Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 2 – Healthcare – Two cities - Two outcomes - One reason

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 2 in the series considers the medical readiness lessons for today, by contrasting the very different approaches of Philadelphia and St Louis in the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy: Available here.

With masks over their faces, members of the American Red Cross remove a victim of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic from a house at Etzel and Page Avenues, St. Louis, Missouri. St Louis managed the Epidemic better than many other US cities.

American life in 1918 was busy, demanding, and non-stop. 

A world war was raging in Europe; military camps were springing up all over the country to accommodate the military’s demand for more soldiers. Factories (and even community clubs, organizations, and families) were busy turning out provisions needed by those boys going “over there”.

But the demands of this war also drained the nation’s supply of healthcare workers, medical equipment, and diminished the quality of available civilian medical care everywhere. So when the second wave of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic struck toward the end of September, the civilian hospitals and medical personnel were simply unprepared.

The state health officer for New Jersey announced on September 27th that the influenza “was unusually prevalent” throughout the state. Within the next three days, more than 2,000 new cases were reported. Newark’s medical facilities were so quickly overwhelmed that the city purchased a vacant furniture warehouse to be used as an emergency hospital. (Leavitt, 2006)

Makeshift hospitals like that one were hastily opened in almost every community to deal with the astronomical surge in people seeking medical help, but the virulence of this epidemic simply overwhelmed them all. 

One New Jersey physician recalled the outbreak: “There was no need to make appointments. You walked out of your office in the morning and people grabbed you as you walked down the street. You just kept going from one patient to another until late in the evening.” He treated more than 3,000 patients that month. (Leavitt, 2006)

Finally, in newspapers around the country, messages from desperate city health departments appeared:

. . . The spread of the Spanish Influenza is now a matter for the individual citizen. The city is doing what it can. Now it is up to the public. You can help keep the disease down. IT’S UP TO YOU—TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF  (Johnson City Health Department, 1918)

That 1918 directive – very pertinent in both substance and form as we currently battle our own pandemic of epic proportions – actually represented a capitulation of sorts by America’s city and state governments.

At that point, everyone was on his or her own.

Lesson Two: Healthcare - Two Cities - Two Outcomes – One Reason

The very virulence of the influenza virus that late summer and early fall doomed the unready medical system in this country almost immediately. The United States had 5,323 hospitals with just 612,000 beds available to accommodate a nationwide population of some 92 million people. Within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of almost every local outbreak, all of the hospitals in that area were filled beyond capacity. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976)

During the initial outbreak of the Covid-19 Pandemic in spring 2020, the modern healthcare system in the United States came perilously close to the limits that 1918 crossed. How do we handle a second wave that’s as virulent or more so than our first wave?

As history would have it, there actually is an answer to that very question in the 1918 Epidemic. It’s a tale of two cities – Philadelphia and St. Louis.

Philadelphia

For the sake of establishing a timeline by which to compare these two cities, let’s reiterate the facts we discussed in “Lesson One” of this series about Philadelphia’s health director Dr. Wilmer Krusen’s disastrous decisions that led to Philadelphia’s high mortality rate.

Despite evidence to the contrary regarding the virus’ virulence in the various military camps surrounding Philadelphia, Krusen was quoted in a Harrisburg newspaper on September 14th that he didn’t see any danger in the “Spanish Flu”. (Harrisburg Telegraph, 1918)

Three days later on September 17th, the first cases of the flu in the city were reported. Krusen took no quarantine measures or other social precautions, and furthermore, he ignored pleas from the local medical community to cancel the September 28thparade through the city. Over one hundred thousand people witnessed and participated in the parade that day. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

Within seventy-two hours, Philadelphia’s hospitals were overrun. As the disease spread, essential services collapsed. Nearly 500 policemen failed to report for duty. Firemen, garbage collectors, and city administrators fell ill. [1] But it wasn’t until October 3rd that the city finally closed schools, banned public gatherings, and took other citywide measures to suppress the epidemic. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

Krusen’s fourteen-day delay between the first reported cases in the city and his decision to finally impose a quarantine played a major role in the deaths of well over 12,162 people from influenza and other influenza-related complications between October 1 and November 2, 1918. (Dunnington, 2017)

One of the findings Thomas Garrett noted in his 2008 study of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was that healthcare actually becomes irrelevant if there are no plans in place to ensure that a pandemic does not incapacitate the healthcare system like it did in 1918. (Garrett, 2008)

St Louis

In St Louis, Dr. Max Starkloff, the St. Louis health commissioner, planned ahead.

Instead of waiting for the virus to start, Starkloff started. 

First, he changed his thinking from IF to WHEN. By September 20th, Starkloff had already published a list of social “Don’ts” regarding behavior that could spread the “epidemic of influenza” that was happening in the east. (Evening Missourian, 1918)

He also alerted the local medical community to be prepared, and with their help set up a network of volunteer nurses to treat residents in their homes when the hospitals ran out of space. Members of the Red Cross Motor Ambulance Corps* were diverted from various camps to help transport civilian patients to the hospital and to deliver broth and food to those influenza patients being treated in their homes. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

Starkloff was ready.

When the first cases of the influenza epidemic were reported in St. Louis on October 5th, he and his staff moved rapidly. Two days later on October 7th, they closed schools, theaters, playgrounds and other public places. Quickly added to that list were churches and taverns, as well as restricted attendance at funerals. Streetcars were limited to seated passengers only – the usual crowds of standing riders were forbidden. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

These restrictions were enforced too. Despite significant pushback from local religious leaders and business owners who complained about the “draconian” measures and predicted dire economic consequences because of the closings, Starkloff and Mayor Henry Kiel remained firm. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

One Reason

What’s so staggering is the contrast in the mortality figures for these two cities. Philadelphia experienced 12,162 (or more) deaths in one month; St. Louis experienced 1,703 deaths over four months – the lowest mortality rate among the nation’s largest cities. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

The one and only reason: In St. Louis, an intervention plan was in place and ready to go when the first cases were reported.

History is NOW

In a recent Washington Post interview, a frustrated ER nurse at Sinai Grace Hospital in Detroit, Michigan, Mikaela Sakal, described their struggle against the coronavirus:

Nobody prepared us for this, because this didn’t exist. These aren’t the kinds of scenarios you go over in training. Where do you put 26 critical patients when you only have 12 rooms? How many stretchers fit into a hallway? (Saslow, 2020)

The Covid-19 Pandemic is filled with healthcare anecdotes like this one.

While all kinds of “plans” supposedly have been designed to deal with a pandemic, there were no complete readiness plans that had been designed, practiced, corrected, approved, and waiting to be implemented. Even essential medical stockpiles of such common essentials as facemasks, hazmat suits, ventilators, or the machines to make them were wholly inadequate to handle the demands of this disaster.

And when a pandemic like 1918 DID hit in 2020, what occurred was panicky, uncoordinated, reactionary moves with no contingency plans for implementation problems, the long-term effects of each measure, or the necessary vs. available resources.

“Nothing went by the book,” Ms. Sakal explained angrily, “Every night, we had to come into work and rewrite the rules.” (Saslow, 2020)

When there is no virus vaccine, “readiness” becomes the major factor in the government’s ability to protect its citizens from a pandemic. Faced with spiraling mortality rates across vast populations over a short period of time, a “virus war” requires preparation, the ready availability of healthcare workers, hospital beds, and huge stockpiles of ready medical equipment to meet the massive demand.

More importantly, as the Philadelphia and St. Louis examples demonstrated, a national readiness plan uniting all of these elements is necessary.

Otherwise, healthcare becomes irrelevant, and 675,000 Americans could die.

Food for thought.

Now, read part 3 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 3 – Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’ 

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 1 – ‘the threat of an outbreak you may not have experienced’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey starts a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

The first article in the series considers what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy today, namely the current controversy about reopening the economy after only several weeks of quarantine.

US troops with influenza in 1918 at U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 45, Aix-Les-Bains, France, Influenza Ward No. 1.

On December 1, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln wrote some advice for the nation’s legislators in his Second Annual Message to Congress. 

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. [1]

Embroiled in the chaos of America’s first and only civil war, Lincoln’s advice to Congress to do what today we call “think outside the box” was almost futuristic in its suggested application. But to think outside the box requires one to know what’s already IN the box.

That’s where the world is right NOW in 2020 – trying to think anew and act anew - as the Covid-19 Pandemic upends the entire globe medically, socially, economically, and politically. 

But humanity is desperate. 

We don’t have the lives to waste on actions that merely repeat past failures or the time to ignore proven medical measures to chase quack medical solutions or the economy to endure all these haphazard plans born of desperation or political expediency.

But do we actually have any idea of what has gone before? Do we know what’s been tried and failed or what’s been tried and worked or what was never tried at all during a pandemic of THIS magnitude?

Ironically, we do – the 1918 Influenza Epidemic. 

In 2008, Thomas Garrett, then an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, published a study on “Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-Day Implications”. The third paragraph of his study contains this common sense recommendation.

Certainly an event that caused 40 million worldwide deaths in a year should be closely examined not only for its historical significance, but also for what we can learn (in the unfortunate chance the world experiences another influenza pandemic). [2] 

But the relevant question is: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic? 

With Garrett’s suggestion as a goal, this article is the first of a four-part series to answer that question. Using the 1918 Influenza Pandemic as our foundational model, this series will examine that event using the three top issues or questions that have emerged during the 2020 crisis. We’ll see how the government and the people in 1918 handled similar challenges, and what, if any, lessons from the past can help us in the present.

Starting with the current controversy about reopening our economy after only several weeks of quarantine, we’ll also take a look at two other 2020 issues: healthcare and government leadership in the 1918 pandemic. 

The final article in this series will present some conclusions from the lessons of 1918 and offer some anecdotes that give voice to those who experienced this same type of crisis more than a hundred years ago. 

If we must think anew and act anew, then we must do so with knowledge – not ignorance.

Lesson One: ‘the threat of an outbreak you may not have experienced’

The United States (and the world), due to social distancing and stay-at-home restrictions during the Covid-19 Pandemic, hasn’t come near the mortality levels of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic. In fact, we’ve even flattened the rate of infection and mortality curves projected by most, if not all, of the statistical models used for the 2020 crisis.

Because of this good news, public health experts, state governors, the Trump administration, business owners, and Americans from all walks of life are now debating the question uppermost in everyone’s mind: How long do the restrictions need to continue before we can reopen the economy?

Despite the statistical success, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said on CNN’s “State of the Union” that the answer to reopening the economy “depends”.

“It is not going to be a light switch. It is going to be depending where you are in the country, the nature of the outbreak you’ve already experienced, and the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced.” [3]

Whether Fauci intended it or not, the end of his statement - “and the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced” – actually contains a double meaning. For 2020, it means those areas of the country that were spared the Covid-19 virus thus far, which was his point.

But the unusually deadly 1918 epidemic suggests a far darker meaning for us – the possibility of another wave of outbreaks that could be far more murderous than the first. What made the 1918 Influenza Epidemic so unusual - and so devastating for humanity - were those two subsequent waves of infection in the fall of 1918 and the winter of 1919.

The first wave – spring 1918 

The great influenza pandemic first hit Europe, the United States, and Asia, in 1918 and raged across the globe for two years from January 1918 to December 1919. [4] However, early reports of the virus were almost dismissive.

On page one of the February 6, 1918 Malone, New York newspaper were several updates on area residents at home and abroad. One of the updates was about Lieutenant Clarence M. Kilburn, an infantry officer serving with the First Division in France.

Letters received by his wife and mother – the last one dated Jan. 14th - stated that the lieutenant was still in a hospital in France. He had been in the hospital since Thanksgiving, first with an infection of the bowels and then with influenza which followed. [5]

The April 4, 1918 Port Jervis, New York newspaper – The Evening Gazette – had an article on page six about new U.S. recruits training and marching at Camp Dix - the new World War I military training and staging ground built in New Jersey in 1917. Tucked away at the very end of that article was a short blurb about the March health report for Dix, the largest military reservation in the Northeast. 

Camp Dix. . . The March health report was a setback for the high health mark maintained at the camp for six months. Weather of considerable variance in temperature and humidity coming and going suddenly was responsible for the increase in pneumonia cases, according to Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Ekwurzel, division surgeon. The sudden changes in temperature, coupled with a week of consistently damp weather in early March when the sun failed to break through for days, brought on a camp wide attack of influenza. Many of the pneumonia patients were among those first bothered with influenza. [6]

These initial outbreaks had all the signs of a seasonal flu. But there were two important differences; this particular strain was highly contagious and particularly virulent.

Camp Funston, Kansas reported outbreaks of influenza in early March. A military installation of 54,000 troops, Camp Funston reported that within the first two days of the outbreak 522 men reported sick and by the end of the month, 1,100 troops were hospitalized and thirty-eight of them died from pneumonia complications. [7]

The virus continued spreading throughout Europe, but the number of cases from that spring outbreak of influenza in the U.S. dwindled over the summer. But the first wave was actually a warning of things to come. Unfortunately - like 2020 - these early warning signs were minimized, dismissed, or ignored - because things got better.

