Selling Americans on America after World War Two: The Freedom Train

The Freedom Train was a bold concept – a patriotic museum on the tracks aimed at unifying a fractured United States after World War Two. It offered needed moments of genuine patriotic respite in a post-war time of divisive challenges and solutions. Gerry and Janet Souter, authors of a book on the freedom train (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explain.

A locomotive built especially for the freedom train.

Ten years of the Great Depression plus four years of World War II had left Americans battered. Every facet of life seemed challenged; the United States had inherited world leadership by default.Sixyears of wartime production brought the country outof the Great Depression, but with the conflict ended, unions demanded higher wages and were at war with the government. In 1945-46, five million workers went out on strike.Manufacturershad barely crept back intocreatingconsumer products. Soldiers returned from the war zones to the protection of the GI Bill of Rights that promised education, cheap housing and a new start, but not a job. Adding to shifting labor force problems were boatloads of refugees streaming into the country from war-ravaged Europe. Many of these “Displaced Persons” were highly skilled and educated, affecting labor and housing issues at various levels. Black GIs sought recognition in the segregated South and fearful North. 

It was time to re-ignite the republic’s exhausted engine, to re-establish the core that had sustained the nation through those past years of sacrifice. The American people needed the cavalry to arrive in the nick of time, the winning touchdown to score, and the long shot horse to win the race— something to cheer.

No one could have imagined that Adolf Hitler would provide a bold embrace of America’s freedoms, patriotism, civic responsibility and pride in her hard-won liberties.

Selling the Freedom Train Idea

One of the greatest selling jobs ever attempted began in1946. William Coblenz, an assistant director with the Public Information Division of the Department of Justice often spent his lunch hour at the National Archives. There he discovered an exhibit of captured German government and military documents, including an original copy of Hitler’s last will and testament to the German people. Staring at the Fuhrer’s signature on that yellowed document, the frightful power of those final wretched thoughts of a mad man made Coblenz wish more Americans could look on the face of tyranny and appreciate the freedoms they inherit as a birthright. The Archives also displayed America’s legacy of documents from the conception of the independent republic to iconic objects brought back from the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific that would touch hearts and drive home our sacrifices for those freedoms. They were all there—and in the Library of Congress and private collections—all sealed behind glass. How could this treasure be brought to whole country?

Virtually every city and town had a railroad station. Understanding the government’s cash-strapped post-war situation, Coblenz proposed a passenger car be turned into a traveling museum featuring the contrast between Nazi Fascism and American Freedoms. It would be coupled to freight trains and dropped off at cities and towns in all the 48 states to be opened for the public’s inspection of copies of the actual documents. He called it the “Liberty Train” with a budget of $20,000 and presented his idea to his boss, Thomas C. Clark, the U.S. Attorney General. Clark loved the idea and understood the sad condition of the country’s coffers. “Might as well be two million,” as far as Congress was concerned. Realizing that opening the concept to private funding might sully the simple patriotic message, he still saw no other option and made a few calls.

The Liberty Train idea caught fire among movie and corporate moguls. Bank and Stock Market presidents signed on along with labor unions and entrepreneurs. In December 1946, they gathered for a meeting in Washington, D.C. Also included at this plan meeting was the Advertising Council, a conglomeration of advertising shops who furnished Allied propaganda and civilian wartime motivation during the war. They’d honed their patriotic idea-selling to a fine edge and joined the board of directors to the brand-new American Heritage Foundation, led by Ad Council president, Thomas Brophy.  The Council created the patriotic infrastructure that drove the selection and presentation of the collected artifacts. Under Brophy’s leadership, all public utterances flowed from, and all private funds were collected by this foundation.

The freedom train in Los Angeles.

Creating the Train and Its Irreplaceable Cargo

With expert historians combing the National Archives, Library of Congress and private collections, the train grew from one orphan passenger car to a train of seven passenger cars hauled by their own locomotive. The selection of documents and iconic objects eventually booted out Hitler and the Nazis for a more positive All-American collection in passenger cars converted into rolling steel vaults forming one long aisle for visitors. The Pennsylvania and Santa Fe railroads furnished the coaches to be gutted and lined with custom bronze and Lucite cases containing the actual documents, notcopies. Heading the train was a brand-new ALCO diesel-electric locomotive, and, like the rest of the train, painted white with red and blue stripes and gold eagles.   

The value of the new cargo aboard the “Freedom Train,” its final name, required extreme security. Thomas Clark penned the Secretary of the Navy for the loan of 27 United States Marines in dress blue uniforms. From more than 200 applicants, the result was a detail of combat Marines led by Lt. Colonel Robert L. Scott.  Three deluxe passenger coaches were set aside for their traveling quarters plus three pullman porters. With the marines were housed curator experts, train managers, and a Navy medical officer.

Packaging the Freedom Message

To build a bigger tent for the national audience, the Advertising Council provided a pre-train arrival package to each of 300 cities and towns consisting of collateral material to produce a week of “rededication” to American values. To facilitate these “Rededication Weeks” the Advertising council would unlimber a campaign for each locality on radio, in newspapers, comic books and movies. Collateral printed material, posters, event suggestions and camera-ready boiler plate logos would spread the message. Advance planners were to visit each community’s designated planning group to help create the necessary buzz and enthusiasm.

Extracting further commitment from Freedom Train visitors, a “Good Citizen” booklet was passed out listing the “Rights and Duties of an American” and the “Nine Promises of a Good Citizen.” (vowing to vote, pay taxes, serve on a jury, etc.) At the conclusion of a visit, a “Freedom Pledge” headed a scroll to be signed by the visitor. This Freedom Pledge was also recited in schools, churches, civic meetings and patriotic events during Rededication Weeks. 

Following a nationally broadcast celebrity and champagne send-off from Philadelphia, the Advertising Council’s publicity campaign had already produced an advance notice to the nation that this train would be on its way. The Twin Falls (Idaho) Times News, which was not even on the list of Freedom Train stops—but close enough for a half day auto trip to visit the train at Boise further northwest—was still impressed. Its editorial for August 26, 1947 read:

“it must be admitted that Americans have developed the technique of the publicity build-up to a remarkable degree…The purpose of all this is to make every one of us conscious of the responsibilities as well as the privileges which are ours as Inheritors of the legacy of American freedom. This country's high tradition of democracy has been seriously challenged in the past six years, and is still challenged today. Every failure to live up to that tradition provides a little more ammunition for those who would discount or destroy it. There is a real need for most of us to try more actively and consciously to be good citizens and alert guardians of our heritage.

And on the train went, giving an average head-count of 9,000 Americans a day the opportunity to see:Abraham Lincoln’s reading copy of the Gettysburg Address, the Bill of Rights, Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence, one of Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Papers, the Emancipation Proclamation, the NATO Charter, the flag flown from the summit of Mount Suribachi by the marines on Iwo Jima during World War II, the German Surrender document, Victory War bonds sold to Americans to help finance the war…130 priceless pieces of our freedom heritage.

Ahead of the train and after it passed, the air waves were filled with patriotic programing. New York promised listeners,  

“Two hours of star-studded programs saluting the Freedom Train are scheduled on WNEW tonight from 9 to 11 p.m. 

“The station has cancelled all regular programs in order to present this special feature which will include ‘The Lonesome Train’ by Norman Corwin, ‘Patrick Henry and the Frigate's Keel’ with Clifton Fadiman, Orson Welles performing readings from ‘The American Condition,’ Bing Crosby as narrator and singer in ‘The Man Without a Country,’ and ‘Ballad for Americans’ sung by Paul Robeson and chorus. Arthur Godfrey will take a CBS microphone aboard the Freedom Train at Grand Central Station on Wednesday at 5:45 p m. to give listeners a word picture of the unique train which is carrying historic documents to all parts of the country.” 1

On the Rails through the Nation

While the Freedom Train inspired Americans’ pride in their country, there were still undercurrents of resentment against those who didn’t quite fit the mold  As one Arkansas newspaper editorial noted, regarding the influx of European refugees:

“In these troublesome times…it may sound a bit brutal to those who have not given sufficient thought to the subject.We consider the time ripe to stop thinking with our hearts and start thinking with our heads on the matter of admitting 400,000 displaced foreigners to the United States.” 2

However, as one Baptist minister in Syracuse, New York remarked, “We must get rid of the idea that displaced persons are the scum of the earth. They are industrious, skilled workers, and religious people." 3

In the Deep South, racism was still rampant. The American Heritage Foundation established a rule: “Any city that plans to segregate visitors to the Freedom Train will be bypassed.”Birmingham and Memphis both refused to desegregate their lines of visitors and both, despite pleadings, were bypassed by the Freedom Train.

Whatever the Freedom Train’s reception, the experience of passing down the hushed aisle was, as one newspaper reporter noted, “one has the feeling he is in church.” 4

Journey’s End—Freedom’s Rededication Takes Root

From September, 1947 to January, 1949, the Freedom Train crisscrossed the entire United States to finally end its odyssey in time for Harry S. Truman’s presidential inauguration in Washington D.C. He had sent the train off in Philadelphia and was there at the end. He had won re-election aboard his own train, traveling across the country gathering in grass-roots voters to the trackside cry of “Give ‘em hell, Harry!” Another inspired train shared the rails—the “Friendship Train”—brought tons of donated food to war ravaged Europe and received boxcars of gifts from the Europeans called, the “Merci (Thank you) Train.” 

The Freedom Train was a bold concept, aimed at unifying a fractured United States. Despite the ballyhoo and hoopla pushing its conservative consumerism message, it offered needed moments of genuine patriotic respite in a post-war time of divisive challenges and solutions. 

One of the Freedom Train’s traveling staff members summed up their experiences that spanned the journey. 

“After a while you get up in the morning and start feeling for your Uncle Sam beard. When you see what this country and these documents mean to people—how they stand out there all day to see the things that make the nation great—you get a lump in your throat.”5

The Freedom Train was a rock star and a creature of a jumbled post-war world, striving to bring a measure of unity and order out of chaos to Americans lining the tracks, waiting for the shout, 

“Here she comes!” 

