the bison.

Legislation

The legislation of HR. 921 stands as one of the most important primary sources in reconsidering the collapse of the bison populations. If the United States government intentionally committed a conspiracy of destroying the bison to force Great Plains into subservience on the reservation system, why did both the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in 1874 introduce a bill to regulate the hunting of bison only to Native Americans? Congressman Fort of Illinois introduced the bill with the goal of stopping the early extermination of the bison, recognizing that bison were “killed every year in utter wantonness without any object whatever except to destroy them.”  The fact that H.R. 921 passed in the House with a tally of 132 ayes and the nays remaining uncounted, shows that there was ample interest in protecting the bison from the onslaught of illegal hide hunters. H.R. 921 was designed to protect bison and give favorable hunting rights to Native Americans, stating, “That it shall hereafter be unlawful for any person who is not an Indian to kill, wound, or in any manner destroy any female buffalo, of any age.”

H.R. 921 ultimately failed to pass, dying at President Grant’s desk due to a pocket veto, however the significance of its passage in both the house of Representatives and Senate cannot be understated. The most likely culprit of the collapse of the bison of the Great Plains rests in the ascendancy of market hunting. For a time, it was profitable to hunt bison on a vast industrial scale. These hunts prioritized female bison for their tongues and robes providing the best meat and the best quality leather for production. The industrial revolution occurring in the east fueled the need for more leather products putting unsustainable strain on the bison populations. For a time, bison boomtowns popped up overnight in the northwest territories trading goods at extortionate rates to Native Americans who had honed and perfected their hunting techniques and could trade bison materials for these goods. This interaction in addition to the larger share of market hunting by white hide hunters ultimately spelled doom for the bison populations. The reason for this conclusion is not revolutionary in nature, the bison followed the same trends as any other animal in the United States that experienced the pressures of market hunting. The beaver of the northeast and northwestern United States was reduced to virtual extinction from market hunting. The whitetail deer and alligator of the southeast were also led to near extinction from the combined forces of deforestation and market hunting which prioritized meat and leather over the preservation of animal species. The collapse of the bison provides a cautionary tale of the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon the natural environment. Without the presence of clear and strict conservation measures, environmental cataclysm can and will occur again. Rather than being a story of intentional and willful political malevolence, the tale of the bison represents the dangers that unregulated capitalism can inflict upon nature.

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References

Dodge, Richard Irving. The Hunting Grounds of the Great West. 1877. The Newberry Library. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.americanwest.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Detail/the-hunting-grounds-of-the-great-west.-a-description-of-the-plains-game-and-indians-of-the-great-north-american-desert/4455563?item=4455597.

Flores, Dan. The Natural West. University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.

Gast, John. American Progress. Oil on canvas. Brooklyn, New York: Autry Museum of the American West, 1872.

Geist, Valerius. Buffalo Nation. Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 1996.

Isenberg, Andrew C. The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Kindy, Dave. “How Buffalo Bill and a Civil War General saved Yellowstone National Park.” The Washington Post, March, 6, 2022.

Krech, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History. New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.

Library of Congress. The Far West-Shooting Buffalo on the Line of the Kansas-Pacific Railroad. 1871. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington D.C. Accessed July 2, 2024. https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c33890/?st=image.

Meriwether, Lewis, and William Clark, Jonathan Carver, and Alexander Mackenzie. The Travels of Capts. Lewis & Clarke. Philadelphia: Hubbard Lester, 1809.

Protection of Buffalo. HR 921. 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, Pt.3: 2104-2109.

Ramsay, Crooks. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 1849, 31sr Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 550), 1022.

Sandoz, Mari. The Buffalo Hunters. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1978.

Wade, Mason. The Journals of Francis Parkman. vol 2 New York: Harper, 1947.

The 1864 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House in the US Civil War

The 1864 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House was the second major battle in the Overland Campaign during the US Civil War. Following the inconclusive Battle of the Wilderness, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's army disengaged and strategically shifted to the southeast, to lure Lee into battle under more favorable conditions. Grant was committed to advancing after the Wilderness, recognizing that Lincoln’s presidency depended on the outcome. Given Spotsylvania's location at the southernmost point of the Wilderness, it was unsurprising that this town became the next target. The timing of Grant's move, however, remained the solitary uncertainty.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The 1864 Battle of Spottsylvania. By Kurz & Allison.

The Union forces consisted of approximately 100,000 troops from the Army of the Potomac (AoP), led by General George Meade, and an additional 15,000 soldiers from the independent IX Corps, commanded by General Ambrose Burnside. Both Meade and Burnside reported to General Grant, who oversaw the entire operation. On the opposing side, General Robert E Lee's Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) was estimated to have around 55,000 men, having suffered approximately 11,000 casualties during the Wilderness battle. Notably, two of the three corps within Lee's army had temporary commanders due to illness and injury: Second Corps under Maj  Gen AP Hill would be led by Maj Gen Jubal Early due to Hill’s illness, and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson would replace Lt. Gen. James Longstreet in command of the First Corps following his wounding on May 6. Third Corps remained under Gen Richard Ewell’s command. Lee visited A.P. Hill's headquarters and found him very ill in bed. He had considered Early to replace the wounded Longstreet but decided to promote R H. Anderson who had previously been in the I Corps before Jackson's death. With Hill sick Lee assigned Early temporary command of the III Corps. Gordon was promoted to command Early's division.

All these arrangements were temporary. Hill returned to command the III Corps and Early returned to his division and Gordon was assigned Johnson's division. When Ewell was sent to command the Richmond district, Early was promoted to command the II Corps and Ramseur took Early's division.

General Lee found himself uncertain about Grant's intentions after the Wilderness. Reconnaissance revealed that the river crossing equipment at Germanna Ford across the Rappahannock River was removed, indicating that Grant did not plan to withdraw as his predecessors had done. This left Lee contemplating whether the Union Army was heading east toward Fredericksburg or moving south. Lee recognized the significance of the crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House, which served as the intersection between Brock Road and the road leading to Fredericksburg, and hence was a central point for either destination.

Lee instructed his artillery chief to construct a road through the woods, connecting the Confederate position at the Wilderness to the Catharpin Road leading south. Although Lee did not emphasize the need for urgency, General Anderson and his troops were eager to leave behind the devastation of the burning forest and corpses in the Wilderness, prompting them to commence their march around 10 pm on May 7th. The arrival of the ANV at the critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House just moments before the AoP was a result of a delay in the Union movement and the construction of the road by the Confederates.

May 7

On the evening of May 7th, Grant issued orders for the AoP to commence their march towards Spotsylvania Court House. The overarching strategy devised by General Grant aimed to interpose his forces between the ANV and Richmond and to engage Lee in an open region so he could take advantage of his numerical superiority.

Grant ordered an advance along two separate routes to reach Spotsylvania Court House, which lay approximately 10 miles to the southeast. One of these routes, the more direct path, was assigned to Warren's V Corps, who would proceed along the Brock Road. Following closely behind them was Maj Gen Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps. Maj Gen John Sedgwick's VI Corps was directed to head towards Chancellorsville via the Orange Plank Road, before eventually turning south. Burnside's IX Corps was bringing up the rear, following the same route as Sedgwick's forces.

May 8

Confederate Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was ordered to prevent the Federals from reaching Spotsylvania. Fitzhugh Lee led a division of Stuart's cavalry in a fierce battle against the Union cavalry for control of the Brock Road that lasted 2 days. The Union troopers faced additional difficulties in clearing the road due to obstacles. Meanwhile, Wade Hampton and Rooney Lee's cavalrymen halted the progress of Colonel J. Irvin Gregg's brigade at Corbin's Bridge on the Catharpin Road. Another confrontation unfolded between Wesley Merritt's Union division and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, who had taken positions behind barricades on Brock Road, approximately a mile south of Todd's Tavern. Intense fighting ensued, leading to a stalemate by late afternoon. Todd’s Tavern was at the crossroads of Brock Road and Catharpin Road. This was the finish line of the race; for the army with control of this junction, Spotsylvania was just a bit down the road. That is why the indirect route Burnside & Sedgwick took was so critical: that route takes them beyond Todd’s Tavern without going through the intersection there, or to take an eastern or southern flanking. It means that Todd’s Tavern is an inherently unholdable base.

As darkness fell, General Sheridan decided to halt the advance and ordered his men to set up camp at Todd's Tavern. The first Union infantry began moving at 8 pm, but their advance was plagued by traffic jams. When Meade reached Todd's Tavern after midnight he was infuriated to see Sheridan's sleeping cavalrymen and ordered them to resume their road-clearing operation.

General Lee's forces were compelled to retreat from Todd's Tavern and regrouped at a strategically advantageous position called Laurel Hill, located on the south side of the Brock Road. This hill was the last defensible position north of Spotsylvania, and losing it would also mean surrendering control of the crucial crossroads at the courthouse. Fortunately for the Confederates, Anderson arrived at Spotsylvania on the morning of May 8, positioning his troops within two miles of Laurel Hill, which was a low ridge just south of the Spindle farm clearing.

Meade ordered the infantry to attack the cavalry positions. Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery valiantly defended the Alsop farm, causing a delay in the Union's advancement. Meanwhile, the cavalrymen established a defensive line on Laurel Hill. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, Lee called upon Anderson's infantry, who had already reached the Block House Bridge on the Po River and were having breakfast. Anderson promptly dispatched two infantry brigades and an artillery battalion.

Laurel Hill was the Confederate center of gravity; if they could push their way beyond, it would put Lee on the defensive with fewer and less bloodshed would be loss.  The Union high command did not know how many soldiers had filtered through to Laurel Hill when they originally arrived. The Confederates beat them there by a matter of minutes. If there was not a delaying action by the Confederates the Union would have easily beat them to it because the Confederates had a head start to Spotsylvania due to their interior lines and had unintentionally began withdrawing after the fire in the forest at the Wilderness.

Union Major General Gouverneur K. Warren was under the impression that Spotsylvania was within his reach, and led his Fifth Corps up the hill. To his surprise, he encountered Anderson's corps opposing him, which had arrived at Laurel Hill just as Warren's troops approached from the north, coming within 100 yards. Warren's attempts to push back the Confederates were met with significant casualties, leading both sides to begin fortifying their positions.

Later in the day, Sedgwick's VI Corps arrived near Laurel Hill and extended Warren's line to the east. At 7 pm both corps launched a coordinated assault, but they were met with heavy enemy fire and were unable to make significant progress. They tried to maneuver around Anderson's right flank, only to be caught off guard by the arrival of divisions from Ewell's Second Corps, who were there to repel them once again. Meade had lost the race despite having the inside track, based on the existing roads.

The ensuing disagreement between Meade and Sheridan regarding the effectiveness of the cavalry arm and its role in the movement sparked a quarrel. Sheridan firmly believed that he could defeat Stuart if given the opportunity. When this was reported to Grant, he responded, "Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it." This sequence of events led to the Battle of Yellow Tavern, but was also responsible for the absence of Union cavalry for the remainder of the battle at Spotsylvania, which would delay a full comprehension of the battlefield.

While Warren's unsuccessful attack on Laurel Hill was taking place on the morning of May 8, Hancock's II Corps had reached Todd's Tavern and established defensive positions on the Catharpin Road, protecting the rear of the Union army.

May 9

Grant made several attempts to break the Confederate line over the next few days, employing various strategies. The Union troops also began entrenching themselves as they prepared for the ongoing battle. On the night of May 8, the outnumbered Confederate forces entrenched along a 4-mile stretch, adopting a defensive strategy that would become a hallmark of this battle and continue to be utilized well into the 20th century. The Confederate line extended from the Po River, encompassing the Laurel Hill line, crossing the Brock Road, forming a horseshoe shape, and extending south beyond the courthouse intersection. However, the exposed salient known as the "Mule Shoe," which extended over a mile in front of the main line, posed a vulnerability in this arrangement. Despite this, it was deemed necessary to incorporate the high ground to Anderson's right.

Tragically, during the inspection of his VI Corps line, Sedgwick was fatally shot by a Confederate sharpshooter using a Whitworth rifle from a distance of approximately 1000 feet. Sedgwick's death was instantaneous, occurring shortly after he famously remarked, "... they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."

Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps to cross the Po River and locate Lee's left flank. However, upon noticing Hancock's movement, Lee swiftly shifted two divisions to counter the Union forces at Block House Bridge, successfully forcing them to retreat across the river. When Hancock advanced, he saw that the Confederates were heavily entrenched and did not attack. This delay led to the kind of set-piece battle Lee was expert in.

Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox's division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan's cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee's right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.

