Admiral Nimitz’s Plan for the Battle of Midway – Formulated, but Forgotten

The naval victory at Midway on June 4, 1942 has rightly been recognized as one of the greatest in the history of the US Navy, and one of the most significant victories in the history of armed conflict. However, events did not follow the plan formulated by US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, and the battle was very nearly lost by Pacific Fleet forces. Conspicuously missing from earlier accounts of the Battle of Midway is a description of the Nimitz plan to confront the Japanese carrier fleet.

Dale Jenkins explains. Dale is author of Diplomats & Admirals: From Failed Negotiations and Tragic Misjudgments to Powerful Leaders and Heroic Deeds, the Untold Story of the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Chester Nimitz while Chief of Naval Operations.

The actions taken by Pacific Fleet forces during the Midway battle deviated significantly from the Nimitz plan. But, despite the deviation, the battle was won. What occurred at Midway was essentially a broken play, but positive action from a junior task force commander, astute calculations from an air group commander, and intrepid, skilled flying from carrier pilots saved the day. 

The intelligence team at Pearl Harbor had decrypted sufficient Japanese messages by May 27 to advise Nimitz of expected Japanese fleet movements on June 4. Nimitz’s intelligence staff, headed by LCdr Edwin Layton, informed him that the Japanese carrier fleet, or Striking Force:

“would probably attack on the morning of 4 June, from the northwest on a bearing of 325 degrees. They could be sighted at about 175 miles from Midway at around 0700 (0600 local) time.”(1)

Layton expected four or five Japanese carriers steaming from the northwest at 26 knots. There were four: Akagi(flagship of carrier Striking Force commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo), Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. Nimitz had a week to plan a defense of the attack, formulate a counter-attack, and continue to assemble forces on Midway to carry out the plan. He issued Operation Order 29-42 that detailed the forces that were to be employed, including the scouting operation of PBY amphibious planes and a picket line of submarines.

Additional Japanese forces included an amphibious Occupation Force operating south of the carrier force, a separate force to attack the Aleutian Islands, and a battleship force trailing 300 miles astern of the carriers. The battleship force included super-battleship Yamato with Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto embarked.

The Japanese planned to launch 108 planes, half the total air complement of the four carriers, against the shore defenses of Midway Island at 0430 on June 4 when approximately 220-240 miles from Midway,. The remaining reserve force would be armed with anti-ship bombs and torpedoes to combat any unexpected Pacific Fleet forces. The Japanese command expected the Pacific Fleet carriers to rush to the scene from Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese would destroy them with their carrier planes and battleships in a showdown confrontation.

To counter the Japanese carrier force, Nimitz had planes on Midway Island and three Pacific Fleet carriers, Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown, under the overall command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Fletcher, embarked on Yorktown, was in direct command of Task Force 17. A more junior rear admiral, Raymond Spruance, embarked on Enterprise, commanded Task Force 16 of Enterprise and Hornet.  

Operating range

A particular problem was the difference in operating ranges between the Japanese carrier planes and those of the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese operating range was 240 miles, and the equivalent for the Pacific Fleet planes was just 175 miles.  That difference meant the Japanese planes could attack the Pacific Fleet carriers when the Pacific Fleet planes were out of range of the Japanese carriers. Nimitz had to have a plan that would get the carriers through the band between 240 miles and 175 miles without being spotted and attacked. The difference, 65 miles, meant that a carrier covering that distance, averaging 25 knots, would have to steam for 2 ½ hours to cross the band where they were vulnerable to attack without being able to return it.

Nimitz designed an attack on the Japanese carrier fleet by moving the Pacific Fleet carriers through the night of June 3-4, under cover of darkness, to arrive at a position where they had the best chance to launch an attack before they were discovered by Japanese scouts. He planned to use PBY amphibious planes from Midway as scouts because the Japanese could sight the PBYs without being alerted to the presence of carriers. The light wind coming out of the southeast meant that the Japanese carriers, steaming into the wind, would launch and recover planes without changing course. Layton based his calculations on the PBYs taking off from Midway at 0430, plus plane and ship speeds, to arrive at his calculation that the PBYs should encounter the Japanese at about 0600, 175 miles from Midway.  The planes on Midway would launch immediately upon receipt of the scouting report.  Japanese carriers would move about 35 miles after the PBY report until the Midway planes intercepted them about 0720, 140 miles from Midway.

Nimitz formulated a plan for a concentration of force of Midway planes and carrier planes. To accomplish this, he determined that the Pacific Fleet carriers were to be at a position 140 miles northeast of the interception point at 0600. That position also was 200 miles directly north of Midway Island and was designated as the navigation reference point for the carrier force. When the report from a PBY was received at approximately 0600 the planes from both Midway and the three carriers would launch their planes. In a successful execution, all the Pacific Fleet planes would arrive over the Japanese carriers at approximately 0720 in a concentration of force. The goal was a victory by 0800-0815.

Because the Japanese planes attacking Midway would not return before 0830, the Pacific Fleet attack would be against just half of the Japanese air defenses. In addition, if the flight decks of the Japanese carriers were heavily damaged, even if the carriers themselves were not sunk, the planes returning from Midway would have to ditch in the ocean.

A graphic of Nimitz’s plan at the Battle. Copyright Dale Jenkins. Printed with permission.

After-action report

The after-action report of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher confirms the intended movements of the carrier force in conformity with the Nimitz plan:

ENTERPRISE and HORNET maintained their air groups

In readiness as a striking force. During the night of June 3-4

both forces [TF-17 and TF-16] proceeded for a point two

hundred miles North of Midway. (Emphasis added) Reports of enemy forces to the Westward of Midway were received from Midway and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. These reports indicated the location of the enemy Occupation Force but not the Striking Force.(2)

The ComCruPac (Fletcher) report refers to PBY scouts on June 3, when the Occupation Force was sighted and the carrier Striking Force was still under heavy clouds. It confirms Fletcher’s knowledge of the plan and his intended movements. Further confirmation of the Nimitz plan and the ordered position of the carriers to be 200 miles north of Midway at 0600 on June 4 is contained in published accounts of at least three contemporary historians who had the opportunity to interview participants during and after the war: Richard W. Bates, Samuel Eliot Morison, and E. B. Potter. (3)

On June 3 the PBYs took off from Midway at 0430 and contacted the Japanese occupation force. This contact confirmed that the Japanese were proceeding with the plan as previously decrypted by Layton’s intelligence unit. The carrier force was still under a heavy weather overcast and was not discovered on June 3.

On June 4 the PBYs launched again at 0430. At 0534 a sighting of enemy carriers was transmitted to Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, and to the forces on Midway. At 0603 the earlier report was amplified:

“2 carriers and battleships bearing 320 degrees, distance 180, course 135, speed 25 knots.” (4)

Immediately after receiving the latter report the planes on Midway took to the air.  Fighters rose to defend Midway, and six Avenger torpedo planes and four B-26s fitted with torpedoes flew to attack the Japanese carriers.  Two more carriers were in the Japanese formation but were not seen by the PBY pilot.

However, Pacific Fleet carriers were not in position to launch planes at 0603 because Fletcher, while heading southwest overnight June 3-4 toward the designated position 200 miles north of Midway, decided that the scouting as ordered in Operation Order 29-42 might not be sufficient. At first light, he ordered Yorktown carrier planes to conduct a separate sweep to the north and east. To do this the carriers had to change course to the southeast to launch planes into the wind, and to be on that course to recover the planes. These course changes took the carriers away from the interception point. When the 0603 message from the scout arrived, the carriers were 200 miles east and north of the interception point and 25 miles beyond their operating range of 175 miles. 

At 0607 Fletcher sent a message to Spruance:

“Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located. I will follow as soon as planes recovered.”(5)

Spruance, detached with Enterprise and Hornet, proceeded southwest at all possible speed to close the range, but at an average speed of 25 knots it would take an hour to cover 25 miles.  Meanwhile, the planes from Midway arrived separately over the Japanese carriers and attacked. The plan for a concentration of force had failed.

The Avengers and B-26s, arriving at 0710, flew into the teeth of the Zero fighter defenders. They attempted valiant torpedo runs against two of the four carriers, but the inexperienced pilots were hopelessly outclassed by the fast, agile and deadly Zeros. There were no hits or even good chances for hits, and the Zeros sent five of the six Avengers flaming into the ocean. The B-26s hardly did better, but one pilot, with his plane on fire and probably knowing he was never getting home, dove at the bridge of the Japanese flagship. He missed by a few feet and crashed into the ocean.

B-26 pilot

The B-26 pilot may have done as much as anyone that day to turn the tide of the battle.  At 0715 the shocked Admiral Nagumo, already notified that the Midway attack had run into heavy resistance, decided that a second attack on Midway was required. He ordered the armaments of the standby force to be changed from anti-ship bombs and torpedoes to point detonating bombs for land targets.  All of this would require over an hour to complete, and not before the Midway attack force would be returning to land about 0830, low on fuel.

Admiral Spruance, ready to launch planes from his two carriers at 0700, plotted courses to a new interception.  Ranging closely together between 231 degrees and 240 degrees, but delayed at the launch, the planes expected to arrive at the new interception at 0925 – almost 2 1/2 hours after the launch time.

At 0917, with the Midway force landed, Admiral Nagumo turned northeast to confront the Pacific Fleet carriers that a Japanese scout had discovered earlier. Decisions he had made, including landing the Midway planes, had delayed any attack on the American carriers. The Americans were still making attacks, but the Zeros swept them aside easily. Now Nagumo was supremely confident. Rearming and refueling the entire air complement on all four carriers would be completed by 1045. They would launch a massive, coordinated attack of over 200 planes and sink the American carrier fleet.

The Enterprise and Hornet planes crossed the revised intercept point at 0925 but found nothing but open ocean. The Hornet air group commander took his squadrons southeast to protect Midway.  The Enterprise air commander realized that the Japanese carrier force probably had been delayed by earlier actions.  He took two squadrons of dive bombers on a northwest course to retrace the Japanese movements, then began a box search that came upon a Japanese destroyer, and that led to the Japanese carriers.  Diving out of the sun at 1025 caught the Japanese defenders by surprise, and in five minutes Akagi and Kaga were destroyed. The Yorktown planes suddenly appeared and destroyed Soryu.

Hiryu, the remaining Japanese carrier, launched dive bomber and torpedo plane attacks which led to the loss of Yorktown. Later in the day on June 4 Enterprise dive bombers destroyed Hiryu. The greatest victory of the US Navy had been realized.

Aftermath

In the aftermath of the Midway victory no one was going to complain about not following the Nimitz battle plan, least of all Admiral Nimitz.  Consequently, the existence of the plan has been overlooked until now. Whether following the plan would have resulted in the same victory by Pacific Fleet forces, or the same victory without as many losses in ships, planes and personnel, has never been explored and is left to speculation.

As a reminder, Dale is author of Diplomats & Admirals: From Failed Negotiations and Tragic Misjudgments to Powerful Leaders and Heroic Deeds, the Untold Story of the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

References

(1) Layton, Edwin T., And I Was There, Konecky & Konecky, Old Saybrook, CT, 1985, p. 430

(2) Report of Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Adm. Fletcher), To: Commander-in-Chief,

United States Pacific Fleet, Subject: Battle of Midway, 14 June 1942, Pearl Harbor, T.H., Para. 3, included as Enclosure (H) in United States Pacific Fleet, Advance Report – Battle of Midway, 15 June 1942

(3) Bates, Richard W., The Battle of Midway, U.S. Naval War College, 1948, p. 108; Morison, Samuel Eliot, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, Naval Institute Press, 1949, p. 102; Potter, E.B., Nimitz, Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 87.

(4) Morison, p. 103.

(5) Morison, p.113

Abranham Lincoln Versus a Polish Count: Slavery, War, and the President in the Eyes of Adam Gurowski

Unlike many other Poles who took part in the Civil War on the Union side, Count Adam Gurowski was not a soldier or a commander, and his actions had no influence on the shape of the Civil War. He was primarily a publicist whose sharp views on the actions of Abraham Lincoln's government were so violent and uncompromising that the US president even treated him as a potential assassin. Rafal Guminski explains.

