Unknown World War I – The battle that history is forgetting

The Siege of Leningrad and the Battles for Moscow and Stalingrad in World War Two (WWII) are well documented, but very little, certainly in the West, has been written about the Eastern Front during World War One (WWI). Apart from the crushing blows to the Tsar’s Imperial Russian Army at Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes and the German Army’s march east, the only other battle that ever seems to get a mention is the short lived Brusilov offensive in June 1916.

Here, the author Frank Pleszak returns to the site and tells us about the little known Battle of Vileyka in September 1915.

During WWI there was significant fighting and demonstrations all along the eastern front from Riga on the Baltic Sea in the north all the way south to Romania, and once Romania entered the war, right down to the Black Sea. My dad was born and raised in a small Polish village about 100 kilometres east of Vilnius near to Lake Naroch (in what is now Belarus). Though he never mentioned it, there was a huge, and to the Russians catastrophic, battle there in the spring of 1916. It was of such importance that the historian Norman Stone said of it “Lake Naroch was, despite appearances, one of the decisive battles of the First World War. It condemned most of the Russian army to passivity”.

The ‘Battle of Lake Naroch’, the ‘Russian Spring Offensive of 1916’, occurred following the Russian ‘Great Retreat’ when the Eastern Front had settled down into positional trench warfare. It was an ill conceived, poorly planned, and disastrously executed Russian offensive across a front of nearly 100km over a series of frozen lakes and swamplands. Its intention was to bring Vilnius into striking distance in an attempt to draw German troops east and away from their offensive on the Western Front at Verdun. The Russian 2nd Army massively outnumbered the Germany XXI Army Corps, almost 450,000 infantry to 75,000 but suffered staggering losses of more than 120,000 while the Germans lost about 20,000. After two weeks of bloody and futile fighting in the most appalling conditions the battle came to an end with the Russians having only captured a tiny area to the south of Lake Naroch.

Fighting at Ladischky-Bruch during the Battle of Lake Naroch.

Forgotten?

There is almost nothing written about this battle in the west and it is in danger of being lost to history. In a small effort to prevent this happening I have researched the battle from both sides and almost completed a book on the subject that should be published later this year.

Other than the Brusilov campaigns, Russia did have some other battlefield success. In fact in the lead up to the Naroch debacle, the battle for the small town of Vileyka, where the German advance east was stopped and then pushed back is considered by some to be one of the most significant military victories ever achieved on Belarusian soil. There will be a chapter with detailed information in my forthcoming book, but I include a summary here…

So, following on from the success at the second battle at the Masurian lakes at the end of February 1915, the German X Army, commanded by General von Eichhorn, after heavy fighting, had by mid-August, taken the strategically important fortress at Kaunas but then found the capture of the city of Vilnius altogether harder.

After regrouping to the north of Vilnius, supplemented with additional reinforcements, von Eichhorn’s X Army bypassed Vilnius and towards the end of August broke through Russian General Radkevich’s 10th Army in the so called Swenziany (Švenčionys) gap. Elements pressed on east through the city of Postavy towards Hlybokaje, but the bulk of the force headed south-east towards the City of Maladzyechna (Molodechno) and the primary objective; the city of Minsk.

By mid-September, amidst stiff opposition, General von Garnier’s VI Cavalry Corps (H.K.K.6.) had captured the towns of Vileyka and Smorgon. The 3 Cavalry Division moved on towards Maladzyechna, some units even approached the west of Minsk, and others had penetrated to the east of Minsk and attacked a bridge along the Beresina River south of Borisov. Stavka, the Russian high command, were clearly concerned. Not only was Maladzyechna an important railway cross roads but it also contained important secret government and military installations. 

German cavalry attack at Vileyka.

On 17 September, as the German X Army began to surround Vilnius, Russian forces were withdrawn and the city ceded to the Germans. But as the German Army marched east their supply lines had increased and become severely stretched. Russia’s had shortened and their material losses were made good from increased production at home together with supplies from France and England. The Russian 2nd Army, devastated at Tannenberg and then obliterated at the Masurian Lakes, had re-formed and re-grouped, and under General Smirnov were given the ‘honour to finally halt the German advance’.

Back on the front foot

The H.K.K.6.’s rapid advance had left them vulnerable. Whilst they had easily crossed the rivers, streams and swamps their infantry and artillery support struggled over rivers with bridges blown up by the retreating Russians. The Russian 10th and 2nd Armies struck back, and immediately halted the German advance before Maladzyechna, and then pushed them back north along a 40km stretch of the River Wilja from the town of Vileyka to Milcza where they were slowly reinforced with advanced infantry units of the 115 Infantry and eventually 75 Reserve Divisions.

Extent of the German X Army Advance East.

By 22 September the town of Smorgon between Vilnius and Maladzyechna had been recaptured by a combination of a Russian 10th Army offensive together with Russians withdrawing from Vilnius. The Germans were exhausted and hungry, most of their artillery and supplies of food and munitions were still far behind their front. The Russians counter-attacked at Vileyka. Smirnov’s 27th Army Corps commanded by General Balanin had moved into positions to the south of Vileyka along the southern bank of the River Wilja and bombarded German positions. At 16:00 an infantry company supported by a machine gun company attacked across the railway bridge south of the town, scattering the German defenders that enabled two companies to ford the river and through the night occupy high ground to the southwest of the town.

By the early morning of 23 September all the Russian artillery, including two heavy batteries, had assembled to the south of Vileyka and by the same time further infantry had crossed the Wilja near the village of Olszyna just to the east of Vileyka causing a distraction to the German defences. Taking advantage, a further three infantry brigades were moved quickly from reserve to consolidate the breakthrough.

Russian Artillery.

The Germans regrouped and counter-attacked the positions to the south and west, but even more Russian Infantry was brought up to assist. The German action was brave but futile and by mid-afternoon as the Russians massed ready to storm Vileyka from the south, southwest and west of the town the Germans stubbornly repeated their attacks. At 16:00 massed Russian artillery began bombarding the outskirts of the town and at 16:30, as the wooden houses burned, Russian Infantry moved forward from the south. Within minutes they had driven the Germans back towards the centre of the town. Fierce hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting took place at almost every building but by 17:00 the centre was under total Russian control. Dogged German resistance prevailed around the cemetery and at the nearby prison but with the assistance of targeted Russian artillery the fighting quickly moved to the northern outskirts where a German howitzer was captured. The Germans fought desperately to recover the lost gun but Russian support arrived and repeated German attempts failed.

Russian Map of attack (original dates in Julian format).

At the same time Russian units moved, largely unopposed, around the west of the town preventing any German withdrawal to the west. Fighting within Vileyka concentrated along the northern perimeter and particularly around the railway station where a furious firefight erupted with the station changing hands several times. More Russian units moved in from the southwest and eventually cleared the remaining resistance around the cemetery before moving to the northern edge of town where they helped capture the station.

The closing stages

20 kilometres to the east at the village of Sosenka Russian cavalry failed in an attempt to capture the bridge over the River Wilja that was guarded by a single company of 80 German defenders. But nearer to Vileyka Russian infantry had crossed the Wilja around the village of Kasuta and within 4 hours had forced the German X Army back along the road towards the town of Kurzeniec, capturing the villages of Kaczanki, Hrycuki, and Kłynie together with several light field guns in the process.

Further Russian infantry crossed the Wilja capturing the villages Chołopy and Małmhy on the eastern outskirts of Vileyka. The remaining Germans were surrounded on three sides and their support was too far back to assist. Their position was hopeless so during the night all remaining units were withdrawn to new positions north of Vileyka around the village of Wołkowszczyzna.

The battle for Vileyka was effectively over. The Germans, overstretched without supplies, exhausted and hungry, struggled on for a few more days but with increasing demands from the Western Front it became clear that the prospect of any further German short-term progress to the east was unrealistic. On 25 September General von Hindenburg ordered a halt to the advance east, withdrawal of all the forward troops along the River Wilja back to positions around Lake Naroch, and for the establishment of permanent defensive lines (Dauerstellung) which were developed through the winter of 1915.

Isolated but bloody fighting erupted periodically in sections along the whole of the new front through the winter and early spring of 1916. Both sides continued to build up their forces and prepare for battle, but neither were prepared for the onslaught that eventually came in the March of 1916. The Russian success at Vileyka was not to be repeated; in fact, despite overwhelmingly superior forces they were so badly beaten that the consequences were drastic and far reaching…

Frank Pleszak has written a book about his father’s journey from near Lake Naroch via the GULags of Siberia to England entitled Two Years in a Gulag.

It is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can also hear an excerpt from the book in our related podcast here.

Frank has also almost completed a book on the Battle of Lake Naroch. His YouTube presentation is here. He is working on a history of the Polish 2nd Corps – Anders Army. Finally, Frank’s Twitter handle is @PolishIICorps.

The Unknown SAS? World War Two’s Desert Raiders

The Long-Range Desert Group played a fascinating role in desert operations during World War Two, but unlike the SAS, it is largely unknown. Here, Robert Walsh shares the fascinating story…

An LRDG patrol during the Desert Campaign.

