US Cold War Propaganda: The Failures of the CIA in its Radio Broadcasts to Albania in the Early Cold War – Part 2

The US had a variety of ways to influence citizens behind the ‘iron curtain’ during the Cold War. One of those was radio broadcasts. Here, Richard Cummings, author of a recent book Cold War Frequencies (Amazon US | Amazon UK), continues the catastrophic story of how the CIA got a vessel ready to broadcast in Albania in the early 1950s. Here, Richard looks at what happened when the ship was close to Albania.

Read part 1 on how the U.S. prepared for the mission here.

Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of Albania from 1946 to 1985. Shown here in1944.

The JUANITA arrived in Greece on March 25, 1951, to perform the following mission under Project BGSPEED:

The JUANITA was equipped to broadcast on the medium wave band into Albania, utilizing the skip wave technique. When the JUANITA was purchased, there was no certainty that any country would grant permission for her to operate within that country's coastal waters. Therefore, it was understood that the broadcasts might have to be conducted from the open sea, that the vessel obtained for this role would have to be sufficiently seaworthy for open sea operations, and the equipment capable of broadcasting from a considerable distance at sea. 

This skip wave, which exists both day and night, becomes effective as darkness falls and the ionosphere descends and becomes ineffective as the sun rises and the ionosphere ascends.) During the night hours, the beam from the antenna strikes the ionosphere. It bounces back to earth, permitting reception much farther from the transmitter than is normally possible by ground wave--which follows the ground sixty or seventy miles or so, depending on terrain, and grounds out.) 

Problems

After the JUANITA arrived in Greece, serious problems began; below is a summary of these problems, extracted from declassified OPC and CIA reports -- in no particular order of importance.

·       A contract engineer was sent to Greece to review the JUANITA operation. He wrote: “The JUANITA was intended to broadcast medium wave--skip wave into its target from 175-300 miles, came to light during a meeting with Washington communications men two days before my departure to Athens. On arrival in Athens, I found that the men (operations and communications) had been unacquainted with this intention. They expressed surprise that Washington intended to depend on skip wave, for they believed skip wave had never been depended on before for medium wave broadcast.”

·       The Albanian area is greater than the noise level off the U.S. east coast. Radio stations in the Balkans make a Babel of voices, move up
 and down the dial, and operate
with many times the power the JUANITA was given

·       A chance, ever-present in open sea operation, of a wave through the wheelhouse door or the hatch over the transmitting room threatened to fry the communications men at their posts and disable the equipment permanently

·       There is no ventilation in the transmitting room. The heat and smell when the equipment in operation is intense enough to cause sickness, a condition aggravated by semi-tropical weather and the violent movement of the ship

·       The vessel was delivered in the U.S. with its original wiring, which is of the house type and unsuitable for marine use. The vessel's house-type wiring causes repeated fires. This is evidenced by numerous minor fires which have occurred onboard and the extreme difficulty that the engineer has had in maintaining electric current throughout the vessel

·       At anchor in a sheltered island cove, one finds oneself a few hundred yards from village dwellings. After the fall of darkness, the large white yacht, whose presence has brought excitement to the otherwise dreary existence of the islanders, lights up (when transmitting) like a Christmas tree. Spreader and running lights glow, and brilliant flashes play about the rigging.

Conclusions

One conclusion of the JUANITA'S history was: "It was not necessary to buy a yacht, equip her, operate her, sail her across the Atlantic, and maintain her in Greece for half a year to demonstrate that her transmitting equipment would not work."

In one OPC report, there was this commentary:

I wish to reiterate my belief that there need be
no apologies by anyone for a decision now to liquidate this particular experiment. It has provided some people
with valuable experiences and has taught several lessons that could not have been learned without the basic proposition being tried out in actual practice. It has, however, taken up a great deal of time that might better now be directed to more pressing and fruitful activities. 

In March 1952, Acting Assistant Director for Policy Coordination wrote a memorandum to the Assistant Director, Office of Communications, in which he summarized the principal failures of Project BGSPEED, part of which read:

Many things have gone wrong in the implementation of this project, and it was terminated in October 1951. No actual broadcasting ever took place. Much of the onus for the failure can be attributed to shortcomings within OPC. These include lack of seasoned judgment from various OPC officers concerned with the project, lack
of continuous, adequate supervision, unfortunate selection of a vessel: etc. On the other head, the communications equipment provided proved inadequate for the contemplated operation. This constitutes an expensive lesson for OPC. 

The JUANITA, purchased for $80,000 in 1951, was sold in May 1953 for $10,000. 

Although Project BGSPEED was considered a failure, that did not stop OPC from beginning clandestine psychological warfare broadcasts into Albania as the Voice of Free Albania (often interchanged with Radio Free Albania) from the CIA radio transmitting site near Athens, Greece at 10 p.m. local time on September 18, 1951.

This article is based on Chapter 5 of Richard’s book: Cold War Frequencies: CIA Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, published in 2021 by McFarland & Co. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

From Emigrant to Viceroy: The Life of Ambrosio O’Higgins

The improbable lives of Ambrosio O’Higgins and his son, Bernardo, would change the history of South America forever. Two men, father and son, both strivers and achievers. Two men who did not take the traditional paths to power and high office. Two men, who through a series of improbable events, would both become, in their own ways, among the founders of the nation of Chile.  The chain of events would begin, of all places, in County Sligo in Ireland.

Erick Redington starts this series on the O’Higgins family by looking at Ambrosio O’Higgins’ extraordinary life, and how he went from an emigrant to Chile to Viceroy.

Ambrosio O’Higgins.

The Ireland that Ambrose O’Higgins was born into was a sad one for the formerly great noble Irish families. During the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, the O’Higgins family had lost its land due to confiscations by Oliver Cromwell and the English Commonwealth government. This reduced the members of the family to poverty and working for others, mainly Protestant settlers who were given the Irish lands to break the power of the landed, Catholic, Irish aristocracy. Irish Catholics were subject to laws restricting religious, political, and property rights to encourage conversion and assimilation. Despite this, many of the O’Higgins clan refused to convert and assimilate.

From the time when Henry VIII declared the creation of the Church of England and began to enforce Protestantism on his kingdom, official persecution of Catholics caused many Irish to emigrate. Many of these Irish were looking primarily for the right to worship as Catholics. This caused many to look to, arguably, the most rigorously Catholic nation in Europe, Spain. The Spanish government was more than happy to take in Irish men and women seeking refuge from religious persecution.

To Spain

While religion was the primary motivation, there were others as well. Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries owned a large proportion of the Western Hemisphere. The modern northern border of California to the southern tip of South America at Tierra del Fuego was largely Spanish territory (Brazil and a few other territories excepted). This was the land of Cortes and Pizzaro, the Aztecs and the Inca. It was also the riches of the Potosí mine, so rich in silver that it caused hyper-inflation in Europe and the gold of Mexico. There were limitless economic possibilities in the Spanish Empire. A combination of the push factors of persecution and land confiscation in Ireland and the pull factors of Catholic freedom and economic opportunity led many Irish to choose emigration to Spain. A young Ambrose would be just one of thousands of these emigrants.

Probably born in 1720, though no one really knows for sure, young Ambrose O’Higgins was forced to work on the farms and estates of others to earn his living. Much of the early life of Ambrose is unknown. Although he would make much in later life about his lineage from the great O’Neill family and would even commission a genealogical survey, little can really be known for sure. What is known is that Ambrose begins appearing in the historical records in 1757 after leaving Spain for South America, when he was about 37 years old. Later, he would claim that he first arrived in Cádiz in 1751. Cádiz was a window to the world for young Ambrose. It was one of the home ports for the Spanish Navy, one of the largest in the world. It was also one of the primary ports for trade with the new world. Every year, hundreds of ships would arrive carrying the wealth of the New World. In Cádiz, Ambrose was able to find work, and his natural brilliance and energy would show to his employers. In 1756, Ambrose, now Ambrosio, left Spain for South America. This appears to be a business trip, an assignment for the bank in Cádiz he worked for. In a time of slow communications and the ease of a person disappearing, this was a position of trust the bank gave to Ambrosio. They must have recognized some drive and talent in him to send him off.

While on this first trip to South America, Ambrosio would see many of the great cities of South America: Buenos Aires, Asunción, and Lima. For a man with business acumen and a striving mentality, the possibilities young Ambrosio saw were endless. When he returned to Spain several years later, after his business trip was over, he petitioned the Spanish government to grant him permission to trade in the colonies. The Spain of the 1760s was rife with corruption and sloth due to administrative decay. Without patrons, Ambrosio would have a difficult time gaining official sanction. Another Irishman, John Garland, was a military engineer being transferred to the Captaincy-General of Chile, an administrative division of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. Garland, recognizing the talent and drive of his friend, offered him a position on his staff, which Ambrosio readily accepted. The problem for a young, relatively poor civil servant in Spain at the time was the cost of maintaining office. As corruption was almost expected, salaries were very low. To pay for his transit to America, and then over the Andes Mountains, Ambrosio would bring to South America goods from the mother country to sell to the colonials. This would be the start of Ambrosio’s fortune. 

Chile

When he arrived in South America, Garland wanted to take the trip to Chile at a leisurely pace. Given the pace of travel in the 1760s, crossing the Andes in winter would be difficult at best and suicidal at worst. Ambrosio, however, had drive. Whether it was bravery or foolhardiness is up for debate, but regardless, Ambrosio crossed the Andes in winter with only a few porters for the baggage and arrived at his destination. For most people, a difficult journey would simply be another chapter in the story, an interesting anecdote and nothing else. For Ambrosio, it would set him on the path to all the heights he would achieve. 

Ambrosio’s assignment took him to Chile, a mountainous strip of territory on the western coast of South America. Overland travel between La Plata and Chile was difficult at the best of times due to the difficult terrain. One of the primary reasons for the separate political administration of Chile was due to its isolation from the colonial authorities in Buenos Aires. Ambrosio’s idea was to develop a way to keep the passes open in winter to safeguard travelers and keep trade open all year around. It sounds like a small idea to modern ears, but for the people of Chile, it was a matter of life and death. Due to transport and logistical issues, Chile was the most remote and underdeveloped of Spain’s American colonies. If Ambrosio could succeed in opening the Andes, the vast natural resources of Chile could be transformed into vast amounts of wealth. For a man with a natural business acumen, the attractiveness of this prospect seems obvious. For the Spanish government, improving communications between La Plata and Chile would have the benefit of tying the area to the colonial administration in Buenos Aires. A further benefit would be military. The movement of troops would be much easier with open roads and waystations. The primary route of travel and communication was through the Straits of Magellan, one of the most notoriously bad seas to sail in the world. 

Ambrosio was not only looking for business possibilities. He was, after all, part of a military organization. In Chile, the primary military threat to the colony was the Araucanians. For over 200 years by this point, the Spanish and the Araucanians had had repeated wars and raids. The Araucanians were never able to drive out the Spanish, and the Spanish never had the strength to destroy the natives. Ambrosio participated in many of the battles against the Araucanians. In battle after battle, Ambrosio would distinguish himself leading troops from the front. Ambrosio would steadily rise through the ranks and would be noted for development of innovative cavalry tactics fighting the natives. His fame would only grow when he received a head wound during a fight where the Araucanians were surprised by his innovative tactics and routed at Lautaro. Despite the near-constant fighting with the Araucanians, Ambrosio was not in favor of destroying the Araucanians. Although many in the Spanish colonial administration would press for a policy of extermination against the natives. As he rose through the ranks of administration, Ambrosio pressed for more trade with the Araucanians. He had a great deal of respect for their culture and was an avid devotee of their handwoven blankets and the ponchos that were so common to the area. Although he was a man of his time and believed in the “civilizing” mission of the Spanish, as colonial administrators went, Ambrosio was forward thinking in his relations with the local tribes. This is not to say that he was a pacifist. He would go on to order multiple reprisal expeditions against local tribes in response to raids. He had no qualms about extending Spanish imperial control further into tribal lands.

During one of Ambrosio’s many trips to southern Chile at this time, he would be a houseguest of a friend of his, Simon Riquelme, a landowner near the city of Los Angeles. In a story as old as time, the young teenage daughter of Riquelme, Isabel, was impressed by the powerful and dashing Ambrosio. Ambrosio, being a man of power and wealth, also had an eye for women. Despite being over 30 years his junior, Isabel would become pregnant from the liaison between the two, and in 1778, a boy named Bernardo Riquelme was born. According to Bernardo, later in life, Isabel only yielded to Ambrosio’s advances when he promised to seek permission from the royal court to marry her. Although Ambrosio would provide some financial support for this illegitimate son, especially when it came to education, Ambrosio would never deign to meet this young boy who would have the same brilliance and energy of his father. This will not be the last we hear of young Bernardo. 