Adam Gurowski.

Count Adam Gurowski: History and Political Activity in Europe

Adam Gurowski was born on September 10, 1805, into a family of noble origins and a count's title. He was the oldest of seven siblings. His sister, Cecilia, was married to Baron Frederiks, general adjutant of Tsar Nicholas I, and his brother, Ignacy, married the Spanish Infanta Isabella de Borbón, daughter of the Duke of Cadiz, and became a Spanish grandee. As the oldest son, he received a good education. After completing his education at the provincial school, he began his studies in Berlin, Leipzig, Göttingen, and Heidelberg. He studied law, philosophy, history, and classical philology.

After his studies, Gurowski returned to the Kingdom of Poland and joined a political party from the western part of the country, which sought to maintain the status quo and preserve the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. The count quickly left the organization, and in January 1829 he was supposed to take part in preparations for the so-called coronation plot, the aim of which was the death of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I. After the outbreak of the November Uprising, Gurowski became involved in organizing the insurgent administration and civil authorities, which, however, ended in failure. The count became a staunch critic of the insurgent dictatorship, and after its fall, he became a member of the Patriotic Society, on behalf of which he demanded the dethronement of Tsar Nicholas I as the King of Poland.

Despite being blind in one eye, he joined the insurgents as an ordinary soldier and took part in battles, for which he was promoted to officer and received the Silver Cross of Virtuti Militari. After leaving the army, he became an envoy of the Patriotic Society to Paris, where in French magazines such as Trubine, François, National, Reformateur, La Révolution de 1831 and Le Globe, he undertook to criticize the authorities of the November Uprising. After the fall of the Uprising, Gurowski struggled with the instability of his political views and a tendency to sharp disputes, through which he quickly alienated people from his closest surroundings.

The year 1834 was special for the Pole because of the radical change in his views and ideas. His statements began to include comments of a pan-Slavic nature with Poland as the unifier of the Slavic world. He also viewed the Polish emigration differently, whose activities for the liberation of the country he had previously assessed negatively. The change in the count's views is best seen in his interest in the postulates of French utopian socialism. The changes in Gurowski's worldview reached even such basic assumptions as nation and patriotism.

The count's new views conflicted him with his family and Polish patriotic circles, but it was only the request for amnesty addressed to Tsar Nicholas I and the recognition of Russia as the country that was to lead the unification of Slavic nations that made Gurowski a national apostate. His stay in Russia turned out to be difficult. The state apparatus of the Tsarist regime forced him to reassess his views once again, and the complete isolation from his family and countrymen began to weigh heavily on him.

A Polish Count on American Soil

In 1840, Gurowski returned to the Kingdom of Poland to sort out his property and family affairs. The attempt to recover his confiscated property ended in failure. Finding himself in a hopeless situation, the count decided to emigrate. In April 1844, he left the border of the Kingdom of Poland forever and went to the West. For some time, he lived in Bavaria, Hesse, and then in Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy. Unable to settle down permanently, the Pole decided to leave the Old Continent and emigrate to the United States of America. On December 2, 1849, Count Gurowski found himself in New York.

The Pole's situation in America was quite stable at first. He had brought a supply of cash with him from Europe, and thanks to letters of recommendation, he had access to intellectual circles from the very beginning. After half a year, the count's financial situation began to deteriorate, which forced him to seek a source of support outside New York. In Boston, he was even offered a chance to lecture on law at Harvard University, but due to poor attendance, his lectures were quickly suspended. During this time, the Pole became keenly interested in the issue of slavery and took an active part in the life of the local intellectual social elite. He managed to get to know the leaders of American literature and poetry: Henry W. Longfellow and James R. Lowell, who, together with Gurowski, had in common a particular aversion to slavery and criticism of that institution.

Eventually, the Pole returned to New York and in 1852 took a job at the New York Daily Tribune. He wrote a column on European affairs, criticizing the rule of Tsar Nicholas I. Despite his continued interest in European affairs, the Pole was fascinated by his new homeland, which he admired in many ways. He traveled extensively in the northern and southern states, and published his observations in “America and Europe”, which was warmly received by critics and praised for its impartiality and insightful observations. The Pole was greatly impressed by his new homeland and in many ways recognized its superiority over European countries. He paid special attention to the unique relationship between power and freedom. In his opinion, in Europe, these two forces competed with each other, while in America, they cooperated for the common good and development. The count was equally impressed by the class structure of American society. In his opinion, the superiority of the American system was the lack of class division dominated by the aristocracy. He noted with admiration that the law was created on the initiative of the people and for the people, and not by a privileged ruling group.

Gurowski's relations with the New York Daily Tribune began to deteriorate significantly, and as a result, the count lost his job. From then on, for four years he supported himself by publishing articles in various magazines. During this time, he continued to write a book on the history of world slavery, which was published in 1860 under the title “Slavery in History”.

Abraham Lincoln under harsh criticism from Adam Gurowski

The Pole, who was increasingly vocal in his criticism of slavery, decided to move to the US capital, Washington, where he hoped for greater understanding of his views. He wanted to seek support from politicians from the radical wing of the Republican Party. Thanks to his work in the New York Daily Tribune and his authorship of the books: “America and Europe” and “Slavery in History”, the Pole was already a well-known person in Washington. He quickly established important acquaintances, including Salmon P. Chase, the future chief justice of the United States, and John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts. After the outbreak of the Civil War, he joined a volunteer unit under the command of Cassius M. Clay, which was to protect and patrol the capital. After the threat had passed, the Pole got a job at the State Department. His duties included reading the European press and preparing reports on articles of interest to the department. However, Gurowski lost his job after his diary, in which he criticized the government, the president, and the Union generals, fell into the wrong hands. Ultimately, he published the contents of the diary in December 1862. Thus began his crusade against Abraham Lincoln.

Adam Gurowski should be considered the most ardent critic of the federal government and the president at the time. Although the Pole spoke positively about Lincoln's inaugural address, the government's lack of decisive action in the event of the attack on Fort Sumter and the riots in Baltimore ultimately confirmed his dislike of Abraham Lincoln. Gurowski stated that the current Union government "lacked the blood" to defeat the Confederacy, and calling up 75,000 volunteers was definitely not enough to defeat the Confederacy. He also believed that the situation overwhelmed Abraham Lincoln, who had no leadership skills and could not compare to George Washington or Andrew Jackson. He considered the president's greatest flaw to be his lack of decisiveness, and he saw it as the cause of the Army of the Potomac's defeats. Gurowski also criticized Lincoln's personnel decisions, especially the delay in dismissing General George McClellan from the position of commander of the Army of the Potomac. However, Gurowski was able to appreciate Lincoln. He praised the president's behavior after the defeat at Chancellorsville. The count accused Lincoln of manipulating election promises and making military decisions through the prism of politics, which was to result in the deaths of many soldiers. However, in the face of the president's re-election, Gurowski showed a shadow of support for him, fearing for the election of the hated McClellan and his pro-slavery lobby.

There is no doubt that Gurowski's criticism of the president was often exaggerated, but in some aspects the Pole's opinion coincides with the contemporary opinion of historians. The count's attitude towards the president was dictated by his views and difficult, uncompromising personality. The Pole's most positive opinion of Lincoln was expressed after the president's death. In Gurowski's eyes, the murdered president became a martyr close to sainthood, who will go down in world history as a great and noble man.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

·       Carter R., Gurowski, „The Atlantic Monthly” 1866, t. 18, nr 109.

·       Derengowski P., Polacy w wojnie secesyjnej 1861-1865, Napoleon V, Oświęcim 2015.

·       Fisher L.H., Lincoln’s Gadfly, Adam Gurowski, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1964.

·       Garewicz J., Gracz. Rzecz o Adamie Gurowskim [1805-1866], „Res Publica”, 2 (1988), nr 5,

·       Głębocki H., „Diabeł Asmodeusz” w niebieskich binoklach i kraj przyszłości: hr. Adam Gurowski i Rosja, Arcana, Kraków 2012.

·       Łukasiewicz W., Gurowski Adam, Polski słownik biograficzny, V.  9, Wrocław 1960-1961.

·       Stasik F., Adam Gurowski 1805-1866, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN ,Warszawa 1977.

Anne of Cleves – The Survivor Wife of King Henry VIII

Because she played her cards right, Anne of Cleves, as the fourth wife of King Henry VIII of England, managed to escape the wrath he inflicted on two of his previous wives and lived a privileged life on good terms with the king after their separation.

C. M. Schmidlkofer explains.

Anne of Cleves. Painitng by Barthel Bruyn the Younger.

It seems unfair that Anne of Cleves, the fourth wife of King Henry VIII, is known throughout history as the “ugly” wife (out of the six total he had) when in reality, it was her wit and intellect that makes her remarkable.

Born in Dusseldorf in 1515, Anne of Cleves was the daughter of Maria of Julich-Berg and Johan III, Duke of Cleves. Her marriage to Henry in Jan. 6, 1540, right from the start was fraught with disappointment and misunderstanding.

First, at the tender age of 24, she was invited to become Henry’s fourth bride based on a painting the king commissioned of her countenance which he later said looked nothing like her. But that came a bit later.

The marriage was a political arrangement fostered by Henry’s “fixer,” Chief Minister Thomas Cromwell who sought to temper the power plays of Spain and France while boosting Protestant influence with the union.

First meeting

The first meeting between the king and his bride was a massive fail, as Anne rejected Henry’s surprise meeting wearing a disguise and the relationship went downhill from there.

The complaints began in earnest then as the king complained she did not look like the commissioned portrait.

He called her a “Flanders Mare,” said she smelled, and reportedly refused to have marital sex with her.

Anne was a fish out of water in Tudor Court. Her upbringing did not include dancing and music, the heart of Tudor life, but was focused on learning duties of a noblewoman she was expected to become along with household skills.

In an attempt to integrate herself into life with Henry, perhaps nervous over what lay ahead, she had the foresight to socialize with her English travelers to learn customs and social skills as well as learning the king’s favorite card games during her voyage to meet him.

There is little known about Anne’s feelings about the marriage but she was keenly aware that two of Henry’s first three wives were either banished or beheaded and that the purpose of any union was to produce a male heir for the king.

And although Henry had his coveted son through his third wife, Jane Seymour, who died shortly after giving birth, he was forging ahead with the fourth marriage to secure another.

End of marriage

Seven months after his marriage to Anne, who served as queen consort, Henry notified his bride their marriage was to be annulled three days hence. His reasoning was the marriage was never consummated and for good measure threw in questions about Anne’s relationship years ago with her brief engagement to Francis the Duke of Bar in 1527.

Wisely, Anne knew that arguing or pleading to continue the marriage would not be successful and instead fully cooperated with the king’s wishes. Certainly, she had nothing to lose and as it turned out she gained beautifully.

Henry, possibly relieved over Anne’s cooperation, awarded her with a generous settlement, granted her the title of “the King’s Sister” as long as she remained in England and bestowed upon her large tracts of properties, such as Hever Castle – the former childhood home of Henry’s second wife, Anne Boleyn, whom he had beheaded in 1536.

Unlike Henry’s first wife, Catherine of Aragon, who resisted the king’s demand for annulment on religious grounds, ending up banished from court until her death in 1536, Anne was allowed to keep her jewels, her metal plate and her dresses, and received a generous annual stipend along with revenue from other properties.

She willingly turned over her wedding ring to Henry, asking that it be destroyed “as a thing which she knew of no force or value.”

Henry seemed to value Anne’s counsel after their separation and continued a cordial relationship with her until he died in 1547.

Later years

At that point Anne lost her title of the “King’s Sister” and she moved away from court, leading a quiet life until Mary I, Henry’s daughter with his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, and Anne’s stepdaughter, took the throne in 1553. Anne briefly came under suspicion when a plot to depose the queen and place Elizabeth I on the throne was investigated because Anne also had a close relationship with Elizabeth I, the daughter of the king and Anne Boleyn.