May 10

Grant conducted a series of probing assaults along the entire length of the Confederate line in an attempt to identify weaknesses. He observed that Lee had concentrated his forces in front of Hancock's position, effectively controlling both Block House Bridge and the southern area of the Po. Jubal Early launched an attack on General Barlow's position, which forced Hancock to shift his corps westward for support. Consequently, Warren found himself alone facing Laurel Hill and was eager to launch an immediate attack. However, the presence of a grove of dead pine trees obstructed the assault, diminishing its impact.

Upton’s Attack

On the Union left Colonel Emory Upton’s brigade faced the Mule Shoe, with Burnside positioned on his flank. The Mule Shoe, located on the right side of the Confederate line, protruded beyond the rest of the trenches, making it a vulnerable point in Lee's defenses at Spotsylvania. The Mule Shoe's western edge later became infamous as the "Bloody Angle."

Colonel Emory Upton gained recognition for his successful leadership in attacking entrenched positions during the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House. He introduced a novel tactic for assaulting Confederate entrenchments, which foreshadowed the trench warfare strategies employed in World War I. Instead of the traditional method of advancing slowly in wide battle lines and firing at the enemy, Upton devised a novel strategy. Instead of adhering to the traditional formation, he organized his regiments into a three-by-four-column arrangement, opting not to halt and fire while crossing the field, but rather to charge directly ahead.  Instead of having his troops fire as they advanced, Upton organized his brigade to charge the enemy's position in columns, without pausing to engage in gunfire. The primary objective was to swiftly reach the enemy's fortifications, aiming to overpower them before they could mount a strong defense. The objective was to overwhelm the defenders in a specific sector by rapidly advancing with a large number of troops, without pausing to reload and fire. Referred to as the "stacking method of attack," this approach involved engaging the enemy in close combat using bayonets and rifle butts, rather than wasting time on firing shots.

Emory Upton’s improvised charge at Spottsylvania had a profound impact on the course of the Civil War and revolutionized the tactics employed in warfare. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the traditional infantry tactic of advancing in a long line, he opted for a different strategy. It was widely recognized that the conventional two-line attack, known as "Close Order," was highly vulnerable to artillery fire when executed across an exposed field. The high casualties sustained during such attacks resulted in diminished effectiveness at the focal point of the assault. Not only did this approach result in a significantly reduced number of soldiers reaching the enemy's fortifications, but even if the entrenchments were breached, there were insufficient forces to break the line or hold it against a counterattack.

Upton's innovative approach was inspired during a reconnaissance mission alongside Lieutenant Ranald MacKenzie, a young engineer. MacKenzie had been assigned the task of identifying a suitable location for Upton's regiments to strike the Confederate line. Earlier in the day, Union infantrymen had successfully pushed back a portion of the Confederate skirmish line, which was defended by Brigadier General George Doles' Georgia brigade. Doles, however, failed to reestablish the line, granting MacKenzie and Upton an unobstructed view of the enemy's position. Upon observation, they noticed a sharp swale on their right, partially shielding them from a battery of Richmond Howitzers positioned within Doles' line. Additionally, the presence of a ridge directly ahead provided ample cover for the advancing Union forces as they traversed the open field.

Upton devised a brilliant strategy that set his plan apart from previous military tactics employed during the Civil War. Rather than send all of his men in one large charge (e.g., Pickett’s Charge), or en echelon (e.g., Hood and Longstreet on day 2 at Gettysburg), or in waves (e.g., Fredericksburg), Upton opted for a more calculated approach. He intended to provide substantial support for the attack by moving his column forward, breaking through the Rebel line, and holding the ground long enough for additional troops to exploit the breach. To ensure the success of his assault, Upton ordered an artillery bombardment on the targeted line and prepared his men to charge across an open field. One might question the efficacy of this compact formation, as it seemingly remained susceptible to artillery fire, particularly from the flank. Yet, the specific topography of the Mule Shoe battlefield played a crucial role in making this alignment the right choice.

However, despite his meticulous planning, an unforeseen event occurred that disrupted his strategy. Prior to Upton's planned attack, Major General Governeur Warren, commander of the V Corps, made an appeal to George Meade, urging him to initiate the assault ahead of schedule at 4 p.m. Unfortunately, Warren's attack was repelled, causing a delay in Upton's scheduled attack time. This delay was a result of a lack of communication, as no one informed Gershom Mott, who was supposed to provide support for Upton's assault. Consequently, Mott advanced against the tip of the Mule Shoe Salient, assuming he was coordinating with Upton, only to face defeat like Warren. Regrettably, Upton remained unaware of Mott's failed attempt.

Finally, at 6:10 p.m. on May 10, 1864, Upton's men commenced their assault. Upton led a force of twelve regiments against the salient. His men advanced in a line of columns, with rifles unloaded, bayonets fixed, and marching at a rapid pace. Initially, their attack successfully penetrated the center of the Mule Shoe, but the intense fighting that ensued made it difficult to hold the ground. The success of the assault relied heavily on the supporting regiments also launching their attacks to secure the salient. However, due to the allocation of all available troops to other fronts, Upton's supporting regiments were unable to join the assault. As a result, Upton was compelled to withdraw his forces due to the enemy's artillery fire and the increasing arrival of Confederate reinforcements.

Upton ordered the artillery bombardment of the line he was going to attack. He readied his men to charge 200 yards across an open field. Realizing that advances in musketry had made obsolete the centuries-old infantry tactic of having troops attack in a long line, firing—and being slaughtered—as they went, he chose a different approach. Upton decided that his brigade would rush the enemy fortifications in columns, without slowing to stop and fire. The idea was to reach the enemy as quickly as possible.

Upton's forces managed to breach the first two lines of advanced rifle pits, successfully overpowering the defenders. Upton's attack carried the first two lines of advanced rifle pits but became bogged down within the main Confederate position. Engaging in intense hand-to-hand combat, the attacking units resorted to bayonets and rifle butts as they struggled to unleash volleys of fire. The lack of command and coordination within the attacking units made it difficult to sustain the assault. While waiting for reinforcements, it became evident that the timing of Mott's support attack was premature, resulting in a disjointed and piecemeal offensive. Ultimately, they were overpowered and had to retreat.. It was clear that had his support group charged with him, he would have held the position.

Despite the ultimate failure of the assault, Upton's innovative approach to advancing against entrenched positions garnered recognition and praise. His promotion to brigadier general on the same evening highlighted the significance of his strategic breakthrough. The linear infantry attack, a centuries-old tactic, was rendered obsolete by Upton's successful demonstration of a more effective method. Grant, observing the battle, gained valuable insights from Upton's assault, which influenced his subsequent plans 2 days later. Building upon Upton's concept, Hancock modified and implemented the columnar assault strategy.

Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox's division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan's cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee's right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.

May 11

Although the previous day’s battle had not gone well, Grant now better understood the line that Lee was defending, and he was optimistic that Upton’s innovative concept would work if supported, and if accomplished with an entire corps. To move his line around to make such an attack, he spent much of May 11 moving Hancock closer to the Mule Shoe while having Burnside attack the eastern side of the salient.

Grant’s optimism is encapsulated in his often-cited report to Secretary Stanton that although his losses were high, so were the enemies, and that “…I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

Meanwhile, Lee received reports suggesting that Grant was preparing to withdraw to Fredericksburg. In anticipation of a potential pursuit, Lee ordered the withdrawal of artillery from the Mule Shoe. Amidst a heavy downpour, General Allegheny Johnson's men could hear the noise created by Hancock's troops. Initially, this noise was interpreted as a sign of withdrawal, but suspicions arose, leading to the order for the artillery to return. Unfortunately, this order was not received until 3:30 am on May 12, a mere 12 hours before Hancock's assault.

Yellow Tavern

On May 11, General J.E.B. Stuart and the Confederate cavalry made a stand against the advancing Union cavalry near Yellow Tavern, which was located six miles north of Richmond. The Union troops, under the command of General Philip Sheridan, greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces, with a two-to-one advantage. The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately, Sheridan's men emerged victorious. The Confederacy suffered a significant blow as General Stuart was mortally wounded during the battle.

May 12

General Grant assembled a force of 20,000 soldiers from the Second Corps, positioning them opposite the tip of the salient. General Lee, recognizing the movement of the Federal troops, mistakenly believed that Grant was preparing to retreat. Consequently, he ordered the removal of his artillery from the area. The attack on May 12th involved nearly 24 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, among the fiercest witnessed during the Civil War. The assault, based on the strategy developed by Upton, was executed by multiple corps against a better-prepared, albeit somewhat surprised, Army of Northern Virginia. Although the assault was scheduled to commence at 4 am, it was delayed by over half an hour due to heavy rain and thick mist.

Hancock's men serendipitously struck the Confederate line where mainly infantry remained. Now called the Bloody Angle, recent analysis has shown that if the attack had occurred on time, no artillery was in the salient at that time. Barlow’s division swung around to the eastern tip of the Mule Shoe, overpowering the brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart. This successful maneuver resulted in the capture of both Steuart and his division commander, Allegheny Johnson. On the right side of Barlow's division, Brig. Gen. David B. Birney's division encountered stronger resistance from the brigades led by Col. William Monaghan and Brig. Gen. James A. Walker, famously known as the Stonewall Brigade. Despite the Confederates' gunpowder being compromised by the rain, they fiercely engaged in close combat. The Union troops continued their advance southward along the western edge of the Mule Shoe.

The attack had breached the lines again and took thousands of rebel prisoners. The Stonewall Brigade was crushed by the initial attack with many killed and captured. .  Only 200 men escaped the onslaught and the Brigade was dissolved into a single regiment for the rest of the war. The attack would have been devastating if it weren't for the quick thinking and reaction of Confederate Gen. John Gordon, who ordered his men to shore up the Stonewall brigades sector and to seal off the center to prevent a bigger breakthrough. Burnside was ordered to attack on the left side of Barlow's Division to pin down and expand the breakthrough, but as in previous assaults,  Burnside was halted by Confederate reinforcements; another attack around 2 PM resulted in a stalemate because both Burnside and the Confederate troops attacked each other at the same time.

Although the initial success in dismantling a significant portion of the Mule Shoe salient was achieved, a flaw in the Union plan became apparent: there had been no strategic consideration on how to capitalize on this breakthrough. The 15,000 infantrymen from Hancock's II Corps became concentrated within a narrow front, approximately half a mile wide, resulting in the loss of unit cohesion. Consequently, they devolved into little more than an armed mob. As Grant continued to deploy additional troops against the Confederate defenses, Lee swiftly shifted reinforcements into the salient.

General Lee personally observed the progress of his troops as they moved forward. Just like in the advance at the Widow Tapp farm during the Battle of the Wilderness, Lee tried to advance and lead his soldiers. However, he was prevented from exposing himself by Gordon and the soldiers' repeated chants of "Lee to the rear" defense, while Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur's brigade suffered significant losses as they valiantly fought to reclaim the entrenchments previously lost by the Stonewall Brigade. After approximately half an hour of intense combat, these brigades successfully secured a substantial portion of the eastern section of the Mule Shoe.

The assault led by Warren at Laurel Hill commenced on a modest scale around 8:15 a.m. Unfortunately, for some of his soldiers, this marked their fourth or fifth attempt at capturing the same objective, resulting in a lack of enthusiasm. After thirty minutes, the attack gradually lost momentum. Meade, recognizing the urgency, commanded Warren to launch an immediate and all-out assault, even if it meant utilizing his entire force. However, the attack proved futile, as the Union corps encountered fierce resistance from a lone Confederate division. Not only did the V Corps fail to achieve its objective, but it also failed to divert Confederate troops from other areas of the front, contrary to Grant's intentions. Grant granted Meade the authority to relieve Warren of his duties, proposing that Meade's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, assume command. Nevertheless, Humphreys skillfully coordinated the withdrawal of the V Corps units without actually relieving Warren from his position.

At approximately 6:30 am, Grant issued orders for additional troops to launch an assault on the Bloody Angle, which was the northwestern section of the salient situated closest to Union lines. In response, Confederate forces dispatched more troops to counterattack, and the line was fortified with artillery. Consequently, the battle evolved into a gruesome deadlock, with the combat persisting relentlessly for nearly 24 hours. The engagement was characterized by intense close-quarter fighting. Meanwhile, both Warren and Burnside made renewed attempts to attack their respective sections of the line, but their efforts yielded minimal results.