The Souters’ book,Selling American’s on America—Journey into a Troubled Nation is available from Barnes & Noble and Amazon US | Amazon UK

References

1.     Bridgeport (Connecticut) Telegram of September 22, 1947

2.     Camden (Arkansas) News September 13, 1947

3.     Syracuse Herald Journal, January 11, 1948)

4.    Gilbert Bailey, "Why They Throng to the Freedom Train," New York Times Magazine, January 25, 1948.

5.    Ibid., Bailey

How could the Confederate South have won the US Civil War?

Over 150 years after its end, the American Civil War continues to provoke debate and controversy. One of the longest running debates is whether and how the South could have won the war. Here, we explain some theories on this ever-topical subject.

The Confederate Cabinet from Harper’s Weekly, June 1861, including Confederate President Jefferson Davis in the center-right of the picture.

The Civil War was the bloodiest war ever fought on American soil. While both the armies of the Union and the Confederacy sustained devastating casualties, the American South bore the brunt of this carnage economically for years postbellum. Forty percent of the South’s livestock was killed. Over two-thirds of the South’s rails and bridges were destroyed. The direct costs to the Confederacy in human capital, government expenses, and physical destruction from the war totaled $3.3 billion. Over a quarter of Southern white men of military age died during the war, which left alarming numbers of families destitute. The end of the Civil War saw a large migration of former slaves to the cities whose dislocations caused a severe negative impact on the black population, with large numbers of sick and dead. 

With Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865 the American Civil War had finally reached its conclusion. In just four years, the newly formed Confederate States of America that had so confidently entered the war in defense of what they viewed as state sovereignty had dissolved back into the Union. Debates among historians continue today on what the South could have done differently to achieve victory in a war in which time was on the side of the much more industrialized North. To better understand how the South could have possibly achieved its goal of a lasting secession it is important to first consider the in some ways overwhelming strengths of the Union.

The Power of the Union

General Lee himself recorded after his surrender, “The Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources…” There were 20 wholly Union/Northern states with 5 border “slave” states fighting against 11 Southern states. The passage of time on incomplete or lost records has made it difficult to estimate the exact number of soldiers on either side of the war. At best guess, the Confederate Army likely consisted of between 600,000 and 1,000,000 men. The Union was estimated to have 1,550,000 to 2,400,000 soldiers, clear numerical advantage. In addition to this, new conscripts were readily available for the North in the form of immigrants who faced such dire circumstances in their homelands that joining the Union Army seemed a better alternative. Immigration to the South was however limited due to the extensive blockade of its ports.

With industrial superiority, the Union states possessed a much greater capacity to produce armaments and the infrastructure necessary to move supplies efficiently. Financially the North also possessed a great advantage as the South’s primarily export based economy was also greatly hampered by the Union blockade.

Theories from the South and North

Many Southerners however, were convinced that they possessed superior soldiers and leadership and were fighting in defense of their homeland. Yet, some modern historians attribute the Confederacy’s loss to Lee’s aggression in offensive tactics rather than the more successful strategies of defensive approaches or even guerilla warfare after Appomattox, one of the last battles of the American Civil War. Historians hypothesize that Lee should have held the North at bay until it got tired of the clash and instead sought the route to a negotiation. Others are certain that the Confederates could have won if Atlanta, Georgia and Mobile, Alabama as well as the Shenandoah Valley, were held by them beyond the 1864 election. The Shenandoah was a strategy favored by the Confederates for its terrain that was west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, stretching from the southwest to the northeast. This route conveniently funneled troops for deployment.

Early in the war, the Confederacy had the upper hand following repeated victories. While not a complete victory like the Union later on achieved, the Confederates wanted to negotiate rather than conquer the North. By 1863, President Lincoln and his cabinet were reduced to three strategies for winning the war. First, a massive area of the Confederate States needed to be conquered and occupied, preferably the size of the whole of Western Europe. Second, the South’s infrastructure had to be demolished. Third and possibly most difficult to achieve was annihilating the South’s armies as an effective fighting force. The Union may have possessed superior manpower and material resources, being industrial while the South was mainly agricultural, but the South still had at least four well-established advantages from the start of the war that counteracted the North’s manpower and material resources.

The South’s 4 Advantages

First, a psychological benefit was associated with the Confederacy’s need to protect their family, homes, and lifestyles. It can be observed that the South possessed a more determined fighting spirit than the North on many occasions. Second, the South was filled with rivers, mountains, and swamps that acted as fortresses combined with successful deployments of armies. Third, and surprisingly, the South’s resources in life’s necessities such as livestock and corn were greater than that of the North. Fourth and most well-known, the Confederacy was abounding with cotton. Cotton would have been considered an economic or diplomatic factor as the cotton was in the hands of the Confederacy as a cash crop of substantial value. However, as the war carried on, planting was reduced and bales prepared for shipments were burned, thereby discouraging overseas exports. 

Military leadership and experience, specifically those in their respective Commander-in-Chief, was starkly contrasting between Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Union President Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was lacking in military experience when elected president in 1860. During the Black Hawk War of 1832, he shortly served as an officer in the Illinois state militia, but saw no combat. During the Mexican-American War, Lincoln fiercely criticized President James K. Polk for hounding Mexico and engaging in western land grabs that only benefited slaveholders. During the Fort Sumter crisis, Lincoln issued conflicting orders to the navy, resulting in confusion. A humiliating Union loss at the First Battle of Bull Run took place when he put pressure on the army to mount an immediate assault on Richmond in the summer of 1861 against advice. Despite his inexperience, Lincoln was a hands-on commander-in-chief, studiously learning the business of war, testing new weapons on the White House lawn, and reading books on military strategy from the Library of Congress. 

Davis, on the other hand, had a decorated political and military career. He was a West Point graduate with seven years of service in the frontier army, a Mexican-American War veteran (wounded in battle), and Secretary of War under President Franklin Pierce. Even during his time as the Confederacy’s first president, his hunger for war never left him. During the first major battle of the war at Bull Run in July 1961, Davis fled his office in Richmond and sprinted towards the sound of the fighting, some believe with the intent of assuming the command of the troops and leading them into battle. Despite his habit of micromanaging more than Lincoln, Jefferson Davis proved an effective administrator and motivator of men. He operated under a similar command structure as Lincoln in constitutional terms. Under the Confederacy’s constitution, Davis would serve a six-year term and was forbidden from running again after that term was up.

How the South could have won

With the backgrounds of respective leaders and war advantages and motivations established, it is time to overview options the Confederacy could have taken that may have well guaranteed victory over the Union, ending the American Civil War. 

If the Confederates exported cotton as much as possible to Europe, most notably Great Britain before it sought cotton elsewhere in India or Egypt for a cheaper price, before the Union’s blockade of Confederate ports, then the Confederacy could have established lines of credit to buy war material. This could have been utilized to construct and repair the broken-down railway system to move troops and goods to critical positions. This was possible before the failed alliance with European nations was realized and trade nations like Britain conducted with the Union far outweighed the value of Southern cotton. 

Jefferson Davis had less consolidated power than his enemy and given his lack of men and resources, Davis was argued to have better served the cause by writing off large portions of the Confederacy’s scattered territory which would enable him to focus his armies around a few key areas important to the South’s survival. It has even been suggested conventional warfare should have been replaced with guerrilla warfare on Union occupation forces. Davis was never comfortable with guerrilla warfare and pursued this option to only a limited extent. For example, after the Union seized control of the Mississippi River in the summer of 1863, he permitted states west of the river to fend for themselves in the war and let “irregular” Confederate guerilla units operate without much intervention from his administration. 

The question of how the Confederacy could have won the Civil War has been debated and questioned endlessly by historians and scholars, professional and amateur. It should be recognized such a topic deserves far more discussion and study than noted in this article. Ultimately, the Union and its president won the Civil War. The Confederacy and its president lost the war and it is not difficult to foresee that a self-proclaimed nation with limited resources was bound to lose such a catastrophic war.

What do you think of this article? How could the Confederate South have won the US Civil War?

Unknown Heroes of World War Two: People who Saved those in Great Danger from the Nazis

World War Two created a whole host of heroes in the battle to beat the Fascist Powers in Europe. But many of the heroes remain unknown. Here, Brian Fleming, author of a recently published book on unsung heroes of World War Two (Amazon US| Amazon UK), explains some stories of amazing people whose actions saved the lives of people in great danger from the Nazis.

Aristides de Sousa Mendes, who helped save the lives of many people from the Nazis.

Introduction

For some reason, I have always been particularly intrigued by the doings of unsung heroes. Perhaps it is as a result of their invariably modest attitudes towards their achievements or maybe the fundamental unfairness that sometimes permeates accounts of events is the cause. My curiosity prompted me to write The Vatican Pimpernel: The Wartime Exploits of Monsignor Hugh O’Flaherty (Amazon US| Amazon UK).[i] A fellow Irishman, who while working as a priest working in the Vatican during World War 2 established what became known as the Rome Escape Line. O’Flaherty and his colleagues rescued many Allied servicemen and others who were on the run from the Nazis and Italian Fascists. My interest in this case was that his story was relatively unknown in Ireland despite the fact that at least 6,500 individuals were saved by the organization. There were reasons for this to be the case, most particularly because his own modesty. Researching The Vatican Pimpernelbrought me in contact with stories of other escape lines and I have realized an ambition to explore some of these in Heroes in the Shadows: Humanitarian Action and Courage in the Second World War (Amazon US| Amazon UK).[ii]

On this occasion rather than give an extensive account of one escape line, I have provided a chapter on each of four escape lines which allows for a fairly comprehensive outline of the activities of each one. The first chapter, however, is not about an escape line strictly speaking. In it, I recount the activities of diplomats in various parts of Europe who used their positions to save thousands of individuals. Of these, Raoul Wallenberg is by far the most famous but there were others whose heroic deeds need to be better known 

Aristides de Sousa Mendes

One interesting example is that of the Portuguese diplomat Aristides de Sousa Mendes. Under the dictator Salazar, Portugal, like its neighbor Spain, was determined not to become involved in WW2. Sousa Mendes, a lawyer by profession, served in his country’s diplomatic service and took up duty as Consul General in Bordeaux in 1938. The following year, Salazar, anxious not just to remain neutral but to be seen to be so, issued an instruction to his nation’s diplomats that visas were not to be issued to various categories of people. Essentially this covered all refugees who might be seeking access to Portugal. Exemptions could only be granted with sanction from the Foreign Ministry in Lisbon. It is clear that from the very start that Sousa Mendes was uncomfortable with this restrictive approach. He began to make exceptions without prior clearance and put forward, to the authorities, retrospective justification for his actions. The numbers involved were quite small but the situation changed radically in 1940 as French resistance to the Nazi invasion began to collapse. Millions fled south, many to avoid conflict but others, notably the Jews, had far more specific reasons to leave France. Hundreds approached the consulate in Bordeaux seeking assistance.