She escaped a charge of treason and remained cordial with Mary I until her death in 1557 at the age of 41 after a brief illness in Chelsea Old Manor, her home and former home of Catherine Parr, Henry’s sixth and last wife.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/sixwives/meet/ac_handbook_children.html

https://www.theanneboleynfiles.com/the-death-of-anne-of-cleves/

https://www.historytools.org/stories/anne-of-cleves-the-unwanted-queen-who-survived-and-thrived

https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/inspire-me/blog/blog-posts/henry-viii-and-anne-of-cleves/

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anne-of-Cleves-queen-of-England

Operation Frankton: The Most Daring Raid of World War 2

Operation Frankton was a covert military operation carried out by the Royal Marines during the Second World War and was one of the most audacious and daring raids in military history. The raid was executed in December 1942 and targeted the German-occupied French port of Bordeaux, a crucial hub for the Axis powers, which facilitated the movement of supplies critical to the German war effort. The operation, led by a small group of commandos, was remarkable not only for its boldness but also for its significant impact on the war effort. Delving into the main reasons behind the mission, the key figures involved, and the importance of the operation, it is also possible to lightly explore the separately planned parallel mission by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) against the same targets.

Terry Bailey explains.

Tannenfels, a German blockade runner which was sunk.

The Strategic Importance of Bordeaux

Bordeaux, located in southwest France along the Garonne River, was a vital port for the Axis powers during the Second World War. Following the fall of France in 1940, the German military took control of the port and used it to facilitate the movement of supplies utilizing blockade runners. The port was especially important for the transit of rubber, which was essential for manufacturing tires and other military equipment. The loss of Bordeaux would disrupt the supply lines and put a significant strain on the German war machine, making it a prime target for Allied forces.

The British Admiralty recognized the strategic value of targeting Bordeaux early in the war. However, conventional bombing raids were deemed too risky to the civilian population and ineffective due to the heavy defenses surrounding the port. The need for a more unconventional approach led to the conception of Operation Frankton, a mission designed to strike at the heart of the German supply chain with minimal resources.

The Planning of Operation Frankton

The idea for Operation Frankton was conceived by Major Herbert "Blondie" Hasler, a Royal Marines officer with a background in unconventional warfare and small boats. Hasler, who had previously served as a fleet landing officer in Scapa Flow, was then sent to Narvik in support of the French Foreign Legion in the Norwegian campaign, for which duties he was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE), mentioned in dispatches, and awarded the French Croix de Guerre.

He was known for his innovative thinking and determination and believed that a small, highly trained team could infiltrate the heavily guarded port using kayaks, plant explosive charges on the ships, and escape undetected. The operation would rely on stealth, surprise, and the ability to navigate the treacherous waters of the Gironde estuary.

Hasler's plan was initially met with skepticism by some members of the Admiralty, who viewed it as too risky and unlikely to succeed. However, Hasler's persistence, coupled with the lack of viable alternatives, eventually won over his superiors. The operation was given the green light, and Hasler was put in charge of selecting and training the men who would carry out the raid.

The men Hasler recruited became part of the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment which was part of combined operations. The group who carried out the raid consisted of 13 Royal Marines, including Hasler himself, 6 two-man teams plus one reserve. The men were chosen for their physical fitness, mental toughness, and ability to operate under extreme conditions. They underwent rigorous training in kayaking, explosives, and navigation, practicing initially in the waters in southern England, and eventually in the cold and treacherous waters off the coast of Scotland.

The operation was set to take place in December 1942, during the winter, when the long nights would provide the cover of darkness needed for the raid. The men would use specially designed folding kayaks, nicknamed "cockles," to navigate the Gironde estuary and reach the port of Bordeaux. Once there, they would attach limpet mines to the hulls of the German blockade-running ships and then attempt to escape through France to Spain, with the help of the French Resistance.

The Execution of the Raid

The operation began on the night of the 7th of December, 1942, when Royal Navy submarine HMS Tuna sailed from Holy Loch in Scotland with the six kayaks and raiders on board, where the men were dropped off the coast of France, near the mouth of the Gironde estuary. The plan was for the men to paddle their kayaks up the estuary, cover a distance of around 70 miles, and reach the port of Bordeaux within four nights.

The hull of Cachalot was damaged while being passed out of the submarine hatch, leaving just five kayaks to start the raid. The reserve member of the team, Colley, was not needed, so he remained aboard the submarine with the Cachalot crew Ellery and Fisher.

The first night of the mission was fraught with difficulties. The strong currents and freezing temperatures took a toll on the men, fighting against strong cross tides and cross winds, Coalfish became separated. The remaining kayaks then encountered 5 ft (1.5 m) high waves and Conger capsized and had to be scuttled, once it became apparent that it would not be possible to bail it out, Sheard and Moffatt held on to two of the remaining kayaks, which carried them as close to the shore as possible, then had to swim for it, the remaining kayaks then came across the separated Coalfish.

As the conditions deteriorated Mackinnon and Conway in Cuttlefish became separated from the other kayaks in the group. After reaching the shore, MacKinnon and Conway evaded capture for four days but were betrayed and arrested by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans at La Reole hospital 30 miles southeast of Bordeaux, while attempting to make their way to the Spanish border.

The 3 remaining kayaks, Catfish, Crayfish and Coalfish, covered 20 miles in five hours landed near St Vivien du Medoc, and laid up through the day, however, while resting during the day and unknown to the others, Wallace and Ewart in Coalfish had been captured at daybreak near the Pointe de Grave lighthouse where they had come ashore, now they were only 2.

The second night, 8/9 December, the two remaining kayaks Catfish and Crayfish paddled a further 22 miles in six hours. On the third night, 9/10 December, they paddled 15 miles and on the fourth night, 10/11 December, because of the strong ebb tide they only managed to cover 9 miles.

Hasler's original plan was for the raid to be carried out on the 10th of December, but now Hasler had to change his plan, due to the strength of the ebb tide they still had a short distance to paddle, so the remaining commandos laid up for another day, setting off to and reach Bordeaux on the night of 11/12 December.

On the night of the 11th of December, 1942, after four grueling nights of paddling, avoiding German patrols, the surviving commandos reached the port of Bordeaux. The men split into two teams, with Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in the kayak Catfish taking one side of the port and Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in the kayak Crayfish taking the other side of the port. Using limpet mines, the teams successfully attached explosives to the hulls of six German ships. The explosives were set to detonate in the early hours of the morning, ensuring the commandos had time to extract themselves from the immediate area.

The raiders then made their escape, splitting up into pairs and heading in different directions to avoid capture. Hasler and Sparks managed to make contact with the French Resistance and began their journey south towards Spain. Laver and Ellery, however, were not as fortunate. They were captured by the Germans a few days later and executed, as part of Hitler's infamous commando order. Hasler and Sparks, after a harrowing journey through occupied France, eventually reached Spain and were repatriated to the United Kingdom via Gibraltar in April 1943.

The Aftermath and Impact of Operation Frankton

Operation Frankton was a tactical success, with 2 ships sunk, 2 ships several damaged and a further 2 ships slightly damaged. The damage to the ships and the resulting disruption to German supply lines had a significant impact on the war effort. The raid also had a profound psychological effect, demonstrating that even heavily guarded ports were vulnerable to small, highly trained commando units.

However, the mission came at a high cost. Of the 10 men who set out on the raid, only 2 survived, Hasler and Bill Sparks, 6 were captured and executed by the Germans, while 2 were lost at sea. Despite these losses, the bravery and determination of the Royal Marines became a symbol of courage and ingenuity.

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, later praised the operation, stating that it shortened the war by six months. While this claim is difficult to verify, there is no doubt that Operation Frankton had a significant impact on the course of the war, both strategically and symbolically. The Germans defined the raid as the most daring raid of the Second World War.

The Parallel Mission by the Special Operations Executive (SOE)

While Operation Frankton is the most well-known raid on Bordeaux, it is important to note that the SOE had also planned a 2 part parallel mission against the same targets. The SOE, a British organization responsible for conducting espionage, and sabotage in occupied Europe, recognized the importance of disrupting German supply lines in Bordeaux.

A team led by Claude de Baissac of the Special Operations Executive were preparing to take explosives onto the ships when he heard the explosions of Hasler's limpet mines. The loss of the opportunity for Hasler and de Baissac to work together to strike a harder blow against the Germans was a hard lesson.

The other aspect of the SOE's plan was codenamed "Operation Josephine B," which involved a sabotage mission aimed at destroying the electricity supply to the port of Bordeaux. The mission was to be carried out by a team of SOE and French resistance, who would infiltrate the power station and plant explosives to disable the facility. The objective was to cut off electricity to the port, rendering the German ships and facilities inoperable.

Operation Josephine B was planned to take place around the same time as Operation Frankton, this aspect of the SOE mission was delayed due to difficulties in securing the necessary explosives and logistical support. By the time the mission was ready to go ahead, Operation Frankton had already been executed.

Despite the delay, Operation Josephine B was eventually carried out in June 1943, and the power station was successfully sabotaged. The mission achieved its objective, but the impact was somewhat mitigated by the fact that the ships in the port had already been severely damaged by Operation Frankton. The SOE's mission, while important, is often overshadowed by the daring and dramatic nature of the Royal Marines' raid.

The SOE was aware of the Royal Marines' mission, but the Royal Marines were unaware of the SOE mission due to SOE's secrecy policy. However, after Operation Frankton a clearing and controlling house was set up that would coordinate all special operations in the future ensuring that missions did not clash, this process is still in place today.

In conclusion, Operation Frankton stands as a testament to the courage, ingenuity, and determination of the Royal Marines during the Second World War. The raid on Bordeaux, carried out by a small team of commandos using unconventional methods, dealt a significant blow to the German war effort and demonstrated the vulnerability of even the most heavily defended targets.

The operation also highlighted the importance of coordinated efforts in warfare, as the separately planned SOE mission against the same targets showed. While both missions were successful in their own right, the lack of coordination between these missions is a reminder of the challenges faced by Allied forces in executing complex operations during the Second World War and the loss of a greater blow to the Germans.

The legacy of Operation Frankton lives on, not only in military history but also in the broader narrative of the Second World War. The bravery and sacrifice of the Royal Marines continue to inspire generations of military personnel and serve as a powerful example of what can be achieved through courage, ingenuity, and determination in the face of overwhelming odds.

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Notes:

The Bordeaux raiding team consisted of:

A Division

Blondie Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in kayak Catfish.

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in kayak Crayfish.

Corporal George Sheard and Marine David Moffatt in kayak Conger.

B Division

Lieutenant John Mackinnon and Marine James Conway in kayak Cuttlefish.

Sergeant Samuel Wallace and Marine Robert Ewart in kayak Coalfish.

Marine W. A. Ellery and Marine E. Fisher in kayak Cachalot.

A thirteenth man was taken as a reserve, Marine Norman Colley.

Blockade runner

A blockade runner is a light fast merchant vessel used to evade a naval blockade of a port or strait. In addition to, speed it uses stealth, blockade runners transport cargo, such as food or arms to a blockaded city.

The Special Boat Service

The Special Boat Service (SBS) is a special forces unit of the United Kingdom under the control of Royal Navy admiralty and part of the Royal Marine Commando.

The SBS traces its origins back to the Second World War when the Army Special Boat Section was formed in 1940 as a sub-unit of the Special Air Service, (SAS). However, after the Second World War, the Royal Navy through the Royal Marines commando formed the SBS special forces, initially as the Special Boat Company in 1951 then re-designated as the Special Boat Squadron in 1974—until on the 28th of July, 1987 the unit was formally renamed as the Special Boat Service, bringing it inline from a naming point of view with the army special forces unit the Special Air Service, (SAS), warranting the SBS its own budget.

The reformation of the SBS after the Second World War as part of the Royal Marine Commandos is in part due to Operation Frankton by the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD).

Words of Lord Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations

Mountbatten's words are carved into a stone at the Royal Marine Commando base in Poole, Dorset, (the current headquarters of the SBS).