Or so the world thought.

The second and third waves 

In August 1918, an even more virulent strain of the influenza virus appeared simultaneously in the shipping ports of Brest, France, Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Boston, Massachusetts. Medical historians now believe this strain was caused by a mutation of the initial virus.

For the next three months – September through November – the virus killed millions worldwide. An estimated 195,000 Americans died in October alone. [8]

The last - but no less deadly - wave started in Australia in January of 1919. This one, however, spread more slowly because World War I was over, but it, too, eventually reached the U.S. in December.

After three waves of this pandemic, an estimated thirty-three percent of the world’s population was infected and the worldwide death toll stood at over 45 million people - 675,000 of whom were Americans. [8]

Contributing factors to the high mortality rate

What made the 1918 Influenza Epidemic so devastating for humanity - were those two subsequent waves of infection in the fall of 1918 and the winter of 1919. 

Why were they so deadly?

While there are a host of biological reasons for the virulence of the virus, war and human decisions also played key roles in exacerbating the spread.

Like all wars in America’s history to 1918, disease killed more soldiers than battles. Recruits in all those wars came from every part of the nation, and they were crowded together in training camps, winter camps, and on ships. They brought with them their own local viruses and immunities, as well as their susceptibilities to other local viruses to which they’d never been exposed. 

But this war was the first truly WORLD war – one that involved soldiers from every continent on the globe. This international mingling increased every soldier’s exposure to a host of local viruses from other soldiers to which they had no immunities. Combine these human petri dishes with crowded training camps and trench living conditions, and it’s a recipe for a medical pandemic. This exposure is similar to that found on public transportation, cruise ships, and during air travel in 2020.

As these soldiers in 1918 went abroad, came home, or went on liberty, they infected civilian populations with similar results.

Many cities and states tried to enforce some degree of social distancing restrictions in 1918 by passing regulations regarding public gatherings and travel in attempts to stay the epidemic. In many places theaters, dance halls, churches and other public gathering places were shut down – some for over a year. One U.S. town even outlawed shaking hands! [9]

Quarantines, however, were few and those that existed were enforced with little success. Some communities were so desperate to isolate themselves that they put armed guards at the town limits to turn back any travelers who might bring an infection. But on the whole, the efforts were unsuccessful. [9]

One historian, Dr. James Harris, who studies both infectious diseases and World War I, came to this conclusion: The reluctance of public health officials to impose quarantines during the first two waves was partly to blame for the high mortality rate.

“Little was done those first two thirds of the pandemic. There was the wartime context, pushback to social distancing, people moving around the globe on a massive scale.” [7]

The failure of public health officials to do what they knew was in the public good because of sensitivity to political or public opinion further endangered the lives of the very people they were hired or elected to protect. 

Philadelphia, in 1918, provides a graphic example. 

By mid-September 1918, the virus was running rampant throughout the various military installations, training camps and staging areas in and around Philadelphia. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Philadelphia’s director of public health, reassured the public. The September 14th edition of the Harrisburg Telegraph reported on page six that “Dr. Wilmer Krusen, Philadelphia health director, does not see any danger in the Spanish influenza at present.”  [10]

Then came the Fourth Liberty Loan Parade.

Scheduled for September 28, the parade and a subsequent concert were organized to promote the sale of “Liberty Bonds” – a way to get the public to buy war bonds to help the government finance the war.

However, as the date approached, the medical community of Philadelphia pleaded with Dr. Krusen to cancel the parade and concert. According to Sam Dunnington’s 2017 post on the blog site: HiddenCity: Exploring Philadelphia's urban landscape:

Dr. Wilmer Krusen found himself under pressure from the city’s medical establishment to cancel the event. Krusen was Philadelphia’s director of Public Health and Charities. Several doctors had called on him earlier that month to quarantine 300 sailors that had recently arrived at Philadelphia’s Navy Yard. The servicemen had come from Massachusetts, where a virulent outbreak of influenza had already caused the Army to cancel a draft call. Krusen refused to quarantine the men. As concerns about influenza grew, the medical community encouraged the cancellation of the Liberty Loan parade in the interest of avoiding crowds and ideal transmission conditions. [11]

Again, Krusen refused. On September 28, over a hundred thousand citizens and soldiers watched or took part in the parade and concert.

Within seventy-two hours, Philadelphia’s hospitals were overrun with influenza cases. Between October 1 and November 2, the city registered 12,162 deaths from influenza - a number that does not include those that died from underlying conditions while fighting the virus. [11]

Dunnington concludes:

Krusen could have lessened the death toll by mandating a quarantine or canceling the parade, but he operated in an environment that made such decisions almost unthinkable. . . With Krusen, Philadelphians experienced the pandemic under a public health official that could not act in their best interests without risking becoming an enemy of the federal government. [11]

History NOW

The controversy about our current pandemic now raging across the United States is whether the social distancing and stay-at-home restrictions need to continue since the rate of infection seems to be tapering off.

Gerard Tellis, Neely Chair of American Enterprise, director of the Institute for Outlier Research in Business (iORB) and his research partner Ashish Sood of UC Riverside, along with Nitish Sood, a cellular and molecular biology student at Augusta University, have released a paper that parses the possibilities.

"The U.S. faces a unique challenge. All states have still not ordered lockdowns. So states that have and contain the disease may suffer contagion and relapse from those that don't or were late to do so. A uniform federal policy seems imperative." [12]

Our experiences during the 1918 Influenza Epidemic indicate that underestimating the first wave of an outbreak and continuing to yield to public and political pushback against quarantines and social distancing may lead to much higher mortality rates. 

As Fauci said, it’s “the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced” that should guide our decision-making - not politics or boredom.

Food for thought.

Now, read part 2 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 2 – Healthcare – Two cities - Two outcomes - One reason

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

References

[1] Roy P. Basler, et al. eds. (1953). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln – Volume 5. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, p 538.

[2] Garrett , Thomas A. (2008). “Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-Day Implications”. Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis Review - March/April 2008. p.76. 

[3] Sonmez, Felicia, Taylor Telford, Elise Viebeck. “Public health experts urge caution about push to reopen the economy”. The Washington Post – April 13, 2020, First edition.

[4] Rosenwald, Michael S. “History’s deadliest pandemics, from ancient Rome to modern America”. Washington Post – April 7, 2020, First edition.

[5] The Malone Farmer. (Malone NY), February 06, 1918. p.1. Lt. Kilburn recovered, survived the war, and returned home to Malone. He was elected to Congress in 1940 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Wallace E. Pierce (R-NY). Kilburn served in Congress from February 1940 until January 1965.

[6] “Four-Week Recruits at Rifle Practice: Next Seven Days for 7,000 Soldiers Will Be One of Busiest and Most Interesting”. The Evening Gazette, (Port Jervis, NY) April 4, 1918. p. 6.

[7] Roos, Dave. “Why the Second Wave of the 1918 Spanish Flu Was So Deadly”. History Stories - March 3, 2020; Updated March 30, 2020. HISTORY. Archived April 2, 2020 from https://www.history.com/news/spanish-flu-second-wave-resurgence

[8] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “1918 Pandemic Influenza Historic Timeline”.  CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Archived April 4, 2020 from https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/pandemic-timeline-1918.htm

[9] “1918 Flu (Spanish flu epidemic)” About Avian Bird Flu - The Avian Bird Flu Survival Guide - May 21, 2008. Archived April 4, 2020 from http://www.avian-bird-flu.info/spanishfluepidemic1918.html

[10] “Well Known People”, Harrisburg Telegraph. (Harrisburg, Pa.) September 14, 1918. p.6.

[11] Dunnington, Sam. “A History Of Leadership During Philadelphia’s Epidemics”. HiddenCity: Exploring Philadelphia's urban landscape – July 21, 2017.

[12] Tellis, Gerald, et.al. “How long will the COVID-19 quarantine last? Business research provides insight”. Medical Xpress, April 8, 2020. Archived April 18, 2020 from https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-04-covid-quarantine-business-insight.html

Reflections on the Vietnam War: George S. Patton and the Reasons for the Vietnam War

George S. Patton, son of legendary World War II general of the same name, served three times in the Vietnam War. In this major piece, Robert McBroom considers Patton’s thoughts on the Vietnam War, including the reasons for the conflict and how to fight the Viet Cong. To produce the article, Robert has worked closely with the Patton homestead archive in Hamilton, Massachusetts and met and interviewed George Patton’s wife Joanie Holbrook Patton.

George S. Patton in 1977.

“The war in Vietnam was unwinnable lost before the French expeditionary force fired its first shot, before the south fielded its first soldier in the national Army of Vietnam, before the first U.S. advisor set foot in country.  An idea independence and unity would triumph over bullets. “[1] Colonel William C. Haponski, who served with Major General George S. Patton would go on to explain what he believes is the result of the conflict in Vietnam.  When the White House got involved in Vietnam, they had zero control during the conflict and had no real foundation of why our boys were fighting in a foreign land.  George would later reflect on Vietnam by saying, “There was an absence almost total of a national strategy.”[2]  Despite victories on the battlefield, the conflict in Vietnam had no end goal.  The Vietnam conflict has had many different perspectives and historians for years have tried to develop an understanding for all.  Historian Mark Philip Bradley would explain the Vietnam conflict as “there were many Vietnam wars, among them an anti-colonial war with France, a cold war turned hot with the United States, a civil war between North and South Vietnam and among southern Vietnamese, and a revolutionary war of ideas over the vision that should guide Vietnamese society into the post-colonial future.”[3]  The Vietnamese people had been fighting a war of independence since the very start of their existence and have used guerrilla warfare to their success against colonial powers.  The separation of North and South Vietnam started with French missionaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and would rule Vietnam.  While the French would rule the South, China and other communists’ countries supported the revolutionary groups in the North, thus the separation was created at the 17th parallel which was a boundary created by the military in 1954.  All of this would make the conflict in Vietnam like nothing this country had seen before, historian Christian G Appy would say that “there has never been a war quite so frustrating as Vietnam.”[4]  However, Congress had not technically declared a war since 1942.  His frustration is one that is felt by historians of Vietnam.  Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. who was a graduate and an illustrious man of the Army War College, while also being a veteran of Korea and Vietnam would go on to explain to Nguyen Don Tu that, “you know you never beat us on the battlefield.”[5] While his counterpart of the North Vietnamese Army, Colonel Nguyen Don Tu would say “That may be so, but it’s also irrelevant.”[6]  Creating this frustrating for all who were a part of Vietnam and the scholars who study the conflict.  This paper will examine his experience as a United States advisor in Vietnam, which would end up being his first of three tours involving the conflict.  Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton would reflect on the Viet Cong and their guerilla warfare, and how the United States could find a weakness but also what made the North Vietnam Army so strong along with their leaders and their philosophy in his Army War college thesis.

Major General, George S. Patton IV, was the son of old blood and guts, Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. who was a veteran of both World Wars, would go on to explain what he believes is a cause of the conflict in Vietnam and the history of the area is a direct result of the French rule over time in the region and a lack of leadership from America political leaders.  The Major General was born December 24th, 1923 and would later drop the IV legally in 1947 after his father’s passing.  George would explain to historian Bill McCloud that, “Lyndon Johnson failed to mobilize either the armed forces or the people at home.”[7]  In any time period of war and or conflict, the President of the time must mobilize both the efforts at home, as well as being clear cut orders for the military, which Lyndon Johnson failed miserably at doing so.

After his graduation at West Point a man is famously known for saying “You’ll never be the man your father was but congratulations.”[8]  Never less Patton would become a veteran of two significant military conflicts during the second half of the century, the conflict in Korea and the conflict in Vietnam.  Historian Lewis Sorley would discuss an incident with General Abrams and Patton to show how understanding a person and soldier George was.  “When he arrived Patton could see he was in a foul mood…When he neared it, he asks Patton, you got any whiskey?  Paton said he did and got Abrams a scotch and soda.”[9]  George knew not to antagonize General Abrams; he was simply there to listen and support his fellow soldier who had just returned from the combat zone.  James Dozier, a friend of George's who served with him in the 11th Armored Cavalry regiment known as the Blackhorse regiment would later reflect on Patton’s career by saying, “he just had an instinct for doing the right thing at the right time in combat and many American soldiers are alive today because George Patton was their boss.”[10]  George had the instinct that many military leaders of his time did not have and many veterans of the conflict are thankful for George for being their boss.   