Moving up

Ambrosio moved further up the ladder when he was promoted to Governor of the province of Concepción. Concepción province was the location of the capital of Chile and was a prestigious post for a man who started as a poor immigrant. While Governor of Concepción, Ambrosio would have contact with the French explorer the Comte de la Perouse. Although Ambrosio would have an adversarial relationship with the explorer, the research he conducted led the British to plan an expedition to Chile to conquer the region. Although this expedition would be redirected to Montevideo, the scare would give Ambrosio the impetus to recommend improvements to the defense of his province. Ambrosio’s noted ability, as well as his sound recommendations would lead the king, Carlos III to ennoble him as the 1st Barón de Ballinar in 1787 appoint him as the Captain-General of Chile in 1788. In 30 years, an Irish refugee had risen to the highest office in the Spanish colonial administration of Chile. 

Ambrosio wasted no time. He dusted off his old plan to create stations in the Andes to improve communications with Buenos Aires. After all these years, he had not forgotten. A postal service was created. Defenses were reinforced. Surveys were made to determine the mineral and agricultural wealth of Chile. He would make frequent inspections and tours to see for himself that there was always activity. New towns were founded. Imports were encouraged, despite the resistance of local manufacturers. The success that Ambrosio had in developing the region around the city of Osorno would lead to King Carlos IV making him Marquis de Osorno in 1796. There were military tasks that Ambrosio undertook where he could showcase his skills. He ordered the development of old fortifications and construction of new ones in Southern Chile. Military roads were constructed between Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción. Routes were opened in Araucanian and Mapuche territory. Perhaps the greatest reform Ambrosio undertook while Captain-General was to abolish the encomienda system. This system, which combined many of the worst aspects of manorialism and slavery, required the native populations of Chile to provide labor to landowners they were bound to. Under Ambrosio’s rule, Chile rose from being a colonial backwater to highly developed colonial jewel. It was at this time that the foundations of the economic and political growth of Chile in the years after independence were formed.

Viceroy of Peru

Due to the impressive accomplishments of Ambrosio in his governorship of Chile, in 1795 he was promoted to be the Viceroy of Peru. Lima, the seat of the viceroyalty, had been the home of Spanish administration in South America for over 250 years. Peru is where a large amount of the mineral wealth of the Americas was extracted for Spain. Only Mexico provided more to Spain than Peru. This wealth kept the corrupt and incompetent Spanish court afloat. Entrusting this responsibility to Ambrosio is a window into both the importance of the office and the opinion the court held of Ambrosio. 

Unfortunately, Ambrosio would not have quite the success in Peru as he had in Chile. By 1795, the French Revolutionary Wars had started, and Spain would play an active part, first as an enemy of France, then its ally. Spain needed all the money it could get its hands on to fight the British, especially the Royal Navy. The money for internal improvements and building projects would not be there for Ambrosio, unless it were for fortifications. The great plan he developed, to link Lima and the old Incan capital, Cuzco, by road would never come to fruition. The Spain of the cartoonishly incompetent and corrupt pair of Carlos IV and his prime minister, Manuel Godoy, was not the enlightened despotism of the reformer Carlos III.  What could have been the ultimate capstone to his career was a disappointing and frustrating denouement. In 1801, Ambrosio died. 

The life of Ambrosio O’Higgins was extraordinary for its time. He rose from a family of Irish tenant farmers to a twice ennobled colonial administrator in the Spanish Empire. Emigrant to Viceroy. Through sheer drive, energy, and competence, Ambrosio O’Higgins wrote one of the most unique chapters in the history of South America. However, this story does not end with his death. Toward the end of his life, Ambrosio declared in his will that his illegitimate son, Bernardo Riquelme, to be his heir. It would be this penniless young man who would take his father’s legacy, and his last name, to become Bernardo O’Higgins, the father of an independent Chile. 

What do you think of Ambrosio O’Higgins’ life? Let us know below.

Now, read part 2 about the early life of Ambrosio’s son, Bernardo O’Higgins, here.

References

Clissold, Stephen. Bernardo O’Higgins and the Independence of Chile. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1968.

Fanning, Tim. Paisanos: The Forgotten Irish Who Changed the Face of Latin America. Gill Books, 2016.

Kinsbruner, Jay. Bernardo O’Higgins. Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968.

The US Response to Aggression Against China in the 1930s: The Stimson Doctrine

If a stronger country invades and conquers part or all of a weaker one in an act of aggression, the United States usually does not accept or recognize this act as lawful. This is known as the Stimson Doctrine. Think of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or Russia’s 2014 invasion of the Crimea. Such was not always how the U.S has approached such situations before the twentieth century. The U.S. would recognize acts of power as facts of life. Peter Deane explains.

Henry Stimson. Source: Harris & Ewing, available here.

U.S. Secretary of State John M. Hay’s Open Door Policy set the background in 1899. The U.S. intended to preserve the territorial integrity of China. At the time, other powers seemed to respect it; however this changed over time.

1915

Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to China with the goal to obtain control of large portions of China’s infrastructure. With the European powers occupied with World War One, and the Japanese Empire an allied nation, they made no effort to oppose it. China had no choice other than war to the acceptance of the demands.

Secretary of State William J. Bryan was strongly opposed to them as a contravention of the Open Door Policy. Rebuffed by the European powers, he wished then to act unilaterally. He was also a sincere pacifist and wished to do nothing hostile. The State Department issued a note: the U.S. would not recognize the legality of any of the demands, or officially accept them as true. In other words, nonrecognition of any Japanese treaty that infringed on China’s sovereignty. At the time the State Department saw it as a weak expedient—no threat of force or sanction lay behind it—but the best one available. This attack on Japan’s authority did nothing to impair the empire’s power. Japan disregarded the note. 

1931

On September 18, the “Mukden Incident” occurred. Mukden was a railway station in Manchuria, a north Chinese province. The Japanese army alleged that Chinese soldiers used explosives to damage one section of track of a Japanese owned railroad. A later League of Nations investigation found the “Incident” to be a Japanese Army fabrication. 

However the Mukden Incident provoked public outcry among the Japanese and provided the pretext for the Japanese army to advance against nearby Chinese army forces, which were disorganized and easily defeated. They successfully expanded their attack across all Manchuria in the following weeks. 

Manchuria was a resource-rich province adjacent to Japanese-controlled Korea. Many of the Twenty-One Demands had pertained to Manchuria, such as railroad control. The Japanese Empire benefited greatly from influence over Manchuria, and stood to gain still more with absolute control. Japanese occupation of an entire Chinese province was thinly veiled with the formation of a new nation called Manchukuo.

In this way, from the standpoint of international law, stood the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, which guaranteed China’s territorial integrity, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty (Pact of Paris) and the League of Nations. Both China and Japan were signatories and members, respectively. The U.S. was a signatory of both treaties but not a League member. 

The Kellogg-Briand Pact was a 1928 treaty with over fifty signatories. Each agreed to renounce war and military aggression as national policy. Such a lovely idea. But sad to say, the Treaty had no teeth. Violation carried no penalty. Other signatories could respond ad lib. 

Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson raised the issue of response in Cabinet meetings. President Herbert C. Hoover, although he had much foreign policy experience, was otherwise occupied. By this time the Depression was worsening steadily, beyond prior ones, with no end in sight. 

Hoover was a man of Quaker roots and, while not a pacifist, he shrank from the idea of the use of military force. He saw the U.S. armed forces as a purely defensive tool. In a Cabinet meeting on October 9, Stimson learned that Hoover’s main concern about the crisis was to avoid conflict and not allow “under any circumstances anybody to deposit that baby in our lap.” Perhaps the League of Nations would act somehow.

The European powers faced declining economies too and were in no hurry to act. The League opted to appoint a commission (the Lytton Commission) to investigate the Mukden Incident, over Japanese protest. That decision effectively stalled any League response for months. 

Stimson felt the need to do something. Repeatedly he raised the issue of the “weapon” of economic sanctions against Japan. But Hoover had very strong opinions against the use of sanctions because of the civilian suffering they could cause. Also, the U.S. could ill afford to close a foreign market for its goods. Sanctions were warfare conducted by other means and could lead to military conflict (as they did ten years later). He had famously worked to relieve hunger in Europe due to WWI and wished to inflict privation on no one. Hoover grew testy over the issue. 

Hoover suggested instead, in the November 9 Cabinet meeting, that Bryan’s strategy of nonrecognition be used. Stimson adopted this idea and worked out a formulation with State Department staff. This he brought back to the Cabinet to some opposition. Both the Secretaries of War and the Navy opposed it as risky; the Administration was not prepared to put force behind any move that might antagonize Japan. But Stimson and Hoover agreed. It committed the U.S. to nothing. Others could join in if they wished.

1932

Stimson’s staff finished the final draft. “The American Government … does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of…” standing agreements. 

This was delivered first to the embassies of China and Japan on January 7, and then copies sent to the other Nine Power Treaty signatories. The Chinese and Japanese ambassadors were first informed of its content in person.  Neither reacted strongly. 

In February, Stimson made the policy public by writing an open letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It said in part:

“One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating … provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.” 

The United States could cease compliance with treaties too. But everyone knew that such was an empty threat at a time when the U.S. was attempting to shrink its own navy to save money. Given this reality, the Cabinet officers opposed felt it worse than useless to make an empty threat. 

Stimson was stunned when the British government reacted coolly to the note, rather than support and echo its message. Ultimately the British did support it, publicly at the League of Nations. This coincided with the Lytton Commission’s report that the Mukden incident was a fabrication. This led to the prompt departure of the Japanese from the League of Nations. 

“Manchukuo” gained little in the way of diplomatic recognition in the following years, but Japanese aggression was not swayed by world opinion.

President Hoover faced re-election and was not fond of the term “Stimson Doctrine”. It had been his suggestion originally. But the term stuck, to the Secretary’s quiet satisfaction. The Doctrine has remained a basic principle of American foreign policy since then. 

What do you think of the Stimson Doctrine and China? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Fausold, M. L. The Presidency of Herbert C. Hoover. Lawrence, KA; University of Kansas Press, 1985

Ferrell, R. H. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1957

Hoover, H. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933. New York, NY; The Macmillan Co., 1952

Jeansonne, G. The Life of Herbert Hoover: Fighting Quaker, 1928-1933. New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2012

Stimson, H. L. and Bundy, McG. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York, NY; Harper Bros., 1947

Wheeler, G. E. Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life. Washington, DC; Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1974

Nazi Germany’s Helicopters in World War 2

It is little known that Germany produced helicopters in World War II. Here, Daniel Boustead discussed the successes and failures of the helicopters that Nazi Germany produced – as well as how the Nazis ultimately saw little benefit from them.

The Flettner Fl 282 helicopter at trials after World War II. It has the US military star marking.

The German helicopters of World War II are one of the little-known weapons of the Nazi German arsenal. These aircrafts were created to serve a specific military purpose and they did have some success in the role they were assigned. However, these roles were largely irrelevant because it bled the Third Reich dry of its resources and diverted time away from much needed weapons projects. Furthermore, these helicopters had some flaws which destroyed their effectiveness as weapons and as pieces of equipment for military use. The German helicopters were just another example of the Nazi wasteful squandering of precious time and resources that would ultimately yield no results or change the outcome of the war.

Helicopters in the war

The Third’s Reich’s helicopters that served in combat did have some successes.  The FA-330 “Bachstelze” was a small gyroplane helicopter which was designed for the use as a submarine-based reconnaissance aircraft ([1]). The FA-330 Bachstelze (Wagtail) accomplished its job of reconnaissance by being towed behind a surfaced submarine or U-Boat ([2]). The FA-330 was attached to the submarine by a steel cable working from a winch on the deck (2). The airstream of the ship or submarine supposed to suffice to allow the FA 330 to lift up (3). The FA-330 would hold an altitude of 440 feet and could see about 25 miles with the assistance powerful binoculars and report back to the U-Boat by telephone (2).  A total of some 200 FA-330s were built (3). As early as February 1943, the FA-330s were used successfully with the Type IX D2 U-Boat’s which were operating in the Far East (1). The FA-330s were also used in the Southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans where aircraft patrols were not common at the time (2). The FA 330 was also used by U-Boats in the Gulf of Aden (4). The U-Boat U-861 used the FA-330 gyro kite to patrol in the Indian Ocean off Madagascar. In the aftermath of the Japanese permitting the establishment of a German U-Boat base at Penang Malaya (in the summer of 1943), the Germans exchanged the FA-330 for a small Japanese float plane. On another occasion at the U-Boat base at Surabaya (Java) an FA-330 gyro kite was exchanged for a Japanese floatplane to supplement the two Arado reconnaissance aircraft which kept watch over the harbor.