Heavily armed, heavily customized vehicles moving stealthily around the Western Desert, driven by men resembling pirates more than elite soldiers, going deep behind enemy lines to gather intelligence and raid enemy targets. Sounds familiar? You’re more than likely thinking of the original Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment founded and led by Lieutenant Colonel David Stirling. And in this case you’d be wrong. Well, not wrong, exactly. The original SAS were founded for that purpose. But there were other units doing similar work during the Desert Campaign and the SAS weren’t the only ‘desert raiders.’ These units are often overlooked or simply overshadowed by their SAS comrades and many who know the SAS might not have heard of their less famous brethren. The Long-Range Desert Group was one of these units, earning a compliment from their opponents that the SAS themselves would have envied.

They were originally formed in June 1940 at the suggestion of Major Ralph Bagnold, assisted by Captains Patrick Clayton and William Shaw. Bagnold was a pre-war desert explorer and approached General Archibald Wavell, proposing to form a long-range reconnaissance unit to work deep behind enemy lines on covert reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and small-scale raiding missions. Wavell had been a liaison officer with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the First World War and doubtless knew of similar operations performed by the ‘Light Car Patrol’. Unlike some of his colleagues (Montgomery, for instance) Wavell understood the concept of what we now call Special Forces and lacked a prejudice common to many generals of the time. Regular British Army officers often had a deep dislike for what they called ‘private armies’, especially when those ‘private armies’ used decidedly irregular methods. Units like the Commandos, SAS and LRDG often found themselves obstructed and hindered by Regular officers and their inflexible attitudes. Wavell not only understood the LRDG’s purpose, he actively assisted in their formation and ensured they were properly supplied and equipped for the job at hand.

Where the SAS tended toward more straightforward sabotage and raiding operations, the LRDG were to adopt a quieter approach, hence the unofficial LRDG motto of ‘Not by Strength, by Guile’ (still the unofficial motto of today’s Special Boat Service, an elite unit within the Royal Marine Commandos). The LRDG did perform raiding operations, but they were mainly to avoid combat and gather information covertly. The SAS might attack airfields, supply dumps, fuels dumps and suchlike, but it was often the LRDG that provided the intelligence and also the transport to get them to and from their targets. Hence the LRDG’s unofficial nickname of the ‘Libyan Desert Taxi Service.’ The LRDG did provide the SAS with transport and intelligence, sometimes joining them in raiding missions. They also ferried secret agents to and from their rendezvous deep behind enemy lines. But they were far more than simply a taxi service for spies and saboteurs. Once the SAS were fully equipped with their own vehicles they were able to mount their own deep-penetration operations and secret agents needed guides who could move stealthily through the desert while fighting if they had to. Hence, the LRDG has sometimes been seen (unfairly and inaccurately) as being merely a taxi service for other units. The LRDG were a small unit, never numbering more than 350 men at their largest, but they achieved results out of all proportion to their numbers.

Specialist Soldiers, Specialized Equipment

The LRDG was a volunteer-only unit. Nobody had to sign up and those that did knew full well the risks of working behind enemy lines. If anything went wrong then they could find themselves stuck hundreds of miles behind enemy lines with very limited supplies and ammunition, large numbers of enemy troops hunting for them, North African desert tribes who might either help them or sell them to the enemy depending on which suited them best, burning heat during the day, freezing cold at night, snakes, spiders, sandstorms, enemy aircraft, ground patrols, impassable obstacles and the ever-present chance of their vehicles breaking down and stranding them in the desert. It was also a multinational force. The first volunteers were from New Zealand, but they were swiftly joined by many volunteers from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Great Britain. Specialized equipment, vehicles, weapons and training were essential for the LRDG to even exist in the desert, let alone function effectively as a military unit. Fortunately, Major Bagnold was an experienced pre-war desert explorer. He could provide essential knowledge and even equipment of his own invention such as the ‘sun compass’ fitted to all LRDG vehicles. He knew how the vehicles needed to be customized to make desert travel less difficult, how to navigate across the desert, which weapons would be most effective, which tribes were pro-British, pro-German or simply helped the highest bidder at any given time. Without Major Bagnold or someone very similar, the LRDG would never have existed except as an idea.

Two LRDG patrols at a rendezvous with their typical vehicles.

Their vehicles were mainly two-wheel drive jeeps and small trucks, heavily adapted for desert use. Radiators were made larger and condensers fitted to save water and reduce the risk of engines seizing. Special low-pressure desert tires and improved suspension systems made vehicles faster and easier to drive. Every vehicle had a ‘sun compass’ for navigation, a device invented by Bagnold during his pre-war exploring days. Any excess weight and unnecessary parts were stripped and replaced with useful items. Shovels and sand channels were standard for digging vehicles out of sand banks. Excess bodywork was removed to make room for extra weapons and equipment. Everything possible was done to convert LRDG vehicles from ordinary small trucks and jeeps into fast, nimble, heavily armed raiding and reconnaissance vehicles. Ford CMP and Chevrolet trucks were standard issue and the famous Willys jeep also became very popular as a patrol commander’s vehicle. Each patrol had a custom-equipped radio truck and four 6-ton trucks to deliver supplies and set up secret replenishment bases in the desert, enabling patrols to patrol deeper into enemy territory and stay in the field for longer. Communications patrols and LDG headquarters were excellent. Courtesy of each patrol’s specialist radio truck, equipped with the most modern radio equipment and the best radio operators, there were only three occasions during the Desert Campaign where a patrol lost radio contact with their headquarters.

Irregular Warriors

Their personal appearance and vehicles were unconventional. Their choice in weapons was equally unusual and staggeringly broad. LRDG members thought nothing of equipping themselves and their vehicles with captured enemy weapons in addition to whatever they found useful from British arsenals. An LRDG truck might have twin-mounted Vickers or Browning light machine guns at the front, a 50. Caliber Browning machine gun in the back and captured German or Italian machine guns such as German MG42s or Italian Breda M38s mounted at its tail. An LRDG trooper might carry a mixture of personal weapons, British, German, American and Italian. It wouldn’t be unusual to see an LRDG trooper carrying a standard British Commando dagger, a German or Italian pistol (possibly more than one) and a British rifle, an American Thompson submachine gun or a captured submachine gun such as a German MP40 Schmeisser or an Italian Beretta M1934. Light machine guns ranged from British Bren guns to American 30. Caliber Brownings via German MG34s, MG 42s or Italian Breda M37s and M38s. It was expected that all LRDG troopers should be as comfortable with using and maintaining enemy weapons as British or American ones. The LRDG also used hand grenades, landmines, rifle grenades, plastic explosives and specially made ‘Lewis bombs’ (designed by SAS officer ‘Jock’ Lewes) for destroying enemy aircraft on the ground. Couple a mixed bag of weapons with dirty, torn, stained fatigues, Arab headdress, a deep suntan and two weeks of unshaved beard and it is no surprise that LRDG troopers tended to look more like pirates or mercenaries than soldiers, especially to traditional military eyes.

The LRDG cap badge, specially chosen to reflect their military role.

The LRDG’s differing role was reflected even in their cap badge. Where the SAS still have the ‘winged dagger’ representing their airborne capability and the Sword of Damocles that can instantly fall on an enemy, the LRDG had a less aggressive emblem. Their cap badge was a wheel (reflecting their mobility) around a scorpion (a small desert creature with a lethal sting). The rest of their uniform (if you could call it that) usually consisted of torn, stained desert fatigues, sun hats and Arab headdress. The LRDG prided themselves on their unconventional methods and practical effective performance, not on the conventional ‘spit and polish’ smartness of the Regular Army. They looked like a bunch of ruffians, but did their particular jobs as professionally as the smartest-looking soldiers on a parade ground. It was results that mattered, not appearances. The SAS had a similar attitude. Shiny boots and polished buttons meant nothing in the North African desert, hundreds of miles behind enemy lines and knowing that they were as likely to be shot out of hand as taken prisoner if an operation went wrong. For both units this apparent lack of formality and convention frequently caused tensions and rifts with soldiers from Regular units, especially with the more traditionally minded senior officers.

At first a typical LRDG patrol comprised two troopers and 28 non-commissioned officers. Between them a patrol drove one Ford CMP truck and ten smaller Chevrolet trucks. Patrol commanders and patrol sergeants had the option of driving customized jeeps. Each patrol had a patrol medical orderly, desert navigator, radio operator and mechanic. In March 1941 patrols were reorganized into one officer, fifteen to eighteen men and five or six vehicles. Halving the size of patrols gave the LRDG the ability to send more patrols over wider areas while each patrol retained sufficient firepower to fight their way out of trouble if they needed to. Stealth was always preferable to combat and the LRDG soon acquired a nickname from the Italian opposition. The Italians began calling them the ‘Pattaglia Fantasma’ or ‘Ghost Patrol’ acknowledging their ability to evade detection and strike at will.

After The Desert War

When all German forces in North Africa surrendered in Tunisia in May 1943, the LRDG, now having grown to two squadrons comprising around 350 men in all, was at a loose end. They needed to find new areas to operate and so justify their continued existence. They soon found them. The LRDG operated in a number of areas besides the desert although they’re best remembered for their desert operations, especially their work at the Battle of Kufra and their raid on Barce as part of ‘Operation Caravan’. New hunting grounds in the Mediterranean and the Balkans now occupied their time. The Dodecanese campaign, the Battle of Leros, Albania, Yugoslavia and the Italian campaign all featured the LRDG, often operating jointly with other raiding and reconnaissance units such as the SAS, Special Boat Service and the Greek ‘Sacred Squadron’. They adapted their methods to fit the different locations they now operated in and their skill and flexibility made them a valuable asset right up until the end of the war. After the war in Europe officially ended on May 8, 1945 the LRDG’s leaders requested that they be deployed to the Far East and continue performing similar operations against the Japanese. Their superiors declined and on August 1, 1945 the LRDG was formally disbanded. Days after their disbandment the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Second World War was over; the Cold War was about to begin.