Vietnam became a large cemetery because of their history of conflict with outsiders was the reason for that.  The only way the American political leaders and some military leaders could see success was by body count of the enemy.  “To obtain the attrition rate, enemy bodies had to be counted.”[11]  Chief intelligence William Westmoreland stated.  The Vietnamese wanted nothing more than their culture and lifestyle, but with the strong outside forces controlling the Vietnamese people, Major General George S. Patton would describe it as an open door for communism.  “These powerful forces set up the stage for the entry of communist ideology.”[12]  A long history of injustice for the people of Vietnam was the issue at hand while George would go on to say that “Most humble were confronted by Frenchman holding exact the same or lower jobs but being paid two or three times more.  Thus, the French janitor at Hanoi received a base pay that was slightly higher than that of a Vietnamese professor with a PHD from Paris.”[13]  This George believes is one of many reasons for a communist ideology to spread in a place like Vietnam and also a cause for a revolution for the Vietnamese people, the disbalanced democracy that favors a person’s background and not the education of an individual who went to school in a western country.  “The French concept of divide and rule which kept the five colonial dependencies politically separated, were contributory to today’s dilemma.”[14]  Having the separation between North and South Vietnam all these years, George believes is also a direct cause of the conflict America had become a part of.  Vietnam was unlike anything his father had faced before along with military personnel of his time. “In Vietnam there were no lines, Patton pointed out.  “It was more a war of the people.  And we did not understand that war nor did we have a clear-cut national strategic objective.  It was not clearly defined by the leadership of this country.”[15]  Our military members during the time did not have a understand why we were their just like the American people watching in their living rooms. 

I. Leaders of the Vietnam Conflict

Patton would write several versions of his Army War College thesis on the Viet Cong forces and how they endured their history, and how he viewed success in Vietnam along with his beliefs on the Vietnamese people.  Unlike Westmoreland, George did not believe that a body count of the enemy was the simple solution with the conflict in Vietnam. Patton would state that “This early failure to establish a viable political base which would include these important ethnic minorities was to prove costly.”[16]  The idea of counting the enemy in body bags, was a cover up for American political problems with not creating a political base for the South Vietnam People.  Thus, Communism which was an easy quick government to set up, seeps through and into the Vietnamese lives. 

After his first tour in Vietnam, George S. Patton would examine his enemy, the Viet Cong and how Vietnam has been shaped over time and in history.  “The very existence of Vietnam as a separate country and the survival of the Vietnamese as a distinct people must be regarded as a miracle for which scores of historians have satisfactory solution.”[17]  Vietnam had been under colonial rule since the French got there in 1887 and continued to be under rule for much of their history, yet the people of Vietnam were never going to give up.  “Vietnam has everything that others want both geographical and historical should have made the absorption of Vietnam by the Chinese empire and inescapable fate.”[18]  The Vietnamese people had no problem with outsiders coming to their homeland, they just did not want to be controlled.  George would go on to explain that “They did not mind the French so very much.  They just didn't like always being occupied and working for the French.”[19]  If the Vietnamese people and the French could have lived together with equal opportunity, they’d be no conflict.  Let the Vietnamese have their culture and ways of life, that had been taking away from them for so many years.  This unbalance democracy allows for Communists countries to intervene on Western beliefs in Vietnam both North and parts of the South.   

II George’s view on the Conflict

When the French backed away and the United States would now take over with the help of the Democratic party of South Vietnam, that had now been established.  It was still not going to kill the Viet Cong heart and soul, that their leader Ho Chi Minh and others have put forth to them with Propaganda and radio broadcasts over the years to get the outsiders out, a tactic known as psychological warfare.  Revolution had been a part of Vietnam’s history since the people could remember and the Viet Cong used that to their advantage.  Their country had been under foreign rule whether it was the Chinese empire, or the French or America acting for western democracy ideology.  ”From the perspective of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, it was a war to end foreign domination and reunite the two Vietnams.”[20] The people in North Vietnam were under a nationalistic uprising, while the people of the south was in conflict within the Saigon government.  Both the North and the South had major issues within their own governments.  The United States military was simply trying to make life better and help get the Chinese out of Vietnam, as they were supporting the North Vietnam army.  “You fools Don’t you realize what it means if the Chinese stay? Don’t you remember your history?  The last time the Chinese came, they stayed for one thousand years![21]  Ho Chi Minh would explain to his pro Chinese counter part of the North Vietnam Government.  “As for me I prefer to smell French shit for five years, rather than Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” This confusion within the government led the Vietnamese people to a conflicting point of view on both sides of the government in both North and South Vietnam.  Some of the Vietnamese people saw American’s as the enemy because of the psychological pressure put on the people by propaganda, put forth by the communist party in North Vietnam.  Patton would discuss a situation about his men helping a local village.  “Our generosity was often overlooked, “says Patton. 

“One time, in a village called Bing Co, elements of the 919-engineer company, which was organic to Blackhorse, were laying foundation for a new school and playground.  As a vehicle carrying water and food for the army troops approached, it hit a mine buried in the road, wounding two soldiers and destroying the vehicle.  The mine location must have been well known to some of the villagers. Yet, within thirty minutes of the incident other dedicated engineers were back outside to finish the playground job even without orders.”[22]

Despite the political views on either side, the military had developed a reason to be there in Vietnam, and that was helping the people.  Try to fix the constant destruction upon it because of the country’s history.  Helping the South Vietnamese people was not put forth by the United States government, but rather acts of kindness by Veterans.  “Few American’s arrived in Vietnam with a deep-seated commitment to help the people of South Vietnam, but most were convinced that helping the South Vietnamese was a central purpose to their mission.”[23]  The simple act of helping them build schools and Patton would go on to say that any operations that was happening in Vietnam, was a chance within itself.  “These were very delicate operations and any time one realized that the chances of success were perhaps 50 percent or less.”[24]  The Military members never asked questions, and always did what they were told and no matter how difficult the operation sounded, they did it with no questions asked.  Marine Lance Corporal Steven Shircliff who was a member of the Third Reconnaissance Battalion, would reflect on a call to battle his platoon got to return to the battlefield where they’d just fought, by saying “I can still remember those insane words to return.  Not only I, but everyone else who was left were in tears, shock, and disbelief.  It was unbelievable that we were being ordered back into the same hell we had just managed to survive.  But we followed orders.”[25]  Whether the political leaders of the time, kept sending our military service members back into the Jungle, or the massive media hit the service members got by having the war televised in America’s living room.  They could not see what Patton and many other veterans of Vietnam, saw before the conflict ended, including the North Vietnam leaders, one being Bao Dai who said “I saw Ho Chi Minh suffer.  He was fighting a battle within himself.  Ho had his own struggle.  He realized communism was not best for his country, but it was too late.  Ultimately, he could not overcome his allegiance to communism.”[26]  Communism was the best fit for the Vietnamese people to come together as one people and for the nationalistic side of individual’s became the forefront of their lives.  The North Vietnamese Army was not going to give up anytime soon and nothing was going to beat the belief in independence, even if communism was not the right answer, it was a solid starting point for the hope of combining to create one Vietnam.

 III. Fighting the Viet Cong

In George’s writings about the conflict, did he ever reflect on how the United States could be successful in Vietnam against the Viet Cong forces?  Fighting the North Vietnamese Army was an issue that was very complex.  George would explain in his thesis that the “the main force Viet Cong may be of either sex, in our out of uniform and of any age.  He may or may not be a communist party member.”[27]  The Vietnamese had been in this conflict for a very long time and it became a war of not only communist members, but the people of Vietnam.  Viet Cong forces, Patton wrote, were commanded by those before who have survived a western influence over the years and those leaders have used propaganda to gain the trust of mostly peasants.  “Communist ideology was not a significant motivating factor other than being the force that developed the propaganda that emerged as the primary weapon of this conflict.”[28]  The leaders of North Vietnam over the years, developed a strong hatred, grievances and a sense of adventure for their people to join against the westerns and their beliefs.  Although communism would not be good for the people in the long run, to reunite the two Vietnam’s it was the best fit.  They did not care if they were poor or rich, they just wanted to live in peace in their corner of the world.  

The Major General would go on to explain that the leaders of the Viet Cong, were a heroic figure for the people of Vietnam because they were “effective, dedicated, experienced and product of the law of survival.”[29]  Thus they have stood the tests of time and are true Vietnamese patriots.  The General would discuss the strong influence of self-criticism for a Vit Cong solider in Mai Xuan Phong’s diary states that “In my heart, I keep loyal to the party and people.  I am proud and happy.  For two days we have been short of food and had only glutinous rice.  The sun is burning hot.  Not enough drinking water.  But our patriotism and our determination to liberate will help us overcome all.”[30]  The General would go on to explain that “these extracts and reports merely demonstrate that complaint continues as a handmaiden of soldiering, and cannot be discounted as an influencing factor”[31]  George would explain that when things for the United States did not look good in Vietnam, examine the enemy and find what is not working for them as well for what is working for them.  “In the words of our greatest ally, “when things look bad and one’s own difficulties appear great, the best tonic is to consider those of the enemy.”[32]  When your plans are not going as the way you wanted them too, George believes that taking a deeper look at the enemy situation and status is a good way to figure out how to overcome one’s own difficulties in warfare.

The North Vietnamese Army never stopped training, no matter if that meant military or political training their minds.  “Main force military training consists of forty-five days with five days extra for cadres.  Fifteen days are for general military items and ten days are for tactics.  There is a separate training schedule for politics, this is about 20 days.”[33]  George would explain that in one of Ho Chi Min writings, unknowingly would write what he believes was a “western shortcoming in training for guerrilla war.”[34] In that the North Vietnamese knowingly knew what and how westerns trained for battle.  “To Train everybody for guerrilla warfare.  But in many localities time is devoted only to training or parade.  This is like practicing music for putting out a fire.”[35]  However, George believes that is was a political tactic for Ho Chi Minh and for his spread of communist propaganda as the main objective to reach the people and gain their support, since this was a major factor for the Viet Cong forces.  “Always returning to the importance of effective propaganda…but encourages go to the people to give them explanations.”[36]  He was a man of the people, much like most of the North Vietnam military leaders.  Patton also believes that there was nothing new and nothing about the Viet Cong military training that would make them super revolutionary.  “There is nothing starkly revolutionary about the Viet Cong military training.  On the other hand, it is training for revolutionaries, realistic and simple, reflecting the simple character of the trainee.”  That the main Viet Cong forces had not done anything new or different when it came to those before him.  The Vietnamese people were fighting for independence and would not stop because the North Vietnam government had made a “big promise”[37] to the people.  Another strong belief for the Viet Cong forces Patton believes is that to keep secrets and never reveal information.  “The Viet Cong are fairly good at security operations in general, and yet there are the diaries heretofore cited.”[38]  The Diaries of fallen Viet Cong forces would be a helpful tip inside of what they were thinking, planning and even sometimes their next moves Patton believes.

The Viet Cong soldier had the idea drilled into them, that to bear torture if captured.  Since the North Vietnam army refrains from believing in torture and to not torture others as well, Patton would explain that “Although it is certain that both sides have indulged in some cruelty, especially after sharp engagements, constant RVN efforts have achieved some improvement.”  Thus, torture and integrations are a part of warfare, so it some way or from it will make its way onto the battlefield.  After intense fighting and both sides are still filled with hate, anger and all kinds of emotions.  

When it came to supplies and weaponry, The Viet Cong forces did not have much.  George believes that “The Viet Cong are a have not force.  Therefore, what they do have they will secure and maintain, paying special attention to ordnance material, critical foodstuffs, and medical supplies.”[39]  As the conflict continues, they would try to capture the weapons and supplies they need and had been successful doing so.  The Vietnamese people had been in a conflict with each other and had been under a foreign rule for so long, that the need for supplies was always a need as the North Vietnam army would have to rely on civilian population and help.  George would explain that for the Viet Cong to have success in the future, they would have “to respect and help the civilian population.”  However, this was not always true because the survival of the Viet Cong was so important, George would explain that “The insurgent enemy is a combination of many things.  He is known to be a mixer of terror with days of help, murder with general education and falsity with kindness.  He is a pillager and a thief, yet sometimes a philanthropist.”[40]  The Viet Cong had to be all of this George believes, because they had to hide the political side of their mission, while being for the people like Ho Chi Minh and other Viet Cong leaders.  

While reflecting on her husbands’ military career, along with his War College Thesis Joanne Holbrook Patton would say that “My husband was always aware that there could have been other things done.  If we had gone further as a government to get to know Ho Chi Minh, might have been possible something better could have happened, wouldn’t have said he was all communist because first he was all Nationalist.”[41]  The United States propaganda put forth by the political leaders and their scare of the spread of communism, along with the media had turned Ho Chi Minh into a full blown Communist when in reality, he was all nationalist and wanted to unify the two Vietnam’s anyway he could, as this was the main objective for him.  

IV George’s view on Viet Cong philosophy

Patton would describe the Viet Cong philosophy for government as something to be conflicting within its own ideology.  That the United States could use the North Vietnam propaganda and beliefs as counter propaganda if it was placed in the hands of an expert.  “It’s is Questionable as to whether the reputation of either Ho or his government is indeed founded on fact.”[42]  Ho Chi Minh and his government relied on their Propaganda to gain a foundation for nationalism and a movement towards unity, as this was their main objective and hid communism from the people.   

