Three Times Russia was Invaded in History

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and the conflict continues to this day, with many commentators predicting it will last well into 2024 and maybe even beyond that. But Russia has been involved in a number of invasions of its territory - here, Michael Thomas Leibrandt looks at 3 times that Russia was invaded in history.

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow by Adolph Northen, painting from 1851.

The Ukrainian counter-offensive against the Russian military continues. Last month, the Ukranian military launched a counter strike in the Zaporizhzhia region.

The counter-offensive is in response to the ongoing war in Ukraine which began with a Russian invasion. On February 24, 2022, Russian forces supported by tanks began an invasion of Ukraine from northeastern, southeastern, and southern fronts. Underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainian people, the support of the western powers, and major military tactical mistakes all had effectively stalled the Russian invasion.

Russia has a long history of repelling invaders themselves.

Invasions of Russia

Genghis Khan had long planned to invade Russia before he ordered his grandson, Batu Khan to make it a reality. In the late months of 1236 AD, Khan led approximately 40,000 mounted archers across the Volga Bulgaria and conquered Kievan Rus.

By the end of 1241 AD, the Mongols had conquered almost all Russian cities, including Kiev. The Mongol army was adept at withstanding the Russian winter conditions, and only supply issues prevented them from conquering all of Russian territories at that time.

The Mongols who settled in Russia became known as the Golden Horde and ruled for almost 250 years. The Mongol invasion led to the construction of mighty stone castles all over Russia, many of which still stand today.

In 1380 AD at the Battle of Kulikovo, the Russian army defeated the Mongol Horde. The victory led to the expulsion of the Mongols in Russia. Over time, Russia would reclaim territory controlled by the Mongol Golden Horde.

But Khan was not the only famous invader of Russia.

French invasion

On June 24, 1812 and leading the largest invasion force that Europe had ever seen, Napoleon Bonaparte (Emporer of France and the Master of Europe) crossed the Nieman River into Russia with nearly 600,000 men.

Over the course of the next six months, Russian forces baited the massive invading army into a war of attrition. After capturing a deserted Moscow, Napoleon’s army would suffer horribly during a retreat that exposed his troops to supply shortages, severe winter weather conditions, and calculated guerrilla tactics by Russian Cossacks.

Of the original invading force, 380,000 of Napoleon’s troops would perish before the last of the his army crossed the Berezina River into French territory and burned the bridges behind them on November 28th. Invading Russia was the beginning of the end for the man who conquered almost all of Europe. In October of 1813 in Germany at the Battle of Leipzig, Napoleon suffered a defeat by a coalition army that included Russian forces.

World War II

One hundred and twenty-nine years later on June 22, 1941 nearly 4,000,000 troops from Germany and its allies under Operation Barbarossa began their attack on Russia around the Caspian Sea. Just like in 1812, it was the largest invasion force that Europe had ever seen including over 7,000 artillery pieces, 2,500 aircraft, and around 3,000 tanks.

Culminating in February 1943 and the Russian victory at the Battle of Stalingrad, Operation Barbarossa suffered through multiple brutal winters, was rife with logistical problems, and a failed vision of a short campaign without clear and attainable capitulation.

All very similar oversights that Emporer Napoleon would make a century earlier.

And like the French retreat in freezing temperatures in 1812, the surviving German soldiers who had not surrendered to the Red Army, killed, or captured, were pushed back across the Dneiper River in 1943 and eventually into Prussia and Germany. The Russian Red Army would take Berlin in May 1945.

Of the three major world powers that have invaded Russia since 1236 AD, all have eventually been repelled. Germany and Napoleonic France were forced into eventual capitulation in part by Russian forces.

Russia’s vast history will loom large as their military prepares for defense against Ukrainian forces. They have only to look at their own ancient, defensive stone castles built centuries ago when Russia needed to defend itself, much like Ukraine.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, PA.

The San Francisco Earthquake of 1906: A History

The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 had huge impacts on the city. The earthquake measured 7.9, with over 3,000 lives lost and some 80% of the city destroyed. Richard Bluttal explains.

Fire in San Francisco following the 1906 earthquake.

At the turn of the twentieth century, San Francisco’s most striking physical feature was the great multitude of boats and ships crowded along the city’s waterfront and extending far into San Francisco Bay. Communication, transportation, and above all trade and commerce had been the key ingredients in transforming barren, wind-swept hills and sand dunes into a bustling metropolis.

The newspaper correspondent Jack London was relaxing in his home when word was delivered to him from his employer Colliers Magazine. He was requested to go to the scene of the disaster and write the story of what he saw. London started at once, he sent the dramatic description of the tragic events he witnessed in the burning city.

“The earthquake shook down in San Francisco hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of walls and chimneys. But the conflagration that followed burned up hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of property  There is no estimating within hundreds of millions the actual damage wrought. Not in history has a modern imperial city been so completely destroyed. San Francisco is gone. Nothing remains of it but memories and a fringe of dwelling-houses on its outskirts. Its industrial section is wiped out. Its business section is wiped out. Its social and residential section is wiped out. The factories and warehouses, the great stores and newspaper buildings, the hotels and the palaces of the nabobs, are all gone. Remains only the fringe of dwelling houses on the outskirts of what was once San Francisco.

Smoke

Within an hour after the earthquake shock the smoke of San Francisco's burning was a lurid tower visible a hundred miles away. And for three days and nights this lurid tower swayed in the sky, reddening the sun, darkening the day, and filling the land with smoke. “

On Wednesday morning at a quarter past five came the earthquake. A minute later the flames were leaping upward in a dozen different quarters south of Market Street, in the working-class ghetto, and in the factories, fires started. There was no opposing the flames. There was no organization, no communication. All the cunning adjustments of a twentieth century city had been smashed by the earthquake. The streets were humped into ridges and depressions and piled with the debris of fallen walls. The steel rails were twisted into perpendicular and horizontal angles. The telephone and telegraph systems were disrupted. And the great water mains had burst. All the shrewd contrivances and safeguards of man had been thrown out of gear by thirty seconds' twitching of the earth-crust….”  

George Bernard Musson, captain of the S.S. Henley, a British steamer was at port in San Francisco at the time of earthquake. The ship served as a floating refugee camp for many displaced by the earthquake and subsequent fires that engulfed the city. He wrote this letter to his mother on April 21, 1906, three days after the quake.

          “My dearest Mother,

...If you picture the scenes described and imagine the horrors a thousand times greater you will still know less than I have personally witnessed. The shock threw me from side to side in my bed and I thought our engines were blown up until I reached the deck and even in that short space of time smoke was breaking out from 100 places in the town and of course all water conduits were destroyed so that little could be done to save the city from the terrific sea of flames which swept and roared from block to block....

This is the most hideous catastrophe that has ever happened to any city and thousands still be buried beneath the smoldering ruins. I have got a large number of homeless people aboard and the tales of woe are fit to break any human heart….

One sweet old lady onboard saved only her umbrella and a cage of pet canaries together with the clothes she wears. Others have nothing but what they had time to put on, motherless children and childless women are here, the old and aged and young are all here, high born and low are all one class and I shame to say it, but the women are more cheerful in all their grief than the men....

I have been condensing day and night and have supplied tens of thousands with water to drink. Fancy people walking miles and miles through blazing streets to get a drink of water and a bite to eat....

Oh, the brave deeds will never be all known and neither will the despicable nature of others. Justice is swift and sure now and all are shot down on sight who refuse to work when called upon, or thieves, or for molesting women.

From Poor Old Burns. “

5:12 a.m. April 18, 1906

At almost precisely 5:12 a.m., local time, a foreshock occurred with sufficient force to be felt widely throughout the San Francisco Bay area. The great earthquake broke loose some 20 to 25 seconds later, with an epicenter near San Francisco. Violent shocks punctuated the strong shaking which lasted some 45 to 60 seconds. The earthquake was felt from southern Oregon to south of Los Angeles and inland as far as central Nevada. The highest Modified Mercalli Intensities (MMI's) of VII to IX paralleled the length of the rupture, extending as far as 80 kilometers inland from the fault trace. One important characteristic of the shaking intensity noted in Lawson's (1908) report was the clear correlation of intensity with underlying geologic conditions. Areas situated in sediment-filled valleys sustained stronger shaking than nearby bedrock sites, and the strongest shaking occurred in areas where ground reclaimed from San Francisco Bay failed in the earthquake.

Duration: 45 to 60 seconds -Fault: The San Andreas Fault – earthquake Damage Cost: more than $400 million in 1906 dollars –  Strength: 7.9-8.3

The shock was violent in the region about the Bay of San Francisco, and with few exceptions inspired all who felt it with alarm and consternation. In the cities many people were injured or killed, and in some cases persons became mentally deranged, as a result of the disasters which immediately ensued from the commotion of the earth. The manifestations of the earthquake were numerous and varied. It resulted in the general awakening of all people asleep, and many were thrown from their beds. In the zone of maximum disturbance persons who were awake and attending to their affairs were in many cases thrown to the ground. Many persons heard rumbling sounds immediately before feeling the shock. Some who were in the fields report having seen the violent swaying of trees so that their top branches seemed to touch the ground, and others saw the passage of undulations of the soil. Several cases are reported in which people suffered from nausea as a result of the swaying of the ground. Many cattle were thrown to the ground, and in some instances horses with riders in the saddle were similarly thrown.

In the inanimate world the most common and characteristic effects were the rattling of windows, the swaying of doors, and the rocking and shaking of houses. Pendant fixtures were caused to swing back and forth or in more or less elliptical orbits. Pendulum clocks stopped. Furniture and other loose objects in rooms were suddenly displaced. Brick chimneys fell very generally. Buildings were in many instances partially or completely wrecked; others were shifted on their foundations without being otherwise seriously damaged. Many water tanks were thrown to the ground. Springs were affected either temporarily or permanently, some being diminished, others increased in flow. Landslides were caused on steep slopes, and on the bottom lands of the streams the soft aluminum  was in many places caused to crack and to lurch, producing often very considerable deformations of the surface. This deformation of the soil was an important cause of damage and wreckage of buildings situated in such tracts. Railway tracks were buckled and broken. In timbered areas in the zone of maximum disturbance many large trees were thrown to the ground and in some cases, they were snapped off above the ground.

Cause of the Earthquake

The 1906 earthquake preceded the development of the Richter magnitude by three decades. The most widely accepted estimate for the magnitude of the quake on the modern moment magnitude scale  is 7.9; values from 7.7 to as high as 8.3 have been proposed. According to findings published in the  Journal of Geophysical Research, severe deformations in the Earth’s crust took place both before and after the earthquake’s impact. Accumulated strain on the faults in the system was relieved during the earthquake, which is the supposed cause of the damage along the 280-mile-long (450 km) segment of the San Andreas plate boundary. The 1906 rupture propagated both northward and southward for a total of 296 miles (476 km). Shaking was felt from Oregon to Los Angeles, and as far inland as central Nevada.

The only aftershock in the first few days of near M 5 or greater occurred near Santa Cruz at 14:28 PST on April 18, with a magnitude of about 4.9 M. The largest aftershock happened at 01:10 PST on April 23, west of Eureka with an estimated magnitude of about 6.7 MI , with another of the same size more than three years later at 22:45 PST on October 28 near Cape Mendocino.