Sousa Mendes became indisposed in mid-June with what he described subsequently as a breakdown. Clearly he was in a very difficult situation caught between his instructions from Lisbon and his humanitarian instincts. Happily the latter proved decisive and he emerged from his illness with an emphatic decision. ‘From now on I’m giving everyone visas. There will be no more nationalities, races or religions.’[iii]For the next few weeks this is precisely what he did. Obviously Salazar’s government could not tolerate such defiance and he was recalled, an instruction he complied with but not in any great hurry. Estimating the numbers he saved is difficult as visas often covered more than the individual holder but included family members such as children. Some have suggested that between him and his colleague Emile Gissot in Toulouse, 20,000 were saved. Certainly a figure of 10,000 would constitute a conservative estimate. The noted Holocaust scholar, Professor Yehuda Bauer has described the role played by Sousa Mendes as perhaps the largest rescue operation by a single individual during that period. Subsequently the career of Aristides de Sousa Mendes was destroyed on the direct instructions of Salazar. Sadly he lived in relative poverty for the remainder of his life and his actions were airbrushed from history. Eventually the truth began to emerge and a campaign in the US by a group including the diplomat’s son, John Paul, bore fruit in 1986 when 70 members of congress wrote to the then Portuguese Prime Minister asking that the good name of Aristides de Sousa Mendes be restored. Two years later the Portuguese parliament unanimously adopted a motion striking out all charges against Sousa Mendes and marked the decision with a standing ovation. Further recognition has followed in Portugal and in Bordeaux where he made his wonderfully courageous decision.

The Belgian

Escape lines during WW2 tended to specialize in particular target groups. Some focused on ensuring the safe return home of members of the Allied Forces so that they could re-join their regiments, whereas others prioritized the needs of civilians who were seeking to evade capture by the Nazis and Fascists. 

Pat O’Leary was the name used by the leader of a prominent escape line centered in the South of France. In reality, he was a Belgian doctor whose real name was Albert Marie Guérisse.  When his native country was invaded, he made his way to Britain and enlisted in the Armed services. In early1941, he arrived in Marseille and made contact with Ian Garrow, a member of the Seaforth Highlanders who had been unable to reach Dunkirk in time to evacuate. Making his way south, he had begun to establish an escape line with a Scottish-born clergyman called Donald Caskie amongst others. The arrival of O’Leary was a major step forward as he brought new skills to the endeavor, including an ability to speak French fluently and the training he received in undercover work whilst in Britain. Indeed, he became the central figure in the organization and it became known as the ‘Pat Line’. He immediately set about expanding the line in terms of the number of ‘safe houses’ that were available in which to lodge escapees while ways of getting them out of France were organized. 

There were about 50,000 personnel who, like Garrow, failed to make the evacuation at Dunkirk. Many remained at large and others, whilst captured initially, managed to escape. The main objective of the line was to locate and repatriate these so that they could return to active service. In order to do this, the organization had to extend its presence throughout France as far as possible and to set up a route through Spain so that evacuees could be brought to Gibraltar and home from there. Establishing a large organization throughout war-time France was a risky operation. There were Nazi spies both in that part under the control of the German authorities and Vichy France, the so-called un-occupied region. Recruiting helpers was always difficult as the authorities were constantly seeking to penetrate organizations favorable to the Allied cause. Despite this, an extensive escape line stretching from north of Paris to Gibraltar was soon in place. 

Getting escapees over the Pyrenees and through Spain was difficult. Spain, under the control of General Franco, while nominally neutral, was favorably disposed towards the Nazis especially when they had the upper hand in the conflict. As a result, there were plenty of Nazi undercover agents in the country and the authorities turned a blind eye. Donald Darling was appointed by the British authorities to facilitate evacuees heading for Gibraltar and he soon had a fairly efficient operation in place. In this, he was helped by a diplomat stationed in the UK embassy in Berlin and a number of favorably-disposed locals. 

Of course, ensuring the safe passage of escapees through France was even more difficult. Operating over such a distance and involving so many volunteers led inevitably to failures. The line was penetrated by Paul Cole, an Englishman and former soldier. He had a number of early successes in bringing people down to the South of France and eventual freedom. This was a typical tactic by the Nazi authorities to allow an agent acting on their behalf build a positive image. In late November 1941, Cole’s real role became clear and he was confronted but escaped. He betrayed some of the lines leading supporters in the North of France, costing approximately fifty to be arrested, tortured and executed.

Despite this very serious setback, O’Leary and his team re-built the organization and evacuations to Gibraltar continued. In the main, these were by way of the Pyrenees but, for a period, sea evacuations were carried out successfully. They also managed to organize jail breaks including some spectacular ones, so that particular vital personnel could return home to resume their duties. On 2March 1943, O’Leary himself was betrayed by a volunteer named Roger le Neveu. He suffered serious torture in prison but survived. For obvious reasons an organization such as the ‘Pat Line’ kept no detailed records so estimating how many were assisted is not straightforward. It is likely, however, that about 2,000 individuals were helped by O’Leary and his colleagues.

The Franciscan

Assisi has been a focus of pilgrimage and religious practice for Christians over the centuries. As such, for those seeking sanctuary from the effects of the war it was an obvious destination to seek out. Indeed the local bishop had set up a committee to care for refugees at an early stage. Padre Rufino Niccacci was, at the time, Father Guardian of the local Franciscan seminary. In June 1944 the Allies, after protracted battles, eventually reached Rome. A few hours later, Padre Rufino was woken by a colleague close to midnight with a message to call to see the bishop immediately, which he did. As he had no involvement with the committee for the welfare of refugees, he was surprised to be asked to bring a group of them to Cardinal Della Costa in Florence, who would arrange for them to leave Italy via the port of Genoa. His surprise became astonishment when it was explained that this was a group of Jews, including a Rabbi. Rufino had never met a Jew and indeed, it was believed that no one of that faith had ever been in Assisi. The task was successfully completed and Rufino was destined to learn a lot in the next few months as he looked after increasing numbers of Jews arriving in the area to seek sanctuary. As escape via Genoa became unavailable, he hid them in the many religious houses in Assisi, supplemented by many locals who were willing to accommodate some in their private homes. A dangerous game of cat and mouse ensued between him and the local Nazi forces and, despite many near misses, he ensured that all in his care survived the war. Given the nature of these events it is likely that many locals were aware of what was going on but he and his charges were never betrayed. Interestingly, it is probable that the Nazi commander in the area during the final months of the occupation had some inkling of what was afoot and chose to turn a blind eye.

These are just three of the cases detailed in Heroes in the Shadows. There are others recorded there and elsewhere and, indeed, many individual heroic acts that are long forgotten.  War invariably provides ample evidence of humankind’s capacity for appalling brutality. It is important not to forget that many possess the necessary moral courage to resist such examples of man’s inhumanity to man and a willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice in doing so.

Heroes in the Shadows: Humanitarian Action and Courage in the Second World Warby Brian Fleming is available here: Amazon US| Amazon UK

[i]Fleming, Brian The Vatican Pimpernel: The Wartime Exploits of Monsignor Hugh O’Flaherty(the Collins Press, 2008 & 2014, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012).

[ii] Fleming, Brian Heroes in the Shadows: Humanitarian Action and Courage in the Second World War (Amberley Publishing,2019).

[iii]Paldiel, Mordecai Diplomat Heroes of the Holocaust (KTAV Publishing, 2007) p. 74.

Introduction to History: What Were the Reasons for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962?

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a period of thirteen days of high tension between the US and NATO on one side and the USSR and Cuba on the other. The crisis began when the US found out that the Soviets had moved missiles capable of reaching the mainland United States into Cuba, some 100 miles from the US shore. This led to days of diplomatic activity, military preparations, and high-level, high-risk correspondence between senior leaders in the USSR and USA - and nearly led to nuclear war.

However, the underlying reasons for the crisis were complex: these included that the USSR wanted to threaten and compete more effectively with the USA, the involvement of the USSR and the US in the Korean War and Vietnam War, strategic imbalance between the two sides, and the division of Berlin.

Nicky Quinton explains.

A picture of the US Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile, which were partly responsible for the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Background

The political relationship between the United States and the USSR after World War II was filled with tension. Two geographical giants were competing for economic, technical, and military superiority all over the world. Government policies were aimed at improving performance in various fields to tip the balance of power in their favor, even to the detriment of their citizens. The space race, nuclear arms race, and even the Olympic Games were proof that the US and the Soviet Union did not want to give an inch in the battle.

After World War II, the world was largely divided into two camps: those who supported capitalism and those who supported communism. The United States and the Soviet Union were the leaders of these two groups. Unfortunately, this confrontation was not limited to an informational and ideological war. Instead, the two states got involved in wars to support their ideological allies.

This was because neither the USA nor the USSR truly wanted to fight each other directly – the desire to avoid another World War and the risks from nuclear weapons helped prevent that. However, their armies fought indirectly in conflicts, notably the Korean War and Vietnam War. 

Korean War and Vietnam War as examples of indirect war

The split of Korea after World War II into two independent states was driven by the Cold War. A socialist regime was established in the northern state, and a capitalist regime was established in the southern state. The Soviet Union (and China) supported the communist leader Kim Il-sung, and the US supported the anti-communist leader Syngman Rhee. The war began in 1950 and ended up with the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953.

The Vietnam War is another example of a proxy war. Although the official conflict took place between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, the real state of affairs was similar to the Korean War. The USSR and China supported communist North Vietnam, and the United States and other anti-communist countries more actively supported South Vietnam. Therefore, indirect conflicts increased the tension between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was different to those wars – it was partly about strengthening the Soviet position and giving it a more credible nuclear threat.