Vietnam was being influenced by foreign countries in both the North and the South, while the United States was in the South, the North was facing two different enemies, the Chinese and the Soviet Union, George believes that a weakness could be found if the United States exploits those two countries.  “The Chinese intervention problem and this nation’s basic ideological disagreements with the Soviet Union might, if properly pressed and exploited by the free world, enfeeble the insurgency.”[43]  The Soviet Union and China had now placed the small nation of North Vietnam and their government into a dilemma, due to the Sino-Soviet split, Patton believes that it will “Force the small nation to cast her lot with one side or the other or follow an independent course which may be economically undesirable.”[44]  Doing this will open a weakness within the North Vietnam Government and allow the South and the United States to try to bring North Vietnam to the discussion table which is the only way George believes will be the only way North Vietnam can come out of the conflict with some form of victory.  That if the conflict was to continue.  The United States military, with the help of South Vietnam would over run the Viet Cong Military force.  George would write about how the Viet Cong “Must bring us to the conference table to win because a military victory is completely beyond their power”[45]  When it comes to military strategy, George would explain that we must fight the Viet Cong with their own tactics, Beat them at their own game and that the only way for this conflict to end was to meet at the table.  The time for that meeting, was never to happen as American political leaders pulled troops out of Vietnam in March 1973.

V. Conclusion 

“Find the Bastard and Pile on!”  was the standing order that George S. Patton gave his men who were a part of the 11thArmored Cavalry regiment.  George was hopefully that this conflict could be turned around with the right leaders in charge.  Joanne Holbrook Patton would go on to say “George was hopefully his favorite general Abrams, when appointed to take the place of Westmoreland, he would be able to turn things around.  But he hardly got started when everything was shut off.”[46]  When General Abrams finally got the command to lead, it was too late.  As troops returned home to an unpleasant welcome by American citizens.  “George was frustrated by the press showing that the Tet offensive was such a success for the North…not the whole story.”[47]  Success in Vietnam is very complex and frustrating, general Abrams finally got his chance to lead, but the effort in Vietnam had to come to an end, because of the pressure from the people at home and media not showing the whole conflict is something that George would take with him for the rest of his life.  George was a beloved soldier by so many and a fantastic father.  “He was a tolerant father, one time or another one of our children did something that was not what he wanted them to do but never deserted them.”[48]  Even after the conflict in Vietnam was over, the veterans who returned home took most of the blame for it because of the media and press of Vietnam.  He never let his feelings toward the conflict and political leaders get in the way of what meant more to him in life.  His duty to serve his country, and his duty to be the best father and husband he possibly could be.  True American hero.   

What do you think of George S. Patton and the Vietnam War? Let us know below.

[1] Autopsy of an unwinnable war Vietnam colonel Ret William C. Haponski with colonel Ret Jerry J. Burcham foreword by lieutenant General Ret Dave R. Palmer pg.241

[2] Bill McCloud, What Should We Tell Our Children? Norman: (The University of Oklahoma Press) 1989. Pg.98.

[3] Mark Bradley, (Vietnam at war New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) pg.8

[4] Christian G Appy. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Pg.237

[5] Ibid pg.236

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Brain Sobel, George Smith Patton, and Joanne Holbrook Patton. The Fighting Patton’s. Bloomington: (Indiana University Press, 2013) pg.7  

[9] Lewis. Sorley Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. Bloomington, IN: (Indiana University Press, 2008) Pg.300

[10] Ibid pg.120

[11] Gregory A. Daddis No Sure Victory Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. New York: (Oxford University Press)2011

[12] (George S. Patton Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.4

[13] Ibid pg.14

[14] Ibid pg.15

[15] The Fighting Patton’s pg.xv 

[16] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.10

 [17] Briefing on my AWC thesis (the VC) 19 September 1964 1st version Patton family homestead archive file 02.289.02 

[18] Ibid 

[19] Ibid  

[20]James Stuart, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-2010. Malden (Mass.): Wiley Blackwell, 2014. Pg113

[21] William Appleman. America in Vietnam: a Documentary History. W.W. Norton, 1985. Pg.94

[22] The Fighting Patton’s by Brain M. sobel pg.146

[23] Working Class War by Christian Appy pg.212

[24] The Fighting Patton’s. Pg.104

[25] Lawrence C. Vetter JR Never without Heroes Marine Third Reconnaissance Battalion in Vietnam. pg250

[26]Williams, William Appleman. America in Vietnam: A Documentary History. W.W. Norton, 1985. Pg.94

[27] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.4

[28]Ibid pg87

[29] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.84

[30] Ibid pg.67

[31] Ibid pg.68

[32] Ibid 

[33] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.69

[34] Ibid pg.28

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid 

[37] Ibid pg.94

[38] Ibid pg.71

[39] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.73

[40] Ibid  

[41] Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service.  In person with author February 28th, 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton at 4:40

[42] (Thesis US Army War college April 1965) portrait of an insurgent: a study of the main force Vietnamese communist force 02.1591 pg.94

[43] Ibid pg.92

[44] Ibid pg.92

[45] Ibid pg.97 

[46] Personal interview Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service. 28th February 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton 8:09

[47]Ibid 8:36

[48] Ibid 12:02

Bibliography

Patton Family Homestead, Wenham Museum, Hamilton, Ma

Patton Family Archive collection  

Sobel, Brian, George Smith Patton, and Joanne Holbrook Patton. The Fighting Patton’s. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Personal interview Joanne Patton reflects on her husband’s war college thesis and his service. 28th February 2020, Interviewer Robert L McBroom Jr. interviewee Joanne Patton

Published Secondary Sources:

Appy, Christian G. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Bradley, Mark, and Marilyn Blatt. Young. Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bradley Mark Vietnam at war New York: Oxford University Press, 2009

Conley, Michael Charles. The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy. Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 1967.

Daddis, Gregory A. No Sure Victory Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Duiker, William John. Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. Boston: McGraw Hill, The Pennsylvania State University press, 1995.

Herring, George C. Americas Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

McCloud, Bill. What Should We Tell Our Children? Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

McKenna, Thomas P. Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.

Palmer, Bruce. The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington University Press Of Kentucky, 2002.

Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1981.

Morningstar, James Kelly. Patton's Way: a Radical Theory of War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017

Olson, James Stuart, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-2010. Malden (Mass.): Wiley Blackwell, 2014.

Sorley, Lewis. Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 (Modern Southeast Asia Series). Lubbock TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004.

Sorley, Lewis. The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnams Generals. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2010.

Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.

The Pioneering Soviet Espionage Device that was Active in the US Embassy in the USSR for Seven Years

‘The Thing’ is surely one of the most remarkable espionage devices in all history. Given to the Americans as World War II was closing, it managed to escape American notice for 7 years – despite being in the US Embassy in the USSA. And it took a lot longer for the West to uncover its secrets. But what was ‘The Thing’? And what did it do? Pitamber Kaushik explains.

The seal opened exposing the Soviet bugging device, ‘The Thing’, on display at the National Cryptologic Museum in Maryland, USA. Source: Austin Mills, available here.

Automated Doors, Manufacturing line tracking, Supermarket Product Tags, Credit Cards, and Passports are common places where you might encounter the humble RFID tag - a radio frequency identification tag whose information can be “read” using radio waves, a form of shortwave electromagnetic radiation. RFID tags are a crucial component of modern-day automation and information tracking, and were the very definition of “Smart” before the advent of the modern smartphone, and were in fact, a contender technology for realizing the ‘Internet of Things’. These nifty, effortless labels became commercially popular only in the last couple decades of the 20th century and hence it might come as a bit of a surprise to know that they essentially operate on World-War II technology. Its bulky forerunners were Radio Frequency Identification kits that were used in World War 2 fighter aircraft to prevent friendly fire. One aircraft’s radar would “illuminate” the other’s kit which would automatically communicate a signal indicating that it was on their side. This response needed no power source on the part of the latter - it drew its energy from the incident radiation.

As a token of appreciation, amity, and solidarity for their alliance in the Second World War, and a promise of maintaining them in its wake, the Young Pioneer Organization of the Soviet Union, an organization of boys, presented a hand-carved two-foot wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States to the American ambassador to the Soviet Union W.A. Harriman, a month before the conclusion of the war. It was a natural procedure for the embassy office to meticulously scrutinize any inbound item but this souvenir without a trace of wiring or batteries seemed totally innocuous and did not appropriate a thorough dissection and consequent desecration. It was, after all, a harmless gift from enthusiastic children, and was thus gladly and dearly hung on the wall of Harriman’s study. Harriman gave it a privileged place in his private chambers since it was a welcome gesture from the Soviets. Or was it? The Americans had slightly underestimated Soviet engineering. They had fallen for the Trojan horse, admitting it into their most intimate quarters.

Leon Theremin, the inventor of the eponymous no-contact electronic musical instrument, was compelled to work in the Soviet Experimental Design Bureau, a specialized espionage department. It was here that he had designed the Buran eavesdropping system, a sophisticated device that cast infrared rays on windowpanes from a distance, in order to “listen to” conversations inside the room via the vibrations induced by them on the glass - a technology that Lavrentiy Beria, the Head of the Soviet Secret Police would use to eavesdrop on the British, French, and American embassies, as well as allegedly, on Stalin himself. It was also Theremin who had designed the minimalistic bug that was concealed in the plaque. It was a passive device, meaning it needed no attached power source. When the Soviets irradiated it with radio waves, it responded to them, at other times remaining inanimate, making it very difficult to detect. It derived its operational impetus from the inbound “interrogating” signal and “answered” to it utilizing the signal’s own energy.

The device being inconspicuous in size and structure and spontaneously operational (staying dead-silent when not being tapped into), it didn’t catch the notice of anyone at the office for a long time. It remained dead until it was activated by the right frequency Soviet interrogation waves, upon which it reacted to the sounds around it (sounds varied its ‘capacitance’, encoding their waveforms into its outbound signal) and relayed them to the Soviets in its retransmitted signal. The Soviets sent out a characteristic signal which would be regenerated by the device, now enclosed in the envelope of the signal of the sound in the room. The audio transmission from the room would be superposed over (act as a container for) the communicating signal. The Soviets would disentangle their own rebounded communication wave from the characteristic frequency from the encoded signal in a process called demodulation, extracting the audio from the room. Put simply, whenever the Soviets cast the appropriate signal upon it, the device conveyed the sounds of the room encoded in the same signal back to them.

Its simplistic design and passive nature gave it a veritably unlimited operational life. It would be seven years before the device would be discovered, during the tenure of George Keenan, owing to an accidental reception by an operator at the British Embassy when the Soviets were illuminating the device. In the meantime, it would have relayed much of the vital contents of Harriman’s private conversations. Upon its discovery, two State Department Employees were dispatched to the USSR in order to conduct a “sweep” of American, British, and Canadian embassy buildings to check for other bugs. Its discovery sparked a frenzy of emulation, improvisation, and progressive development of radio signal-based eavesdropping devices on the Western side. Such was the precisely frugal ingenuity of the device that even upon discovery and procurement, it befuddled American scientists, working on comprehending and possibly emulating it, for quite some time. It appeared to have several resonant frequencies, relied on both Amplitude Modulation and Frequency Modulation, and its membrane was so sensitive that it was damaged during the American probe of the device and had to be replaced. It would be years before the British and the Americans would develop a reliable, pulsed cavity resonator of their own. The Western vexation at the elusively designed device is palpable in the name it was given – ‘The Thing’.

What do you think of ‘The Thing’? Let us know below.

Bernard Freyberg: The New Zealand World War I Hero who Failed to Defend Crete in 1941

For the Greek public, the 1941 Battle of Crete is known for the wrong decisions made by the British commanders, so leading to an Axis victory. The tactical mistakes of the British were critical in allowing the occupation of the island by the Nazis and were caused by the decisions of high-ranking officers like General Bernard Freyberg. But who was this General? And why is he a hero in his native New Zealand? Here, Manolis Peponas looks at the life of Bernard Freyberg.

Bernard Freyberg (right) during the Battle of Crete in May 1941

Bernard Freyberg was born in London in 1889 but moved to New Zealand with his parents in 1891. When he was a young man, he became famous as a swimmer. In March 1914 he moved to the USA and, after that, to Mexico where he participated in the Mexican Revolution. In the summer of 1914, he was informed about the beginning of World War I and decided to enlist in the British Army. That was the starting point of a successful military career.[i]

Freyberg fought on the Western Front and in the Gallipoli Campaign. He was wounded nine times and became one of the most decorated young officers in his homeland. For example, he won a Distinguished Service Order (DSO) because he swam ashore in the Gulf of Saros and diverted Turkish attention from the main landing, at Bulair in Gallipoli in April 1915. In 1916, he won the Victoria Cross for his heroic acts at the Battle of the Somme. During the interwar period he worked mainly in staff positions, and in 1937, he was obliged to retire because of a heart problem.[ii]

World War II

Following the outbreak of World War II, Freyberg again offered his services to the New Zealand government. Immediately, he was appointed as the commander of the 2nd New Zealand Division which took part in battles in Greece, North Africa, and Italy.[iii]

Winston Churchill said about Freyberg:

“I had suggested to the C.I.G.S.[iv] that General Freyberg should be placed in command of Crete, and he proposed this to Wavell, who had immediately agreed. Bernard Freyberg and I had been friends for many years. The Victoria Cross and the D.S.O. with two bars marked his unsurpassed service, and like his only equal, Carton de Wiart, he deserved the title of ‘Salamander’. Both thrived in fire, and were literally shot to pieces without being affected physically or in spirit. At the outset of the war no man was more fitted to command the New Zealand Division, for which he was eagerly chosen.”[v]

In Crete in May 1941, the New Zealand major general believed that he was to face an invasion from the sea, so he created a plan that was wrong from the start – the German invasion was in fact mainly airborne. Also, he did not give the right orders for the support of the Commonwealth’s troops who defended the Maleme airfield. However, Freyberg was not the only one responsible for the fall of Crete; he had to command a varied and badly equipped army, without the RAF’s support or the necessary artillery battalions.[vi] This meant that despite the Allied loss in the Battle of Crete, as recognition of his service, he added a third bar to his DSO and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.

