Can Neville Chamberlain’s Career be Defined his Failed Appeasement Policy?

Neville Chamberlain will without a doubt continue to be a controversial figure in British history. His tenure as a British Prime Minister will be always overshadowed by his last seven months in that position as German forces swept across France and Belgium forcing the British and French evacuation from Dunkirk. His appeasement policy has been portrayed as a weak and ineffective Prime Minister who sold out to Hitler. This perspective has been allowed to stand as the defining feature of his career but there was more to Chamberlain than his appeasement policy and the disaster that ensued.

Steve Prout looks at Neville Chamberlain’s career.

Neville Chamberlain holding the signed Munich Agreement in 1938 after meeting Hitler. The agreement committed to peaceful methods.

Lloyd George and the First World War

Chamberlain first started out in life as a successful businessperson before serving as the Lord Mayor of Birmingham between 1914-16. Afterwards he took the post as Director-General of National Service during the First World War under David Lloyd George. It would not be a successful start in his political career because he was often at odds with Lloyd George who was particularly critical of Chamberlains’ techniques. Chamberlains and his supporters would argue that he frequently lacked the support and clarity needed from Lloyd George to be successful in that role.

Both would harbour mutual dislike of each other that would continue up to Chamberlains death. Lloyd George would state that Chamberlain was “not one of my most successful selections” and in later added, ‘When I saw that pinhead, I said to myself, he won’t be of any use.’ Chamberlain in return referred to Lloyd George as "that dirty little Welsh Attorney.” Suffice to say it was a relationship that would never repair and resurface much later at when Chamberlain was at his most vulnerable.

Not all of Chamberlain’s peers agreed with Lloyd George’s comments. John Dillon, an Irish Nationalist MP, stated in a rather flowery fashion that "if Mr. Chamberlain were an archangel, or if he were Hindenburg and Bismarck and all the great men of the world rolled into one, his task would be wholly beyond his powers".  Bonar Law in a more succinct manner called Chamberlain’s role an "absolutely impossible task" and would later rescue Chamberlain’s career. Meanwhile Chamberlain's successor Auckland Geddes received more favor and support than Chamberlain ever received.

In 1918 when Chamberlain became a Member of Parliament he refused to serve under Lloyd George and in 1920 he refused a junior appointment offered by Andrew Bonar Law in the Ministry of Health. In October 1922, the situation changed when Lloyd George’s Coalition Government collapsed and presented Chamberlain new opportunities and a succession of top-level posts would follow.

Despite Lloyd George’s disparaging comments Bonar-Law was impressed with Chamberlain’s administerial abilities and appointed him as Postmaster-General. A promotion to Minister of Health in March 1923 soon followed and his advancement would continue. In August 1923 Bonar Law was forced to resign due to his ill health and Stanley Baldwin who took over as Prime Minister appointed Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

His ascent to the top levels of government was as fast as it was brief. Within five months Baldwins Conservative government was defeated in the December 1923 general election and the first Labour government took power in January 1924. Chamberlain’s contribution almost went unnoticed, but renowned historian AJP Taylor said of Chamberlain “nearly all of the domestic achievements of Conservative governments between the wars stand to his credit.”  The work he did in the interwar years was considerable.

Domestic affairs – politics in the interwar period

Neville Chamberlain was highly active in all the offices he held. He possessed a drive to reform and promote efficiency. By 1929 he had presented twenty-five bills to Parliament of which twenty-one of this number had become enacted into law and practice. Despite this Opinion remains divided concerning Chamberlains effectiveness as politician and Prime Minister. His achievements were numerous.

The introduction of the Local Government Act of 1929 abolished and reformed the obsolete poor laws in Britain that were not fit for purpose. The administration of poverty relief was placed in the hands of local authorities. One aspect of this act made medical treatment of the infirmaries free to those who could not afford it. In a pre-1945 Welfare State Britain this was a forward-thinking piece of legislation.

The Housing Act in 1922 addressed another set of issues. The necessity for this piece of legislation arose due to the shortfall in housing created by the previous Liberal Government, who under Christopher Addison had promised “homes fit for heroes” for the returning soldiers but the reality was that this promise had not delivered upon. Chamberlain was tasked to address this shortfall. He was of the belief that Government high subsides were the reason building costs were remaining too high and so stunted progress. Being a former businessperson and quintessential conservative, he believed the private building sector would perform the task more efficiently and so reduced these subsides. He was not entirely wrong because by 1929 438,000 houses were built. This was in the words chosen by AJP Taylor’s “the one solid work of this (Baldwins) dull government.” But critics viewed the Housing Act as only helping the lower middle classes and not the industrial workers giving the impression that he was the “enemy of the poor”. This perception would contribute to losing the Conservatives a substantial number of votes.

The introduction of the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act 1925 lowered the age for entitlement to receive the old age state pension from 70 to 65 (there has been little change since until the twenty first century), and it allowed provisions for dependents of deceased workers. Although it was met with criticism for not extending far enough it was still nevertheless a progressive step forward for pre-welfare state Britain. Chamberlain’s justification to his critics was that the act was not intended to replace private thrift and that the sum was the” maximum financially feasible” within budgetary means.

The Factory Act of 1937 was another successful and progressive piece of legislation for the time. Whether the motive out of altruistic reasons or due to a growing, effective opposition from the Labour Party and the unions it still was particularly far reaching. This Act set various standards factory working condition which addressed working hours, sanitation, lighting, and ventilation. This had significantly improved working conditions set by an earlier Act in 1901. The official wording by the Home Office, signed by Samuel Hoare was that the act presented an “important milestone on the road to safety, health and welfare in Industry.” The Holiday Pay Act of 1938 would follow which allowed workers one full week’s holiday pay. By modern times this seems paltry, but in the context of the time it was a significant move forward for the working population.

Chamberlain had his supporters although much of this support came posthumously. AJP Taylor said that “Chamberlain did more to improve local government while serving as Health Minister than did anyone else in the 20th century” and from an American perspective, according to Bentley Gilbert, Chamberlain was "the most successful social reformer in the seventeen years between 1922 and 1939… after 1922 no one else is really of any significance."

Dutton considers, later in 2001, that Chamberlain's accomplishments at the Ministry of Health were "considerable achievements by any standards" and of Chamberlain himself “a man who was throughout his life on the progressive left of the Conservative Party, a committed believer in social progress and in the power of government at both the national and local level, to do good” - but the war clouds that were gathering above Europe and his domestic achievements would be forgotten.

Munich, Churchill, and the road to war

In his last few months as Prime Minister Chamberlain and his appeasement policy was attacked from his own party and opposition parties with accusations of being blinkered, narrow and supporters of appeasement were now labelled cowards whereas before they were saviours for averting war. This is not entirely fair as for Chamberlain’s government these were not normal times and the problems placed before his government left his few alternatives that sat comfortable or palatable with little or no alternative but to acquiesce to Hitler’s demands.

Chamberlain’s bellicose opponents were either suffering from a delusion that Britain could face the many growing threats abroad alone. There were no suitable allies to form effective alliances with, the USSR was as untrustworthy as Germany, and therefore any containment from the east for the time being was unlikely. There were other threats outside of Europe such as Japan which threatened Britain in the Asia. The USA, a power in the Pacific, was following an isolationist policy. Adding to this were Italian aspirations for empire building in North Africa, and there Britain needed a cautious approach.

Churchill would ignore all of this, re-write history, and instead portray Chamberlain in a poor light whilst at the same flattering his own place in history. On the one hand he said “I have received a great deal of help from Chamberlain. His kindness and courtesy to me in our new relations have touched me. I have joined hands with him and must act with perfect loyalty.”  Then on the other hand he said "Poor Neville will come badly out of history. I know, I will write that history" and he ensured that this happened in his memoirs, The Gathering Storm, in 1948 by referring to Chamberlain as “an upright, competent, well-meaning man fatally handicapped by a deluded self-confidence which compounded an already debilitating lack of both vision and diplomatic experience”.

For many years, his version of events remained unchallenged, but we wonder how much of this can be taken as a gospel of those times. We forget that whereas Chamberlain sought to work with Hitler and was later reviled for doing so, Churchill had no qualms with working with other dictators as we would see for example with Stalin in 1941 and in the 1930s his praise of Mussolini. Stalin’s relationship with the democracies would prove equally toxic. After the war Eastern Europe would be subjected to further totalitarian rule which would last longer than Hitler’s domination of Europe.

Chamberlain was not fooled by the outcome of Munich affair, and he knew by that point in time that Hitler could not be contained nor trusted. He immediately started in earnest an ambitious rearmament programme. This programme was on no small scale and challenges the accusations of complacency that history critics accuse him of. In May 1938 after four months elapsing since Munich agreement, Chamberlain told the annual Conservative Women’s Conference that “we have to make ourselves so strong that it will not be worthwhile for anyone to attempt to attack us”.

Rearmament

Chamberlain began a vast expansion in Britain’s armed services. Whilst doing so he was attacked by the Labour Party for ‘scaremongering, disgraceful in a responsible politician’ because of his support of expansion of Britain’s military capacity. By April 1939, rearmament was swallowing 21.4 per cent of Britain’s Gross National Product, a figure that reached 51.7 per cent by 1940. War was delayed but it was to no avail to “a man of no luck.” The failure of the Norwegian campaign and the subsequent invasion of the Ardennes quickly changed the political landscape for Chamberlain, eroded the support of his own party and of the majority of as in May 1940 British troops were being evacuated off Dunkirk.

The results of Chamberlain’s rearmament programme were not immediately appreciated but the advances made in Air Power and Sonar were vital for the Battle of Britain. The British Spitfire for instance was one of the most up to date fighter planes of the time. The British expeditionary force at the time of its mobilisation was one of the most modern and mechanised armies in the world. Within the disaster of the Norway there was one redeeming feature - that naval battles crippled the German Navy so much it could not be relied upon by Hitler in his plans to invade Britain. All these subtle factors brought Britain a chance, albeit a hairs breadth, of resisting an invasion if nothing more. The realists also knew there was little chance of an offensive and Britain could only consider her meagre defensive options.

Although Chamberlain was assigned the blame for the failure to hold Norway he was not the architect of the plan. This plan was in fact devised and supported by Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty who made many unpunished errors in the matter. He had the diminished confidence of his Conservative peers owing to his costly actions in The First World War and India. Some feared that Norway would be a repeat of Gallipoli. In the debate in The House of Commons in May 1940 when questioned about the campaign Churchill said “I take complete responsibility for everything that has been done by the Admiralty, and I take my full share of the burden” only to be rebuffed by Lloyd George who vented his criticism out on Chamberlain whose fate was already sealed.

Chamberlain was not alone in his naivety that Germany was economically stretched and that a simple naval blockade would deprive her of her natural resources. Churchill even displayed lack of foresight over Germany’s strategic position when the Soviet Union invaded Poland when he immediately proclaimed, “Hitler’s Gateway the East was closed.” Under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet Union was providing vast quantities of war materials to Germany. It was a spoken folly equal to “Hitler has missed the bus.”

The war materials the Soviet Union provided to Germany throughout the early years of the war were enough to render any Allied blockade ineffective. Whether Churchill knew the quantities and the extent is not known but it is likely that this would have been available via the British intelligence services. The true extent of the aid the Soviets gave was over 820,000 metric tons (900,000 short tons; 810,000 long tons) of oil, 1,500,000 metric tons (1,700,000 short tons; 1,500,000 long tons) of grain and 130,000 metric tons (140,000 short tons; 130,000 long tons) of manganese ore. This considerable amount of material excludes rubber and other industrial outputs that enabled Germany’s war machine. If Chamberlains political judgements were flawed then equally so were Churchills, but he was not in the Premier’s seat and so escaped much of the fallout.

Critics

Old adversaries and new would be particularly visceral in the debates that followed in parliament. It is interesting how some of Chamberlain’s most vocal and loudest critics were also the most hypocritical. Leo Amery famously quoted “You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!". Leo Amery was a supporter in the 1930s of Italian aggression in Abyssinia and Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Lloyd George, who held a deep dislike of Chamberlain, also could not resist but he also conveniently forgot his courting of Hitler in September 1936 and his praising of a “pro-English Hitler”. Chamberlain’s premiership ended but he continued to serve in the higher levels of government until his death.

Chamberlain’s political career continued long after Munich and it was not yet over. He still served cordially under Churchill in the war cabinet. Despite the war controversy Chamberlain, in Churchill’s absence due to Prime Ministerial duties, still deputised and chaired the war cabinet meetings until cancer finally forced him to resign in 1940.

Chamberlain spoke of Churchill, “Winston has behaved with the most unimpeachable loyalty. Our relations are excellent, and I know he finds my help of terrific value to him.” Churchill reciprocated: “I have received a great deal of help from Chamberlain. His kindness and courtesy to me in our new relations have touched me. I have joined hands with him and must act with perfect loyalty.” And upon Chamberlains death he said. “What shall I do without poor Neville?,” as Churchill admitted that he “was relying on him (Chamberlain) to look after the Home Front.” Chamberlain had remarkable administrative skills Churchill recognised and still was of value to Britain’s war effort. Churchill himself admitted that the two men could work respectfully and professionally with each other.

In a eulogy in the House of Commons Churchill spoke highly in praise “He had a precision of mind and an aptitude for business which raised him far above the ordinary levels of our generation. He had a firmness of spirit which was not often elated by success, seldom downcast by failure and never swayed by panic…He met the approach of death with a steady eye. If he grieved at all, it was that he could not be a spectator to our victory, but he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had, at least, turned the corner.”

Churchill would conveniently forget this in the post war period and be one of many to blight Chamberlain's career and reputation. Dr Adam Timmins, reviewing the book Appeasing Hitler by Tim Bouverie sees that too much emphasis was put on one event and one person and no other factors that guided that decision which at the time appeared the only sensible option only hindsight offers other alternatives. Without the benefit of hindsight, the phenomena of Hitler were something that had never been witness or confronted before, and with that it is of no surprise that the states people of the 1930s failed to accurately judge him.

Conclusion

Neville Chamberlain’s presence in British history will always be overshadowed by Munich and the road to war. This will always continue to be enforced by surviving accounts such as Michael Foot’s Guilty Men or Churchill’s post war memoirs, which places the failure to contain Hitler together with the early misfortunes unfairly on his shoulders.

When we remove all of this from the emotional equation Neville Chamberlain has been unjustly criticised and maligned by political opportunists of the time who failed to understand the limitations Britain faced. Chamberlain was proof of the adage that “history is written by victors”, a phrase invented by Churchill who did just that when writing about Chamberlain. He conveniently chose to omit his own failures and ill judgement in the early days of the war. It is that context that the Director of Military Operations, Major-General J.N. Kennedy, remarked on later during the campaign in North Africa. "He (Churchill) has a very keen eye to the records of this war”, Kennedy wrote in his diary, “and perhaps unconsciously he puts himself and his actions in the most favourable light.” Churchill’s contradictions and self-aggrandization are unhelpful and misleading.

Chamberlain was the unfortunate victim of circumstances. AJP Taylor terms him a man of no luck whom the cards always ran against. He had a shaky start against Lloyd George and his humiliation at Hitler’s hands bookended his political career. The tide of the war would turn against Hitler and deliver Churchill two titanic allies with immense resources, the USA and T=the USSR, to form a formidable alliance. It was a matter of fortunate timing that Chamberlain would be denied and that Churchill would enjoy.