Another German helicopter which made its impact during World War II was the Flettner FL 282. From November 1942 until the end of January 1943, the FL 282 conducted service trials mining operations on the German minelayer Drache alongside the ship Bulgaria in the central Aegean Sea (5). The service trials tests were successful as noted by the Naval Inspectorate report from February 10, 1943, which stated “The Fl 282 can now be operated successfully as a shipboard aircraft for patrol and anti-submarine tasks, even from small ships”. By 1943 the FL 282s were routinely being used by the Kriegsmarine for convoy protection and reconnaissance (6). The FL 282 would fly from platforms above gun turrets of convoy escort vessels in the Aegean, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas. The Fl 282 was successful in searching Allied submarines and summoning other Luftwaffe aircraft to attack the U-Boats (7). In this case Fl-282s encountered and spotted U-Boats and other Luftwaffe aircraft during the fleet exercises which were done in conjunction with the 21st U-Boat Flotilla in Danzig Bay and north of Gotland Island from April 24, 1943, to May 15, 1943 (8). At the end of February 1945 FL 282s spotted the attack of the Red Army’s 1stand 2nd White Russian Front in Far Pomerania at the right time (7). However, because of the weakness of the German army units, their report could not stop the further Soviet advance. In 1945 surviving Fl 282s were stationed with the Luftwaffe’s only operational helicopter squadron the Transportstaffel (transport squadron) 40 at Rangsdorf and Ainring at Mulhdorf, Bavaria in their role as artillery spotters (8). The FL-282s of the Transportstaffel 40 made many flights during this time into and out of besieged and encircled towns transporting dispatches, mail and key personnel (9).

Diverting resources

In spite of the success of the German Helicopters, their deployment and development diverted precious resources away from more essential and important weapons programs. The most important weapon that the German Luftwaffe needed from 1942 to 1945 was something that would destroy the Anglo-American bombing raids over Germany and Austria. This was destroying German war production and the many of the Third Reich’s cities. The factories in Munich and Eisenach, that produced the Fl 282, were destroyed by Allied bombing (8). The Anglo-Americans also bombed the Flettner Johannisthal factory that produced the Fl-282 Helicopter. The fact that these factories existed for production of the Fl-282 showcase that these factories were diverting away precious people and materiel away from more important weapons projects.

The aircraft that was the perfect choice to destroy Allied Bombers and their Fighter escorts was the German ME 262 Jet. The ME 262 Jet Fighter had a maximum speed of 540 miles per hour at 19,685 feet (10). The ME 262 Jet Fighter was equipped with four 30 millimeter MK 108 cannons (11). On May 22, 1943, German Fighter Ace Adolf Galland tested the ME 262 Jet and felt it could allow the Luftwaffe a qualitative superiority over the Allied quantitative superiority (12).  According to a detailed analysis of the records of combat from August 1944 to May 1945, ME-262 Jets contributed to the losses of 52 bombers and 10 fighters that belonged to the Eighth Army Air Force (13). This means that a total of 62 aircraft from the Eighth Army Air Force were lost by the ME 262 Jets from August 1944 to May 1945, while 200 ME 262 Jet Fighters were destroyed during this period of time (13). Even though these figures may be exaggerated, they at least set the terms upon which the ME 262s combat performance has to be evaluated (13).

Options

In contrast the German helicopters of that period were not shooting down any enemy aircraft, making the need for their existence less necessary. However Nazi Germany’s leader Adolf Hitler destroyed the ME 262 Jet Fighter’s chances of success by his Fuhrerbefehl or Leader Order of June 8, 1944, which limited the ME 262’s role to a bomber, a role it wasn’t suited for (14). Hitler’s fateful order hastened the demise of the Third Reich because it delayed the ME 262s production and introduction to combat.

Another aeronautical weapon that could have halted the Allied air supremacy over the Third Reich was the X-4 air-to-air missile. By 1943 it was becoming apparent that existing aircraft machine guns and cannons were insufficiently lethal against Allied Heavy Bombers (15). The X-4 missile was developed and it was a wire-guided system (16). The guidance system used a pair of trailing wires derived from the Dortmund/Duisberg system developed earlier for anti-ship missiles. After the launch, the pilot tracked the missile by following its tracer flare and steered the missile using a Knirps joystick control. The warhead was triggered either by a Rheinmetall-Borsig Kranich acoustic proximity fuse or an impact fuse. The ME 262 Jet was supposed to have four X-4 Missiles per plane. The X-4 program was cancelled on February 6, 1945, by Kammler’s edict which shut down many of the German missile programs. The Nazi Luftwaffe’s entire production should have focused on producing only the ME-262 Jet and the X-4 air-to-air missile.

Faults with the helicopters

The major German helicopters also had some faults which reduced their effectiveness as weapons. In May, 1943 U-Boat losses reached 41 U-Boats that were lost at sea and the losses continued to get worse after that point (17). The reason for these losses were improved Allied radar technology, long-range airplanes, breaking the German Enigma Code, better anti-submarine weapons, and better anti-submarine warfare tactics. These losses were to become apparent in the Indian Ocean and Southern Atlantic, when Allied long range aircraft appeared in these areas (2). This forced the U-Boats to crash dive quickly in these areas which resulted in them not be able to recover the FA-330 autogyro pilot from the ocean (2). The fact that the U-Boat war was effectively lost after “Black May” 1943 eliminated the need for the FA-330 Autogyro. On January 3, 1943, while the Fl-282s were undergoing test trials, they were attacked by Allied Bombers and Torpedo planes (5). Though no damage or casualties were sustained, a statement was issued in the aftermath of this incident. The ship that received the statement was the “Aegean”, which requested, “to permit the operation of the two valuable FL 282s only when there is no prospect of enemy countermeasures”. The means it could be destroyed while on a ship.  In 1945 when the Fl-282’s were operating at the Berlin-Rangsdorf they fell victim to Soviet fighters and Soviet flak (7). The fact that the FL-282 could be shot down by anti-aircraft guns or fighter planes further reduced its effectiveness as a weapon (7). 

The Nazi helicopters received very little attention in the period of World War II and thereafter. The aircrafts were designed for a specific role. However, these roles became irrelevant because the Third Reich was being bombed into submission. The aircraft that was most needed to stem the tide for the Luftwaffe was the ME-262 Jet Fighter to destroy the Allied Air onslaught and not a helicopter. The Nazi helicopter projects were mainly ineffective, and it wasted the Nazis resources which could have been used for more ME 262-Jets and X-4 air-to-air missiles. 

What do you think of German helicopters in World War II? Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Nowarra , Heinz J. German Helicopters 1928-1945. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History Publishing. 1990. 37. 

[2] “The Focke Achgelis FA 330 Bachstelze(Wagtail)”. Uboat.net. Accessed on November 29th, 2021. https://uboat.net/technical/bachstelze.htm

3 Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters WW2. Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon. Com. November  29th, 2021. 24. 

4 Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters of World War 2.  Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon.com.  November 29th, 2021. 30. 

5 Johnston, David. Translator. The Luftwaffe Profile Series No. 6: Flettner FL 282. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1996. 27. 

6 Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters of World War 2. Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon.com. November 29th, 2021. 65. 

7 Nowarra, Heniz J. German Helicopters 1928-1945. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History  Publishing. 1990. 28. 

8 Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters of World War 2. Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon.com. November 29th, 2021. 72. 

9 Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters of World War 2. Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon.com. November 29th, 2021. 72 to 73. 

10 Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 118. 

11 Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 130. 

12 Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 32 to 33.  

13 Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 55. 

14 Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 36. 

15 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz-X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 40. 

16 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz-X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 40 to 41. 

17 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of Raiders of the Deep. Washington;  District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000. 129. 

Works Cited Page

Boyne, Walter J. Messerschmitt ME 262: Arrow to the Future. Atlgen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History/Aviation History Publishing Ltd. 1994. 

Johnston, David. Translator. The Luftwaffe Profiles Series No.6: Flettner FL 282. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1996.

Lindberg, Leo. German Helicopters of World War 2. Middletown: Delaware. “Self-Published” and available on Amazon.com. November 29th, 2021.

Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington: District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000.

Nowarra, Heinz J. German Helicopters 1928-1945. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History Publishing. 1990.

“The Focke Achgelis FA 330 Bachstelze (Wagtail)”. Uboat.net. Accessed on November 29th, 2021. https://uboat.net/technical/bachstelze.htm

Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 

India: A Nation since Time Immemorial

In this article, Apeksha Srivastava highlights the territorial and cultural continuity in the idea of India centuries before the British colonized it.

Sir John Strachey on the left with his brother Sir Richard in 1876.

Sir John Strachey, an English civil servant in British India, had said at the University of Cambridge in 1888, “What is India? ... There is no such country, and this is the first and most essential fact about India that can be learned. India is a name, which we give to a great region including a multitude of different countries. There is no general Indian term that corresponds to it.”[1]

Such statements bring us face to face with the Europe of the past times that represented non-western cultures as a series of ‘lacks’ that it supposedly possessed. Since India lacked several progressive qualities, it was the White Man’s Burden to civilize this barbaric, non-white Other. It was upon the British to modernize and unify India for the first time. According to historian David Ludden, “... India was never what it is today in a geographical, demographic, or cultural sense, before 1947”[1].

The Indian Notion of Nation

Providing arguments against this misassumption, Dr. Shonaleeka Kaul [2,3] (Associate Professor, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University) talked about texts like the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and Mahapuranas (starting 5th century BCE), Chinese pilgrim Xuan Zang, Shankaracharya’s voyages, Greek ambassador Megasthenes, geographer Ptolemy (Roman Empire), the Tamil epic Silappadikaram, astronomer Varahamihira (Brihat-Samhita), Arab traveler Al-Biruni, Mughal historian Abu Fazl (16th century CE), Jain and Tibetan texts. All of them have emphasized a significant territorial and cultural continuity in the idea of India across centuries (Bharata, Bharatvarsha, Yindu, Indu, Indika, Indói, Hind, Jambudvipa [name given by Ashoka], Hindustan, Bharatakshetra, Bharata Khanda, Phags-Yul, [French-Inde; Dutch-Indië]). Their definitions of the Indian notion of nation talk about a vast and diverse land surrounded by lofty mountains and seas/oceans. India has been one entity centuries before the British.

Timeless Indianness

According to some scholars, one of the oldest names associated with the Indian subcontinent was Meluhha. It was mentioned in the Akkadian texts of ancient Mesopotamia in terms of the trade relations of the Harappans (3rd millennium BCE). In the words of archaeologist Jane R. McIntosh, “The imports from Meluha mentioned in Sumerian and Akkadian texts, such as timbers, carnelian, and ivory, match the resources of the Harappan realms.”[4] This timeless Indianness traveled all the way to pre-colonial India, strengthened as one entity. As stated by the Chinese pilgrim Li Daoyuan (527 CE), “From here (Mathura) to the south all (the country) is Middle-India (Madhyadeśa).”[5]. Marco Polo, a Venetian merchant, explorer, and writer who traveled through Asia along the Silk Route in the 1270s, mentioned, “... the great province of Maabar ... a part of the continent of greater India, as it is termed, being the noblest and richest country in the world”[6].

Majestic & Sacred

Turning landmarks into sacred spots have been a powerful device in unifying the idea of India. The strategic placement of a majority of mahā Shaktipīthas and upapīthas across India has broadly identified this nation with the divine body of Sati (the Mother Goddess)[7]. According to the legend, Daksha, Sati’s father, did not invite her to a yagna (religious ceremony). Although her husband, God Shiva, tried to convince her not to go, she went to the ceremony. There, Daksha insulted Shiva in front of her. Unable to bear this, Sati jumped into the sacred fire of the yagna. Later, a livid Shiva carried Sati’s burnt body and roamed around the universe with it, out of grief and sorrow. To prevent the destruction of the universe because of Shiva’s anger, Vishnu used his Sudarshana Chakra (weapon) to cut Sati’s body, parts of which fell on the Indian subcontinent to become sacred sites.

India: A Sacred Geography by Diana Eck “investigates a particular idea of India that is shaped ... by the extensive and intricate interrelation of geography and mythology that has produced this vast landscape of tīrthas ... at least 2000 years old, ... enacted in the practice of pilgrimage for many centuries”[1]. The Chār Dhām (visiting these four pilgrimage sites in India is believed to help achieve salvation), Kumbhamela (celebrated approximately every 12 years at four river-bank pilgrimage places in India), 12 Jyotirlingas (devotional representations of god Shiva), Sapta puri (seven holy pilgrimage centers in India), and others trace Bharatavarsha way before the British. The Bhārāta Mātā Temples in Varanasi (1936) and Hardvār (1983) contain maps of India, indicating its holy places. Above the Hardvār-temple map is the image of Mother India (the Nation’s Goddess). Radhakumud Mookerji, an Indian historian and a noted Indian nationalist during British colonial rule, associated the Rigveda (dated roughly between 1500–1000 BCE) river hymns with the “first national conception of Indian unity such as it was.” Furthermore, there are several overlaps and intersects between India’s Hindu and Muslim sacred landscapes. The Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Christians also developed several shrines in India over centuries, emphasizing the religious unanimity of this land.

Unity & Pluralism: Two Sides of a Coin

According to the British ethnographer and colonial administrator, Sir Herbert Hope Risley, “underlying uniformity of life from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, there is in fact an Indian character, a general Indian personality, which we cannot resolve into its component elements”[8]. In India, unity and pluralism are inseparable. This aspect is visible today on Indian currency notes containing several scripts, the national emblem (an adaptation of the Lion Capital of Ashoka from 280 BCE), postage stamps with images of stupas (hemispherical structures containing relics of Buddhist monks or nuns), and other artifacts. These diverse ancient symbols denote a unified India for us.