It could happen at all because in the years before 1962 the Cuban Revolution led communist leader Fidel Castro to take control of Cuba in 1959. The Soviets were more than happy with an ally some 100 miles from the US coast and used it to their advantage.

The Soviet initiative to place missiles in Cuba was the result of the Soviet’s perceived strategic imbalance, since the United States had nuclear weapon bases in Turkey, close to the Soviet Union (Nathan, 58). In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy agreed to put 15 nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles near the Turkish border. While the US military was deemed capable of delivering a first strike on the USSR (launching a nuclear attack before the enemy could do the same), the Soviets had few ballistic missiles deemed capable of reaching the continental US from the USSR at the time. Furthermore, these were considered to be both inaccurate and unreliable (Allison and Zelikow, 92). Therefore, the USSR wanted to solve this problem by placing mid-range missiles in Cuba, thus restoring the strategic balance.

One more crucial reason for the Crisis was Berlin. During the Cold War, Germany was effectively split into two: East Germany (GDR) and West Germany (FRG). The border went straight through Berlin. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev believed that by having missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union could try and strike a deal with the West into relinquishing its control over the western portion of Berlin (Allison and Zelikow, 105).

In short, some of the key reasons for the Cuban Missile Crisis were:

·      The Cuban Revolution that led communists to take charge of Cuba

·      Political competition between the USA and the Soviet Union.

·      Growing tensions throughout the 1950s, partly driven by the Korean War and the (early days) of the Vietnam War

·      To put pressure on the United States to remove its nuclear arms from Turkey

·      Control over Berlin

Conclusion

Crisis was averted in Cuba and the US did in fact secretly later remove the nuclear-tipped missiles from Turkey (Nathan 134). Fortunately the Cold War didn’t turn into a “hot war.”

Works Cited

Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. TPB, 2000.

“Cuban Missile Crisis.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 8 May 2019, www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis.

Nathan, James A. The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

This article was provided by Nicky Quinton of WriteMyEssayOnline.

Editor’s note: That external link is not affiliated in any way with this website. Please see the link herefor more information about external links.

The Importance of Locations in Britain for the 1944 D-Day Invasion

The 75th anniversary of D-Day took place a few days ago, on June 6th. In honor of that, today we have a contribution from an author of a recently published book about D-Day - D-Day UK: 100 Locations in Britain (Amazon US| Amazon UK). Here Simon Forty explains the background to World War Two’s D-Day and his book.

US troops approaching Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944.

In June 1944 Allied forces invaded France to liberate Europe and destroy Nazism.

Immortalised in film and book, D-Day is, rightly, seen as a turning point in 20thcentury

history and opened a land campaign that finished less than a year later in the

unconditional surrender of the enemy. 

The speed, means and method of this victory have been discussed and debated

ever since. Most of the discussion has concentrated on the landings and the battles

that followed: the bravery of the soldiers, sailors and airmen; the effectiveness and

personality of the commanders; the efficiency and abilities of the respective tactics,

weapons and armies.

The locations are written indelibly in our memories: Omaha and Juno, Pegasus

Bridge, Arromanches, Pointe du Hoc, Sainte-Mère-Église. Understandably, much of the

military remembrance – the cemeteries and memorials – are on the French side of the

English Channel, as are most of the remnants of war – bunkers, vehicles, scarred buildings.

However, like the tip of an iceberg, the D-Day landings and the battle of Normandy

– about two months’ fighting from 6 June until the end of August – were the result of

years of preparation that took place to a great extent in Britain. It was in Britain that

the plans were developed, the logistics organised and the weapons prepared. It was in

Britain that the soldiers boarded the ships to take them to France, from Britain that

the air forces provided aerial cover and the armada set sail. It was in Britain that large

numbers of young American, Canadian, Polish, and French men and women spent so

much time that they became part of the everyday life of the country. And it wasn’t all

work: the influx of that many young men and women – including more than 100,000

black troops – had a striking affect on Britain’s social scene. After the war, 60,000 war

brides left Britain for a future in North America. British and American culture hadn’t

become one entity, but it had certainly joined at the hip.

Americans start to arrive

The first Americans arrived in Northern Ireland in January 1942 – although

‘Special Observers’ had been there since spring 1941. By May 1944 their ranks had

swelled to around 750,000, a figure that doubled before 1944 was out. Some of these

soldiers spent a short time in Britain before heading to the Mediterranean theatre;

others spent as much as 20 months training for action.

This invasion – often dubbed the ‘friendly invasion’ – affected most people

in Britain in one way or another. The Americans had to be housed and fed; they

had to have places to train and trainers to tell them what to do. They had to have

equipment and places to practise using it. The supplies for the battles to come had

to be stored somewhere. The details of the invasion had to include secure locations

for final preparation, places to board ships and receive final orders. And then there

were the naval facilities, and those needed for the US Air Forces: airfields, runways,

hangars. This was no mere temporary posting. This was the creation of an American

infrastructure in a way that hadn’t been done before. The rulebook had to be created.

Over the next two years the preparations for the invasion of France took form.

It wasn’t a linear progression: political considerations, fighting in Africa and the

Mediterranean, the strength of the opposition – all these things interrupted progress

until late 1943. From then on the countdown had begun and while the actual end date

changed slightly, it wasn’t a question of if, but when.

D-Day UK, published to mark the 75th anniversary of D-Day, chooses 100

locations in Britain to tell the story of how the invasion of France came about. It covers

the practicalities of the planning process, the main people and the major organisations

involved. It looks at the specialist training the troops needed and the major exercises;

gives an insight into some of the logistical issues, covers the movement of troops from

marshalling camp to embarkation – for delivery to France by landing craft or aircraft;

examines the range of air assets over the battlefield, from fighters through medium

bombers to the heavies; and touches on the naval side of the landings, particularly the

minesweepers and landing craft.

Choosing 100 locations

Choosing 100 locations proved to be a difficult job and I’m sure that many would

disagree with my choices: too much air and not enough naval; too much in Hampshire

and not enough in Essex; too much American and not enough British or Canadian; too

much that can’t be seen today. In the end it’s impossible to please everyone.

Finally, I decided early on not to include museums in the listings: there could

have been 100 of them alone, including the Imperial War Museum, National Army

Museum, RAC Tank Museum, D-Day Museum, Royal Signals Museum, Fleet Air

Arm Museum, the excellent Portsmouth naval museums (the Submarine Museum,

Naval Museum and Explosion Museum of Naval Firepower), Bletchley Park, Cobbaton

Combat Collection, museums at airfields (Tangmere, Shoreham, Dunkeswell), up to

and including the Commando display in the Fort William Museum. All these and many

more have material related to D-Day and are worth a visit.

D-Day UK: 100 Locations in Britainby Simon Forty is available here:Amazon US| Amazon UK

Iran after the 1953 Coup: The contributions of John Mowlem & Co. Ltd and Iran National to Iranian soft power diplomacy, 1954-66

The Shah of Iran led a coup d’état in Iran in 1953, with the help of the UK and US. This article considers what happened after the coup, in particular how the awarding of a road-building contract to a British company ultimately led to resistance to awarding major contracts to some foreign companies. Guan Kiong Teh explains.

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza, with his wife and son in 1967.

I wrote this article on the road building and vehicle industry in the late Pahlavi state to respond to two aspects of Iranian historiography. The first is the lack of scholarship on the technique of science and technology within Iranian modernization. Many scholars mention science and technology within Iranian political discourse. However, I focus upon scientific technique - defined as the legal, political and societal context and consequences of the application of technology. This only started gathering force recently, with for instance, Katayoun Shafiee’s focus on ‘sociotechnical’ processes in Machineries of Oil(2018).

The second is the thin analysis of the social impacts of consumerism during the years between the 1953 coup and the announcement of the Peykan car in 1966 through an integrated system of the private market and public infrastructure. Drawing upon British governmental and personal sources, and documents produced by the Iranian Government, Mowlems, and Chrysler, I examine how road building and the related vehicle industry contributed to Iranian political practice and discourse between the spring of 1954 and the announcement of the Peykan car in 1966, particularly towards the concept of independent foreign policy and an Iranian state for the Iranian people. The Mowlems contract was a blessing and a curse. While it demonstrated to the Iranian government that they had the sophistication to turn perfidious Albion on its heads, its costliness contributed to the pro-business spirit of the 1960s and the mythical White Revolution.

Iranian Vehicle Industry

The vehicle industry represented a fertile opportunity to win over the Iranian people and execute leverage against countries such as Britain, America, and Germany, particularly given the lessons of the Mowlem’s affair from 1954-57. Commercial development projects grew in geopolitical significance during the Cold War. Iran shared a border with the Soviet Union. The increasing burden of aid, military and nuclear expenditure in Iran in the 1950s compelled Mohammad Reza Shah to pursue a more independent foreign policy, most notably through the ‘soft’ weapon of the trade of goods and services within Iran. The logic: to reap the benefits of aid and expenditure without furthering the impression and consequences of Anglo-American political puppetry. Between 1954 and 1959, the PO sought to consolidate its uniquely ‘educated’ and powerful role in government through these formative exercises, refining its technique of portraying British firms as undeserving of their prestigious commercial reputation. The diplomatic successes and economic costs, however, led the government to pursue diplomatic success through economic profit, as evidenced in the birth of Iran’s automotive industry, culminating in the Iran N Peykan.