Chamberlain’s other work, which brought about significant and successful social reform, went unnoticed. At the outbreak of war, he said in Parliament "Everything I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins." Chamberlain’s legacy would be marred by his unwavering desire to avoid war that was further tainted and twisted by the hypocrisy of his critics. Neville Chamberlain will always be a subject of polemical debate and his reputation will continue to be blighted.

When do you think of Neville Chamberlain’s career? Let us know below.

Now read about Britain’s relationship with the European dictators during the inter-war years here.

References

Stuart Ball - Professor of Modern British History at the University of Leicester. Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain, 1918–1945 (Oxford, 2013).

Leo McKinstry - In Defence of Neville Chamberlain – Article the Spectator Nov 2020

David Dutton – Reputations – Neville Chamberlain – May 2001 – Bloomsbury Academic

AJP Taylor English History 1914-45 and Origins of The Second World War

Graham Hughes, history graduate (BA) from St David’s University, Anglo-Nazi Alliance Debate

Ulysses Grant versus Robert Lee: US Civil War Generals

On April 6, 1865 Union forces managed to capture a considerable chunk of Lee’s army at the Battle of Sailor’s Creek. And by April 8, Union cavalry had cut off Lee’s further retreat to the west. Grant wrote Lee with a summons to surrender. The Confederate general demurred for as long as there seemed a chance to break out and continue the retreat. But when one key subordinate assured him that the situation was hopeless, Lee said sadly, “Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

Richard Bluttal tells us about the US Civil War generals.

A reproduction of a Thomas Nast painting showing the surrender of General Lee to General Grant at Appomattox Court House in Virginia on April 9, 1865.

On that day in April 1865, Lee arrived at the McLean house about one o'clock and took a seat in the parlor. A half hour later, the sound of horses on the stage road signaled the approach of General Grant. Entering the house Grant greeted Lee  in the center of the room. The generals presented a contrasting appearance, Lee in a new uniform and Grant in his mud-spattered field uniform. Grant, who remembered meeting Lee once during the Mexican War, asked the Confederate general if he recalled their meeting. Lee replied that he did, and the two conversed in a very cordial manner, for approximately 25 minutes. The subject had not yet gotten around to surrender until finally Lee, feeling the anguish of defeat, brought Grant's attention to it. Grant, who later confessed to being embarrassed at having to ask for the surrender from Lee, said simply that the terms would be just as he had outlined them in a previous letter. Aside from Grant and Lee, only Lt. Colonel Marshall and perhaps a half dozen of Grant’s staff officers were present for most of the meeting. Approximately a dozen other Union officers entered the room.

briefly, including Captain Robert Todd Lincoln. Few besides Grant left detailed accounts of what transpired and while some accounts disagree on the details, there are many key consistencies.

Terms

The heart of the terms was that Confederates would be paroled after surrendering their weapons and other military property. If surrendered soldiers did not take up arms again, the United States government would not prosecute them. Grant also allowed Confederate officers to keep their mounts and side arms. Although Lee agreed to the terms, he asked if his men could keep their horses and mules in the

cavalry and artillery. The Confederate army provided weapons and military property, but the men provided their own mounts. Grant indicated he would not amend the terms but would issue a separate order allowing that to happen. Lee said he thought that would have a happy effect on his men. By 3:00p.m., the formal copies of the letters indicating the terms and acceptance of the surrender were signed and exchanged, and General Lee left the McLean House to return to his camp. Horace Porter, one of Grant’s staff officers recorded that Lee paused at the top of the stairs and energetically “smote” his hands together three times. Grant and his staff followed him and removed their hats as a respectful, farewell gesture which Lee returned in kind before riding down the stage road.

The Start

This war opened with a clash between half-armed farmers and half-trained soldiers. From the beginning materials and industry were complete in  the North and throughout the war were lacking in the South. The South did not have the type of industrial advancement as the North. If was lacking in methods of transportation such as railroads. The Northern soldier was compelled to fight in his enemy’s country, but he was compelled to devastate it as well as conquer it.

The story of Grant and Lee is a very complex one. You are talking about two of the greatest generals in our history who had so much in common as education and training but there were differences in terms of character and military tactician.  

The author Bruce Caton explains it best in his article Grant and Lee: A Study in Contrasts. “The most obvious difference was in terms of early childhood. Lee was tidewater Virginia, and in his background were family, culture, and tradition. . . the age of chivalry transplanted to a New World which was making its own legends and its own myths. He embodied a way of life that had come down through the age of knighthood and the English country squire. Lee stood for the feeling that it was somehow of advantage to human society to have a pronounced inequality in the social structure. There should be a leisure class, backed by ownership of land; in turn, society itself should be keyed to the land as the chief source of wealth and influence. It would bring forth (according to this ideal) a class of men with a strong sense of obligation to the community; men who lived not to gain advantage for themselves, but to meet the solemn obligations which had been laid on them by the very fact that they were privileged. He was Virginian all the way.

Grant, the son of a tanner on the Western frontier, was everything Lee was not. He had come up the hard way and embodied nothing in particular except the eternal toughness and sinewy fiber of the men who grew up beyond the mountains. He was one of a body of men who owed reverence and obeisance to no one, who were self-reliant to a fault, who cared hardly anything for the past but who had a sharp eye for the future.

Contrast

And that, perhaps, is where the contrast between Grant and Lee becomes most striking. The Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. He lived in a static society which could endure almost anything except change. Instinctively, his first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. He would fight to the limit of endurance to defend it, because in defending it he was defending everything that gave his own life its deepest meaning. The Westerner, on the other hand, would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society. He fought so because everything he lived by was tied to growth, expansion, and a constantly widening horizon. What he lived by would survive or fall with the nation itself. He could not possibly stand by unmoved in the face of an attempt to destroy the Union. He would combat it with everything he had, because he could only see it as an effort to cut the ground out from under his feet.”

They both graduated from West Point, Lee earlier due to age. At the age of 18, Robert leaves for the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which had earned one demerit. Robert E. Lee graduates second in his class from West Point. While at the military academy, Lee is one of six students in his graduating class to never receive a demerit. His classmates note his drive for perfection and focused, secluded personality with the nickname "Marble Model." As one of the top cadets, Lee is able to choose the branch of service for his first assignment and elects to work for the Army’s Engineer Corps. Lee, second in his West Point class, an engineering officer, a career military officer, truly was a great general. As a tactician, he was head and shoulders above Grant.  Good defensively, Lee was even better on the offensive. He was bold and decisive, a calculating gambler. Can anyone who has studied the Battle of Chancellorsville deny it? Splitting his army on several occasions, he surprised his opponents and won the day. Lee was a master of the holding attack; a tactic George Marshall would later instill as the only tactic taught at the Army War College prior to World War II. Lee  fought in the Mexican American War (1846-1848) as one of General Winfield Scott’s chief aides. He was instrumental in several American victories through his personal reconnaissance as a staff officer, which allowed him to discover routes that the Mexicans hadn’t defended because they thought it was impossible to pass through the terrain.General Scott later wrote that Lee was “the very best soldier I ever saw in the field”.

In 1839, seventeen-year-old Hiram Ulysses Grant received an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. It changed the course of his life—and his name. Grant always disliked his first name and was commonly known by his middle name. He wanted to swap his first and middle names when he entered the Academy. However, Congressman Thomas Hamer had submitted Grant’s application to West Point under the name “Ulysses S. Grant.” Hamer knew the boy as Ulysses and, at a loss for his middle name, chose “S” because Grant’s mother’s maiden name was Simpson. Later on, as result of military victors in the West, the USG becomes unconditional surrender Grant.

West Point

Grant’s experiences at West Point and as a young officer provided both formal and incidental preparation for his later career and gave him insights into future Civil War comrades and foes. Grant, for his part, was a keen observer of human nature who believed that attending West Point at “the right time”—he encountered more than 50 future Civil War generals there—together with his experiences in Mexico, proved “of great advantage.” In addition to teaching “practical lessons,” the Mexican War introduced him to “older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion.” More important and what developed into a major military strategy was his proficiency in being a quartermaster, one whose prime responsibility is managing supply trains and transportation  in a hostile environment, this became essential during the Civil War.

Surviving drawings and paintings from Grant’s West Point years show early signs of what the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called a “special gift” common to successful painters and generals alike: namely, a remarkable visual memory. After Grant studied a map, his staff officer Horace Porter recalled, “it seemed to become photographed indelibly upon his brain.” Besides having an incredible gift of memory, he also excelled in horsemanship. Grant experienced combat for the first time on May 8, 1846, at the Battle of Palto Alto during the Mexican American War. Grant served as regimental quartermaster, but yearned for a combat role; when finally allowed, he led a charge at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. . He demonstrated his equestrian ability at the Battle of Monterrey  by volunteering to carry a dispatch past snipers, where he hung off the side of his horse, keeping the animal between him and the enemy. 

Historians increasingly have pointed to the importance of Grant's experience as an assistant quartermaster during the war. Although he was initially averse to the position, it prepared Grant in understanding military supply routes, transportation systems, and logistics, particularly with regard to "provisioning a large, mobile army operating in hostile territory," according to biographer Ronald White. Grant came to recognize how wars could be won or lost by crucial factors that lay beyond the tactical battlefield. Serving as assistant quartermaster made Grant a complete soldier, and learning how to supply an entire army gave Grant the training to sustain large armies. This experience as a quartermaster will later benefit him In the Civil War.

After his victory at Donelson, Grant never failed to base his strategy upon supply, more than often than not the latter strategy upon supplies Lee based his upon search, after supplies and consequently suffered chronically from a shortage of supplies and a dispersion of forces. In the object of the campaign Grant eclipsed Lee, not only because his army was stronger, but because it was better organized and supplied.

From his training and time spent at West Point a number of  characteristics were greatly enforced such the ability to develop lucid orders, even in the heat of battle.  General Meade’s chief of staff commented that “there is one striking feature of Grant’s orders; no matter how hurriedly he may write them on the field, no one ever has the slightest doubt as to their meaning or even has to read them over a second time to understand them.” His study of maps and creating artwork at West Point was extremely useful. James McPherson attributes to Grant a “topographical memory.” He “could remember every feature of the terrain over which he traveled and find his way over it again; he could also look at a map and visualize the features of terrain he had never seen. . . . Grant could see in his mind the disposition of troops over thousands of square miles, visualize their relationship to roads and terrain, and know how and where to move them to take advantage of topography.” His perseverance was that of history, in 1864–65, Grant demonstrated his perseverance as he carried out his campaign of adhesion against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, achieving all his goals within a year.  Grant was a simple man who dealt with the facts as he found them. While his contemporaries saw the war in all its complexities and too often took counsel of their fears, from Belmont to Appomattox Grant saw the main chance, stuck to it, and thus led his armies to victory.” When President Lincoln brought Grant east from his triumphs at Vicksburg and Chattanooga to confront Lee, Grant refused to back off, waging a bloody war of attrition which last exactly a year. His focus, early in the war was to defeat, capture or destroy opposing armies, not simply occupying geographic positions, was critical to his success.

War tactics

Grant had no fear of using all the resources that were available to him. Remember the North always enjoyed a substantial edge in manpower and almost every manufacturing category, He recognition and deployment of these resources stands as one of his achievements. Grant was decisive. Colonel James F. Rusling of the quartermaster general’s staff recalled that in the winter of 1863–64, a quartermaster officer approached Grant for approval of millions of dollars of expenditures for the coming Atlanta campaign, and Grant approved the expenditure after briefly examining the papers involved. Questioning Grant’s swift decision, the officer asked him if he was sure he was right. Grant replied, “No, I am not, but in war, anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find out and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money and may ruin everything.”

Grant has gone down to history as a bludgeon general, a general who eschewed maneuver and who with head down, seeing red, charged his enemy again and again like a bull: indeed an extraordinary conclusion, for no general, not excepting Lee, and few generals in any other war, made greater use of maneuver in the winning of his campaigns, if not of his battles. Without fear of contradiction, it may be said that Grant’s object was consistent; strategically it was to threaten his enemy’s base of operations.’ Lee acted on the spur of the moment and never once brought fruition, because he acted so impulsively as to  be unprepared to take full advantage of them.  The Seven Days campaign ended in the disaster of Malvern Hill, the Second Manassas campaign in that of Antietam and the Chancellorsville campaign led to Gettysburg.

War was very simple to him, you have a job to do, you go out and do it to your fullest. One of his biographers said of him “His success was the success of sheer common sense-----which is almost the same thing as generalship—and of American Democracy. “  Here is a man who is not only capable but self-reliant, and  its self-reliance which nearly always wins over a superior, because it relieves him of onus of a work which he himself can not control.  His honesty and modesty towards himself endowed him with wisdom; he could discover his own mistakes and was never stampeded by his success. Grant’s outlook was simpler and consequently more all-embracing. He sees the war as a whole far more completely than so than even Lee saw it.  He is the preeminent grant-strategist, while Lee is the preeminently the field strategical. His orders are simple , direct and unmistakable. Lee’s more often than not are vague and frequently verbal.

He relied on his staff for detail not ideas, which was his job. He was able to bear in mind a clear picture of the topography of the country he operated in. This would enable him to work out a strategic problem mentally with more certainty than could one who does not have this ability.  When others were at their wits ends Grant was perfectly calm and collected.  With the Vicksburg campaign, in the time that a plan was essential General McPherson offered him a glass of liquor, Grants response. “Mac, you know your whiskey won’t help me to think; give me a dozen of the best cigars  you can find…. I think by the time I have finished them I shall have this job pretty nearly planned. “

As  Bruce Catton later goes on saying, “Each man had, to begin with, the great virtue of utter tenacity and fidelity. Grant fought his way down the Mississippi Valley in spite of acute personal discouragement and profound military handicaps. Lee hung on in the trenches at Petersburg after hoping itself had died. In each man there was an indomitable quality. . . . the born fighter's refusal to give up as long as he can still remain on his feet and lift his two fists. Daring and resourcefulness they had, too, the ability to think faster and move faster than the enemy. These were the qualities which gave Lee the dazzling campaigns of Second Manassas and Chancellorsville and won Vicksburg for Grant.”

Grant was a mass of contradictions: loved order and yet could find no place in an orderly world. He hated war, and yet found his place there above all his fellows. He went to West Point not to be a soldier but because he was determined to escape the life of a tanner, and West Point did that for him. He never failed to look at every problem from the simplest point of view, and to answer it in the simplest possible manner. He has said he watched the progress of the Army of the Potomac ever since it was organized and has been greatly interested in reading the accounts of the splendid fighting it has done. This is very illuminating for a few generals who had to face his problems would have troubled to find the time to examine those of others hundreds of miles away.  

Flaws

Grant also had his flaws. As a tactician, he was horrible. He seemed to know only one tactic – the frontal assault. Time and time again, he threw troops at entrenched positions, only to suffer incredible casualties. At Vicksburg, he attacked strong fortifications and suffered accordingly. Did he learn to try other methods? No. At Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor he did it again on an even grander scale, suffering even grander casualties. Grant seems to be one of those Civil War generals, of whom there are quite a few, who did not understand the changes the rifled musket forced on tactics. Frontal assaults no longer worked, but many a general seemed to think if only another division were thrown in, the result would be different. 

Grant’s modesty, lucid orders, topographical memory, full use of his staff, perseverance, full use of Union resources, minimizing support personnel, full use of assigned generals, decisiveness, moral courage, political common sense, focus on enemy armies, maneuverability, and intelligent aggressiveness all combined to make him the best general of the Civil War and to demolish the myth of “Grant the Butcher.” Grant was one of the greatest generals in American history.