As the fighting raged on at the Bloody Angle, Confederate engineers hastily worked to establish a fresh defensive line approximately 500 yards southward, positioned at the base of the Mule Shoe. The conflict at the Bloody Angle persisted incessantly day and night, with neither side gaining a decisive advantage, until the fighting eventually ceased around midnight on May 13. At 4 A.M., the fatigued Confederate infantrymen were informed that the newly constructed line was prepared, prompting them to withdraw gradually from the original earthworks, unit by unit.

May 13-16

From this point forward, the battle became an attempt on both sides to find an advantageous place to strike; neither found one. Grant shifted Warren and Wright to his left to find an attacking capability from the Fredericksburg and Massoponax Church Roads. With the diminished Mule Show now the de facto center of the line, Lee shifter Anderson from his left to meet the new threat from the east. It rained a great deal of the time which prevented any massing of troops to make a determined attack.

May 17-18

Lee having shifted his men back from the left to cover his right, Grant then waited for two days of dry weather to bring Wright and Hancock back to the area of the Mule Shoe, now anchoring the Confederate left. But Ewell’s men were still there and had entrenched further. No progress was made.

May 19-21

Having once again been stopped by Lee, Grant tried a deception. He ordered Hancock to move to the railroad line and move south hoping that Lee would follow, unentrenched. when Grant would attack the rear. Grant ordered Hancock to pull back toward the Fredericksburg Road. Observing the movement, Lee sent Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corps forward as a reconnaissance force to determine where the Federals were going. Ewell’s men run into stiff resistance by a brigade of new heavy artillery-turned-infantry regiments at the Harris family farm. But Lee didn’t fall into the trap and discerned that Grant was once again planning on a southeast movement to the  North Anna River.

Grant meeting with his staff during the Overland Campaign at Massaponax Church, May 21,1864 by Timothy O’Sullivan, Library of Congress

Summary

The fighting at Spotsylvania was perhaps the most brutal of the war, with hand-to-hand combat of vicious severity on both sides, especially at the Mule Shoe. Despite lasting for two weeks, the battle ended inconclusively from a tactical standpoint. Interestingly, both the Confederacy and the Union claimed victory. The Confederacy believed they had emerged victorious due to their ability to hold their defenses, while the Union saw it as their triumph because their offensive continued and General Lee's army suffered irreplaceable losses.

*****

Casualties

Union: 100,000-110,000 Total

Casualties and losses: Total: 18,399 (2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded, 2,258 captured or missing)

Confederates: 50,000–63,000 Total

Casualties and losses: Total: 12,687 (1,515 killed, 5,414 wounded, 5,758 captured or missing)

*****

In terms of percentages, the battle could be considered a draw, but when looking at absolute numbers, the Union paid a heavy price. The initial stages of the battle were unfavorable for the Union forces, with the disastrous outcome at Laurel Hill and the delayed and poorly supported attacks on May 9th. General Grant's army suffered substantial casualties during the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House. Between May 5 and May 12, the Army of the Potomac experienced approximately 32,000 casualties, surpassing the combined casualties of all Union armies in any previous week of the war. Contributing to the carnage were advances in weaponry that by 1864 had outstripped the Napoleonic warfare of the day. The result was massive casualties: on May 12 alone, Lee lost eight thousand men; Grant, nine thousand.

However, it was the Mule Shoe attacks that inflicted significant damage on the Confederates, resulting in the capture of many soldiers. Due to the suspension of prisoner exchanges, these men would never return to the fight. After suffering severe casualties in the Wilderness, Lee had no choice but to curb his aggressive instincts and prepare for a defensive battle at Spotsylvania. Employing advanced fieldworks that foreshadowed the trench warfare of World War I, Lee skillfully organized his exhausted veterans to defend against Grant's relentless attacks.

Although there was no clear victor of the multi-day battle, many consider it a strategic victory for Grant. The battles inflicted proportionately higher casualties on Lee's numerically smaller army, driving his forces into a siege at Petersburg and eventually leading him to surrender his forces at Appomattox in April 1865.

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Further Reading

·       Rhea, Gordon C. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

·       Stephen E Ambrose, Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/05/10/a-grand-charge-emory-uptons-assault-on-the-mule-shoe-salient-may-10-1864-part-2/

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/spotsylvania-court-house

·       https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/battle-of-spotsylvania-court-house

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/emory-upton

Henry Halleck: Polarizing Figure of the US Civil War

Major General Henry Halleck was a central figure in the US Civil War, being the General in Chief of the Armies of the United States from 1862-1864. However, he is often overlooked and even outright denigrated by modern minds. His portrayal in historical descriptions and fictional accounts borders on the derisory. Typical character traits that are emphasized include being a bureaucrat, a wine gourmet, and emotionally separated from the battlefield. These polarizing depictions do not give credit to a general who was a highly skilled political and administrative man who was indispensable to victory. Part of his negative historical reputation is that he wasn’t a great field commander during the war, but the concept that generals have to be battle warriors rather than policy or administrative types may fill the popular mold, but it’s not correct. Few people have the hands-on experience of foreign policy that generals do. So, men like Dwight Eisenhower, George C Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, William Westmoreland, David Petraeus, and Mark Miley deserve recognition for primarily setting policy. But Halleck lacked the diplomatic skills among his peers that these more successful men had, which may be why we remember him with such disdain.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major General Henry Halleck during the US Civil War.

Early Life and Career

Halleck was born on a farm in Upstate New York and hated that life. He was raised by an uncle who set him up for a military career. He went to West Point where he excelled, graduating 3rd in his class. He was a favorite student of Dennis Hart Mahan. He became a member of the elite Army Corps of Engineers, who studied and improved the defenses of New York Harbor and traveled to Europe to see what the French were doing. He along the way wrote books on military science. He gave a series of lectures in Boston which were collected and published in 1846 as Elements of Military Art & Science.

On his way to California for the Mexican War, he didn’t waste his time playing shuffleboard; he instead did something that made him quite famous. He translated Jomini’s Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon into English. This book made him famous in America and in Europe. The point of this book was how Napoleon used his military power to achieve political ends.

He was engaged at the Battle of Mazatlán but was primarily an administrative officer. Having achieved a reputation as a military scholar, he acquired the nickname “Old Brains”.

After the war, he resigned from the army opened a law firm, and became secretary of state of California. He married Elizabeth Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton’s granddaughter. He resigned from the army in 1854. His firm Halleck, Peachy, and Billings was highly prominent. He also was for a time president of the Atlantic and Pacific RR. He also remained a Major General in the California militia. Through land speculation, became a wealthy man. He owned a 30,000-acre ranch in Marin County.

The Civil War Begins

When the Civil War broke out, Halleck promptly volunteered, and Abraham Lincoln promptly made him a full major general. Despite being out of the army at that point for 7 years, he was ranked only by Winfield Scott, George McClellan, and John C. Frémont.

In November, Halleck was sent to St. Louis in command of the Department of the Missouri.  He replaced Frémont, who had been nothing short of a disaster. The department was rife with corruption and fraud. Halleck quickly put his administrative talents to work, and within a few months restored a measure of order to a region defined up to that point by chaos.

A series of important Union victories in his department followed. Even though he did not lead the troops personally, his organizational work had helped and Halleck, rightly or wrongly, received much of the credit. These included Pea Ridge, Island No. 10, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh.  Although he was not the commander in the field in any of these battles, he was responsible for ordering the movements that led to the battles, supervising the generals who were there, and supplying their forces.

After Shiloh, he led the Corinth campaign. His approach was to move slowly and entrench every mile or so. His methodical style was not what was needed. Beauregard was able to hold the city for over a month, then retreat without a battle. In retrospect, he could have captured the town in a week. Keeping in mind that he was a student of Mahan, and translated Jomini, both defense-minded strategists, he was fighting a Napoleonic war, not the Civil War. Old Brains was strategically obsolete.

Halleck & Grant

His relationship with his best subordinate general was difficult. When the senior manager has in his department a budding genius, how that relationship plays out tells you oodles about the kind of person he is. Ulysses Grant was a brigadier general in Halleck’s department who had never been in command of anything before, perhaps including his own sobriety. But Grant proposed an amphibious combined forces operation on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to take out Forts Henry and Donelson. Nothing like that had ever been tried and certainly was not in the books Halleck had written. I’m not sure what any of us would have thought about Sam Grant in January 1862 if we were his superior, especially when he proposed an aggressive attack to a defense-minded Old Brain.

But the resulting victory and capture of 14,000 confederates as the eastern theater was doing nothing made Halleck an important man. He promoted Grant but then relieved him, only to reinstate him. Grant wondered about this, leading to a highly cynical response from Halleck that whistles throughout history.

What did Sherman and Grant think about Halleck at this point? Was it accurate?

What changed Halleck’s mind about Grant’s plan for Fort Donelson was President Lincoln’s need for a victory. Lincoln was insistent that an offensive be started, and Halleck had no better ideas. Lincoln order was issued January 27th, ordering all Federal forces to advance on February 22nd.

But despite the victories at Donelson &  Henry, Halleck initially demoted him. Grant left his district to meet Buell in Nashville and did not immediately stop looting at the two captured forts. Halleck also cited rumors of renewed alcoholism. There are rumors of a rogue telegraph operator tossing Grant's messages to Halleck, but Halleck had issues throughout the war.  The recent Samuel Curtis bio suggests that Halleck had his aides create a digest for all communications, so Halleck was constantly under the impression that his subordinates were not communicating to him regularly when the digest failed to represent their activity. Ostensibly, for whatever reason, Halleck claimed Grant had gone incommunicado, but there appears to have been some jealousy involved because instead of claiming that Grant was not communicating appropriately, Halleck accused him of being drunk.

Once again, Lincoln and Stanton intervened. Lincoln asked Halleck to forward specific charges against Grant for official review, and Halleck was promoted to command of all armies in the west.  His jealousy being sated and his hand called, Halleck restored Grant to command. Their correspondence is ironic because Grant complained about his arrest by claiming "… there must be enemies between you and myself" and Halleck responded "…there are no enemies between myself and you," which was the truth because the enemy was Halleck himself.

Why Halleck wanted to take credit for Grant’s victory isn’t hard to understand; because it was the first major Federal victory of the war, and Halleck could parlay the victory into command of all forces in the West. Lincoln needed a general who wasn’t afraid to fight. In that sense, Halleck was a clone of McClellan, and they couldn’t have that in both theaters. Grant asked him if someone was giving Halleck bad reports about him, Halleck responded in the negative without telling him that it was he, himself, responsible. Halleck was not the commander of the Western Theater; Buell was his competition. Halleck needed the credit for his advancement.

At this stage of the war, both Grant and Sherman thought highly of Halleck and owed him their positions. Halleck was the master at that point in the war, certainly in terms of paperwork and administration. Grant had many of the qualities of a great leader that Halleck would never have: gut instinct, fearlessness, and indomitable energy. But any book on being a CEO today will tell you just as important is a sense of humility.  If you find yourself the smartest person in the room, you're in the wrong room.  Grant was not a great military thinker, but he was the greatest idea aggregator.  He sought to surround himself with thinkers and then would forge plans as an aggregate of the part. Grant regarded Halleck as "one of the greatest men of the age" and Sherman described him as the "directing genius". And why not? Halleck was in command of the best department in the Army at that point. Curtis had won at Pea Ridge, Pope at Island  Number 10, and Grant at Donelson. And in fact, he deserves some of the credit. Halleck understood grand strategy a little better than McClellan and had the ability to recognize and promote talent, but also the ambition and ego to resent being overshadowed by their successes.  Lincoln put him in the right place - where he could have rank and wield some power, and be close to power, but where he couldn't interfere any more than Lincoln himself allowed him to.  He was more than a clerk but much less than the commanding general he wanted to be.

Advancement to General-in-Chief

In March 1862 Halleck was given command also of Ohio and Kansas, placing Buell under his command. With Grant under personal attack after Shiloh, Halleck arrived to personally command this army and move on to Corinth. While Grant felt that he was being shunted aside, Halleck to some extent was doing them both a favor.

With the fall of Corinth and the collapse of the Peninsula Campaign, Halleck was transferred east to become General-in-Chief. He placed Grant in command of most of the Western forces. Lincoln was hopeful that Halleck could stimulate aggressiveness; but while Halleck excelled at training, supply, and deployment, he was awful as a strategist and unable to work with the generals under him, who simply ignored him.

Most accounts of Halleck moving Grant to his second in command suggest a nefarious motivation. The problem is that while how things turned out for Grant is well known, after Shiloh, he was under a massive media attack. The fact that Grant had been the victim of a surprise attack made him, at that moment, tough to support. But as much as Halleck didn’t support Grant, he was even less inclined to trust the volunteer generals under him.