Remotely triggered events included an earthquake swarm in the Imperial Valley area, which culminated in an earthquake of about 6.1 MI  at 16:30 PST on April 18, 1906. Another event of this type occurred at 12:31 PST on April 19, 1906, with an estimated magnitude of about 5.0 MI , and an epicenter beneath Santa Monica Bay.

The Structural and Human Damage

The massive earthquake that struck San Francisco on April 18, 1906, destroyed hundreds of buildings in a little over a minute. When the shaking stopped, most of the city was intact, though damaged. That would soon change as one of history’s greatest urban firestorms swept over San Francisco. In the course of three days, 28,188 buildings burned. Virtually all of these buildings were totally destroyed. Nearly 25,000 wood buildings burned to the ground. Fire gutted the interiors of brick buildings. Many of these buildings collapsed completely. Others were reduced to burned-out shells. Although a great many brick buildings came through the earthquake relatively unscathed, losing perhaps cornices or parts of their facades, when fire burned through their floors and internal framing, their walls fractured and fell. Only the most stoutly constructed brick buildings remained structurally intact. Some of the city’s steel-frame and supposedly fireproof buildings also succumbed to the fire. They suffered severe structural damage as under-fireproofed steel buckled and deformed in the intense heat. When the fire finally burned itself out, the commercial, financial, and residential core of the West Coast’s leading city was in ruins.

The earthquake and fires killed an estimated 3,000 people and left half of the city's 400,000 residents homeless.

The earthquake and fire hit the poorest San Franciscans the hardest. On the eve of the quake, the poorest workers lived in old, run-down boarding houses and apartments. Employment was scarce and poorly paid. Working families, especially those living in the south of Market Street neighborhood, often stretched their incomes by taking borders into their already crowded homes. The flimsy construction of these neighborhoods guaranteed their destruction by the quake and fire. With most housing burnt to the ground, rents immediately soared 350%, and in 1910 were still 71% higher than pre-fire rates. Women faced especially severe problems, as their manufacturing and service employments disappeared along with the income they had received for cooking, cleaning, and laundering for lodgers. Asian San Franciscans faced additional barriers to survival. In the weeks following the disaster, Chinese refugees remained segregated and were relocated four times by city and military officials in response to whites who refused to share space with the much-despised Asians. Although ultimately unsuccessful in their efforts, city developers seized upon the destruction of Chinatown, located on some of the most valuable property in the city, as the perfect solution to ridding the city of Asians once and for all. Asian San Franciscans were totally excluded from official relief efforts.

Although the impact of the earthquake on San Francisco was the most famous, the earthquake also inflicted considerable damage on several other cities. These include San Jose and Santa Rosa, the entire downtown of which was essentially destroyed.

The Cleanup

Despite its utter devastation, San Francisco quickly recovered thanks to the help of some mighty machinery. Considered modern technology at the time, steam-powered equipment helped clean up the mess caused by the quake. Large Holt and Best steam tractors helped clear the immense amount of rubble, in an effort to help people and businesses reclaim what was lost. The use of these machines, in its own small way, led to the rebirth of San Francisco.

The survivors slept in tents in city parks and the Presidio, stood in long lines for food, and were required to do their cooking in the street to minimize the threat of additional fires. On April 19th, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Torney, commanding officer of the Presidio’s Army General Hospital, telegrammed Washington, D.C. with the alarming news, “Medical Supply Depot was destroyed totally.” He requested immediate shipment of first aid supplies. The Army General Hospital fared better than those in the city and opened its doors to civilians. An Army Field Hospital sent from the East and 26 medical dispensaries also provided free medical care to thousands of civilians throughout the city. Based on the army's experience in the 1906 disaster, clear and formal policies were developed regarding civil relief and the Army's relationship with the Red Cross was formally defined. Food donations began arriving in San Francisco almost immediately. However, prohibitions against fires forbade people from cooking.

By April 23rd, less than one week after the earthquake, the Citizen's Relief Committee was overcome by the food distribution efforts and the mayor asked the army to take over. General Greely, now back in San Francisco, initially refused Mayor Schmitz's request to manage food distribution. It was only after prodding by members of the Committee of Fifty that Greely agreed to set up nine food depots. Each civilian was fed the equivalent of three-quarters of an Army enlisted man's rations. On April 30th more than 300,000 people were fed at these commissary food stations. The Army commissary later assisted in organizing and opening relief restaurants.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, an estimated 75,000 citizens simply left San Francisco. The remaining homeless population of 250,000 established makeshift camps in park areas and amidst the burnt-out ruins of city buildings. As fires burned across the eastern side of the city, refugees migrated west towards Golden Gate Park and the Presidio seeking food and shelter. Eventually, the Army would house 20,000 refugees in military-style tent camps—including 16,000 at the Presidio.

Soon, the refugee camps became small and highly organized tent towns, where, according to some reports, "The people are well cared for and are taking things as happily and philosophically as if they were out on a summer's camping trip." Despite their recent hardships, refugees in the camps quickly established routines of regular life. Children formed playgroups in the camps and dining halls became a center of social gatherings. These camps emptied as the city was rebuilt. The Presidio camps were dismantled first, closing in June 1906.

Immediately following the 1906 disaster, risks to public health were very real. The lack of clean water supplies, the broken sewage system, and accumulating garbage and debris led to high rates of typhoid and smallpox. To avoid a panic that could harm relief efforts, health officials dealt with the problem of disease discreetly. Those disease outbreaks were controlled by late 1906.

Response and Aftermath

Almost immediately after the quake (and even during the disaster), planning and reconstruction plans were hatched to quickly rebuild the city. Rebuilding funds were immediately tied up by the fact that virtually all the major banks had been sites of the conflagration, requiring a lengthy wait of seven to ten days before their fire-proof vaults could cool sufficiently to be safely opened. The Bank of Italy (now Bank of America) had evacuated its funds and was able to provide liquidity in the immediate aftermath. Its president also immediately chartered and financed the sending of two ships to return with shiploads of lumber from Washington and Oregon mills which provided the initial reconstruction materials and surge. During the first few days after news of the disaster reached the rest of the world, relief efforts reached over $5,000,000. London raised hundreds of thousands of dollars. Individual citizens and businesses donated large sums of money for the relief effort: Standard Oil  and Andrew Carnegie each gave $100,000; the Dominion of Canada made a special appropriation of $100,000; and even the The Bank of Candad in Ottawa gave $25,000. The U.S. government quickly voted for one million dollars in relief supplies which were immediately rushed to the area, including supplies for food kitchens and many thousands of tents that city dwellers would occupy the next several years.

Congress responded to the disaster in several ways. The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees enacted emergency appropriations for the city to pay for food, water, tents, blankets, and medical supplies in the weeks following the earthquake and fire. They also appropriated funds to reconstruct many of the public buildings that were damaged or destroyed.

Other congressional responses included the House Claims Committee handling claims from owners seeking reimbursement for destroyed property. For example, the committee received claims from the owners of several saloons and liquor stores, whose supplies of alcoholic spirits were destroyed by law enforcement officers trying to minimize the spread of fires and threat of mob violence. In the days following the earthquake, officials destroyed an estimated $30,000 worth of intoxicating liquors.

Conclusion

The earthquake, despite its tragic destruction, birthed our modern understanding of earthquakes in the United States. Extensive research in the aftermath of the 1906 earthquake led to the formulation of the elastic-rebound theory related to earthquake source by Reid (1910). With the theory of plate tectonics coming more than 50 years after the earthquake, it’s appropriate to say this event helped to motivate and develop a better understanding of how such earthquakes come about.

A commission of over 25 geologists, seismologists, and other scientists worked to provide The Report of the State Earthquake Investigation Commission, published in May of 1906, with a subsequent report published by Lawson in 1908. The 1908 publication is widely believed to be the most extensive and influential single earthquake reports.

Do you have any thoughts in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake? If so, let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

The Thunder of Silence: Oklahoma City Bombing

In April 1995 a shocking event took place in Oklahoma City. Here, Jennifer Dawson looks at the Oklahoma City Bombing and what happened in the years after.

The aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing in April 1995.

Imagine your typical Wednesday morning. The sky is clear, the city's hustling, and it feels like any other day. Then, at exactly 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, the clock stops. A massive boom echoes, like a terrifying thunder clap in the heart of downtown Oklahoma City. The nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building shatters into a thousand pieces.

From Normalcy to Nightmare

On this grim day, a truck packed with explosives erupted in front of the building, ripping off its entire north wall. It wasn’t special-effects magic for a movie scene; it was painfully real. The terrifying blast caused a domino effect, damaging and destroying more than 300 buildings in the vicinity. The echo of the blast was not just heard--no--it was felt, reshaping the lives of countless individuals.

Race Against Time

Later that day, and for the agonizing two weeks that ensued, emergency crews from all over the United States swarmed to Oklahoma City; a unified mission to search, rescue and heal tightly wrapped around their hearts. When the dust finally settled, the catastrophic toll was horrific--168 people tragically lost their lives in the blast. Among the victims, 19 were young, innocent children, a day care center their final playground.

Legal Aid Arrived 

Amidst the cardiac trauma, physical injuries weighed heavily on survivors. More than 650 people endured the searing agony of burns and injuries; the scars etched on their bodies a permanent reminder of the nightmare. This isn't just important, it’s crucial to know that in this sea of chaos, the Oklahoma City Burn Injury Attorneys emerged as unsung heroes. They fought tooth and nail for survivors and families affected, against the negligence that led to such life-altering burn injuries.

Journey of Justice: From the Boom to the Gavel

Fast forward to 1997; Timothy McVeigh stands trial, with a storm of 11 counts brewing against him. A gauntlet of charges for the mastermind behind the heinous act, the darkest day of '95. On June 2, the ax fell – guilty on all accounts, and by August 14, the bell tolled for McVeigh as the death penalty was formally imposed. A chilling message echoed through the courtroom: justice isn't just served, it's etched into history.

The Silent Spectator

When the dust settled, another player emerged from the shadows: Fortier, an Army buddy of McVeigh. His crime? Spectating the gruesome plan from the sidelines, never once warning the boys in blue. By 1998, Fortier was sporting a not-so-fashionable jumper, sentenced to 12 years behind bars. He walked out a free man in 2007, slipping into the shroud of the witness protection program – a Phantom of the Oklahoma Opera.

Nichols: From Conspiracy to Convictions 

Meanwhile, Terry Nichols waited for his moment in the spotlight. December 1997, guilty as charged on one count of conspiracy and eight counts of involuntary manslaughter. Nichols, however, was not done with the courtroom battles. A 2004 state trial ended with him facing a mountain of convictions – 161 counts of first-degree murder, including fetal homicides. He was handed down a lifetime behind bars – well, 161 to be precise.

McVeigh's Final Bow

Backstage, McVeigh had his own finale planned. In December 2000, he requested termination of all appeals of his convictions and an execution date. The federal judge granted this final act, and on June 11, 2001, McVeigh exited the world's stage via lethal injection. He was the first federal prisoner to be executed since 1963 – a fitting end to the puppet master of terror.

The Phoenix from the Ashes

The demolished Murrah Building became a silent witness to the dark chapter of '95. In its place now stands the Oklahoma City National Memorial Museum – a beacon of hope, resilience and testament to the indomitable spirit of Oklahomans.

Let us know your thoughts below.

When did the First World War Really End?