Lee

On April 18, 1861, as rising star in the U.S. Military, Lee is called to a meeting with Francis Blair, a close associate of Abraham Lincoln. Blair offers Lee command of the Union Army, but Lee declines the offer, unwilling to fight against his home state of Virginia. Lee next seeks the advice of his former commander and Director of the War Department, Winfield Scott. Lee explains his divided loyalties to Scott, but his superior refuses to allow him to "sit out" the war.  On  April 20, 1861 After days of deliberation, Lee resigns from the United States Army. He states in a letter to his Union-supporting sister, Anne Marshall, that "with all of my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizens, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home." Just two days later, the governor of Virginia assigns Lee to command the Virginia forces for the Confederate Army.  This is perhaps where the contrast between Lee and Grant is so striking. As historian Bruce Catton says, “the Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. His first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. On other hand the Westerner would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society, “ or for his country. Lee was a Virginian first and a Confederate second. This trait was harmful, even though he was not the commander-in-chief, due to his crucial role as Jefferson Davis’s primary military advisor throughout the war.

As Catton states, “So Grant and Lee were in complete contrast, representing two diametrically opposed elements in American life. Grant was the modern man emerging; beyond him, ready to come on the stage, was the great age of steel and machinery, of crowded cities and a restless burgeoning vitality. Lee might have ridden down from the old age of chivalry, lance in hand, silken banner fluttering over his head. Each man was the perfect champion of his cause, drawing both his strengths and his weaknesses from the people he led. Yet it was not all contrast, after all. Different as they were--in background, in personality, in underlying aspiration--these two great soldiers had much in common. Under everything else, they were marvelous fighters. Furthermore, their fighting qualities were really very much alike.” Despite his lack of manpower and material, Lee’s military genius was the principal factor in keeping the Confederacy alive. He was a legend in his own lifetime. In May 1862 Stonewall Jackson wrote, “Lee is the only man I know whom I would follow blindfold. “ His soldiers, to whom he was either ‘Uncle Robert’ or ‘Marse Robert’ idolized him.

For another difference, Lee was not a good quartermaster. The Army of Northern Virginia was always poorly equipped. Much of its equipment and supplies were taken from the Army of the Potomac after their numerous victories, but there was never enough. Not all of this blame can be laid at the feet of Lee, though. The Confederacy was woefully short of the industry needed to supply its armies, and the Northern blockade prevented adequate supplies from being imported as the war dragged on. Some may lay additional fault on the South’s lack of railroads to deliver supplies. Virginia, however, did not suffer from this lack. Finally, northern Virginia was fought over so much that it simply could not feed the army. Lee was also determined to include Europe in his war with the North. On April 7, 1865 he said to General Pendleton; “ I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination   of our subjugation, make good in the long run our independence unless foreign powers should directly or indirectly, assist us.”

Strategist?

Another major difference, was Lee as a strategist. In a word, he was not. His concern was northern Virginia and nothing else. Throughout the war, he resisted attempts by Jefferson Davis to draw forces from the Army of Northern Virginia to reinforce the western armies. Lee was obsessed with the operations in Virginia and urged that additional reinforcements be brought to the Old Dominion from the West, where Confederates defended ten times the area in which Lee operated.  Only once did it happen, when Longstreet went west and fought at Chattanooga, but not without Lee’s efforts to stop it. He also opposed attempts to make him commander in chief of Southern forces until it was too late for it to be of any benefit. Lee’s Civil War strategy concentrated all the resources he could obtain and retain almost exclusively in the eastern theater of operations. His approach overlooked the strength of the Confederacy in its size and lack of communications, which required the Union to conquer and occupy it. He often refused requests by President Jefferson Davis to comply with requests to send critical reinforcements to the West. Lee was obsessed with Virginia and the moral aspects of the war. His one and only grand strategy was to terrify Washington. This would have been a perfectly sound object had his army been well trained and provided with a grand siege train, which was greatly limited in materials and funding.  Only once did Lee agree to send a portion of his army west. He delayed for two weeks from Virginia which caused many of them to arrive only after the Battle of Chickamauga and without their artillery.

Additionally, and most importantly, Lee failed to realize that the Confederacy’s best hope of survival was to hold out. Since the South had a lack of fighting men compared to the North, its best hope was to keep casualties to a minimum, to live to fight another day. Lee’s offensive tactics ensured the Army of Northern Virginia sustained greater casualties than it could afford. Had he fought defensively most of the time, Lee would have saved soldiers who could fight again, perhaps outlasting the North’s will to win. That Lee though loyal to Virginia, was at heart disloyal to the Confederacy is absurd. To him the base of the Confederacy was but the base of Virginia because the only form of attack he really understood was the moral offensive, and Virginia enabled him to carry this out.

While the North was compelled through force of circumstances to develop its resources the South, relaying on Europe for its munitions of war, failed to do so, with the result, that more and more did Southern policy develop into a political game of chance.

Conclusion of the war

Lee was successful only at winning battles. He never had a conception of how to take battlefield victories and turn them into victory in war, unlike U.S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, who both came to realize that individual battles were themselves meaningless — what mattered was winning the war. In this area Grant, in particular, completely out-classed Lee. Sherman proved better at achieving goals without the waste of battle — but battle was what graduates of the U.S. Military Academy had been trained to think was how wars were won.

Lee ceased being “successful” (except at not-losing) when Grant was put in charge of all Union armies because Grant, unlike Lee, had a conceptual strategy and (some) subordinates he could trust to execute it out of his sight. But the decisive theatre of war was not Virginia, even though this is where nearly all the focus of study on the U.S. Civil War stands. The Western Theatre contributed far more to the collapse of the Confederacy first by splitting the Confederacy in two, logistically and economically, and then destroying Southern morale via Sherman’s destruction of the Confederate back yard — all of it effectively unopposed, because Sherman was a master of achieving his ends without uselessly killing his men in meaningless battles.

In the words of the General who defeated him, the legend of Lee as a “great general”, is much overrated and a product of the lovers of the “lost cause”. His use of Napoleonic tactics caused Lee to lose more men than all of his other generals combined. Lee himself said that even in victory that he never did anything that would “last longer than the battle that occurred that day.” His blunders at Gettysburg cost him that battle and was the beginning of the end for his army of northern Virginia. “It is all my fault”, Lee said to the men of what was left of Pickett’s division after he sent them to their slaughter.

Lee rejoins his family in Richmond, where Mary has been living since 1861. That summer they will move to the country in Derwent, Virginia.In a letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee blames the loss of the war on the moral condition of his men. He believes that the troops had been getting letters from home indicating that they no longer supported the war, leading the soldiers to lack aggressiveness and the grit necessary to win battles.

The Lee family moves to Lexington, Virginia, where Lee assumes the role of President of Washington College. Lee overhauls the curriculum, requires weekly progress reports for all of the students, and encourages the females in his family to attend church services in the hopes that "if the ladies would patronize it that the students would be more interested in going." The college has since changed its name to Washington and Lee University. 
Lee assembles notes, letters and data in an effort to defend his actions and his Army of Northern Virginia, but never writes. Lee discusses the failures of Gettysburg in conversations with his peers at Washington College, attributing the loss to his commanders J.E.B. Stuart and Richard Ewell.
Lee is summoned to give testimony to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. In his testimony, Lee expresses his concern over the social and political structure of the country and his doubts that African Americans should have civil rights. Above all, he expresses a desire to be left alone.

After suffering a severe stroke on October 12, 1870 Lee dies in the company of his family. Lee's coffin is paraded through the small town of Lexington, Virginia. The procession, filled with former Confederate soldiers, Washington College students and state politicians, makes its way past the Virginia Military Institute for a small service.

Grant became a national hero, and the Republicans nominated him for president in 1868. A primary focus of Grant’s administration was Reconstruction, and he worked to reconcile the North and South while also attempting to protect the civil rights of newly freed black slaves. While Grant was personally honest, some of his associates were corrupt and his administration was tarnished by various scandals. After retiring, Grant invested in a brokerage firm that went bankrupt, costing him his life savings. He spent his final days penning his memoir which was published the year he died and proved a critical and financial success.

What do you think of Grant and Lee? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

Paraguay’s 1936 February Revolution and its Lessons for the Paraguayan Left

Like most of Latin America, Paraguay is a nation whose history has been sadly tarnished by social inequities, reactionary politics and civil war, but also one where exceptional circumstances have resulted in the emergence of leaders with bold programmes of reform and the drive to carry them through to the bitter end. One such event was the February Revolution of 1936, which led to the coming to power of a reformer by the name of Rafael Franco.

Vittorio Trevitt explains.

Rafael Franco

This 1936 February Revolution, which saw the old establishment being overthrown and replaced by a military leader, was the culmination of a series of unfortunate events. From the time of its independence from Spain in 1811 Paraguay had been led by a mixture of dictators and civilian leaders who presided over a nation often racked by injustice and instability. In 1883, a law was passed under which land that had previously been universally accessible was enclosed and transformed into large private estates, with peasants, as noted by historian Peter Calvert, “either forced to leave or to work for a pittance.” A bloody war involving Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina lasting from 1864 to 1870 proved a traumatic one, with Paraguay losing an estimated 50% of its people not just through fighting, but also as a consequence of famine and disease. Nor would this usher in a brighter age. In the five decades following the war’s end 32 presidents assumed and were deposed from office in a series of revolts and coups, while the two parties that came to dominate politics for most of that period, the Colorados and Liberals, had little to distinguish themselves in their management of the country.

In 1932 a conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia erupted owing to a dispute over territory that ended in 1935 after much suffering. Criticism was levelled against the government for its handling of the war, with José Félix Estigarribia, a noted hero of that conflict, claiming that at the war’s first major battle his men fought without adequate arms, food, medical supplies or ammo. The authorities had aroused the ire of the army by refusing to provide pensions to disabled war veterans, with the country’s legislature (dominated by the Liberals, one of the main parties that had led Paraguay since independence) rejecting this proposed measure in a 1935 vote, “pleading an exhausted treasury,” as noted by one study. Economic difficulties led to thousands of troops being demobilized; a decision that resulted in many unemployed and disaffected former soldiers wandering aimlessly around the capital. The seeds of revolution were therefore sown long before Franco’s ascension.

The end

The end of the old establishment came in February 1936 when a coup (an event that became known as the February Revolution) brought to power a nationalist coalition. Rafael Franco, the man who headed this alliance, was a war hero and officer of the Chaco War whose fair treatment of soldiers had earned him their support. The social measures rolled out by the new administration seemed to indicate a clear break from the past. A public health ministry was inaugurated, along with the first labor code in Paraguayan history. A National Labor Department was set up to handle matters such as the regulation of women’s employment, and new labor rights were rolled out including a day off on Sundays, an 8-hour workday, bonuses and paid holidays.

Other spheres of life fell under the umbrella of the government’s radical agenda. Public works were introduced, together with a National Patronage of Indigenous People to improve conditions for the nation’s aborigines. To widen land tenure in a nation where only 5% of the people owned land, a law was passed under which the government was given authority to expropriate up to five million acres of uncultivated land and divide it into plots of 25 to 250 acres to sell on favourable terms to farmers without land. By December 1936, over 200,000 acres of land had been expropriated; benefitting thousands of families. Perhaps affirming the faith Franco’s men had in him during his time as a soldier, the revolutionary government devoted much of its time to helping former combatants. Pensions were awarded to Chaco War veterans unable to work due to service-related illness and injury, while those who were crippled were entitled to necessary orthopaedic parts. For a population long accustomed to war and injustice, Franco’s presidency appeared to mark a turning point for the better.

The Franco administration’s tenure was not an isolated incident. Instead, it was part of a trend in Latin America at that time that saw the coming to power of radical reformers committed to policies geared towards the masses instead of the elites. In Colombia, an election in 1930 saw a conservative party being voted out after 70 years in power and the election of a liberal administration that over the course of a decade would roll out a social and economic reform programme akin to the American New Deal. In neighbouring Chile, a similar agenda was pursued by a reform-minded Popular Front following elections in that country in 1938. Further north in Mexico, a populist socialist came to power in 1934 by the name of Lázaro Cárdenas, whose tenure would become legendary amongst the Mexican Left with his radical reforms in areas like land distribution that won the hearts and minds of many.

Short-lived

The administration Franco led, however, did not last as long as the aforementioned governments, with certain actions contributing to its downfall. The administration lacked, for instance, a commitment to democratic values, as demonstrated by decisions made to abolish all political parties and implement press censorship. Also, while the revolutionary period brought tangible gains to workers, the functioning of labor organizations was prohibited at the same time. Nor was the government an ideologically homogeneous one, with socialists, fascists, and individuals harbouring Nazi sympathies amongst its ranks; an attempt on Franco’s part to bring together the different factions within the revolution under one umbrella. This turbulent situation allowed a successful coup to take place in August 1937, one that enabled the Liberals to return to office once more.

Although the return of Paraguay’s traditional hegemonic party seemed to spell the end of a dream for a fairer Paraguay, Franco’s revolution had, in the words of historian Paul H. Lewis, “unleashed expectations of change that couldn’t be ignored.” Traditional Liberals were put to one side and in 1939 a former hero of the Chaco War, José Félix Estigarribia, assumed office. Reflecting the reform impulses of a generation of “New Liberals,” positive measures reminiscent of the Franco era such as agrarian reform were pursued. At the same time however, Esitgarribia responded to unrest (such as conspiracies among some military cliques) following his restoration of political freedoms by suppressing opposition after he declared himself a temporary dictator. Following his death and that of his wife in an airplane crash, his successor Higinio Morínigo clamped down on civil liberties while relying on the army to rule. Pressure from the United States to democratise Paraguay’s political system, however, resulted in Morínigo putting together a new cabinet including the Febreristas (followers of Franco), who during the Forties succeeded in accumulating a support base amongst labor unionists and students. It seemed that the Febreristas had an opportunity to replicate the social justice ethos of the Franco years, but this wasn’t to be. Protests against the president, combined with conflict between backers of the 3 main parties in the cabinet (the Colorados, Liberals and Febreristas), led to Morínigo removing the Febreristas from their posts and allying himself alone with the Colorados. Partly due to violence conducted by a Colorado group who sought to use force to return their party to power, numerous opposition groups rallied to support Franco, who instigated a revolt backed by the overwhelming majority of Paraguay’s army officers and enlisted men. The Colorados, however, mobilised a force strong enough to beat Franco, whose revolt ended in August 1947. In an ironic case of political intrigue, Morínigo would still end up being forced from office. Despite joining the Colorados and endorsing its victorious candidate in elections held the following year, Colorado-leaning officers uncertain of promises made by Morínigo giving up the presidency forced him to leave Paraguay. For the next 6 decades, Paraguay would know the rule of no party other than that of the Colorados.

Lugo

Paraguay would not again see a Franco-esque reformer come to power until 2008 when that year a priest by the name of Fernando Lugo, who headed a broad-based left-right alliance that included the Febreristas won the presidency; marking the end of Colorado hegemony. Despite divisions in his alliance (with echoes of Franco’s), Lugo was able to initiate bold reforms like free dental care, pensions for elderly persons on low incomes, and school snacks. His alliance however, lacked a majority in the legislature, plaguing Lugo’s ability to advance much in the way of meaningful reform. He was also plagued by scandals over paternity claims from his time as a bishop, and was eventually impeached in 2012 on numerous grounds, such as failure to tackle increased insecurity. Much controversy surrounded Lugo’s impeachment, but this failed to generate enough support for a leftist alternative to win the next election, which instead saw the return of the Colorados, who have remained in power to this day.