Earlier I mentioned the LRDG receiving the highest of compliments from the unlikeliest of people. The unlikely person was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the legendary ‘Desert Fox’ and commander of the Afrika Korps. His compliment to the LRDG was this:

The Long-Range Desert Group caused us more damage than any other British unit of equal strength.

Did you enjoy this article? If so, tell the world! Write about it, tweet about it or share it by clicking on one of the buttons below!

Sources

Gross, Kuno; O'Carroll, Brendan and Chiarvetto, Roberto. Incident at Jebel Sherif. Berlin: Kuno Gross, 2009

http://www.lrdg.org/

http://www.specialforcesroh.com/browse.php?pageid=lrdg

http://www.lrdg.de/vehicles.htm

Morgan, Mike. Sting of the Scorpion: The Inside Story of the Long Range Desert Group. The History Press Publishing, 2003

The Cold War: A War without a Winner

“Did anyone really win the Cold War?” was the question that Samantha Jones asked after the recent shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. After all, many assume that as the USSR collapsed in 1991, the US won the Cold War. Instead, Samantha argues that nobody really won this war. Here she explains why.

With the recent shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine, tensions in some ways similar to those felt during the Cold War are once again being raised upon the world stage. With President Putin’s reaction to the crisis and the obvious Russian military presence between the border of Russia and Ukraine, this hostility links back to events and ideologies that brought about the Cold War. Once again the rivalries between various countries have influenced nations and people worldwide. No longer is this a matter of communism versus capitalism, or socialism versus democracy, but is instead a power struggle that goes beyond two major superpowers. The aftermath and rivalries from the Cold War are still present today. Why? Perhaps it is because the Cold War was a war that had no final end without a final winner.

An East German soldier guarding the newly-formed Berlin Wall in August 1961.

AN UNUSUAL WAR

The Cold War was a war that was never won. Despite the massive cost and time spent on the conflict, little physical confrontation occurred between the super-powers. This was not a normal war. Simply put, the Cold War was a series of cooling, warming and frosty interactions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (US). Although these superpowers are said to be the big players, the hostility between these countries caused a catalyst for revolutionary worldwide events and issues. It involved the Third World, the Middle East and the Western sphere of influence. From the aftermath of World War Two, a vicious rivalry between communism and capitalism arose, bringing the world into a new age of technological warfare with nuclear weaponry. Welcome to the modern world.

It is widely believed that owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US won the Cold War by default. But this really is not the case. By analyzing the physical conflicts, technological aspects and scale of this worldwide conflict, one can see the deep layering and complications to this. To have a winner, one must have a loser. But what did the US win? It did not receive any territory, reparation payments or a formal apology from the USSR. It was a war with no surrender or defeat. Yes the Berlin Wall came down and yes the USSR is no longer a communist nation. However, this does not mean the US won the Cold War. In my opinion the Cold War has no winner, which is why remnants of the conflict continue today.

For a world war there was very little physical confrontation in regard to the scale of the conflict. In no way do I mean any disrespect to those that did fight during the Cold War; however in comparison to the world wars, the armed struggle was small. The Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are probably the most noted military contests during this time. Even so, both superpowers were defeated in Vietnam and Afghanistan and retreated after a series of long battles and the loss of many human lives. Also, both superpowers were overcome by an enemy that was not the USSR or the US. Of course the presence of each superpower was evident behind the battleground, such as supplying resources, aid and even initiating certain conflicts. But in a physical sense, it hardly seems reasonable to announce a winner when both the USSR and the US failed to decisively win militarily during the Cold War.

GLOBAL BATTLE, UNCLEAR WINNER

As mentioned before, the Cold War was also a revolutionary conflict in terms of technology, truly introducing the world to nuclear weaponry. The Space Race and the Hydrogen Bomb reveal how warfare took on a new meaning at this time. In this sense, the Cold War was a war that almost happened, or a war that could have been. What I mean by this is that it is a real victory for both superpowers as they decided not to use this form of weaponry against each other on a massive scale. Since neither superpower actually used their nuclear weapons and this war was not fought in outer space, the US does not deserve the title of ‘winner’ in this particular arena.

Lastly it is quite insular and ignorant to believe that the Cold War was only fought between the USSR and the US; therefore to announce one winner is incorrect. The crises in the Middle East, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the rise of Mao’s China, the Korean War, the Berlin Wall, the imposition of communism on Eastern Europe, and numerous nations fighting for their independence can all be connected to the Cold War. Countless personalities and politicians outside these two superpowers were involved in continuing and trying to stop this worldwide division. It was not just an ideological struggle between the democratic capitalists and the dictatorial communists. After World War Two the world entered into a period that broke with traditions of the past, such as colonization. The extreme layering in each piece of the Cold War puzzle does not add up to one clear victory. It is unjust and unfair to only include the US and the USSR in this debate and the question of who won.

As one could write an entire book on this subject, I have only touched the tip of the iceberg here. Hindsight tells us that the Cold War was unlike any other war in history for so many reasons – including that there was no clear winner or loser. Yes the USSR collapsed, but this was not due to any direct action caused by the US, rather domestic issues rotting the superpower from within. And yes the capitalist US did survive when the USSR did not, but just what did it gain? Reagan’s large increase in military spending in the 1980s caused the US to greatly increase its debt as well as use methods that can be argued to be crimes against humanity.

And was it worth it? After all this, parts of the world are still at war, the US and Russia aren’t friends, small nations are fighting for their independence in civil wars, and superpowers continue to dominate those that are weak. It seems that not much was learned from the Cold War.

Do you agree with Samantha’s argument? Did the Cold War not have a winner? Let us know your thoughts below…

World War One – How did the Eastern Front differ from the Western Front?

The Eastern Front in World War One is often largely unknown to many Westerners. The situation there was quite different to that on the Western Front. Here, Rebecca Fachner follows up on her articles on Royal Family squabbles here and the spark that caused war to break out here.

The 100th anniversary of the first summer of World War One rolls onward, and with it commemorations of battles that everyone in the Western world seems to know instinctively - the Marne, the Somme, Ypres…  The war on the Western Front is very much alive in the Western consciousness, but what is so often forgotten is that it was actually a two-front war in Europe. Germany was not only fighting in the West against the French and British (and eventually the Americans), but also in the East against the Russian Empire.

Russian troops on the move to the front line. From National Geographic magazine, volume 31. 1917.

As a fighting force, the Russian Empire was extremely contradictory. They were a formidable foe, but at the same time a very worrying ally. Their one huge advantage in warfare was the sheer numbers of troops that they had at their disposal. It was truly a staggering amount of men, millions upon millions of Russian troops, a “mass of bodies ready to bleed” in the words of one historian of the period.[1] The main disadvantage for the Russians was everything else. The army had miserably poor leadership, was woefully underfunded and was technologically backward. In the years before the war, the Allies, especially France, had spent enormous sums of money trying to improve Russia’s technological capability.

Railroads had been a particular target, as the movement of troops to the front as quickly as possible was of paramount importance. France knew that German war plans hinged on Russia’s inability to mobilize their troops and so planned on attacking France first, then moving on to Russia only after the French had been defeated. Therefore, if Russia could respond more quickly, and force Germany to divert troops in their direction earlier, so much the better for France.  Their efforts did do some good, but not enough, as was painfully demonstrated in the opening days of the war. It took weeks for the Russians to assemble a fighting force along the German and Austro-Hungarian borders.

DIFFERENCES WITH THE WEST

Russia began the war by invading eastern Germany. It was able to do so as Poland was not an independent country at this time meaning that Russia and Germany were contiguous. The first major engagement of the war was the Battle of Tannenberg, which was a resounding defeat for the Russians. The next week at the Battle of Masurian Lakes, the Russians were pushed back further, and would not fight on German soil for the remainder of the war. Despite the inauspicious beginnings, the Russians did enjoy some success, particularly against Austria-Hungary in the fall of 1914. By 1915, however, the Germans had made the Eastern Front their top priority and began to hurl troops at the Russians, managing to turn the tide of the eastern war permanently in their own favor. Russia never again enjoyed a significant advantage.

The geography of the war in the east was very different when compared to the west. Rather than a compressed front line, the Russians and Germans were eventually fighting over an area of more than a thousand miles. This spread the fighting, placing a much larger burden on military supply chains than in the west, and making Russian transportation problems an even bigger issue as they began to have supply problems soon after war broke out. One small, seemingly trivial problem added to the frustration, namely that Russian railroads were, and still are, on a different track gauge than parts of Europe further west. Railroad tracks in Europe (and almost everywhere else) are 4 feet 8 inches apart from each other, but in Russia the tracks are 5 feet apart. This means that trains from Europe don’t work in Russia and vice versa; to this day, if you are travelling by railroad into Russia it causes delays at the border. This created all kinds of chaos for supplying both armies and moving troops. All told, it generally slowed down the war in the east. Additionally, because the front line stretched over so large a territory, trench warfare, something that is so closely associated with the war in the west, was not a factor in the east. There was no need for trenches, as the armies had so much more room to maneuver.