The very question as to when the First World War ended may appear an unnecessary question as the accepted date as November 1918 is firmly imprinted on our memories in those nations that gather for Remembrance Sunday to observe a respectful two-minute silence. However, the intention is not to rewrite history or challenge historians. When we examine other factors in some more detail the answer may not be so definitive. There may be alternative dates that can stretch the timeline as to when the Great war finally was concluded.

Steve Prout explains.

The so-called ‘Big Four’ at the Paris Peace Conference, May 27, 1919. Left to right: Prime Minister David Lloyd George (Great Britain), Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Italy), Premier Georges Clemenceau (France), President Woodrow Wilson (USA).

Continuing battles

The armistice of November 1918 did not bring the fighting to an immediate end. It continued for limited periods elsewhere around the world and in isolated pockets in Europe. The First World War in terms of battles and bloodshed was mainly fought on European soil, but it did extend because of colonial extension on a more limited scale in the Pacific, Middle East, and Africa. The African theatre continued days after the November armistice. A typical telegram sent to east Africa from Europe could take up to a full day to arrive before it could be actioned upon, and this was what exactly happened in German East Africa.

The allies had anticipated that there would be delays and therefore in advance of the armistice, on 10 November, the British General Staff sent a telegram to east Africa asking them for the quickest way to get a message to Von Lettow-Vorbeck, the commanding officer of the German colonial army. He was an exceptional German officer who had been successfully fighting and evading the Allies for four years. Vorbeck had his forces scattered over the vast territories of German East Africa and so reaching him and co-ordinating a truce would be a logistical challenge. On November 12, the day after the armistice, the two sides clashed again, and on that day Von Lettow-Vorbeck only received the telegram that the war had now ended after the battle. The two sides declared a truce, and Von Lettow-Vorbeck formally surrendered at Abercorn, Zambia on November 25, 1918, therefore extending the accepted end date by two weeks.

The Peace Treaties

An armistice is only a ceasefire and only a when a treaty is signed with the conditions determined can war be formally concluded - at least formally. Another interesting angle is to consider the dates and the timelines that these actual treaties were signed. Treaties for multiple participants and belligerents take time to finalize. The debates and negotiations for some of these treaties stretched into the early 1920s.

The treaties for the remainder of the Central Powers such as Bulgaria, Austria and Turkey were concluded long after November 1918 - and in fact the very last treaty was signed in 1923 extending diplomatically at least World War One by a further five years. Once Versailles set its uneasy peace with Germany in 1919 the rest of the Central Powers needed to be reckoned with. The order ran as follows: Austria was addressed at St. Germain-En-Laye in September 1919 and in November 1919 at Neuilly Bulgaria followed suit. In June 1920, a treaty was set with Hungary in Trianon and the first of two treaties with Turkey followed in August of that year in Sevres. It would not be until July 1923 at Lausanne that the Turkish matter would be finally settled and with that finally bringing the war to its diplomatic and formal conclusion.

The peculiarities continue because in the case of Costa Rica, who declared war on Germany, a peace agreement for the First World War was not signed until 1945 due to a diplomatic oversight. It is interesting how many of our past wars are technically continuing in forgotten diplomatic archives.

Demobilisation and preparing for war?

The announcement of the armistice did not bring a settling feeling to post war Europe. Underlying tensions still existed and in the forefront of the allies minds there was a prospect of the war being resumed. Although the German Army was at the point of exhaustion in November 1918 it had not actually been decisively beaten. There was only a tentative ceasefire in place until peace terms could be settled. The demobilization of British, colonial, and imperial troops did not finish until 1920 so in a sense a war footing was maintained. This was much longer than service members had anticipated and was not welcomed by many, causing mutiny in some instances. They did realize they might be called upon to fight again but fortunately the hostilities did not resume.

However, it was not just the fear of a return to arms in Europe that delayed demobilization. There were huge challenges like transporting millions of dominion troops home. There was the immense administrative burden on a scale never seen before that contributed to the enormity of the task. Events abroad also influenced the issue as Britain and France required a military presence to maintain order in their wider Empires, especially for Britain in the Middle East and Ireland where dissent was growing and needed containing. There was also the question of Russia and the fear of the spread of Bolshevism from Lenin’s revolutionary fervour. The fear was so great that a combined allied force from Britain, Commonwealth, US, Italy, France, and Japan were deployed between 1919 and 1920 in strategic areas of Russia in what is known as the War of Intervention. Interestingly the armistice agreement also included the requirement for German troops to remain in the Baltics to also assist and contain the Bolshevik spread. Europe was still not free from the effects and uncertainties of the war and Poland would soon join the fight against Russia in a grab for territory. Old allies and adversaries were still fighting in various limited forms.

Conclusion

The post war settlements were far from being settling and they planted the seeds for future wars as the likes of Germany, Poland, Hungary, and other newly formed states would be dissatisfied with their new borders. This was also suspected and known by the participants of the time. Some diplomats such as Smuts, and preceptive journalists and intellectuals like John Maynard Keynes could almost predict this happening. Perhaps the best example was as the famous illustration by William Orpen who produced the famous cartoon depicting a child crying at the prospect of a war within twenty years of the 1919 Versailles Treaty.

In answer to our question as to when World War One ended symbolically it will always remain with November 1918 when the general desire for peace brought about in the main a cessation of hostilities - but if we want to be technical we can stretch that date anywhere between 1918 and 1923 (although there are also unreconciled declarations of war sat lost in diplomatic archives). The case of Costa Rica signing her treaty in 1945 brings forth an interesting point as to how many other conflicts sit in a similar state of limbo? Are there any nations still technically at war since 1918 with the central powers due to diplomatic oversight? This is certainly true of modern times. Citing a study of war, Quincy Wright observed that from the end of World War Two up to 1970 (when the actual study was conducted) that over thirty-four conflicts just ended with an armistice or ceasefire and not by formal treaty. It makes an interesting trip into the annals of our accepted history - and perhaps history is not as absolute as we imagine.

When do you think the Great War ended? Let us know below.

Now read about Britain’s relationship with the European dictators during the inter-war years here.

Sources

AJP Taylor - English History 1914-45 and Origins of The Second World War

British policy and Bulgaria, 1918-1919. Treanor, Patrick Joseph; (1999) British policy and Bulgaria, 1918-1919. Doctoral thesis (Ph.D.), University College London. 

Europe of The Dictators 1919-1945 -Elizabeth Wiskeman- Collins 1966

Chronicles of Twentieth Century – 1987 - Longman

The Maryland Campaign of 1862 in the U.S. Civil War

The Maryland Campaign was the first invasion of Union territory by General Robert E Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. The Eastern Theater in 1862 had gone very well for the Confederacy. Southern leadership hoped that a victory on northern soil would provide unassailable proof that their new nation was solid and strong, perhaps bringing Great Britain in to mediate a peace agreement.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862.

Consequences of Second Manassas

The Confederate victory at Second Manassas August 28-30, 1862 followed victories in The Valley Campaign and the Peninsula. The casualties incurred by the Army of the Potomac included 14,000 killed or wounded of 62,000 engaged, compared to about half of that for the Army of Northern Virginia. Then on September 1, Stonewall Jackson defeated a Union cohort retreating from the battlefield, resulting in the deaths of 2 iconic Union generals. The Battle of Chantilly further supported the notion that the Confederate was invincible.

General Pope was relieved of command and sent to Minnesota, never to be heard from again. A subordinate would state about Pope, “I dare not trust myself to speak of this commander [Pope] as I feel and believe. Suffice to say ... that more insolence, superciliousness, ignorance, and pretentiousness were never combined in one man.” Pope would blame Fitz-John Porter for the loss, even though that wasn’t the case; Porter would be heard from again at Antietam but his career would be destroyed soon after.

It would be hard to imagine what President Lincoln was going through at that moment. After a year plus of fighting, none of his generals had ever defeated the Rebels in the eastern theater, although General Halleck had done well enough in the west, thanks in large part to a crazy general named Sherman and a drunken one named Grant. The backbiting in the army was at full swing, the blockade was having only a moderate effect, and his diplomat to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, was afraid that PM Gladstone would force negotiations to end the conflict. The soldiers who had been enlisted for one year were now done unless they wanted to re-enlist. Casualties were high and there was a pervasive sense of incompetence at the top of the military leadership.

And even worse, General Lee was rumored to have crossed the Potomac on September 3rd. The United States was being invaded, the Union army had no commander, and the national mid-term elections were coming up in 2 months. President Lincoln had a serious crisis on his hands, perhaps the most serious threat to the United States in our history.

General George McClellan

Following the Peninsula Campaign, Lincoln had fired McClellan for his incompetence as a general and his arrogant attitude. But now, 6 months later, Lincoln grudgingly called McClellan back into action in defense of Washington. Lincoln felt compelled to take this step because McClellan had the confidence of the soldiers. In the early stages of his command, McClellan was able to build up the Union army into a more powerful unit than the Confederacy had faced at Bull Run. He was really a brilliant administrator and he had amassed a well trained and supplied army, had planned a clever strategy to take Richmond, and his army greatly admired him. Despite these organizational successes, his apparent slowness, almost an unwillingness, to fight a battle slowed the war beyond what Lincoln could politically accept.

His repeated unforced retreats in the Peninsula led to a lack of confidence. But now, Lincoln needed a general to meet an imminent threat and he went back to McClellan. McClellan was very popular among the soldiers and the military. The parallels are really very interesting with the one at the onset of the Gettysburg campaign, when Hooker was dismissed on the eve of battle during an invasion after a large loss in Virginia.

It is believed that McClellan purposely withheld his men from helping Pope at Second Manassas.  In late August, two full corps of the Army of the Potomac had arrived in Alexandria, but McClellan would not allow them to advance to Manassas because of what he considered inadequate artillery, cavalry, and transportation support. He was accused by his political opponents of deliberately undermining Pope's position. But he is especially criticized by historians for his letter to his wife on August 10, "Pope will be badly thrashed within two days & ... they will be very glad to turn over the redemption of their affairs to me. I won't undertake it unless I have full & entire control." He told Abraham Lincoln on August 29 that it might be wise "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.”

After his severe defeat, Pope was relieved of command, McClellan reinstated. Lee’s invasion of Maryland and the Battle of Antietam occurred just 3 weeks later.

General Lee

After Second Manassas, General Lee enjoyed widespread popular acclaim and the confidence of the president and his cabinet. He had turned every battle into a victory, defeating two union commanders in just a few months. While supplies and armaments were in short supply, at this stage they seemed adequate.  It was a propitious moment to plan an invasion of the north. But with autumn coming, and the events it would bring, Lee had to move quickly and efficiently.

He had two excellent Corps Commanders in Longstreet and Jackson. His division commanders were also terrific, but their spirit was high, and their personalities clashed with their superiors. Still, success tends to dampen such disagreements.

Lee had these objectives with an invasion of the North:

• To move the focus of fighting away from the South and into Federal territory.

• Recruit in western Maryland and bring secession leaning citizens hope

• Achieve a military victory in the north,

• Perhaps could lead to the capture of the Federal capital in Washington, D.C.

• Confederate success could also influence impending Congressional elections in the North and

• Persuade European nations to recognize the Confederate States of America. 

This was the single moment in the war that Lee was truly in the ascendancy. Unlike the Gettysburg campaign 9 months later, which was a desperate move, this invasion made military and political sense. This likely was the real high water mark of the confederacy. Clearly Lee recognized that Stonewall Jackson thrived on independent action especially attack situations, and placed him in that position at Harpers Ferry. He also saw Longstreet as embodying the main army, as an attacking defender, and used him for that purpose in the campaign.