The Franco interlude provides two worthwhile lessons. The first is that when elites fail to meet the needs and aspirations of its citizenry certain individuals will take drastic measures such as attaining power by force. The second is that acquiring power in this way is doomed to failure, as authoritarian administrations are prone to corruption and, in the case of Franco’s government, badly divided. Achieving a peaceful revolution through the ballot box, with a leadership united with clear goals and progressive values, is the best chance Paraguay has of a brighter future.

What do you think of Paraguay’s 1936 February Revolution? Let us know below.

War Photography Through the Ages

War photography and Photojournalism are an essential part of war reporting and have been in every conflict since the art of photo-taking was invented. As Susan Sontag notes in her seminal work Regarding The Pain of Others, ‘war-making and picture-making are congruent activities.’ But why do we have such a fascination with photos and footage of war? What is Photojournalism? And how has Photojournalism changed over the years? Let us first put photojournalism into context.

Chris Fray explains.

Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima by Joe Rosenthal.

A photojournalist is a reporter who uses photos or film to tell a news story. Every war since the first photographed conflict - the Mexican-American War (1846-48) - has been photographed and recorded by images.(1) Images can have a decisive effect on public opinion and perceptions of war. A photograph is a snapshot of a memory, frozen in time, allowing those un-connected to the situation to view the conflict up close and personal.

I would like to take you on a journey spanning over a century, detailing the way in which Photojournalism has progressed and what this means for war photography and for us, the public. I will touch on photography in the major conflicts of the 20th and 21st Centuries, beginning with the First World War (1914-18). We will then explore the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the Second World War (1939-45), Vietnam (1959-75), the Gulf War (1990-91) and finally the use of photojournalism is our own time using the devastating examples of the ongoing Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts.

First World War

At the start of the 20th Century, cameras were large and cumbersome. Immobility was an issue and the heavy camera required tripods. The fragile glass negative plates were easily broken and darkroom chemicals were required by the photographer to be immediately on hand in order to develop the negative quickly after exposure.(2) Obviously, this did not lend itself to conflict photography.

By the start of the First World War, however, handheld cameras such as the Vest Pocket Kodak were being produced, a favourite of soldiers in the First World War.(3) The quality of the images produced was poor and the camera was prone to blurring, but the negatives had much quicker exposure times than before and most importantly it was small enough to carry in an army pack. War photography was progressing at a fast pace yet the command structures of both sides of the conflict were suspicious of the technological progress.

Almost as soon as war was announced, both the Allies and Germany set hardline policies in place to limit photographer’s abilities to publish images related to conflict and access conflict zones. Each side were deeply concerned with the effect that photography could have on spy-work and espionage as well as domestic morale. Professional photographers were restricted from war zones and could only gain access with written and signed agreements of the war council although censorship was lightened later into the war. The images which were taken have had a lasting impact on the memory of the war and shows the value of photography as a means of mass communication- elements of which have been replicated in every conflict since.(4)

Servicemen were banned from owning or using cameras. But as we know, as soon as rules are made, there are those who are willing to break them. The pictures taken by servicemen on the front lines, in the trenches make up some of the most haunting and evocative photos of the First World War. Many photos show the horror of war in the trenches, soldiers staring up at the camera amongst the mud and barbed wire. Some pictures on the other hand depict daily life- soldiers making tea and playing cards showing that life went on as well, even under the rattle of machine gun and crack of artillery shells.

Spanish Civil War

It was only in the 1920s following the invention of small portable 35mm cameras such as the Leica and Ermanox that war photography fully developed (no pun intended). These cameras were faster and more compact, permitting exposure without a flash which allowed for night time and indoor photos to be taken.(5) With the technological developments of photographic equipment, quick, fast-paced snapshots of battle became possible, revolutionising photography. As a result, audiences were able to experience the heat of battle in their own living rooms.(6) Wireless transmissions of photos and the introduction of affordable, high quality printing paper also allowed photojournalists to have their work published in a matter of days. This quick turnaround was essential to the public relations effort for both sides.(7)

The Spanish Civil war, therefore took place at a turning point for modern photography. The impact of ‘in conflict’ photos on the audiences in Britain, France and the United States should not be understated. Action shots of war had rarely been seen and certainly not on a scale such as this. ‘Photographs of Spain became images not just of conflict but in conflict.’ This was a shocking statement and certainly caught the attention of the world.(8) The war also came at the height of the picture magazines of the 1930s, such as Vu, Life, Picture Post, Regards and Match. These magazines focused mainly on images and adverts. These magazines had an exceptionally far-reaching readership and all of them featured the civil war to some extent, making the Spanish Civil War the first war to be covered and photographed for a mass audience.(9)

Left leaning photojournalists such as Robert Capa, David Seymour and Augusti Centelles began to use their platforms as photographers in the picture magazines to influence readers in the UK, France and the USA to contribute to the Republican war effort. Photographs were becoming weapons of influence. A number of photographs taken during the Civil War have taken on iconic roles in representations of the fight against fascism. Possibly the most famous is Robert Capa’s ‘Fallen Soldier.’ It depicts a Republican soldier at the instant of death, as a bullet hits him in the head, knocking him backwards. It is a tragic depiction of the brutality of war, so close you can almost hear the fatal shot. By the end of the Civil War, war photography was firmly established and exceptionally popular. Due to the way in which Nationalism was progressing in Europe, however, many Europeans were to themselves face conflict, not only through the pages of a magazine but at their own front doors.

Second World War

Many of the Civil War photographers who had cut their teeth in the 1930s were seasoned photojournalists by the start of the Second World War in 1939, with strong links to well-read magazines. However now the scene of conflict was not just a single country, but now spanned across the whole world as photographers from Europe to Africa, Russia to Asia were capturing unbelievable pictures of worldwide conflict. With more people shifting between countries than ever before, war was now a global affair, and therefore so to was photography.

The Spanish Civil War photographers were taking photos and sharing with audiences as a call to action. Now war was first and foremost in the public mind. Western photographers were using their skills in support of the Allied mission against the evil Nazi threat. This was a war in which both sides would employ photography effectively as a propaganda tool; as General Dwight Eisenhower wrote, ‘Correspondents have a job in war as essential as the military personnel.’ Media and reporting had an enormous effect of public opinion, and ‘public opinion win wars.’

Censorship of photography was considered highly important and only certain photos were published in the press. Photos such as dead or dying Allied soldiers were considered bad for moral and suppressed for the majority of the war. It was only towards the end of the conflict that President Roosevelt, faced with strikes and opposition to Americans fighting and dying in Europe, decided to allow a clearer and more violent image of the war to be published. Real images of dead and wounded soldiers were shown to the public which roused US citizens to overwhelming support of the war.

In the 1940s, along with the advancement of weapon technology came the improvement of photographic technology. Long-range cargo planes could transport thousands of rolls of films and negatives between Europe and America, allowing the pictures to be shown in papers and magazines within days. Cameras in the 1930s which took 4 X 5 inch negatives were superseded by smaller and faster 35mm, 2 ¼ X 2 ¼ Rolleiflex, Contax rangefinder and Leica cameras. Not only this, but they could be fitted with telescopic lenses, allowing for close-up and zoom shots. More photographers than ever before were braving the battlefield to capture battlefield heroics. As Robert Capa famously remarked, “if your pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough.”

Perhaps some of the most moving photos from the Second World war are those of Robert Capa’s landing on Omaha Beach in the first wave of troops. As the only photographer to land on the beach, we have direct and close-up documentation of the landings. The pictures are blurry, as Capa himself admits, because his hands were trembling so much with fear on the mortared beach.

Vietnam

At the end of the Second World War in 1946, around 8,000 American households owned a television set. By 1960, just under 45 million households had a television.(10) The war which raged in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos captured the public and was beamed to millions of households all over the world, giving the Vietnam war the epithet, ‘the living room war.’ The prominence of television had started to push the press photographers from their prime reporting position. Viewers were now able to see much more than a snapshot of conflict. They were able to see the true horror of the uncompromising cruelty of war, frame by frame in video.

As images of US soldiers fighting for freedom in the previous war had mustered public support, their portrayal in Vietnam had an entirely opposing effect. An American public, expecting images of democratic US Marines fighting Communists were faced with a continuous tirade of film and images showing the mud, squalor and death their sons and fathers encountered, every day on the news. Photographers and journalists were given such freedom in Vietnam never seen before, or since. There was little to no censorship. Instead, the US army command intended to recruit the press into sharing their own perspective of the war. However, as the war developed into the 1960s, more US servicemen were losing their lives in a decade long conflict which many at home found hard to relate to. A cultural and moral revolution in the USA swung much of the public towards peace and as the US high command rapidly lost control of the situation in Vietnam, conditions in the army worsened, professionalism laxed and this was all captured on camera.

Many have claimed that the media were responsible in some part for the defeat of the Vietnam war. One of the key photos in this debate is the Saigon street execution, taken by Eddie Adams in 1968. It shows a prisoner seconds away from a shot to the head, at point blank range. It sums up the lawless and brutal nature of the conflict, even away from the battlefield.

It was in the Vietnam conflict that the idea that war photography could have a harmful impact on the perceptions of war at home. The more advanced technology became and the more skilled the photographers became in depicting horror- the more the public came to view war as a sickness. In essence, war reporting moved too far for the public. It presented the tragic truth of conflict.

Falklands & The Gulf War

If Vietnam was over-reported, sickening the public with gore and grit and eventually ending in defeat, conflicts in the subsequent decades were decidedly, and intentionally, under-reported. As a leading member of Britain’s Ministry of Defence asked rhetorically on the announcement of the Falklands War, “are we going to let the television cameras loose on the battlefield?”(11) The Falklands war took place in the 10 weeks between April and June, 1982 in response to the invasion and occupation of the British islands in the South Atlantic by Argentinian forces.

The British Ministry of Defence exercised extreme control over coverage from the conflict. In polar opposition to Vietnam, the images and footage of the conflict hardly featured in British newspapers and only two of the 29 accredited media professionals were photographers. Governments were clearly learning lessons from Vietnam. By the time the conflict was over, only three batches of film had been returned to London.(12) Although by the 1980s, technology had dramatically improved, the press were unable to use it. In a 10-week conflict in which 255 Britons were killed, 777 wounded and an estimated 2,000 Argentine casualties, no images were released. This only fuelled the public’s suspicion of the Ministry of Defence.(13)

In a very similar vein and probably still scarred by the public reaction to the media surrounding Vietnam, when the Gulf War began in 1990, the utmost care was taken in photographic and film representations of the conflict. Subsequently to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, the US led a 42 Nation coalition intervention against Iraq. In the 1990s, photographic technology was incredibly advanced. The coverage of the war however was heavily sedated. Press focus was made on the mechanised technology of war, the enormous guns and steel cannisters, firing bullets and shells from slick fighter jets. Yet there was no indication of what damage these bullets and shells were doing upon impact. It was presented to the public as a ‘painless war of precision.’(14) For the first time a conflict was being told from the perspective not of soldiers, but of weapons.(15)

Reports and briefings from the war council were kept secret from reporters and although there were around 1,600 Western photographers and reporters in the area, they were all isolated from the conflict and supervised by public-affairs managers who made sure they saw only a sanitised view of the conflict. The pictures presented a white-washed version of war which distracted from the real brutalism involved in conflict. Removing the people from the pictures also removed the empathy for the casualties.

There is a belief that over saturating the public with images of death and destruction will ultimately dull society into accepting these images as the norm, gradually shocking less and less until they are ignored altogether. However as Torie Rose DeGhett says, never showing these images at all absolutely guarantees that understanding of the images will never develop. (16)

Syria & Ukraine

So where does this leave us now? Are we able to trust the photographs we see of conflict? With the invention in the past 20 years of social media and camera phones in every pocket, it could easily be argued that each person recording and sharing material could be considered a photojournalist. The process of free un-filtered, un-sanitised and un-censored material being captured by millions per day in various perspectives, angles and mediums provides an overwhelming change to what was previously considered photojournalism. Of course, photojournalists still exist and provide the world with moving images of conflict and pain all around the world. However, the range of material is so large now, that photojournalists are a tiny proportion of those on the ground, experiencing war.

When the Syrian conflict began in March 2011 and turned into a full blown Civil War in 2012 to 2013, foreign photographers and journalists were banned from entering the country. The danger was exceedingly high following the deaths of several foreign reporters including Marie Colvin of The Sunday Times and so the images and footage which was released was shot by local people. Amateur photographers and the average person- anyone with a camera-phone, expressing themselves through photography and film and appealing to the wider world for help. This produced a revolution in photojournalism, with minute by minute live-reporting of conflict via Facebook and Twitter. This is something which was never before possible.

Is this a positive outcome for war journalism? We might be tempted to say, yes. The wider the audience, the more likely the world is to see and connect with the pain of those living through war. However as Swiss photographer, Mattias Bruggmann has said, lack of journalists and increased use of public media opened the floodgates to propagandism from every side in Syria. “Every opposition group and every rebel battalion set up its own unit to produce photographs and videos.”(17)

The most recent and equally harrowing world conflict, the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has also produced a tidal wave of images and videos. Again, as technology improves, so does the capacity for ordinary people and individual soldiers on the ground to document their own personal perspective of the conflict. Courageous acts of covert filming of Russian soldiers and troop movements by occupied Ukrainians are being used by the Ukrainian military in some cases and shared on social media, giving the conflict the epitaph, ‘the first tik-tok war.’

The nature of this is certainly not as fun as it sounds. Given the brutalness of this current invasion and the overwhelming number of alleged war crimes committed, organisations such as the United Nations are already compiling photographs by renowned photographers, military footage, local amateur photographers and footage from social media to be used as evidence for prosecuting these crimes in the future.

Throughout its history, war photography has contributed to a truly humanitarian mission. Photographs stand as a testament to conflict. A snapshot of History which says, “this happened,” and “this cannot be forgotten.” It holds those in the wrong, accountable and has always provided a voice to those who are unable to provide their testament. It is the hope of many organisations that these photos will result one day in the prosecution of the perpetrators of war crimes, providing justice for those who were at the receiving end and for the families of those who died. Photos are therefore an essential element, not just to war reporting but to justice and humanity.

What do you think of war photography in different periods? Let us know below.

References

1 Payne, Carol and Brandon, Laura. Guest Editors’ Introduction: Photography at War. P.1.

2 Griffin, Michael. ‘The Great War Photographers: Constructing Myths of History and Photojournalism.’ P.135.

3 https://blog.scienceandmediamuseum.org.uk/the-vest-pocket-kodak-was-the-soldiers-camera/#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20first%20and,years%20ago%2C%20in%20April%201912.&text=The%20Vest%20Pocket%20Kodak%20camera,model%20was%20discontinued%20in%201926.

4 https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/photography

5 Brothers, Caroline. War Photography: A Cultural History. P.6

6 Payne, Carol and Brandon, Laura. P.3.

7 Faber, Sebastiaan. Memory Battles of the Spanish Civil War: History, Fiction, and Photography. (2018). p.16-17.

8 Brothers. p.2.

9 Brothers, Caroline. p.2.

10 https://www.elon.edu/u/imagining/time-capsule/150-years/back-1920-1960/#:~:text=Approximately%208%2C000%20U.S.%20households%20had,million%20had%20them%20by%201960.

11 Brothers, p.205

12 Brothers, p.206

13 Brothers, p.209

14 Brothers. p.211

15 Bruce. H. Franklin, ‘From Realism to Virtual Reality.’ P.110

16 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-war-photo-no-one-would-publish/375762/

17 https://newlinesmag.com/photo-essays/shooting-the-war-in-syria/

An Introduction to the Enlightenment Period

Beginning in the late 17th century and concluding in the 18th century, the Enlightenment was a period of time where scientific, political, and philosophical advances attained more authority and influence than blind obedience and superstition. The ideas of the thinkers who established these advances set the basis for education, governmental balance, people’s rights, and even revolution.