Another significant and often remarked upon problem for the Russians was the personality of the men making the key decisions. Tsar Nicholas was a weak and largely ineffective leader, and enjoyed far too much command authority for a person with limited military experience. His two top commanders, Grand Duke Nicholas and Minister of War General Sukhomlinov, hated each other and constantly tried to undermine the other, often to the detriment of their command.  One of those commanders, it must be said, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich, was an extremely dedicated and able military commander, frustrated by the duplicity of his counterpart and the ineptitude of his boss.

THE TSAR TAKES CHARGE

This was not a recipe for success, and as the Russians continued to lose, blame was shifted around and around the command structure. Eventually the Tsar, frustrated and exasperated, decided to move to army headquarters to take personal command of the military. He hoped that his presence would inspire both the troops and the command structure and turn the tide of the war. On the face of it, this was not as poor a decision as it turned out to be, and at least the Tsar’s heart was in the right place, so to speak. Unfortunately, Nicholas’ presence had the opposite effect, and he was blamed by many for every single thing that went wrong with the war from that point on. This severely undermined his authority, not just with his army but also with his people, who had previously believed that the Tsar was close to divine, and blamed all the military failures on his generals. With his very visible presence at the head of his army, Nicholas was exposed as ineffective and weak, and the Russian people had no choice but to blame him for the manifest failures of his strategy.

Compounding the Tsar’s image problem was that he had left his wife in control in his absence. Empress Alexandra was dangerously unstable, and extremely unpopular, partly due to her association with the monk Rasputin; it was widely thought that she was under his direct control. Alexandra quickly assumed many of the governmental duties that her husband had left behind, which was very unfortunate, as she had little political acumen and no experience in government. What she did have was an unshakable faith in Rasputin, and a stubborn refusal to grasp how widely he was mistrusted and disliked. Alexandra careened from one disastrous policy to another, dismissing competent ministers and replacing them with self-serving yes men. Events continued to spiral out of control, and after years of war and shortages, poor management and an ineffective monarchy, it is actually extraordinary that the revolution didn’t happen sooner.

The Russian Revolution, at least the first one, didn’t end the war. The first Russian Revolution, in February 1917, deposed the Tsar but the Provisional Government that took his place did not want to end the war. Alexsandr Kerensky, the leader of the Provisional Government, had the makings of a political genius, and it is one of the frustrating what-ifs of the Russian Revolution to wonder what he might have achieved, but he was intent on continuing to prosecute the war. This proved to be the undoing of both the Provisional Government and Kerensky, as they underestimated just how war weary Russia was, and suffered the consequences when the Bolsheviks launched the October Revolution, promising, among other things, to end the war.  The Bolsheviks sued for peace, and the Germans forced them to sign a humiliating treaty, ending the war in the east.

A clip about the 1916 Battle of Lake Narocz on the Eastern Front is available here on the site.

[1] Massie, Robert Nicholas and Alexandra: the Fall of the Romanov Dynasty. P. 302

The 3 most bizarre Tanks ever

Tanks have been integral to armies since World War One. But over the years a number of prototype designs have been made that never quite worked. Here, Adrian Burrows tells us about the most bizarre tank designs…

Since the Great War the mighty tank has formed the mainstay of any skilled (or unskilled) military commander’s army. The tank started its military career from fairly inauspicious beginnings.  Originally called ‘Landships’ - this name didn’t stick as military bods were concerned that such an overly descriptive title might give away what their secret weapon was to the enemy, so the name ‘tank’ was instead adopted - the tank really hasn’t changed a great deal in its design or function since its first use in battle. Yes, advances in technology have rendered a modern tank a distant relative to the first tank prototype (fondly named as ‘Little Willie’ by the British Military) but it still remains a relative nonetheless.

The classic image of a tank is of a hulking and box like central chassis, the twin caterpillar tracks either side in order to propel its vast form forward over any and all terrain, and a rotating turret to provide a 360 degree field of fire. Perhaps the core tenants of tank design haven’t changed because the initial concept was just so effective. Why try to fix what isn’t broken? Well, that didn’t stop people from trying. Allow me to present to you the top three weirdest tank prototypes of all time.

3. The Russian Tsar Tank

Caterpillar tracks are brilliantly effective at moving big heavy tanks across difficult terrain. Indeed, they were initially designed in order to allow tanks to climb up and over the trench-laden terrain of the Western Front. Yet, as thought by the Russian boffins Nikolai Lebedenko, Nikolai Zhukovsky, Boris Stechkin and Alexander Mikulin, if caterpillar tracks are great then surely two giant bicycle wheels would be awesome.

That was the primary design decision behind the Russian Tsar Tank - and what a sight it must have been. Each giant spoked wheel attached to the central hub of the chassis was a massive 27 feet in diameter, the idea being that such a vast wheel would be able to plough through any obstacles in its path (and the two 250 horse power Sunbeam engines would certainly help with that). The tank was ready for war armed with a giant 8-meter high cannon turret and plans for further cannons to be attached to the tank’s frame. The central casing itself was a massive 12 meters wide with thick armor to protect the soldiers inside. So far so good? Why on earth didn’t the Russian Tsar Tank take off?

Its Achilles heel turned out to be the small stabilizing wheel at the rear of the tank (giving it its tricycle appearance). During the first test run through a field the stabilizing wheel became firmly entrenched in a patch of mud. The entire mighty form of the Tsar Tank became rooted to the spot, making it a major target that resembled a giant penny-farthing. After the abysmal test run the tank never saw active service and remained stuck exactly where it was until the end of the war.

2. Ball Tank

Texan Inventor AJ Richardson had a noble goal, how best to ensure men could quickly and safely cover the distance of a mud and crater strewn No Man’s Land in order to close in on an enemy position? The answer he came up with? A giant metal ball. This mighty metal ball of death could not only protect the troops within it, but being spherical it could also outmaneuver anything else on the battlefield. The project was never developed due to one small problem that scientists at the time could not overcome… there was no way that the troops within could see outside of the tank. In theory though, it would have been amazing.

1. Antonov A-40 Krylya Tanka (Tank Wings)

Tanks are big and powerful but slow and cumbersome. If somehow their maneuverability could be increased then surely nothing could stand in their path as they rapidly out flanked the enemy’s position. The logical conclusion to this quandary? Invent a tank that can fly.

And that’s exactly what Oleg Antonov set about doing in 1942. A T-60 Light Tank (light being 5.8 tons) went on a crash diet under Antonov’s watchful eye by removing the vehicle’s armor, weaponry and headlights. The T-60 was also provided with a limited amount of fuel in order to decrease its total weight yet further. What was the next step? Attach some wings to the tank of course. Yes, they were literally stuck to the side of the tank, transforming it into the world’s most unlikely glider. The final step was to utilize a Tupolev TB-3 plane to lift the tank gently in to the air; once the plane had reached a sufficient height and speed, the prototype could be released, allowing it to glide majestically into battle.

Did it work? I would love to say yes, but no, no it didn’t.

Remarkably no one died in the experiment. The TB-3 had to ditch the tank in mid-flight due to the massive drag it caused, but apparently the T-60 did glide back down to earth before being driven back to base. This initial set back didn’t put off the Soviet Union. Over the next twenty years the country was able to develop the necessary techniques and equipment to para-drop BMD-1 vehicles with its crew on board.

So, that’s my top 3 most bizarre tank prototypes of all time. Tanks with bicycle wheels, ball tanks, tanks that can fly… the weird and the wonderful. Perhaps your list would differ? If so I would love to read your top 3. There’s plenty to consider after all. Those that just missed out on a place in my top three include the Russian Screw Drive Tank that couldn’t go in a straight line and the British Praying Mantis Tank intended to shoot over obstacles. Both fine ideas ruined by issues of common sense. But then that’s what makes them so brilliantly barmy. Until next time!

Adrian Burrows works at Wicked Workshops, an organization that prepares great history workshops. Find out more about a World War One related workshop here.

Do you know a weird and wonderful tank? If so, let us know below...

An alternative Founding Father – Theodore Roosevelt and the American Conservation Movement

Theodore Roosevelt was an impressive president for a number of reasons, but in many ways he is still quite hard to pin down. In this article, Wout Vergauwen looks at Roosevelt and his presidency through the prism of his one his more unknown policy areas, that of conservation.

There can nothing in the world be more beautiful than the Yosemite, the groves of the giant sequoias and redwoods, the Canyon of the Colorado, the Canyon of the Yellowstone, the Three Tetons; and our people should see to it that they are preserved for their children and their children’s children forever, with their majestic beauty all unmarred.

 - Theodore Roosevelt, twenty-sixth President of the United States

Ever since Theodore Roosevelt left office in 1909, politicians, historians and naturalists have debated who the twenty-sixth president really was, and how he should be remembered: as a politician, a cowboy, a soldier, a historian, an author, a conservationist, or a hunter. However, Theodore Roosevelt could not be pigeonholed, and that is why he is now remembered as one of most versatile presidents since Thomas Jefferson. Though many aspects of his multi-faceted presidency have been covered by historians, his conservation efforts remain largely underexplored. 