After the Allied victory in the war, the retired high-ranking officer was appointed Governor-General of New Zealand, a position he served from 1946 to 1952. After that, he returned to Britain where he acted as Deputy Constable and Lieutenant Governor in charge of Windsor Castle. He died in Windsor on July 4, 1963 following the rupture of one of his many wounds. Today, he is a national hero for the people of New Zealand.[vii]

What do you think of Bernard Freyberg? Let us know below.

[i]         Ewer, Peter (2010). Forgotten Anzacs: The Campaign in Greece, 1941. Scribe Publications. p. 30.

[ii]        ‘Bernard Freyberg', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/bernard-freyberg, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 8-Nov-2017. Retrieved 5-5-2020.

[iii]               'Freyberg given command of 2NZEF', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/bernard-freyberg-assumes-command-of-the-nz-expeditionary-force, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 17-Nov-2016. Retrieved 5-5-2020.

[iv]               C.I.G.S.: Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

[v]       Churchill, Sir Winston (1959). Memoirs of the Second World War. Houghton Mifflin Company. p. 441.

[vi]      Barber, Laurie. “Freyberg and Crete: the Australasian Perspective”, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 72, No. 292 (Winter 1994), pp. 247-254.

[vii]     ‘Bernard Freyberg', URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/bernard-freyberg, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 8-Nov-2017. Retrieved 5-5-2020.

How did Nazi Germany Treat Mixed Race People?

The German Nazi Party is responsible for some of the greatest atrocities in all history, notably the Holocaust in which around 6 million Jews were killed. But in Nazi Germany what happened to mixed race, or ‘Mischlinge’ people - that is people who were partly Jewish and partly not Jewish by descent? Seth Eislund explores this question by looking at the work of three historians.

Erhard Milch, who was in charge of Nazi Germany’s aircraft production in World War II. His father was Jewish and his mother was not Jewish.

From its inception in 1920, the German Nazi Party saw the Jews as an “anti-race” that threatened to destroy the purity of German blood. Following Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933, the Nazi government legalized its racist anti-Semitism with the 1935 Nuremberg Laws. In addition to discriminating against Jews, these laws created a racial category called “Mischling,”[1] or “mixed-race,” for Germans of partial Jewish descent. There were different classifications of Mischling depending on how much “Jewish blood” a person possessed. A “full Jew” had three or more Jewish grandparents, a “Mischling First Degree” (a “half-Jew”) had two Jewish grandparents, and a “Mischling Second Degree” (a “quarter-Jew”) had one Jewish grandparent.[2] While Nazi legislation defined who a Mischling was, what was the regime’s policy towards Mischlinge, and how was this policy enforced? Historians Peter Monteath, Bryan Mark Rigg, and Thomas Pegelow provide compelling answers to this question. While the three scholars use different methodologies to examine Nazi policy towards Mischlinge, they agree that such policy was inconsistent and vacillated between persecution, semi-toleration, and racial reclassification.

Monteath’s Approach: A Social Analysis

Drawing on extensive oral history research, Peter Monteath argues that Nazi legislation towards Mischlinge displayed a clear disconnect between ideology and practice, and that Mischlinge consequently lived anxious and tumultuous lives. Monteath observes that there were two main schools of thought regarding Nazi Mischling policy. The first school tended towards a pragmatic integration of Mischlinge into German society. This form of thinking led to the opening of the draft to Mischlinge in 1935, and the declaration of “mixed marriages” as privileged and protected against anti-Semitic persecution in 1938.[3] The second school of thought, however, was more radical. Its adherents saw Mischlinge as equivalent to Jews, and therefore they needed to be removed from Germany. These party radicals pushed for violent measures against Jews, such as pogroms like Kristallnacht.[4] These integrationist and radical schools of thought manifested themselves in local Nazi policy. For instance, certain German cities, like Dortmund and Hamburg, gave illegitimate half-Jewish children a “German upbringing,” while Königsberg saw such children as thoroughly “semitised” in blood and mentality.[5] Furthermore, at the infamous Wannsee Conference of 1942, its attendees agreed on conflicting resolutions to “the Mischling Question.” It was agreed that half-Jews should be treated as “full Jews,” while Mischlinge married to Germans with Aryan blood should be exempted from being treated as Jews.[6] Similar to the Nazi government’s inconsistent policy towards them, Mischlinge lived uncertain and anxious lives. They existed in a grey area between the racial categories of “Jewish” and “Aryan,” and faced persecution ranging from daily slights to the deportation and mass murder of relatives and friends.[7] Thus, Monteath convincingly argues that Nazi Mischling policy and the lives of Mischlinge were incoherent and chaotic.

Rigg’s Approach: Mischlinge in the Military

While Monteath does an excellent job of describing the specificities and constant uncertainty of Mischling life and policy in Nazi Germany, his analysis overlooks a key aspect of the Nazi regime: the military. However, Bryan Mark Rigg provides a thorough examination of Nazi policy towards Mischling soldiers in the Third Reich, which he calls “a maze of confusion and contradictions.”[8] According to Rigg, the Nazis either persecuted or tolerated Mischling soldiers based on their perceived loyalty and importance to the regime, which varied widely on an individual basis. Rigg states that despite their Jewish ancestry, half-Jews and quarter-Jews were legally allowed to serve in the German military until 1940.[9] However, they were forbidden from becoming non-commissioned officers or officers without the personal approval of Adolf Hitler. Hence, due to their Jewish blood, Mischling soldiers were not allowed to advance in rank. Their Aryan commanders, who were their superiors in rank and blood, were destined to command them. Thus, the Nazis saw Mischlinge as useful to their military goals but refused to treat them as equal to Aryan soldiers due to their Jewish ancestry. However, Mischling soldiers were treated far better than their Jewish parents, who lost their jobs and civil liberties due to Nazi legislation.[10] This demonstrates a disconnect between the Nazi treatment of “full Jews” and Mischlinge. While a “full Jew’s” blood was completely tainted, a Mischling possessed some Aryan blood and could therefore serve the Third Reich. While Hitler eventually decided to expel all half-Jews from the German military in 1940, he made several exceptions. Hitler personally signed thousands of special permission forms that “allowed [half-Jews] who had proven themselves in battle…  to [remain] with their units.”[11] This demonstrates that Hitler approved of veteran half-Jewish soldiers more than he did ordinary half-Jewish soldiers, as their extensive service demonstrated their loyalty and utility to the regime. Thus, Rigg makes the potent observation that, in military terms, Nazi policy towards Mischlinge was influenced by an individual soldier’s perceived devotion and significance to the regime based on their decoration and experience in combat.

Pegelow’s Approach: The Language of Nazi Racial Categories

Although he reaches similar conclusions to Monteath and Rigg, Thomas Pegelow’s analysis differs from theirs. Instead of examining the social or military aspects of Nazi policy towards Mischlinge, he examines the language behind Nazi racial categories, arguing that “Racial discourses were not static, but were constantly remade.”[12] Pegelow focuses on the Reich Kinship Office (RSA), which was created in 1933 with the mission of “determining people’s ‘racial descent’ in cases of doubt.”[13] The RSA’s decisions about a person’s racial descent had severe consequences: being designated as “Aryan” resulted in one’s safety while being designated as “Jewish” resulted in one’s death in a concentration camp. Mischlinge knew this, and many tried to avoid persecution by publicly disputing their Jewish ancestry with the RSA.[14] Pegelow’s portrayal of Mischlinge corroborates Monteath’s argument that Mischlinge lived frantic lives due to their ambiguous status in Nazi policy. Consequently, Pegelow argues that the RSA committed “linguistic violence” against Mischlinge. This was because the RSA constructed racial categories through language, such as the German Volk and the Jewish race, and it used language to determine who was a member of each group.[15] The RSA excluded some Mischlinge from the Volk, thereby condemning them to persecution and death. However, they also declared 4,100 Mischlinge, or 7.9% of all Mischlinge who petitioned for racial evaluations, to be legally Aryan.[16] Thus, the RSA’s classification of over 4,000 Mischlinge as Aryan demonstrates that Nazi policy towards Mischlinge was inconsistent. The category of “Mischling” was fluid and ambiguous, and it’s meaning changed depending on the individual Nazi official who interpreted it. Some Nazis associated Mischlinge with the Aryan side of the racial spectrum, while others saw Mischlinge and Jews as identical.

Conclusion

Peter Monteath, Bryan Mark Rigg, and Thomas Pegelow’s research demonstrates that Nazi policy was inconsistent towards Mischlinge, as it shifted between persecution, quasi-toleration, and conflicting racial definitions. According to Monteath, Nazi officials contested the status of Mischlinge: some party members advocated for the integration of Mischlinge into German life, while others saw them as “full Jews” and pushed for their removal from Germany. Mischlinge lived similarly incongruous and anxious lives: they suffered varying degrees of persecution and constantly worried that they would face imprisonment and death. Similarly, Rigg observes that even Hitler’s policy towards Mischlinge serving in the German military was contradictory. While Hitler discriminated against Mischling soldiers by preventing them from serving as NCOs or officers, he signed thousands of forms that allowed battle-hardened Mischlinge to continue fighting during the Second World War. Lastly, Pegelow argues that Nazi racial categories, such as “German” and “Jewish,” were linguistically constructed and therefore subject to constant change. Nazi functionaries defined Mischlinge, who occupied an uncertain place within the Nazi racial hierarchy, as either Aryan or Jewish based solely on their individual assumptions. Thus, the inconsistency of Nazi policy towards Mischlinge reflected the latter’s ambiguous status in the Third Reich. For the Nazis, Mischlinge were members of a contradictory and perplexing racial category, a bizarre mix of the most superior race and the most inferior race, and Nazi policy towards them was equally paradoxical.

What do you think about the article? Let us know below.

[1] In German, “Mischling” is singular and “Mischlinge” is plural.

[2] Peter Monteath, “The ‘Mischling’ Experience in Oral History,” The Oral History Review 35, no. 2 (2008): 142, www.jstor.org/stable/20628029.

[3] Monteath, 142-143.

[4] Monteath, 143.

[5] Monteath, 144.

[6] Monteath, 144-145.

[7] Monteath, 154.

[8] Bryan Mark Rigg, “Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers,” in Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in the Holocaust and Its Aftermath, ed. Jonathan Petropoulos and John K. Roth (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 123.

[9] Rigg, 119-121.

[10] Rigg, 119-120.

[11] Rigg, 121.

[12] Thomas Pegelow, “Determining ‘People of German Blood’, ‘Jews’ and ‘Mischlinge’: The Reich Kinship Office and the Competing Discourses and Powers of Nazism, 1941-1943,” Contemporary European History 15, no. 1 (2006): 43, www.jstor.org/stable/20081294.

[13] Pegelow, 44.

[14] Pegelow, 45.

[15] Pegelow, 46.

[16] Pegelow, 64.

Bibliography

Monteath, Peter. “The ‘Mischling’ Experience in Oral History.” The Oral History Review 35, no. 2 (2008): 139-58. Accessed April 23, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20628029.

Pegelow, Thomas. “Determining ‘People of German Blood’, ‘Jews’ and ‘Mischlinge’: The Reich 

Kinship Office and the Competing Discourses and Powers of Nazism, 1941-1943.” Contemporary European History 15, no. 1 (2006): 43-65. Accessed April 23, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20081294.

Rigg, Bryan Mark. “Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers.” In Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in the Holocaust and Its Aftermath, edited by Jonathan Petropoulos and John K. Roth, 118-126. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012.

The 1918 ‘Spanish’ Influenza Pandemic and the Boy Scout Movement

The 1918 flu pandemic, or ‘Spanish Flu’, lasted from the spring of 1918 to the summer of 1919. With many Americans in Europe to fight in World War One in 1918, sometimes other groups stepped in to help. Here, Joseph Connole tells us how the Boy Scouts of America provided much needed assistance during the pandemic.

Boy Scouts helping to distribute food and medicine to houses during the 1918 influenza epidemic.