Trees have also defined India since times immemorial. There are references to it since the Indus Civilization. According to the Puranas, the Bargad or banyan tree, native to the Indian subcontinent, symbolizes the Trimūrti: Gods Brahma (roots), Vishnu (bark), and Shiva (branches)[9]. The tree represents longevity and fertility. Married women celebrate the Vat-Savitri vrat, a religious ritual involving Banyan worship, for their husbands’ long and prosperous life in several regions of India. Buddhist scriptures mention its self-arising nature comparable to the way kāma overcomes humans [10]. Alexander was amazed to see this tree, during his plunder journey in India, that provided shelter to his large army of 7,000 men [11]. Ayurveda talks about its medicinal properties. Banyan trees offer a vast canopy of leaves that block out the sun and have been serving as natural meeting places in many Indian villages for a very long time. Today, the Banyan is the national tree of India, unifying the past and present. 

The idea of India is ancient. It is a diverse thought unified by one consciousness. Although not exactly the same in boundaries and concepts during different times, there seems to be a lot in common about this notion of India as a nation held by various religions, residents, foreign travelers, and chroniclers. The Indian concept of oneness has time and time again embraced that vast diversity, which some people thought would never let India be united as one entity.

You can read more from Apeksha on feminine national personification in the UK, India, and France here.

Apeksha Srivastava completed her Master’s degree from the Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. She is currently an aspiring writer and a second-year Ph.D. student at this institute. This article is from an assignment she submitted for the semester-long course, Perspectives on Indian Civilization.

References

1.     Eck, D. L. (2012). India: A sacred geography. Harmony.

2.     The New Indian Express. The Idea of India: A Historical Corrective. Retrieved on 18 January 2022.

3.     The New Indian Express. The Idea of India: A Historical Corrective-II. Retrieved on 18 January 2022.

4.     The Indian Express. From Meluha to Hindustan, the many names of India and Bharat. Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

5.     Sen, T. (2006). The travel records of Chinese pilgrims Faxian, Xuanzang, and Yijing. Education about Asia, 11(3), 24-33.

6.     Polo, M. (1854). The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian: The Translation of Marsden Revised with a Selection of His Notes(No. 33). Bohn.

7.     The New Indian Express. Motherlodes of Power: The story of India's 'Shakti Peethas.' Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

8.     Risley, H., & Crooke, W. (1999). The people of India. Asian Educational Services.

9.     Cultural India. National Tree. Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

10.  KÛLAVAGGA. (5) SÛKILOMASUTTA. Retrieved from https://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe10/sbe1034.htm.

11.  Varanasi, S., & Narayana, A. (2007). Medico-historical review of Nyagrŏdha (Ficus bengalensis Linn.). Bulletin of the Indian Institute of History of Medicine (Hyderabad), 37(2), 167–178.

Henry Ford’s Calamitous Rainforest Utopia: Fordlândia

Fordlândia was an idea of the great carmaker Henry Ford in the 1920s. He set-up a base in the Brazilian Amazon with the aim of producing rubber for car tires. In this excellent piece, Felix Debieux looks at what happened at Fordlândia – and how grand ambitions ultimately turned to failure.

Water tower and warehouse building in Fordlândia, Brazil in 2010. Source: Amit Evron, available here.

What do Ford, Firestone and Goodyear have in common? You would be right to say that they are all major players in today’s automotive industry. What is not so well remembered, however, is their shared historical interest in the Amazon rainforest. In the second half of the 1920s, clandestine explorations were conducted by engineers and geologists from Britain and North America who hoped to find oil, precious minerals, and promising locations for rubber plantations. Each sought to tempt the automotive giants to the jungle with land capable of growing the crucial raw material they needed to make their product: tires. 

Following negotiations with Amazonian state governments for concessions, each speculator was convinced that they had secured the rights to exploit the most valuable territory. By 1927, one speculator successfully acquired 2.5 million acres – an area 82% the size of Connecticut - on the Tapajós River in the Amazonian state of Pará. As an indication of the vastness and remoteness of the area, he not only managed to plant half a million rubber seedlings, but also arranged for an armed security force to protect the operation from rival speculators. Later, this land was acquired by American industrial magnate Henry Ford who set out to grow a new supply of rubber. Rubber, however, is only part of the story. Indeed, this marked the beginning of a bizarre socio-economic experiment in the Amazon spearheaded by America’s premier innovator. In his day, Ford’s name was every bit as evocative as the glimmering promise of technological revolution as Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg, and he planned to build an American city smack in the middle of the jungle. Like other empire builders preceding him, he would name the city after himself: Fordlândia. 

Ford’s motivation: an industrialist in the jungle

Henry Ford’s foray into the jungle was, first and foremost, a pragmatic move. In 1922, exports of rubber from Asian plantations were made much more difficult by the Stevenson Plan. Concocted by British and French planters, the Stevenson Plan created an artificial global rubber shortage and succeeded in inflating its price on the international market. As the consumer of 70% of the world’s rubber supply, manufacturers operating in North America were left with little choice but to seek alternative sources. While Firestone decided to invest in Liberian plantations, and Goodyear planted in Sumatra and the Philippines, Ford cast his eye on South America. 

In growing his own supply, Ford believed that he could establish a rubber autarchy: a system of total self-sufficiency from rubber seedling through to tires. For Ford, this must have seemed entirely feasible. After all, the Ford Motor Company during the 1920s controlled nearly every raw material that constituted the manufacture of a motorcar. The glass, the wood, the iron; everything except latex produced by rubber trees. Alongside Ford’s other innovations, anything must have seemed possible. Indeed, this was the man who:

§  Had by 1926 established the Ford Air Transport Service: the first private contractor to deliver mail for the U.S government.

§  Had transformed a bankrupt Michigan railway into a temporarily successful operation.

§  Had developed revolutionary new glassmaking techniques. 

§  Had improved coalmining technology.

How hard could running a rubber plantation be?

Doomed from the start? A legacy of failure in the Amazon

Preceding Henry Ford’s Amazonian enterprise was a catalogue of foreign projects aimed at extracting the region’s wealth. Many of these schemes were highly problematic but did not register in Ford’s planning. Take Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury as an example. Back in the 1850s, the Director of the U.S. Naval Observatory promoted North American occupation of the Amazon drainage as a dumping group for southern planters and their slaves. At a time when Brazil guarded its northern regions from foreign trade and navigation, Brazilians suspected that Maury’s ideas would mean the forceful opening of the Amazon to U.S. colonialism. 

Suspicions of colonialism continued into the 1860s, when a scientific expedition led by Louis and Elizabeth Agassiz influenced Emperor Dom Pedro II to open up the Brazilian Amazon to international trade and navigation. The threat of foreign exploitation emerged again at the turn of the century, when the Anglo-American ‘Bolivian Syndicate’ put forward an idea to develop a rich rubber territory disputed by Bolivia and Brazil. While Brazilian’s were certainly wary of North American colonialism, there was also a legacy of disappointment rooted in the repeated failure of development projects. At best, foreign projects were over-ambitious and ill-conceived. At worst, they were exploitative.

Ford remained oblivious to the enduring stigma of failure surrounding the region’s development. Indeed, several calamitous infrastructure projects pointed to major geographical and public health obstacles inherent to the Amazon. Perhaps the best example of the difficulties a foreign enterprise might encounter was the 226-mile Madeira-Mamoré Railway. During the construction of what became known as the ‘Devil’s Road’, a combination of malaria, yellow fever and other causes claimed the lives of anywhere between 6,000 and 30,000 men. Of greater relevance to Ford, however, was the bad reputation, which Amazonian rubber production had acquired among Brazilians. Labor exploitation, whether through debt peonage or outright slavery, played a major part in the industry’s notoriety. Again, the region’s history did not bode well for Ford.

Putting the conscience in capitalism

Given the stigma surrounding North American interest in the Amazon, it is not surprising to learn that Brazilians questioned Henry Ford’s motives. Many feared that Ford might use the contractual privileges of his concession to undermine national and state sovereignty. What distinguished Ford from other foreigners, however, were his reputation as a reformer of industry and his enlightened social and economic ideas. Indeed, his biography My Life and Work (published in Portuguese in 1926) went a long way to reassure literate Brazilians that Ford represented capitalism with a conscience. 

Emphasizing Ford’s benevolent intentions for the region were his allies in the Brazilian government and the press, who helped to cultivate the image of Ford as a reformer. It was claimed that Ford would transform the Amazon and bring about unprecedented benefits for its impoverished workers. Ford packaged his offer with a promise to develop the region and to manufacture tires and other rubber articles in Brazil. A little showmanship, too, was considered. Reportedly, Ford toyed with the idea of journeying to Pará with Charles Lindberg, who at the time was planning a 9,000-mile tour of Latin America aboard his famous plane: The Spirit of St. Louis. Ultimately, a combination of lobbying and a careful public relations campaign helped to convince Brazilians of Ford’s honest intentions. 

A sign of things to come

In December 1928, Henry Ford’s freighters – the Lake Ormac and the Lake Farge – arrived at the site of what would become Fordlândia to begin construction. On board the ships were an entire railway, a disassembled warehouse, a tugboat, and an arsenal of equipment needed to build a self-sufficient rubber plantation. It was not long before the first signs of trouble appeared. When the plantation manager quit his post and returned home to the U.S., the project was left in the hands of Danish sea captain Einard Oxholm who knew nothing about growing rubber. Ford, who wholeheartedly believed that any man could quickly master a field outside of his own expertise, decided that the Dane was the right person for the job. Unfortunately for Oxholm, his reputation for integrity gave Brazilian and European entrepreneurs all the encouragement they needed to overcharge the plantation for key supplies and services. 

Just one month later, Ford had already spent more than $1.5 million and had virtually nothing to show for it. What is more, 95% of the rubber tree seedlings planted by the end of 1929 were either dying or dead. These were huge problems which defied a solution. Indeed, even the very land on which Fordlândia was constructed was a poor choice. The site, again chosen by a man with zero agricultural experience, was hilly, prone to erosion, and miles away from any settlement. Instead of kitting his plantation with managers and every piece of available technology, Ford would have been better served had he employed biologists who understood the rainforest. Not a single one was consulted in the planning process.

During this period of waste and incompetent management, Brazilian officials struggled to reconcile Ford’s reputation for efficiency with the chaos on show at Fordlândia. How was Ford, an industrial genius, making such a hash of this project? One observer reported that:

“There is a complete lack of organisation at the property. No one knows what the whole picture should be. Waste is terrible… I can well understand the Minister of Agriculture in Rio should think we are crazy… At present, it is like dropping money into a sewer”.

While the physical plantation reached impressive proportions, this was in reality a façade for a failing operation.

Experimenting with an agro-industrial utopia

While the rubber plantation continued to stutter, Henry Ford pushed for a diversification of activities at Fordlândia. Seeking to deliver his promised social and economic benefits, Ford’s plantation would boast comfortable employee housing, a school, a well-equipped modern hospital, a power plant, a sanitary water supply, thirty miles of road and reportedly the largest sawmill in Brazil. Plans were made to export lumber, to produce wooden auto parts for export, and to manufacture tiles and bricks. In addition, there were also plans for both a tire factory and a city with the capacity for 10,000 Brazilians. By the end of 1930, Fordlândia’s landmark structure was complete: a water tower, which stood as a beacon of Ford’s ‘civilizing’ project. This increased breadth of operations represented key pillars of Ford’s personal philosophy: small-town America, and the marriage of agriculture and industry. 

Ford’s nostalgia for an agrarian, small-town America was a prevalent feature of Fordlândia. While he certainly did promise to develop the Amazon, the improved life he envisioned for his workers was very specific and closely resembled the Midwestern towns of his childhood. Having grown up on a farm, the industrialist believed that there was a symbiotic relationship between agriculture and industry. Mechanization, he thought, would not only reduce the waste and drudgery of antiquated farming, but it would also free up the farmer to work in the factory and provide spare time for agricultural pursuits. Fordlândia presented an opportunity to make his unique vision of an agro-industrial utopia a reality. As Ford himself put it in his Ford Evening Hour Sermonettes, this would be a world in which workers had “one foot in industry and one foot on the land”. However, he would eventually learn that the culture he longed for could not so easily be transplanted into the jungle.

Rumble in the jungle: a clash of cultures

For all their suspicions of U.S colonialism, Brazilians and their dependents living at Fordlândia did receive the amenities and provisions promised to them. Indeed, Fordlândia was always about much more than rubber, with Henry Ford seeking to recreate an idyllic American society founded on his own morals and values. Amazonians employed by Ford received a free home, free medical and dental care, recreational facilities, and a wage ranging from the equivalent of thirty-three to sixty-six cents per day. This was at least twice the wages paid elsewhere in the region. Furthermore, workers were able to buy food and other supplies at prices subsidized by Ford. Other free provisions included pasteurized baby milk and burials at the company cemetery. From cradle to grave, workers could expect to live comfortably under Ford’s paternalism.