Theodore Roosevelt when in the Rough Riders during the 1898 Spanish-American War. From Harper's Pictorial History of the War with Spain, Volume II. Published in 1899.

The key is to understanding Roosevelt’s conservation policy is that his efforts were not strictly political, but also personal. From his youth onwards, Roosevelt always felt passionate for the nature in which he found comfort while battling illness.[1] As a result, he entered Harvard on the brink of adulthood “intending to become […] a scientific man of the Audubon, or Wilson, or Baird, or Coues type – a man like Hart Merriam, or Frank Chapman, or Hornaday, to-day.”[2] Disappointed in the way science was practiced at university - through the microscope and in the laboratory with little field work - he decided to pursue his fascination for nature elsewhere. In 1888, he founded the Boone and Crockett Club, a foundation concerned with the preservation of big game species and their habitat that quickly became one of the most effective conservation organizations of its day.[3] Prior to his arrival in the White House, several other efforts followed, but the scale of his efforts drastically enlarged once he succeeded William McKinley as president. In his first annual message to a joint Congress, Roosevelt used McKinley’s assassination as a political opportunity to set the domestic agenda of his administration. He indeed managed to get hold of Congress’ attention and shifted it toward what he thought was important - conservation. After that, it was not long before he created his first - and the country’s sixth - national park: Oregon’s Crater Lake.[4]

PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS

Creating a national park, however, was not as simple as one might think, especially since Roosevelt had to create a new mindset. Indeed, Roosevelt did not only need to persuade Congress, but he also needed to invent a whole new policy domain that was understood by the people. Public support was almost nonexistent, or as Roosevelt noted himself in his autobiography: “the relationship between the conservation of natural resources and the ‘national welfare’ had not yet ‘dawned on the public mind’.”[5] The establishment of his conservationist ideals as the hallmark of his presidency was no easy task. Therefore, one should ask how he accomplished what he did and how he profiled himself as the founder of the conservation movement, even though he did not create the first national park, and neither did he establish the National Park Service, Woodrow Wilson’s accomplishment in 1916. Thus, the area that really needs to be addressed first is about the source of his powers, the way he obtained them, and the way he used them. Be sure, these powers were needed. From the beginning onwards, Roosevelt faced fierce opposition, not only from Congress, but also from ranchers, mine operators, loggers, power companies, and the Western states who protested his conservation efforts because they limited the exploitation of natural resources.[6] Even so, within the boundaries of the law, Roosevelt continued to protect the environment and resources for the generations to come, although he dealt rather creatively with Congress and legislation.

A remarkable though interesting way to approach the power issue is through one of the nation’s most popular historical myths: The Frontier Myth. Unlike other rhetorical presidents however, Roosevelt did not just use it, he altered the myth so it could serve his purposes.[7] Being perceived as a frontiersman himself, he used this image to rearticulate the myth and link it to his conservation purposes, thereby promoting his policies. Roosevelt thus needed to persuade his audience and confronted two rhetorical challenges to do so: “First, he had to create a sense of exigency, an urgency to resolve the environmental crisis. Second, he had to formulate a nexus between conservation and values and attitudes that his audience embraced.”[8] In doing so, Roosevelt did not only use the altered Frontiers Myth, but linked his alterations to both the Constitution and Thomas Jefferson. Although, these cannot be seen as “values and attitudes” in a literal way, they serve the purpose perfectly.

The Jefferson link becomes clear when reviewing the first alteration, that of the frontier’s hero. Once perceived as a Jeffersonian yeoman farmer, the myth’s hero had evolved toward the Old West cowboy whose brutal character and limitless exploitation of nature had been turned into virtues by the end of the century. Roosevelt linked the then contemporary farmer to his Jeffersonian counterpart, thereby restoring the “American hero that could symbolize the conservation of the nation’s resources”[9] and thus revitalizing the ‘original’ Frontier Myth. A second alteration dealt with the finite character of the Frontier, where Roosevelt played the commercial, rather than the environmental, card: “if you do not want to preserve nature for nature itself, at least support it for commercial interest.”

STRUGGLES WITH CONGRESS - A BATTLE FOR POWER

After signing the Crater Lake Bill, Roosevelt did not take the time to enjoy the creation of his national park, but started looking for another natural gem worth saving.  He found many, and continued his efforts to create national parks in order to protect them against human exploitation and to save them for the children of the future. In his fourth annual message to Congress, he announced the creation of a National Forest Service: “[…] neither can we accept the views of those whose only interest in the forest is temporary; who are anxious to reap what they have not sown and then move away, leaving desolation behind them […] The creation of a forest service in the Department of Agriculture will have […] important results”[10] Two months later, under the governance of Gifford Pinchot, the Forest Service was indeed put in place. Soon after its creation, the Forest Service accumulated power, so becoming independent from Congress.[11] Because of this, lawmakers were not very accommodating to the president’s following conservation policies and saw an opportunity to make this clear by delaying Roosevelt’s efforts to gain Federal protection for Wyoming’s Devils Tower - often described as the strangest molten rock configuration in North America - the Grand Canyon, and several other sites. Although Roosevelt tried to push this through, Congress did not approve it and the body adjourned for the summer in June 1906.

NATIONAL MONUMENTS - A SMART MOVE

Roosevelt, however, held the upper hand and revealed himself as an even stronger defender of nature. During the spring of 1906 he had gathered a team of preservationists to draft a bill declaring: “that the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments.”[12] The language of the legislation was carefully chosen and sounded inoffensive. Without realizing what they had approved, Senators passed the bill on May 24, 1906, and the House, also not fully understanding the impact of the bill on the floor, followed suit on June 5. Roosevelt signed the bill on June 8, and before apprehending that they were outsmarted by the president, Congressmen went home on June 30 - not to return before the start of their next session on December 3, 1906.  A lot of irony is to be found in this situation since Congress granted, unknowingly, their president the power they tried to hold on to. The newly ‘invented’ National Monuments did not need Congressional approval - as opposed to the National Parks - and gave the president free reign to protect whichever natural site he wanted to, something that he did. Wyoming’s Devils Tower was proclaimed the first national monument on September 24, and before the end of the year three others – El Morro (NM), Montezuma Castle (AZ) and the Petrified Forest (AZ) – would be added to that list. When Roosevelt left office in 1909, fourteen additional national monuments were created; whereas no new national parks were added to the list until Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, added Glacier National Park to the list in 1910.

This circumvention of Congress was only one example of what Theodore Roosevelt tried to accomplish: making the presidency more powerful. He never made an effort to hide his belief that the executive should be the most powerful branch of government and accomplished this in many ways.[13] Accusations that he usurped congressional powers were publicly ridiculed which made Congressmen yearn openly “for the day when [Theodore Roosevelt] would no longer lead – when [Congress] would have again a President in the mold of McKinley.”[14]

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[1] D. Brinkley, The Wilderness warrior. Theodore Roosevelt and the crusade for America, New York (NY), Harper Perennial, 2010, p. 22.

[2] O.H. Orr, Saving American Bird: T. Gilbert Pearson and the Founding of the Audubon Movement, Gainesville (FL), University Press of Florida, 1992, p. 74

[3] S. Marvinney, “Theodore Roosevelt, Conservationist” In: New York State Conservationist, 50 (1996), 6, [retrieved from: web.ebscohost.com on November 23, 2013]

[4] Already existing national parks were: Yellowstone, Sequoia, General Grant, Yosemite, and Mount Rainier.

[5] L.G. Dorsey, “The Frontier Myth in Presidential Rhetoric: Theodore Roosevelt’s Campaign for Conservation” In: Western Journal of Communications, 59 (1995), 1, p. 2.

[6] D.O. Buehler, “Permanence and Change in Theodore Roosevelt’s Conservation Jeremiad” In: Western Journal of Communications, 62 (1998), 4, p. 446.

[7] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 3.

[8] D.O. Buehler, art. cit., p. 441.

[9] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 8.

[10] T. Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1904 [retrieved from: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu on November 29, 2013]

This is part of a larger excerpt: “The forest policy of the government is just now a subject of vivid public interest throughout the West and the people of the United States in general […] The forest reserve policy can be successful only when it has the full support of the people of the West. It can not safely, and should not in any case, be imposed upon them against their will. But neither can we accept the views of those whose only interest in the forest is temporary; who are anxious to reap what they have not sown and then move away, leaving desolation behind them […] The creation of a forest service in the Department of Agriculture will have for its important results: First. A better handling of all forest work […] Second. The reserves themselves […] will be more easily and more widely useful to the people of the West than has been the case hitherto […] Third. Within a comparatively short time the reserves will become self-supporting.”

[11] W.H. Harbaugh, op. cit., p. 323.

[12] “An Act For the preservation of American antiquities.” In: US Statutes at Large, Volume 34, Part 1, Chapter 3060, p. 225.

[13] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 2.

[14] W.H. Harbaugh, op. cit., p. 333.

Balloon Busters. The daredevils of World War One?

Airplanes evolved at a rapid pace during World War I. With this evolution, came a growing number of daredevil pilots who took great risks. Possibly the most daring of them all were the balloon busters, fearless pilots who did an often forgotten task.