But his failings at this level of command would soon become obvious. His biggest failure was the coup de grace for Lincoln’s views of him. When McClellan didn’t come to support Pope at Second Manassas, Lincoln lost hope in Halleck, calling him “little more than a first-rate clerk”. To be fair, there were no better generals for either Lincoln or Halleck to select from, and it’s a bit unfair to pin the blame on Halleck. Lincoln had promoted him to get the results he had in the west, but with eastern generals.  Still, Halleck was a bit thin-skinned and thereafter refused to take direct responsibility for anything that happened.

His subordinates had little respect for him. McClellan said of Halleck, “Of all the men who I have encountered in high position, Halleck was the most helplessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end.” Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Halleck originates nothing, anticipates nothing to assist others; takes no responsibility, plans nothing, suggests nothing, is good for nothing."

Grant Supersedes Halleck

Grant was promoted to Lt Gen and general-in-chief on March 12, 1864. Halleck became chief of staff, and Grant graciously stated that he had been relieved at his own request. Grant of course took a completely different view of the job than Halleck had, accompanying Meade’s army in the field and setting strategy at the battlefield.

Which left Halleck back in Washington, doing what he did best: ensuring proper supplies, equipment, and manpower. He supported Grant’s initiatives politically and the two worked very well in complementary roles. But with Jubal Early threatening the city, Halleck had responsibility for its defense. Halleck’s inability to organize a defense of the capital was his final disgrace. Chaos reigned. He did ultimately gather together a force that held Early off. Were it not for Monocacy, he might have entered the city.

After the War

With Lincoln’s assassination, Stanton took the first opportunity he could and moved Halleck out of Washington to a new job, where Halleck made a very serious political enemy. Stanton had had enough of Halleck, and without Lincoln around to hold him back, he made Halleck commander of the Division of the James, which meant Richmond. When Sherman offered Johnston the infamous gracious original surrender terms, Stanton suggested that Sherman was a traitor (actually, he was implementing what he thought Lincoln would have wanted based on their meeting at City Point) and Halleck, ever the politician, went along with it. This upset Sherman; and things deteriorated when at the Grand Review Halleck ordered one of Sherman’s Corps to pass him, which Sherman countermanded. This was a shocking turn of events since Halleck had given Sherman every opportunity to rehabilitate himself when he was deemed “crazy” at the start of the war.

Consequently, just 4 months later, Grant moved him to political exile Grant moved him back to San Francisco as commander of the Division of the Pacific. Given his home and residence there, Grant must be complimented on trying to help out his old chief as best as he could. A few years later, he was moved to command in Louisville, where he died a few years later.

Conclusion

Halleck was a bureaucrat, in every sense of the word, both good and bad. His need for success, like many of the others in the Union Army at the start of the war, precluded taking chances or doing anything not politically correct. He also had the wrong temperament for field command and was promoted beyond his capability. Still, he was an intelligent man whose inability to work with others led to terrible personal relationships, rather than he being incompetent. Administration takes on a negative connotation in the context of glorified heroes of battle, but he should be recognized for his positive contributions as well as his flaws.

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Admiral Thomas Cochrane: The Seawolf of the Royal Navy

Admiral Thomas Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald, stands as one of the most audacious and controversial figures in naval history. His career, marked by brilliance, bravery, and a defiance of convention, not only revolutionized naval warfare but also carved a place for him in maritime legend. From his early days in the Royal Navy to his exploits while engaged by foreign navies, Cochrane's life was a relentless pursuit of innovation and excellence, often at odds with the establishment.

Terry Bailey explains.

Thomas Cochrane as painted by copyist Archibald Eliot Haswell-Miller. Original painting by Peter Edward Stroehlin.

Early Life and Entry into the Royal Navy

Born on the 14th of December, 1775, in Annsfield, Scotland, Thomas Cochrane was the son of Archibald Cochrane, the 9th Earl of Dundonald, a man of scientific curiosity and perpetual financial woes. This backdrop of intellectual vigor and economic struggle likely influenced Thomas's character—imbuing him with a relentless drive and a disdain for bureaucratic incompetence.

Cochrane's father secured him a commission in the British Army at an early age, however, Cochrane managed to extract himself from the army commission preferring to join the Royal Navy as a Midshipman in 1793, at the age of 17, amid the turbulent backdrop of the French Revolutionary Wars. His early postings included the 28-gun frigate HMS Hind and the 32-gun frigate HMS Thetis. Cochrane's aptitude for seamanship and tactics quickly became apparent, and by 1796, he was promoted to lieutenant after passing the relevant examinations. His career trajectory continued to ascend as he distinguished himself with daring tactics and a sharp mind for naval warfare.

The Speedy and Mediterranean Exploits

Cochrane was given command of the small sloop HMS Speedy in 1800, HMS Speedy was not a remarkable vessel, and it was felt that command of such an unremarkable vessel was given to Cochrane as part punishment for his outspoken manner and behavior. However, this dent to his career path did not prevent Thomas Cochrane from excelling and the command of HMS Speedy simply marked the beginning of his legendary status.

HMS Speedy was a diminutive vessel with a modest armament of fourteen 4-pounder guns, which became a formidable adversary under Cochrane's command. His boldness and strategic ingenuity transformed the Speedy into a symbol of naval prowess. One of Cochrane's most famous exploits occurred on the 6th of May, 1801, when he captured the Spanish xebec-frigate El Gamo, a vessel three times the size of the HMS Speedy, boasting 32 guns and 319 men compared to the Speedy's 14 guns and 54 men. Cochrane used clever subterfuge, hoisting multiple flags and sailing directly into close quarters, where HMS Speedy's small size and maneuverability turned the engagement into a boarding action. Cochrane's men overwhelmed the El Gamo's crew which was numerically superior, capturing the ship in a remarkable display of naval audacity and tactical brilliance.

Political Battles and Imprisonment

Despite his successes, Cochrane's career was marred by controversies, mainly stemming from his outspoken criticism of naval administration and his political ambitions. Elected as a Member of Parliament for Honiton in 1806, and later for Westminster, Cochrane used his platform to advocate for naval reforms and to expose corruption within the Admiralty. His relentless attacks on government mismanagement earned him powerful enemies.

In 1814, Cochrane's career took a devastating turn when he was implicated in a stock exchange fraud scandal, the "Great Stock Exchange Fraud." Cochrane maintained his innocence, asserting that he was framed by his political adversaries. Nonetheless, he was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison, fined £1,000, and expelled from the Royal Navy and Parliament. Cochrane immediately escaped from prison, however, presented himself openly to protest his innocence, however, was promptly rearrested. This period was a dark chapter in Cochrane's life, but it did not diminish his indomitable spirit. It was not until 1832, that Thomas Cochrane was granted a pardon and restored to the Navy List with a promotion to rear-admiral many years after his release from prison.

Service in Foreign Navies

Undeterred by his fall from grace in Britain, Cochrane sought to continue his naval career abroad once released from prison. In 1817, he accepted an invitation to command the Chilean Navy in their struggle for independence from Spanish rule. Cochrane's arrival in Chile marked a turning point in the naval campaign. His leadership and innovative tactics, such as the use of fireships, in addition to, combined naval and land operations proved instrumental in securing key victories, including the capture of Valdivia in 1820, which significantly weakened Spanish control over the region.

Cochrane's success in Chile led to further opportunities. In 1823, he took command of the Brazilian Navy, playing a crucial role in Brazil's war of independence against Portugal. His operations in Bahia and Maranhão helped secure Brazilian sovereignty, further cementing his reputation as a liberator.

In 1825, Cochrane extended his influence to Greece, participating in the Greek War of Independence, between 1827 and 1828. Although his time in Greece was less successful, marred by political infighting and limited resources, his commitment to the cause of freedom remained unwavering.

Return to Britain and Later Years

Cochrane's international successes eventually helped pave the way for his rehabilitation in Britain. In 1832, he received a royal pardon and restoration to the navy list followed. He returned to the Royal Navy and saw a promotion to Rear-Admiral of the Blue serving with distinction. One of his significant contributions during this period was his advocacy for steam propulsion, recognizing the transformative potential of steam power in naval warfare, additionally 1847, Queen Victoria reappointed him Knight of the Order of the Bath.

His foresight contributed to the modernization of the Royal Navy and eventually, he received a promotion to Admiral of the Red in 1857, which was a relatively tranquil period compared to his earlier adventures. He authored several works, including his autobiography, which detailed his remarkable career and offered insights into his innovative approaches to naval tactics and strategy.

Legacy

Admiral Thomas Cochrane's legacy is multifaceted. He is remembered as a fearless and innovative naval commander whose exploits inspired not only his contemporaries but also future generations of naval officers. His daring tactics and unorthodox methods challenged conventional naval doctrine, earning him the nickname "The Sea Wolf."

Cochrane's influence extended beyond his lifetime, with his exploits serving as inspiration for literary characters such as C.S. Forester's Horatio Hornblower and Patrick O'Brian's Jack Aubrey, in Master and Commander. His life story, filled with dramatic turns and heroic deeds, continues to captivate historians and naval enthusiasts.

Moreover, Cochrane's advocacy for naval reform and technological advancement had a lasting impact on the Royal Navy. His early recognition of the potential of steam power and his relentless pursuit of efficiency and innovation helped shape the future of naval warfare.

Conclusion

Admiral Thomas Cochrane's career is solid proof of the power of individual brilliance and the impact of unwavering determination. His journey from a young Midshipman to a celebrated hero in multiple countries illustrates the profound influence one person can have on the course of history. Despite facing significant obstacles, including imprisonment and exile, Cochrane's legacy endures as a beacon of courage, ingenuity, and resilience in the face of adversity.

In naval history, Cochrane's name stands alongside the greatest maritime strategists and commanders. His life story is not only a thrilling saga of naval adventure but also a profound lesson in the enduring spirit of human endeavor.

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A Sailors Life in the Age of Sail

The age of sail (16th century to 19th century) ushered in a new era in world history with the rise of sailing trade and warfare. The age of sail provided the old world with the products and goods of the new, goods that were otherwise unknown to most cultures. The discovery and import of these goods led to huge economic booms for their nations, developed societies, and shaped the world as we know it. Sailors traveled thousands of miles to distant places no European had ever seen in search of exotic goods, and trade relationships with these nations. Sailors were truly the astronauts of their day, putting their fears and anxieties behind them to make the voyages necessary for the growth of their country.

In this article, Avery Scott aims to examine the daily lives of the sailors that helped to shape so much of the world. Beginning with the areas in which merchant vessels, navy vessels, and pirates/privateers are similar and then looking at some differences depending upon the type of vessel one served on.

A painting of the 1571 Battle of Lepanto.

The Sailors Life

Rations

The diet of almost all sailing vessels was the same. The men subsisted on salted pork, fish, or beef, ships biscuits, and a limited supply of vegetables such as peas. Additionally, sailors received unwanted calories from the weevils and other insects that burrowed their way into the ship’s biscuits while the vessel was out to sea, thus making an awful ration even worse. In some cases, sailors would have live animals aboard ship to assist in providing fresh food to the crew, however livestock tend to struggle on oceanic voyages and therefore they did not always last very long. Eventually it was learned that fresh fruit and vegetables, specifically vitamin C, were helpful in reducing cases of scurvy – a disease that ravished ships for years. Once this was discovered, rations of citrus fruit would be kept aboard. By doing so, ships were spared the ravages of scurvy.

Food rations were vital to the health and wellness of crews on a voyage, but alcohol played an equally significant role as a morale boost to the crew. Alcohol choices varied depending upon the location, distance, and time at sea. But the most common aboard were beer or ale, wine, and rum. Water was also kept aboard ship in large casks, but the water became undrinkable very quickly into voyage. Therefore, the men subsisted mostly on rations of alcohol.  A persistent habit of sailors was to keep the ration of rum given throughout the day and drink the total of a day's rations at one time becoming very drunk. In answer to this, Admiral Edward Vernon (known as “Old Grog” due to the grogram coats he frequently wore) required his sailors mix their ration of rum with water. This reduced the drunkenness aboard and helped to improve the overall health of the crew, even if it did not make them particularly fond of him.