On the face of it, Fordlândia represented a capitalist’s paradise. However, Ford never succeeding in imposing his alien philosophy on the Amazon; the region’s ingrained cultural and economic traditions were not so easily replaced. Indeed, Brazilians simply did not understand Ford’s idealized vision of small-town America. One example is Ford’s attempt to supplant the traditional role of patrão, which in Brazilian society served as both boss and indulgent parent to the workers. The patrão not only held workers in debt servitude, but he also supported as a godfather and protector figure. The position certainly did not fit the Ford mold of efficiency, and was not suited to the modern employer-employee relationships which Fordlândia hoped to instill. 

Brazilian work culture remained an enigma to Ford. His obsession with timesaving and efficiency served only to annoy his workers who would not accept a rigid work regime. Most disliked the way they were treated - being required to wear ID badges and work through the afternoon under the sweltering sun - and refused to work. Unfamiliar food, such as canned goods and hamburgers, caused further discontent. The tipping point came in 1930 when the plantation dining hall shifted from waited service to cafeteria-style self-service. This change, intended to reduce lunch breaks, would quickly backfire. Workers queuing in line with their trays complained that they were not waiters. Foremen were equally furious, realizing that the new system meant eating in the same manner as their workers. Anger descended into rioting. Workers, armed with shotguns and machetes, and proceeded to rampage through the plantation and chase Fordlândia’s managers (and the town’s cook) into the jungle for a few days until the Brazilian Army arrived to quash the revolt. 

Not understanding Brazilian dining preferences was one thing, but there were other facets of the local culture which persistently baffled Ford. High wages, for instance, failed to ensure that workers would stick around because there was no consumer society in the Amazon on which to spend hard-earned cash. Workers might commit for a few weeks but would then disappear back into the rainforest to work on their own land. While this infuriated Fordlândia’s managers, the cultural disconnect was just as glaring outside of the workplace. Indeed, Ford had very specific ideas about how a society should function, and the sorts of activities people should enjoy. One example was square dancing. Having met his wife at a square dance, Ford decided it would be a good idea to build a large dance hall at the plantation. Although this proved to be unpopular, it was not as unpopular as Ford’s decision to prohibit alcohol. Even though drinking was perfectly legal in Brazil, Ford was a teetotaller and did not see a place for alcohol in his utopia. Like many cultural impositions in Fordlândia, prohibition failed too. Workers continued to drink their customary cachaça, and many travelled down river to a nearby bar and brothel on the aptly named ‘Island of Innocence’.

A predictable end

What became of Fordlândia? After the riot, Fordlândia experienced somewhat of a change in fortune. At long last a successful manager was found in Archibald Johnston, who pushed forward with the construction of housing, and the roads needed to link Fordlândia to the huge territory Ford had acquired inland from the river. Johnston even managed to implement some of Ford’s social ideas, including an emphasis on gardening and strict diets. None of this, however, could compensate for the elephant in the room: Fordlândia was not producing any rubber. Acre after acre of jungle was cleared to make room for rubber trees, but this yielded very poor results. Even when did trees did take root they quickly succumbed to disease. 

Still, Ford did not give up on his vision of rubber self-sufficiency. He hired James Weir, an expert botanist, whose insistence on extravagant planting methods left Johnston exasperated. The biggest demand on Johnston’s list was the construction of a second plantation within Fordlândia, which meant relocating much of the project downstream to Belterra where better growing conditions could be found. Despite the attempt to inject new life into Fordlândia, Weir abandoned the project without notice just a year later. Around the same time, industry advances in the production of synthetic rubber reduced the global demand for natural rubber. 

The close of the Second World War represented a clear turning point for Fordlândia. By then, Ford himself was in poor health and so management of the company fell to his grandson. Henry Ford II, seeking to rein in the company’s spiraling costs, decided to amputate any underperforming assets. This included Fordlândia, which was sold back to Brazil for just a fraction of the purchase price. Perplexed Brazilian residents looked on as their neighbors quickly packed up and headed back home. In stark contrast to the publicity and excitement surrounding Fordlândia’s creation, the project ultimately died a very quiet death. 

While no man better exemplified American ingenuity and industry, Ford’s planned utopia proved to be a colossal error.  It is unfortunate that it took Ford nearly two decades to recognize the error and cut his losses. Left to vandals and to rust in the humid Amazon air were the generator, the sawmill and much of the equipment. The landmark water tower still stands today, although the Ford logo which once represented ‘civilization’ has long since faded. While there has in recent years been a surge in Fordlândia’s population (in 2017 a population of approximately 3,000 people was recorded), the city today is arguably more useful as a parable. As historian Greg Grandin puts it: 

“It’s a parable of arrogance, but the arrogance isn’t that Ford thought he could tame and conquer the Amazon. He had his sights on something actually much bigger. He thought he could tame and conquer capitalism, industrial capitalism. That didn’t happen”.

What do you think of Fordlândia? Let us know below.

References

Industrialist in the Wilderness: Henry Ford's Amazon Venture, John Galey, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2, May 1979, pp. 261-289.

Ever Heard of Henry Ford's Colossal Failed City in the Jungle?, Entrepreneur Europe, 16 January 2019.

Episode 298 Fordlândia, 99% Invisible.

Henry Ford built 'Fordlândia’, a utopian city inside Brazil's Amazon rainforest that's now abandoned — take a look around, Business Insider, 10 February 2020.

Lost cities #10: Fordlândia – the failure of Henry Ford's utopian city in the Amazon, The Guardian, 19 August 2016.

Fordlândia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City, Metropolitan Books, Greg Grandin, June 2009. 

Beyond Fordlândia: An Environmental Account of Henry Ford’s Adventure in the Amazon, Claremont McKenna College, Marcos Colón, 27 April 2021.

Deep in Brazil’s Amazon, Exploring the Ruins of Ford’s Fantasyland, Exploring the Ruins of Ford's Fantasyland, New York Times, 21 February 2017.

Ford Rubber Plantations in Brazil - The Henry Ford, The Henry Ford.

The Amazon Awakens, produced by Walt Disney for the U.S. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 29 May 1944. 

Fordlândia is a reminder of how the Amazon rainforest resists business interests, Financial Times, 3 November 2021.

Fordlândia and Belterra, Rubber Plantations on the Tapajos River, Brazil, Joseph A. Russell, Economic Geography, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1942, pp. 125-145.

The Modern Military History of India: Part 2 - The 1961 Battle of Mormugao Harbour

India’s military history is rich, long and storied yet there is criminally little written about it and it is hideously ignored in many debates on military history of the 19th century. This perhaps is because Indians themselves know very little about what the Indian Army did in the years between 1858 and 1910. In these few decades, the Indian Army became one of the most combat experienced forces in the world as it fought alongside the British Army from Egypt to Afghanistan. The Indian Army (though officially known as the British Indian Army, it was always referred to as the Indian Army), which was already one of the most professional and most well-equipped forces in the world, by the time the Great War rolled around, had become arguably the single most experienced armed force in the world alongside the British Army.

Siddhant A. Joshi continues his series of the modern military history of India by looking at The Battle of Mormugao Harbour in 1961, which was a battle between the Indian Army and Portugal. At the time, Portugal still held Goa, India as a colony.

You can read part 1 on the Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry here.

The NRP Afonso de Albuquerque. Source: Chanthujohnson, available here.

The names INS Betwa and NRP Afonso de Albuquerque mean nothing to most people and yet these two ships, pawns on the chessboard of a small and historically insignificant war1, became the forgotten sentries of a now dead era. On the 18thof December 1961 – one day into the Indian attack on the Portuguese colony of Goa – the NRP Afonoso de Albuquerque would spot the vanguard of the Indian Navy’s carrier force, led by the frigate INS Betwa, and – unbeknownst to the crew of either vessel – they would both make history.

1961, in many ways, saw the completion of India. It would mark the culmination of India’s effort to rid itself of the past and begin anew. In the years previous and immediately following independence in 1947, India set about trying to carve its own, fresh identity. This meant complete unification of the new nation. In 1947 it invaded and annexed the small kingdom of Junagadh in modern day Gujarat, in 1948 it annexed the Kingdom of Hyderabad in modern day Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. In 1954 it took the small Portuguese colony of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

A nation

By the end of the 1950s, the newborn Republic of India had – for the most part – united itself into one cohesive nation. The Portuguese colony of Goa, the now famous holiday destination on India’s western coast, stuck out like a sore thumb.

Initially, India wanted to avoid invasion and confrontation at all cost since it wanted to keep international favor for which it could not be seen as an aggressor and because, it must be mentioned, Portugal was very much a part of NATO. The effort to annex Goa had been for a decade (1950-1960) entirely diplomatic with moves such as the introduction of visa restrictions which made it almost impossible for Portuguese Goans to enter India and ending consular services in the colony. By 1961, however, it had become evident that Portugal was not going to let Goa go without a fight. The Portuguese army mistakenly shelled an Indian ferry vessel believing it to be a landing craft in November of that year. That, many people believe, was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

In December, India invaded and within 3 days the Portuguese would surrender. There would be no NATO outcry, no shouting at the UN, no international condemnation. The 3-day war would become part of the footnotes of history. And yet, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque and the squadron led by INS Betwa would fight the last of a dead form of battle – the last ship-to-ship exchange of cannon fire.

 

The 2 Forces in Comparison – 1961

There was, from the offset and in every field, a massive disparity between the Portuguese and the Indians. The Portuguese had a total of 5,000 military and police personnel – barely the size of an Indian infantry brigade. While their native infantry, native marines and Portuguese infantry were well trained and well equipped, their police personnel were simply not up to the task. They also had no combat experience and for many this would be their first fight.

The Indians on the other hand showed up with the 17th Infantry Division and the 50th Parachute Brigade – some 45,000 in all. The Indian Air Force had attached to these, 20 English Electric Canberra B(I) heavy bombers and over 20 different state-of-the-art fighter and attack aircraft. Crucially, the Indian troops were extremely well trained, extremely well equipped and – most importantly – highly experienced with every single high-ranking officer having fought in World War 2 and the first Indo-Pakistan War.

This disparity, which lent itself to the obvious result, extended very heavily to naval forces as well. The Portuguese had 3 light patrol boats reinforced by the light frigate NRP Afonso de Albuquerque. The Indian Navy, on the other hand, had mobilized the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and her escort force which consisted of 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, 8 frigates and 4 minesweepers.

While the aircraft carrier saw almost no action, its forward screening vessels did. INS Delhi, one of the cruisers, shelled Diu Fortress in the opening hours of the invasion. INS Mysore, the second cruiser, and INS Trishul, one of the frigates, launched an amphibious assault on Anjidiv Fort and supported the Indian marines with sustained firing on the island-fort. But, apart from INS Delhi opening fire with her machine guns on a Portuguese patrol boat, none of the Indian vessels encountered any naval resistance – except when INS Betwa and INS Beas, both of which were Leopard Class frigates, sailed into the entrance of Mormugao Harbour where they would find the PNR Afonso de Albuquerque.

The Leopard Class vs the Afonso de Albuqeurque – Technical Comparison

The two vessels were horribly mismatched. The Leopard Class frigates were modern, radar armed and extremely reliable vessels. The Afonso de Albuquerque was, by 1961, almost 30 years old – having been commissioned into service in 1934. In comparison, the Betwa and Beas were just a year old, having been ordered in 1954 and commissioned in 1960. Afonso had no radar and her 120mm guns, although she had 4 of them, were old and clunky.

In comparison, the Indian vessels were armed with modern NATO standard radar systems, the brand spanking new QF 4.5-inch Mk.6 naval guns and, significantly, an experienced and well-trained crew.

The 4 120mm cannons of the Portuguese vessel, though of a larger caliber than the Indian (120 as opposed to 113), fired only 2 rounds per minute (some sources say 5). The QF 4.5- inch Mk.6 fired 16-24 per minute (depending on if they were hand loaded or power loaded). The shells the Portuguese fired were of World War 1 vintage and their fuses were unreliable. The Indian shells were far superior with excellent fuses.

The nearly 50-year-old Portuguese cannons were also horribly inaccurate. The QF 4.5-inch Mk.6 was lethally accurate.

By the time the Indian vessels were spotted by the Afonso, she had been given orders to act as a radio station, relaying messages back and forth, and nothing more. She had not spotted the Indian squadron approaching and when she did see the Indian vessels, they had already positioned themselves on either side of her and were waiting for orders to open fire.

But, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque, with everything against her, chose not to go quietly into the night. When she was asked to surrender by INS Beas, she quietly weighed anchor, slipped her moorings and headed out to fight.

The Battle of Mormugao Harbour – 70 Minutes of Glory

By 1100hrs on the 18th of December, the Indian frigates had entered the harbor and had blocked the only way in and out. NRP Afonso de Albuquerque had very little room left in which to maneuver. At 1200hrs, INS Beas fired warning shots across the bow of the NRP Afonso de Albuquerque and transmitted requests for surrender.