The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918 was the worst public health crisis of the 20th century; however, some public officials were reluctant to acknowledge the extent of the pandemic because of the First World War. As a result, the virus spread through communities across the world and the US, killing an estimated 650,000 Americans in just less than two years. Local authorities responded differently to the outbreak, in some cities the authorities shut down businesses, schools, and churches. In others, little was done.[i] The outbreak of the flu in 1918 was different though; it killed those who were in the prime of their lives. To complicate matters, the U.S. was fighting a war. As the U.S. war effort started, the government instituted a draft taking millions of men away from homes to fight in Europe. Yet, across the country, young men in the Boy Scouts of America sprang into action to help those suffering from the influenza.  At the start of the First World War, there were 150,000 men in uniform. At the same time, in 1918, there were over 400,000 Scouts and Volunteers in the Boy Scouts of America.[ii]  The Boy Scouts of America were the largest uniformed body in the country. Scouts helped the nation’s war effort by holding parades, selling war bonds, and establishing victory gardens. During the Spanish Influenza, they helped by handing out health guides, serving as informants for local health officials, serving food, and working with local hospitals to provide help. 

How the Scouts helped

In cities across the country, local Boy Scouts came to the aide of local health officials, hospitals, and the Red Cross. They distributed literature, ran kitchens, and helped in a variety of other ways.  Between October 1918 and July 1919, the Boy Scout official magazine for volunteers, Scouting Magazine, recorded how Scouts from across the country answered the call for assistance as the nation was paralyzed by the flu.[iii]

The image of Scouts during the second decade of the twentieth century is one of young men marching in parades, selling liberty bonds, and planting gardens. But during the Spanish Influenza outbreak, Scouts heard the call of local officials in need of help and selflessly came to their assistance. In the October 24, 1918 edition of Scouting Magazine, the Boy Scouts took out several pages to address the Spanish Influenza outbreak in the United States. They declared, “Scouts and Scout officials are not only, definitely concerned, but have a distinct opportunity for service by reason of the nation-wide Spanish Influenza epidemic.”  This call for action would be heard by Scouts across the nation. Scouts would go on to serve as junior health officers and in at least one instance, a Scout served as an intern in a hospital. The movement warned Scouts to be on their guard due to the highly contagious flu and implored Scouts to receive permission from local health officers before undertaking any risk to themselves or their families.[iv] The same issue of the magazine went on to discuss the best ways to prevent infection. 

In Shoshone, Idaho Scouts distributed some 7,500 pieces of literature to residents and met trains as people came off and distributed masks,[v] while in Topeka, Kansas, Scouts were sworn in as junior health officers. Scouts took the following oath before taking on their official duties:

In assuming the duties in the Topeka health service, I agree to hold myself responsible for the distribution of all notices and literature in my district requested by the commissioner of health. 

I further agree to gather any information that may be desired and to report on the health and sanitary situation in any district when asked to do so. 

I agree to assist the Topeka health department in every way I can, with the understanding that I will not be called upon to perform any duty that will interfere with my school or endanger my health.[vi]

In a time well before the Internet, one of the most effective ways for local health officials to get out notices to people was through the Scouts in their communities. But in some special circumstances, Scouts were also called upon to do more. In St. Paul, Minnesota, Scouts were tasked to report on violations of local health orders which would then be investigated by a health officer.[vii]

Doing their duty

In other instances Scouts took on even more advanced roles than were found in Topeka and St. Paul. In New Brunswick, New Jersey, York, Pennsylvania, New Bedford, Massachusetts, and Morgan, New Jersey, Scouts provided help by guiding and manning ambulances, escorting nurses or acting as orderlies, and serving as messengers or telephone operators. The Elizabeth Daily Journal praised the work of Scouts saying, “The work of the Boy Scouts received the warm praise of all the older workers, who found their assistance almost invaluable.”  It went on to report, “They carried cots, ran errands, acted as escorts to the refugees, served the food, stood guard over families, cared for the babies and acted in almost every capacity.”[viii] In every instance where Scouts assisted local health officials or hospitals, their work was praised according to Scouting Magazine. 

The most impressive effort made by Scouts came in Morristown, New Jersey. In one instance, a Boy Scout acted as an intern for the hospital and “he did all of the work which is usually performed by a grown man” for two weeks. Another Scout drove a supply truck three times a week for the Red Cross between Hoboken and a convalescent hospital for soldiers in Mendham. And yet another worked for a week inside a children’s home where nearly sixty of the children were sick. That Scout carried water up four flights of stairs, prepared and served meals, and did various other tasks required of him.[ix]

The Scouts who performed these duties showed unparalleled courage. In each instance of the Scouts helping in their respective communities, they were well received by the local officials and hospitals that they served. Their contributions helped save an unknown number of lives and they did it without desire for public recognition.

What impact do you think the Boy Scouts had on the Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

[i] https://www.history.com/news/spanish-flu-pandemic-response-cities

[ii] Boy Scouts of America. Annual report of the Boy Scouts of America: Letter from the chief scout executive transmitting the annual report of the Boy Scouts of America ... as required by federal charter. Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off. 1919. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.30000054452598&view=1up&seq=8  Accessed 5/1/2020. P. 18

[iii] All citations of Scouting stories during the Spanish Influenza pandemic come from Scouting Magazine in the Porta to Texas History unless otherwise noted, individual issue citations are given. Scouting Magazine in The Portal to Texas History. University of North Texas Libraries. https://texashistory.unt.edu/explore/collections/SCOUT/ accessed March 18, 2020.

[iv] Boy Scouts of America. Scouting, Volume 6, Number 24, October 24, 1918, periodical, October 24, 1918; New York, New York. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth282984/: accessed March 18, 2020), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Boy Scouts of America National Scouting Museum. p. 5

[v] Ibid., Volume 6, Number 32, December 19, 1918. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth283002/: accessed March 18, 2020). p. 5

[vi] Ibid., Volume 7, Number 11, March 13, 1919. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth283026/: accessed March 18, 2020). p. 8

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Quoted in, ibid. https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth283061/: accessed March 18. 2020, p. 70

[ix] Ibid., ., Volume 6, Number 32, December 19, 1918. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth283002/: accessed March 18, 2020). p.7

Afro-Cubans in the USA During the Cold War

The Cold War and the Cuban Revolution of the 1950s led to permanently altered demographics in Miami, Florida and New York due to several influxes of Cuban immigrants in the years and decades after. Studies of this tend to focus on key players such as John F. Kennedy, political tensions between the USA and Cuba, and specific immigration issues, for example, the Elian Gonzalez scandal. 

Still, a question begs for attention: how did race and politics influence the lives of Cuban refugees in America during the Cold War? The answer is most obvious when we look to the experiences of Afro-Cuban refugees. Lietty Roig explains.

A boat with Cuban refugees arrives in Key West, Florida in 1980 as part of the Mariel Boatlift.

Afro-Cubans have not only been underrepresented and understudied in the literature of the Cold War, but they have mostly been included in the tales of how others experienced their arrival. Research shows a clear pattern that initially Afro-Cubans often settled away from Miami, Florida because the racism was so unbearable. During the first wave of migration in the 1960s only between 3 and 9% of individuals were Afro-Cubans. Under the assumption that those figures are accurate, their absence from the early scholarly literature makes sense. Still, a more practical explanation for migration further north than Miami rests on the practical reason that they would be very far away from the feared bombings and military activity of the era. During the later waves of migration, some Afro-Cubans did settle in Miami. However, these individuals struggled to fit in with white Cubans, who they shared a nationality with, and African Americans, who they shared African roots with. As a result, Afro-Cubans created their own space in the greater Miami area: Allapattah, the point between Little Haiti and Little Havana. 

What is interesting about the Afro-Cuban experience during the Cold War is that it was not universal. During the early waves of Cuban migration, Afro-Cubans enjoyed government aid, and a higher socio-economic status in New York City. In 1980, the last wave of Cuban mass migration took place through the famous boatlifts. This group of immigrants did not receive government aid, and society labeled them as criminals. So, that last wave of Afro-Cubans was met with the same discrimination as the early refugees, only this time they were stripped of their identity. By the late 1980s, Afro-Cubans were grouped with African Americans in Miami, and Puerto Ricans in New York. That triggered a crisis of identity for all the demographics involved. For one, African Americans and Afro-Cubans have African roots in common, but their histories are quite different. A similar divide can be established between Puerto Ricans and Afro-Cubans.

Yet, to think that race alone influenced their experience is naïve. Politics was a driving force in everything. For instance, John F. Kennedy was adamant about relocating many Cubans away from Miami to reduce the overflowing population. Still, that is the tip of the political iceberg.  Obviously, the United States lived in fear of communism, and so did the white Cuban refugees from the early waves. So, an “ideal” Cuban refugee was created in the United States: anti-communist, mostly republican, and white. However, Afro-Cubans struggled to fit in this mold not just because of race, but because many of them – at least initially - supported Castro. The fact of the matter is that the early wave of Cuban refugees was fleeing Castro’s ideologies, and one of those promises was racial equality. If you are at the top of the totem pole, you want to stay at the top; it is a natural reaction, whether we like it or not. Yet, those Afro-Cubans were lulled into favoring Castro because of that promise of racial equality - until they saw what reality under his rule was like. Then no one wanted to be there because there was only one person on top of the pyramid: Castro. 

While it would be easy to say that Afro-Cubans were excluded from the narrative because of racist writing, it would also be ignorant. Afro-Cuban refugees made up only a small portion of immigrants during the early years of the Cold War. During the later waves of migration, Afro-Cubans struggled with a self-identity crisis, and were not quite sure how they fit in their new surroundings. It would also be ignorant to say that discriminatory experiences started in the United States, because Afro-Cubans experienced their fair share of racism in Cuba.

What do you think about the experience of Afro-Cubans in the United States? Let us know below.

References

Benson, Devyn S. "From Miami to New York and Beyond: Race and Exile in the 1960s." In Antiracism in Cuba: The Unfinished Revolution, 122-52. University of North Carolina Press, 2016.

Current, Cheris Brewer. "Normalizing Cuban Refugees: Representations of Whiteness and Anti-communism in the USA during the Cold War." Ethnicities 8, no. 1 (2008). 

Grosfoguel, Ramón, and Chloé S. Georas. "Latino Caribbean Diasporas in New York." In Mambo Montage: The Latinization of New York City, by Laó-Montes Agustín and Dávila Arlene, 97-118. Columbia University Press, 2001.

McHugh, Kevin E., Ines M. Miyares, and Emily H. Skop. "The Magnetism of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration." Geographical Review 87, no. 4 (1997): 504-19.

The Life of Princess Olga ‘Olishka’ Nikolaevna, the Eldest Daughter of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia

Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna, ‘Olishka’, (1895-1918) was the eldest daughter of Tsar Nicholas II, Russia’s last Tsar. While many of us know how Nicholas II and his family were killed by the Bolsheviks so ending the Romanov Dynasty, many of us know less about Nicholas’ children. Here, Jordann Stover tells us about Grand Duchess Olga, the lives of the Imperial children, and the tumultuous events in Russia during her life.

You can also read Jordann’s article on Princess Anastasia Romanova, the youngest daughter of Tsar Nicholas II here.

Princess Olga (right), with her younger sister Tatiana.

There is something fundamentally heartbreaking about being the eldest sister of a family. As the first child of one’s parents, it is through them that said parents learn and grow— that is a daunting task for a baby just learning how to toddle around a nursery. Eldest sisters look out for the little ones; the diaper-clad girl with chubby, unsteady legs must set an example for those that come after her. She’s supposed to be inherently nurturing, almost like a second mother to her brothers and sisters. A great deal of pressure comes down on these children making the fits of anxiety and outbursts that often dominate the child’s personality understandable. Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna was the eldest sister to end all other eldest sisters. This blonde haired, blue-eyed little girl came into the world as the first child of the last Tsar of Russia. After her birth, four more imperial children would follow. Olga’s parents put a great deal of pressure on their children, especially their firstborn who was to guide the other children in matters of behavior and their studies. This task was difficult for the little girl, she was sensitive and temperamental, a girl with a strong sense of right and wrong. Her life is often overlooked or forgotten in the chaos that was her father’s reign and subsequent fall which is, undeniably, a shame. Olga, as well as her sisters, were more than just royal children. They were fascinating beings in their own right. Their assassination was brutal, the details so gruesome that it is nearly impossible to stop reading fact after dreadful fact when studying this family. Behind the bloodstained wall and crudely crafted, unintentional bulletproof corsets that served to elongate their suffering during the last few moments of their lives were individuals of great character. Olga had a mind of her own; her heart ached with the pain that accompanied teenage crushes and thumped with anger when arguing with her sisters. Studying the young woman behind the stories is remarkably interesting, her innocence paired with an almost unfounded wisdom utterly captivating. 