Routine

Sailing ships during the age of sail more resembled a small city than a ship. Everything needed for the voyage would be packed aboard, as well as the men with the skills necessary to keep the ship moving. Movements were all controlled like clockwork. This was done to ensure order, cleanliness, and avoid idle hands that often became drunk and disorderly. Ships all used a similar watch schedule, although it may change slightly depending upon the size of the crew, but more on that in a later section. Watches were broken down into four-hour blocks of time, with two dog watches of two hours a piece. First watch was from 8:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Middle watch was from 12:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. Morning watch was 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. Forenoon watch 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Afternoon watch from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. And two dog watches from 4 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Some sailors, such as coopers, blacksmiths, and surgeons did not work based upon the watch schedule, and they worked during the day and were able to sleep during the evenings. Each watch was noted by a bell and the bosuns’ whistle. If men were below in their hammocks they would be alerted to the start of their watch, and often “started” by a bosun hitting them with a piece of tar-dipped rope. Additionally, sleepy-headed sailors would be hurried along by cutting down the ropes of their hammocks, allowing them to tumble to the deck.

Most days would begin by cleaning the ship with holy stones to ensure the grime and dirt would be scrubbed off, this was especially important after a battle, and to keep the detritus from the live animals mentioned above to a minimum. Scrubbing the deck would be followed by swabbing and rinsing. Many captains were very particular about the cleanliness of their ships and would have the ship scrubbed with vinegar to reduce sickness. Other daily tasks were different depending upon the role a sailor filled within the vessel. Gunners would be maintaining the guns, topmen would be working the sails, officers would oversee navigation, and those special trades would be involved in their work such as carpentry or making barrels.

Money

Sailors were notoriously financially irresponsible. However, much of this may be because they were often not paid until a voyage was completed. This method was thought to reduce desertion (although it did not appear to be successful). This meant that they often went months without pay, and then received a considerable sum at one time. The men would often spend a large chunk of this money of alcohol, women, and gambling – sometimes becoming so poor they had no choice but to go aboard another vessel to ensure they had food to eat. Some sailors did manage to amass some financial means while at sea, typically through prize money – something exclusive to navy, pirate, and privateering vessels. Additionally, if men had families at home, they could have some money sent to their families or paid out by the ship’s owners from their home port. This ensured their family had money to subsist on in the sailor’s absence. If a sailor were to die at sea, their sea chest (their collection of personal effects) would be auctioned off on deck, and the money sent home to the family.

Differences

Despite the inherent similarities between the various sea trades, sailors did live different lives depending upon the vessel that they served on. In this section, I will break down some of the specifics of life aboard a merchant ship, navy vessel, and a pirate and privateer.

Merchant Ships

Merchant vessels were designed to carry massive amounts of cargo, to earn the highest revenues for the owners. This meant that ships would be very heavily laden, scarcely armed, and undermanned. These ships had little chance of standing up to a dangerous enemy as they had little resources to defend themselves with. Additionally, because manpower is expensive, ship owners would not allow for more crew than were necessary to operate a ship on a voyage. For the crew this meant each man would be required to take on additional tasks that would typically be spread between many men. These men received less sleep for their work as they were more frequently required to be on deck to handle the ship. Also, to maximize profit, the victualers for a merchant ship would be more inclined to obtain subpar or insufficient rations for the voyage.

A positive for merchant sailors was they typically did not have as strict of discipline as a navy vessel would, and this could make their lives more enjoyable while at sea. Discipline could still be hard, but flogging and other punishments were less likely to be handed down. And since the men were onboard willingly, they were more frequently allowed shore leave when in port. Finally, since merchant sailors were not engaged in any military activity, they were not as likely to be killed in a battle, although the presence of disease was an ever-present threat to all ships.

Navy Ships

Navy ships were often described as “hell” to the men that crewed the vessels. Class distinctions were ever present, and punishment for the smallest infractions could be excruciating. The crew lived and worked in constant fear of the cat-of-nine-tales, as the captain and officers were always willing to pass down punishment in the name of order. Ships would have been cramped as navy vessels required larger crews to staff the guns, account for death in battle, and the man prizes that were captured at sea. The advantage to this larger crew size is it meant less work per sailor, but it also meant disease could more rapidly spread through the ship. Many navy vessels struggled to fill their ranks and were forced to use impressment to obtain the necessary sailors. The press gangs would rove waterfront streets, taverns, incoming ships, or vessels at sea to impress men for service. Because of this method of recruitment, officers had to be constantly vigilant for signs of mutiny. The fear of mutiny was so great that most naval ships had a detachment of marines aboard to help protect the officers from mutiny. Marines also acted as regular troops during battle and could inflict considerable damage from small arms fire. Life    aboard a navy ship did offer the chance of a financial reward in the form of prize money. Because the crew were entitled to prize money if they captured a belligerent nation's vessel and could successfully plunder the cargo from the other vessel.  While this money was often small in comparison to the cost of life and limb, it was a motivating factor for the men.

Pirates and Privateers

While pirates and privateers have some obvious differences, they share many of the same traits. Much like Navy vessels, these ships would be heavily manned to ensure prizes could be sailed, battles fought, and crew left for the continuation of the voyage after a battle. Pirates and privateers all made a living from battle, and this increased the risk of death. Also, if captured pirates were sure to be hung for their crimes, and often led short lives for this. Additionally, privateers were considered to be pirates by the nations with which they were at war – so a similar fate would befall them if captured.  Pirates also had limited access to resources as many places were patrolled by navy vessels looking to take down a pirate ship. Pirates did, however, have the benefit of being more democratic than their aristocratic partners in navy and privateer vessels and therefore could elect or depose their captains and officers if they felt they were not doing a good job.  Additionally, pirate vessels wrote their own ships articles in conjunction with the entire crew. By doing so, rules were established for the common good – not just those of the owners and officers. Finally, pirates and privateers had the possibility to earn huge sums of prize money, but also risked no money if prizes were not captured.

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Elizabeth Fenning: A Miscarriage of Justice in 19th Century England

On July 26, 1815, a 20-year-old woman named Elisabeth Fenning dressed in a white high-waist muslin gown. She had personally made it for her wedding to her fiancé Edward, a day that would have begun a new chapter in her life. Sadly the day never came. Instead the dress was being worn for the final chapter of her life, her death. She was preparing for the gallows where she was going to die for a crime she most likely didn't commit. Her story is one of the worst cases of miscarriage of justice in Britain.

Nonye Ugo explains.

A dpecition of Elizabeth Fenning awaiting her execution. This is from the 1912 book William Hone: His Life and Times. Image in the Public Domain.

Elizabeth “Eliza” Fenning was born on June 10, 1793 in the Caribbean island of Dominica.

Her parents William and Mary Fenning had a total of ten children, but only Elizabeth survived to adulthood, a common occurrence due to the high infant mortality rate at the time.

Her father had been a soldier. Upon his discharge, the family settled in London and he transitioned to selling potatoes.

The family was very poor, as such there were very few opportunities available to Elizabeth. She learnt to read and write, and by the age of 14 she entered service, working as a domestic servant.

By 23 she got a job as a cook to the wealthy Turner family, joining a staff that consisted of a maid, Sarah, and two male apprentices.

Olibar Turner, a wealthy tradesman lived at Chancery Lane, London with his wife, Margret, son Robert, and daughter in law Charlotte. Elizabeth was an easy going, dedicated worker, but a few weeks into her employment she had a falling out with Charlotte Turner, who threatened her with dismissal, for entering the room of an apprentice, partially dressed, to borrow a candle. Given the morals of the time partially dressed could even mean not wearing her stockings.

Dumplings

Elizabeth was hurt by what she considered a questioning of her morals and confided her feeling to Sarah, hinting that she now disliked Charlotte.

On March 21, Elizabeth asked to showcase her dumpling making skills and was granted permission to make dumplings and potatoes for the family lunch, and steak pie for the servants.

The Turner’s, with the exception of Margret who was absent, immediately became violently ill after eating the pudding. Elizabeth and an apprentice who had also eaten the pudding became just as sick.  A doctor was called. He diagnosed arsenic poisoning and after a brief investigation, concluded it had been mixed in the dumplings.

On April 11 while the family was recovering from the effects of the poison, a still unwell Elizabeth was arrested and tried for attempted murder.

The  case was presided by Sir John Sylvester at the Old Bailey. The evidence against Elizabeth was circumstantial, the state claimed she had motive, (revenge against Charlotte who had earlier reprimanded her) opportunity, (being alone in the kitchen) and means, (access to arsenic, normally used to kill rats, kept in the apprentice room drawer). Despite all their evidence being countered by facts, such as that Elizabeth had also eaten the dumplings and become sick, the drawer containing the arsenic was assessable to every member of the household, no arsenic had been found in the flour used to prepare the dumplings, and five witnesses who testified to Elizabeth’s good and honest character, the jury sentenced her to death by hanging, the then punishment for attempted murder.

Working people, angered by the injustice of the trial and convinced of her innocence, started a petition to have her reprieved. Even the Turners doubted her guilt and were ready to sign the petition but changed their minds, after being warned that they would be investigated for the crime if Elizabeth was reprieved. The reprieve was denied.

Death

So on July 26, wearing what was originally intended as a wedding dress, Elizabeth Fenning was hanged. She maintained her innocence till the end. Her funeral was held on July 31.

Immediately after, an angry mob surrounded the Turner home threatening to burn it down. They were dispersed by police, who remained days after to prevent harm to the family.

But the hatred of the Turners remained. They eventually went bankrupt and Robert Turner ended up in a workhouse. People, especially the working class, saw the injustice of her death. They knew it was a message to the poor servants: Don’t ever even think of harming your rich masters.

So did Elizabeth Fenning really try to poison the Turners?

I strongly believe that she did not. One, there was no real evidence of the sickness being caused by arsenic poisoning. The doctor, Dr. John Marshall, only assumed it was because, arsenic was in the home, and the cutlery used in eating the pudding had turned black, which he claimed was the result of arsenic on silver. That claim was later proved to be false. For all anyone knew the Turners may have been suffering food poisoning. And, just before the trial Elizabeth was given a choice - trial or deportation to a colony. She chose going to trial, obviously because she knew she was innocent and felt it would be proven.

Two, if arsenic was used Elizabeth wasn’t the only one with access to it. The two apprentices and maid Sarah did too, and Elizabeth did leave briefly to go to the butcher shop while the dumplings were being prepared. Anyone in the household could have poisoned them in her absence.

So if the Turners were poisoned, who did it?

Maybe Sarah, taking advantage of Elizabeth’s strained relationship with Charlotte, tried to poison the family knowing Elizabeth would be accused. Robert Turner on his death bed was said to have admitted to the crime.

Whatever the truth, the fact remains there was no evidence against Elizabeth Fenning. She was convicted because she was a poor Irish servant and her supposed victims were a rich English family. Her sentence and execution was one of the worst miscarriages of British justice.

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Did One Man Really Connect Abraham Lincoln’s Death and the Identity of Jack the Ripper?

One man links two of the most notorious crimes of the nineteenth century – an Irish American by the name of Francis Tumblety. It stretches credulity but this individual, arrested in 1865, as a suspected member of the gang behind the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, was also detained by Scotland Yard in 1888 over the Jack the Ripper case.

Tony McMahon, author of a related book (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explains.

Francis Tumblety in a military uniform.

If the story rested on the bizarre coincidence of the arrests in 1865 and 1888, that would be compelling enough. But during my research, I encountered an extraordinary figure whose life consisted of a series of crises and scandals. It included two manslaughter cases; violent assaults; arrests for gross indecency; and accusations of business fraud. Then add to that being arrested as a suspected co-conspirator in the Lincoln assassination and Scotland Yard drawing up charges in relation to the Jack the Ripper case.

Even after the 1888 arrest over the Ripper murders - when Tumblety jumped bail and escaped to New York - he was soon in court for striking a young man while Manhattan later shuddered in horror at news of a copycat Ripper killing in a hotel. New Yorkers were convinced the Whitechapel murderer was in their midst and the newspapers pointed an accusing finger at Tumblety.

Tumblety did not operate in the shadows. Far from it. Styling himself the Indian Herb Doctor, he was a high-profile medicine man skillfully using the emerging mass circulation newspapers to transform himself into a nineteenth century celebrity, known throughout north America (Canada and the United States). In fact, his celebrity, and the networks he developed in high society, played a key role in protecting him from imprisonment on multiple occasions. It may also explain why he was not extradited from the United States to face the Ripper charges in London after absconding.

Tumblety’s sexuality

As an LGBT historian, I am fascinated by Tumblety’s very open homosexuality. The term was yet to be popularized in the mid-nineteenth century but nobody needed sodomy to be defined. Gay men were recognized in clubs, theatres, and taverns. Journalists commented on the doctor's nocturnal cruising and very literal clashes with younger men he picked up, then fell out with bitterly. He supplied great copy for the gossip columns of the newspapers given his repeat brushes with the police and courts. For decades he was tailed by the Pinkerton detective agency who seemed obsessed by the doctor’s man problems.