The First World War was unusual in many ways. One was that, for the first time in military history, the air became a battlefield. No longer were combatants confined to land and sea, now they could exploit the military potential of what in 1914 was a relatively new invention – the aircraft.

The sheer speed at which aircraft evolved from barely more than powered gliders into fully-fledged weapons was staggering. In 1914 aircraft were so fragile and underpowered that carrying even the weight of a machine gun was usually beyond them. By 1918 there existed fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, while the weapons and tactics had evolved. In 1914 a typical dogfight often consisted of one aircraft from either side with pilots firing their service pistols at each other. By 1918 aircraft were stronger, faster, more agile and carried machine guns, bombs, and rockets. In only four years combat flying evolved from two pilots with pistols using the same aircraft for any and every purpose into fully-fledged air forces with custom-designed aircraft flying and fighting in huge numbers. It was a common theme among those veterans who survived that, by 1918, if there weren’t at least fifty or sixty aircraft involved in a dogfight, it wasn’t a proper dogfight.

Belgian pilot Willy Coppens, balloon buster of the First World War.

BALLOON BUSTERS

The fighter aces became heroes overnight, but seldom lived to enjoy their celebrity. Men who became household names at the time are almost entirely forgotten today. Manfred von Richthofen (the famous ‘Red Baron’) lives on as the most famous fighter pilot of all time, but few remember Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock, James McCudden, Rene Fonck or Werner Voss. But one elite group of fighter aces are especially neglected today, the ‘balloon busters’.

So who were they, what did they do, how did they do it and what military value did they have? Simply, they specialized in flying high-risk missions behind enemy lines to destroy enemy observation balloons. So high were the risks that many balloon busters attacked either alone or with only one or two fellow pilots. Squadron commanders recognized the extreme risks by making balloon busting missions largely voluntary, although pilots could be ordered to attack balloons if they were proving particularly troublesome to friendly ground troops.

Balloons were highly valued for several reasons. They could hover at high altitudes and monitor enemy behavior, spotting troop movements, new supply and munitions dumps, whether the enemy were stockpiling supplies and munitions, and if they were moving fresh troops forward to defend against an upcoming offensive or mount one of their own. Their other standard purpose was artillery spotting. Gunners often lacked a direct view of the enemy due to distance, weather conditions and geographical factors like ridgelines and hills. To accurately shell enemy targets they needed balloons to literally ‘call the shots’ by spotting where shells landed and directing gunners accurately on to important targets. Balloons were immensely valuable for intelligence gathering and artillery spotting. Protecting friendly balloons while destroying enemy balloons became increasingly important as the war ground on.

The targets, enemy observation balloons.

DANGEROUS REWARDS

Balloon busters attacked balloons in addition to flying regular combat missions. Nowadays, people thinking of First World War aces usually think about those destroying enemy aircraft, the dogfighters. One thing separating most balloon busters from regular fighter aces was that many of the war’s most famous aces actively refused to attack balloons at all. Manfred von Richthofen never attacked a balloon. Top-scoring British ace Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock scored his first ‘kill’ by destroying a balloon, but found the job so dangerous that he never attacked another. French ace Rene Fonck, top-scoring Allied ace of the war with 75 confirmed kills, never shot down a balloon.

It could also be readily argued that hindering enemy intelligence gathering and artillery spotting was often of greater value than dogfighting, shooting down one or two enemy aircraft if they were lucky and then returning to base. Granted, deaths of famous aces such as Richthofen, Major Lanoe Hawker (himself killed by Richthofen) and American balloon buster Frank Luke caused some damage to enemy morale, but the vast majority of aircrew killed died with little recognition outside of their squadrons, families and friends. Destroying observation balloons had genuine influence on the local progress of the war. Shooting down novice enemy fighter pilots and very occasionally killing a leading enemy ace simply didn’t have the same value.

So how did they do it? They checked reports of balloons sighted behind enemy lines, examined intelligence on enemy defenses, plotted the least-dangerous route to their target and attacked. Fortunately, pilots had some specialist weapons to assist them. These were designed to take advantage of the chronic German shortage of helium, the non-flammable gas often used by Allied balloons. In the absence of helium, German balloons usually used hydrogen but, while hydrogen is lighter than air and as good as helium for lifting a balloon, it is explosive when mixed with air and any kind of flame. Even a cigarette end could cause a hydrogen-filled balloon to explode. The first of these specialist weapons was the Le Prieur rocket designed by French officer Yves Le Prieur in 1915. This was simply a larger form of firework rocket containing a charge of gunpowder and tipped with a sharp iron spike to pierce a balloon just before the gunpowder detonated. Le Prieur rockets were unguided and woefully inaccurate at more than 120 feet from their targets, but they were also the first air-to-air missiles in military history and cutting-edge weapons for their time.

Pilots on both sides also used special incendiary bullets containing phosphorous. The incendiary bullets gradually replaced rockets owing to their greater accuracy and range. Using them, however, carried a particularly nasty risk. Downed pilots whose aircraft were found carrying incendiary ammunition were likely to be summarily shot by their captors rather than taken prisoner. Some pilots carried written orders from their commanders explicitly stating incendiary ammunition was exclusively for use against balloons and not for strafing runs on trenches, infantry columns or other human targets, but this didn’t stop balloon busters risking summary execution - assuming that they survived being shot down to start with. Another specialist weapon, equally likely to incur summary execution, was the phosphorous canister used by flying over a balloon and dropping the canister like a normal bomb. Ground troops had particular loathing for phosphorous canisters and especially for pilots who used them. They carried 20 pounds of white phosphorous and could easily miss a balloon entirely, landing instead among defending ground troops with horrifying results.

TACTICS FOR ATTACK

Pilots also developed specialized tactics. They never flew straight and level when attacking balloons, usually preferring a shallow dive at high speed, making a single pass and escaping rather than risk a second attempt. Enemy defenses were usually too heavy for any pilot wanting to survive to attack a balloon more than once. Some pilots favored flying deep behind enemy lines before circling round and attacking from within enemy territory. Enemy gunners often opened fire much later rather than risk a friendly fire incident and pilots could make a single high-speed pass while headed for their own lines, making a successful escape much more likely. On larger-scale raids often involving multiple aircraft and multiple targets, one group would attack the balloons while another remained as ‘top cover’, circling at higher altitude to defend against enemy fighter patrols. Enemy fighters were often assigned specifically to patrol balloons, providing both physical defense and a deterrent to all but the bravest or most reckless enemy pilots.

The frequent fate of would-be aces. Balloon buster Heinrich Gontermann’s Fokker Triplane, destroyed on a balloon busting mission.

You might think that balloon busting was already dangerous enough without any additional risks. Unfortunately for balloon busters the job of enemy defenders was to make it as dangerous as humanly possible. Balloons were connected to the ground by a winch allowing them to an agreed height and no higher. Heavy anti-aircraft guns used clockwork shells designed to explode at altitudes set by their gunners and gunners always set them to explode at roughly the same height as the balloons they protected. As if heavy guns weren’t bad enough, balloons were almost always held below 3,500 feet, the maximum accurate range of light and heavy machine guns. Balloons were invariably protected by a half-dozen or more machine guns of varying calibers. Infantry were also encouraged to fire rifle volleys at any enemy aircraft diving within range. One weapon particularly feared by Allied pilots was the Hotchkiss 37mm gun firing five shells at once. The shells glowed bright green as they came up in clumps, leading Allied pilots to nickname them ‘flaming onions’.

One particularly nasty weapon was the booby-trapped balloon. These were used by both sides and deliberately left at a tempting altitude for enemy fighters. Instead of a human observer a straw dummy dressed in uniform was placed in the basket. The remainder of the basket was filled with a 500-pound explosive charge detonated from the ground. First World War fighters were immensely fragile by today’s standards and being anywhere near such large explosions frequently proved fatal. The booby traps did occasionally backfire on their users, literally in the case of Belgian ace Willy Coppens. Coppens attacked a balloon that was strangely unprotected by ground fire and, like many pilots before him, didn’t realize the balloon was manned by a dummy until it was too late. Unfortunately for the Germans, the bomb failed to explode while Coppens shredded the hydrogen-filled balloon with incendiary bullets. The bomb-laden basket, now itself thoroughly alight, promptly descended into the middle of the German positions where the impact and fire finally detonated it causing considerable casualties on the ground. Coppens, the highest-scoring balloon ace of the war, regarded it as one of his luckiest escapes while the opinion of the defending Germans is unrecorded. This is probably just as well.

The grave of Frank Luke, probably the First World War’s most famous balloon buster.

​A DANGEROUS LIFE

Despite the undoubtedly extreme risks, many ambitious young pilots tried their hand at balloon busting. Given its extreme danger and spectacular nature balloon busting was the quickest route to fame and medals for young fighter pilots wanting to make their name. Many died. Some tried it once or twice before sticking to conventional dogfighting and a few made it their specialty. Belgium’s Willy Coppens was the highest-scoring balloon buster of the war. France’s Henri Bourjade, the Royal Flying Corps’ Anthony Beauchamp-Proctor and German pilots like Erich Lowenhardt and Heinrich Gontermann destroyed hundreds of balloons between them. Most famous of all was the American Frank Luke, whose career lasted only eighteen days before his death, during which he destroyed fourteen balloons and also shot down four German aircraft. For ambitious young pilots wanting fame and rapid promotion, balloon busting seemed like the fast track to immortality. For most of them it was really the fast track to their graves.