Helen Oh explains.

Late 17th century portrait of John Locke. By Godfrey Kneller.

The Enlightenment produced many ideas regarding the way people should be governed, and these ideas were centered around the state of nature, the social contract between the people and the government, and the ability for citizens to revolt. John Locke, a philosopher whom I strongly agree with, believed in a representative democracy whose sole purpose was to uphold and protect the natural rights of the people. Compared to the ideas of other philosophers and thinkers, John Locke’s ideas of the state of nature, social contract, and revolution would create the most successful and legitimate government.

The state of nature was the description of human life before the establishment of a community, in which humans were bound only to the law of nature and respected the rights to life, liberty, and property of other humans. This freedom and equality was the basis of the state of nature, yet it also provided the ability for humans to abuse these rights and take away the rights of others without consequence. Therefore, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes both agreed that humans needed to escape this violent state of nature by forming a society, where humans would resign some of their freedoms in order to assure peace. However, these two thinkers disagreed on how this newly formed society should be run and how much power was given to the government.

Social Contract

In order to preserve the peace of society, a social contract was needed. The social contract was an agreement among society that set the boundaries for governmental control. Hobbes believed in an absolute monarchy, where the social contract was an agreement among only the citizens to give up their self-preservational rights to a sovereign ruler. However, Locke believed that the social contract should be an agreement among not only the people but also the government, making sure that the government acted only to protect and ensure the natural rights of the citizens. In Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, he says that a representative government that governed lightly was ideal: “When legislators try to gain or give someone else absolute power over their lives, liberties, and property of the people, they abuse the power which the people had put into their hands”. Found even in today’s governments, Locke’s ideas on balancing the power between people and government successfully ensures and protects the natural rights of the people.

One of Locke’s most controversial ideas at the time was his viewpoint on revolution against the government. Like many others, Hobbes believed that revolution against governmental authority was never justified. However, Locke explained that people reserved the right to revolt if the government’s purpose was no longer solely to reserve the natural rights of the people. This unpopular idea was supported by the fact that corrupt governments should not and do not deserve to stay in power. Therefore, Locke’s philosophies on the citizens’ ability to revolt are the most ideal for a legitimate government.

Conclusion

In conclusion, English philosopher John Locke’s ideas on the state of nature, the social contract between the people and the government, and the ability for the citizens to revolt are the closest to what I would deem the ideals on which a proper government should be established. These ideals were employed in acts like the American Revolution and documents like the Declaration of Independence, where Thomas Jefferson used Locke’s ideas on limiting governmental power and revolution. This proves that Locke’s ideas are not only applicable in theory but also to modem and even future societies.

What do you think of the Enlightenment? Let us know below.

The Modern Greek State: 1941–1949 – War & A New Divide

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. Now, when fascist Italy invaded Greece in October 1940, the Greeks put aside the issues of clientelism and united delivered a formidable fight and resistance against the Axis. This did not last long though. The rise of the Communist party as a significant political factor supported by a strong military branch reshuffled the balance of power and led to yet another civil war and yet another socio-political schism. Thomas Papageorgiou explains

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, and part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here, and part 5 on the issues of clientelism here.

Greek troops during the Italian Spring Offensive, March 1941.

I United against the Axis

The Italian Invasion of Greece was proven another significant failure for Mussolini. It was repulsed by the Greeks who immediately counterattacked. The Greek army demonstrated extraordinary skills in mountainous warfare and by the end of 1940 thanks to its heroic efforts the Italians were forced to retreat 50 km behind the Albanian borders along the entire length of the front. For several months 16 Greek divisions managed to nail in Albania 27 Italian ones. (Churchill, The Second World War (Vol. I), 2010, pp. 510, 513)

When the Germans came to the rescue at the beginning of April 1941, they offered overwhelming support to the Italians, whereas the British, estimating that the loss of Greece and the Balkans would not constitute a big loss, if Turkey remained neutral, were more reserved. (Churchill, The Second World War (Vol. I), 2010, pp. 544 - 545) Thus, on the 27th of April the axis forces were in Athens. The last stand took place on Crete which was invaded on the 20th of May 1941 by German paratroopers, who, after paying a very heavy death toll, took it by the end of the month. The king and the Greek government together with the British Expeditionary Force and the remnants of the Greek Army fled to Egypt.

II Occupation, resistance and first signs of division

Although their performance at the battlefield was questionable, the Italians were left with the control of most of the Greek territory. A chunk was also reserved for Bulgaria, that finally found exit to the Aegean through Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. The Germans retained Thessaloniki under their control though, together with the most strategically important areas in Central Macedonia, the Greco – Turkish border, several Aegean islands including most of Crete, the port of Piraeus and the capital Athens.

As we have seen, the Italian attack in October 1940 found Greece’s economy in a fragile state with the country relying heavily on imports to cover the needs of its people. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Now the invasion destroyed a significant amount of Greece’s infrastructure and the triple occupation put the external trade to a stop. Soon, especially the urban population, faced food shortages and by the end of 1941 starvation. During the tragic winter of 1941-42 approximately 300,000 people lost their lives. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 89 - 90) Overall, Greece paid one of the heaviest tolls among the allied forces losing 7 – 11 % of its 1939 population during the Second World War. (Wikipedia, 2023)

This situation pushed the Greeks towards struggle rather than passivity. They needed to resist in order to survive. The first resistance group under the name National Liberation Front (in Greek Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo - EAM) was created by the Communist Party in September 1941. Its military branch was the Greek People’s Liberation Army (in Greek Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos - ELAS). This was not only the first, but also the biggest resistance group. Indeed, by 1944 ELAS numbered 50,000 fighters in the Athens – Piraeus area only, whereas estimations for EAM members reach up to 2,000,000 (total population 7,000,000). (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 91, 99) (Heneage, 2021, p. 188) The most important resistance groups with non-communist leadership were the National Republican Greek League (in Greek Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Sindesmos – EDES) and the National and Social Liberation (in Greek Ethniki Ke Kinoniki Apeleftherosi – EKKA). These did not have the size of EAM-ELAS though as the latter dominated most of the country whereas EDES’ bastion was restricted to Epirus and EKKA’s in the mountainous area of Parnassus in Boeotia. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 92 - 93)

For some time , the different resistance groups worked together and with the help of the Allies they managed to carry out formidable operations, like Operation Harling, which destroyed the heavily guarded Gorgopotamos viaduct in Central Greece in November 1942, stemming the flow of supplies through the Balkans to the German Afrika Korps. (Wikipedia, 2023) As a result, 9 divisions of the Axis powers were stuck in Greece to maintain some order, with questionable results, especially away from the main cities and transportation arteries, and that only after intense fighting. As a German report with the title ‘The political situation in Greece. July 1943’ put it:

‘90% of the Greeks today are unanimously aligned against the Axis powers and ready to go into open rebellion’. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 95 - 96)

The pressure the resistance groups exercised on the Axis forces and before that the army’s performance during the Italian invasion in October 1940 showed once again what the Greeks could do when standing united. In the following though, we will describe several open issues tackled by the Greek political establishment of the time in such a way that once again tore the Greeks apart.

As we have seen, before the war Greece was ruled by Metaxas’ dictatorship. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Metaxas died in January 1941, but the government that fled to Egypt together with the king, after Greece’s occupation by the Axis forces, appeared officially as a continuation of this dictatorship. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 97) Back home in Greece though, contrary to the anti-Communism sentiments of the government, EAM seemed to have the upper hand and ELAS could field thousands of guerrilla fighters. As the German report of 1943 mentioned above continues:

EAM and its militant organizations have borne the brunt of the resistance against the Axis. Most resistance groups belong to EAM. Politically, it is the leading force and because it is highly active and has a coordinated leadership, it represents the greatest danger to the occupation forces. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 96)

But how did the communists gain such an advantage in building the resistance? First, they were already experienced in building illegal networks of operation as they were outlawed by Metaxas’ dictatorship already before the war. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 91) Second, the remnants of the Greek Army, whose officers could have been the core of the resistance movement, escaped to Egypt with the king and the government. And it is further suggested that the latter (king and government) did not want to encourage resistance in occupied Greece! (Gerasis, 2013, pp. 90 - 91) We should not forget that Venizelos’ failed coup of 1935 gave the royalists the opportunity to purge the army from elements supporting unreigned democracy and restored the dynasty that was exited in 1924. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Now, the king and the government did not want to risk the return of the democrats under arms within the ranks of a resistance movement that could eventually hinter their return to Greece at the end of the war.

Although the King succumbed to the British pressure and abolished the dictatorship in February 1942 (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 97), the perceived threat for him and his entourage became more imminent when, in March 1944, EAM formed the Temporary Committee of National Liberation. The latter called for the formation of a government of national unity challenging the legitimacy of the exiled government in Egypt. The call was positively received by a significant amount of the Greek army serving under allied command in Africa. Their demand that the request be accepted by the government in Cairo was vigorously met with the help of the British and 20,000 service men were sent to concentration camps in Libya and Eritrea. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 105 - 110) It is difficult to assume that 50% of the Greek army in the Middle East had suddenly turned communist. It is more likely that these were the democratic elements of the army.        

At the same time, back home, in occupied Greece, the situation was also becoming more and more difficult and complicated. Italy had surrendered to the Allies already in September 1943. As the Italians were occupying most of Greece, this created a control gap. To fill this gap, Hitler replaced the Italians with troops transferred from the collapsing eastern front. These men, brutalized by their experiences fighting the Russians, brought with them a different kind of warfare. Fifty Greeks were to die for every German soldier killed, ten for every wounded German, with no distinction made between guilty and innocent. The massacres at Kommeno (Wikipedia, 2022), Kalavryta (Wikipedia, 2023) and Distomo (Wikipedia, 2023) are characteristic of this self-defeating approach, as the Greeks left their burning villages and joined the resistance in the mountains. This together with the weaponry of the 90,000 Italian soldiers that surrendered in Greece in 1943 made ELAS even stronger. (Heneage, 2021, pp. 190 - 191)

To make up for this loss Hitler’s reinforcements from the eastern front were not enough. Thus, the Germans turned for help to the … Greeks! The Security Battalions were set up to act against the resistance and maintain order in 1943 by the quisling government in Athens. Denounced at the time as ‘fascists’ and ‘collaborators’ these people, nevertheless, also included moderates who feared the communists’ post-war intentions and can surely have been no more ideologically attracted to the doctrines of Hitler than most of the ELAS fighters to the doctrines of communism. (Heneage, 2021, p. 194) (Beaton, 2021, p. 437) Indeed, considering that the Communist Party was getting no more than 5-6% of the votes in the national elections before the war (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), it is natural to assume that most of the rank-and-file EAM-ELAS little knew or care about communism. After all, as we have seen, Greece was a country of smallholders who believed fervently in property ownership (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) and most of the people who joined EAM-ELAS did it following a message not about class struggle but national liberation. (Heneage, 2021, p. 188)  This way the Communists were able to impose their leadership but not their ideology on a significant part of the Greek people. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 95)

Thus, all sides were simply fighting to survive in a failed state and to preserve what they could of what they valued, when even the forces of occupation could barely keep order outside the major cities, and only by terrorizing the citizens with arbitrary arrests and mass executions. (Beaton, 2021, p. 437) Towards the end of the occupation then the Greeks had once more started to fight against each other with the resistance groups exchanging accusations for collaboration with the Security Battalions and the Germans. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 98) The assassination of EKKA’s leader Psaros by the communists in April 1944 was one of the most striking events of this time and indicative of what was about to follow. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 101)

Another part of the puzzle, and a very significant one, was the intentions of the Allies. After all, Greece was a defeated country and its future depended on the overall outcome of the war and the negotiations between the Great Powers of the time. And the decision was that Greece will remain under the sphere of influence of the Western Powers. It was taken during a meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. The exchange of views was done using a rough sheet of paper [there is even talk about a napkin (Heneage, 2021, p. 193)] on which Churchill wrote who would get what. The British prime minister found the whole process, affecting the lives of millions of people, so cynical that he suggested to burn the sheet of paper at the end of the negotiation. But Stalin continued cynically and said: ‘No, you keep it’. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, pp. 1154-1155) It has been suggested that the Soviets informed EAM about their intentions to give up Greece already before Churchill’s visit to Moscow. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 112 - 115)

III Liberation and … another civil war!

Now, with all these in mind, what could have, ideally, be done? The Communists should realize that their military superiority was becoming doubtful, in the long term, without Soviet support and with Greece left under the influence of the Western Allies. After all, most of the ELAS fighters were not actually communists. They should try, nevertheless, to capitalize on the fight they put up against the Axis as leaders of the most massive resistance movement and ‘cash out’, so to say, any positive appeal this might have to the people by getting more votes and seats in the parliament compared to the pre-war period. The king and the government, on the other hand, should play down the communist threat, especially after the decision of the Allies, and work for a smooth transition to the post-war period and for the recovery of Greece that suffered heavy human and material losses during the war. To this end, both parties should lay their guns down, when the Germans fled from Greece in October 1944, and stand united at the peace negotiations claiming effective support for their country.