While he has been recognized as a Ripper suspect since his arrest, Tumblety’s sexuality has often been skirted around, maybe to save the blushes of some Ripperologists. Also because it raises awkward questions about his motives in the Ripper murders, which I set out to tackle in the book. To understand the kind of life he led and how he came to be implicated in these two enormous crimes, it’s impossible not to put his homosexuality center stage.

Tumblety claimed to be disinterested in the opposite sex after marrying a woman he then discovered was a prostitute. I suspect this story, told by Tumblety in his multi-edition slim autobiography, may not be true. It offered a cover for his same sex preference coupled with a violent misogyny noted by the American police and shared by them with Scotland Yard. The London police were further convinced he was Jack the Ripper after reports in the American press that Tumblety owned a grotesque collection of uteruses in glass jars which he displayed at his all-male dinner parties. The Ripper’s second victim, Annie Chapman, was missing her uterus when her body was discovered.

America

This intriguing figure began his life in Dublin but like many Irish at the time, including many of my ancestors, he boarded a ship for a new life in America. His family set up home in Rochester, New York, and the Irish teenager lived in miserable poverty. But he was growing up in a country experiencing rapid growth where hucksters and opportunists changed their backstory, adopted a glamorous persona, and fleeced the vulnerable, making considerable fortunes. This was capitalism at its most unregulated and freewheeling.

Clearly not without talent, Tumblety set himself up as a completely unqualified doctor with a flamboyant persona. To promote his dubious medical business, he processed down main street on a circus horse with a plumed helmet and assistant dressed as a native American handing out leaflets. With bombastic language, he declared war on mainstream physicians and claimed his herbal cures could tackle everything from pimples to cancer.

The association with Lincoln began with an astonishing appearance on horseback behind Lincoln’s carriage when the newly elected president processed through New York, having just been elected president in early 1861. Journalists were aghast at this unlikely vision, as the herb doctor was embroiled at that moment in a rather sordid legal case involving one of his young male assistants. Yet Tumblety ignored the brouhaha and set out to ingratiate himself with the president by moving to Washington DC, attending Lincoln’s public appearances.

However, he seems to have been playing a double game. I’ve uncovered evidence linking Tumblety to at least two members of the gang that plotted Lincoln’s assassination and a newspaper article from 1914 that proves he knew the man who fired the fatal bullet: John Wilkes Booth. Little wonder that Tumblety was arrested and held at the Old Capitol Prison in the aftermath of the presidential slaying. Somehow, though, he was able to walk out of jail a free man.

After Lincoln

The quarter of a century between the Lincoln killing and the Ripper murders saw Tumblety flitting between America and Europe. The police and Pinkerton agency continuing to keep tabs on this strange character. I believe he contracted syphilis at some point and that the condition impacted both his physical and mental health as we approach 1888. The alleged manslaughter of a patient in Liverpool led to no conviction, possibly the result of an out-of-court settlement. Then the herb doctor was arrested over gross indecency with four men. While he was being held, Scotland Yard changed tack, realizing he was Jack the Ripper.

Without giving too much away, he ends up back in the United States and it’s his last years, neglected up until now, that are very revelatory. There is clear proof that Tumblety had cultivated networks in the Irish American diaspora and what passed for a gay community. In two cases, respected political figures rescued him from criminal convictions – but for what reason?

Conclusion

American journalists had no doubt that Tumblety was the notorious serial killer who had struck terror into the streets of Whitechapel. I share some ideas, based on his life experience and character, that explain why a gay man would have committed such heinous acts. His sexuality does not rule him out at all. Reporters speculated on other crimes that he may have been linked to and the possibility that one of his “valets” – young male employees – could have helped him on his murder spree.

To me, Tumblety presents a far more intriguing prospect as Jack the Ripper than a rogue member of the Royal Family or a conspiracy by Freemasons. He was a rags to riches story that guides us through Civil War America, the Gilded Age, and on to the streets of Victorian London. His life was turbulent, violent, and scandalous. What he did was unforgivable and sheds so much light on the sexual politics, media landscape, and precarious existence that millions of people led during this period.

Tony McMahon’s new book Jack the Ripper and Abraham Lincoln: One man links the two greatest crimes of the 19th century is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

The Chinese Boxer Rebellion: A Clash of Cultures and Powers

In the twilight of the 19th century, the world watched as China convulsed in a tumultuous uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion. This cataclysmic event, which erupted in 1900, was not merely a clash of arms, but a collision of civilizations, ideologies, and ambitions. At its core, the Boxer Rebellion was a struggle for the soul of China, pitting traditional values against encroaching foreign influence.

Here Terry Bailey delves into the multifaceted dimensions of the rebellion, outline the foreign powers involved, their political aims, the valor recognized through decorations like the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, and the perspectives of the Chinese Boxers, including the pivotal role played by Empress Dowager Cixi.

The photo shows foreign forces inside the Forbidden City in Beijing in November 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion.

Origins of the Boxer Movement

To comprehend the Boxer Rebellion, one must understand its roots deeply entwined with China's history of internal strife and external pressures. The late 19th century saw China reeling from a series of humiliations at the hands of foreign powers, compounded by internal turmoil and economic distress. The Boxers, officially known as the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, emerged as a grassroots movement fueled by resentment towards foreign domination and perceived cultural erosion.

The International Response

As the Boxer movement gained momentum, foreign nationals and missionaries in China became targets of violent attacks, triggering international alarm. In response, an Eight-Nation Alliance composed of troops from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened to quell the rebellion and protect their interests in China.

Each member of the alliance had its own political aims and agendas driving their involvement in the conflict. For instance, European powers sought to safeguard their economic privileges and spheres of influence in China, while Japan seized the opportunity to assert its growing regional power. The United States, keen on preserving its ‘Open Door Policy’ and ensuring the safety of American citizens, also joined the intervention force.

The Boxers' Perspective

Contrary to portrayals by Western accounts, the Boxers were not merely mindless fanatics but individuals driven by a complex blend of nationalism, religious fervor, and socio-economic grievances. Comprising primarily of peasants and martial artists, the Boxers perceived themselves as defenders of Chinese tradition against the encroachment of Western imperialism and Christian missionary activities.

For the Boxers, their struggle was not just against foreign powers but also against the corruption and decadence of the Qing dynasty. Their rallying cry, "Support the Qing, destroy the foreigners," encapsulated their belief in restoring China's glory by expelling foreign influence and purging the nation of perceived traitors.

Empress Dowager Cixi's Role

At the heart of the Boxer Rebellion stood Empress Dowager Cixi, a formidable figure whose political maneuvering would shape the course of Chinese history. Initially hesitant to openly support the Boxers, Cixi eventually threw her support behind the movement, viewing it as a means to bolster her own waning authority and expel foreign influences.

Cixi's decision to align with the Boxers proved fateful, leading to a declaration of war against the Eight-Nation Alliance. Despite her efforts to galvanize Chinese forces, the coalition's superior firepower and logistical prowess ultimately overwhelmed the Boxer forces and brought about the collapse of their rebellion.

Legacy of the Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion left an indelible mark on China and the world, reshaping geopolitical dynamics and fueling nationalist sentiments. While the intervention of the Eight-Nation Alliance temporarily quelled the uprising, it also deepened China's resentment towards foreign powers and sowed the seeds of future conflicts, in addition to further internal strife.

The rebellion's aftermath witnessed the imposition of harsh indemnities on China, further weakening the Qing dynasty and hastening its eventual collapse. The events of 1900 served as a stark reminder of the perils of imperialism and the enduring struggle for national sovereignty.

Sun Yat-sen, known in China as Sun Zhongshan was the eventual galvanized the popular overthrow of the imperial dynasty through his force of personality. Which occurred on the 19th of October 1911. At the time of the eventual successful overthrow of the 2000 year old dynasty Sun Yat-sen was in America attempting to raise funds for the future of China.

He was a highly educated individual who was strongly opposed to the actions of the Boxers before and during the rebellion, knowing that violent offensive action against the strong foreign powers would be detrimental to China’s future.

In conclusion

The Boxer Rebellion is an outstanding example of the complexities of history, where competing interests, ideologies, and aspirations converge in a crucible of conflict. Reflecting on this turbulent chapter, it is possible to be reminded of the enduring quest for dignity, autonomy, and justice that transcends borders and generations.

Additionally, the history of the Boxer rebellion should provide a stark reminder for any nation that decides to intervene into another nation’s concerns where the intervening power has hidden political agenda residing below the surface.

This reminder should be dealt to all nations, not only where a political fueled agenda influences an intervention by military force but any intervention that the preservation and protection of life is not the prime concern of military action.

“war is a continuation of politics by other means,”

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, 1st of July 1780 – 16th of November 1831

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Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

The Boxer Rebellion witnessed acts of exceptional bravery and heroism, recognized through prestigious military decorations such as the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, for soldier of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.

Victoria Cross recipients

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB (14th of May 1870 – 9th of March 1966) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Captain RMLI, (later General)

His citation reads:

Captain (now Brevet Major) Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday, Royal Marine Light Infantry, on the 24th June, 1900. The enemy, consisting of Boxers and Imperial troops, made a fierce attack on the west wall of the British Legation, setting fire to the West Gate of the south stable quarters, and taking cover in the buildings which adjoined the wall. The fire, which spread to part of the stables, and through which and the smoke a galling fire was kept up by the Imperial troops, was with difficulty extinguished, and as the presence of the enemy in the adjoining buildings was a grave danger to the Legation, a sortie was organized to drive them out.

 A hole was made in the Legation Wall, and Captain Halliday, in command of twenty Marines, led the way into the buildings and almost immediately engaged a party of the enemy. Before he could use his revolver, however, he was shot through the left shoulder, at point blank range, the bullet fracturing the shoulder and carrying away part of the lung.

Notwithstanding the extremely severe nature of his wound, Captain Halliday killed three of his assailants, and telling his men to "carry on and not mind him," walked back unaided to the hospital, refusing escort and aid so as not to diminish the number of men engaged in the sortie.

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO (9th of May 1882 – 29th of December 1956) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Midshipman RN, (later Commander)

London Gazette citation

“Mr, (read Midshipman), Basil John Douglas Guy, Midshipman of Her Majesty’s Ship “Barfleur”.

On 19th July, 1900, during the attack on Tientsin City, a very heavy cross-fire was brought to bear on the Naval Brigade, and there were several casualties. Among those who fell was one A.B.I. McCarthy, shot about 50 yards short of cover.

Mr. Guy stopped with him, and, after seeing what the injury was, attempted to lift him up and carry him in, but was not strong enough, so after binding up the wound Mr. Guy ran to get assistance.

In the meantime the remainder of the company had passed in under cover, and the entire fire from the city wall was concentrated on Mr. Guy and McCarthy. Shortly after Mr. Guy had got in under cover the stretchers came up, and again Mr. Guy dashed out and assisted in placing McCarthy on the stretcher and carrying him in.

The wounded man was however shot dead just as he was being carried into safety. During the whole time a very heavy fire had been brought to bear upon Mr. Guy, and the ground around him was absolutely ploughed up.

Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

During the Boxer rebellion, 59 American servicemen received the Medal of Honor for their actions. Four of these were for Army personnel, twenty-two went to navy sailors and the remaining thirty-three went to Marines. Harry Fisher was the first Marine to receive the medal posthumously and the only posthumous recipient for this conflict.

Side note:

Total number Victoria Crosses awarded

Since the inception of the Victoria Cross in 1856, there have been 1,358 VCs awarded. This total includes three bars granted to soldiers who won a second VC and the cross awarded to the unknown American soldier.

The most recent was awarded to Lance Corporal Joshua Leakey of 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment, whose VC was gazetted in February 2015, following an action in Afghanistan on 22nd of August 2013, this information was correct at the time of writing.

Total number of Congressional Medal of Honor, (MOH), awarded

Since the inception of the MOH in, 1861 there have been 3,536 MOH awarded.

The most recent was awarded was made to former Army Capt. Larry L. Taylor during a ceremony at the White House, by President Joe Biden, Sept. 5, 2023, this information was correct at the time of writing.

The Medal of Honor was introduced for the Naval Service in 1861, followed in 1862 a version for the Army.