"Of the many brave and dashing raids carried out by the men of Combined Operations Command none was more courageous or imaginative than Operation Frankton".

Point of interest:

The reader may be interested to know that the author of this article personally met and knew both Blondie Hasler and Bill Sparks in the early 1980s.

Herbert George "Blondie" Hasler, DSO, OBE

Herbert George "Blondie" Hasler, DSO, OBE (27 February 1914 – 5 May 1987) served as an officer in the Royal Marines and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel.

He was recommended for the Victoria Cross, for Operation Frankton, however, he was not eligible as his actions were not "in the face of the enemy" as required for that decoration.

William, (Bill), Edward Sparks DSM

William, (Bill), Edward Sparks DSM (5 September 1922 – 1 December 2002) was a British Royal Marine Commando in the Second World War.

He volunteered for hazardous service as a way of avenging his brother Benny who had died on the cruiser HMS Naiad.

One of his three sons Terry Sparks, became a Captain in the Royal Marine Commandos

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in the kayak Crayfish were also recommended for the DSM which at the time could not be awarded posthumously, so instead were mentioned in dispatches.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement: The Agreement that Haunts the Modern Middle East

During the First World War, the Triple Entente was faced with the very real prospect of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Eager to secure their interests in the Middle East, the British and the French drew up the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the region in the case of victory against the Central Powers. Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never enacted, it set the framework for the Middle East’s current borders and the name Sykes-Picot has since become synonymous to many with an era of colonial misrule.

Holly Farrell explains.

Sir Mark Sykes.

Francois Georges-Picot.

During the First World War, the Triple Entente was faced with the very real prospect of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Eager to secure their interests in the Middle East, the British and the French drew up the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the region in the case of victory against the Central Powers. Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never enacted, it set the framework for the Middle East’s current borders and the name Sykes-Picot has since become synonymous to many with an era of colonial misrule.

Holly Farrell explains.

‘The Sick Man of Europe’: Why did the Allies anticipate the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire?

By the turn of the 20th century the Ottoman Empire, which controlled areas across North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, was struggling both economically and militaristically. The Ottomans became unable to maintain such an extensive bureaucracy and a vast decentralized political structure. Although reforms attempted to modernize the Empire, these measures were of short-lived success and contributed to a growing debt crisis in the late 19th century. The Ottoman Empire also lost many territories in the decades preceding the First World War. France gained control of Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, Italy took Libya in 1911, and Britain took control of Oman in 1861, the Arabian Gulf Chiefdoms in 1820, Kuwait in 1899, Egypt in 1882 and Sudan in 1899. In October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, hoping to confront Britain and France, and benefit from German aid.

Drawing up the Sykes-Picot Agreement

Negotiations between the Entente Powers of Britain, France, and Russia for the division of Ottoman territories began in November 1915. They were initially between Mark Sykes, a scholar and guard in the British military during the Boer War, and Francois Georges-Picot, a lawyer-turned-delegate for the French government. However, the eventual agreement was also up to the assent of Russia. All three powers aimed to secure territory, trade routes, and oil wealth, but also had their own ambitions for particular areas. Russia hoped to gain ports in the Dardanelles, including Constantinople, to access trade routes to the Black Sea. Britain wanted to control Palestine due to its proximity with the Suez Canal, and secure access to India through the Persian Gulf. France, meanwhile, was the largest investor in the Ottoman Empire and sought to maintain their influence in the region to protect their investments.

The Entente Powers had already given Constantinople and its surroundings areas to Russia as part of the Constantinople Agreement in March 1915. This crucially granted Russia access to the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot Agreement sought to coordinate Britain and France’s interests in the region. On May 16 1916 a deal was secretly signed between Sykes and Picot and approved by Russian foreign minister, Sergey Sazonov.

Under the terms of the agreement, France was allocated control of Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia, and Mosul, whilst Britain was allocated Baghdad and Basra and northern Palestine (this included the ports of Haifa and Acre, and modern-day Jordan). However, as shown on the map below, these territories were divided into spheres of control and those of ‘influence’. It was decided that Palestine would be put under international administration due to its holy sites. Independent states would be created in the remaining Arab territories.

Britain’s contradictory promises: Sykes-Picot, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, and the Balfour Declaration

Whilst Britain, France and Russia appeared to have settled their vision for the post-war Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was threatened by two additional contradictory agreements which Britain had made with the Arab nationalist and Zionist movements.

In July 1915, several months prior to the beginning of Sykes’ and Picot’s negotiations, Hussein bin Ali (Arab nationalist leader and Sharif of Mecca) wrote to Henry McMahon (the British High Commissioner in Egypt) to request British support for an independent Arab state. McMahon was initially reluctant to collaborate with Hussein, believing his territorial ambitions to be ‘extravagant’, however he was eventually persuaded to offer his support. When McMahon replied to Hussein, British and French troops were suffering defeats by Turkish forces in the Gallipoli campaign. McMahon believed that an Arab uprising would distract and weaken Ottoman forces in the region, enabling the Entente troops to make a tactical withdrawal. Consequently, Britain saw an advantage in working with Hussein. Over the course of ten letters between July 1915 and March 1916 (referred to as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence) Hussein and McMahon negotiated a plan of British support for an independent Arab state if the Arab nationalists launched a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. However, the British excluded three areas from the independent state as they claimed they were not ‘Arab enough’. This affected the provinces of Basra and Baghdad, the Turkish districts of Alexandretta and Merson, and the districts of Syria that lay west of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Merson. The nationalist uprising began in June 1916 and, although the Entente provided limited manpower, they provided officers, gold, and munitions to support the war against the Ottomans. However, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence lacked the formality of a treaty and its contradiction with Britain’s plans under Sykes-Picot ultimately made it an empty promise.

However, Britain’s conflicting plans for the Middle East did not end here. On November 2 1917 the British government issued an arrangement for Palestine in the Balfour Declaration. In a letter to prominent Zionist Lord Rothschild, the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour outlined Britain’s promise to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This support was later publicized. However, the question of why the British government issued this declaration has still gone unanswered. Whilst some historians have argued that many members of the British government had Zionist sympathies, others have suggested that antisemitism increased support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Alternatively, it has been argued that Britain was trying to gain the support of Jews across the world, particularly in the US, who the British hoped would take a more active role in the war. However, this declaration was a bitter betrayal for the Arabs.

Despite initially being kept secret, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was eventually publicized by the Bolsheviks in late November 1917 following the Russian Revolution. Leon Trotsky published the Sykes-Picot Agreement in Izvestia newspaper on November 24 1917 to expose the plans which Vladimir Lenin called ‘the agreement of the colonial thieves’. This caused a political scandal for Britain and France and created a strong mistrust between the Entente and Arab nationalists. The British assured their allies in the Middle East that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was merely discussion amongst the Entente powers and that they would stand by the Arab people.

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, Entente forces (mainly the British) occupied the former Ottoman territories. Whilst the original division of land planned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement did not materialize during peace negotiations, the borders of the newly created states were similar to those agreed upon in 1916. This was determined in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

Before signing the Treaty of Sèvres, the former Entente powers met at the Conference of San Remo in April 1920 to determine the division of the Ottoman Empire’s territories. Under article 22 of the newly created League of Nations, certain former colonies were classed as ‘mandates’ (ranging from A to C depending on perceived levels of development) if they were deemed unable to govern themselves independently. The former Ottoman territories became Class A mandates, meaning that they had ‘reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone’ (as stated in Article 22). As a result, the newly created states in the Middle East became British and French mandates rather than colonies.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres:

·       The Ottoman Empire was dismantled

·       Turkey had to relinquish claims to territories in North Africa and the Middle East

·       Greece gained Smyrna (now called İzmir), Adrianople (now called Edirne), most of the hinterland to Constantinople and the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles

·       Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine became British mandates

·       Lebanon and Syria became French mandates

·       Morocco and Tunisia became French protectorates

·       Hejaz became an independent kingdom (it would later unite with Najd and other districts in 1932 to form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

·       Armenian independence was recognized

·       The League of Nations controlled the Turkish straits

·       British, French, Italian and Greek troops occupied Turkey

·       The Turkish army could have a maximum of 50,700 men, it was forbidden to have an air force, and the navy could have a maximum of thirteen boats

·       The Allies were to control Turkish finances

The Treaty of Sèvres was resented in Turkey and popular discontent fueled an uprising against Sultan Mehmed VI. The new nationalist government under Kemal Atatürk drove the Greek and British troops out of Turkey and repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres. Consequently, the Allies agreed to renegotiate the settlement and signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Under the Treaty of Lausanne:

·       All the territories given to Greece were returned to Turkey

·       All foreign troops were ordered to leave Turkey

·       Turkey regained control of the Straits, but they had to remain demilitarized

·       Turkey was recognized as the successor to the Ottoman Empire

·       The Allies no longer imposed controls over Turkey’s finances or military

·       The Allies dropped demands for autonomy for Kurdistan and Turkish cession of territory to Armenia

The Legacies of Sykes-Picot and the post-WW1 settlement in the Middle East

Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never implemented, it set the framework for the modern-day frontiers of the Middle East. This has created a lasting resentment in the region, especially amongst Pan-Arabists who oppose the division of majority Arab-populated territories into separate states and associate Sykes-Picot with European colonial misrule. Sykes-Picot has since been targeted by various groups in the region, including by the so-called Islamic State who declared their intention to remove Sykes-Picot as they bulldozed the border between Iraq and Syria in 2014.

One of the most controversial aspects of the division of former Ottoman territories was the eventual fate of Palestine. As a British mandate, Britain called for the migration of Jews to Palestine, paving the way for region to be declared a Jewish state (known as Israel) once they ended their mandate in 1948. This led to the displacement of the Arab population and the ongoing conflict between Israeli and Palestinian groups.

The post-First World War settlement in the Middle East also lay the groundwork for sectarian conflict elsewhere in the region due to the limited regard for the ethnic, tribal, religious, or linguistic groups of the new states’ inhabitants. Although the British and French eventually withdrew from the region in the 1960s and 1970s, there has been hardly any change to national borders. Crucially, this has left the Kurdish population without a homeland as the Treaty of Lausanne failed to accommodate for Kurdish self-determination.

As sectarian conflict continues in the Middle East, the question remains as to whether the national borders created by the Treaty of Sèvres can survive into the future, or if all traces of Sykes-Picot need to be removed to ensure peace in the region.

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References:

Al Jazeera. ‘A Century on: Why Arabs Resent Sykes-Picot’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/sykes-picot-100-years-middle-east-map/index.html.

Al Tahhan, Zena . ‘More than a Century on: The Balfour Declaration Explained’. Al Jazeera, 2 November 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/11/2/more-than-a-century-on-the-balfour-declaration-explained.

Britannica. ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement ’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement.

Britannica. ‘Treaty of Lausanne’, 17 July 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923.

Britannica. ‘Why Was the Ottoman Empire Called “the Sick Man of Europe”? ’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-was-the-Ottoman-Empire-called-the-sick-man-of-Europe.

Kearey, Kat. International Relations and Global Conflict C1890-1941. Oxford AQA History Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Muir , Jim. ‘Sykes-Picot: The Map That Spawned a Century of Resentment’. BBC News, 16 May 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36300224.

Oxford Reference. ‘Sykes–Picot Agreement’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://doi.org/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100546581.

Oxford Reference. ‘Treaty of Sèvres’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://doi.org/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100457377.

Rabinovich, Itamar, Robbie Sabel, and Oded Eran. ‘A Century since the Sykes-Picot Agreement: Current Challenges’. Institute for National Security Studies, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08741.

The Avalon Project. ‘The Sykes-Picot Agreement : 1916’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp.

The Economist. ‘Unintended Consequences’, 12 May 2016. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/05/12/unintended-consequences.

‘The Treaty of Sevres’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://historylearning.com/modern-world-history/treaty-of-sevres/.

United Nations Digital Library. ‘Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/829695.