It must also be mentioned that just a few minutes before the request for surrender, IAF aircraft had bombed port facilities at Mormugao Harbour and the psychological effects of air strikes against which the Portuguese could do nothing must not be ignored. Everybody onboard knew this was an unwinnable fight. That the enemy could hit them from the air. That they were outnumbered, outclassed and outgunned. That they had no room left, no way to escape, nowhere to run. They knew that, should they surrender, no one would blame them.

Yet, at about 1202hrs, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque fired back and thus begun the Battle of Mormugao Harbour – the final vestige of a bygone era. Within the first minute, the crippling fire superiority of the Indian vessels became obvious as Afonso struggled to keep up with their rate of fire. Her old guns also failed her in the relatively long ranges of combat (7,500yd or almost 7km/4miles) where they struggled to hit the Indian vessels while the accurate Indian guns did not struggle whatsoever and scored hit after hit.2

In fact, the damage done to the superstructure of Afonso is plainly visible at https://laststandonzombieisland.com/tag/afonso-de-albuquerque/ where they have some excellent photographs of the battle (which, unfortunately, I cannot use here due to copyright reasons).

The first casualties came at 1215hrs when Afonso took a direct hit to the bridge, injuring the weapons officer. All the while, Afonso attempted to close the range and return fire. It is unclear how close she was to her opponents when she took her first KIA when, at 1225hrs, another direct hit killed the radio officer and severely wounded her commander, Captain António da Cunha Aragão. In the same salvo, her propulsion and steering system was heavily damaged and it was becoming increasingly clear to the crew of the ship that they would not be able to close the distance to the Indian vessels.

Within 10 minutes of this salvo, at 1235hrs, Afonso swung 180 degrees (it is not known whether to port or starboard) and ran herself aground at Bambolim Beach. From here, she would continue to fire on the Indian frigates. At some point now, the Sergeant-in-Charge of Signals disobeyed a direct order from Captain Aragão and ordered the white flag to be raised.

However, as per the official Portuguese records, ‘But as no one had actually given the order to surrender, the flag was lowered again. The flag was not seen by any means by the Indians because of the windy and smoky conditions.’3

By 1250hrs, the fate of the ship had been sealed. She had lost 5 of her crew and 13 injured. She had fired between 350 and 400 shells and any damage on the Indian vessels had been negligible at best. The order was given to abandon ship. Once again, per official Portuguese records ‘Most of the personnel complied with the order to abandon ship, while the fire from the Indian ships continued, reaching the ship and the surrounding area, with the clear intention of hitting the men who were already on the bank.’4

By 1310hrs, the ship had been abandoned. The Battle of Mormugao Harbour was officially over and with it, the book finally closed on the story of naval shot and shell.

In Conclusion

The small 3-day-long Indian campaign in Goa saw a lot of firsts for South Asia. It marked the first time a South Asian navy used an aircraft carrier, the famous INS Vikrant, in combat operations – regardless of the fact that the carrier and her air wing did not actually see combat. It marked the first use of a jet bomber by a South Asian nation in combat when IAF Canberra bombers struck the airport at Panjim. It marked India’s first amphibious operation – the storming of Anjidiv Fort.

It is fitting then that it should also see the last battle of a bygone era. Perhaps it is poetic as well. You see, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque was named after Afonso de Albuquerque who was a Portuguese general that, in 1510, conquered Goa for the Portuguese crown. The vessel named after the man who conquered Goa struck down on the day that Goa is made free. The world has a funny way of righting itself.

What do you think of the Battle of Mormugao Harbour? Let us know below.

1 I must here mention, coming from a military family, that no war is insignificant no matter how small it is. It has a profound and very long-lasting effect on the people that fight it and the people that are directly affected by it. That being said, the 1961 Indian Annexation/Invasion of Goa was a war that was historically insignificant

– i.e it achieved nothing of historical importance, did not swing the fate of countries or continents, but merely liberated a small Portuguese Colonial enclave.

2 https://laststandonzombieisland.com/tag/afonso-de-albuquerque/

3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150317124204/http://www.areamilitar.net/DIRECTORIO/NAV.aspx?nn=128 ‘Entretanto o Sargento de sinais terá dado ordem para que fosse içada uma bandeira branca, o que foi feito. Mas como na realidade ninguém tinha dado ordem de rendição, a bandeira voltou a ser arriada. A bandeira não foi de qualquer das formas avistada pelos indianos por causa das condições de vento e fumo.’, translated by Google Translate

4 https://web.archive.org/web/20150317124204/http://www.areamilitar.net/DIRECTORIO/NAV.aspx?nn=128 ‘A maioria do pessoal cumpre a ordem de abandonar o navio, enquanto o fogo dos navios indianos continua, a atingir o navio e a área circundante, no claro propósito de atingir os homens que já se encontravam na margem.’, translated by Google Translate

The Battle of Blair Mountain: America’s Largest Worker Uprising

The Battle of Blair Mountain took place in 1921 in Logan County, West Virginia. It is the largest labor uprising in United States history and the largest armed uprising since the US Civil War. Roy Williams explains.

Miners surrendering to federal soldiers.

Introduction

The history of labor in America is a complex matter in attempting to understand the nature of economics, worker rights, and the conflicting political apparatuses. While the traditional narrative of American labor history relies heavily on an approach that magnifies the importance of urban centers and familiar elements of the industrial revolution, and economic expansion, there are significant aspects of labor history that occurred in rural areas. One such event stands as extremely consequential but largely glossed over by the generalist historical narrative. The Battle of Blair Mountain in Logan County West Virginia stands as the largest labor uprising in United States history as well as the largest armed uprising since the Civil War. From August 25th to September 2nd, 1921, 10,000 coal miners fought 3,000 lawmen and Baldwin Felts detective agency strike breakers only ending when the United States Army arrived to contain the conflict. How did the situation become so dire that 10,000 miners, many of which were veterans of the Great War, take up arms against company management and agents of the law?

Background

As the United Mine Workers Union began to push further south into Mingo County West Virginia, spearheaded by Mother Jones, the prominent union organizer, the management of the mines began to retaliate against workers. Upon the move from 3,000 Mingo County Miners to vote for Unionization, the company began firing and evicting the workers and their families from their company homes with the help of the Baldwin Felts detective agency. While most lawmen were not generally seen as potential allies to the miner’s plight, one individual broke that mold. The Matewan police chief Sid Hatfield rejected the attempts of the Baldwin Felts agents to continue evictions of families and confronted them with a group of deputized miners. Albert Felts of the agency informed Sid Hatfield that he had a warrant for Hatfield which resulted in a shootout and the deaths of 7 Felts agents, 2 miners, and the mayor of Matewan, Cabell Testerman. The event galvanized union support and lionized Sid Hatfield as an icon of resistance against the mining companies.

On August 1st, Hatfield was summoned to McDowell County to stand trial on charges of dynamiting a coal tipple. Travelling with Hatfield was his good friend Ed Chambers and both of their wives. As they ascended the steps to the courthouse, Baldwin Felts detective agents ambushed them opening fire in an extrajudicial killing resulting in the deaths of both Hatfield and his friend Chambers. The news of the killing spread like wildfire to the miners who had come to idolize Hatfield as a champion of their cause. Miners began to take up arms in anger knowing that Hatfield had been ambushed and murdered. At a rally on August 7th, Mother Jones, the prolific union organizer, pleaded with miners not to resort to violence to no avail. The miners began gathering at lens creek mountain in preparation for an assault on Blair Mountain. 

The Battle of Blair Mountain

As skirmishes began President Warren G. Harding threatened to send in troops and B1 bombers to quell the insurrection. This threat worked at first by causing miners to return home but would ultimately fail as rumors of Logan County Sheriff Don Chafin attacking pro-union sympathizers and their families spread throughout the mountains. At news of Chafin’s continued acts of violence the miners took up arms again and began their march upon Blair Mountain. While the miners heavily outnumbered the lawmen, they were poorly armed and poorly organized resulting in little tactical gains. Chafin’s men had established superior fortifications and were able to outlast the barrage of Miners until the Army finally arrived. The conflict resulted in an estimated 50-100 miner deaths with nearly 1000 arrests. Nearly 30 lawmen lay dead from the armed revolt. While outwardly the result of the conflict was a massive victory for the coal industry and anti-union forces, the battle and its publicity raised awareness of the plight of coal miners and would ultimately result in major union victories later with the implementation of President Roosevelt’s New Deal.

The Battle of Blair Mountain stands as a particularly unique event in analyzing both class and racial solidarity. While the miners were largely white, there were black and immigrant workers such as Italians involved in the struggle. An interesting parallel between the events of the battle and other events of economic uprising is the reality that certain events supersede racial boundaries and racial protocols. Much like the populist movement and its agrarian focus, which encouraged instances of racial and class solidarity among farmers, the Battle of Blair Mountain stood as a significant example of racial and class solidarity in the face of economic tyranny. The economic situation of the miners and their response to oppression dismantled the racial protocols of the 1920s. 

While some scholars attempt to analyze parallels between the plight of West Virginia coal miners within a socialist framework with labor at its center, it is important to explore its inherent complexity. While the miners of West Virginia were certainly exploited and faced heinous conditions, their rebellion was not directed at capitalism as a system itself. Their rebellion stood solely in the direction of their actual oppressors, the mining companies. While other socialist revolutions feature prominent organizers and a large percentage of sympathizers throughout the country, the battle of Blair Mountain stood as a relatively small event in the world of the coal economy. The importance of the battle itself does not rely on a Marxist interpretation attempting to argue the inevitability of socialist revolutions throughout the world but to understand the significance of workers rights, the rule of law, and the commitment to fair and equitable economics without worker exploitation. The miners of West Virginia did not instigate a socialist revolution in the hopes of overthrowing their government and capitalism. Instead, they fought for their existence, their families, and the hope that the system would work fairly for them rather than exploit them in a radically unjust manner.

What do you think of the Battle of Blair Mountain? Let us know below.

Now, read Roy’s article on the Armenian Genocide here and the 1980s Guatemalan genocide here.

Bibliography

https://guides.loc.gov/chronicling-america-blair-mountain

https://appvoices.org/2021/09/02/battle-of-blair-mountain-centennial/

https://www.history.com/news/americas-largest-labor-uprising-the-battle-of-blair-mountain

https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/blair-mountain-ends/

World War 2 in Italy: The 1944 Battle of Anzio

World War II’s 1944 Battle of Anzio took place from January to June in Italy. It started following an Allied decision to attack this central part of Italy. William Floyd Jr. explains the background to battle and how it evolved over the first half of 1944.

Sherman tanks at Anzio in 1944.

In early November 1943, Adolf Hitler would sign a formal order stating there would be an “end of withdrawals.” In Italy, this would condemn a million German soldiers to the brutal combat that would soon follow. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Hitler’s favorite general at the time, would leave the Mediterranean Theatre to over see the Atlantic Wall defenses in France for the expected Allied invasion.

Rommel, at the time, would state to a comrade that, “the war is as good as lost and hard times lay ahead.”

The Battle of Anzio was incredibly brutal and would cost thousands of Allied and German lives as well as the lives of Italian civilians. Anzio is a small town on the west coast of Italy on the Tyrrhenian Sea about thirty miles south of Rome. In the early morning hours of January 22, 1944, Allied troops of Fifth Army came ashore along a fifteen-mile stretch of Italian beach near the prewar resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno. The Allied landings could not have been carried out any better. German resistance was so light that British and American forces gained their first day’s objectives by noon, moving three to four miles inland by dark.

The local German commanders were surprised by the landings. They had been assured by their superiors that an amphibious assault would not take place during January or February. Within a week, the Allies would consolidate their positions and achieve a minor breakout from the beachhead. The Germans began to gather troops to eliminate what Hitler would call the “Anzio abscess.” The fighting over the next four months, on the Italian peninsula, would be some of the most savage of the war.

Agreeing the operation

The Anzio operation had been shelved on December 18, 1943, due to the fact that Anzio was too far ahead of the front to guarantee a swift overland hookup with the isolated vulnerable beachhead. However, changes of the command structure in the Mediterranean theatre would soon lead to the operation being revived. General Dwight Eisenhower would relinquish command of Allied forces in the Mediterranean to British General Sir Henry M. Wilson in January 1944. Eisenhower would become Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord, the cross-channel invasion of France. Under Wilson the Anzio plan would be resurrected with the influence of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill playing a large roll. Despite their differences on certain aspects of strategy, both the Americans and the British were united in the hope that Italy, the weaker of the Axis partners, could be forced out of the war. 

Anzio was not only within striking distance of Rome, the ultimate prize, but was also within range of Allied aircraft operating out of Naples. One week before the landings at Anzio, the Allied Fifth Army made up of U.S., British, and French units would mount an offensive on the German Gustav defensive position in the area of Cassino and plan to link up with the forces at Anzio for the drive on Rome. In the meantime, Allied forces of the Eighth Army were to break through on the Adriatic front or at least tie down German forces to prevent them from being sent to Anzio.