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 5: Pickett’s Charge, July 3

In perhaps the pivotal moment of the Civil War, on July 3 at 1 pm, about 12,000 men charged across a field about a mile in length and were cut down in an extraordinary artillery barrage. The infantry attack was named after Confederate General George Pickett, who led the charge of his division from the south portion of the field. Generals Pettigrew and Trimble also led their divisions in the charge from the northern part of the field.  These divisions advanced toward the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, encountering fierce resistance in the form of intense artillery and rifle fire from Union troops strategically placed on higher ground.. Only men from Pickett’s division made it to the Angle and pierced the Union line; Pettigrew and Trimble never crossed the Emmitsburg Pike.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened during Pickett’s Charge.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here, and part 4 on Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field here.

Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Meade Staff Meeting

Late in the evening of July 2nd,, General Meade held a council of war to decide what should be done after two days of intense warfare. Probably Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. His senior staff officers and corps commanders concurred that, despite the significant losses suffered by the army, the most prudent course of action was to maintain their current position and await the enemy's attack.  As the meeting ended, Meade took aside Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command of the II Corps, and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed and if he concludes to try it again, it will be on our center."

Lee’s Plan

In contrast, General Lee did not convene a similar council of war, and his subsequent reports indicate that no alternative course of action was seriously considered. General Lee had intended for an early morning assault to coincide with the attack on Culp's Hill, but the arrival of Pickett's forces was delayed. The reasons behind this delay have been a topic of debate among historians ever since, and it remains a point of contention.

Longstreet’s intent to try a flank attack further around the Union right was immediately denied by Lee that morning, who insisted on an infantry attack on the Union center. Longstreet considered the attack unlikely to succeed, and according to his memoirs, he told Lee so in the moment. His reluctance to order Pickett’s Charge is one of the most renowned anecdotes of the Civil War. His memoirs describe that he told Lee: “General,” said Longstreet, “I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.” His reluctance and doubt have reverberated in history.

Pre-Attack Bombardment

The July 3 bombardment before Pickett’s Charge was the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for one hour, starting around 1 p.m. The Confederate artillery, numbering between 150 to 170 guns, unleashed a barrage along a two-mile line, aiming to weaken the Union defenses and silence their artillery. The cannonade is believed to be the most intense artillery attack in history up to that moment.  Despite the massive scale of the bombardment, its impact was limited.

The Confederate guns inflicted some damage on the Union batteries, but they largely overshot their targets. Part of the reason the Confederate bombardment was ineffective was that Confederate artillerymen missed their marks due to poor visibility from the smoke on the battlefield. July 3, 1863, was an extremely hot, windless day and the smoke from the guns hid the lines from the Confederate gunners, who thus could not adjust their range. The smoke from the firing hung low over the battlefield during the summer heat so no one could see what the effect on the defense line was and to make adjustments. Another factor was that It was usual to aim over the heads of the enemy so the explosion would maximize the shrapnel below. Further, at Cemetery Ridge, the line was very narrow, so there was little room for error. For these reasons most of the shells sailed over the heads of the line into the rear, causing mostly unimportant damage.

Fuses. But the most significant problem was that the fuses used burned longer than expected. The fuses used were not the usual ones; these had an extra second burn before detonating. The reason for this originated in a fire in the Richmond arsenal producing the fuses. An explosion in Richmond Harbor in April 1863 blew up the fuse manufacturing area, which led to a deficiency of the usual artillery fuses, so replacement ones had to be used from ordnance supplies manufactured in Selma and Charleston. These new fuses took 1 second longer than what the artillery commanders were used to, delaying detonation.

The Bormann fuse was the most common fuse used on smoothbore field artillery ammunition during the war. Both sides used this design.  Bormann fuses were notoriously unreliable and were often replaced with copper fuse adaptors to accept the standard paper time fuse. The Confederates adopted the Bormann fuse, a mechanical fuse, in 1861 and immediately began having problems.

The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target. Today, manufactured products are tested for effectiveness before they are sent to the supplier. After Gettysburg, Lt James Dinwiddie working for the Ordnance Dept investigated the fuses and it was found that they contained a resin filler that would soften and mix with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July. The filler mixing with the powder was the cause of the longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells.

The CSA artillerymen had no idea that there was a problem with the fuses coming out of Selma and Charleston that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond. The design modification was intended to make the fuses burn slower, but no one had informed the Confederate artillery commanders.

A week after the battle, tests were conducted on the various fuses supplied from around the Confederacy at the Richmond Laboratories. The findings showed that those fuses in shells intended to explode over the Federal position at Gettysburg ranged anywhere from 150 to 200 yards further to the rear before exploding. A 4-inch fuse would burn at the rate as a Richmond fuse one cut to 5 inches. Why this product testing wasn’t carried out sooner isn’t known.

The Confederate Artillery: Organization and Position

Focusing on the Confederate artillery positioning, the Confederate cannons are placed in a wide perimeter. While those focused on Culps Hill make sense, you will note how many batteries are placed north and northwest of town where no troops are going to charge. Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. Thus, Alexander had to organize his artillery without other help. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.

The Confederate officer responsible for this configuration was Lee's artillery chief, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. Although he was Lee’s friend, his major contribution to Pickett’s Charge was to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the two corps besides Longstreet.  The responsibility for the artillery cannonade to start the charge was given to Longstreet’s Corps Artillery chief, the outstanding young artillerist, Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who had effective command of the field.

Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective. When Lee reorganized after Chancellorsville and Jackson’s mortal wounding, creating 3 Corps instead of 2, the army’s reserve artillery was disbanded and its batteries reassigned to the infantry corps. This provided each corps with five artillery battalions and the flexibility of assigning battalions to the infantry divisions or keeping them under corps command. This seemingly trivial command structure change had huge implications on July 3rd.

Note that the Confederate configuration is based on the corps location. The artillery stayed with their commander. The Union placement is based on intuitive defense. Aside from the command arrangement, geography factored in: the Confederates were occupying a wider area and many of their artillery placements were based on the needs of the previous two days and what grounds they had suitable for artillery placement.

Alexander did not have full confidence that all the enemy's guns were silenced and that the Confederate ammunition was almost exhausted. Longstreet ordered Alexander to stop Pickett, but the young colonel explained that replenishing his ammunition from the trains in the rear would take over an hour, and this delay would nullify any advantage the previous barrage had given them. The infantry assault went forward without the Confederate artillery close support that had been originally planned. When the Union artillery died down, General Alexander believed that the time to charge had arrived.

The Union Artillery Organization and Position

Were it not for General Henry J Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, the Union might have lost the battle and perhaps the war.

Before the war, General Hunt was a member of a team that had revised the drill and tactics for the artillery arm of the US Army. He was the lead proponent of a radical organization concept: instead of allowing artillery batteries to be commanded by the infantry command, where they were used only to protect troops, he proposed strategic control by artillery commanders. The idea was that artillery could do much more than protect: they could attack, both on offense and defense.

On the morning of July 3, while inspecting the Union lines, he found an elevated vantage point from which he observed something whose importance only an expert in artillery tactics would grasp: the Rebel batteries were forming in line or going into position along a line that stretched from the Peach Orchard to the edge of town to the north. He alone knew what that meant. He also observed hurried activity in the Confederate infantry lines.

General Hunt understood that these were signs of an impending enormous attack. And, he knew from Colonel Sharpe of BMI that General Pickett commanded a division that had not yet seen action. Convinced that a massive infantry assault was imminent, Hunt rode back along the Union position, directing his battery commanders to reserve fire and avoid an artillery duel, which would simply exhaust the ammunition supply before the infantry’s appearance.

He lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire. His idea was to create enfilading fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long-distance firing.

But Pendleton ran out of ammunition; Longstreet inquired if this should delay the attack, but Pendleton’s supply wagons would have required over an hour delay, by which time all of the firing benefits from the bombardment already undertaken would have been lost.

Hunt, the best-known artillerist of his day, had argued for years that a single commander of artillery should be in charge. The Confederates never accepted Hunt’s command ideas, so each division and regiment had their own artillery under the division leader’s command. Hunt had full authority over his army's artillery while the ANV's artillery was directed by the three corps artillery chiefs (note- Alexander at this time was not the 1st corps artillery chief, he was technically just a battalion commander. Putting him in charge of the bombardment was a huge breach of protocol).

This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

Next, he ordered the last four batteries of the artillery reserve to start moving toward the Union battle line. He arranged his lines of fire from the sides of the line to aim toward the center, creating crossfire and plunging fire lanes. And he insisted that the batteries hold their fire when the Confederate batteries began their barrage – to conserve ammunition for what he knew was coming. And, he could so order, despite General Hancock ordering them to fire because he was the artillery commander independent of the Infantry. His theory of command was proven in practice.

He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition, but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long distance firing. The diminishment in US artillery fire was intentionally designed by Hunt (CO of the Artillery reserve) to create the impression among the rebels that the US artillery had been silenced and therefor would be unable to respond effectively to Pickett's charge. There was actually a substantial row between Hancock, who wanted the artillery firing to boost the morale of his troops, and Hunt who wanted to gull the rebels.

As the barrage continued, Hunt gave orders that deceived the Confederates; he directed several batteries to withdraw near the center of the line, causing the Confederates to think the batteries were destroyed. However, Hunt replaced the withdrawn batteries with artillerymen and cannons from the reserve, making sure the artillery line stayed strong along the ridge.

When the Confederate infantry broke the Union lines at The Angle, Hunt rushed forward, directly into the fray, firing away with a pistol at the advancing Rebels until his horse was shot, pinning him to the ground, but with no serious injury.

Hunt’s artillery knowledge, determination, and brilliant tactics ensured the Union line’s cannons had ammunition to fire when the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge began. Trusted by Meade and forceful enough to inspire his artillerymen to obey his orders rather than Hancock’s, General Hunt garners huge admiration from those who understand his contributions. Hunt was able to control the Union artillery as a single force which Pendleton could not do on the Confederate side Because Hunt was in charge of all of the artillery separate from Corps command, he was able to create this deception. Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down by Alexander's bombardment.

General Hunt anticipated the infantry attack across the field connecting Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge in the afternoon of July 3. As the map shows, he lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire and plunging fire. His idea was to fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. See the map which shows the lines of fire Hunt placed the Union artillery in position for, while the Confederate line of fire was straight ahead.

The Infantry Charge

Approximately 12,500 men in nine infantry brigades advanced over open fields for three-quarters of a mile under heavy Union artillery and rifle fire.

The charge was made by 3 divisions. Pickett’s division led the charge. General Pettigrew led Heth’s division (of Hill’s Corps), who had been injured on Day 1. General Trimble led Pender’s division, who had been killed on Day 2. Two brigades from Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division (Hill's Corps) was to support the attack on the right flank: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Col. David Lang (Perry's brigade). Hill’s illness precluded him from selecting who would attack from his corps; surprisingly, his troops who had fought heavily on Day 1 were chosen but those lightly used were not.

During the assault, the Confederates started to bunch up towards the center of the line. This was precisely at a bend in the Union line called the Angle.  At this location, the Union line formed a 90-degree angle behind a stone wall. The 71st and 69th PA Regiments were positioned on this wall, with support from the 1st NY Battery. Under Gen. Armistead, the Confederates overran the 71st and 69th PA before reaching the 1st NY Battery

What was the landmark that was the objective of the attack?

Although traditionally the Copse of Trees near the Angle has been cited since Bachelder as the visual landmark of the attack, this is probably mythical. Lee’s objective was very likely on July 3 exactly what his original objective on July 2 was: the actual focus of the attack was Cemetery Hill and the trees they were keying on were those of Ziegler’s Grove, which was much more prominent then. Lee’s attacks on both days were intended for the Union center. It was much more strategically significant than the open area where the Copse of Trees was. It was more elevated and a perfect artillery platform (hence why the Union had artillery there) and it would command the road network.

Cemetery Hill was the key to the fishhook position. Lee saw this July 1 from Seminary Ridge and his goal never wavered for 3 days. The fundamental problem was that the town of Gettysburg is right beneath that hill, and there remains no direct route even today, you have to go by Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge. Today’s Steinwehr Avenue runs close but perpendicular to where you’d need to go. The only possible staging area would be the old Cyclotron site, and imagine that with artillery blasting the whole time from there. Washington Street does get near, but it goes directly into the center of the town. So, Lee either has to get his army up Emmitsburg Road onto Steinwehr, then make a right turn onto Washington Street or nearby, or take Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge.