The Campaign Begins

Lee started off September 3 and crossed the Potomac at two fords west of Washington.  His army moved to Frederick, camping in a field 2 miles south of the town at Best’s Farm.

The idea for the invasion was well conceived. Although many modern day civil war enthusiasts consider this a terrible idea and suggest that the Confederacy should have stayed on defense, not fritter away their resources. Lee actually had a bold plan that few civil war buffs know about, in large part because it didn’t work. Lee's invasion of Maryland was intended to run simultaneously with an invasion of Kentucky by the armies of Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith. Lee is typically criticized as lacking that kind of vision in coordinating attacks, as Grant for example had. But this is the case that proves that criticism wrong.

Fredrick, Maryland is centrally placed between Washington and Baltimore. The B& O RR set up a supply line to that town. It is also well located to Harper’s Ferry. And, it was the new capital of Maryland when it removed from Baltimore. It today is a very cute small town; the National Medical Civil War Museum is located there. This was appropriate, as the town was overfilled with the wounded after Antietam.

In September 1862, Confederate forces crossed the Potomac River at several places. Here are the main crossing points utilized by Lee's army prior to the Battle of Antietam:

• White's Ford: Located near Leesburg, Virginia, White's Ford was the major crossing point used by Lee's army as they entered Maryland (see drawing). They crossed the Potomac River here on September 4-6, 1862, and began their advance into Union territory.

• Cheek’s Ford: Upstream of White’s Ford, also was used by Confederate forces

• Noland's Ferry: Situated downstream from White's Ford, Noland's Ferry was another crossing point used by Lee's forces. They crossed the Potomac here on September 7-8, 1862, continuing their movement into Maryland.

Lee wanted to use Leesburg as his stepping off point to get to Frederick. The turnpike leading out of Snickers Gap goes to Leesburg, This turnpike was an old Indian trail that white settlers had widened and had become the main thoroughfare between the Shenandoah and Loudon County. Up to this point, Lee was using main roads for supply lines, which was clever strategically, as there were no railroads except as connected to Harper’s Ferry.

Lee was moving to attack Harpers Ferry, which is west of Frederick. He was not moving to advance on the big eastern cities. It is a fable that General Lee’s invasions had major cities as targets. His supply lines were too tenuous to try: he couldn’t have held them, in any case.

Harpers Ferry was a critical strategic point early in the war. It was the north-south crossroads from the Shenandoah Valley to Western Maryland, and the joining of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers. It contained a large arsenal and was a concentration for military manufacturers. All of these factors played key roles in why it was a crucial military goal. In fact, control of the town changed 8 times during the war, remaining in Union control for most of it.

Surrounded on three sides by steep heights, the terrain surrounding the town made it nearly impossible to defend; all one had to do with take the heights and shell the town until it surrendered. Stonewall Jackson once said he would rather “take the place 40 times than undertake to defend it once.”

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were crucial supply lines connecting the east with the west, and they ran right through town. These assets were the real reasons why Harpers Ferry was so strategically important.  If you take Harpers Ferry the RR is cut in half and the east can’t get supplies to the west without a large detour. And most importantly, Lee could then use this town as his supply depot for further operations deeper into Maryland. In the Gettysburg campaign, Lee skipped this step and instead went further west, in order not to have to hold territory. This decision helped him speed up on the way to Gettysburg, but could have led to disaster on the retreat.

McClellan Takes Command

General McClellan assumed command of an army that was truly leaderless. When McClellan took charge of the Union forces on Sept. 1, he inherited four separate armies, thousands of untrained recruits and numerous other small commands that needed to be made ready in a hurry. To further complicate matters, three of his senior commanders had been ordered relieved of duty, charged with insubordination against Pope.

McClellan knew that Lee was in his northwest and moved, supposedly slowly, to that region. By the time he arrived in Frederick on September 13, Lee had been gone for 4 days. Classic histories portray McClellan's army as moving lethargically, averaging only 6 miles a day.

McClellan commanded in theory 28 cavalry regiments. But the disastrous Manassas campaign had worn out the horses of almost half the Union regiments, while most of the remainder were stranded at Hampton Roads by gale-force winds. For the first week of the campaign, McClellan could only count on perhaps 1,500 cavalry from two regiments and a few scattered squadrons from his old army to challenge some 5,000 Confederate cavalry soldiers screening Lee’s army.

In the week it took for Lee's army to march to Frederick, McClellan's army traveled an equal distance to redeploy on the north side of Washington. This was accomplished as he reshuffled commands, had his officers under charges reinstated and prepared to fill out his army with untrained recruits. Although he is rightly criticized for having “the slows”, criticisms of his aggressiveness in this campaign have not held up to in depth scholarship.

Special Order #191

Lee and the Confederate Army bivouacked on the Best Farm, about 2 miles south of Frederick, near the Monocacy River. This site would 2 years later be the location of the Battle of Monocacy but on September 9, 1862, the Union army was nowhere around. On the farm field showed in the photo, General Lee set up headquarters and had orders written that laid out the campaign plans for the next couple of weeks. Special Order #191 was written here, and couriers were directed to bring copies to the corps and crucial division leaders.

In Special Order #191, General Lee outlined the routes to be taken and the timing for the attack of Harpers Ferry. It provided specific details of the movements his army would take during the invasion of Maryland.

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“Special Orders, No. 191

Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia

September 9, 1862

The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which cases they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.

Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Virginia, and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpepper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.

The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.

General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance—wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee

R.H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General”

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Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson was to lead the advance and capture Harper’s Ferry. DH Hill was designated to guard the rear. General Longstreet was to encircle the towns and roads leading to Harpers Ferry. Jackson was to take Harpers Ferry while the rest of Lee's army was posted at Boonsboro under command of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet. Lee hoped that after taking Harper's Ferry to secure his rear, he could carry out an invasion of the Union, wrecking the Monocacy aqueduct, before turning his attention to Baltimore, Philadelphia, or Washington, D.C. itself. Unlike the Pennsylvania Campaign, Lee had a real plan. Lee did not expect to be attacked by McClellan at this vulnerable moment. He was hiding at Boonsboro precisely to keep McClellan guessing. He could not know that McClellan knew where he was.

The places where parts of the army were sent controlled the roads into and out of Harpers Ferry. Martinsburg holds the road across from Whites Ford. Boonsboro hold the road north of Harpers Ferry.  Once Lee’s various divisions were in place, Harpers Ferry was in essence surrounded.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Chilton, Lee’s assistant adjutant general (chief of staff), wrote out 8 copies of the order, 1 to each of the generals named and 1 to President Davis. At the time that Special Order #191 was written, Hill was under the command of Jackson, his brother-in-law. Jackson personally copied the document for Hill, because once the army crossed into Maryland, the order specified that Hill was to exercise independent command as the rear guard. For this reason, Jackson copied and sent Hill the order because he didn’t know if Chilton had done so. But, since Special Order #191 conveyed Hill’s having an independent command once entering Maryland, Chilton had in fact sent Hill a copy. DH Hill received only the letter from General Jackson, and never received the copy written by Chilton. Since he had received his orders, no one was concerned that a copy had been lost.

Famously, the order was lost, and was found 4 days later by men under General Alpheus Williams.

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2022/02/24/who-lost-the-lost-order/

and later found by the Union army about a half mile north and east of this location.

https://www.rebellionresearch.com/special-order-191-ruse-of-war-part-1

https://www.theodysseyonline.com/the-insignificance-of-special-order-191

When General McClellan came into the possession of Special Order #191, he had an accurate and timely picture of exactly where the components of the Confederate army were located and what routes they were going to be using in the next several days. He knew that the Confederate army was divided and he knew exactly where they were. Lee had dangerously split his army into five parts. Three columns had converged on Harpers Ferry to capture the Federal garrison there, a fourth column was in Hagerstown, and a fifth column was acting as a rear guard near Boonesboro, Md.

Most traditional histories of the Antietam Campaign assert that McClellan was given Gen. Robert E. Lee's plans in Frederick, Md. at noon, Sept. 13. The narrative states that he waited 18 hours before acting on the find. By waiting before taking advantage of this intelligence and reposition his forces, he squandered the best opportunity in the war to defeat Lee conclusively.

These criticisms stem from the belief that McClellan moved too slowly and cautiously to attack Lee. They assert that when a copy of Lee’s plans fell into McClellan’s hands, the Union general wasted precious hours before advancing. Politicians from the 1860s onward and countless historians have claimed he could have easily destroyed Lee’s army during the campaign and ended the war in 1862, sparing the country another two and a half years of bloody conflict.

A more recent re-evaluation disputes this sequence of events entirely, citing long overlooked evidence that McClellan moved quickly and there was no 18-hour delay. Some historians believe that for this reason, the loss of the Special Order #191 wasn’t as decisive as history makes it out to be. That it had in fact little impact on subsequent events. Gene Thorp in a 2012 article in The Washington Post cited evidence that the vanguard of Army of the Potomac was in motion all day on the 13th due to orders McClellan issued. After the war, McClellan held to the claim that he acted immediately to put his armies on the move.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/in-defense-of-mcclellan-at-antietam-a-contrarian-view/2012/09/06/79a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html

Early in the morning of Sept. 13, most of the Union army was on the move to Frederick, Md. including McClellan, who was relocating his headquarters there from Urbana. At the conclusion of the march, a copy of Lee’s orders was found in an open field. What time this "Lost Order" was found, and when McClellan received it, has been relatively unchallenged until recently.

In "Landscape Turned Red," Stephen Sears asserts that McClellan verified before noon that the papers were legitimate, then exhibited his usual excessive caution and failed to move his army for 18 hours. To back up this theory, Sears cites a telegram that McClellan sent to Abraham Lincoln at "12 M" — which Sears says stands for meridian or noon — in which McClellan confidently informs the president that he has the plans of the enemy and that "no time shall be lost" in attacking Lee. In summary, the traditional view is:

1. McClellan had the Lost Order by noon as is proven by the telegram from him to Lincoln that is dated "12M" for Meridian.

2. McClellan waited 18 hours before moving his troops after finding the Lost Orders

The original telegram received by War Department is clearly dated "12 Midnight". After the book's publication, though, the original telegram receipt was discovered by researcher Maurice D'Aoust in the Lincoln papers at the Library of Congress. It shows that the telegram was sent at midnight (the word was written out) — a full 12 hours later than Sears thought. D'Aoust points this out in the October 2012 issue of Civil War Times in an article entitled " 'Little Mac' Did Not Dawdle."

In the disputed telegraph, McClellan wrote Lincoln, "We have possession of Catoctin [Mountain]," which is important because those two passes were still held by the Confederates at noon. The Braddock Pass was not gained until 1 p.m. and the Jefferson Pass further south was not taken until near sunset. This is evidence that there was no noon message.

McClellan is known to have been riding through the town of Frederick at the 11 am hour (see photo), to raucous crowds, thrilled to see him. Its hard to square this with being told of the orders and telling President Lincoln about it less than an hour later.

The Lost Order was not found until after the 12th Corps, of which the 27th Indiana Regiment belonged, ended its morning march. At least five accounts show that the Corps completed its march about noon, which would make it impossible for McClellan to have written and sent a telegraph that contained information about the Lost Order at the same time it was found. The commander of the unit that found the order notes that it was found after its march ended at noon and that it was carried to army staff soon thereafter.