Young, George. ‘Deceit in the Desert: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire’. Hohonu 17 (2019): 37–40. https://hilo.hawaii.edu/campuscenter/hohonu/volumes/documents/DeceitintheDesertThePartitionoftheOttomanEmpire.pdf.

The 1941 Battle of Cape Matapan Between Britain and Italy

The Battle of Cape Matapan, fought between March 27 and  March 29, 1941, was a pivotal naval engagement during the Second World War. Taking place off the southern coast of Greece, it marked a significant victory for the British Royal Navy against the Italian Regia Marina.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Italian Battleship Vittorio Veneto firing her guns in March 1941.

As the Second World War intensified, the Mediterranean became a critical theatre of operations for both the Axis and Allied powers. Control of the sea lanes in this region was vital for the supply lines of the British Empire and the Axis powers, particularly for Italy, which sought to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and secure its holdings in North Africa.

By early 1941, the Italian Navy had suffered several setbacks, including the British raid on Taranto in November 1940, where the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm crippled the Italian battleships Littorio, Conte di Cavour, and Caio Duilio. Despite this, the Regia Marina remained a formidable force, with superior numbers of surface ships compared to the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet.

The immediate catalyst for the Battle of Cape Matapan was the Italian desire to assert control over the eastern Mediterranean and support their forces in North Africa. Admiral Angelo Iachino, commander of the Regia Marina, was tasked with leading a significant operation to intercept British convoys bound for Greece and Crete. Unknown to the Italians, however, the British had a critical advantage: the ability to decode Italian naval communications, thanks to the work of the Bletchley Park codebreakers.

The breaking of codes by British cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park was one of the war's greatest intelligence coups. By early 1941, the British had made significant progress in deciphering German and Italian military communications. This capability allowed them to anticipate Axis movements and prepare accordingly.

In the case of Cape Matapan, Bletchley Park had intercepted and decrypted Italian naval signals, revealing the details of Admiral Iachino's planned operation. This intelligence was swiftly passed on to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the commander of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet.

With this foreknowledge, Cunningham was able to plan a decisive counteraction. Cunningham, a seasoned and aggressive naval commander, quickly assembled a task force to intercept the Italians. His fleet included the battleships HMS Warspite, HMS Valiant, and HMS Barham, the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable, 7 light cruisers, and 17 destroyers. The stage was set for a confrontation that would decisively alter the naval balance in the Mediterranean.

On the 27th of March, 1941, Admiral Iachino set sail with a force that included the battleship Vittorio Veneto, 6 heavy and 2 light cruisers, in addition to, 13 destroyers. His objective was to intercept a supposed British convoy; however, the real target was an opportunity presented by the British Fleet, which had left its base in Alexandria, Egypt.

As the two fleets approached, the British launched air strikes from HMS Formidable. These attacks, though initially unsuccessful inflicted significant damage, forcing the Italians to alter their course and delay their advance. A subsequent air strike on the 28th of March scored a crucial hit on Vittorio Veneto, damaging her propellers and reducing her speed. This allowed Cunningham to close the distance.

The critical phase of the battle occurred on the night of March 28th - 29th. The Royal Navy had honed its night-fighting skills, a domain in which the Italian Navy was significantly less experienced. Using radar technology, which the Italians lacked, Cunningham's forces were able to locate and engage the Italian ships with deadly precision.

The Italian cruisers Zara, Fiume, and Pola, along with several destroyers, found themselves caught in a deadly rain of fire from the British battleships. In a matter of minutes, the British guns tore the Italian ships apart. The Pola, which had been immobilized by an earlier air strike, became an easy target and was finished off at close range. The Zara and Fiume were similarly destroyed, along with two destroyers, Alfieri and Carducci.

Admiral Iachino, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, ordered his remaining ships to retreat. The battle was a devastating defeat for the Regia Marina, with 3 heavy cruisers, and 2 destroyers sunk, in addition to, 1 Battleship and 1 destroyer damaged with over 2,300 Italian sailors killed and 1015 captured. The British, by contrast, suffered minimal losses, 3 killed, 1 aircraft lost and slight damage to 4 light cruisers.

Key Figures

Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham

On the British side, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was the mastermind behind the victory. His aggressive tactics and willingness to engage the enemy directly, combined with the advantage of intelligence from Bletchley Park, proved decisive. Cunningham's leadership during the battle further solidified his reputation as one of the Royal Navy's most effective commanders.

Admiral Angelo Iachino

Admiral Angelo Iachino, the Italian commander, found himself outmatched despite his competent leadership and the strength of his fleet. The lack of radar and the element of surprise lost due to the deciphering of codes left him in an untenable position. His decision to withdraw the surviving ships likely prevented an even greater disaster, but the loss of so many vessels and men was a severe blow to the Regia Marina.

The Battle of Cape Matapan was a turning point in the naval war in the Mediterranean. The defeat severely weakened the Italian Navy's ability to challenge British control of the Mediterranean sea lanes. The loss of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, combined with the psychological impact of the defeat, meant that the Regia Marina would be hesitant to engage the Royal Navy in large-scale fleet actions for the remainder of the war.

For the British, the victory at Cape Matapan bolstered morale and reaffirmed the effectiveness of their naval tactics, particularly night-fighting and the use of radar. It also demonstrated the value of intelligence in modern warfare, with the success of the codebreakers playing a crucial role in the outcome.

In the broader context of the war, the battle helped to secure the eastern Mediterranean for the Allies, ensuring the continued flow of supplies to Malta and North Africa. It also contributed to the eventual defeat of Axis forces in the region, as control of the sea allowed the Allies to launch and support offensives in North Africa, later the landing in Sicily and mainland Italy which led to the eventual expulsion of Axis forces from continental occupation.

Legacy of the Battle

The Battle of Cape Matapan is remembered as one of the numerous important Royal Navy victories of the Second World War. It showcased the importance of technological superiority, intelligence, and leadership in naval warfare. For the Italians, it was a bitter lesson in the dangers of underestimating the enemy and the necessity of modernizing naval capabilities.

In the years following the battle, the lessons learned at Cape Matapan would influence naval tactics and strategy. The importance of radar, training ships' companies in the techniques of night-fighting, and the integration of air power into naval operations became increasingly evident, shaping the future of naval warfare.

The defeat also had political ramifications in Italy, contributing to growing dissatisfaction with the war effort and the leadership of Benito Mussolini. The loss at Cape Matapan, combined with other military failures, eroded the confidence of the Italian people and military in their leadership, setting the stage for Italy's eventual capitulation in 1943.

In conclusion, the Battle of Cape Matapan was more than just a clash of fleets; it was a confrontation between two different approaches to naval warfare. The British, with their emphasis on intelligence, technology, and aggressive tactics, emerged victorious against the Italian fleet. The battle's outcome had far-reaching consequences, shaping the course of the war in the Mediterranean and reinforcing the importance of naval power in modern warfare, in particular the use of aircraft.

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Points of interest:

Italian Admiral Iachino wrote that:-

"The battle had the consequence of limiting for some time our operational activities, not for the serious moral effect of the losses, as the British believed, but because the operation revealed our inferiority in effective aero-naval cooperation and the backwardness of our night battle technology".

Admiral Cunningham

Admiral Cunningham retired as Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Browne Cunningham, 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, KT, GCB, OM, DSO & Two Bars.

Admiral, (at the time of the battle), Cunningham was so grateful for the code breaker's work in respect to his naval victory that a few weeks after the battle he dropped into Bletchley Park to congratulate the team of ladies responsible for providing him with the insightful intelligence that enabled him to execute such a one-sided victory.

World War 2 in North Africa - The Long Range Desert Group

The Second World War brought about a new dimension of warfare that saw the utilization of vast and often unforgiving terrains as strategic battlegrounds. Among the most inhospitable of these were the deserts of North Africa. The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), a special operations unit of the British Army, was formed in response to the challenges posed by desert warfare. Established in July 1940, the LRDG was tasked with conducting deep reconnaissance, sabotage, and raids behind enemy lines but reconnaissance was its primary mission.

Terry Bailey explains.

A Long Range Desert Group vehicle in the desert in March 1941.

Concept and founding of the LRDG

The concept of the LRDG was born out of necessity. In 1940, the British Army faced the daunting task of navigating and fighting in the North African desert, a vast and largely unmapped region that stretched across thousands of square miles. Conventional military tactics were rendered ineffective in this environment due to the hostile terrain and extreme temperatures, in addition to, the lack of water, which all presented significant challenges. The British recognized the need for a specialized unit capable of operating in such conditions.

The idea for the LRDG was proposed by Major Ralph Alger Bagnold, OBE, FRS, a British Army officer of the Royal Engineers who had extensive experience in desert exploration. Before the war, Bagnold had spent years studying and surveying large parts of the North African deserts, leading expeditions, and developing techniques for traversing and navigating the desert, moreover, the techniques needed to extract vehicles.

His geographic knowledge of the region, coupled with his understanding of the challenges posed by the desert, made him the ideal candidate to lead the new unit. In June 1940, Bagnold was permitted to form the LRDG. The unit was initially composed of volunteers from commonwealth countries, such as New Zealand, African commonwealth countries and Australia, individuals were chosen for their physical fitness, resourcefulness, self-reliance and ability to endure the harsh conditions of the desert. The LRDG was structured into small, highly mobile patrols, each equipped with modified vehicles capable of carrying large quantities of fuel, water, and supplies.

Training and Equipment

The training of the LRDG was rigorous and focused on survival, navigation, and combat in the desert. Bagnold emphasized the importance of self-reliance, as the patrols would often operate hundreds of miles from the nearest friendly forces. The men were trained in desert navigation using the Sun and stars, in addition to, the maintenance and repair of their vehicles under extreme conditions.

The vehicles used by the LRDG were a critical component of their success. Initially, the unit relied on Chevrolet trucks, which were modified and would carry extra fuel and water, as well as weapons and supplies. The trucks were stripped of unnecessary weight to improve their performance in the sand, and equipped with wide tires to reduce the risk of bogging down. The LRDG also used the iconic Willys Jeep, which proved to be highly effective in the desert environment.

The vehicles of the LRDG were armed with a variety of weapons, including an assortment of machine guns, including the Bren gun, in addition to, the Boys anti-tank rifles. It is worth noting that captured weapons were often utilized by the LRDG, especially the much sought-after Italian Breda 37 or the German MG34 and later the MG42. The personal weapons of patrol members included the Sten submachine guns, Lee-Enfield rifle and later the Thompson submachine gun. Patrols were heavily armed to defend themselves if necessary, but their primary focus as indicated was on reconnaissance, therefore, avoiding direct engagements with the enemy was key to success.

Operational Deployment

The LRDG's first operational deployment took place in September 1940, shortly after the unit's formation. Their initial mission was to gather intelligence on Italian forces in the Libyan Desert. The LRDG's patrols successfully penetrated deep into enemy territory, providing valuable intelligence to the British Army. This intelligence was crucial in planning the early stages of the Western Desert Campaign. The German and Italian forces were nervous about the open desert, allowing the LRDG to penetrate deep into the Axis power's flank often unmolested offering advantageous intelligence-gathering opportunities.

As the war progressed, the LRDG's role expanded. The unit conducted a wide range of missions, including assisting in sabotage, raids on enemy supply lines, and the destruction of airfields and communications infrastructure alongside the SAS and other units. The LRDG's ability to operate virtually undetected in the desert allowed them to carry out these missions with minimal interference from the enemy, however, aircraft were always a concern. Their deep reconnaissance operations were instrumental in gathering information on enemy movements, which was used to plan large-scale offensives.

One of the LRDG's most notable operations was the raid on the Italian airfield at Kufra in early 1941. The LRDG, in collaboration with Free French forces, launched a surprise attack on the airfield, destroying several aircraft and disrupting the Italian supply lines. The success of this operation demonstrated the effectiveness of the LRDG's tactics and their ability to strike deep behind enemy lines.