John Mowlem & Co Ltd. were British construction agents. By the 1950s they were established names in Britain, supervising Thames drainage projects at the turn of the century. In April 1954, Glossop was approached by Ebtehaj, Fazlollah Zahedi and the Shah to negotiate for a road-building contract, with vocal support from Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador to Iran. Mowlem’s first problem was demonstrating hostility towards the Iranian Government’s demands for accountability in technical expertise, exacerbated by the British Embassy’s lack of technical knowledge. A July 27 telegram states the position of the Iranian Government as interpreted by Ambassador Roger Stevens. Mowlems was expected to seek a contract to acquire the road plant material from a preferably non-British firm. The Iranian Government did not, as a matter of practice, enter multiple contracts in its pursuit of development projects. The Embassy advised that this was a clear warning that Mowlems’ would be held to the highest technical scrutiny. Since the previous month, Ebtehaj repeatedly expressed that he was under pressure from American firms to ensure that plant contracts were not exclusively awarded to British firms. Finally on May 10, 1955, Richard Glossop, the Managing Director of John Mowlem & Co. Ltd, exchanged contracts with Abdolhassan Ebtehaj. These were the roads to be constructed.Mowlems committed, as ‘managing agents’, to supervise the construction of 6,000 kilometers of roads in Iran over eight years. This was, according to the British Embassy, ‘the most important contract we have secured in Persia since the resumption of diplomatic relations. For years past foreign contractors have tried and failed to get it.’ Yet Mowlems’ shortcomings in its mastery of technical information served as a wake-up call for the Iranian government. When this contract was terminated in December 1957, barely 300 kilometers of roads had been refurbished in small stretches, with no new roads built. The contract was formally annulled on September 10, 1958. Further road building contracts until the mid 1960s never rivaled the Mowlems’ contract on scale, and were overwhelmingly awarded to Iranian firms or, at most, a minor supervisory role was awarded to Belgian, South African or Danish firms notably Kampsax - never Anglo American again.

How the Agreement Ended

The Plan and Budget Organization enacted political leverage against Britain by purporting that Mowlems failed to deliver the technical excellence necessary to justify maintaining the contract. The experience demonstrated that Iran had the strategic sophistication to manipulate perceived British commercial opportunism. Yet this was executed at the expense of contributing towards a balance of payments crisis between 1958-60 and presenting unfinished roads to the public, instilling further ambivalence about the merits of the incorporation of ‘Western’ development and Iranian nationalism advocated by the Shah. 

While the extraordinary expenditure of the Mowlems’ contract makes it difficult to argue that money was judicially used, the Plan Organization took some steps towards independent foreign policy by challenging Mowlems not on explicitly financial or political but technical grounds. The PO presented limitations upon British commercial advantage as a moral and financial obligation to find the most technologically competitive route to infrastructure development. The contract negotiation period between April 1954 and May 1955 was formative for the PO in coming to terms with manipulating technical expertise of road building. 

Relations were warmest where British and Iranian interests in road building and foreign policy clashed. During the second half of 1956, Mowlems’ dedication towards technical competitiveness improved. In November, a 36 kilometer stretch of road between Qazvin and Takestan was successfully refurbished, of which General Ansari gave a tour to Majlismembers at the end of the year. By December 1956, Ebtehaj grew more praiseful of Mowlems, announcing early in January 1957 to commit to fund a new flagship project: a road from Qazvin to the Turkish border at Jolfa, via Tabriz, and a direct route between Isfahan and Shiraz[1]. The route to the Turkish border provided easy access to a ‘friendly’ missile base, and would also serve Iranian interests in regional links.

However, Mowlems’ astonishing cost-saving by refusing to study soil composition exasperated the Iranian government. By mid-1957, only 240 kilometers of roads had been refurbished with no new roads built. Early batches were cracking and potholed, the result of importing a road plant mixture designed for British weather and soil. The Shah summoned Stevens, decrying it as ‘the worst piece of propaganda I’d ever seen’. Once he said this, Ebtehaj went for the pincer. The Shah had promised Mowlems’ reputation to the Majlis in 1955. If Mowlems’ did not improve or concede incompetence, the Iranian state was headed for a crisis of confidence that could rival what happened 1953. Eventually, Ebtehaj wrote to Mowlems to annul the contract on 23 December 1957. 450 million rials had been wasted over two and a half years.

The Consequences for Iran

This experience primed commercial instinct during the White Revolution. It gave the Iranian Government an obsession with ensuring Iranian - particularly Persian,Pahlavicharacter was evident in national ‘modernization’ and ‘development’, as evidenced in the automotive industry, particularly the Iran National Peykan, announced 1966, and the Pars Khodro Shahin, announced 1967. Cars were a uniquely potent symbol of the West and a unique absorption point for discontent therewith. Unlike Western lecturers or artists, ‘ordinary’ Iranians interacted with the benefits of the car on a practical (as opposed to abstract) level. Unlike refrigerators, hydroelectricity or the sewage system, ‘ordinary’ Iranians interacted with the car for extended periods of time. Unlike radios or TV sets, the value of the car as a tool and means of earning income were more obvious. Further, in an experience common around the world, the car was often the most expensive product and second-most expensive that a family bought, after their house. The passenger car has political capital. Note the situation that Volkswagen found themselves in during 2018, when they faced criticism that they withdrew from the Iranian market due to lobbying by the American ambassador in Germany.

To begin, the Government ostensibly took steps to secure Iranian national input; ostensibly committed to Import Substitution Industrialization as defined in the Third Development Plan (1963-68). A June 1963 news broadcast announced that the Government was planning initiatives to boost car battery production within Iran. The Government favored entrepreneurs to the detriment of the consumer’s pockets by enforcing considerable economic incentive to encourage importers and distributors to seek tenders for nationalized Complete Knock-Down Kits. For instance, 126 ‘saloon cars’ were imported between 27 September and 2 October 1965. These cars were worth 9,500,000 rials to their importer and subject to governmental duties of 92%, at 8,740,000 rials. High tariffs were imposed upon cars that were supposed to be relatively affordable. While the exact make and model of the 126 saloons are unknown, they were all the same model, giving a market price of 75,397 rials and a tariff of 69,360 rials per vehicle, costing the importer 144,757 rials per vehicle in total. As sold to consumers, the vehicle would have cost slightly more than the 150,000 rial Peykan and was a likely competitor. Yet the pressure upon importers was clear: one could be subject to heavy tariffs, or one could try hard to persuade car brands to license cars for CKD production. These were not technologically advanced cars: the Volkswagen Beetle’s air cooled engine was far more appropriate for Iran’s arid climate. Overall, the impetus to produce the national car came from an interest in profit and symbolism of adopting a British and American car; symbol that the Iranian government could actually reign in foreign powers and, to quote British politician Nigel Farage, ‘make a titanic success out of it’. 

Conclusion

The Peykan divided urban and rural more than it united. The Hillman Hunter GT was rebranded the Peykan Javanan, heralding the prominence of youths in the country and the role of youth in Iranian politics. Few in the countryside, however, could afford to maintain cars. In villages, those who drove taxis were respected as ‘chauffeurs’, their ability to drive singled out by hopeful mothers trying to matchmake sons. In 1969, 4 million - 15% of Iran’s population - lived in cities. Yet 80% of the passenger car market was urban. 

The Pahlavi state made genuine efforts to ensure that ‘development’ initiatives from the United States, Britain and their Cold War allies were practical for those outside Tehran and Iran’s major cities. The road building experience was good. However, the Pahlavi state focused on the wrong aspect of the lessons, valuing money over expertise. This was the main takeaway: without subscribing to determinist narratives on the inevitability of the White Revolution leading to a Black instead of Red Revolution, Iran’s determination to make sense of the point of scientific and technical control meant that following a clear path of ‘development’, as suggested by Huntington or Moore, was never going to be likely.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

[1]Tehran to FO, 16 February 1957, FO 371/127117

The US and Britain at War with each Other: The War of 1812 at Sea, USS Constitution and HMS Java

Great Britain and the United States of America have cooperated in two World Wars, the Iraq Wars and the War on Terror. When considering these military theatres it can be forgotten that these two countries have fought one-another. The War of 1812 is one such example. The growing US strength in the aftermath of the War of Independence is revealed by the two ship-on-ship engagements which I will examine. Though Britain won this war with overwhelming naval control, the USS Constitution sank two Royal Navy warships in an impressive display of seamanship.

Here, Toby Clark follows his first article in the series (here) and considers the naval battle between USS Constitution and HMS Java.

The USS Constitution and HMS Java in battle in 1812. Drawing by Nicholas Pocock.

USS Constitutionversus HMS Java

It was December and in the South Atlantic before USS Constitution caught the second British frigate. This time under the command of Commodore Bainbridge the Constitutionhad, in partnership with the much smaller USS Hornet patrolled to the port of Salvador, on Brazil’s East Coast. Leaving the Hornet to challenge the Royal Navy sloop HMS Bonne Citoyenneto a battle, Bainbridge had sailed northwards up the Brazilian coastline. The decision to leave the Hornet was taken because Bainbridge hoped that by withdrawing the Constitution, HMS Bonne Citoyennewould emerge from the port and fight. However, the Royal Navy sloop ignored the Hornet’s challenge. Ignoring a challenge might damage a ship’s reputation but HMS Bonne Citoyenne made the correct decision because her cargo contained bullion and specie, which was needed to sustain Arthur Wellesley’s Army in Spain.[1]By not fighting, HMS Bonne Citoyenne avoided USS Hornet’s Master Commandant James Laurence; the same man who would later reduce HMS Peacock to a shattered hulk but would go on to die in command of USS Chesapeake in the momentous fight with HMS Shannon. 

Aside from this matter, the important engagement occurred on December 29, 1812 as Constitution sighted HMS Java. HMS Java was identical to HMS Guerriérebecause they were both French warships originally, but pressed into British service after they were captured. Such similarities meant similar weaknesses because HMS Java, like Guerriére, had 49, 18-pounder cannons, whilst Constitutionmounted 55, 24-pounder cannons. 

Aboard HMS Java Captain Lambert decided to fight. This decision makes sense when we consider that Lambert was unaware of the destruction of HMS Guerriére; as communicating with ships at sea was extremely difficult.[2]The engagement began with Java chasing Constitutiontowards the open sea only for Bainbridge to suddenly turn towards the Java. Sailing parallel to one-another, Java on the left, or port and Constitution on the right, or starboard and the two ships remained out of range. Keeping the distance was certainly Bainbridge’s idea, knowing full well that 24-pounder cannon could outrange Java’s 18-pounders. By 14:00 PM Constitution andJava were ready for battle and the first shots boomed out across the calm sea; fired at long range by the Constitution these cannon balls struck the Java which was powerless to respond. 

The Battle Gets Fiercer

The battle was decidedly one sided for these first forty minutes. HMS Java made efforts to close the distance between the ships but each time Lambert steered to starboard, Bainbridge drew Constitution away and as a result the British cannon could not be brought to bear. Unlike the engagement with HMS Guerriérewhich Constitution began in a poor position taking heavy fire and then concluded at short range with broadsides, here Bainbridge shrewdly chose to bombard Java without putting Constitutionin harm’s way. 