If Ziegler’s Grove was the intended focus of the attack to crush Cemetery Hill, how did the attack end up at the Angle at Cemetery Ridge instead? Hunt’s placement of his weapons forced the charge to go south. This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

The fences on Emmitsburg Turnpike

To cross from their positions on Seminary Ridge, the infantry had to cross Emmitsburg Turnpike about 100 yards before Cemetery Ridge. Witnesses noted that Pickett’s men crossed the road without problem from the southern end of the attack and were the ones who made it to Cemetery Ridge.  However, Trimble and Pettigrew’s men were caught in the road and very few moved further east. Hess first identified that a significant part of the problem was that the fences on either side of the road posed an obstacle to cross. Many were killed trying to get over the fence. But on the southern part of the road, these fence posts had been removed the day before during the July 2 battle, so they didn’t pose a problem for Pickett.

The fences on both sides of the road on the south part of the field were down from the action of July 2nd but not on the north side and this proved to be a huge obstruction. After crossing Emmitsburg Road, Kemper’s brigade was hit by flanking fire, driving it to the left and disrupting the cohesion of the assault. General Hunt had arranged his artillery to create crossfires and plunging fires on the south end. On the north part of the field, the Emmitsburg Pike was lined with fences which became huge obstacles to cross during the battle. The casualties piled up where men attempted to cross, only to be shot in the act. Many of the troops just took cover in the road.  Pettigrew’s men were in a similar situation although at least some of his men were caught in artillery at the start of the battle, and panic developed. Meanwhile, those fence posts had been removed on the South part of the field in the Rebel attack on July 2. There was no problem for Pickett to get to the wall, but then Stannard and artillery units opened up firing on the flank, forcing the attack to the north.

Hancock

Winfield Scott Hancock was one of the heroes of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hancock's leadership and bravery were conspicuous during Pickett's Charge. As the Confederate forces prepared for Pickett's Charge, Hancock rode along the Union lines, boosting the morale of his troops. He famously told his men, "There is no reason why any man should be nervous...I shall lead you through this battle!"

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war and for the rest of his life, carrying a cane.

On July 3rd, his Corps was positioned on Cemetery Ridge and therefore commanded the Union center. Hancock recognized the Confederates' intentions to launch a major assault and anticipated that the Confederate attack would focus on Cemetery Ridge and made preparations to defend against it. He coordinated with other Union generals to reinforce the defensive line and prepare for the Confederate assault.

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war, and for the rest of his life.

He almost died. Although he was wounded during the assault, he remained on the field until the Confederate attack was repulsed. When the fighting ended, the general was taken by stretcher and ambulance to a field hospital. He journeyed through Pennsylvania to Philadelphia and then Norristown to convalesce. His wound gave Hancock enough trouble, especially when riding a horse, that he was forced to give up active command at Petersburg in 1864, and it bothered him for the rest of his life. 

General Gibbon, who had been warned the night before, commanded the 2nd Division, II Corps. Gibbon's division bore the brunt of Pickett's Charge, where Gibbon was wounded. His leadership at the Angle was instrumental in the victory.

Alexander S. Webb was the brigade leader at the Copse of Trees. The 71st PA stopped the Confederate advance and forced the Confederates to seek cover behind a stone wall. Hand-to-hand fighting began in the Angle, and 2 companies fell back. Webb ordered a charge by the neighboring 72nd to drive the Confederates back, but the regiment refused the order. He then went to lead the 69th PA but was wounded in the thigh and groin. By this time, Col. Devereux's 19th MA Regiment and the 42nd NY Regiment rushed in and drove the Confederates out. He received the MOH in 1891.

Armistead

Brig Gen Lewis Armistead is esteemed as leading Pickett’s Division on the south end of the attack. He led his brigade from in front, through the artillery attack, hat on his sword, toward the Angle, over the stone wall, before being mortally wounded. Armistead embodied every positive attribute a courageous American military leader could display in a desperate moment.

Armistead of course was pre-war friends with General Hancock, his opponent that day. Armistead was the older man by seven years, so their paths never crossed at West Point, but army records show they met for the first time while serving on the frontier in 1844. After working together for 16 months in the remote outposts of modern-day Oklahoma, they fought in the same regiment and experienced some of the same battles in the Mexican War, where both were breveted for gallantry. Then, for a brief period after the war, as the U.S. Army occupied Mexico, Armistead commanded a small company and Hancock was one of his lieutenants. Captain Armistead was in command of the small garrison at the New San Diego Depot in San Diego, which was occupied in 1860. He was a close friend of Winfield Scott Hancock, serving with him as a quartermaster in Los Angeles, before the Civil War.  He was However, during the Battle of Gettysburg, they found themselves on opposing sides of Pickett's Charge, with Armistead leading Confederate forces and Hancock defending the Union position.

It is reported that he was struck by multiple bullets as he and his men reached the stone wall. Traditionally, it is said that he was shot with 3 bullets. Armistead's wounds were not believed to be mortal; he had been shot in the fleshy part of the arm and below the knee, and according to the surgeon who tended him, none of the wounds caused bone, artery, or nerve damage. Other accounts suggest the wounds were located in the upper thigh or groin area. The exact details of his wounds may vary in different accounts, but it is generally agreed upon that he suffered injuries to his lower body.

He was then taken to a Union field hospital at the George Spangler Farm where he died two days later. Dr. Daniel Brinton, the chief surgeon at the Union hospital there, had expected Armistead to survive because he characterized the bullet wounds as not of a "serious character." He wrote that the death "was not from his wounds directly but from secondary bacterium, fever, and prostration.”  One hears frequent discussions of Stonewall Jackson’s death from non-mortal wounds, but rarely Armistead’s. Infection and sepsis were the main causes of battlefield death if the initial wound was not itself mortal. Although this death would not have happened after penicillin was discovered in the mid-1930s, it was a common story in this war. Hancock wasn’t at Gettysburg long enough to see his friend and was in sufficient distress that it wouldn’t have been possible anyway. He might not even have known at the moment.

How many would have been needed to carry the position?

Longstreet ordered nine infantry brigades to make the charge on July 3. Five more brigades were held in reserve, which Longstreet never ordered to advance. Longstreet states in his autobiography that he estimated that it would have required 30,000 men to take Cemetery Ridge.

Mathematical modeling based on the Lanchester equations developed during the First World War to determine the numbers necessary for successful assaults demonstrates that with the commitment of one to three more infantry brigades to the nine brigades in the initial force, Pickett’s Charge would probably have taken the Union position and altered the battle’s outcome.  If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, the model estimated it would have captured the Union position. However, the Confederates would have been unable to exploit such a success without the commitment of still more troops.

Calculations based on the Lancaster Formula which was developed in World War I suggest that 20,000 men would have been needed to make a lodgment, but perhaps 5-10,000 more would have been needed to defeat the inevitable counterattack, which is not far off from the number Longstreet hypothesized.  The authors do not include Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades in the initial force.  If these troops and Anderson’s entire division had attacked with the initial force, this would have supplied five additional brigades and around 5,000 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and from 15,000 to 18,000 men. These numbers would have guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle.  Another five brigades and one regiment scheduled for the second wave of Pickett’s Charge from Pender’s and Rodes’ divisions, as well as at least another brigade from McLaws’ division, were also available.  Had all of these men been brought into the attack column, the total would be nearer to the 30,000 men Longstreet thought necessary.

However, assuming the same rate of casualties, the cost would have been about half, or 15,000 casualties. There would have been insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success. And what about the next hill and the next one? Various regiments might have been recruited for this effort: essentially, all of Longstreet and all of Hill’s Corps. But, assuming the 50% casualty rate on this additional number, and realizing that Lee only had 60,000 men at this point, while it’s theoretically possible they might have held this line, the cost would have been intolerable. Add another 10,000 casualties and it’s hard to see how Lee could have continued the war after taking that ridge.

This illustration shows the Union line kneeling and firing, with only the officers standing. The destroyed artillery from earlier bombardment is seen in the foreground. The rebel attack is coming from the southern or left side, very accurate since Armistead was originally placed far in that direction. It shows a large contingent of southern troops in the Emmitsburg Road just as suggested by Hess in his book and as I noted in my Pickett’s charge challenges. It shows the heavy smoke from the weaponry and seminary ridge in the background.  Note also the Codori Farm at the top left.

Casualty Rate

Between 10-15,000 infantry made the charge. The duration of Pickett’s Charge was 50 minutes. Total Confederate losses during the attack were 6,555, of which 1,123 Confederates were killed on the battlefield, 4,019 were wounded, and 3750 were captured including many of those listed as wounded. Many of the “wounded” died over the next days to weeks. Do the math: that’s 22 killed and 80 wounded per minute; about 1.7 casualties per second.

The casualty rate of Pickett’s Charge is typically given as 50-60%, with 10% killed on the

battlefield and 30% wounded with another 30% captured, many overlapping the wounded category. The Union loss is thought to be 1500 casualties. Pickett's division suffered 2,655 casualties (498 killed, 643 wounded, 833 wounded and captured, and 681 captured, unwounded). Pettigrew's losses are estimated to be about 2,700 (470 killed, 1,893 wounded, 337 captured). Trimble's two brigades lost 885 (155 killed, 650 wounded, and 80 captured). Wilcox's brigade reported losses of 200, Lang's about 400.

These figures are similar to the famed Charge of the Light Brigade (Crimean War, 1854) where, a British cavalry unit attacked Russian forces. The casualty rate was exceptionally high, with around 40% killed or wounded. These rates surpass the Assault on the Great Redoubt (Battle of Borodino, Napoleonic Wars, 1812), where The French Grand Army's assault on the Russian Great Redoubt during the Battle of Borodino resulted in high casualties; estimates suggest casualty rates of around 30%, and also the Assault on Marye's Heights (Battle of Fredericksburg, 1862), where the casualty rates for the Union troops were estimated to be around 15-20%.

The Confederate Army lost many of its top officers. Brigadier General Armistead was mortally wounded and captured. Garnett was killed in action; his body was never recovered and is believed to be buried with his men in Richmond, Virginia. Kemper was wounded and taken prisoner by the Union. Although the newspapers reported he was killed in the battle, his family did not believe it and were able to free Kemper from the Union prison.

Was Pickett’s Charge a Bad Decision?

The criticisms often directed at Lee for Pickett’s Charge are unwarranted. What else could he do under the circumstances? He had tried both flanks. He couldn’t go left because it led further away from any viable target. He couldn’t go right because it lengthened his supply line and he was out of artillery ammunition. If he turned around and declared victory, he wouldn’t have changed anything in the trajectory of the war and he’d be right where he started.

The Gettysburg campaign was a roll of the dice at a crucial moment.. You have to see it as a desperate final try to win the war on the battlefield. Despite all of Lee’s victories, the Union had not given up and in fact, were winning in the Western theater. The west was being lost and the confederacy was running out of time. Resources are dwindling. Davis and Lee know that things aren’t looking promising. He was a riverboat gambler who rolled the dice in every battle. From that perspective, it starts to make sense.

One hears suggestions that General Lee was ill and that he had heart disease, weakening his judgment. A contemporary analysis shows no reason for this suspicion. Heart attacks do not lead to poor judgment 2 months after they occur.

Faced with circumstances on July 3, Lee had no other options but to attack, and no other place to attack than the center.  If he retreated then the campaign would be a failure. The salient on Cemetery Hill is the obvious place to attack. Ewell is stalled on the left. Longstreet tried on the right the day before. He wants to go further to the right but there is no road there and no supply line. Hill is sick. Longstreet is being obstinate. Stuart had gotten nowhere that morning. General Lee is all alone. Where Lee miscalculated is that Hunt had created a deadly crossfire with artillery that had never been done like that before. Lee had not anticipated as devastating an artillery defense and indeed, none like it had ever been organized. Lee lost that day but look at all the other gambles he won.

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Further Reading:

·       Hess, Earl, Pickett's Charge--The Last Attack at Gettysburg.  UNC Press, 2010.

·       J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.

·       Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of the Civil War (Civil War Trilogy).Modern Library, 2004.

·       Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.

·       Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

·       William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg: A Journey in Time. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975.

·       https://theconversation.com/picketts-charge-what-modern-mathematics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982

·       Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·       James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/

·       Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge:  mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168. 

·       Richard Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg Magazine, No. 18, July 1998, 104-110.

·       Lloyd W Klein and Eric J Wittenberg, “Did General Lee’s heart attack impact the conduct of the Battle of Gettysburg?” Gettysburg Magazine 67:July 2022; 62-75.

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2018/06/26/artillery-henry-j-hunt-chief-of-artillery-for-the-army-of-the-potomac/

·       https://militaryhistorynow.com/2022/11/27/armistead-and-hancock-rethinking-the-storied-friendship-between-opposing-generals-at-gettysburg/amp/

·       Lloyd W Klein,  “Why Pickett’s Charge Failed”. The Civil War Center. https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/