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References

http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/balloon_busters.php

Guttman, Jon; Dempsey, Harry. Balloon-Busting Aces of World War 1. Osprey Publishing, 2005

Shores, Christopher; Franks, Norman; Guest, Russell. Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the British Empire Air Forces 1915-1920 Grub Street, 1990.

Hart, Peter: Aces Falling: War Above The Trenches, Phoenix Books, 2008.

Lee, Arthur Gould; Open Cockpit, Grub Street, 2012.

Lewis, Cecil; Sagittarius Rising, Pen And Sword Books, 2009.

Image Sources

http://simhq.com/forum/ubbthreads.php/topics/3878426

http://www.sabix.org/bulletin/b28/kerisel.html

http://www.pourlemerite.org/wwi/air/gontermann.html

http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=9233

How Hollywood blurred the facts of one of the trials of the century

The trial of the century? In this article Edward Vinski looks at a famous 1925 trial between religion and science. And how later Hollywood and Broadway depictions blurred the truth of events.

Perhaps twentieth century America’s most famous clash between religion and science occurred in Dayton, Tennessee. Science teacher John T. Scopes stood trial for teaching the theory of human evolution by natural selection to a class of high school students. Over the course of eleven days in July 1925, news reporters from all around the United States crowded into the small town to cover what was called “the trial of the century”. Much of the interest in the case stemmed from the fact that Scopes was defended by Clarence Darrow, perhaps the country’s most famous trial attorney, while William Jennings Bryan, the former Secretary of State and three-time Presidential nominee, aided the prosecution. The trial peaked when Darrow put Bryan on the witness stand to answer questions about the Bible, and culminated with a guilty verdict that was ultimately and anti-climactically overturned on a technicality. That Bryan died in Dayton a few days after the trial ended only added to its drama.

John T. Scopes in 1925

FROM TENNESSEE TO BROADWAY

The story, however, did not end in Dayton. In 1955, Inherit the Wind, a play based on the events of the trial, opened on Broadway. Written by Jerome Lawrence and Robert Edwin Lee, the play used the trial as a metaphor for McCarthy-ism with the Scopes character representing those blacklisted by the House Un-American Activities Committee. Five years later, the play was turned into a film starring Academy Award winners Spencer Tracey and Frederic March in the Darrow and Bryan roles respectively. Both the play and the film were well received and have been remade several times over the ensuing decades.

The popularity of these fictionalized accounts has, though, produced an interesting by-product. Many people have come to believe that the film/stage versions are accurate depictions of what occurred in 1925. Easterbrook (N.D.) suggested that “many Americans know the Scopes trial not from history books but from ‘Inherit the Wind’.” Unfortunately, Inherit the Wind distorts the facts of the trial, and while I think most of us expect a certain amount of Hollywood-izing where ‘based on a true story’ films are concerned, we run into great dangers if we treat such fictionalized accounts as historical documents.

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

As we approach the 90th anniversary of the Scopes Trial, I would like to set some of the record straight. In doing so, I will avoid discussing minor instances of creative license, and keep my focus on the aspects of the 1960 film that can cause misunderstanding of the facts of the case.

We begin with the arrest and indictment of the defendant, John T. Scopes. The film opens with the Scopes character teaching his biology class when the lesson is interrupted by the authorities placing him under arrest. The truth was somewhat less dramatic. Following the passage of Tennessee’s anti-evolution law in May 1925, the ACLU offered to assist any schoolteacher who challenged the law. Upon hearing this, local business leaders, school board personnel and attorneys concocted a scheme in which a local teacher would be tried for violating the statute. The resulting trial would not only challenge the controversial law, but it would also serve as a publicity stunt for the town which had fallen on hard times (Moore, 1999). Scopes, 24-years-old at the time, was the local high school’s general science teacher and football coach. He was tracked down not in his classroom, but on a local tennis court and brought to a Dayton drug store where the conspirators were scheming over breakfast. Upon his arrival, he was asked whether he would be willing to let his name be used in the case. Scopes was opposed to the anti-evolution law although he knew very little about it, being primarily a physics and math teacher. In fact, there is some question as to whether or not he ever actually taught an evolution lesson while substituting for the regular biology teacher (Benen, 2000). His uncomplicated life also made the young, unmarried, childless Scopes an attractive candidate as he would have little to lose from this scheme. After some discussion, Scopes accepted (Larson, 2006).

A nearby justice of the peace swore out an arrest warrant, handed it to a police officer who promptly served the papers to Scopes. While the conspirators made phone calls to newspapers announcing the upcoming trial which would help put their town “on the map”, the accused left the drug store to resume playing tennis (Larson, 2006). Within days of the announcement, Bryan volunteered his services to the prosecution, Darrow agreed to aid the defense, and the trial of the century was set to begin.

MORE ERRORS

This, however, brings us to another point of comparison between Inherit the Wind and the actual trial: Scopes’ treatment while in custody. The film shows the Scopes character languishing alone in a jail cell, being taunted and threatened with lynching by his fellow townspeople, and intimidated by prosecutors who were out for blood. Again the truth tells a different story. As one might gather from Scopes’ post-‘arrest’ tennis match, he never spent one minute in jail. The crime was, in fact, a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine of “not less than One Hundred $(100.00) Dollars nor more than Five Hundred $(500.00 ) Dollars for each offense” (1925 Tennessee House Bill, 185).

In addition, far from being hated by the populace, Scopes was generally well liked by his fellow townspeople and this opinion seems to have been shared by members of the prosecution (Larson, 2006). In fact, during the noon recess on one particularly hot day, Scopes went swimming with two of the prosecuting attorneys, Wallace Haggard and William Jennings Bryan, Jr. They enjoyed themselves so much that they lost track of time and were late returning to the courthouse. Upon their arrival, they found that the trial had proceeded without them, and they had difficulty squeezing through the crowded courtroom to take their places.

We have begun to get a flavor for how Inherit the Wind helped to establish the Scopes Trial myth at the expense of its facts. One would expect that Scopes would be the central figure of his own trial. The personalities that dominated it, though, were such that the defendant became an afterthought.

Edward Vinski is Associate Professor of Education at St. Joseph's College in New York.

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References

Benen, S. (2000). Inherit the Myth: How the movie version of the Scopes trial monkeyed with the facts. Church and State, 53, 15-16.

Easterbrook, G. (N.D.). The Scopes trial vs. “Inherit the Wind”. Retrieved from http://www.beliefnet.com/News/1999/12/The-Scopes-Trial-Vs-Inherit-The-Wind.aspx

Larson, E. J. (2006). Summer for the gods: The scopes trial and America’s continuing debate over science and religion. New York: Basic Books.

Moore, R. (1999). Creationism in the United States: The lingering impact of Inherit the Wind. The American Biology Teacher, 61, 246-250.

1925 Tennessee House Bill, 185.

The Man who Attacked Pearl Harbor: One Nation’s Enemy, Another Nation’s Hero

Admiral Yamamoto led the attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II. However, Yamamoto was an interesting character who clashed with other, more bellicose, factions in Japan. Here, Kevin K. O’Neill tells us about his life.

Seventy-three years ago, on a day that has lived in infamy, America was attacked by Imperial Japan at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in a devastating surprise attack. One of the masterminds of this attack was Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of Japan’s combined fleet. Portrayed in the American press as the chief perpetrator of this nefarious gambit, Yamamoto was successfully demonized in the American mind by newspapers and magazines. Such slander is a tool of war as old as the business but with the passage of time a more realistic summation of Yamamoto’s character is in order.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

A NAVAL MAN

Born Isoroku Takano in 1884, to a Nagaoka samurai clan, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto clan in 1916 to keep the clan name alive, a common practice of samurai clans with no male heirs. By that time Yamamoto had already graduated form the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1904, served as a line officer during the Battle of Tsushima Straits in 1905, returned to the Naval Staff College in 1914, and been promoted to Lieutenant Commander in 1915. Yamamoto went on to study at Harvard for two years with several subsequent American postings allowing him to tour America and become fluent in the English language. It was during this time in America that Yamamoto gleaned his understanding of American production and logistic capability. Showing foresight, Yamamoto shifted his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation.

In the 1930s the Army and Navy of Imperial Japan were at odds with each other over national doctrine. This animosity was fanned by politics turbulent enough to, after an assassination attempt in 1930, give the Japanese eleven Prime Ministers in as many years before the Army Officer, Hideki Tojo, became Prime Minister in 1941. The Army’s nationalistic outlook, a mix of ‘bushido’ and European fascism termed ‘Showa Nationalism’ by historians, was fueled by many things. Two of these were lingering resentment over the treatment by the ‘Black Ships’ of Commodore Perry’s gunboat diplomacy, and the indignation over the Japanese ‘racial equality’ proposal being rejected by the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I. One of the main bones of contention between the bellicose Army and the more pragmatic Navy was whether or not to join the German-Italian Axis powers in what was to become the Tripartite Act.