Once satisfied that Java had been struck repeatedly by the heavier US cannonballs and damage sustained by the British gun crews, Bainbridge chose to bring the Constitutionalongside for the final reckoning. However, the maneuver did not go smoothly because Java was also attempting a similar move. The two ships came together with Java’s prow smashing into the rear port side of Constitution. Here was an opportunity that the British could not miss! Captain Lambert called for boarders to stream across the wooden bridge formed by Java’s jib-boom - the large mast rising above the prow - which was entangled with Constitution’s mizzen, or rear mast. This tenuous link was all the incentive the British needed as having endured an hour of maneuver where every attempt to engage was frustrated by Constitution pulling away, Lambert’s cry for boarders was eagerly answered. The pivotal moment approached as the British swept forward across Java’s deck. Faced with this charge the crew of Constitutionrose to the challenge and rapid musketry broke out from Constitution’s rigging. The British charge was doomed; not only had Captain Lambert and most of the boarders been smashed down onto Java’s deck by musket balls, the USS Constitution then pulled to starboard tearing Java’s jib-boom away and breaking free. 

With the range closed, the two ships began firing broadsides. Huge crescendos filled the air as smoke, fire and iron seared the gap between the warships. Aided by her thick wooden walls and larger cannons Constitutionkept the advantage. Below decks the cannon balls ripped great holes in the wooden walls and sent splinters through the tightly packed gun crews. The carnage was worse aboard Java as 24-pounder balls blew cannon from their mounts, smashed stairways and floors, but worse of all caused catastrophic damage to Java’s masts. By 16:00 PM Javawas a hulk, with masts down, rigging and sails draped across the deck and over the sides of the hull. Most of the crew was incapacitated including Captain Lambert, who was mortally wounded, and the British gunnery dropped away to sporadic single shots. Realizing that Javawas stricken Bainbridge turned out of range to assess damage to his own ship. 

Provided with time, the Java’s replacement commander, Lieutenant Chads, nailed the Royal Navy ensign to the stump that remained of the main mast and reorganized the ship. Unsurprisingly, Chads display of leadership was not enough and as the Constitution took up position for more broadsides, the Royal Navy ensign was hauled down. The time was 17:30 PM and HMS Java surrendered to USS Constitution.

The aftermath of the fight was a sorry affair; HMS Java was no longer seaworthy, 48 men were dying and 100 more were wounded. Due to Bainbridge’s decision to keep the Constitution out of range of the British guns for parts of the battle the US casualties were much lower, only 12 men being killed and 22 wounded. In this engagement with HMS Java‘Old Ironsides’ had once again protected her crew from the ravages of battle.

Analysis

The power of the Royal Navy was undisputed from 1805 until 1812 when the United States’ frigates targeted British warships. Here we see the primary reason for British defeat: unpreparedness. Professor Jeremy Black has suggested that the British warships were lacking a full complement of sailors which would reduce the frigates’ ability in battle.[3]This reduction in ability was due to the difficulty of firing and maneuvering a warship under fire without enough sailors for each role. The lack of sailors on board also suggests a lack of resources but the larger problem remains. By allowing the British frigates to patrol off the US coast whilst under-crewed shows unpreparedness because the US threat was deemed so weak that Royal Navy frigates were crewed for sailing rather than for fighting. This is demonstrated in the case of HMS Java which had an inexperienced crew as well as civilians on board. In light of these weaknesses, Phillip S. Meilinger concludes that HMS Javawas “hoping to avoid a fight”[4]which does not fit with the Royal Navy’s Nelsonian tradition of victory. 

The major inaccuracy in the story is the supposed equality of the USS Constitution and the British warships that she destroyed. Firstly, the Guerriéreand the Java were smaller in size and had thinner outer-walls, added to which the British cannons fired smaller projectiles which did less damage. In the case of the Guerriérethe US frigate had another advantage because the British ship was an elderly French warship and her masts were rotten and too weak for rapid changes of direction, such as tacking into the wind.[5]In another inaccuracy, the British gunnery is downplayed to the point of ineptitude. However, aboard HMS Guerriéreand HMS Java the traditional Royal Navy excellence was in place.[6]Despite this, George Canning MP and a previous Treasurer of the Navy spoke in Parliament of how the “sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures”. Canning went on to stress that this war “may not be concluded before we have re-established the character of our naval superiority, and smothered in victories the disasters which we have now to lament, and to which we are so little habituated.”[7]

Conclusion

The Royal Navy had lost two warships in foreign waters and this shocked the establishment. The loss of HMS Guerriére and HMS Java to a fledgling US Navy was the 19thCentury equivalent to HMS Repulse andHMS Prince of Wales being sunk by the new Japanese naval air arm in 1941. With time the British overwhelmed the United States Navy, blockaded the coastline, retained Canada, and burnt the White House. Signed on Christmas Eve 1814 the Treaty of Ghent ended the war and arguably came just in time for the United States.[8]

For historians this is the tale that is remembered; for example in his magnum opus,The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Paul Kennedy does not mention the US frigate victories at all. Instead Kennedy focuses upon the obvious limitations of British sea power, namely that in the future a large continental land mass like America could not be conquered by warships alone.[9]However, it remains ironic that the Royal Navy was held at bay by a warship named Constitution, evoking the document which had set North America apart from the British Empire. The British victory over the United States may have settled the relationship between the two countries, but the US successes at sea suggested an alarming future; a future which foresaw a rise of US maritime and naval power that would eclipse Britain in just over a century. 

What do you think of this naval battle? Let us know below.

[1]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships, 39.

[2]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships, 39.

[3]Jeremy Black, A British View of the Naval War of 1812 (Naval History Vol. 22 Issue 4, August 2008, pp: 16-25)

[4]Phillip S. Meilinger, Review of The Perfect Wreck—“Old Ironsides” and HMS Java: A Story of 1812by Steven Maffeo (Naval War College Review

 Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring 2012, pp: 171-172)

[5]Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812, 75-76.

[6]Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812, 77 and 99.

[7]Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,  18 February 1813:Address Respecting the War with America (Vol. 24, pp: 593-649) 

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1813/feb/18/address-respecting-the-war-with-americaDate accessed: 05/02/2019)

[8]Matthew Dennis, Reflections on a bicentennial: The War of 1812 in American Public Memory(Early American Studies Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 2014), 275. 

[9]Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin, 2017), 139.

President James Buchanan and the American Civil War: Part III: South Carolina’s Secession

James Buchanan was US President from 1857-1861. He is often considered one of the worst presidents of the US, with his presidency leading up to the US Civil War. Here, Ian Craig concludes his look at Buchanan’s presidency. He considers events around South Carolina’s secession in late 1860 and early 1861, specifically how conflict started and the role that Buchanan played.

You can read the earlier articles in the series on James Buchanan and Bleeding Kansas here, and preparing for secession here.

Fort Sumter in April 1861, with the Confederate flag flying.

On December 20, 1860, James Buchanan’s fears had come true as South Carolina seceded from the Union. The President had long foreseen the possibility that the South would take such drastic measures.  As we have seen prior, Buchanan attempted to prepare for secession, but Congress had ignored his advice and request to prepare for such an event.  Congress never raised the five regiments that the President had asked for nor did they make any efforts to enforce forts in the South.  The debate over slavery and the inability for the nation’s lawmaking body to agree on the issue left America in a divided state.  

Once Buchanan became aware of South Carolina’s treachery, he immediately ordered Major Robert Anderson, the commander of the forts in Charleston Harbor, to do nothing to provoke the situation but to stand firm.  The President advised Anderson to stay at Fort Moultrie on the mainland and to only move to the heavily fortified Fort Sumter offshore if an attack was imminent.  Buchanan believed that his orders were quite clear, however, just six days later he received word that Anderson had moved his location to Fort Sumter.  The President was perplexed by Anderson’s decision to disobey his orders.  Despite this, he believed that the major would not have left his location at Fort Moultrie unless he truly felt threatened.  As he recalls in his memoirs “the president never doubted for a moment that Major Anderson believed before movement that he had ‘tangible evidence’ of an impending attack required by his instructions.”[1]He thought it unlikely that South Carolina would initiate an attack since it had sent commissioners to Washington in order to find a peaceful solution. With that he waited for Major Anderson to send word of his decision and why he had violated orders. 

Major Anderson’s explanation was examined by Buchanan and he determined that Anderson had moved on a false alarm.  However, he could not confirm what caused the alarm because once Anderson moved, the remaining forts and all federal property in Charleston were taken over by state authorities.  On December 28, two days after the siege of federal property, Buchanan (who had not been informed of what had happened yet) received the commissioners from South Carolina as private citizens.  This was because he did not recognize the legality of secession and could not see them as ambassadors of a foreign republic.   He would listen to their requests, but it was only Congress who could receive them in the role in which they were sent. After hearing their request Buchanan wrote that “to abandon all those forts to South Carolina, on the demand of the commissioners claiming to represent her as an independent State, would have been a recognition, on the part of the Executive, of her right to secede from the Union.  This was not to be thought of for a moment.”[2] In stating this, Buchanan made it clear that he did not accept the legality of South Carolina’s secession. His strict adherence to the United States Constitution supported his decision. 