Ideally yes. But what did really happen? The truth is that at the beginning the Communist Party made some concessions. Instead of using its military superiority to take Athens and the power, after the withdrawal of the Germans, it accepted to participate in a government of national unity under Georgios Papandreou, head of the exiled government in Cairo, and set ELAS under British command. The king’s fate and consequently the form of the state system (reigned or unreigned democracy) would once again be decided by referendum. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 158)

Nevertheless, violent events between the opposing factions did not stop and the mutual suspicion remained obvious. Thus, when the government ordered the dissolution of the guerrilla groups, including ELAS, that were to be replaced by a national army, a crisis erupted. The problem was that the national army was to have the heavily armed Greek brigade, that fought under allied command and the exiled government brought with it, at its core. After the purge of its democratic elements in the Middle East we saw earlier though, this was fanatically pro-royal and the Communists demanded its dissolution as well. Papandreou denied. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 117) The Communists then left the government of national unity, withdrew ELAS from British command and organized a general strike and a large rally in Athens. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 159)

The later took place on the 3rd of December 1944 and was drowned in blood when the security forces started firing against the crowd. It is not clear if the order came from the government, the British or if the Security Battalions, whose members at that time were laying low following the developments, were involved in the incident, but hundreds of the demonstrators lost their lives or were wounded. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 120 - 122) In response, the communists chose to resort also to violence and the crisis culminated to the Battle of Athens, that started after the rally and lasted for 33 days. The visit, in the midst of the fighting, of the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, in Athens was indicative of the latter’s determination to keep Greece under the sphere of influence of the western allies. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, pp. 1172 - 1184) His interventions have actually been heavily criticised as triggering the devastating all out civil war that would shatter all hope for post war unity in Greece (Heneage, 2021, p. 197), and it is a fact, that with the help of the British forces that landed in Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans, the government was able to draw the Communists to sign in February 1945 the Agreement of Varkiza. The latter provided for the demobilisation and disarmament of ELAS, general amnesty for ‘political’, but not criminal, offenses, the holding of general elections and the referendum for the fate of the king. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 161)

Nevertheless, as atrocities were carried out by both factions, during all this time, many issues remained open. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 133) Things were made worst by the participation in the Battle of Athens of many members of the quisling militias who collaborated with the Germans on the side of the government against the communists. This way, the battle acted as a legitimizer for these organizations, as it seemed to confirm the view that the quisling militias were nothing more than a means of dealing with the communist threat. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 162) With the tolerance of the government these people infiltrated into the ranks of the security forces and continued to terrorize anyone who was or was perceived to be communist. After all, the fact that criminal offences could still be prosecuted even after the compromise reached at Varkiza offered a good pretence. This was also admitted by Nikolaos Plastiras that returned to Greece after 10 years in exile to replace Papandreou in the premiership, before the Varkiza truce. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 136) His Venizelist past (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) was hoped to work conciliatory for the warring factions. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 133) To no avail. According to EAM in the year between the Varkiza agreement and the elections set for March 1946 1,289 people were murdered, 6,671 were seriously wounded, 31,632 tortured and 84,931 arrested. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 137)

This political climate led the communists and a significant part of other left and centrist parties to abstain from the elections set for the 31st of March 1946. When they realized that this way they would lose any chance they had to co-shape the political establishment after the end of the war, they revised their position, but this was two days after the deadline for submitting nominations. Thus, they asked for the postponement of the elections, but prime minister Sofoulis, leading the fourth government formed after the replacement of Plastiras in April 1945 (Kostis, 2018, p. 296), declined. Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary in the Labour government of Clement Attlee, that replaced Churchill in the premiership in July 1945, is supposed to have exercised the influence ensured by the presence of the British army in Greece towards this direction. As a result, voters abstention reached 50%, but the elections gave legitimacy to the right-wing government and cemented the re-emergence of the royalists. Indeed, in the September 1946 referendum on the fate of king George, the system of government was confirmed as a reigned democracy with 68,9% of the votes. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 140-141)

The decision for abstention from the elections of the left and centrist parties and its exploitation from the parties of the right would prove to be a fatal error. The only option left was the extra-parliamentary opposition. Encouraged by the hardening of the Soviets’ attitude already during the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, where they stated their disagreement and protest against the ways of the British in Greece based on Stalin’s ‘old and vague authorization’ to Churchill (see above), and later, in January 1946, during the first session of the UN Security Council, where they demanded the withdrawal of the British forces from Greece, the Communist Party commissioned General Markos Vafiadis to set up the Democratic Army in the mountains in August 1946. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 143-145) Nevertheless, support was to come mainly from the neighbouring Communist countries, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, that pledged to fully support the operations of the Democratic Army, during a conference in the Slovenian city of Bled in August 1947. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 163) Thus, in the summer of 1947, Greece was, yet again, engaged in an all-out civil war with incalculable consequences.

IV Fighting among themselves … almost

At the end of the First World War, Greece continued the fighting for another 4 years in an attempt to increase its territorial gains in Asia Minor. The undertaking resulted in the catastrophe of 1922. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) At the end of World War Two the modern Greek state had once more territorial gains (its last): the Dodecanese. On the 31st of March 1947, the British surrendered the islands to a Greek military commander although the law on the annexation of the Dodecanese to Greece was published in the Government Gazette on 9.1.1948 with retroactive effect from 28.10.1948. (Divani, 2010, pp. 683-685) Nevertheless, instead of focusing on the rebuilding of the country like most of the winners, and losers, of WWII, the Greeks, once more, continued the fighting. This time it was not about further territorial expansion. It was a fight for power among themselves.

Among themselves? Almost. As I commented before (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), division invites foreign intervention. Indeed, after the Battle of Athens, Churchill’s remark was that at the time when 3,000,000 men on both sides fight in the western front and massive American forces line up in the Pacific against the Japanese, the Greek crisis might seem of minor importance. But the country is at the nerve center of power, law, and freedom of the Western world. Consequently, he wouldn’t back off easily from the deal he made with Stalin (see above). The problem was that the British Empire was on the retreat after WWII. It was not the British who were to conclude the mission in Greece. It would take the persistent efforts of the one who would soon constitute the united power of the English-speaking world: Uncle Sam. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, p. 1184)

In March 1947 the USA adopted a diplomatic policy, under the ‘Truman Doctrine’, which stipulated that any threat from the Left to a non-communist country would be deterred even by force. The size of military and economic support to Greece thanks to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Wikipedia, 2023) was tremendous. Three hundred million dollars were granted by the US Congress in 1947 only and much more later. The effect of the American support on the army was huge. It reached 200,000 men including well trained mountain troops. It was equipped with modern weapons, artillery and fighting aircraft. A modern communications network was built. The airfields, roads, bridges, and ports that had fallen into disuse during the occupation were repaired. American military advisors were working together with the Greek General Staff for the planning of the operations against the Communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 151-152, 157)

The latter on the other hand were in a tough spot. As we have seen they were getting some support from the neighboring communist countries, but only against concessions in Macedonia, which made their cause very unpopular in the rural areas in the north, in view also of recent atrocities of the Bulgarians there during the occupation. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 159-160) Their networks in the cities were also gradually being neutralized by the police as the Communist Party was outlawed and thousands of its members were sent to exile. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 158) Additionally, for most of the Greeks 6 years of fighting was already enough. Recovery and financial stability were now the imperative. Any attempt for further unrest met their disapproval and dismay. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 148) Thus, the Democratic Army had soon problems in finding new conscripts. Eventually, 25% of the fighters in its ranks were women and the voluntary conscription was replaced by a forced one. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 155) This was followed by terror tactics like hostage taking. A striking case was that of young children at the age of 3 to 14 years and their expatriation to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 159) All these were exploited of course by the government propaganda.

Things got worse for the Communists because of internal disputes. In view of the problems in conscription, training, and equipment, Vafiadis resorted more to guerilla tactics, but the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikos Zachariadis, wanted to turn to more conventional ways of war. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 160) Vafiadis was finally replaced by the General Secretary in the leadership of the Democratic Army, but the decisive turn came in June 1948, when Yugoslavia’s leader Tito disagreed with Stalin and his country was expelled from the Cominform. (Wikipedia, 2023) Despite the fact that the Soviet Union offered little practical support during the war, it was the ‘mother’ to which communist hard-liners, and especially Zachariadis, had to obey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 158-159) Thus, a year later, in July 1949, Tito closed the border and the Democratic Army lost access to the rear of Yugoslavia where it used to withdraw in times of danger in order to regroup and resupply. At the same time, the imminent threat of an invasion of the Greek army in Albania forced the Communist Party to declare a cease fire on the 16th of October 1949. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 166) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 162) This is 5 years after the Germans left Athens in 1944.

V The aftermath: A new schism

At the end of the Second World War the magnitude of the disasters that Greece had suffered could only be compared with those of Yugoslavia, Poland, or the Soviet Union. From 1940 till 1944 550,000 people were killed (corresponds to 8% of the total population) and 34 % of the national wealth was lost. 401,500 houses were destroyed and the number of the homeless reached 1,200,000. 1,770 villages were set on fire, whereas the big ports, the railway lines, the locomotives, the telephone network, the civil airports, and the bridges were in ruins. 73% of the capacity of the merchant fleet and 94% of the capacity of the passenger fleet was sunk. 56% of the road network, 65% of privately owned vehicles, 66% of trucks and 80% of the buses was also lost. The number of horses was reduced by 60%, of small animals by 80% and 25% of forests was burned. By 1944 the production of cereals was down by 40%, of tobacco by 89%, and that of currant by 66%. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 134)

And yet, in front of all this devastation, the Greeks continued fighting a civil war for another 5 years! This brought more dead (40,000 according to official statistics, 158,000 according to unofficial calculations), hundreds of thousands of additional homeless and material damages comparable to that estimated at the end of 1944. Moreover, 80,000 to 100,000 Greeks branded as communists back home fled or were forcibly taken across the country’s northern border and would have to make new homes in eastern Europe’s communist countries. The largest such Greek community was established in the city of Tashkent in Uzbekistan. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 163) (Beaton, 2021, p. 438)

This ‘exodus’ was a manifestation of a new schism in the Greek society that was realized by 1949 and replaced that between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists (and of course others before that): the schism between ‘nationalists’ (ethnikofrones) and ‘communists’. In a nutshell, the nationalists stood on the winning side of the civil war and professed the defence of the ‘Greco-Christian’ tradition against the subversive dispositions of the loosing side, that is the ‘communists’. The distinction was rather blur (e.g. we saw – see above – that many ELAS members were not actually communists) and thus served for the prosecution of many whose political convictions did not suit the state at the time. Indeed,  postwar Greece was very far from being a liberal paradise (although neither was it, as we will see, Stalinist Russia). (Heneage, 2021, pp. 205-206) In fact, this schism, in a much milder form though, is carried to this day between the ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’ and the ‘progressive’ parties that continue to fail to collaborate even under severe conditions, like the current economic crisis, with devastating consequences for the country.

VI Conclusion: Who’s fault was it?

Greece is probably the only country in the world that does not have a celebration for the victory in the First World War whereas victory in the Second World War is (strangely) celebrated at the date that marked the entrance of the country to the deadliest conflict the world has ever seen and not that of its liberation and exit. The reason, obviously, is the fact that in both cases the Greeks continued the fighting undertaking a disastrous campaign in Asia Minor in the first case and engaging in a protracted civil war in the second. Nothing to celebrate then.

If we were to ask the question who’s fault was it that Greece fought yet another civil war, a popular narrative is that the war was the result of the pressure that the government, supported by the British, exercised on the communists in an attempt to eliminate their influence on the social and political life which was significantly increased as a result of their leading role in the resistance against the axis forces that occupied Greece.

Some of this narrative, implying that the Communist Party was in ‘self-defense’ was carefully presented in the previous sections. And caution is indeed necessary as there is also harsh criticism of the communist leadership’s stance at that time from former party members. There were indeed incomprehensible positions and decisions of the party like (i) the adoption of the slogan for an independent Macedonia and Thrace, particularly unpopular to the Greek general public, (ii) the compromise with the exiled government in Egypt and avoidance of taking the power by force, when ELAS had overwhelming military superiority at the end of the occupation in 1944, followed by (iii) a turn to military means at an unfavorable time, when the government and its army returned and established itself in the country, with the help of the British and later the Americans. These are interpreted as the implementation, by the internationalist leadership of the party, of the decisions and commands of the Soviet Union that were based on the latter’s conflicts, agreements and overall power play with the British and the Americans in the region and elsewhere. (Lazaridis, 2022 (8th Edition), pp. 21-22, 77-82, 84-86 ) In a nutshell, it is suggested that the communist leadership was working for the Soviet interests.

I believe that the developments that culminated to the civil war can be readily understood within the concept of clientelism, which was described in detail in the previous article of this series on the interwar period. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Once again two rival factions used their audiences (clients) to collide for power. Continuing the devastation of the Second World War they worked against the country’s recovery and had to resort to foreign support (intervention) to achieve their goals. The communists lost because they did not get the lavish support that the government enjoyed from the British and the Americans. Additionally, their real audience was much smaller whereas some of their positions made their cause even more unpopular to the public, as unpopular was already the continuation of the war by both factions, after the end of the Second World War. What needs to be stressed here is that clientelism is not something that is restricted internally in a state. When clientelism is in place the state itself becomes a client. The price of American largesse was that Greece effectively became a client state. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) If the communists had won, Greece would correspondingly become a client state of the Soviets.

In fact, retrospectively thinking, if we were to find a positive element in the events of the period, this is undoubtedly the avoidance of the fate of Greece’s northern neighbors that ended up in the Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Greece remained firmly connected to the West, it managed to benefit from the Marshall Plan and, after the civil war, it followed the amazing economic course of the Western European countries, finally achieving an unprecedented leap in economic development that put it far ahead of its Balkan neighbors. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 170) More on this in the articles to follow.   

What do you think of the 1940s in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Beaton, R. (2021). The Greeks, A global history. New York: Basic Books.

Churchill, W. S. (2010). The Second World War (Vol. I). Athens: Govostis (in Greek - The work is also available in English by Penguin Classics).

Churchill, W. S. (2010). The Second Worls War (Vol II). Athens: Govostis (in Greek - The work is also available in English by Penguin Classics).

Divani, L. (2010). The Territorial Completion of Greece (1830-1947), An Attempt at Local Lore. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Gerasis, G. (2013). The Chronicle of a National Tragedy. Athens: Roes (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

Kalyvas, N. S. (2020 (3rd Edition)). Catastrophies and Triumphs, The 7 cycles of modern Greek history. Athens: Papadopoulos (in Greek, in English under the title Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know by Oxford University Press).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Lazaridis, T. (2022 (8th Edition)). Fortunately, We Were Defeated Comrades. Salonika: Epikentro (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, May 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/5/20/the-modern-greek-state-19141922-greeks-divided?rq=Papageorgiou#.Yw-AoxxBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, March 22). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/3/22/the-modern-greek-state-19231940-the-issues-of-clientelism#.ZDj9i_ZBy3A

Tsoucalas, C. (2020). The Greek Tragedy, From the liberation to the colonels. Athens: Patakis (in Greek, originally published in English by Penguin in 1969).

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacre_of_Kommeno

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harling

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalavryta_massacre

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distomo_massacre

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tito%E2%80%93Stalin_split

The 1936 Summer Olympic Games: Nazism on the World Stage

The Olympic games have been around since the time of the ancient Greeks, being a showcase of physical feats and sport prowess. After Germany won the bid for the Olympic games in 1931, the Nazis would unfortunately be able to use it to showcase the country’s technological and economic prowess to the world. In the process they would also set the precedent for all Olympic games to come.

Kyle Brett explains.

The torch relay for the Summer Olympic Games, 1936. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1976-116-08A / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

Germany wins the Olympic bid

Germany originally won the Olympic bid to host the summer games in Berlin in 1908. This would not come to fruition as the advent of the first World War led to the games being canceled. Organizers of the event wanted to have the games continue to run during wartime like the ancient Greeks had done, but the brutality of the war made the games unfeasible. Thus the next Olympic games would be held in Antwerp, Belgium in 1920.

Germany, after the First World War, was broken, its economy was in tatters and its people left unhappy with their leadership. These problems were further exacerbated by the advent of the Wall street crash and the Great Depression. The 1924 Olympic games in Paris had even banned Germany from participating in the games, which followed the general public sentiment that people were not fond of Germany for their actions during the first World War. This would all change with Dr. Theadore Levalde and his lobbying for Berlin in the International Olympic committee.

The 1930 and 1931 meetings of the International Olympic committee saw much debate on which city would be the one to host the 1936 summer games. Levalde would spend much of these debates proposing Berlin as the host city and defending Germany in these meetings. Levalde was Germany’s Olympic representative since 1904 and was  a very well respected member of the International Olympic Committee community. That gave Germany a good chance to win the bid and host the Olympics. There was also a rising sentiment of utilizing the games to bring the world together. The past 20 years saw much division in the world, and the IOC sought to help right that with the Olympic games. At the end of the 1931 meeting 2 cities had to be chosen: Barcelona and Berlin. In the end it came down to an uncertainty surrounding the Republic of Spain and their ability to host the summer Olympics in Barcelona. This left Germany the winner and thus the 1936 bid for the Olympic games went to Germany and to the failing Weimar Republic.

A new Ideology rises to claim the Olympics

The Nazi party rose out of the failure of the Weimar Republic to capture the public's trust, thus the people of Germany yearned for a leader who would change the country for the better. To this end saw an ever growing support for the Nazi party and its very strong ideological values and economic solutions. This culminated in 1933 with the Nazi party seizing power from the Weimar Republic and becoming the leaders of Germany as well as the inheritors of the Olympic Games.