Close association with L Detachment, SAS, (eventually becoming the SAS regiment)

The LRDG's expertise in desert warfare soon caught the attention of other special forces units, including the newly formed L Detachment, Special Air Service (SAS). The SAS, founded by David Stirling in 1941, was a unit dedicated to carrying out raids and sabotage operations behind enemy lines. The harsh conditions of the North African desert made it an ideal testing ground for the unconventional tactics of the SAS. Recognizing the LRDG's unparalleled knowledge of the desert, Stirling sought their assistance.

The LRDG provided the SAS with vital instruction in desert navigation, survival, and vehicle maintenance. In many ways, the LRDG served as the operational mentor for the fledgling SAS, helping to shape their desert tactics to match Stirling's vision and approach to warfare.

The partnership between the LRDG and SAS soon evolved into joint operations. The LRDG's reconnaissance capabilities and knowledge of the terrain complemented the SAS's focus on direct action and sabotage.

One of the most famous joint operations took place in December 1941, when the LRDG transported a SAS detachment to raid the German airfield at Sirte. The raid destroyed several German aircraft and marked the beginning of a series of successful collaborations between the two units. The LRDG also played a critical role in supporting the SAS during Operation Crusader in November 1941. As part of the British Eighth Army's offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk, the LRDG assisted the SAS in conducting a series of coordinated raids on enemy airfields and supply lines. These raids disrupted the Axis forces' ability to reinforce their front lines and contributed to the eventual success of the operation.

Evolution and later operations

As the war in North Africa continued, the LRDG adapted to the changing circumstances. The unit's patrols became more specialized, with each patrol focusing on specific types of operations, such as deep reconnaissance, or assistance with sabotage and direct action. The LRDG also began to incorporate elements of psychological warfare, using deception and misinformation to confuse the enemy. These deception operations were coordinated and led from Cairo by A Force under Brigadier Dudley Clarke.

In 1942, the LRDG was involved in one of the most daring operations of the war— a multifaceted large-scale operation. Working in conjunction with the SAS, SIG and the Royal Navy, and other components the LRDG conducted a series of raids on the port's defenses, paving the way for a larger assault by Allied forces. The operation, codenamed "Operation Agreement," was ultimately unsuccessful.

Working as part of the larger force undermined the efforts of the LRDG and SAS, simply because large-scale operations were not part of the modus operandi of these units, thus ignoring the concept of small-unit operations and the requirement for stealth.

The LRDG continued to play a vital role in the North African campaign until the Axis forces were defeated in 1943. Following the end of the campaign, the LRDG was redeployed to other theatres of war, including the Aegean and the Balkans. In these regions, the LRDG initially operated as traditional infantry.

However, in December 1943, the LRDG was re-organized into two squadrons of eight patrols. Patrols were then parachuted north of Rome to obtain information about German troop movements and also carry out raids.

In August 1944, two patrols parachuted into Yugoslavia. One patrol destroyed two 40-foot (12 m) spans of a large railway bridge, which caused widespread disruption to the movement of German troops and supplies.

In September 1944 a team were parachuted into Albania, their mission was to follow the German retreat and assist Albanian resistance groups in attacking them.

In October 1944, two patrols were parachuted into the Florina area of Greece. Here they mined a road used by the retreating Germans, destroying three vehicles and blocking the road. Firing on the stranded convoy from an adjacent hillside, they directed RAF aircraft in to destroy the rest of the convoy.

The Long Range Desert Group's contribution to the Allied war effort in North Africa and other theatres cannot be overstated. Their pioneering tactics in desert warfare, combined with their close collaboration with the SAS, set the standard for special operations units in the years to come. The LRDG's emphasis on self-reliance, mobility, and deep reconnaissance became the hallmark of modern special forces operations.

The LRDG's legacy is also evident in the continued importance of desert warfare training for modern military units. The techniques and strategies developed by the LRDG during the Second World War are still studied and applied by special forces units around the world. The unit's ability to operate in extreme conditions, far from conventional supply lines, remains a key element of special operations doctrine.

Moreover, the LRDG's association with the SAS forged in the Second World War provided a lasting legacy. The SAS, which would go on to become one of the World's elite special forces units, owed much of its early success to the guidance and support provided by the LRDG. This partnership laid the foundation for the development of modern special operations tactics, which continue to evolve and adapt to new challenges.

In conclusion, the Long Range Desert Group was more than just a reconnaissance unit; it was a pioneering force in the development of special operations warfare. From its formation in 1940, the LRDG demonstrated that small, highly mobile units could achieve strategic objectives far behind enemy lines, even in the most inhospitable environments. Their collaboration with the SAS not only enhanced the effectiveness of both units but also set a precedent for future special forces operations.

Reflecting on the LRDG's contributions to the Second World War, it is clear that their legacy extends far beyond the sands of the North African desert. The principles of adaptability, self-reliance, and innovation that defined the LRDG continue to inspire military units around the world. In many ways, the LRDG was a precursor to modern special forces units that play such a critical role in today's conflicts, proving that even in the harshest of environments, a determined and well-prepared force can achieve remarkable success.

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Notes:

Numerous small specialist units existed in the British forces throughout the Second World War. The LRDG and SAS were just two such units. The collective knowledge and experience of all these small specialist units laid the foundation for not only Britain's Special Forces of today but the World. Although each country trains and operates their special forces slightly differently from one another the foundation and concept of all special forces around the world can be traced back to the numerous individual units formed in the early years of the Second World War including the LRDG.

The Special Forces units formed by the USA in the Second World War worked very closely with the British Special Forces units in the latter years of the war, a practice that continues to this day.

In Great Britain today 4 special forces units and 1 special forces support unit operate:

SAS

The Special Air Service, (SAS), an independent unit of the British Army

SBS

The Special Boat Service, (SBS), is a specialization of the Royal Marine Commandos operating under the Admiralty as an independent unit.

MAWC

The Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre, (MAWC), is a specialization of the Royal Marine Commandos operating under Admiralty control.

SRR

The Special Reconnaissance Regiment, (SRR), is a unit dedicated to reconnaissance within the British Forces. It was formed to relieve the SAS and the SBS of that role.

SFSG

The Special Forces Support Group, (SFSG) consists of elite troops operating in Special forces environments alongside other special forces units.

The SFSG's primary role is to support Special Forces operations. It was formed as a Tri-service group, composed of a detachment of Royal Marine Commandos, the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Air Force Regiment.

Point of interest:

Otto Johann Anton Skorzeny a German SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel), in the Waffen-SS known for the Gran Sasso raid, 12th September 1943, studied British Special Forces' tactics and operations intending to develop similar German units.

The History and Evolution of Airships

Airships, also known as dirigibles, have fascinated humanity for centuries, representing a unique intersection of science, engineering, and exploration. The journey of airships, from their humble beginnings as lighter-than-air balloons to the sophisticated designs of today, is a tale of innovation, ambition, and tragedy.

Terry Bailey explains.

The 1937 Hindenburg Disaster.

The birth of lighter-than-air flight

The concept of lighter-than-air flight can be traced back to ancient times, however, with the musings in the Renaissance period by visionaries such as Leonardo da Vinci, we see the drawings and plans of these concepts.

However, the practical realization of this idea began in the 18th century. In 1783, when the Montgolfier brothers, (Joseph and Stephen Montgolfier), and Jacques-Étienne, launched the first successful manned hot air balloon with Francois Pilatrê de Rozier and Francois Laurent, Marquis of Arlanders onboard.

They stood on a circular platform attached to the bottom of the balloon. They hand-fed the fire through openings on either side of the balloon's skirt. The balloon reached an altitude of at least 500 feet and travelled about 5½ miles, (just over 8 kilometers), before landing safely 25 minutes later.

The balloon was made of paper and silk and filled with hot air, providing a historic flight that marked the dawn of lighter-than-air aviation.

Just ten days after the first hot air balloon ride, the first gas balloon was launched by physicists Jacques Alexander Charles and Nicholas Louis Robert. This flight started in Paris, France. The flight lasted 2½ hours and covered a distance of 25 miles, ((approximately 40 KMs). The gas used in the balloon was hydrogen, the lightest element known. The ability to produce gas from hydrogen was developed by an Englishman, Henry Cavendish in 1776, by using a combination of sulphuric acid and iron filings. This achievement opened the door to further experimentation with lighter-than-air flight, laying the groundwork for the development of airships.

The evolution of airships, from balloons to dirigibles

While balloons demonstrated the feasibility of lighter-than-air flight, they were limited by their inability to be steered. This limitation led to the development of the first airships, which could be navigated through the air using engines and rudders. The evolution of airships can be divided into three main categories: non-rigid, semi-rigid, and rigid airships.

Non-rigid airships, early dirigibles

Non-rigid airships, often referred to as blimps, were the first type of dirigible to be developed. These airships relied on a gas envelope to maintain their shape and used internal air-filled bags, or ballonets, to control buoyancy and pressure. The absence of a rigid internal structure made these airships lighter and more maneuverable, but they were also more susceptible to damage.

One of the earliest successful non-rigid airships was designed by French engineer Henri Giffard. In 1852, Giffard built a 144-foot-long airship powered by a 3-horsepower steam engine. His airship could reach speeds of up to 5 Mph, (8 Kph), and demonstrated the potential for controlled flight. Giffard's design laid the foundation for future developments in airship technology.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, non-rigid airships saw significant advancements. The German engineer Ferdinand von Zeppelin, who is often considered the father of the modern airship, experimented with various designs before focusing on rigid airships. However, non-rigid airships continued to be developed and used for various purposes, including military reconnaissance and passenger transport.

Semi-rigid airships, the transitional phase

Semi-rigid airships represented a transitional phase between non-rigid and rigid designs. These airships combined a gas envelope with a partial internal framework, usually made of metal, which provided additional structural support. This design allowed for larger airships with greater lifting capacity and improved durability.

One of the most notable semi-rigid airships was the Italian-built "Norge," which was used by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen in his 1926 expedition to the North Pole. The Norge's successful flight over the Arctic demonstrated the capabilities of semi-rigid airships and marked a significant achievement in polar exploration.

Rigid airships, the zenith of airship design

Rigid airships, often referred to as Zeppelins after their most famous proponent, represented the pinnacle of airship design in the early 20th century. Unlike non-rigid and semi-rigid airships, rigid airships had a sturdy internal framework made of metal, typically aluminium or duralumin, which supported the gas-filled cells inside. This design allowed for the construction of larger and more robust airships capable of carrying significant payloads over long distances.

The first successful rigid airship was the LZ 1, designed by Ferdinand von Zeppelin and launched in 1900. The LZ 1 was 420 feet long and powered by two Daimler engines. Although its initial flights were not entirely successful, Zeppelin continued to refine its designs, leading to the development of the LZ 3 and LZ 4, which demonstrated the practicality and potential of rigid airships.

Airships in warfare, the First World War

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 marked a turning point in flight including the use of airships. The German military quickly recognized the potential of airships for reconnaissance, bombing, and propaganda purposes. The rigid Zeppelins, with their ability to fly at high altitudes and cover long distances, became a formidable tool in Germany's arsenal.

German Zeppelins conducted numerous bombing raids over Britain, targeting cities such as London and Edinburgh. These raids, while not strategically decisive, had a significant psychological impact on the civilian population and demonstrated the vulnerabilities of traditional defenses against aerial attacks.

However, the use of airships in warfare was not without its challenges. Zeppelins were slow and vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, in addition to, heavier-than-air machines, (fighter planes), which were quickly developing on a separate path. The British developed various countermeasures, including incendiary bullets, which could ignite the hydrogen gas used in Zeppelins, leading to catastrophic explosions. As a result, many German airships were lost during the war, and the effectiveness of airships as a military tool was called into question.

Despite these challenges, the war spurred further advancements in airship technology. Engineers experimented with new materials, propulsion systems, and designs to improve the performance and survivability of airships. Needless to say, by the end of the war, the airplane had emerged as the dominant military force in aviation, relegating airships to a secondary role.

Key designers and pioneers

The development of airships was driven by the ingenuity and determination of several key designers from different countries. These pioneers pushed the boundaries of what was possible and laid the groundwork for the modern era of aviation.