A growing divide

Even though the President had received the commissioners in good faith, South Carolina’s representatives in Congress justified their actions in Charleston, stating that Anderson had committed an act of aggression by moving his location to Fort Sumter.  They had acted in “self-defense” in seizing the remaining federal property in the city.  For this they blamed Buchanan and discredited his honor in such a way that his cabinet wrote a reply to their allegations stating, “this paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to accept it.”[3]From this point on, hostilities between Buchanan’s administration and South Carolina would increase.  In a special address to Congress about the situation in South Carolina in January 1861, despite calls for him to take direct action by the public, Buchanan wrote “I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any state…to Congress (and) to them exclusively belongs the power to declare war or to authorize the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution…I refrain them from sending reinforcements to Major Anderson who commanded the forts in Charleston Harbor, until an absolute necessity for doing so should make itself apparent…”[4]

Although his message was meant to reassure South Carolina that he would not take direct military action at the present, he still intended to collect tax revenue from the state because in his eyes, South Carolina was still part of the Union.  Senator Jefferson Davis argued against Buchanan’s failure to recognize his state’s right to secede and his ignorance to continue to collect taxes.  At that point, all of Buchanan’s hopes to negotiate with the state ended as “all friendly intercourse between them and the president, whether of a political or social character, had ceased.”[5]

Military build-up

Buchanan was not going to let the South leave under his watch. Although he strongly believed that many of the other Southern States wanted to negotiate with the North and the Federal Government, he recognized that military action may be required. Pending Congressional approval, President Buchanan had made preparations to reinforce Fort Sumter with an additional two hundred soldiers.  By December 15, the Brooklyn a heavily armed ship of war was prepared to be sent to Fort Sumter with supplies and reinforcements. Buchanan was well aware of its preparation sanctioned by the Secretary of the Navy and General Scott.  However, at the time, there was no call for alarm because the President had received a note from South Carolina insisting that they had no intention to attack the forts in Charleston Harbor.  In addition, the state had not officially seceded from the Union yet according to the Federal Government.  The Brooklynstayed ready in New York Harbor incase the situation changed in the state.[6]

When South Carolina officially cut off all negotiations with the President in early 1861, James Buchanan realized that war was imminent. He took immediate action in ordering the Brooklyn to Charleston Harbor via General Scott.  However, General Scott, after seeking the advice of a naval expert, transferred the orders to an unarmed merchant vessel Star of the West.  His reasoning was that a faster ship would provide for the element of surprise and a quick delivery of the reinforcements to Fort Sumter.  This was against the knowledge of the President, who was intent on getting troops to the fort as soon as possible.  General Scott, upon some consideration, recognized his error and immediately sent word to New York to transfer the orders back to the Brooklyn.  However, it was too late as the ship had sailed for Charleston and was beyond reach for communication.[7]

Charleston Harbor

When the Star of the West arrived in Charleston Harbor on January 9, 1861, the batteries set up in the harbor opened fire on the ship forcing it to change course and return to New York.  Its captain had been instructed to land his troops at nearby Fort Monroe and to await the Brooklyn for support in the event he was unable to land at Fort Sumter.  These orders apparently were disregarded in the haste of the retreat to sea after the attack.  Major Anderson did not return fire because he believed that the guns had been fired by mistake and not by the South Carolina governor’s orders.  He was wrong, Governor Pickens had given the order and after the attack sent a message to Anderson demanding that he surrender the fort to him.  Anderson told him that he would not surrender by any means.[8]This marked the last time that the government of the United States under James Buchanan attempted to use military action to secure Charleston Harbor via Fort Sumter.  

Between January and February, before Abraham Lincoln’s inauguration, James Buchanan could only stand by and watch as the nation dissolved around him.  He grew irritated over Congress’s lack of action in declaring war against the South or in giving him the powers to do so.  Buchanan believed that Congress and Congress alone had the authority to authorize him as commander-in chief to take direct action.  He states that it was the “imperative duty of Congress to furnish the President or his successor the means of repelling force by force, should this become necessary to preserve the Union.  They, nevertheless, refused to perform this duty as much pertinacity as they had manifested in rebuilding all measures of compromise.”[9]

Unfortunately for James Buchanan, the South at the time still had a dominant presence in Congress and the string of events had created confusion within the other states.  Therefore, little could be accomplished as the nation’s governing body had been divided by secession.  It was only after Buchanan had left office, under a new Congress, the powers that Buchanan had wanted were given to his successor Abraham Lincoln.[10]

What do you think of James Buchanan’s actions during the secession of South Carolina? Let us know below.

[1]James Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan’s Administration on the Eve of Rebellion, (Scituate: Digital Scanning Inc, 1866/2009): 120. 

[2]Buchanan, 121. 

[3]Buchanan, 121. 

[4]Irving Sloan, James Buchanan: 1791-1868, (New York: Oceana Publishers, 1968): 82-84. 

[5]Buchanan, 85.

[6]Buchanan, 110.

[7]Buchanan, 126.

[8]Buchanan, 127

[9]Buchanan, 102. 

[10]Buchanan, 102. 

The US and Britain at War with Each Other: Royal Navy Defeats in the War of 1812

Great Britain and the United States of America have cooperated in two World Wars, the Iraq Wars and the War on Terror. When considering these military theatres it can be forgotten that these two countries have fought one-another. The War of 1812 is one such example. The growing US strength in the aftermath of the War of Independence is revealed by the two ship-on-ship engagements which I will examine. Though Britain won this war with overwhelming naval control, the USS Constitution sank two Royal Navy warships in an impressive display of seamanship.

Here, Toby Clark considers the background to the War of 1812 and the battle between the USS Constitution and HMS Guerriére.

A painting showing the USS Constitution battling HMS Guerriere. By Anton Otto Fischer.

Background to war

The naval war was driven by the British Royal Navy’s aggressive impressment of United States’ Navy sailors into British service.[1]In fact, the British warships would stop and send Marines aboard the American ship and forcibly remove Royal Navy deserters. In naval terms, impressment is the term for forced servitude on board ship and is best known from ‘press-gangs’ which searched harbor towns for Royal Navy recruits. In his popular study of the USS Constitution Donald Macintyre views the British infringement on the United States’ shipping as deeply wounding to American national pride.[2]Today this diplomatic incident may have resulted in increased naval activity or tense diplomatic discussions but in 1812 the only viable option for the US Government was war. This decision could not be taken lightly by the United States because the Royal Navy was not only highly skilled but also superior in size. For instance, at the outbreak of war the Royal Navy had 83 warships in American waters, and by 1813 this number had increased to 129 warships, including a number of 74 gunned ships of the line.[3]Macintyre makes the point that only a fraction of the Royal Navy would be dispatched to the US; but regardless of British focus on Napoleon in Europe, victory against the United States seemed to be assured.[4]

In contrast to the Royal Navy, the United States Navy appeared woefully inadequate. However, whilst the US Navy was hopelessly outnumbered there were three initial advantages. Firstly, the US Navy was fighting in home waters in close proximity to friendly harbors which meant that repairing and resupplying ships was straightforward. Compare this to the British, who had to sail across the Atlantic Ocean to Britain or northwards to Halifax in Canada in order to reach home bases. This was a key component of A. T. Mahan’s famous thesis on sea power which predicted victory for a navy with closer port facilities.[5]Secondly, the crews of the US ships were well-trained and led by officers who possessed skill and ability. Captain Isaac Hull, Commodore Stephen Decatur and Commodore William Bainbridge are notable figures who each gained successes against the British and whose actions will feature shortly. Thirdly, the US had commissioned a new fleet of frigates whose size and armament was superior to the Royal Navy’s frigates. As an example, a typical British frigate HMS Java carried 49, 18-pounder cannons whilst the USS United States mounted 55, 24-pounder cannon.[6]Clearly, the American frigate, which was a sister-ship to the USS Constitution, possessed a firepower advantage in both numbers and size of shot. So with these local advantages the US frigate fleet put to sea; let us focus on the USS Constitution.

USS Constitution versus HMS Guerriére

Interestingly, the first confrontation between the USS Constitutionand the Royal Navy took the form of a wager back in 1798. Challenged by a Royal Navy frigate, Constitution agreed to race into the wind for one day and the winner would receive a cask of Madeira, a highly desirable fortified wine. The US trumped the British in the race, thus foreshadowing later US successes. 

The first battle under examination was fought by the Constitutionon August 19, 1812 when Captained by Isaac Hull, the USS Constitution met Captain James Dacre’s HMS Guerriére whilst patrolling off Nova Scotia. If the British were confident of victory before the battle, they certainly had a right to be pleased once the engagement began. With a better initial position, HMS Guerriére was able to fire broadsides at the Constitution whilst the US frigate was still attempting to maneuver alongside. The British held the advantage because whilst the Constitutionremained to the rear of the British frigate, the US crew held their fire. In contrast, the British loaded and fired but without much effect.[7]

At this point however the battle turned as Isaac Hull brought the Constitution alongside the Guerriéreand finally authorized the cannon to open fire. Having held a slim advantage up to this point HMS Guerriére was unable to out-maneuver the Constitution because Captain Dacre worried that his ships rotten masts would not handle the strain.[8]Unable to escape from Isaac Hull’s grasp, the greater size of the crew, armor and armament of the US frigate left the Royal Navy warship riddled with jagged holes. Furthermore, following deliberate targeting by the US cannon Guerriére’s masts had been felled and the British frigate was motionless. Having fired a number of broadsides into the stricken warshipHull accepted the British surrender from Captain James Dacre. The battle was over and the Americans’ had suffered fourteen casualties, compared to the British with seventy eight casualties.[9]

The imbalance in casualties can be attributed to superior US gunnery which was faster and more accurate, and the construction of the Constitution meant that British rounds did not penetrate. It is worth mentioning that USS Constitution’s nickname, ‘Old Ironsides’, was borne of her wooden walls which were thick enough to cause British cannon balls to bounce-off. The result was further illustrated by the need to scuttle the British warship because the damage was so severe that towing the prize back to the US was impossible. The once proud HMS Guerriére was set alight and left to burn in the lonely ocean.

The second and final part of the series is here.

What do you think of this naval battle? Let us know below.

[1]Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,  18 February 1813:Address Respecting the War with America (Vol. 24, pp: 593-649) 

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1813/feb/18/address-respecting-the-war-with-americaDate accessed: 05/02/2019)

[2]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships (London: Hamlyn, 1975), 36.

[3]Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), 196 and 243.

[4]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships, 36.

[5]Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783(The Project Gutenberg eBook: September 26, 2004, accessed: 22/04/2019. Originally published: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 535.

[6]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships, 39 and 43.

[7]Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812, 77.

[8]Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812, 75-76.

[9]Donald Macintyre, Famous Fighting Ships, 39.

History of Art in the Soviet Union: Propaganda, Rebellion, and Freedom in Socialist Realism

Art in the Soviet Union underwent a number of phases – from great restriction in Stalin’s time to some more open, less restricted periods in the decades after. Here, Alyse D. Beale provides an overview of the history of art in the USSR, with a focus on Socialist Realism art.

Lenin in Smolny in 1917 by Isaak Brodsky. An example of Socialist Realism.