Before Olga’s birth

Before Olga was even conceived, the controversy that would eventually aid in the end of her family’s dynasty and the family itself had already been in the works for years. Her parents were Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, and Alexandra Feodorovna (formerly Alix of Hesse and by Rhine, a small German duchy). Nicholas’ father had not believed in his son’s ability to rule, never training him as he should have. So, when Nicholas’ father died suddenly while only in his forties, Nicholas was nowhere near prepared for the job he had no choice but to accept. Alexandra married the Tsar quickly, the two of them being moved around at a dizzying pace because of the unexpected death of the previous Tsar. Once settled into their palaces, it became quite obvious that Nicholas was even more unprepared than they’d feared and that his new bride was not someone they were very fond of. Alexandra, a rather shy woman who had suffered a number of tragedies in her short life, was often withdrawn or sullen. The people of the Russian court did not like her and they made sure that she knew it; this only added to her nervousness, leading the Tsarina to hide away in her rooms whenever possible. As these personal, royal issues caused whispers within palace walls and aristocratic circles, nation-wide tragedies and despair flourished as well. The country was suffering, the working class starving, they were unimpressed with wars they deemed unnecessary and leaders that seemed to ignore their plights. The world in which Olga would be born into on November 15, 1895 was not the picture perfect Russian world Grand Duchesses of the past had the luxury of living in— Olga’s bruised and beaten Russia was heading very quickly toward revolution. 

Birth

The day of Olga’s birth was one of celebration for the royal couple and their country. Olga was a beautiful, healthy baby girl, confirming that the couple could indeed conceive of and deliver an heir. They were sure that a healthy son could follow. While a boy was certainly what had been hoped for by the royal couple, they loved their little “Olishka”, Nicholas himself stated in his diary entry the day of Olga’s birth that it would be “A day [he] will remember forever”. Olga was a large baby, weighing over ten pounds. She had piercing eyes and dark blonde hair, the lightest hair of anyone in her family consisting of brunettes and redheads. Her tutor, Pierre Gilliard met Olga when she was ten years old. He described this meeting in his book Thirteen Years at the Russian Court. The Grand Duchesses’ tutor stated that Olga was “very fair…[with] sparkling, mischievous eyes ... she examined [him] with a look...searching for the weak point in [his] armor, but there was something so pure and frank...that one liked her straight off." Olga was a lovely child and the Imperial Family was happy to have her despite what the rest of Russia might have been thinking.  Nicholas and Alexandra wanted to have a close knit, happy family. They wanted some semblance of normal life for Olga and themselves. Alexandra had been raised in a close, loving family back in the small duchy of her childhood and wanted that for her own children. Their closeness was not something common among royal families of the time; little intimacies such as breastfeeding or bathing the children themselves even further alienated the Romanovs from royal tradition.

Olga was not an only child for long-- Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia followed within just a few years. The four of them were incredibly close, closer than any other group of princesses. Olga and Tatiana, nicknamed “the Big Pair”, shared a bedroom while “the Little Pair”, Maria and Anastasia shared another bedroom. Together, the four sisters often signed their letters or referred to themselves as OTMA (Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia) as opposed to writing their full names. While Nicholas and Alexandra loved their girls, they needed a son for dynastic purposes. Russia had an incredibly strict Salic law which forbade female descendents from inheriting the throne. The law dated back to the times of Catherine the Great, her son having hated his mother so much that he put the law in place after the Empress’ death. In the meantime, Alexandra and Nicholas focused on creating a loving family life for their four “girlies”. They raised them to be humble people, girls used to sleeping on plain beds and having simple toys instead of having a lavish life most grand duchesses would have had. The four had a thorough education, studying different languages, history, art, and more. Pierre Gilliard, the aforementioned tutor of the children, stated that Olga “emanated such a feeling of purity and sincerity that she immediately gained [his] sympathy.” She was intelligent and dedicated to her studies, the young girl often lost in analytical thoughts about both herself and the world around her. This deep introspection was almost certainly inherited from her mother. Alexandra was known to be the same, a trait that had been solidified by the loss of her mother and sister from diptheria and her brother from a fall at a young age. The young girl who had once been joyous became a shell of herself, carrying out courtly duties that her mother had once performed all the while grieving for the world she once knew. Olga, like her mother, was deeply religious and critical of herself. Alexandra’s mother, who died when Alexandra was just six years old, instilled in her the importance of helping others, something Alexandra would then instill in her own daughters. She was taught, as is common for most eldest sisters, that she must set an example for her siblings. Olga was expected to be well behaved and set the standards for her three little sisters. The Tsarina who had been sickly her entire adult life, often emphasized the importance of such behavior to Olga by making it seem as though Alexandra’s health was contingent on a lack of stress from her daughters. She would write letters to the Grand Duchesses to be delivered to their nurseries when Alexandra was ill. She would often ask Olga to be good for her sisters, that she was feeling ill and negative reports about her girlies would only worsen her condition.

A different upbringing

Olga had been aware of her place from a very young age. Being the daughter of the Tsar of Russia meant that she had responsibilities that any other girl of her age could not have fathomed. Her studies took up an incredible amount of her time. Academics aside, there were affairs of state, public relations appearances, and more. This little girl knew how to speak with ministers and military leaders when young girls nowadays may be mastering the art of speaking with a waitress when out for a meal with their family. At the same time, she and her sisters were incredibly sheltered. They could speak French and interact with their father’s colleagues but they were blind to the rest of the world that existed beyond the yard of the Alexander Palace. By the time the girls were young women, they were far more immature than they should have been. The girls might have been able to keep up with their contemporaries around Europe when it came to academics, but their social skills were severely lacking. They did not know how to properly interact with anyone that existed outside of the small inner circle of their family’s trusted friends. 

As a child, it was always noted by tutors that Olga was the most intelligent of her sisters. She was very critical of herself as well as any work that she may have been doing. Tutors noted that she was studious but her knack for self analysis could often impact her studies. With her natural intelligence came a sense of frankness and even anger at times-- she was known for having a temper and an inability to hold her tongue. Margaret Eager noted an example of those characteristics in her book, Six Years at the Russian Court which accounts her years as a governess to the four Grand Duchesses. Eager states that Olga once snapped at an artist after his portrait was proving to take a great deal of time; she said to the man “You are a very ugly man and I don't like you one bit!". Despite pre-adolescent outbursts, Olga was known for her kind nature. She cared deeply for those around her and studied the lives of others to better understand the ever changing world. She worked tirelessly for wounded soldiers during the First World War and took up her sickly mother’s duties quite often. She accompanied her father to official business, the young girl having to learn from a young age the importance of charming officials and courtiers alike. All of this responsibility, the pressure no young woman should have to carry on her shoulders, got to her at times. After the stress of working with wounded soldiers during the First World War, she was noted by Maria in her diary as having broken a number of window panes with an umbrella. Valentina Chebotareva, another woman working with Alexandra and the Big Pair in military hospitals, recounted in her memoir a time in which Olga flew into a rage and destroyed many items in a hospital closet. It was clear that the work was becoming too much for the young woman of only nineteen years. She still cared deeply for her soldiers, one of which she fell madly in love with despite the fact that such a relationship could never be, but had to let her nursing work go. Instead, she did office work for the hospital and visited soldiers to try to lift their spirits while her mother and sister, Tatiana, continued to work in the operating room. 

Revolutionary times

Russia was a country on the cusp of revolution which left the lives of the royal family in perpetual imminent danger. Nicholas and Alexandra feared for their children, the assassination attempts aimed at Nicholas’ father and the successful assassination of his uncle made the royal couple even more paranoid about their safety. Alexandra was especially worried, refusing to allow her children (or husband for that matter) anywhere without a trusted group of guards in their presence. They rarely made public appearances save for a few that they simply could not miss such as the tricentennial ceremony celebrating the Romanov dynasty in 1913.

The whole dynamic of the Russian Imperial family as well as their ideas of protocol changed in the summer of 1904 when Alexandra finally gave birth to the son that everyone wanted from her. Tsarevich Alexei was born and for a brief period of time, it was bliss for the family. Nicholas and Alexandra had their four girlies and a new heir, the baby being showered with love from his parents and older sisters. Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia loved the little boy - they understood the importance of his birth for the dynasty but more than that, he was a new little one to play with and dote on. The happy little bubble that the family lived in did not take long to burst. It was discovered after a considerable period of unprompted bleeding from the infant’s navel that he had inherited the deadly disease of Hemophilia from his mother. Recent scientific studies have proven that the Tsarevich suffered from the more dangerous Hemophilia B, a genetic mutation in which the blood does not clot properly. Alexandra had inherited the mutation from her mother who inherited it from her own mother, Queen Victoria of the UK. Women are usually only carriers of the disease, while men suffer greatly. This is because the genetic mutation impacts the X chromosome. Women have two X chromosomes and men have one, inheriting the chromosome from their mother. If one’s mother is a carrier of the mutation, a son would only receive her afflicted X chromosome whereas a daughter would have another X chromosome to balance the hemophilia chromosome. This mutation meant that any little bump or fall could cause bleeding in the joints and possibly death for the Tsarevich. The Tsar and Tsarina were in constant fear for their little one’s life which led them to the infamous Grigory Rasputin who was, in the flesh, more menacing than anything 20th Century Fox could have animated. He was a Siberian peasant believed to be a holy man by many. He was, through sheer coincidence, psychology, or faith if you believe in such miracles, able to ease the Tsarevich’s pain. He seemed to be able to heal the boy with prayers alone. Nicholas and Alexandra, both loving parents and rulers well aware of their need for a healthy heir, became fiercely loyal to the man who, in their eyes, could save their son. Many extended members of the royal family and the majority of the country did not approve of Rasputin’s influence over the Imperial family. He was a drunk who was sexually promiscuous and violent. He had free reign in most parts of the palace, even having access to the children’s nurseries when they were in their bed clothes. There is no evidence of him being indecent with the young girls who were quickly blossoming into young women but that did not stop the rumors from persisting. Rasputin was hated by the people but needed by the family who by now viewed him as a friend and savior. Because of Alexei’s condition and the subsequent hatred of their favorite Siberian monk, the tight circle of trusted friends became smaller, and the family became more reclusive than ever. Alexei’s condition was kept from the people, a decision made to hopefully prevent fears of instability within the Romanov line of succession. 

Growing problems for the Imperial family

This decision was an interesting one. It seems as though the Imperial Family had no clue what it was that actually worried their people. Russia had fallen from a time where the populous worshipped the Tsar as infallible, a caring father-figure. By this time, the Russian people were far more worried about the lack of food and horrendous working conditions. As the animosity toward the Imperial family intensified, perhaps knowing of Alexei’s condition therefore humanising the royal bunch could have altered the eventual outcome. When looking at the fall of this family, it is impossible now, through a modern lense, to deny that they were a loving family. We can see the benevolence in them that the Russian people could not. If the family had allowed their people in just a little more, let their vulnerability shine through at times, the populace may have been more patient with their shortcomings. If these two groups were not so separate, those in charge could have seen clearly how the Russian people were suffering. Nicholas was not necessarily a malicious man; his unfavorable decisions usually preceded advisors giving an unqualified man information. Alexandra had a kind heart that was plagued with the belief in autocratic rule that had been drilled into her from the moment she was born. These leaders were not inherently bad people. They were bound to a system of government that was both outdated and deeply flawed that ultimately made any sense of human goodness further lost in the minds of their people who were suffering horribly. Alienating their family in the midst of this only intensified the growing hatred for anything imperial.

The end

All of this chaos and sense of impending doom came to a head when, on March 15, 1917 Olga’s father, Tsar Nicholas II, abdicated the throne for both himself and Alexei. Revolution was in full swing, different factions competing and people desperate for a change of any kind. A provisional government was put in charge of the Romanovs’ vast and aching Russia while the family was placed under house arrest. They would go from the Alexander Palace to Tobolsk and then finally to Ekaterinburg. With each move, their imprisonment became more strict, their lives becoming darker with every passing day. In their last prison cell, the Ipatiev House in Ekaterinburg, it was noted that Olga was keeping to herself. She was quiet, had lost weight. No one can know for certain if she had any idea of what was to come but she certainly knew that life as she knew it would never again be the same. After a grueling 78 days of house arrest surrounded by anti-tsarist soldiers who often became drunk and rowdy, of having guns aimed at their heads and windows boarded up, the Romanov family was told they would be leaving the Ipatiev house. They had been awoken in the night and told that an army of revolutionaries were nearby meaning the family had to be moved to safety. They gathered what little of their belongings they were allowed, including family jewels sewn into the bodices of the girls clothes, and made their way to the basement. Once standing in what must have been a dirty, musty basement, a death order was read aloud and bullets began bouncing off of the walls. What followed was a brutal execution of the Romanov family and their few companions. The children undoubtedly  suffered the most, the jewels protecting them from the gunfire. They watched as their parents were murdered and cried helplessly for escape until bayonets and bullets to the skull ended their lives.

What if?