Ferdinand von Zeppelin (Germany)

Ferdinand von Zeppelin is perhaps the most famous name in the history of airships. A former German military officer, Zeppelin was inspired by the possibilities of lighter-than-air flight after observing the use of balloons during the American Civil War. He devoted much of his life to developing rigid airships, founding the Zeppelin Company in 1908. Zeppelin's designs, particularly the LZ series, became synonymous with airships and played a crucial role in the First World War.

Alberto Santos-Dumont (Brazil)

Alberto Santos-Dumont, a Brazilian-born aviation pioneer, made significant contributions to the development of non-rigid airships. In the early 1900s, Santos-Dumont designed and flew a series of small, maneuverable airships, including the famous "No. 6," which won the Deutsch de la Meurthe prize for successfully flying from the Parc Saint Cloud to the Eiffel Tower and back. His achievements helped popularize aviation in Europe and inspired future generations of aeronautical engineers.

Barnes Wallis (Great Britain)

Sir Barnes Neville Wallis, CBE, FRS, RDI, FRAeS, an English engineer and inventor, is best known for his work in the Second World War on his geodesic aircraft frame and specialist ordinance, (Bouncing bomb of the Dam Buster raid fame). However, it was his earlier work on the R100 airship, a British rigid airship developed in the 1920s, by the commercial company Vickers, utilizing a geodesic airframe which later was the inspiration for the Second World War Wellington bomber.

Wallis' innovative design incorporated the first practical geodesic framework providing increased strength and reduced weight. Although the R100 was successful in its transatlantic flights, the whole airship programme was overshadowed by the crash of the R101 designed and built by the Air Ministry, a design of different specifications. The disaster led to the abandonment of Britain's airship program.

Airship Disasters, triumph and tragedy

The history of airships is punctuated by several high-profile disasters that underscored the inherent risks of lighter-than-air flight. These tragedies had a profound impact on public perception and the future of airship development.

The R101 Tragedy (1930)

The R101 departed from Cardington on the evening of the 4th of October, 1930, and crashed in the early hours of October 5th, 1930. As indicated the R101 was one of two large rigid airships developed by the British government as part of a plan to establish a global airship network. However, the R101 was plagued by design flaws and structural issues, due to the different construction concepts, that were used on the R100. During its maiden long-distance voyage to India, the airship encountered bad weather over France and several gasbags ruptured leading to a loss of lift. The R101 crash-landed safely at the edge of a wood outside Allonne, 4Km, (2.5Miles), southeast of Beauvais, however, within seconds of a successful emergency crash landing, it burst into flames and instantly incinerated 48 of the 54 people on board.

The R101 disaster had a profound impact on Britain's airship program, leading to the cancellation of airship development in favor of heavier-than-air aircraft. The tragedy underscored the inherent risks and technical challenges associated with rigid airships, particularly in adverse weather conditions.

In the aftermath of the R101 disaster, public confidence in airships waned, and the British government redirected its focus and resources toward the development of airplanes. This shift marked the end of Britain's ambitious plans for a global airship network and contributed to the decline of airship travel as a viable means of long-distance transportation. The R101 crash remains a poignant reminder of the limitations of early aviation technology and the high cost of pioneering new forms of air travel.

The Hindenburg Disaster (1937)

The most infamous airship disaster occurred on the 6th of May, 1937, when the German airship LZ 129 Hindenburg caught fire and crashed while attempting to land at Naval Air Station Lakehurst in New Jersey. The Hindenburg, the largest airship ever built, was a symbol of German engineering prowess and luxury travel.

However, the use of highly flammable hydrogen gas and thermite paint combined with a series of unfortunate events, led to a catastrophic fire that claimed the lives of 36 people.

The Hindenburg disaster was widely covered by the media, with dramatic photographs and radio broadcasts capturing the event in real-time. The disaster shocked the world and effectively marked the end of the era of passenger-carrying airships.

Points of interest:

Even though the early years of airships were tenuous and fraught with issues, airships are now making a resurgence today. However, with advancements in technology airships of today are far safer than airships of the 1920s and 1930s. The modern use of airships takes advantage of their unique ability to hover in place, their long endurance, and their ability to carry heavy loads with minimal infrastructure requirements.

Some modern airship deployments

Border security

Some countries' border services utilize airships for border surveillance due to their ability to loiter over a specific area for extended periods. They can be equipped with high-resolution cameras, radar, and other sensors to monitor large areas continuously.

Environmental services

Whereas, environmental services find the same qualities useful and deploy airships to monitor environmental changes, such as deforestation, wildlife movements, and ocean conditions. Their ability to fly at low speeds and altitudes makes them ideal for detailed observation over time.

Advertising

The world of advertising utilize blimps at large events, such as sports games or festivals, where they are used to display advertisements. Their large surface area and slow movement make them highly visible and effective for marketing purposes.

Aerial filming platforms

Needless to say, the use of airships for aerial filming to capture footage is very popular, especially in scenarios where a stable platform is needed for extended periods. They are often preferred over helicopters for this purpose due to their quieter operation and ability to stay airborne longer.

Specialist lift platforms

Airships provide the perfect platform for heavy lift operations with specialist airships designed to transport heavy cargo to remote or difficult-to-access areas. They can carry loads that are too large or heavy for small conventional aircraft where landing facilities are difficult to access.

Humanitarian missions

These same qualities also make airships suitable for humanitarian aid, having the ability to deliver humanitarian aid to disaster-stricken regions, particularly where infrastructure is damaged or non-existent. Their ability to land almost anywhere and carry significant payloads makes them valuable in these scenarios.

Tourism

Furthermore, modern airships are very suitable as tourist platforms for aerial sightseeing that offer a unique and scenic way to experience landscapes, particularly over cities, natural wonders, or historical sites. These tours are popular in regions where the landscape is particularly striking, and the slow, low-altitude flight provides a different perspective compared to airplanes or helicopters.

Scientific research and space exploration

The resurgence of airships also provides stable structures for scientific work such as atmospheric studies and weather patterns. Their ability to hover and move slowly through different atmospheric layers allows scientists to gather detailed data.

Moreover, the use of airships is undergoing serious consideration for future space-related missions with ongoing research into the potential usage of airships as platforms for space observatories or as launch platforms for small satellites. Their stability and high-altitude capabilities make them suitable for such experiments.

Military

In today's world, some countries are going back to airships for specialist military applications, such as reconnaissance missions, taking advantage of their endurance and ability to stay aloft for extended periods. They can carry surveillance equipment, communication relays, and even unmanned systems.

The use of airships not only offers the military but also commercial communication service providers communication platforms, providing coverage in areas where traditional infrastructure is lacking or has been destroyed.

Urban transportation

Furthermore, airships can play a crucial role in urban transportation mobility. Numerous transportation organizations and think tanks are exploring the use of airships for urban mobility, particularly in congested cities. These concepts are still in development but represent a potential future application of airship technology.

Green logistics

Finally, airships offer a Green logistical option as an eco-friendly transportation system, simply because airship platforms consume less fuel than conventional aircraft, especially over long distances, making airships very attractive for green logistics solutions in the future.

Modern airships benefit from advancements in materials, avionics, and propulsion systems, making modern designs safer, more efficient, and much more versatile than the early 1920s and 1930s predecessors. While they may not be as prominent as they were during their golden age, airships continue to serve important and diverse roles in various sectors and assuredly will become far more prominent in the future.

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4 Reasons Why The Man in the High Castle Was a TV Program - and Not Reality

‘The Man in the High Castle’ was an American television series created for a “parallel universe” where Nazi Germany, and the Empire of Japan, respectively, would rule the world after winning World War II. The series was nominated for over two dozen awards, winning three of them. The author of this piece, Ken Buller, has just finished watching the entire series. I guess it’s always better to be late, then to never have watched it. 

Vyacheslav Molotov (left) and Joachim von Ribbentrop (right) at the signing of the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

As I was binge watching the series, I couldn’t help but pull out every history book, paper, and lesson I had gone through in school to really dive into what were some of the fatal mistakes that the Axis (particularly Nazi Germany) had made to make it a fictional series, and thankfully, not a reality. The list could probably go on forever, but here’s a list of four of the most important reasons for what I think cost the Nazis and Japanese their empires. 

Strategic Blunders

1. The brain drain. With Hitler’s twisted and demonic ideology, he either drove away or killed millions of high IQ, highly skilled entrepreneurs, manufacturers, scientists, engineers, physicians, financers, etc. I think the quote “Our Germans were better than their Germans,” from the film ‘The Right Stuff’ sums up the incalculable waste of talent he could’ve used. 

2. Declaring War on The United States of America. On December 11, 1941, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States due to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor four days earlier. However, according to the terms of their agreements, Germany was obliged to come to the aid of Japan if a third country attacked Japan, but not if Japan attacked a third country. I think if Germany declared war on America, they had a great opportunity through the Kreigsmarine’s U-boat fleet to knock all of his enemies in Europe out, but particularly Great Britain.

3. The Invasion of the Soviet Union. Well, if any of you know about Napoleon, enough said, but that won’t fly with my Editor. Through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Nazis had such an advantage that only a maniac could, and eventually, would ruin it. With their allies in the Balkans, Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, they could have acquired the natural resources and material wealth that they desperately needed in order to maintain their dominance for years to come.

4. Failure to Work with Japan. It seems that throughout the war, Germany and Japan didn’t really work at all and they were more “frenemies” than actual allies. Throughout the war they had some joint operations, but I think they failed to operate on a grand scale. In my previous point, the German forces that were ultimately used on the Eastern Front, could have been used in North Africa, and the Middle East, who could eventually link up with Japanese Forces in India or Central Asia that were pushing in from China and Burma.

In conclusion, I think Adolf Hitler was obviously an evil monster, and because of his horrible ideology, it got in the way of making the right strategic moves at all the right times. I think even if he didn't commit half of the mistakes listed, the war would've gone on for years, and parts of "The Man in The High Castle" we could be living out right now.

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Falklands War: What Happened During the Battle of Goose Green?

The Battle of Goose Green stands as one of the most dramatic and significant engagements of the 1982 Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina. This confrontation saw the British Parachute Regiment overcoming a numerically superior Argentine force to capture a strategically vital airfield.

Terry Bailey explains.

What is left of the 1982 Argentinian defensive positions on Darwin Ridge, Darwin, Falkland Islands. Source: Farawayman, available here.

Introduction

In April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a British overseas territory, triggering a military response from Great Britain. The British government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was under immense political pressure to reclaim the islands swiftly. The international community, particularly the United States, closely watched Britain's military response. These international overseers added to the urgency of a decisive victory, simply because the international community were pressing for a negotiated settlement. A British task force was en route within 3 days of the Argentine invasion.

It is worth noting that Argentina and Great Britain had spent numerous years talking about the Falkland Islands' future long before the Argentine invasion, including a potential dual sovereignty proposal.

However, now that Argentina had invaded and a British task force had set sail, it looked like war was inevitable. The British forces landed on the Falklands and began their advance. Goose Green, a settlement on East Falkland, became a focal point. The Argentine forces had fortified the area in depth, including the nearby airfield, which was crucial for controlling air operations in the region. Military and political leaders in London and the field recognized that capturing Goose Green would deliver a significant blow to Argentine morale and strengthen the British position.

Brigadier Julian Thompson, the immediate commander of the British land forces, faced considerable pressure from the British government to produce quick results. Although some military advisors suggested bypassing Goose Green to avoid heavy casualties, the political imperative for a visible and symbolic victory prevailed. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 PARA), under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert "H" Jones, was tasked with the audacious assault.

Strategic Overview

The overall strategy for the British forces involved a multi-pronged advance to recapture key positions on the Falklands. Goose Green, located on a narrow isthmus on East Falkland, was defended by a strong Argentine force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ítalo Piaggi, numbering over 1,200 men and were well-entrenched with machine guns, mortars, and artillery support.