Admiral Yamamoto, previously against aspects of the Japanese aggressions in China, was also against the Tripartite Act, recognizing that it would almost certainly lead to open conflict with the United States. Well aware of the age old military tenet that it is easier to start a war than to end one, Yamamoto, against public opinion and to the ire of the Army, sounded the alarm over America’s production abilities saying that the Japanese Navy could “run wild in the Pacific for 6 months… after that, I have no expectation of success.” This realistic viewpoint, considered weak and unpatriotic by the Army and an increasing number of the Navy power players, led to Yamamoto being removed from his position in the Navy Ministry to sea duty as the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, where he was held in high esteem.

WHEN WAR BEGINS

After Tojo was appointed Prime Minister, Yamamoto, knowing war was imminent, went into patriotic obedience with the mindset of giving America a heavy blow, drawing battle lines, and suing for peace. The first of these blows came at Pearl Harbor, but while the rest of Japan was celebrating the ‘decisive’ victory Yamamoto was in deep melancholy over the fact that not a single American aircraft carrier was touched and that, due to bureaucratic lag, the declaration of war was delivered late to the Americans, making Pearl Harbor a sneak attack that would harden American resolve. Yamamoto tried again to hit the Americans hard then sue for peace with the plan of securing Midway Island and swatting American aircraft carriers.

Midway was a sure Japanese victory on paper, but there were problems such as the lack of security making the plan an open secret discussed publicly in teahouses. One Japanese pilot received a letter from a foot soldier relative fighting in China wishing him good luck at Midway. Other tricks of fate, including the submarines sent to detect American aircraft carriers being placed incorrectly due to a typographical error, thwarted the Japanese fleet. American intelligence work and gambits, the heroism of the torpedo squadrons, and shipboard fire fighting capabilities helped tip the balance. The Imperial Japanese Navy never recovered from their losses at the Battle of Midway.

As the Japanese were pushed back further and further during the battle for the Solomon Islands and ensuing loss of Guadalcanal, their morale suffered. Yamamoto, against strong vocal protests by his staff, insisted on going on morale boosting visits to forward areas. With the Japanese secret codes broken, the US Navy knew the details of these visits. President Roosevelt ordered the Navy to “Get Yamamoto”. On April 18, 1943, Yamamoto was shot down during an aerial ambush. Killed outright by .50 machine gun fire the 59 year old Yamamoto was found thrown clear of the crash site in his seat, still upright, with head bent as if in deep thought, his katana still clutched in his white gloved hand. Boosting the morale of the Americans and demotivating the Japanese, Roosevelt’s decision to go after Yamamoto is hard to question when viewed from the mindset of the times.

Sadly for the Japanese people Yamamoto never got his chance to keep the, or sue for, peace with the Americans. Roughly 90% of Japanese casualties occurred after his death as the Japanese fought tooth and nail against the advancing allies. One can only wonder what might have happened in the mid-twentieth century had the forces of bellicose nationalism listened to Isoroku Yamamoto, a true warrior who knew the price of aggression.

Now, click here to read our article on how World War II stereotypes of Japan linger on to this day.

Reference: The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire by John Toland.

Michael Collins – Four myths surrounding the death of the Irish independence leader

Michael Collins was an Irish leader who helped his country achieve independence. However, a few years after the Irish Republic was proclaimed, Collins was dead. His death remains a mystery. Here, SM Sigerson, an author of a book related to the assassination, tells us about four myths surrounding his death. 

Michael Collins, his life and times, command an inexhaustible fascination for people everywhere. This is perhaps because they are a sort of microcosm of a political predicament that continues to repeat itself all over the world.

An ancient, semi-feudal oppressor. A people literally dying for self-determination.  A vigorous new generation, chomping at the bit to ‘have a go’. A wealth of new thought and thinkers, transforming political debate, intellectual and cultural life.

Among the best and brightest, a young leader steps into the breach: with the genius, vision and courage that turns the key and brings it all together. Spearheaded by him, his people sweep all before them.

Such popular leaders are sometimes fortunate, and live to rule; shepherding the people through the pangs of establishing their republic. Others fall in the conflict; tragically cut off in their prime, setting their world back decades.

Michael Collins addressing a crowd in Dublin, 1922.

We've seen this drama replayed in many nations. If mythology was created to teach us of classic dilemmas that may be cyclically repeated by humanity down through the ages, perhaps this is one of the key dilemmas.

No wonder that Collins' story has so much to say to us even now. If it's the stuff that dreams are made of, it has also been plagued by myth making in every sense. Mythology can have two potential functions: to illuminate the facts, or to obscure them. Some myths give meaning. They help us understand our mysteries. Another sort may simply be disinformation: concocted expressly to prevent understanding.

Because there has never been any full, official inquiry in to the death of Collins, his story is not much more than a folk tale. A number of myths about it have taken on a powerful life of their own; often tolerated and even disseminated by official sources.

In “The Assassination of Michael Collins: What Happened at Béal na mBláth?” eleven popular misconceptions are listed which, almost without exception, have served to mislead the public about what really happened.

Most of these are easily traceable to sources by no means entirely objective or disinterested - when not to actual political opponents of the man whose death they seem to trivialize. We are going to consider a few such myths here.

Myth 1:  That there is an "official story"; that we know what happened.

Myth 2:  The anti-Treaty side did it.

Myth 3:  "No, stop and we'll fight them."

Myth 4:  Collins died because he was "careless of personal danger"

Myth 1: That there is an "official story"

Origin: Anecdote, folklore, irresponsible commentators.

Translation: "No investigation necessary."

That there never has been any official, public inquiry into the death of Michael Collins [1] is a glaring omission that cannot be excused in any modern democracy.

We haven't even the basic dignity of an official story to pull to pieces. We have only the illusion of one. Unexamined anecdote, conflicting testimony and rumor have been allowed to stand in its place. In reality, there is no official story.

As matters stand there is no real evidence to show what caused his death, and we can only presume it was caused by gunshot. There is no evidence to show that Collins didn't die of a heart attack, or that he was not poisoned and that the wounds were not inflicted afterward. [2]

The eyewitness reports are highly contradictory. None of those present were ever formally questioned by the authorities. There is no autopsy report that we can read. All we know for certain is that shots were exchanged at Béal na mBláth and that only Collins died.

Yet inquests were held in the death of Cathal Brugha, Harry Boland, Sean Hales, Liam Lynch "and a host of others who died from gunshot wounds... Contemporary newspapers show inquests in the deaths of soldiers as well as officers killed in action were commonplace." [3] The authorities' failure to convene any such examination in Collins' death is more than a regrettable oversight.

Myth 2: The anti-Treaty side did it

Origin: Popular assumption, based on contemporary press reports.

Translation: "Case closed."

The assumption that the anti-Treaty soldiers (that is, those who did not support the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that led to Ireland coming into being) shot Collins is no more than that.  As such, it is directly attributable to the lack of any official investigation.

Allegations that he was shot by someone other than the ambushers is not a far-fetched theory, but originates with corroborated eyewitness testimony.

Myth 3: "No, stop and we'll fight them."

Origin: Emmett Dalton.

Translation: "Dalton was not to blame. Collins (i.e. the victim) was to blame."

How many discussions of the events at Béal na mBláth turn on references to these words? How many of the journalists, politicians and others who've quoted this famous line have any idea of its provenance?

Like so much conventional wisdom about Béal na mBláth, this anecdote originates in the account given by one single witness only. It is the version of events given by Dalton. Significantly, it is the version which most seems to excuse Dalton's failure, as chief bodyguard, to keep his priceless charge alive. It is not corroborated by any other source.

This should be enough to restrain prominent commentators from quoting it as gospel.

Myth 4: "Careless of personal danger"

Origin: Folklore, well-meaning biographers.

Translation: "Collins (i.e. the victim) was to blame."

Where courage and judgment are equally required, I would rather send in a clever coward, than a stupid hero.

-  Michael Collins, 1922 [4]

No one survives the kind of attention that the British secret service focused on Michael Collins by mere ‘luck’. In the course of several years on their ‘most wanted’ list, he survived continuous, organized, sophisticated efforts, by the world's most formidable imperialist war machine, to infiltrate his organization, capture and/or kill him.

Running an army entirely dependent on volunteers and constantly recruiting them, he was particularly exposed to such assailants. A number of operatives joined the movement, distinguished themselves, and managed to penetrate quite near him. Expressing a keen desire to meet Collins, some were ultimately exposed and executed.

This sent a very clear message indeed: trying too hard to find Collins was a short way to end in a ditch with a hole in the head. Then there are the many eyewitness reports, scattered throughout his life in Dublin, of his stunning skill in swiftly dispatching the occasional lone armed attacker, with his bare hands and championship wrestling skills.

These were dangerous times. The Irish were playing for high stakes, and had their eyes on the prize: the golden ring of national freedom, which had eluded their forebears for centuries. The struggle required great physical courage in its combatants, and a willingness to take risks.

Yet no one in Collins' position could have survived the War of Independence, had he been ‘careless of personal danger’.

"The Assassination of Michael Collins: What Happened at Béal na mBláth?" by SM Sigerson is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

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Notes

1) He is referred to herein as "Collins"

2) John M Feehan The Shooting of Michael Collins: Murder or Accident?  Mercier Press, Cork, Ireland, 1981

3) Ibid.  Tim Pat Coogan, in his authoritative biography Michael Collins, seems to err in asserting that no inquests were held in deaths that occurred during "military action."  Arrow Books, London, 1991

4) Hayden Talbot, Michael Collins: His Own Story Hutchinson & Company, London, 1923