As with all else under Joseph Stalin’s domain, arts within the Soviet Union glistened with the red tinge of communist propaganda. Whereas Realism in the West sought to illustrate an unromanticized vision of daily life, Socialist Realism employed its artists as propagandists. Soviet authorities ordered countless works of herculean factory workers, the victorious motherland in all its monumental glory, and its robust leaders strolling the Kremlin. Yet with Stalin’s death, Soviet art evolved parallel to its country, becoming at once more democratic, realistic, and rebellious. Socialist Realism, once created as propaganda for a political machine, later became a tool for working against the very regime that created it.

We recommend you view:Gerasimov, Aleksandr MikhailovichI.V.Stalin and K.E.Voroshilov in the Kremlin after the Rain (1938). 296х386. https://painting-planet.com/iv-stalin-and-voroshilov-in-the-kremlin-by-alexander-gerasimov/

What is Socialist Realism?

Socialist Realism in its early form was not so much art, but a political machine that sought to indoctrinate every citizen with communist ideology. The movement first appeared in 1932 at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers and was later adopted as the Soviet Union's official and sole art form two years later when the Soviet Writer's Congress outlined the criteria for all future works for art. Socialist Realism, as Karl Radekexplained during the Congress, meant a reflection of "that other, new reality -- the reality of socialism...moving towards the victory of the international proletariat…[and a] literature of hatred for putrefying capitalism."

We recommend you view:Mikhail Khmelko.The Triumph of the Victorious Mother-Motherland (1949) . https://01varvara.wordpress.com/2015/07/15/mikhail-khmelko-the-triumph-of-the-victorious-mother-motherland-1949/

The Writer's Congress mandated that Socialist Realism embody the Soviets' vision of themselves and their future. The movement emphasized monumental sculptures and buildings to depict the country’s strength and wealth. Bold music prompted workers to action, and paintings displayed cheerful workers, happy peasants, or aggrandized leaders, such as Stalin and Lenin. Each work of art had to meet four requirements: it must be proletariat, typical, realistic, and partisan. Each artwork must show a connection to the proletariat on a basic level, meaning that they be simple to understand and depict scenes from the common man rather than the bourgeoisie. More importantly, each work ought to be partisan, an unquestionable endorsement of the communist party. Socialist Realism left no room for interpretation; it was either total support for the regime, or it was treason.

Art in Thaw

Stalin's death ushered in a somewhat freer era, popularly known as "the thaw" under his successor, Nikita Khrushchev. Though arts within the Soviet Union remained restricted, Stalin's death allowed many new artists to enter the scene. Existing artists, too, embraced this more relaxed atmosphere and created more freely and originally. 

As the country underwent a de-Stalinization, authorities altered works to eliminate Stalin's likeness. The Stalinskaya Station was renamed as Semenovskaya, and removed the dictator's portrait and quote from its walls. At Belorusskaja Station, the new regime replaced a mosaic of Stalin with a red labor flag. 

We recommend you view:On left, Stalinskaya Station. On right, the renamed Semenovskaya Station with Stalin's head removed.  Eugenia. "Moscow Underground Without Stalin - See The Gaps." Real USSR: Lifting the Iron Curtain. March 2, 2010. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://www.realussr.com/ussr/moscow-underground-without-stalin-see-the-gaps/. ​

Because the USSR remained highly censorious, even during “the thaw,” many artists opted to create truly realistic works that avoided any political references at all. Other artists and writers, such as V. Dudintsev who penned Not By Bread Alone, an indirect criticism of the regime, pushed the limits of what Khrushchev would allow as art, and helped pave the way for the late Socialist Realism movement.

Though Khrushchev publically supported more liberal policies concerning the arts, he often contradicted himself, which inadvertently popularized the later, more defiant movement. When the 1957 All World Festival of Youth introduced the USSR to an array of American modern and pop art, Khrushchev denounced it and martyred artists unwilling to conform to state guidelines. 

Late Socialist Realism garnered even more support when authorities ended a 1974 art show with bulldozers and a show of force. Government critics thereafter renamed the event as the "Bulldozer Exhibition." These actions divided art within the Soviet Union into two sects: official and unofficial. While the official state art remained Socialist Realism, unofficial art became more rebellious.

A Painted Rebellion

The Severe Style and Sots Art were two artistic movements that grew from Soviet artists’ rebellion against traditional Socialist Realism. While the Severe Style under Khrushchev’s rule critiqued the government implicitly, the later Sots Art movement grew increasingly blatant in their criticisms, and even mockery of, the Soviet Union.

The Severe Style portrayed Socialist Realism much more realistically than the overly propagandized, early works. Late Socialist Realism became more pessimistic in their view of the working class and embraced western styles of Expressionism. Many artists, sick of communist ideology, refused to paint any topics resembling works done under Stalin at all. Instead, they opted to create depictions of daily life or images that represented change in their country. The Severe Style favored construction sites for this reason, as it implied support for a newer, freer country.

We recommend you view:Bohouš Cizek.Untitled (circa 1960). http://www.eleutheria.cz/socpresent.php?lang=en&image=023

Technically the fusion of Soviet and Pop Art, the Sots Art movement was a complete rejection of the state-sponsored Socialist Realism. Sots Art is defined by its satirical nature and inclusion of Pop Art as a means of criticizing Soviet policies. Art critics claimed that Sots Art pieces, such as those done by Komar and Melimid (famous for their representation of Stalin sitting aside E.T., with a hiding Hitler in the shadows) were "at once subversive and nostalgic." It was a "manifestation of so-called styob, which can be translated as a kind of 'mockery' that involves miming something to such a degree that the original and the parody become indistinguishable."

We recommend you view:Komar & Melamid.Yalta Conference (1982).Tempera and oil on canvas, 72”X48”. http://russian.psydeshow.org/images/komar-melamid.htm

Art in Transition

Late Socialist Realism became a channel for protest, but also a symbol of their society’s transition to becoming, though with varying degrees, more democratic, realistic, and free.

Perhaps Soviet artists' boldest move was exposing the lie of happiness under Stalin's totalitarian regime. They did so not by political sabotage or physical rebellion, but by implementing ink and paint to portray what life was truly like for the ordinary Soviet citizen. Late Socialist Realism took no part in "heroic idealization of the working man," as Stalin had. These new artists exposed the monotony, drudgery, and grime of factories and fields if they chose this subject at all.

We recommend you view: Ivan Babenko. Waiting, set in 1945 at the end of WWII (1975-1985). Oil on canvas, 123x167 cm.

https://kieramotorina.tumblr.com/post/118353730352/week-8-waiting-ivan-babenko-1945

Late Soviet art became more democratic in the sense that it became available to all, rather than just state-sanctioned artists. Shortly after Stalin's death, the first public art competition took place, accepting submissions anonymously and allowing non-established artists to enter. Even the jury had become more democratic, composed of those with various professions and without allegiances and vested interests.

Embers to Flames

Socialist Realism ended with the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Artists, glad to be free from a controlling communist regime, began creating works independently from the state. It seemed as though all were glad to forget Soviet art and life in general. A "fatigue" of anything remotely Soviet led many to dismantle and hide works of Socialist Realism.

Recently, however, the discussion of Socialist Realism has gone from "stultifyingly boring" to trendy. Art collectors and Russian moguls began snatching Socialist Realism pieces, interested more in their history than in the artists' ideologies or techniques. Such pieces have been put on display around the world, featured in exhibitions from Berlin to London and even Minneapolis. One article, interestingly named "Socialist realism: Socialist in content, capitalist in price," dubbed 2014 "the year of socialist realism." The article described a 2014 Sotheby's auction that featured around forty Socialist Realism works, but the exhibition was only one of many. A June 2014 auction estimated that about twenty-four of the pieces were collectively worth about $7.7 million. Socialist Realism, once a tabooed subject of art history, gained a universal interest in a way that it failed to do even in its prime.

We recommend you view:Yuri Ivanovich Pimenov.First of May Celebration (1950)
This work, celebration International Worker's Day, was sold for 1.5 million by Sothebys London. https://tmora.org/2009/02/02/russkiy-salon-select-favorites-and-newly-revealed-works/yuri-ivanovich-pimenov-first-of-may-celebration-1950-132x300/

What do you think of Socialist Realism? Let us know below.

References

1. Eugenia. "Moscow Underground Without Stalin - See The Gaps." Real USSR: Lifting the Iron Curtain. March 2, 2010. Accessed December 6, 2015. 

2. Hosking, Geoffrey A. The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.409.

3. Khidekel, Regina. It's the Real Thing: Soviet & Post-Soviet Sots Art & American Pop Art. Minneapolis, Minn.: Frederick R. Weisman Art Museum :, 1998. P. 19.

4. Lindsay, Ivan. "Socialist Realism." Agents | Dealers - An Authority on Russian Art. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://www.russianartdealer.com/socialist-realism/.

5. Neumeyer, Joy. "Socialist Realism’s Russian Renaissance." Socialist Realism's Russian Renaissance. May 19, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://www.artnews.com/2014/05/19/socialist-realism-has-a-russian-renaissance/.

6. Pyzik, Agata. "Get Real: Why Socialist Realist Painting Deserves Another Look." The Calvert Journal. December 18, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://calvertjournal.com/articles/show/3475/socialist-realism-Soviet-official-painting.

7. Radek, Karl. "Contemporary World Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art." Karl Radek: Contemporary World Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art (August 1934). Accessed December 6, 2015. https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm#s7

8. "Reflections: Socialist Realism and Russian Art." Guggenheim. https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/reflections-socialist-realism-and-russian-art.

9. "Socialist Realism History, Characteristics of Political Propaganda Art." Encyclopedia of Art Education. Accessed December 6, 2015. 

10. Thorpe, Vanessa. New Exhibition in Berlin Brings Forgotten Soviet Art Back to Reality. October 24, 2009. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/oct/25/soviet-art-painting-berlin-exhibition.http://www.visual-arts-cork.com/history-of-art/socialist-realism.htm.

11. Vinogradova, Yulia. "Socialist Realism: Socialist in Content, Capitalist in Price." Socialist Realism: Socialist in Content, Capitalist in Price. July 24, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://rbth.com/arts/2014/07/24/socialist_realism_socialist_in_content_capitalist_in_price_38351.html.