In contrast, 2 PARA comprised approximately 600 soldiers, half the strength of the Argentine defenders. Despite this disparity, the British strategy hinged on surprise, speed, and superior training, in addition to the skill of their troops. The plan involved a night march of approximately 21 kilometers to position the battalion for a dawn assault, to use the element of surprise to disorient the defenders and secure key objectives swiftly. However, the media had managed to transmit the story before the assault occurred, thereby, the element of surprise was lost and Argentine forces were substantially reinforced and ready for the assault.

Under cover of darkness on the 27th of May, 2 PARA advanced towards the settlement, navigating difficult terrain and maintaining strict noise discipline aimed at avoiding detection. The plan was to launch a coordinated attack at first light, striking the surrounding Argentine positions with overwhelming force.

The battalion's companies were each assigned specific objectives. 2 Para were unaware that the Argentine forces were expecting an assault and had reinforced the whole Goose Green area.

A Company, under the command of Major Dair Farrar-Hockley, were to take Burntside House as their first objective, B Company, under the command of Major John Crossland, followed in the next phase of the attack and was to secure Burntside Hill and then continue to Boca Hill.

Where A Company had advanced down the left side of the isthmus, B Company were to follow the coast on the right side of the attack. After a significant delay, the advanced initially encountered very little resistance in the forward trenches. Approaching Burntside Hill, they exchanged fire with the Argentine defenders, however, on reaching the top of the hill, they found the first positions empty.

The Coronation Ridge position temporarily halted Major Neame's D Company as they advanced between A and B companies. However, D Company soon encountered heavy fire from an Argentine machine gun which was silenced by two paratroopers, allowing D Company to continue and clear the Argentine position on Coronation Ridge. These early encounters held up the advance for approximately 3 hours.

Then A Company, 2 Paras moved into the gorse line at the bottom of Darwin Hill facing the entrenched Argentines, who looked down on the British and thus were able to pin down the British with heavy machine gun and automatic rifle fire, in addition to, sniper fire, thus holding up the advance for a further hour.

At this point B Company broke off their attack and began to withdraw to the reverse side of Middle Hill and the base of Coronation Point due to being completely exposed to enemy fire, as the whole area was wide open and had no real cover available for the British.

A and B companies utilized this time to prepare temporary defensive positions while a re-organization of the attack was conducted by 2 Para's second-in-command. The British A and B Companies currently were unable to cross the open ground due to Argentine machine guns and sniper fire.

With both A and B Companies' advance halted and the entire attack in jeopardy, the 2 Para Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jones led an unsuccessful charge up a small gully to try to regain the initiative. 3 of his men, his adjutant Captain Wood, A Company's second-in-command Captain Dent, and Corporal Hardman were killed when they followed his charge.

Shortly after that, Jones was seen to run west along the base of Darwin Ridge to a small re-entrant, checking his Sterling submachine gun, then running up the hill towards an Argentine trench. He was seen to be hit once, then fell, got up, and was hit again from the side. He fell meters short of the trench, H Jones was shot in the back and the groin, and died within minutes. Jones was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

After a further 5 hours of fighting and ammunition supplies becoming critical, A Company eventually overcame the Argentine defenders on Darwin Hill, finally reporting it secure at 13:13 hrs local time, and advanced to take Boca Hill. Waving a white T-shirt from a rifle all resistance on the part of the Argentines holding Darwin Ridge ended, securing the outlying areas of Goose Green.

After securing Boca Hill and the battle for Darwin Ridge was over, the interim objectives had taken six hours of fighting, with heavy losses, the commanding officer, the adjutant, A Company's Second-in-Command, and nine non-commissioned officers and soldiers were killed with a further 30 wounded.

C and D Companies began to make their way to the airfield, as well as to Darwin School (to the east of the airfield), while B Company made their way south of Goose Green Settlement.

A Company remained on Darwin Hill. C Company originally held in reserve now advanced to contact and came under effective enemy fire sustaining heavy casualties.

The order to fix bayonets was given and C company continued their advance clearing the enemy positions as they traversed the boggy uneven terrain. The outer defenders fell back into the Darwin-Goose Green track and were able to escape. Sergeant Sergio Ismael Garcia of 25IR single-handedly covered the Argentine withdrawal during the British counterattack. For this, he was posthumously awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valor in Combat Medal.

By last light, A Company was still on Darwin Hill, north of the gorse hedge; B Company had penetrated much further south and had swung in a wide arc from the western shore of the isthmus eastwards towards Goose Green, but were isolated and under fire from Argentine positions and unable to receive mutual support from the other companies.

At this point further Argentine reinforcements were arriving; however, B Company 2 Para managed to bring down artillery fire on these new Argentine reinforcements, forcing them to disperse towards the Goose Green settlement, although some did re-embark and left with the departing helicopters that had deployed them.

At this point, C Company's attack had also stalled, after their battle at the Darwin Schoolhouse, now advancing towards Goose Green airfield they came under intense direct fire from 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from Goose Green.

Whereas, D Company had regrouped just before the last light, and they were deployed to the west of the dairy—exhausted, hungry, low on ammunition, and without water.

Food was redistributed, for A and C Companies with one ration-pack between two men; but B and D Companies could not be reached. At this time, a British helicopter casualty evacuation flight took place, successfully extracting C Company casualties from the forward slope of Darwin Hill, while under fire from Argentine positions.

To Keeble, now in command of 2 Para with the death of Lieutenant Colonel H Jones, the situation looked precarious, the Argentine position had been surrounded but not captured, and his fighting companies were exhausted, cold, and low on water, food, and ammunition.

His concern was that the Argentine reinforcements, dropped by helicopter, would either be used in an early morning counter-attack or used to stiffen the defenses around Goose Green.

He had seen the C Company assault stopped in its tracks by the anti-aircraft fire from Goose Green and had seen the Harrier strikes earlier that afternoon missing their intended targets. In an orders group with the A and C Company commanders, he indicated his preference for calling for an Argentine surrender, rather than facing an ongoing battle the following morning. This train of thought was based on the fact that the Argentine forces were surrounded and all outlying Goose Green Argentine positions were now in British hands.

However, at the same time, he put an alternative plan into action, in case the Argentines decided not to surrender. This plan was to "flatten Goose Green" with all available firepower and then launch an assault with all forces possible, including reinforcements he had requested from Brigadier Thompson.

On Thompson's orders, J Company of 42 Commando, Royal Marines, and the remaining guns of 8 Battery, and additional mortars were helicoptered in to provide the necessary support for a possible assault on the 29th of May.

However, on the morning of the 29th of May 1982, the formal surrender of Goose Green by the Argentine forces took place with 2 PARA securing a decisive victory, although with heavy losses.

Aftermath and Impact

The capture of Goose Green was a pivotal moment in the Falklands War. It demonstrated the resolve and capability of British forces operating far from their native shores of Great Britain in the world of modern combat, boosting morale both for the islanders and the populace in Great Britain. The victory also had a significant psychological impact on the Argentine forces, undermining their confidence and cohesion.

Over 1,200 Argentine soldiers from Goose Green were taken prisoner by the British. In questioning the prisoners it became quite clear that the use of the bayonet by the British was not only a shock to many of the Argentine soldiers but was a decisive factor in the collapse of morale and therefore, the overall collapse of Argentine forces at Goose Green. It should also be noted that the Argentine commander was fully aware that his command was surrounded and the British now could call upon large amounts of fire support.

The political and strategic implications of the battle were profound. Prime Minister Thatcher capitalized on the success, enabling the strengthening of domestic and international support for the British campaign. The victory at Goose Green underscored the effectiveness of British military strategy and tactics, even when facing numerically superior forces, setting the stage for subsequent operations to reclaim all of the Falklands Islands.

Conclusion

The Battle of Goose Green is remembered as a symbol of courage, skill, and determination of the British Parachute Regiment. Despite facing a numerically superior enemy, 2 PARA's audacious assault, tactical superiority and the overwhelming aggressive fighting ability of the British Airborne soldiers secured a crucial victory in the Falklands War, when international pressure was pushing for a negotiated settlement, that may have sided with the Argentine leadership.

The battle not only showcased the effectiveness of British forces but also highlighted the political and strategic dimensions of military decision-making in the heat of conflict. Reflecting on this historic engagement, the legacy of Goose Green endures as a true symbol of bravery and resilience, providing a reminder that extraordinary feats can be achieved when determination and skill combine in the face of adversity.

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Note

Battles are often confusing and full of contradictions from either side, and the battle for Goose Green is no exception, however, what is certain is that a smaller numerical force overcame a larger force by closing with the enemy with fixed bayonets and generating enough military violence to overcome the enemy positions.

Point of interest

The English Captain John Strong made the first recorded landing in the Falklands, in 1690, and named the sound between the two main islands after Viscount Falkland, a British naval official. The name was later applied to the whole island group. Whereas, Argentina was only founded as a country in 1816 on the 9th of July.

The Argentine sovereignty claim is based upon the inheritance of the islands, known as Las Malvinas in Argentina, from the Spanish crown in the early 1800s. Additionally, the Falkland Islands' proximity to Argentina's mainland appears to be reason enough for the claim by the Argentine government.

Lieutenant Colonel H Jones, Victoria Cross citation

On 28th May 1982 Lieutenant Colonel Jones was commanding the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on operations on the Falkland Islands. The Battalion was ordered to attack enemy positions in and around the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. During the attack against an enemy who was well dug in with mutually supporting positions sited in depth, the Battalion was held up just South of Darwin by a particularly well-prepared and resilient enemy position of at least eleven trenches on an important ridge.

A number of casualties were received. In order to read the battle fully and to ensure that the momentum of his attack was not lost, Colonel Jones took forward his reconnaissance party to the foot of a re-entrant which a section of his Battalion had just secured. Despite persistent, heavy and accurate fire the reconnaissance party gained the top of the re-entrant, at approximately the same height as the enemy positions. From here Colonel Jones encouraged the direction of his Battalion mortar fire, in an effort to neutralize the enemy positions.

However, these had been well prepared and continued to pour effective fire onto the Battalion advance, which, by now held up for over an hour and under increasingly heavy artillery fire, was in danger of faltering. In his effort to gain a good viewpoint, Colonel Jones was now at the very front of his Battalion. It was clear to him that desperate measures were needed in order to overcome the enemy position and rekindle the attack, and that unless these measures were taken promptly the Battalion would sustain increasing casualties and the attack perhaps even fail.

It was time for personal leadership and action. Colonel Jones immediately seized a sub-machine gun, and, calling on those around him and with total disregard for his own safety, charged the nearest enemy position. This action exposed him to fire from a number of trenches. As he charged up a short slope at the enemy position he was seen to fall and roll backward downhill. He immediately picked himself up, and again charged the enemy trench, firing his sub-machine gun and seemingly oblivious to the intense fire directed at him. He was hit by fire from another trench which he outflanked, and fell dying only a few feet from the enemy he had assaulted.

A short time later A company of the Battalion attacked the enemy, who quickly surrendered. The display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined their will to fight further.

Thereafter the momentum of the attack was rapidly regained, Darwin and Goose Green were liberated, and the Battalion released the local inhabitants unharmed and forced the surrender of some 1,200 of the enemy.

The achievements of the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment at Darwin and Goose Green set the tone for the subsequent land victory on the Falklands. The British achieved such a moral superiority over the enemy in this first battle that, despite the advantages of numbers and selection of battleground, the Argentinian troops never thereafter doubted either the superior fighting qualities of the British troops or their own inevitable defeat.

This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a Commanding Officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were an inspiration to all about him.

His Victoria Cross is displayed at the National Army Museum in Chelsea, London.

Other British awards

The Distinguished Service Order was awarded to Maj. C.B.P. Keeble, the Battalion second in command

The Military Cross Was awarded to:

Maj. J.H. Crossland: OC B Coy

Maj. C.D. Farrar-Hockley: OC A Coy

Lt. C.S. Connor: Recce Pl. Cmdr

Distinguished Conduct Medal was awarded to:

Cpl. D. Abols for his daring charges, which turned the Darwin Hill battle

Sgt. J.C. Meredith, Pl Sgt, 12 Platoon, D Company

Pte S. Illingsworth was posthumously awarded the DCM