General Mark Clark had chosen Major General John P. Lucas, U.S. Army Commander of Fifth Army’s VI Corps to lead the Anzio invasion. Lucas’s orders were to divert enemy strength from the south in anticipation of a violent enemy reaction requiring defensive positions. Secondly, he was to move toward the Alban Hills for a link-up with the remainder of Fifth Army on D + 7. Clark became increasingly pessimistic about the British plan and the feasibility of the overall Anzio operation. The notion that the troops landing at Anzio could take and hold the Alban Hills so soon after the landing, as part of the British plan, seemed overly optimistic. Under the circumstances, the best that Clark could tell Lucas was to be flexible, leaving the decision about how far and how fast to move VI Corps up to him.

The landings at Anzio would be protected by Allied air and naval forces. There were approximately 2,600 Allied aircraft available to provide close air support for the invading forces and to destroy enemy airfields and hinder communications. The naval flotilla assigned to support the landings was designated Task Force 81, commanded by U.S. Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry. The task force was made up of over 250 combat-loaded vessels and amphibious craft of all sizes and descriptions. 

The German Forces in the Mediterranean were led by air force officer, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring who had arrived in Rome in December 1941. He had been a founding member of the Luftwaffe prior to receiving the rank of Field Marshal. The exact German reaction to the landing at Anzio was, of course, impossible to predict. The only thing that was known for certain was that the German response would be swift and brutal.

Start of the invasion

The Anzio invasion began at 2:00 A.M. on January 22, 1944, and achieved, General Lucas would recall, one of the most complete surprises in military history. The Germans had already sent their reserves south to counter the Allied attacks on the Garigliano River on January 18, leaving a nine- mile- wide stretch of the Anzio beach defended by a single company. The first waves of Allied troops moved rapidly inland. All VI Corps objectives had been taken by noon as Allied air forces flew 1,200 sorties in and around the beachhead. By midnight over 36,000 troops and 3,200 vehicles, over 90% of the invasion force, was ashore.

Allied units would continue to push over the next few days against scattered but increasing German resistance. Allied forces would capture the town of Aprilia on January 25. The Allied drive created a huge bulge in enemy lines but did not completely breakout of the beachhead. The Third Division commander, Major General Lucian Truscott, on orders from the corps commander, ordered a halt to the offensive which turned into a reorganization of the beachhead forces between January 26 and 29. During this time the materiel buildup would continue despite German air and artillery harassment. During this time the number of Allied troops on the beachhead increased to over 60,000.

In response to the landings, Kesselring would send elements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads leading north from the Alban Hills. Hitler would send additional forces from Yugoslavia, France, and Germany. By the end of D-Day thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite delays caused by Allied air attacks. The German commanders were astonished that Allied forces had not taken immediate advantage of the unopposed landings. 

General Lucas now planned a two-pronged attack for January 30. One to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna and the second was a move northeast up the Albano Road, break through the Campoleone salient, and exploit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A link-up with Fifth Army in the south was still believed possible.

Driving forward?

The initial Allied attack on Cisterna would be carried out by Ranger Battalions under Colonel William O. Darby. Unknown to the Americans, their assault was aimed at the center of an area occupied by thirty-six enemy battalions massing for the February 1 counterattack.

The Rangers would get within 800 yards of Cisterna, when the Germans discovered the advancing lightly armed Rangers armed with only grenades and bazookas for anti-tank weapons. They attempted a fighting withdrawal but were mercilessly cut down. Of 767 men in the two battalions, only 6 would survive.

In spite of the disaster involving the Rangers, some progress was made by 3rd Division units against a much stronger enemy. But by nightfall on January 31, the Americans were still a mile from the village. It became apparent that the Americans were not going to capture Cisterna, and that new German units were arriving in the Anzio area. On orders from Clark and Lucas, Truscott was ordered to dig in.

The other prong of the Allied attack resulted in the Allies reaching Campoleone and penetrating the German main line. But the exhausted Allied troops were unable to exploit their success causing their drive to come to a halt, as a German counterattack began on February 3-4 at Campoleone salient. British forces held but were then ordered to retreat a distance of about 2.5 miles. Lucas then ordered Allied troops to form a beachhead defense line which was to be held at all costs. The Germans would continue their attack off and on until February 22. The offensive would be halted by Allied air power, naval gunfire, and artillery. The VI Corps would go over to the offensive and re-take some lost ground.

On February 29 the Germans resumed the offensive directed at the U.S. 3d Division in the Cisterna sector. General Truscott who had replaced General Lucas as VI Corps commander would substantially reinforce his defensive position. The Germans would continue to seek a breakthrough without any success. A final German assault would fail on March 4.

Following the collapse of the German drive, a three-month lull would begin. Both armies would limit their operations to defending the positions they held at the beginning of March. The VI Corps would reorganize and regroup bringing its full strength to 90,000 men in six divisions.

Supply problems at Anzio, originally one of the main concerns of the Allies would never reach a crisis point. LSTs would begin bringing loaded trucks to Anzio every day, fifteen smaller vessels arrived each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty Ships delivered heavy equipment. Between January 22 and June 1, over 531,511 long tons of supplies arrived at Anzio.

Operations in the spring

On May 5 General Clark would give General Truscott orders for a new Allied offensive code-named BUFFALO. Units from Anzio were to cut Highway 6, the main German line of retreat and trap the enemy forces retreating north through the Liri Valley. The operational concept had been dictated to Clark from Alexander, but Clark had little faith in the plan succeeding. Clark felt the British had received too much credit for Allied gains thus far. Clark wanted Fifth Army to have the honor of liberating Rome. He told Truscott to be ready at any moment during the breakout to swing north toward Rome.

On the night of May 11-12, Fifth and Eighth Armies launched their long- awaited attack against the Gustav Line but initially achieved little success. However, the Germans would abandon Monte Cassino after a week of fighting against Polish forces and the French along with US II Corps and would finally succeed in breaking the Gustav Line. The II Corps would move toward the Anzio beachhead against weakening German resistance.

At 0545 on May 23 an artillery barrage opened on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry attacks along the entire line from Cassino to the Mussolini Canal. Although enemy resistance was very stiff, but by evening the Allied forces had breached the main line of resistance. The next day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna. The town would fall on May 25. On the same day the II and VI Corps would complete their juncture causing the beachhead to cease to exist.

Meanwhile, the breakout in the west was proving very costly to the VI Corps, taking over 4,000 casualties in the first five days of the offensive. In the meantime, elements of Fifth Army joined in the pursuit of German forces falling back on Rome. American forces would liberate the Italian capital on June 4, 1944.

In perspective

The Anzio campaign has always been controversial from the time it was conceived. General Lucas had stated before the landing that he had always considered it a gamble. He maintained that under the circumstances the Anzio forces accomplished all that could have been realistically expected. However, some of Lucas’s critics maintain that a more aggressive commander such as Patton or Truscott could have obtained the goals of the landings with a bold offensive. Yet the campaign did achieve a number of goals including the eventual liberation of Rome.

What do you think of the Battle of Anzio? Let us know below.

Now read William’s article on World War II’s 1943 Trident conference here.

Bibliography

1.     Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

2.     Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001).

3.     Clayton D. Laurie, Anzio 1944 – United States Army Center of Military History.

4.     John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed, The Oxford Companion to American Military History ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

5.     Correlli Barnett, Hitler’s Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).

The Modern Greek State: 1898–1913 – Glory Days

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1898 and 1913 and looks at what happed in Crete, the Greek political, and scene, the Balkan Wars, and how ultimately it was a positive period for Greece. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here and part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here.

A lithograph of the Battle of Yenidje/Giannitsa in the First Balkan War.

The story narrated so far for Greece is not unique. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) By the turn of the 20th century, all modern Balkan countries (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) had suffered indebtedness and political instability, and the maneuvering of the great powers restricted their foreign policy options. The governments of all three were committed to schemes of territorial expansion, but the restraining influences of disorganized armies, chaotic public finances and great power pressure inhibited them. Only through cooperation with one another could they realize their expansionist dreams.  The cooperation process culminated to the inferno of the first and second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Greeks, these were good wars. (Glenny, 2012)

I. Introduction

Cooperation between the Balkan States was not easy. Under the guiding hand of Bismarck, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan States to three expanding spheres of interest – Austro-Hungarian, Russian and British. This created confusion and resentment in many parts of the Balkans. Especially Bulgaria was reduced from 176,000 square kilometers, after the Treaty of San Stefano, to just 96,000 square kilometers. Serbia’s westwards expansion was also blocked. Thus, they both turned their expansionist ambitions south to Macedonia, claimed also by Greece.

Things became more complicated when in 1885 Bulgaria, violating the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Eastern Rumelia, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Powers accepted the outcome of the Bulgarian intervention. The Serbian king Milan Obrenović knew that the annexation gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the impending struggle for Macedonia. He saw the treaty violation as an opportunity to test his new standing army and attacked Bulgaria but was thoroughly defeated. 

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the victory over the Serbs and with Greece bankrupt, distracted by the Cretan Revolt and finally defeated by the Ottomans in 1897, Bulgaria had indeed an important strategic advantage in Macedonia at the eve of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the realization of the Bulgarian threat by the Ottomans and internal divisions among the Bulgarian parastatal organizations which, like in Greece, were coordinating foreign policy led to a significant decrease of the Slavic influence in Macedonia immediately after the suppression of the Ilinden uprising in 1903. (wikipedia, 2021)

Indeed, Greek guerrillas, under the leadership of officers secretly sent by the government in Athens, used the opportunity and swept through western Macedonia restoring the Greek influence in the region. This renewed activity and the retreat of Bulgarian aspirations hastened a change in Serbian policy, too. Serbia would now be fighting for territorial influence not just against the Greeks and Bulgarians, but also against the Ottomans and Albanians. The situation was so complicated that, at various times, the struggle for Macedonia pitted Slav against Slav (Bulgarians against Serbs); Slav against Hellene (Bulgarians against Greeks); Slav against Muslim (Serbs or Bulgarians against Ottomans or Albanians); Hellene against Muslim (Greeks against Turks or Albanians); and Muslim against Muslim (Ottomans against Albanians). The situation calmed after the Young Turks revolution of 1908, which, in its early stages at least, rejected the path of nationalism and created hope for peaceful coexistence among the different ethnicities in Macedonia. (Glenny, 2012)

The successes in Macedonia restored the confidence of the Greek officer’s corps after the debacle in the 1897 war. The army blamed the Crown Prince Constantine for the defeat against the Turks and the politicians for Greece’s chronic lack of preparedness for war. In August 1909 an army conspiracy, the Military League, launched a successful coup d’etat. This did not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of a junta. The officers involved exercised pressure on the new government from behind the scenes to provide for the necessary restructuring of the army and the obliteration of the influence of the palace on it. They also invited Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan rebel politician outside the old political establishment to lead the effort. (Glenny, 2012) (Malesis, 2018)

II Eleftherios Venizelos

In Crete

Venizelos was born in Mournies, a part of the city of Chania, in Crete in 1864, the year of the first territorial expansion of modern Greece to the Ionian Islands. His father Kiriakos, a merchant, was involved in the local social and political developments and was often prosecuted by the Turkish authorities during the frequent Cretan revolts. Thus, Venizelos spent part of his early life in exile. 

His father was granted amnesty in 1872 and returned to Chania, where he successfully set up his business and provided for the best preparation of Eleftherios as merchant. The latter complied at first, but later managed to convince his father to study law in Athens, where he developed his interest for politics. He also became involved with chieftains and veterans of the island’s revolutions and exiles because of them, who, together with his compatriot students, constituted the core of the Cretan irredentism in the Greek capital. He develops intense activity and soon becomes a leading figure among them.

By the time that Venizelos returned to Chania to practise law in 1887, apart from the respect of the Cretans in Athens, he had the good fame of his father, who died four years earlier, and the help of Kostas Mitsotakis, a local politician and husband of one of his sisters (he had four as well as a younger brother) to rely on for the advancement of his political carrier. He also proved to be an excellent lawyer, which added to his fame and financial comfort.

Thus, it came to no-one’s surprise, when in 1889, he was elected to the Cretan Assembly, a representation body of the semi-autonomous state granted to the island by the Pact of Chalepa in 1878. (wikipedia, 2020) This first tenure did not last long though. A few days after the elections, the old political establishment, proposed the declaration of unification with Greece. Venizelos, as well as the Greek government, immediately realized the dangers of yet another premature revolt and worked to establish a climate of appeasement and moderation. To no avail. The Turks crushed the new revolt and declared martial law. The Pact of Chalepa was no more and Venizelos found himself in Athens once more, this time as an exile.   