McClellan issued orders at 3 p.m. for his cavalry chief to verify that the Lost Order was not a trick. It seems out of character for someone who is normally considered so cautious to confidently inform Lincoln of the find three hours before he tried to confirm the accuracy of its contents. From this, we can deduce that McClellan had the orders at 3 pm or sooner but after noon.

The Signal Corps reported that "in the evening" it transmitted a message from Lincoln to McClellan, and a return message from McClellan to Lincoln. The report mentions no other transmittal of information between the two men at any other time of the day.

McClellan had the vanguard of the army, Burnside's 9th Corps, on the move at 3:30 p.m. These men filled the road west to Lee's rear guard at South Mountain well into the night. Near sundown, at 6:20 p.m., he began to issue orders for the rest of his army to move, with most units instructed to be marching at sunrise. (They were roused from sleep at 3 a.m.) In the midst of this activity, at midnight, the general telegraphed the president to tell him what was going on.

By 9 a.m. on Sept. 14, the first troops had climbed South Mountain and met the Confederate rear-guard in battle. By nightfall, McClellan's army carried the heights and forced a defeated Lee to find a new defensive position along Antietam Creek. McClellan pursued the next morning and within 48 hours initiated the Battle of Antietam, which forced Lee back across the Potomac River. This seems like a pretty expeditious sequence of events, not a delay.

Additionally, a detachment of the 9th Corps in conjunction with cavalry marched from Frederick and took the southern Catoctin pass at Jefferson before sunset.

The 6th Corps, about 12,000 men, marched from Buckeystown to the gap in the Catoctin at Jeffersonville, from the evening until at least 10 p.m. A night march beyond that point would have been risky since it was not known precisely where the Confederates were in the valley beyond.

The 1st Corps, about 10,000 men, marched to Frederick the evening of Sept. 13 to be ready for an advance on the Confederate rear-guard the following morning.

Harpers Ferry

There were two significant engagements in the Maryland campaign prior to the battle of Antietam. Both directly impacted the major battle to come. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's captured Harpers Ferry on September 12. This is important because Jackson’s Corps, a large portion of Lee's army, was absent from the Battle of South Mountain and the start of the battle of Antietam, attending to the surrender of the Union garrison. To understand Antietam, the dates and times are almost as important as they are at Gettysburg.

The Battle of Harpers Ferry took place over 4 days. Stonewall Jackson found Maryland Heights stoutly defended but brigades led by Barksdale and Kershaw attacked strongly, with retreat of the Union troops across the Potomac the next day. On September 14, the rest of his infantry arrived and found Loudon Heights undefended. Jackson placed his artillery on these heights while his infantry confronted the Union army on Maryland Heights. An attack on the Union left flank was threatened by AP Hill while 50 guns began a bombardment. The Union commander realized the situation was hopeless and surrendered.

Colonel Dixon Miles was the union commander at Harpers Ferry. At age 58 he was the oldest active colonel in the Union army; a West Point graduate, he led a division at First Manassas but was held in reserve on account that he was drunk. A court of inquiry confirmed this, but he was given command of Harpers Ferry instead of a court martial. Maj Gen John Wool gave miles orders on September 5: "you will not abandon Harpers Ferry without defending it to the last extremity." Wool sent another saying "there must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it". The Union leadership appreciated the likelihood that the town would be attacked. Why they sent no more men to defend it isn’t clear, Why Miles kept his men in the town and not positioned on the heights isn’t comprehensible. Miles was mortally wounded in the artillery barrage.

AP Hill was with Jackson at Harpers Ferry following his feud and threatened duel with General Longstreet after newspaper articles concerning the Battle of Glendale, Hill was transferred to Jackson’s command. He had performed magnificently at Second Manassas. But he clashed with Jackson during the march in Maryland, who had Hill arrested and charged him with eight counts of dereliction of duty after the campaign. For this reason, Jackson left him behind when Harper’s Ferry was captured to process the POWs.

The delay in taking Harpers Ferry had direct consequences on the Battle of Antietam. Jackson has been criticized for taking so long. It’s hard to see how things could have been done any faster. Had Miles positioned his troops with more thought, it would have taken even longer. Had Lee considered this in his placement of the troops around the town? Its not clear, but its is noteworthy that Lee didn’t try to take Harpers Ferry in the Gettysburg invasion.

The Battle of South Mountain

The implications of this delay were enormous. Recall that Special Order 191 was written September 9 but not retrieved by Union forces until September 13. Even though the intelligence was four days old, McClellan knew that Jackson was behind schedule at Harper’s Ferry, which was surrounded but not yet taken, and that Lee’s army was divided and separated over miles of Maryland countryside. Aware that a portion of Lee’s army was now vulnerable to attack, McClellan advanced toward the South Mountain range to attack Lee’s forces there.

McClellan followed Lee’s army based on the routes identified in Special Order 191. Union forces attempted to break through South Mountain to advance toward Lee's army, which would eventually concentrate near Sharpsburg. McClellan was lucky that Lee’s orders were found, that is for sure; otherwise he would have been searching for Lee all over western Maryland. But having them in his possession, he simply followed the road map Lee had drawn for him. There are 2 roads leading west from Frederick; one goes to the north gaps to Hagerstown and one goes south toward Williamsport. Lee left the southern gap exposed, likely due to limitations on manpower and supplies.

The Battle of South Mountain took place on September 14, 1862. It is very important to re-emphasize, see the timeline in the answer 2 days ago, that the lost orders were given to McClellan on September 13 and a battle occurred the very next day. Lee was surprised that the lethargic McClellan had caught up with him so rapidly. Jackson was just wrapping up Harpers Ferry. He only had Longstreet and DH Hill to defend the passes.

Although the Confederate troops ultimately had to retreat, they put up a strong resistance and delayed the Union's progress, giving Lee valuable time to reposition his forces. While Union forces were able to gain control of the mountain, they could not stop Lee from regrouping.  Confederate defenses delayed McClellan's advance enough for Lee to concentrate the remainder of his army at Sharpsburg, setting the stage for the Battle of Antietam three days later.

During the Battle of South Mountain, engagements took place at various passes and gaps within the South Mountain range. The Union forces, commanded by General George B. McClellan, aimed to seize control of the mountain passes and break through the Confederate defensive positions. In the battle, Union army attacked at 3 gaps.

The passes and gaps of South Mountain, particularly Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap, and Crampton's Gap, offered natural defensive positions. Lee was using South Mountain as a screen, but McClellan had pursued faster than was anticipated. With Jackson at Harpers Ferry, Lee fell back along the roads that led mainly to the northern gaps. Lee ordered Longstreet to be in this location to delay the Union advance.

DH Hill was at the northernmost pass with Longstreet because he had been the rear guard and naturally came to these 2 passes. A single 5,000-man Confederate division under D.H. Hill protected Fox’s and Turner’s Gaps at South Mountain. Early on September 14, Union Gen. Jacob D. Cox’s Kanawha Division of the Union IX Corps launched an attack against Samuel Garland’s brigade at Fox’s Gap. Cox’s 3,000 Ohioans overran Garland’s North Carolinians, driving the Southerners from behind a stonewall and mortally wounding Garland. However, by nightfall, Confederate soldiers still held the western edge of Fox’s gap.

At Turner’s Gap, Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s I Corps arrived on the steep mountainside near Frostown, and divisions under George G. Meade and John P. Hatch made relentless charges on the gap’s northern edge. After a brutal firefight along a cornfield fence, Hatch broke through the Rebel line. Only the timely arrival of reinforcements from Longstreet prevented the Confederate line from collapsing. By nightfall, the Confederates still maintained control of Turner’s Gap.

1. Turner's Gap: This was the northernmost and most heavily defended pass. Confederate forces, under the command of General D.H. Hill, held strong defensive positions on the slopes of Turner's Gap, while Union troops, led by General Joseph Hooker, made determined efforts to dislodge them.

2. Fox's Gap: Located south of Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap saw intense fighting between Confederate forces commanded by General Samuel Garland and Union troops led by General Jesse Reno. The Union forces eventually managed to seize control of this pass.

3. Crampton's Gap: Situated south of Fox's Gap, Crampton's Gap was the southernmost pass where significant fighting occurred. Union troops, led by General William B. Franklin, engaged Confederate defenders commanded by General Howell Cobb. The Union forces successfully captured Crampton's Gap, further pressuring the Confederate positions.

Crampton’s Gap.  Civil War enthusiasts typically overlook the Battle of Crampton’s Gap as merely a prelude, but in fact, Antietam happened precisely because of this battle. It was the key to the entire campaign.

McClellan ordered Maj. Gen. William Franklin and his VI Corps to set out for Burkittsville from his camp at Buckeystown 9/14 at daybreak, with instructions to drive through Crampton's Gap and attack McLaws' rear. Although he sent the order immediately, by allowing Franklin to wait until morning to depart, his order resulted in a delay of nearly 11 hours. When the Federals reached Burkittsville around noon, the Confederate artillery opened up. In Burkittsville, while under artillery fire, Franklin assembled his troops into three columns. At 3 p.m., after a delay of nearly 3 hours, the VI Corps finally began its assault. The reason for the delay has never been ascertained, but it would prove costly.

The Confederate force consisted of one battery of artillery, three regiments of infantry under Brig. Gen. William Mahone, one brigade under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, and a small cavalry detachment under Col. Thomas T. Munford. After the report of a very large number of camp fires indicating a much larger Union force than anticipated, General Lee recognized the threat this posed to his split forces, so the order was sent down to General Cobb to ..."hold the gap if it cost the life of every man in my command".

Only about one thousand Confederates defended Crampton's Gap, the southernmost of the South Mountain passes. At around 4:00 p.m., Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum's division charged into the gap and dislodged the Confederates from the protection of a stone fence. The arrival of four regiments under Gen. Howell Cobb did little to stem the Union tide. Reinforced by a brigade of Vermonters, the Federals made a second attack and drove the remaining Confederates down the western slope of South Mountain, leaving the VI Corps in possession of Crampton's.

The Union attack broke the makeshift Rebel line but only at 6 pm, too late for a follow up attack. This gave Lee a chance to salvage his force.

Even though the Confederates still held onto Fox’s and Tuner’s Gaps, Lee ordered his outnumbered forces to withdraw from South Mountain. By sunrise on September 15, the Confederates had completely withdrawn. Once the gap is in Union hands, a road connects it to all of the roads behind the mountain, and so Hill and Longstreet can be surrounded. Longstreet and Hill had to retreat that evening.

Once Crampton’s Gap was taken, even though Turner’s and the Confederates held Fox’s Gap at the end of the day they were not defensible any longer. Consequently, Lee retreated.

Aftermath

The Battle of Antietam took place on September 17, 1862, 3 days after the Battle of South Mountain. More Americans died in battle on that day than in any other day in our nation’s history. The battle was a clear Union victory. The consequences were enormous. Great Britain would never become officially involved in the war or recognize the Confederacy. The Republicans won the mid=term elections. Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in the shadow of victory.

Although McClellan defeated Lee, ending the invasion, he did not pursue the ANV despite Lincoln’s persistent entreaties and orders. McClellan was relieved of duty that October, with Ambrose Burnside taking command. McClellan would run against Lincoln for president in 1864.