Originally Germany’s leader Adolf Hitler was apprehensive about the Olympic games as he saw no real need to host them or to participate in them. His opinion was swayed by the chief propagandist for the Nazi party Paul Joseph Goebbels. Goebbles convinced Hitler that the Olympics could be an opportunity to put Nazism and Germany’s achievements on the world stage, and thus construction of the Olympic stadium in Berlin began.  The Olympic games were to be a showcase of the success of Germany and how their new ideology was to be spread around the world.

Problems fueled by hate

The German government’s state sponsored anti-semitism was not unknown by many of the participating countries. It was originally decided that for the games that no Jewish athletes would be allowed to participate, however facing backlash that rule was lowered to appease the other countries that would be in the games. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws declared that all German Jews were no longer citizens of Germany and thus they were no longer allowed to participate in the games for the German team. These ideas of hate would not leave the games as many countries would sideline their Jewish athletes to appease the German hosts.

There was one problem with the games actually happening and that was the participation of the United States of America. The US would be the largest presence at the games and if they chose to stay out of the games many other countries might also back out. As for if they were to join, there were 2 people responsible for deciding if the US would participate in the games. Those 2 people were Avery Brundage and Jerimiah Mahoney. Avery was an Olympian himself as well as being a self made millionaire. He also saw what was happening in Germany and had no real problems with it, even aligning himself with Nazi values. Mahoney on the other hand would be the opposite, he was a judge who served on the supreme court and he was very staunchly anti-Nazi. His main point on his disdain for the Nazis was their anti-Christian stance on religion in society and that would drive his position against them.

Mahoney was against the games and Brundage was all for US participation, so in a bid to rally support for his position Brundage would travel to Berlin to make sure that the Jewish athletes were being treated fairly. His trip to Berlin, which was very controlled and deceptive, had shown no mistreatment of Jewish athletes by the Germans and had actually shown Germany to be a fair and equal place for all athletes. In reality Brundage was shepherded around by Hitler and taken to talk to actors. It also did not help that Brundage did not speak any German and would need a translator the entire trip. Nonetheless Brundage returned to the US and with his evidence was able to convince the organizers of American athletics that Germany was fit for the Olympics.

Olympic preparations

Germany began their preparations for the 1936 Olympics with the building of the Olympiastadion, a large neoclassical oval stadium that could house 100,000 spectators. This was only the start of Germany’s display of the opulence of the Third Reich.  They would do a tremendous amount of cleanup in Berlin for the upcoming games. One of the main things they would do is remove all forms of hate from the streets. They cleaned up all signs of anti-semitism and would replace them with either the swastika, or with the Olympic flag. This was in an effort to make Germany seem much more liberal than they were in reality. They would also set out to arrest and ship off all of the Romani people in the area around the venue to try to make the stadium seem more opulent and refined. Shops near the stadium were also told to lower the prices drastically in an effort to make the economy of Germany seem much better than it was. There was also a major campaign to repaint and fix up any buildings that were looking run down. This extended out of Berlin to any building along the train lines that lead to Berlin. All of these efforts culminated in a fresh and beautiful city perfect to host the Olympics.

Technology was another major point of focus for the Nazis and something they proudly displayed at the Olympic games. They built 6 large international transmitters so that the journalists could report back to their home countries about the games. They also put cameras in the stadium so that this could be the first ever televised Olympic games. On top of that they showed off other technological achievements like the Hindenburg which was a huge airship as well as various military technologies.

Let the Games begin

The 11th Olympiad began with an opening ceremony and with a new tradition that would become a staple of the modern Olympics. That tradition would be the Olympic flame and its journey from Olympia in Greece to the Olympic brazier. The tradition was treated as if it were an ancient tradition; however it was made up for the Olympics by the Nazis. It was followed by the entrance of Hitler and his entourage which was played up to show the extravagance of the German leadership. The marches of the 49 different countries would follow Hitler’s entrance, with each country showing off their flag and their teams. The opening ceremony continued with a flyover from the Hindenburg and with much more fanfare, really playing up the glory of the Third Reich. With that the games were underway and the first televised Olympics was on for the world to see.

Hitler made sure to provide the journalists and reporters with all the equipment they would need, along with nice living quarters to keep their opinions about Germany good and to keep their reports about the games in good spirits. The eyes of the world were on Germany as the games commenced. There were a few athletes that the public were eager to see like Jesse Owens from the US. The stands would be filled up for most of the games as people were eager to see this worldwide event in person.

The main goal of the Nazis in the Olympics was to show off the Aryan race and their superiority. When all was said and done, Germany led with the most gold medals and with the most medals overall. There were instances, such as Jesse Owens, a black athlete from the US, beating the German champion Luz Long in the long jump that may have hindered their aspirations. However when all was said and done the Germans came out of the Olympics the leaders of the world in athletic prowess, which ultimately was their goal.

The Olympics comes to a close

When the games came to a close and all of the spectators filtered out the hate and discrimination that surrounded the Nazi party before the Olympics had resumed. They returned to persecuting Jews and anyone who was Jewish through what the Nuremberg laws had dictated. Many Jewish families were invited back to Germany before and during the games in an attempt to show the liberalization efforts the Nazi party was trying to showcase. These families were persecuted along with every Jewish person under the Third Reich. The Olympics had generally been a pause for hate and discrimination, but once they had left Germany so too did the facade of a liberal society.

The 1936 summer Olympics was a major success for the Nazi party. They had turned the public perception of Germany from a hateful and downtrodden country, into a much more economically wealthy and liberalized society. They succeeded in showing their technological and economic prowess off to the world and painting the picture of a new and improved society.

What do you think of the 1936 summer Olympics? Let us know below.

Sources

Bachrach, Susan D. The nazi olympics: Berlin 1936. Little, Brown, 2000.

Walters, Guy. Berlin Games: How Hitler stole the Olympic Dream. London: John Murray, 2007.

George McClellan: Problematic U.S. Civil War Commander

Major General George McClellan was one of the central figures of the Civil War. He served as commander of the Department of Ohio, the Army of the Potomac, and was Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army for 5 months. Historically, his command decisions have been criticized and his personal qualities are examined minutely. He represents a paradox: a superbly prepared and highly intelligent man who, during his moment on the world stage, failed in almost every task he performed.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

George B. McClellan. Portrait by Mathew Brady.

Background

McClellan came from a wealthy, elite Philadelphia family.  His father was Dr George McClellan, a foremost surgeon of his day and the founder of Jefferson Medical College. A great grandfather was a brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. After attending the University of Pennsylvania for two years, he left to enroll at West Point, where he graduated second in his class at age 19 in 1846, losing the top spot because of weaker drawing skills. He was friends with aristocratic southerners including George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and AP Hill.

He was breveted a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War he served as an engineer building bridges for Winfield Scott’s army. He was frequently under fire and was breveted to first lieutenant and captain. Since his father was friends with General Scott, he received a coveted spot to perform reconnaissance for the general.

He returned to West Point as an engineering instructor after the war. He was given charge of various engineering projects. He was also sent on a secret mission to Santo Domingo by the Secretary of State to scout its military preparedness. In 1852 he helped to translate a manual on bayonet tactics from French. In 1853, he participated in land surveys to scout a transcontinental railroad route. The route he advised through the Cascade Mountains, Yakima Pass, was known to be impassable during the winter snow. The Governor of Washington territory, himself a top of the class graduate of West Point and a mathematics whiz, had made his own survey. He knew that McClellan hadn’t studied the situation carefully. Time has shown that he missed three greatly superior passes in the near vicinity, which were eventually used for railroads and interstate highways.

He was then appointed By Secretary of War Jefferson Davis as captain of the new First Cavalry Regiment, one of two that would be the proving grounds for the Civil War. Because he spoke French fluently, he was sent to be an observer during the Crimean War. There he conferred with military leaders and the royal families on both sides. He observed the siege of Sebastopol first-hand. His report was hailed for its brilliance. McClellan's observations and insights from the Crimean War played a role in shaping his views on military organization, logistics, and the importance of proper training. He was particularly impressed by the Allied forces' well-organized supply lines, medical services, and use of siege warfare. However, he totally missed the significance of how rifled weapons had changed military strategy, an error that would have substantial repercussions in the conflict ahead. McClellan wrote a cavalry manual and designed a saddle, called the McClellan saddle, which is still in use for ceremonies. This was a promising young man with a great future.

But the fact is, promotion in the small pre-war army was very slow, and McClellan was an ambitious man. At age 31, he resigned to become Chief Engineer of Illinois Central Railroad, a position with a huge increase in salary. There he would be promoted to Vice President and work with an obscure railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.

McClellan was, frankly, bored with railroad management. He served as chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and then became president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. McClellan supported the presidential campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 election. He also married Mary Ellen Marcy, a woman who had fielded 8 prior proposals, rejecting 7 of them, including a prior one from McClellan; the man she had accepted was not liked by her family, so he withdrew. Finally McClellan asked again, and they were married in New York City in May 1860.

Start of the Civil War & Rapid Promotion

The firing at Fort Sumter changed the trajectory of a lot of people’s lives. For McClellan, it was transformative: he found himself a highly regarded and sought after authority on large scale war and tactics, having written two volumes on the subject. He was wanted by the Governors of 3 states to lead their militias, and he settled on Ohio. He was commissioned a major general in the regular army on Amy 14, 1861, outranking everyone except Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator. Once again, political connections moved him rapidly to the top.

After losing First Manassas, Lincoln needed a military leader who could win battles. McClellan had several victories in western Virginia including Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain, and was being hailed as the “Young Napoleon” and “Napoleon of the Present War” in the press. But the fact is, McClellan’s actions there showed a number of disturbing features that in retrospect were prescient. McClellan failed to attack at Cheat Mountain several times despite action being underway. Colonel Rosecrans was promised reinforcements but McClellan didn’t send them, forcing him to achieve victory on his own; McClellan’s report gave him no credit.  Another subordinate was warned to follow cautiously but then criticized in the report for moving slowly.

Positive Attributes

There can be no doubt that he was a fabulous administrator and logistician. He excelled in organizing and training the Union Army at the start of the war, preparing them for the battles ahead. His meticulous attention to detail and emphasis on discipline contributed to a well-structured and efficient force. Additionally, he implemented effective supply and transportation systems to support his troops. His skills in these administrative tasks were superb and are appropriately admired by all.

Criticisms as Commander in Chief

Throughout his tenure as a commander, McClellan consistently exhibited a tendency to overestimate the strength of his opponents and to be overly cautious in his decision-making, often erring on the side of preserving his own forces rather than aggressively engaging the enemy. McClellan was reluctant to begin his offensives, routinely delayed attacking, demanded an impossible number of reinforcements even though his army greatly outnumbered the enemy, displayed insubordination to the President and civilian leaders, allowed the enemy to escape repeatedly, and retreated several times despite not having lost a battle. He had an inability to create original or innovative ideas, despite being tremendously smart and a quick study. His cautious approach to battle and reluctance to take decisive offensive actions limited his overall success as a military leader.

Over-Cautiousness

Several instances highlight McClellan's consistent pattern of over-cautiousness, which led to missed opportunities and strategic setbacks:

• Peninsula Campaign: McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was marked by his excessive caution. Despite having a numerical advantage over Confederate General Robert E. Lee, McClellan moved slowly and hesitated to press his advantage, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces and ultimately repel McClellan's advances.

• Seven Days' Battles: During the Seven Days' Battles, McClellan's caution led him to withdraw his forces in the face of Lee's attacks, despite having numerical superiority. This retreat allowed Lee to successfully defend Richmond and avoid being decisively defeated.

• Maryland Campaign: After discovering Special Order #191, McClellan has been criticized traditionally as moving slowly. Even though McClellan had gained intelligence indicating that Lee's forces were divided, he still proceeded cautiously. However, recent scholarship has questioned the accuracy of this conclusion.

• Battle of Antietam: This battle became the single bloodiest day in American history, and McClellan's failure to exploit his opportunities to defeat Lee's army decisively was attributed to his caution.

• Following the Battle of Antietam, McClellan was slow to pursue Lee's retreating army, allowing them to escape across the Potomac River into Confederate territory. His hesitation to pursue and engage the enemy hindered the Union's success in taking advantage of its tactical success.

Repeated Inflated Estimates of Enemy Strength

McClellan’s propensity to inflate enemy troop numbers occurred so routinely that it’s beyond possibility that it wasn’t intentional, and perhaps psychologically motivated.

The pattern of inflating enemy troop numbers was a recurring theme that marked McClellan's career. McClellan doubled the number of troops he had defeated at Rich Mountain, making his victory appear spectacular. He tripled the number of actual troops facing him across the Potomac, leading to a crisis sense and elevation to commander in chief. In the Peninsula Campaign, the process reached its zenith: hyper-inflate the numbers of the enemy, lament about what was necessary to win, when it was impossible to provide that number to reluctantly proceed anyway, and blame superiors if victory wasn’t achieved.

Procrastination

McClellan’s fatal flaw as general was that he was viewed as a procrastinator. His continual delays and refusal to move against the Confederates allowed them to call in reinforcements and win key battles with less than half the manpower.  McClellan had a long history of delaying attacks. Maybe he thought that he had to plan in great detail before launching them. But these delays were never beneficial and never justifiable. His delay to initiate the battle at Antietam cost him a decisive victory and ultimately led to his dismissal.

He was an excellent administrative general, but as a tactician he was incapable of taking chances, and war is all about chances. Strategically he really wasn’t bad: Peninsula was an interesting idea but he did not follow through tactically. He wanted to cross the James, as Grant would do 2 years later, but was denied. He had a great advantage at Antietam and won, but he failed to pursue the enemy. He might have been incapable of responding creatively to the real time exigencies of battle.  He could not creatively adjust his plan. Thus, at Antietam, when his plan of assault did not unfold like a predetermined Napoleonic success, he was unable to develop any new concepts on the spot to adapt to the changed circumstances.

It is also possible that there were cynical benefits to General McClellan's exaggerated reports of the enemy's size. By consistently overestimating the enemy's strength, McClellan could have positioned himself as the savior of the Union, creating a narrative that he was the only one capable of defending against such a formidable foe. This could have enhanced his political stature and potentially garnered more support from certain factions. McClellan's tendency to exaggerate the enemy's strength could have provided him with a convenient excuse for his reluctance to engage in battle or take more aggressive actions. This allowed him to avoid the risks associated with decisive battles, while placing the blame on the perceived overwhelming enemy forces .And, by portraying the enemy as stronger than they actually were, McClellan might have been able to secure additional resources, troops, and supplies for his own forces. This could have allowed him to build up a larger and more well-equipped army, potentially boosting his own reputation in the process. Finally, the exaggerated reports could have been a way for McClellan to deflect blame for any failures or setbacks onto the supposedly formidable enemy forces. By doing so, he could have avoided taking responsibility for any missteps in his own strategy or decision-making.

Psychological Profile

Psychological profiling of historical figure is fraught with hazard. Nevertheless, historians have found McClellan to be an excellent subject for this kind of analysis. McClellan has been portrayed as “… proud, sensitive, overwrought, tentative, quick to exult and to despair”. He was a competent administrator and engineer who had no skill at winning battles. McClellan's actions and exaggerations might have been influenced not only by strategic considerations but also by his own ambitions and self-preservation. His reluctance to engage in battle can be attributed in part to his fear of failure. His job was to lead, he was supposed to be a great leader, but he was afraid to be wrong. McClellan was more concerned with not losing than with winning. In his mind, as the fate of the Union rested on his shoulders, he could not allow a defeat.

Stephen Sears wrote: “There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision.”