His exile does not last long. In April 1890 he returns to Chania, after general amnesty was granted, and in December 1891 he marries his wife, Maria. His happiness does not last long though. After the birth of his second son, in November 1894, his wife died. At the same time Crete was going through one of the worst periods of its history. The martial law and Turkish terror were casting a dark shadow over the island. The Cretan reaction comes with another revolt in May 1896. Venizelos feared a repetition of the harsh measures of 1889 and was against it. The international condemnation of the Hamidian massacres (wikipedia, 2021) though and the pressure exercised by the Great Powers to the Sultan did not allow for a similar reaction. Thus, the movement was successful in forcing the sultan to commit himself for the restoration of the privileges of the Pact of Chalepa.  

Venizelos was not hesitant to get involved in another revolt though, when the sultan did not honour his commitment. Not only as a politician but also as front-line fighter. This is the crisis that culminated to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Although Venizelos was in line with Trikoupis’ approach that foreign policy should be dictated by the national centre and supported unification with Greece, he did not hesitate to disagree with the Greek government after the Greek defeat and opt for the more realistic solution of Cretan autonomy under the condition that the Turkish army withdrew from the island. His insistency and the clumsy handling of the situation by the Turks, with irregulars attacking British forces, resulted not only to Crete’s autonomy, but also to the appointment of the Greek king’s second born prince George as high commissioner. 

In December 1898 prince George arrived in Chania. He claimed excessive powers for himself, and Venizelos supported him as a strong executive authority was necessary for the rebuilt of the devastated island. He also served for two years as minister of justice in the cabinet of the prince demonstrating significant legislative work. Cooperation did not last long though. Venizelos believed that the main aim should be full Cretan autonomy and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ armies from the island, which, in effect, occupied it. Prince George on the other hand was unsuccessfully trying to convince the Powers to accept the unification of the island with the Greek kingdom. When the commissioner used suppressive measures to settle the differences with the politician, Venizelos revolted. 

The centre of the revolt was at Therisos, near Chania, where Venizelos and his supporters declared the unification of Crete with Greece on the 11th of March 1905. This was an attempt to turn the tables as any reaction from the prince would be an act against his own diplomacy that far. In any case, it was the reaction of the foreign armies on the island that would decide the outcome of the revolt. Eventually, Venizelos found himself in a tough spot, but, preferring a realistic approach instead of a fight to the end, he managed to exploit the differences between the Great Powers and by mid-summer managed to achieve: amnesty for himself and his supporters, the establishment of Cretan militia and withdrawal of the Powers’ armies from the island, a loan for the Cretan autonomous state, provisions for the settlement of important pending issues with the Turks, revision of the Cretan constitution. The Greek king would have the right to nominate the high commissioner, but his suggestion was subject to the approval of the Powers. King George decided to withdraw his son and substitute him with former prime minister Alexandros Zaimis. The Powers accepted. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Thus, by 1905 Venizelos had two revolts on his account and a major clash with the royal dynasty and the political establishment supporting it in mainland Greece. No wonder that the officers of the Military League considered him the ideal candidate for the premiership a few years later.

In the Greek political scene

In the elections of the 8th of August 1910 Venizelos was voted member of the Greek parliament for the first time in his career. Contrary to might be expected of him, he did not accept the premiership offered by the Military League. He pointed out that the army officers had committed a serious political mistake: They revolted against the old political establishment and the crown and after gaining control of the situation they trusted the same establishment with the reorganization of the state. Instead, he proposed a compromise: A revision of the constitution of 1864 to introduce the necessary reforms, after which the Military League would dissolve itself. Nevertheless, material provisions of the constitution and especially that concerning the form of government would remain untouched. The crown was safe. Venizelos’ stance served for an improvement of his relations with the palace, especially with king George.

After the king’s invitation to implement the compromise he suggested, Venizelos formed his first government on the 6th of October 1910. But, although the parliament elected in August included 122 independent members, the majority was still with the old parties and Venizelos was not willing to become ‘prisoner’ of this majority. Thus, he convinced the king to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections on the 28th of November. The leaders of the old parties considered this a constitutional coup and decided to abstain from the upcoming elections. As a result, Venizelos’ newly formed Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority of 307 out of 362 seats. 87% of the new MPs were elected for the first time. 

The revision of the constitution introduced important novelties such as a new regime for the expropriation of land, the establishment permanence for the civil servants, compulsory and free elementary education and a ban on the election of army officers as members of parliament. The goal was to address chronic problems of the state like the oppression of the landless, clientism and army interventions in politics. Venizelos actually retained the ministry of the army for himself, and significant compromises were made here. He took as his adjutant the pro-royal captain Ioannis Metaxas, the later dictator during the interwar period in the 1930s, and most importantly restored the crown prince Constantine at the head of the army in June 1911. The reason behind these compromises was the avoidance of an internal front as Venizelos’ concern during this period was the country’s foreign policy. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Nevertheless, he ensured public support with the elections of March 1912 by winning again with an overwhelming majority against the united opposition this time.

Preparation for war

In February 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a defence agreement and two months later a military pact for common action against the Turks regarding their claims in Macedonia. Venizelos actively pursued Greece’s participation to the alliance but was at first met with reservation from the Bulgarian side. (Malesis, 2018) Nevertheless, the Slavs had no navy and Greece was necessary to restrict the capacity of the Turkish fleet to move freely in the Aegean. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) As far as the Greek army was concerned though, after Greece’s defeat in 1897 and considering its financial problems, it was estimated that it counted far below those of the other Balkan States. (Glenny, 2012) Knowing this, Venizelos did not insist on any settlement of the division of the potential territorial gains in Macedonia during the negotiations. Thus, finally Bulgaria felt comfortable to accept Greece in the alliance in May 1912. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Bulgaria completely underestimated the capacity of the Greek army. The international financial control after 1897 helped tiding up the country’s finances and the surpluses of 1910 and 1911 together with loan take outs in the same period created an abundance of cash for the Greek state at the eve of the war. (Kostis, The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day, 2018) Actually, the reorganization effort started in 1904 already with the establishment of the National Defence Fund by the government of George Theotokis. From 1904 till 1912 214 million drachmas were spent on armaments of which 50% during the last two years, when Venizelos came to power. For comparison, the national GDP in 1910-11 was 282.28 drachmas per capita (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) , whereas the legendary armoured cruiser Averof (Carr, 2014) cost 24 million drachmas. Venizelos also materialized the decision of Stefanos Dragoumis’ government in 1910 to invite, following a demand of the Military League, French and British officers to undertake the training of the army and navy. The French mission under general Eydoux arrived in January and the English mission under admiral Tufnell in May 1911.

During this preparation period Venizelos faced the opposition’s criticism that once again preferred the old ‘wait and see’ tactic determined by public opinion and possible political cost. The palace and general staff were also not pleased with the invitation of the Anglo-French military missions as the crown prince and his officers were trained in Germany and admired the Prussian military tradition. Nevertheless, Venizelos was determined to pursue an active participation to the upcoming war and did not hesitate, against the public opinion, to refuse the admission of Cretan representatives to the Greek parliament in May 1912 that might have triggered a reaction form the Great Powers (and the Turks) that at this point were split regarding their policies in the region and could not undertake coordinated action to prevent the war. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars commenced on the 8th of October 1912, when tiny Montenegro, the fourth member of the Balkan alliance, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Five days later an ultimatum issued by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia was delivered to the Turks, demanding such an extensive number of reforms in favour of the Christian populations of the empire that could not be accepted. Their declaration of war followed on the 17th of October. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Military operations lasted only 10 weeks, but the numbers of combatants involved were huge. The Bulgarians mobilized a full 25% of their male population, just under 500,000 men. (Glenny, 2012) The Greeks and Serbs fielded about 200,000 men each and this at a time when their population was less than 3 million. (Malesis, 2018) The Turks were about 350,000. 200,000 combatants, excluding civilians, were killed. The vast massacres of the soon to come First World War relegated the social and economic impact of the Balkan Wars to the penny place. But those who witnessed or participated in them were given a unique insight into what the 20thcentury had in store for the world. (Glenny, 2012)

During the first phase of the war (First Balkan War) the Turks had just come out of a war with Italy and were obliged to fight in four different fronts: against the Bulgarians in Thrace; against the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia; against the Serbs and Montenegrins in northern Albania (I refer to modern Albania, as this state did not exist at the time of the Balkan Wars) and Kosovo; and against the Greeks in Epirus. (Glenny, 2012) The Greek army made significant gains in southern Epirus, setting the city of Ioannina under siege, and in western and central Macedonia, taking Thessaloniki, after winning the race to the city over the Bulgarians. The Greek navy was proved predominant in the Aegean by blocking the naval transport of Turkish troops from Asia Minor to the different fronts and freed all occupied islands. At the same time the rest of the Balkan Allies neutralized almost every pocket of resistance in Europe stopping only 40 km from Constantinople. Thus, soon the Turks reached for an armistice which was signed with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins in December. The Greeks retained a state of war as Ioannina was still under siege and they also needed to continue controlling the movements of the Turkish fleet in the Aegean. (Klapsis, 2019)   

At the conference of London, in December 1912, the Great Powers tried to regain the initiative in the Balkans with their ambassadors discussing separately from those of the war parts. Nevertheless, Sofia, Athens and Belgrade were no longer prepared to bow to the strategic requirements of the Great Powers. (Glenny, 2012) Furthermore, the Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, although it confirmed the drastic reduction of the Turkish possessions in Europe, contained no specific provisions for the definition of the new borders in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. The incorporation of a new Albanian state complicated things even more.(Klapsis, 2019) It was time for the Balkan states to settle the differences among themselves. 

Meanwhile, Greece, still in a state of war with the Turks, had taken Ioannina and advanced into northern Epirus, before the Treaty of London was signed. Bulgaria, overemphasizing the contribution of its army during the hostilities, was by no means willing to accept any conventional ratification of the status quo after the First Balkan War. (Klapsis, 2019) Realizing the danger, Venizelos turned to Serbia for the formation of a common front against their former ally. The Serbs accepted but demanded that the Greco - Serbian Defensive Treaty includes also mutual support in the case of an Austrian attack against Serbia now that the latter’s ambition on the Adriatic were restricted by the Italo – Austrian push for an Albanian state in the region. Although the Germanophile crown prince Constantine was against this development, later to play a crucial role for the Greek participation to the First World War, the Treaty was signed on the 1st of June 1913. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

The Second Balkan War commenced in mid-June with a sudden Bulgarian attack against Greece and Serbia. After few initial successes, the Bulgarian army was thoroughly defeated by the combined armies of Greece and Serbia (supported also by the Montenegrins). Taking advantage of the situation Romania also entered the war occupying Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. The Turks also retook Adrianople from the Bulgarians. The final settlement took place on Balkan ground with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. For Greece the result was astonishing. The gains in Epirus, west and central Macedonia were supplemented by eastern Macedonia till the port city Kavala. In Bucharest, Crete was also finally ceded to Greece that occupied also the islands of north - eastern Aegean, although their fate was to be decided by the Powers at a later point. Within a year the frightened and despised Greece of the past doubled its territory (from 63,211 to 120,308 square kilometres) whereas its population increased by 80% (from 2.6 to 4.7 million people). (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

III Conclusion

Greece’s expansion before 1912 was rather coincidental. The Ionian islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George in 1864. The annexation of Thessaly was also the result of serendipitous international relations in 1881. It was actually lost to Turkey after the defeat of 1897 and was luckily granted back to Greece, together with the right to appoint the high commissioner in Crete, because of the power play between the Great Powers that the Greek government could barely influence. 

At the beginning of the 20th century things were different. Greece was actively pursuing international alliances. It did not hesitate to change sides when the national interest and not have public opinion dictating it. It capitalized on the painful cumulative growth it had experienced since its establishment and combining military action with diplomacy achieved its greatest triumph to this day. As it was noted ‘For the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Greece was fighting and winning without patrons’. (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Nevertheless, despite Venizelos’ criticism to the Military League that it tried to push reform using the old establishment, he worked with the same establishment. It was probably necessary in view of the imminent developments and the need for internal peace. By restoring the crown prince at the head of the army and pro-royal officers at the general staff though, he revived a power system that the Military League meant to neutralize. Already during the Balkan wars there was significant friction between the politician and the commander in chief regarding the appropriate strategy. The disagreement for the race to Thessaloniki in 1912 (supported by Venizelos) against an advance to Monastir (supported by Constantine) or that on signing the agreement with the Serbs, before the Second Balkan War, are typical examples. King George, who, within a few months, tasted all the joy that was deprived of him during the humiliations of the past, was able to mediate successfully between the two. But in March 1913 he was murdered in Thessaloniki by a paranoid person, according to the official version. It has been commented though that the murder came in handy for the ‘German factor’. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Constantine was now not only at the head of the army but at the head of the state, too.

In short, this was undoubtedly a triumphant period for Greece. But the seeds for another catastrophe to come had also been planted.

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References                                                                                                     

Carr, J. (2014). R.H.N.S. Averof, Thunder in the Aegean. Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Kostis, K. (2018). The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Wikipedia. (2020). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Halepa

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilinden%E2%80%93Preobrazhenie_Uprising

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidian_massacres