What do you think of the Maryland Campaign of 1862? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

A Brief History of American Trucking

Picture this - it’s the ’60s and you’re cruising down Route 66 with the terse rumble of a diesel engine humming in your ears and the broad, beautiful expanse of the American highway sprawling before you. This isn't your typical travelogue. Instead, we’re shifting gears into the annals of American trucking history, offering an intimate gaze into the lives of three remarkable truckers and their considerable contribution to an industry that is, quite frankly, the backbone of American commerce.

Jennifer Dawson explains.

A U.S. Post Office truck ready for Christmas in December 1921.

Larry 'L.D' Drake: Pioneering the way

Drake--a driver who knuckled down for forty-five laborious years, starting in Oklahoma in the 1950s--became a sort of folk-hero within the trucking community. Not only did his work aid the exponential growth of the American economy following World War II, but his well-documented safe driving record also proved him to be a paragon on the road.

Hank Good: A tale of unwavering dedication

Next up, there’s Hank Good, an emblem of unwavering dedication and resilience. Good started trucking in the ‘60s and endured for over five decades in the industry, back when trucks were bereft of today's sophisticated amenities. He was a trailblazer who saw trucking evolve, straddling epochal shifts from the mechanical to the electronic era.

Ira 'Big I' Anderson: Living legend of trucking

Then we've got Ira 'Big I' Anderson, a veritable giant in the trucking scene. Big I’s hard-earned lore began in the 60s within the bustling metropolis of New York. Anderson's unyielding commitment to professionalism and his concerted efforts towards supporting other drivers turned him into a living legend. 

Key Learning - It's all in the details

This isn’t just important--no--it’s crucial. Attention to detail is the sine qua non of trucking. The stories of these three exemplar individuals underline the insurmountable importance of precise routing, load calculations, systems checks, and understanding the nuts and bolts of their vehicles. As found in a trucking safety report by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the devil truly is in the details--even a minor oversight can spell disaster on the road.

Unabridged Vision - Embracing the challenges ahead

These three trucking titans' stories are not tales of swift, sublime triumph; rather, they are chronicles of resilience, grit, and relentless work ethic. Trucking, as an industry, isn’t for the faint-hearted. It smacks of profound challenges, significant time away from family, spotting road hazards, managing wonky sleep schedules, and of course, battling harsh weathers. But, as often remarked by Ira Anderson, "Ain't no mountain too high for a determined trucker."

Modern Marvels - The shifting gears in Truck models

Through each of these truckers' stories, one can't help but notice the immense growth and transformation in truck models and technology. Today's semi-truck is far removed from the models of yore. We now have trucks equipped with automated transmissions, advanced aerodynamics, lane correction systems, GPS tracking, and even eco-friendly hybrid models--rendering the journey smoother and safer for the modern-day truckers.

Remember, Precision and Foresight are Da Vinci and Michelangelo of Trucking Art

You see, trucking isn’t just about point A to point B. It's a dance, a delicate ballet of balance, poise, precision, and foresight. Master these, and you'll glide through the vast arteries of America's highways, a stately knight of the road.

Bottom Line: Heed the Past, Embrace the future

So here's the thing that separates the average from the excellent: Attitude. These three American trucking icons weren't just truckers. They were pioneers, trailblazers, innovators. They looked challenges in the eye and surged ahead—undaunted, determined, resilient. 

"To be a successful trucker, you have to have the foresight of an eagle, the precision of a surgeon, and the patience of a monk" --Larry 'L.D' Drake.

Done right, trucking can be an art—an orchestra of man, machine, and the open road. It's about those men and women who commit, adapt, and evolve. And in this grand theatre of logistics, we've just covered three legendary maestros. So remember, folks, it’s not just one thing--it’s many things that merge and marry into one—the spirit of trucking.

So, buckle up. This ride has just begun.

Let us know what you think of U.S. trucking history below.

The Second Battle of Fort Wagner and the 54th Massachusetts Regiment

The 160th anniversary of the Second Battle of Fort Wagner, in the US Civil War took place in July. As we look back, we remember the men who fought and died on Morris Island in South Carolina in this American Civil War engagement in July of 1863. Michael Thomas Leibrandt explains.

The Old Flag Never Touched the Ground by Rick Reeves. For the state of Massachusetts, 1863

Leading the Union attack was the 54th Massachusetts Regiment of Foot, one of the first African American regiments in the United States army; immortalized in a statue still seen today in Boston Common, and in Robert Lowell’s Centennial poem. The 54th was also the subject of the 1989 film “Glory” featuring Denzel Washington, Morgan Freeman, and Matthew Broderick.

The story and legacy of the 54th Massachusetts is one of the most enduring of any Union regiment from the Civil War. Here is why:

The Emancipation Proclamation authorized the formation of the 54th. Its formation was supported by famous Americans such at Frederick Douglass when its recruitment began in February of 1863. One of the men who was appointed to recruit was George Stephens, a military correspondent who assisted with the recruitment of men in Philadelphia and then joined the 54th Massachusetts as the rank of Sergeant.

The 54th was led by a member of a prominent Boston family. Chosen to lead the regiment was twenty-five year old Colonel Robert Gould Shaw.

After studying overseas in Europe, Shaw attended Harvard from 1856–1859. He was married in 1863 and was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in Company H of the 2nd Massachusetts Regiment. He served at the Battle of Antietam among other engagements. In early 1863, Captain Shaw’s father traveled to Virginia with the commission for his son to lead the 54th. The Captain was initially reluctant to take the commission, as he did not wish to leave his regiment.

The attack

The 54th Massachusetts led the Union advance on Fort Wagner. Constructed by the Confederacy in the summer of 1862 and named after Lt. Colonel Thomas M. Wagner, the fort was built to protect the southern end of Charleston Harbor. Fort Wagner was armed by fourteen cannons. Among them was a 10-Inch (250 mm) Columbiad, three 32 lb. Smooth-Bore Breech-Loading Cannons, a 42 lb. Corronade, a 10-inch Coast Mortar, and four 12-Pound Howitzers. Wagner was also protected by land mines buried in the sand dunes, a moat, and rows of abatis.

At 7:45 P.M., the 54th Massachusetts emerged and advanced up the beach. By the time that the 54th reached the parapet of Fort Wagner, they had devastating casualties. Among the 272 men lost from the regiment was Colonel Shaw, whose sword was stolen from his body immediately after the battle.

Wagner was never taken by Union forces until it was abandoned in late 1863. Today, much of the original defenses of Fort Wagner are under sea level. Periodically, a hurricane hits Charleston Harbor and unearths some Civil War artifacts or ordinance that sends the odd tourist running for cover. For years, inaccessibility to the island has kept the galant legend of the 54th Massachusetts buried under the sand.

The bravery of the 54th Massachusetts, however lives on today. In 2017, after being thought to be lost several times, Col. Shaw’s sword was discovered in a Boston attic. In 2008, the 54th was reactivated as part of the Massachusetts Army National Guard Ceremonial Unit and participated in President Obama’s 2008 Inauguration. The new unit is called the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment and provides military honors at funerals.

Many famed Union regiments have been chronicled in the Civil War. Few, however have storied histories that still attract interest today and no doubt will in the future like the 54th Massachusetts.

The descendants of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw donated his sword to the Massachusetts Historical Society for all to enjoy. The Confederacy buried Shaw’s body in a mass grave with his soldiers. After the war, the United States Army requested that Shaw’s body be exhumed and returned to his family. Colonel Shaw’s father would not allow it, saying “We can imagine no holier place than that in which he lies,” he wrote, “among his brave and devoted soldiers, nor wish for him better company-what a body-guard he has.”

Adding to the honor, legend, and glory of the 54th Massachusetts.

What do you think of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment? Let us know below.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, PA

The Battle of Blair Mountain: Mine Wars

The Battle of Blair Mountain was the result of years of bitter labor disputes between miners and coal companies of southern West Virginia. Here, Richard Bluttal explains what caused the dispute and how it evolved.

A coal miner with his rifle at the Battle of Blair Mountain.

Since the late 1800s, the coalfields of the West Virginia’s Mingo, Logan and McDowell Counties had operated under a repressive company town system. Workers mined using leased tools and were paid low wages in company currency, or “scrip,” which could only be used at company stores. Safety conditions were often deplorable, yet despite the efforts of groups such as the United Mine Workers (UMW), the mine operators had kept unions out of the region through intimidation and violence. Companies compelled their workers to sign so-called “yellow dog contracts” pledging not to organize, and they used armies of private detectives to harass striking miners and evict them from their company-owned homes.

The hostilities only ramped up in 1920, when the UMW finally started to organize workers in Mingo County. On May 19 of that year, members of the Baldwin-Felts detective agency arrived in the town of Matewan to evict union miners from houses owned by the Stone Mountain Coal Company. After catching wind of the detectives’ activities, Matewan Mayor Cabell Testerman and a pro-union sheriff named Sid Hatfield raised a small posse and confronted them near the local train station. A verbal argument quickly escalated into a gunfight, and when the smoke cleared, seven Baldwin-Felts agents had been killed along with Mayor Testerman and two local miners.

The so-called “Matewan Massacre” galvanized support for the UMW, which collected new members and organized a strike in the summer of 1920. The coal companies responded by bringing in non-union replacement workers, and over the next several months, the two sides engaged in a fierce guerilla war. “Murder by laying in wait and shooting from ambush has become common,” Mingo County’s sheriff wrote in May 1921.

Tipping point

The tipping point in the “Mine War” finally came on August 1, 1921, when Sheriff Sid Hatfield was shot dead by Baldwin-Felts agents as he entered the McDowell County Courthouse. The assassination outraged the miners, who considered Hatfield a hero for his involvement in the Matewan shootout. Within days, thousands of union supporters had flocked to the outskirts of Marmet, a small town located near the state capital of Charleston. Led by UMW organizers Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney, they resolved to march on Mingo County to confront the coal companies and free the union men imprisoned in the area. Many of the marchers were World War I veterans, and they came armed to the teeth with military-issue Springfield rifles and shotguns. “It is time to lay down the bible and take up the rifle,” miner and Baptist reverend John Wilburn declared.

The miners’ route to Mingo required them to pass through Logan County, a coal company stronghold ruled by an anti-union sheriff named Don Chafin. Upon learning of the march, Chafin scraped together a 3,000-strong army of state police, deputies and citizen militiamen and prepared for a fight. “No armed mob will cross the Logan County line,” he proclaimed. Chafin and his supporters had soon constructed a network of machine gun nests and trenches around Blair Mountain, a 2,000-foot peak that stood directly in the miners’ path.

On August 24, the main body of coal miners set out from Marmet and headed south toward Mingo County. Keeney and Mooney made a last-minute attempt to call off the march after meeting with the War Department’s General Harry Bandholtz, who warned that any violence would prove disastrous for the union, but the proposed ceasefire collapsed when two miners died in a skirmish with Chafin’s forces. By August 28, some 10,000 union men had massed near the border of Logan County and begun trading gunfire with company supporters. To distinguish one another in the dense forests, many of the miners tied red handkerchiefs around their necks. They soon became known as the “Red Neck Army.”

The first heavy fighting in the Battle of Blair Mountain began on August 31, when a group of around 75 miners led by Reverend Wilburn stumbled across some of Chafin’s “Logan Defenders” on a wooded ridge. Each side asked the other for a password and received the wrong answer, prompting a shootout that killed three deputies and one miner. That same day, the main army of miners commenced a two-pronged assault on Chafin’s trenches and breastworks. Scores of union men streamed up the mountainside, but despite their superior numbers, they were repeatedly driven back by the defenders, who riddled them with machine gun fire from the high ground.