Something about Olga that will always be fascinating are the things that will forever remain a mystery due to her tragic end, the ‘what ifs’ that accompany her story. What would have happened if Olga had been married off to a foreign prince as tradition called for? If her parents had put more pressure on her to find a marriage prospect, could she have survived the Russian Revolution? Perhaps she could have used her influence as Queen or Princess Consort to get her family back in Russia to safety. She could have brought them to her new home, hiding them away from the assassins determined to end them. Or perhaps her new husband would have refused, forcing the girl to watch in horror as her family’s land fell into chaos and her family was murdered? If that were the case, would she have even wanted to survive? Would the young woman have wanted to die alongside her beloved family and friends? Could things have ended differently if she had married one of the wounded officers she’d fallen for? Could that choice, the Tsar allowing his daughter to marry a commoner, have changed the way the Russian people saw their royals? What if Olga had married and given birth to a Romanov heir? A little boy free of hemophilia with Romanov blood flowing through his veins- what would that have meant for the beaten and battered country coming out of the First World War? Would Olga have hidden the boy away to keep him safe or would he have tried to claim the throne that was rightfully his from the Soviets? We’ll never know the answers to these questions but they are interesting enough to consider.

It is nearly unimaginable to consider the amount of change that happened in just a few years following the Russian Revolution. The world in which Olga had lived had been completely eradicated, leaving a country that the Romanovs never would have recognized in its place.

What do you think of Princess Olga? Let us know below.

And remember, you can read Jordann’s article on Princess Anastasia Romanova, the youngest daughter of Tsar Nicholas II, here.

References

Azar, Helen. 2014. The diary of Olga Romanov: royal witness to the Russian Revolution. Yardley, Pennsylvania : Westholme.

Eager, Margaret. 2016. Six years at the Russian court. SoHo, NY: Gibbons' Rare Books.

Gilliard, Pierre. 2016. Thirteen Years at the Russian Court. 

Massie, Robert K. 1967. Nicholas and Alexandra. New York: Atheneum.

Rappaprt, Helen. 2014. The Romanov Sisters. New York, St. Martins.

Vyrubova, Anna. Memories of the Russian Court. Alexanderpalace.org.

The Draft Lottery in the Vietnam War and its Impact on America

The Vietnam War is remembered for many reasons: the military and civilian casualties; the turmoil and bitter division of American society; the ignominious outcome. From 1965 through 1972, the military draft profoundly affected the lives of millions of young men, inducting nearly two million and pressuring many more into volunteering for service. Often overlooked in the legacy of the war is the long-term impact of the draft system on the young men who escaped military duty, often by changing their lives to deliberately manipulate the Selective Service System.

Here, Wesley Abney tells us how the draft lottery worked and the wider impact on society and millions of young American men.

You can also read Wesley’s book on the Vietnam War Draft Lottery, available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Congressman Alexander Pirnie (R-NY) drawing the first capsule as part of Selective Service System draft, Dec 1, 1969. Available here.

NIGHT OF THE LOTTERY

December 1, 1969.  Nearly two million young American men were asking the same question: what will my number be? That evening the Selective Service System held the first draft lottery of the Vietnam era, to determine who would be next to fight in the distant and unpopular war. Overnight, arbitrary chance forced the "winners" to make a choice that helped shape the future of a generation, from combat to conscientious objection, from teaching to prison, from the pulpit to the Canadian border, from public health to gay liberation.

Despite the potentially life-changing drama of the drawing, the ceremony at Selective Service System (SSS) headquarters employed only a drab stage with a large tote board, some folding chairs and a cylindrical glass bowl to hold the lottery dates. Each of the 366 days of the year (including the extra leap year date of February 29) had been printed on a small rectangle of paper, tucked inside a blue plastic capsule, and placed in a box to await the lottery. The SSS had chosen “youth advisory” delegates from across the country and brought them to Washington, D.C. to draw out the capsules, to show that men of draft age were involved in the process.

The 1969 lottery was the first to be nationally televised, as CBS pre-empted the regular broadcast of Mayberry RFD to join news correspondent Roger Mudd for live coverage. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, long-time director of the SSS, introduced the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee (which had oversight responsibility for the SSS), Rep. Alexander Pirnie, R-New York. After the capsules were dumped from the box into the glass container, Congressman Pirnie drew the first capsule which contained the date of September 14. That date was stuck to a tote board beside the numerals 001. Thus every man in the lottery born on that date would be in the first group called for duty in 1970. Then the youth delegates took over the task of drawing the capsules, until all 366 random sequence numbers (“RSN”) were affixed to the board. According to Roger Mudd, four or five of the youth delegates refused to pick numbers on the grounds they were being used by the Nixon administration to give a false appearance of approval by American youth.

Later probability studies of the 1969 lottery results indicated that the selection process was not as entirely random as intended, in that birth dates occurring late in the year were disproportionately likely to be chosen early. This was due most likely to insufficient mixing of the capsules. A court challenge ensued but the lottery results were upheld. The SSS procured the expertise of statisticians for the subsequent lotteries of 1970, 1971 and 1972, which were fully randomized.

DRAFT LAW CHANGES

President Nixon signed changes to the draft law on November 26, 1969, just days before the drawing. In the year since his election, the war effort remained bogged down, while the public had grown increasingly doubtful of its outcome and skeptical of its worth. His presidency was as troubled by protest and dissension as Lyndon Johnson’s before him. He wanted to eliminate the draft as soon as possible and transition to an all-volunteer force, but had no immediate means to scale back troop strength in an amount sufficient to permit that change. In the meantime, he took several steps to ameliorate widespread criticism of the draft.

In May, 1969, in a message to Congress, he proposed to adopt two long-debated changes to the draft system: reversing the age-order of call such that 19-year-olds would be inducted first; and implementing a process of random selection by lottery. Congress approved both changes in draft law amendments passed in late November 1969.

Nixon viewed the lottery as a means to return at least a perception of fairness to the draft as well as deflate campus-based peace demonstrations. At first glance, an impartial method to set the order of call, such that every man of draft age, rich or poor, black or white, would be assigned a priority number based on a random drawing of birthdates, appeared fair and unbiased. Yet the lottery itself did nothing to change the draft law’s existing system of deferments and exemptions, and so did nothing to equalize the draft vulnerability between a man with a deferment and a man without. By this time, deferments for most graduate students had been eliminated, as well as deferments for married men, but many protected categories remained. A deferred undergraduate student, farmer, father or trained scientist could draw a low number and still avoid the draft, at least as long as the deferment continued, while someone with no deferment who drew the same low number was bound for service. Thus the new random selection process mainly affected those men without a deferment or whose deferment was ending, deciding among only them who would be drafted and who was safe.

A perhaps more significant change in the draft law was reversing age priority and limiting the period of time during which a man would be vulnerable to the draft. Instead of taking the oldest men first from the 19-to-26-year-old eligible range, the revised draft would take the youngest men first. Most men’s uncertainty over draft status would be considerably shortened. Instead of waiting up to six years to learn his draft fate, every man would get a lottery number by age 19, and would be primarily vulnerable only during the year to which the lottery applied. Anyone whose number was not reached in the course of that year would be clear of the draft and free to move ahead with normal plans for work and family without the lingering cloud of possible induction. Likewise, those with a deferment would be vulnerable only for the year after the deferment expired.

For the transition-year lottery of 1969, which set the order of call for 1970, everyone aged 19 to 26 (born from 1944 through 1950) who were already classified as available for induction (I-A and I-A-O), or were emerging from deferred status, or were not yet classified, participated in the lottery, a total of 1,893,651 men. The next lottery in 1970 applied only to men born in 1951; in 1971 only to men born in 1952; in 1972 only to men born in 1953. Because the draft was abolished in 1973 without any draft calls that year, no one subject to the 1972 lottery was drafted.

MAKING A CHOICE

Men whose lottery number fell into the definite-to-probable range for call-up had to immediately choose among the few available options: 1. Get drafted for two years’ active duty, often in the combat zone; 2. Volunteer for service in the military or National Guard (and probably avoid combat duty); 3. Try to qualify for a deferment; or 4. Defy the law and hope to avoid a felony draft evasion charge by going “underground” or leaving the country. 

At the time of the first lottery, deferments were still available for those who flunked the fitness test, or worked in various jobs deemed to be essential (including agriculture, teaching, the ministry, and defense industries), as well as for students (undergraduate and certain graduate schools), fathers with a child at home, and conscientious objectors.

GENERATIONAL IMPACT

The hard choices forced on young men by the draft and the lottery steered the major life decisions of millions, helping shape the future of a generation.

Work. Jobs with a likely deferment, such as engineering and teaching, exerted a magnetic pull on draft-age men, such that those fields became glutted with recent college graduates by the late 1960s. In 1969, 85% of New York City teaching trainees were draft-age men. A survey in the 1970s found that the career choices of 10% of draft-age men were influenced by the availability or lack of a deferment.

Education. The U.S. Census Bureau in 1984 observed that men who came of age during the Vietnam War accumulated more college education than those maturing before. A detailed study in 2001 concluded that the rate of college attendance in the late 1960s rose by 4% to 6% due to draft avoidance alone, affecting about 300,000 young men. A separate study of enrollment in Protestant seminaries showed an increase of 31% from 1966 to 1971, compared to a rise of only 3% from 1960 to 1966.

Paternity. Before the war in Vietnam, the U.S. birth rate declined steadily each year after the peak baby boom year of 1957. However, with the draft system back in effect, including the paternity deferment, the pace of decline slowed between 1966 and 1968, and the birth rate actually rose again in 1969 and 1970 before resuming its decline in 1971.

Conscientious objectors (COs). During World War II, when the military inducted 10.1 million men, only 37,000 (or .36%) were classified as COs, and were required to serve either in a non-combat military role, or perform alternative service. During the Vietnam War, when 1.86 million men were inducted, 171,700 (or 9.23%) were classified as COs, a rate 25 times higher than during WWII. Only about one-third of all COs performed alternative service rather than active military duty during WWII. During the Vietnam War, 80% of COs chose alternative work, usually in a hospital or forestry project at least 50 miles away from their home town, performing menial, low paid tasks for the required two years.

Draft evasion. During the course of the war, 209,517 young men were referred by the SSS to the Department of Justice for prosecution in the federal courts, due to violation of the draft laws. However, the DOJ had to dismiss over half of those cases due to procedural errors by the SSS, and another 76,000 men agreed to accept induction in lieu of criminal prosecution, such that only 25,279 were actually indicted. Even so, draft evasion offenses were the fourth largest category on the federal criminal docket by late 1969, and made up 21% of all pending federal prosecutions nationally by June 1972. A total of 10,055 draft offenders went to trial, where 8,750 were convicted by verdict or guilty plea. Of those, 3,250 served time in prison, for an average of twenty-two months. As convicted felons, those men lost the right to vote and were often disqualified for desirable job opportunities.

Immigration. Some men made the momentous decision to flee the country, leaving behind their homes, friends and family. The best government estimates show that about 40,000 young men left the U.S. during the war, with the majority crossing the border into Canada, at an average of 5,000 to 8,000 per year. After the war, an estimated one-fourth to one-half of the exiles chose to remain in their adopted country, even after they were granted amnesty by President Carter in January, 1977.

What do you think of the Vietnam War draft lottery? Let us know below. 

You can also read about the stories of men who were subject to the draft at Wesley’s site: vietnamwardraftlottery.com.

References

“Amnesty: Repatriation for Draft Evaders, Deserters,” CQ Almanac 1972, 1.

Baskir, Lawrence M. and Strauss, William A., Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam        Generation(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

Card, David and Lemieux, Thomas, “Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended Legacy of the Vietnam War,” The American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001), 101.

“CBS News Special Report: The Draft Lottery 1969,” YouTube video, 9:41

“College Enrollment Linked to Vietnam War,” New York Times, September 2, 1984.

Dennis, Lloyd B., “Draft Law Revision.” Editorial Research Reports 1966, vol.1, 431-69.

Fletcher, John C., “Avoidance and the Draft,” Washington Post, February 25, 1992.

Hagan, John, Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Kamarck, Kristy N., The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R44452), 2016.

“Living in Peace in a Time of War: The Civilian Public Service Story,” Mennonite Central Committee, March 28, 2017.

Mansavage, Jean A., “Obvious Inequities: Lessons Learned from Vietnam War Conscientious Objection,” (Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M, 2000).

 “President’s Draft Lottery Approved by Congress,” CQ Almanac 1969, 350-55.

Selective Service Act of 1948 (Elston Act), Pub. L. 80-759.

Selective Service Amendment Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-124.

Selective Service System, “Induction Statistics.”

Selective Service System, Semi-Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Period July 1 to December 31, 1969; July 1 to December 31, 1972.

Starr, Norton., “Nonrandom Risk: The 1970 Draft Lottery,” Journal of Statistics Education, vol. 5, no. 2 (1997).

32 C.F.R. 1622 (1967).

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1968, Table 194; 1969, Table 188; 1971, Table 198; 1973,Table 211, 1974, Tables 67, 68.

Van Sant, Rick, “Paying Price Every Election Day,” Cincinnati Post, September 21, 1993.

Zeidler, Maryse, “40 Years Later, Remembering Jimmy Carter’s Pardon for Draft Dodgers,” CBC News, January 21, 2017.