A fragile ego covered by conceit was reflected in many of his letters to his wife.

He had to build himself up because in fact he lacked self-confidence. McClellan often suggested that divine intervention had chosen him to save the Union. McClellan frequently thanked God for allowing him to be the deliverer of the nation. His letters to Ellen Marcy, his wife, have been widely quoted in this regard (see Table). Many of the letters were intentionally destroyed or burned in a fire after the war, and there is a great deal of speculation as to exactly why the ones that remained still exist. Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses” in his memoirs.

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Some well-known quotes from his letters to his wife:

“I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land … I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator. . . . But nothing of that kind would please me. Therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self denial!”

“Half a dozen of the oldest made the remark . . . ‘Why how young you look — yet an old soldier!! ... It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?”

“The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever. What a specimen to be at the head of our affairs now.”

““It may be that at some distant day I too shall totter away from” Washington, “a worn out old soldier. . . . Should I ever become vainglorious & ambitious remind me of that spectacle.”

“I ought to take good care of these men. I believe they love me from the bottom of their hearts. I can see it in their faces when I pass among them.”

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Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote that a review of his personal correspondence during the war, especially with his wife, reveals “a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.” McClellan thought of himself as the only man who could save the union, and was willing to sacrifice anything and anyone—mentors, colleagues, his own men—to further his ambition.  In that sense, George McClellan's memoirs and letters provide some indications of his personality and mindset, and a narcissistic tendency is suggested. But drawing definitive conclusions about his psychological condition, such as labeling him as a narcissist, solely based on these sources can be misleading.

In contradistinction, Lincoln had failed in life before; he made himself a success by hard work and careful thought, and wasn’t afraid of risk. McClellan had been handed everything, had always come out on top, and was afraid to fail. In war, as in much of life, fortune favors the bold. McClellan’s fear of failure and routine promotions on the basis of political connections would be his downfall.

Relationship with President Lincoln

The personal and professional conflict between General McClellan and President Lincoln that manifest in 1862, and continued into the election of 1864, is one of the fascinating subthemes of Lincoln’s presidency. Lincoln and General McClellan didn’t like one another and didn’t get along well. McClellan believed he had a superior education and family background; Lincoln knew he was being looked down upon, but with his superior emotional quotient, he knew that what was important was getting victories, and if this man could, then he would put up with him.

They originally met before the war: Lincoln was an attorney for the Illinois railroad and the two spent time together between cases. He saw Lincoln as socially inferior and intellectually not nearly on his level. He found the country stories Lincoln told to be below him.

Once the war began, Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan clashed repeatedly. McClellan constantly ignored Lincoln’s orders, and did not share his plans with anyone including the president. McClellan let it be known that he had contempt for Lincoln. He called him the ‘original gorilla’ in public. On November 13, 1861, Lincoln Seward and Hay stopped at McClellan’s home to visit with him. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan’s retirement to bed.

Historian William C. Davis wrote that in 1861, “believing what the press and an admiring circle of sycophants on his staff and high command said about him, Little Mac bristled at being subordinate to the civil authority, and especially to Lincoln, of whom he almost instantly developed a condescending and patronizing opinion. He not only regarded the president as his intellectual and social inferior, but also passed on that attitude to those around him – or even fostered it.”

Famously, President Lincoln came to visit General McClellan on October 3rd. As you can see from the photo by Alexander Gardner, the temperature of the meeting was frosty.  Abraham Lincoln spent four days travelling over the field, just two weeks after the guns fell silent. He met with McClellan, trying to prod his young Napoleon into action, met with other generals, and with thousands of wounded soldiers, Including both Union and Confederate. His trip was well-documented, and the photos of his visit are among the most famous of the entire war.

Lincoln expected McClellan to pursue Lee and engage him in a decisive battle as soon as possible. Although the Union outnumbered the Confederate army by almost three to one, McClellan did not move his army for over a month. McClellan overestimated the size of Lee’s force, suggesting that 100,000 troops were in his command, when he likely had just more than half that number. McClellan also noted that his requisitions for supplies had not been filled. Although traditionally these complaints are dismissed as a manufactured excuse, substantial documentation suggests that McClellan had a genuine supply crisis.

It may be that top Lincoln administration officials ruined his reputation intentionally for political reasons. Knowing that he was popular with the troops and a Democrat, they could see where 1864 was leading. That is not to say that McClellan wasn’t slow at times, but it may have been exaggerated in retrospect when he became Lincoln’s opponent.

What were McClellan’s political opinions about slavery, defeating the South, and his post bellum vision?

McClellan’s view on how the war should be prosecuted differed significantly from Mr. Lincoln’s views. McClellan was a Democrat. He was anti-emancipation. He made clear also his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a war tactic, which put him at odds with the executive branch and some of his subordinates. He had a set of political beliefs almost completely at odds with the Republican Party, the party in power. Most of the officers in the United States Army were Democrats. The army was a conservative institution and many of these officers didn’t agree with the vision for the United States that many of the Republicans had, especially the radical Republicans in Congress, who even departed more radically from Lincoln.

What McClellan wanted to do was to restore the Union to what it had been. He was very happy with that Union. And that was not going to be possible during the war once it had gone past a certain point. McClellan was very clear about what kind of war he wanted. He wanted to beat the Rebels just enough to persuade them to come back under the Union. He didn’t want to slaughter their armies. He didn’t want to overturn their civilization, and he wanted to keep emancipation out of the picture.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then we do today and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain.

As he wrote to one influential Northern Democratic friend, and I’m quoting him here, “Help me to dodge the n____. I’m fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union.” That’s McClellan’s take on the war. He was not fighting to free the slaves, and he was not alone. McClellan almost never spoke of African Americans, and when he did it was always in disparaging terms. McClellan was a quiet racist, one who wanted to ensure that the Civil War ended soon so that the question of black emancipation would not become the leading element.

Now, it must be emphasized that up to that stage of the war, Lincoln was also highlighting union and not slavery. He downplayed emancipation because he thought it would alienate the border states, and he wanted to make sure that they stayed in line. After Antietam, Lincoln thought the North was ready for emancipation, but McClellan never changed his attitude.

Quotes from President Lincoln’s Letters to General McClellan

“After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington, and Manassas Junction … My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected– It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell– … I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mannassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied…”

“There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War, a statement, taken as he said, from your own returns, making 108.000 then with you, and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85.000, when all en route to you shall have reached you– How can the discrepancy of 23.000 be accounted for?” (April 7, 1862)

“And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow– I am powerless to help this– You will do me the justice to remember that I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty — that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place– The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated–“

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?” (October 13, 1862)

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.” You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.”

“I have just read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?”

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The 1864 Presidential election

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln  were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and famously, Lincoln thought that too.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Clement  Vallandigham calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant. He did not run on a platform of surrender, as is often alleged.

To get the nomination, McClellan had to defeat his opponents Horatio Seymour, New York Governor, and Thomas Seymour, Connecticut governor. Both were real “peace” candidates. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign floundered as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked discord.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over 90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a population that was northern, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation. Moreover, McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey.

What do you think of George McClellan? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

• https://www.historynet.com/george-mcclellan/#:~:text=He%20graduated%20second%20in%20his,through%20often%20rugged%2C%20inhospitable%20terrain.

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=etd#:~:text=McClellan%20loved%20his%20troops%20and%20they%2C%20in%20turn%2C,of%20the%20relationships%20he%20developed%20while%20in%20command

• https://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy/

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/civil-war-gen-george-mcclellan-deemed-a-savior-then-a-failure/2011/09/21/gIQAfpF6SL_story.html

• https://www.wondriumdaily.com/american-civil-war-the-fault-lines-in-the-lincoln-mcclellan-relationship/   

• https://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincolns-contemporaries/abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.

• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X.

• Bonekemper, Edward H. McClellan and failure. McFarland & Co, 2007

• Waugh, John C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Book Review: World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein

We don’t usually do book reviews on the site, but we made an exception for regular contributor Roy Williams. Here, he reviews World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

The core-periphery model. Source: Mirkyton, available here.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet significant analysis of the interactions of global market capitalism. Wallerstein divides the world into 3 different categories of economic output and exchange, the core, periphery, and semi periphery. This division essentially describes the western world and certain westernized countries as existing within the core of economic output, with countries like Brazil and India taking the place of the semi-periphery and the rest of the developing world within the peripheral sphere of economic output. This model is coupled with Wallerstein’s analysis of the unequal exchange involved in capitalism which keeps certain nations within the core and others in the periphery and semi-periphery.

Wallerstein asserts that this world system had its origins in 16th century Europe as the western world began to conquer and colonize new territory and bring the process of capitalism to the larger world. Through the process of colonialism, the beginning of a global system of capitalist interaction began. Wallerstein also describes the monumental change of the French Revolution which brought about the normalization and institution of liberalism as a political ideology associated with the global world system. However, Wallerstein also asserts that the global system of capitalism was thrown into crisis with the world revolution of 1968. This leads to Wallerstein’s final chapter and larger argument for the eventual dissolution of the world system and its potential replacement with a new system.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet beneficial analysis of the world system of capitalism in unifying fields such as history, sociology, and economics. The problems of World Systems analysis rests in its inherent eurocentrism which discounts the reality that the system of European hegemony was built upon the empires of Asia and the Middle East during the 13th and 14th centuries. Janet Abu-Lughod provides a detailed criticism of Wallerstein’s Eurocentric assertions in Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 by describing the world system which preceded European hegemony and the world system we recognize today.

The other problem of Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis rests in its final argument that capitalism and the global order are in crisis and therefore on the brink of replacement. Capitalism is always in a state of crisis as it constantly evolves. Products and commodities are constantly shifting from the core to the periphery and nations constantly move on the pendulum of development. Wallerstein’s final argument while moving to a degree, is not necessarily based in reality. The importance of World Systems Analysis is not in its direct accuracy or prophetic notions of a changing future but in its understanding of the movement of capitalism and the understanding of global economic and political interactions. This book stands as a great opening to a global dialectic but it does not necessarily present the final or most compelling word on analyzing the world system.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Please let us know your thoughts below if you’ve read the book.

Bibliography

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. World-Systems Analysis An Introduction. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. Before European Hegemony The World System A.D. 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

The 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet, Florida

Overlooking the popular seaside city of Saint Augustine, Florida is the Castillo de San Marcos, an imposing 17th century fortress constructed by early Spanish Colonials to project power and defend their settlements in Florida and surrounding environs. The role of the fortress had transitioned from that of a military stronghold to a delightful tourist attraction, enticing a multitude of tourists from around the world each year to visit. Not far from Castillo de San Marcos stand in scenic solitude a rather underwhelming fortified watchtower called Fort Matanzas. This peculiar structure was built near the site of one of early North America’s most grisly massacres, indicated by the name of the watchtower and inlet Matanzas, meaning massacre or slaughter in Spanish. It was here on this panoramic beach in September of 1565 that close to 250 French Protestants or Huguenots were slain per the orders of Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles, acting on behalf of his Sovereign Philip the Second of Spain. At this time Europe was plagued by a multitude of religious wars and conflicts stemming from the inception of the Protestant Reformation. The turmoil would spill out of Europe and manifest itself in the New World leading to dire consequences.

Brian Hughes explains.

A depiction of the massacre.

Following the Protestant Reformation in 1517 Europe swiftly spiraled into religious conflict in which unparalleled levels of violence, destruction, and horrors would not be replicated or surpassed until the Napoleonic and World Wars of later centuries. The impetus for religious reform is beyond the scope of this article but the results gnawed at the very foundational socio-political foundations of Europe and would persist for centuries. Certain regions were more embroiled in conflict than others, particularly the states of Central and Western Europe such as the Holy Roman Empire, France and Spain.

Coinciding with these horrific events was the further discovery and exploration of North and South America following the successful exploits of Christopher Columbus decades before. Shortly thereafter Europeans began to exploit these lands and transform them into new geopolitical fronts. The Spanish, staunch Catholics who spearheaded the initial discoveries quickly achieved dominance and gained the most influence in the whole of the Caribbean region as they established settlements and military outposts on islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and a large Peninsula which jutted from the north which the Spanish named La Florida. But the Spanish would not be the only Europeans with ambitions of overseas Empire.

French presence

A small band of French colonists led by Jean Ribault and Rene de Laudonniere established a settlement at the mouth of the St. Johns River which the French named the River of May near the present-day city of Jacksonville. There they hastily constructed a small fort naming it Fort Caroline after the French Monarch King Charles IX. Most of the French Colonists were Huguenots an influential Protestant minority who fled their native France as a means to escape religious persecution, not entirely dissimilar reasons in which the Pilgrims fled England decades later.

The French presence to the north was troublesome to the Spanish as not only was Florida land claimed by Spain, but the majority of the French colonists were Huguenots, sworn enemies of the devout Catholics of Spain. This did not sit well with King of Spain, Philip the Second. Philip dispatched Admiral Pedro Menéndez de Aviles to establish a permanent settlement in Florida and simultaneously root the French interlopers out. Menendez departed span with 800 soldiers, sailors, artisans, and would be colonists, successfully reaching Florida in August of 1565. Landing first near Cape Canaveral Menendez turned northward finding good anchorage and deciding to make landfall. The Spanish would christen their new settlement “San Augustine” which remains to this day the oldest continuously inhabited city in the United States.

The French understood the vulnerability of their situation and Florida. Admiral of France and Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny ordered French Admiral Jean Ribault with 600 personnel to defend the fledgling fort. Ribault was able to catch up with Menendez off the coast of Florida and a brief, but inconclusive naval engagement followed. The French fleet withdrew allowing Menendez valuable time to regroup.

Bad luck would soon befall the French squadron as a hurricane swept the French fleet away from the coast granting valuable time for Menendez and his retinue.

Spanish attack

Menendez then led his body of troops overland to attack Fort Caroline. To this day the terrain of Florida, although flat, can be some of the most difficult to traverse. The Spaniards, burdened by cumbersome armor, gear, and weapons trudged through swamps, impenetrable forests all in the midst of the tropical heat of late summer in Florida. Much of these hardships were compounded by the fact that the same hurricane which swept Ribault's fleet away lingered to pour torrential rains upon the Spanish column.

In spite of these difficulties the Spaniards successfully reached Fort Caroline confirming Menendez’s suspicions that the fort was virtually undefended. The Spanish then launched a successful surprise attack capturing the fort and its surrounding outposts much to the shock and horror of the unsuspecting French colonists. The Spanish killed and captured the majority of the Huguenots who comprised mostly of artisans and various other laborers. Of the 240 occupants 132 were slain. Menendez decided to spare most of the woman and children from the initial slaughter as the Spanish quickly consolidated their position knowing that Ribault was still somewhere off the coast.

Miraculously, Ribault survived the hurricane and subsequent shipwreck along with a handful of his men. They began their trek northward hoping still to arrive at Fort Caroline in time. Menendez received word of this via local indigenous tribes and quickly gathered most of his men and marched south back towards Saint Augustine to intercept the Ribault and other French survivors.

Menendez successfully enveloped Ribault on the inlet that would soon bear the name of what was to occur. The Huguenot prisoners were given one final meal before being bound and brutally massacred on the beach. Only 16 prisoners would be spared, a mix of professed Catholics and artisans necessary for the survival of the new settlement.

The Religious Wars of Europe would only escalate and worsen over the coming decades, with the pendulums of power shifting for both Catholics and Protestants alike. But on a desolate inlet on the East Coast of Florida Huguenot ambitions of overseas Empire would perish forever.

What do you think of the 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet? Let us know below.