The miners made more progress when the battle was renewed on September 1. That morning, a detachment of union men assaulted a spot called Craddock Fork with a Gatling gun looted from a coal company store. Logan forces fought back with a machine gun, but after three hours of heavy fire, their weapon jammed. The miners surged forward and briefly broke the defensive line, only to be repulsed by a fusillade of bullets from a second machine gun nest located further up the ridge.

For the rest of the day, the hills and hollows echoed with gunfire as the union men repeatedly attacked the defenders’ lines. “Machine guns cracked up there so you would think the whole place was coming down on you,” miner Ira Wilson later recalled. At one point in the battle, the din also included the sound of falling bombs. Sheriff Chafin had chartered three private biplanes and equipped them with teargas and pipe bombs loaded with nuts and bolts for shrapnel. The planes dropped the homemade explosives over two of the miners’ strongholds but failed to inflict any casualties.

End of the siege

In the end, the miners’ siege of Blair Mountain was only ended by the arrival of federal troops. A squadron of Army Air Service reconnaissance planes began patrolling the skies on September 1, and by the following day, General Bandholtz had mobilized some 2,100 army troops on the orders of President Warren G. Harding. Scattered fighting continued between the miners and the Logan Defenders until September 4, but most of the men welcomed the government intervention and laid down their weapons. Roughly 1,000 exhausted miners eventually surrendered to the army, while the rest scattered and returned home. It was later estimated that some one million rounds had been fired during the battle. Reports of casualties ranged from as few as 20 killed to as many as 100, but the actual number has never been confirmed.

The Battle of Blair Mountain is now cited as a pivotal chapter in American labor history, but in the short term, it proved to be a crushing defeat for the miners. The state of West Virginia charged Keeney, Mooney and some 20 other union men with treason, and hundreds of others were indicted for murder. Nearly all were later acquitted, but the legal battles emptied the UMWA’s coffers and hindered its organizing efforts. By the end of the decade, only a few hundred miners in West Virginia were still members. The union wouldn’t reclaim the coalfields until the mid-1930s and the Great Depression when workers’ rights to organize were enshrined in New Deal legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act.

What do you think of the Battle of Blair Mountain? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s series of articles on trauma and medicine during war, starting with the American Revolution here.

The Ever-Changing Nature of Britain’s Health

Britain’s health has changed throughout history and what was considered healthy in the past has been proven to be unhealthy today. Some stark examples are that the average life expectancy at a time in nineteenth century Britain for wealthy adults was around 45, while this was lower in the poorer classes, and the percentage of children reaching the age of 5 was much lower in the 19th century than now.

Amy Chandler explains looks at how health and diet has evolved over time.

Sir William Beveridge in 1943.

In society today, individuals are able to take control of their health, if they wish, through the development of apps and trackers that monitor health and lifestyle. The World Health Organisation (WHO) states “social factors, including education, employment status, income level, gender and ethnicity have a marked influence on how healthy a person is”. (1) While the development and innovation of the National Health Service (NHS) in Britain has offered opportunities of free and equal access to medical services, the strain on the economy still limits the capabilities and progress of creating accessible medical treatment for all in Britain. The NHS celebrated 75 years this July and despite the innovations of the health service, the need for funding, treatment and staff equality, limits the good that the service can provide in Britain. This article explores the social, political and economic changes that impacted Britain’s health throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the emergence of the NHS.

Diets, health and lifestyle

The industrial revolution between the years 1760 to 1840 created a boom in industry and manual labour employment in major cities such as Manchester, Liverpool and London. This industrial revolution increased social mobility into the cities and a rise of poverty and disease for the working classes. Despite the rise of infectious diseases and poor living and working conditions, the diet of the working class was not as unhealthy as historians once believed. Those who worked in manual employment, such as factories and docks, were constantly active and needed to consume more calories to sustain themselves during long working hours. The majority of the poorer classes ate food that was in season such as fruits, vegetables and less fatty meats. In comparison, wealthy classes weren’t as active and had access to an abundance of food, alcohol and sugary sweets causing rotten teeth and gout.

For the poor, food supplies were uncertain, basic in diet and didn’t provide the nutrients for a healthy body creating a prevalence of malnourished adults and children. Few had access to personal ovens and relied on open-fires, buying hot food out or eating cold meals. There was limited access to cooking utensils, with many households only using one pot for their cooking. This meant that the access and availability of hot food was scarce or expensive.(2) Many relied on buying off-cut pieces of meat that were rotting or poor quality, and these meals were small and far between. The upper classes indulged in dinners with several courses and had access to the freshest qualities of meat. Usually, household cooks would order their meats, fish, vegetables and other ingredients on the day that they were needed to ensure fresh meals, whereas the poor did not have access to the same expensive food. Furthermore, the overindulgence of rich and decadent food created a rise in obesity amongst the men of the upper class. The obese, rich male figure was seen as a symbol of high status and a display of their wealth because they could afford an abundance of sweet and fatty foods. Wealthy women were not usually obese due to the beauty standards of society, where women wore tight corsets and were expected to be fragile and thin. In modern society, the rise and health implications of obesity are impacting on the NHS.

The British Empire increased the transportation and access to many new foods, sugars and a variety of ingredients such as canned fruits and condensed meat. These new foods became widely available and impacted the health of all classes in Britain. Sugar and fatty foods were only previously available to the wealthy, who could afford the price. (3) The rise in consumption of sugar caused damage to the nation’s teeth and a frequent dental complaint reported by 1900 was the inability to chew tough foods, nuts, vegetables and fruits. The fall in nutritional standards impacted future generations, especially during times of army conscription. Furthermore, the living conditions in poverty-stricken areas created a decline in health with poor sanitary conditions, unclean drinking water and the lack of sunlight in urban slums creating a Vitamin D deficiency. The slums had dense, thick fog as a result of pollution and poor air quality, cramped, filled with rubbish, unsanitary living conditions and contaminated drinking water. These areas were also subjected to communicable diseases such as tuberculosis (TB), cholera and smallpox, to name a few. This also created a large gap between the health of the poor and the wealthy. The wealthy were not immune to these illnesses, but were less susceptible to dying of consumption or poor living conditions, but were more likely to suffer heart attacks from their rich and fatty diets. Therefore, the lives of the working class are considered healthier in terms of fitness levels, eating less fatty and sugary foods, but on the flipside many lived in unsanitary housing, likely to become unwell from the spread of fatal diseases in crowded areas and many could not access medical care.

London’s pollution also contributed to a number of respiratory health conditions coupled with the turn of the century popularity of smoking. The rise of smoking in the 1880s with the growth of industrial cigarette production created accessibility to cigarettes. The preference to using snuff declined and was replaced with cigarettes which was only encouraged during the first and second world war when soldiers were sent cigarettes in their rations. The commercialisation of smoking was seen as a good habit for people and was most commonly used by King George VI to overcome his stutter. The lack of medical knowledge on cancers and what caused these diseases meant that many became addicted to smoking without knowing or understanding the impact on their health. It is only in recent history that the UK government has attempted to tackle smoking in the population, with their strategic plan towards a ‘smoke-free generation’ in England.

The formation of the NHS

After the devastating impact of the Second World War, the health of the nation was deteriorating with rationing, war injuries and the economic burden of the war effort. These factors emphasised the long-term need for a strategy to strengthen the country. The British government needed to find a solution to improve the nation’s health, strengthen the economy and navigate post-war life. In December 1942, Sir William Beveridge compiled a report, Social Insurance and Allied Services, on the health of the nation. Beveridge’s report identified the five evils that permeated society; disease, want, ignorance, squalor and idleness.(4)  In a Parliamentary debate in 1944, Members of Parliament (MPs) suggested the NHS would be a “comprehensive and unified health service for the people”, which is part of a “process of reshaping the background of individual life” in Britain. (5) The NHS was seen as a “counter-process to all the destructiveness of war”. (5)

Throughout history, class and wealth defined people’s health, diet, lifestyle and quality of life and these differences were a continual reminder of social hierarchy. However, war was an equaliser that did not discriminate. Every member of society was impacted from conscription, bombing raids and the emotional and physical scars of war. Arguably those with money could live comfortably and safely, but everyone was equal with a collective desire for the war to end. Services that offered medical treatment like charities were fragmented and not unified. Therefore, there was a sense of openness to the idea of a national health service that was for the many not the few, however there was still opposition to a free health service. As stated in a Parliamentary debate, the service was “no scheme [designed] for giving charity to individuals or state help to particular classes or groups” and it “does not concern itself with poverty or wealth.” (5) This was a scheme that aimed at raising the nation’s health to a “higher plane and keep it there.” (5) This was a step towards equality in post-war Britain under the Welfare State. Under the umbrella of the Welfare State, each member of society was expected to pay a contributory amount of money as National Insurance. (4) The reason that Beveridge insisted on National Insurance was to ensure that the NHS did not damage an individual’s sense of pride, independence and personal responsibility. (4) The NHS created a sense of accountability for one’s health and offered the opportunity for those in poverty to better themselves.

The NHS was officially formed in July 1948 and 75 years later, the NHS is still providing a variety of care and treatment to the public. However, the nation’s health is not where it could be, the COVID-19 pandemic placed a strain on public health services and was economically struggling. NHS workers are striking for better pay and working conditions, while patients are placed on waiting list months in advance. Health issues such as smoking, obesity and mental health are areas that still need improvement, coupled with the changes in lifestyle. Many people work remotely and are not commuting in the same way causing a change in routine and in some cases causing a negative impact on their health. The introduction of the NHS in 1948 was a massive step forward in improving the nation’s health that came after education and housing reforms that cleared the slum areas, that were bombed heavily during the blitz.  Since 1948, many have benefitted from the treatment, care and expertise of health care professionals.

Conclusion

The perception of health has changed throughout history and one treatment that was once seen as effective is now seen as poisonous or ineffective. Illness was prevalent in all areas of society but the type of diseases differed depending on the living conditions, diet, lifestyle and access. What was once seen as healthy, such as smoking is now widely acknowledged as severely damaging to health and quality of life. The advancement in technology in identifying risks to increasing disease and health implications is far greater than in the past. The formation of the NHS was a changing point for Britain’s health and the desire to offer medical treatment to all classes of society in a bid for health equality. Historians often present the poor and working classes as malnourished and in poor health, however in the modern standards exercise and eating less sugar is seen as ideal and due to their lack of accessibility to fatty foods and sugar they were less susceptible to high cholesterol and other illnesses. The health and lifestyle of the working class should not be romanticised as a healthy way to live, as they were far from healthy. A digital age has allowed for more accountability, responsibility and opportunity to take our health into our own hands through fitness apps, healthy recipe boxes and ways to monitor our bodies through forms of artificial intelligence (AI). Progress is still slow in solving major health issues such as cancer, but the rise of technology can provide new ways of treating, curing and progressing our health.

What do you think of Britain’s health over time? Let us know below.

Now read Amy’s article on the history of medicine at sea here.

References

1. WHO, ‘Health inequities and their causes’, 22 February 2018, World Health Organisation, Available at < https://www.who.int/news-room/facts-in-pictures/detail/health-inequities-and-their-causes > [accessed 27 July 2023].

2. A. Whol, ‘What the Poor ate’, July 2022, VictorianWeb, Available at <        https://victorianweb.org/science/health/health8.html >[accessed 27 July 2023].

3. P. Clayton., and J. Rowbotham, ‘How the mid- Victorians worked, ate and died’, Int J Environ Res Public Health, vol. 6 (2009). Available at < https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672390/ >[accessed 31 July 2023].

4. The National Archives, ‘1940’s origin of the Welfare State’, 2023, The Cabinet Papers, Available at < https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/alevelstudies/1940-origins-welfare-state.htm >[accessed 1 August 2023].

5. HC Deb, 16 March 1944, vol 398, cols 428 - 429.

Logistics Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign

The intelligence and logistical problems of the Army of Northern Virginia emerged as critical determinants during the Battle of Gettysburg. The Confederate Army faced severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The generals at Gettysburg: Union Major General George G. Meade (left) and Confederate General Robert E. Lee (right).

Confederate Supply Network

The Confederate Army invaded the north despite facing severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. These limitations made it challenging for Lee to fully address and overcome intelligence and logistical issues during his planning process. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Several potential strategies and actions could have been considered to alleviate problems that could have been expected. Lee could have made efforts to shorten and secure his supply lines. Lee could have used several additional resources history shows that he didn’t have in planning his invasion in June 1863:

1. Spies on the ground to reconnoiter

2. Cavalry in his front and sides to know where the enemy was.

3. Pontoons over the Potomac that he could get across in an emergency.

4. Sufficient long range artillery ammunition to sustain multiple attacks in a long offensive campaign.

5. A functioning supply line to move captured goods retrograde to any advance.

6. Improved command and control, with sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders at all times.

7. With Stonewall Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville, Lee had two new corps commanders. The Confederate Army's command structure was dispersed, with multiple corps and divisions operating somewhat independently. This fragmentation made it challenging to consolidate and synthesize information from various sources and hindered the efficient gathering and analysis of intelligence.

Intelligence Flaws

General Lee faced challenges in obtaining accurate and timely intelligence regarding the location and movements of Major General Joseph Hooker and the Army of the Potomac. The lack of reliable intelligence about the enemy's positions and intentions affected Lee's decision-making and ability to plan his own movements effectively and placed Lee at a disadvantage. Confederate intelligence efforts were hampered by various factors including limited reconnaissance capabilities especially the absence of JEB Stuart. The combination of limited reconnaissance capabilities, dispersed command structure, Union defensive measures, communication limitations, and unfamiliar terrain contributed to the challenges faced by Lee in obtaining accurate intelligence about Hooker's army.

The ANV suffered from limited reconnaissance capabilities. The Confederate Army had limited cavalry resources for conducting reconnaissance and gathering information about the enemy. The cavalry, traditionally responsible for scouting, was stretched thin, and their ability to penetrate Union lines and gather reliable intelligence was hampered. Lee instructed Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia informed of the movements and activities of the Union Army, maintain communication, and act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gaining intelligence on Lee's own army. Lee's orders emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information. Allowing Stuart to circumnavigate the Union army rather than be his eyes and ears must rank among Lee’s greatest mistakes. Using what cavalry he had in guarding passes behind him was his second biggest mistake.

Lee had no formal intelligence service like General Sharpe and the Bureau of Military Intelligence of the Union army. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north, as opposed to the south, where the citizens favored him. This is a bit surprising given the large number of KGC and Copperheads; but western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania were solid pro-Union, another factor Lee may have overlooked.

Operational Manifestations

The Confederate Army relied on a limited and overburdened transportation system to move men, equipment, and supplies. The lack of adequate railways and the reliance on horse-drawn wagons slowed down the movement of troops and hindered the delivery of essential provisions. Maintaining a constant supply of ammunition, weapons, and other necessary equipment was a challenge. The long supply lines made it difficult to ensure a steady flow of these vital resources to the troops on the front lines.

The Union used railroads and rivers to transport their supplies. But where Lee wanted to go strategically, behind the Blue Ridge Mountains to screen his movement, there was no railroad and no river. He had to move everything over land. So Lee employed a wagon train. Consequently, Lee had a 125-mile route for supplies to traverse to get to Gettysburg and more to Harrisburg. The massive wagon trains limited Lee’s ability to maneuver and to bring troops from the rear in case of an unexpected need, as happened on July 1. Moreover, the priority he placed on protecting them required the remaining cavalry units after Stuart left, leaving him without the necessary reconnaissance.

Either 4 horses or 6 mules pulled the supply wagons. They could carry 2000-2500 pounds but moved only at marching pace, about 3 miles per hour, and less if the roads were muddy or rocky. Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile-ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

Wagon trains moved at a relatively slow pace compared to other means of transportation, such as railways. This hindered the army's ability to swiftly maneuver and respond to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Long wagon trains stretched over a significant distance and were vulnerable to attacks from enemy forces. Union cavalry units often targeted these trains, aiming to disrupt supply lines and inflict damage on the Confederates. Wagon trains had a limited capacity, both in terms of the amount of supplies they could carry and the number of troops they could transport. This constrained the amount of provisions and equipment that could be transported to the front lines, potentially leading to shortages.

Animals need to be cared for, fed, and rested, which added to the logistical burden and increased the strain on resources. The animals themselves required massive forage. Mules needed 9 pounds of grain 10 of fodder and 12 gallons of water daily; horses needed 14 pounds, 14 pounds and 10 gallons respectively. They needed horseshoes, and men to apply them. The waste disposal problem is mind- boggling: every day, a single animal produced 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine. Unless animals are optimally cared for, they can’t burden the loads; they move more slowly and carry less until they break down and the army is immobile.

Wagons, like all vehicles, required regular maintenance and repairs. This included fixing damaged wagons, replacing worn-out wheels, and addressing other mechanical issues. Finding the necessary resources and skilled personnel for these tasks added to the logistical challenges.

Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

This was a logistics nightmare. It would directly impact when Longstreet would reach the field, what weapons and armaments would be available, coordination of the 3 corps in battle and of course, the ultimate retreat after the battle. And the fact is, Lee lost this critical battle for precisely these reasons. The logistical limitations faced by Lee's army had a significant impact on their arrival and readiness on the field at Gettysburg. Reliance on slow-moving wagon trains caused delays in the arrival of Lee's troops. The stretched supply lines and the need to coordinate the movements of dispersed units slowed their progress, affecting their timely arrival at the battlefield.

Battlefield Impact

The extended marches and inadequate provisions necessitating foraging combined with the strain of traffic jams and slow movement, took a toll on the Confederate soldiers. Many suffered from fatigue, diminishing their physical condition and overall readiness for battle. Additionally, some soldiers straggled or fell behind due to exhaustion or the inability to keep up with the army's pace. Many Confederate soldiers were sleep deprived and fatigued when they reached the battlefield after night and forced marches, diminishing their overall effectiveness.

July 1. Major General Henry Heth commanded a brigade under AP Hill. He is traditionally assigned blame for unintentionally commencing the Battle of Gettysburg. He did send half of his division toward the town; he later claimed that he was looking for supplies, including shoes.  He apparently did not know that Early’s division had been through the village a few days previously, and any supplies were long gone. On June 30th he encountered mild resistance on the road but it was thought to be a volunteer militia, not regular army. This lack of intelligence would be the real reason the battle would start.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike to perform a reconnaissance-in-force. At about 7:30 am 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The order of march was not the one a commander would choose if a battle was imminent. Pettigrew deployed his men without cavalry in front; there were no pickets and no vedettes and in fact the first enemy he ran into were Union vedettes. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades.

Lee's army was spread out over a significant distance due to the wide deployment of his troops during the march north, from south of Cashtown to Harrisburg. This dispersal made coordination and concentration of forces more challenging, impacting their ability to concentrate their strength. The splitting of the ANV during the march north meant piecemeal arrival of Confederate troops on the battlefield, which affected the initial coordination of Lee's forces. This resulted in a fragmented Confederate attack on the first day of the battle, as units arrived at different times and were not able to coordinate their efforts effectively. The arrival of troops at unplanned times and locations posed challenges to the  reinforcement and maneuverability of troops, resulting in a hindering to exploit opportunities and  limiting the flexibility of his response to Union movements. These issues were most apparent when General Ewell concluded that he lacked the resources (manpower and supplies) to attempt an attack on Culp’s Hill in the late afternoon.

July 2. Improved transportation and supply arrangements could have allowed General James Longstreet's troops to position themselves more swiftly on July 2.  Improved communications would have facilitated better coordination between Longstreet and Ewell. Better communication with his division commanders could have expedited the movement of troops and improved the response to General Sickles’ unwise move to the Peach Orchard.

Adequate logistical support would have facilitated the swift movement of wagons and artillery pieces, enabling them to reach positions in a timelier manner. Had coordinated attacks been organized, the battles in the Wheatfield and Little Round Top might have gone differently.

More effective reconnaissance and intelligence operations would have provided Longstreet with timely and accurate information about the enemy's positions, enabling him to make more informed decisions regarding the deployment of his troops, especially the fact that Little Round Top was occupied by Union forces.

July 3. The supply problems and logistical challenges faced by the Confederate Army had significant repercussions for Pickett's Charge. The movement of the ANV away from its railroads to create a screen with the mountains also caused the loss of the capacity to replenish its long-range artillery ammunition. Recognizing the limited transportation capacity imposed by a wagon train, compromises were necessary regarding the amount of artillery ammunition that could move with the army. The long-range artillery necessary to support offensive action was different from the canister and grapeshot used in defensive battles. Since Lee had no idea what the nature of the battle would be, he brought some of each, but this proved to be insufficient. Lee did order delivery of additional artillery ammunition with the Ordinance department as he moved farther north, but it never arrived. Consequently, the Confederate forces were unable to provide adequate artillery support for Pickett's Charge. The lack of artillery firepower weakened the overall impact of the assault and increased the vulnerability of the advancing Confederates.

The Bormann fuses used by the Confederate Army during Pickett's Charge were also a significant issue that further exacerbated the challenges they faced. The fuses were designed to control the timing of the explosion of artillery shells, and their malfunction or improper functioning had detrimental effects. The origin of the logistical fuse problem was an explosion and fire at the Richmond arsenal on Brown’s Island on March 13, 1863. The explosion resulted temporarily in ordnance supplies originating from Selma and Charleston. These fuses were designed with a resin filler that made them explode about 1 second later than those manufactured in Richmond. This filler softened and mixed with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July, causing longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells. These "new" fuses burned slightly slower than what the artillerists were accustomed to.

The CSA artillerymen had no forewarning that there was a difference in these fuses that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond.

Consequently, in many instances fuses malfunctioning or burning at an unpredictable rate were noted. This meant that some shells exploded too late, reducing their effectiveness and impacting the intended timing of the artillery barrage preceding the charge. The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target.

What do you think of the Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Suggested Reading

• Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.

• Wittenberg, Eric J and Petruzzi, J David. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg. Savas Beatie, 2006.

• Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.

• Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

• Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715.

• Hartwig, D Scott. The Army of Northern Virginia and the Gettysburg Campaign. 2010 Gettysburg Seminar. Pages 40 – 65. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/13/essay3.pdf

• https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

• https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

• Klein LW. Why Pickett’s Charge Failed. The Civil War Center.  https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/