Poland in the interwar years was relatively new to Europe as she had not been an independent country in her own right since 1772, having been previously absorbed into the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Her reinstatement and Polish actions did little to peace or stability of post war Europe. As Europe moved closer to war in 1939 Britain was deciding whether to support Poland against Germany.
Poland had behaved in ways that were largely indistinguishable from the likes of other neighboring totalitarian states. Could the West be confident in the Polish as an ally in the East? Was she worthy and secondly was she at scrutiny really any better than the other authoritarian European states like the USSR or Germany?
Stephen Prout explains.
Members of the Polish Army's 2nd Death's Squadron during the 1918-21 Polish–Soviet War.
Poland and the First World War
During the Great War Poland was part of Austrian-Hungarian Empire and so fought on the side of the Central Powers, technically by default Poland was part of the enemy forces. After the war all belligerents lost territory through various treaties. Poland, however had gained territory but she would not be satisfied with her initial spoils.
Whilst the war raged, Pilsudski formed the Polish Legions to assist the Central Powers defeat Russia and gain a favorable light with her Austrian masters to pave the first steps toward full independence. According to Prit Buttar, "At the beginning of the war, Pilsudski committed his forces to support the Austro-Hungarian cause, believing that Poland's best chance for independence lay in a victory of the Central Powers over Russia” however in the event of the Central Powers being defeated he secretly in in overtures to the west assured them would that he would never fight against them. However, other promising plans were afoot offered by Germany and Austria that the Polish were keen to keep simmering so in the meantime, Poland’s loyalties were with the central powers.
The Central Powers defeated Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceased hostilities. Germany and Austria-Hungary then mooted the creation of a "Mittel Europa" which translated means Central Europe in November 1917. This promised a puppet state Kingdom of Poland. Just about when it seemed the Poles were about to have their independent state Germany was defeated, and it was time for Pilsudski to try his options with the West.
A New Republic and a return of warfare
Poland’s post-war frontiers were established by Lord Curzon in 1919 (the “Curzon Line”) out of the post war treaties. Poland then engaged in a series of overlapping wars that would expand her Eastern territory beyond the post war demarcations and create enmity amongst her new neighbors. She would be far from the peaceful state that a devastated Europe now needed.
These conflicts over the next few years would the cause for the growing discontent in the Eastern regions of Europe. Between 1919 to 1920, whilst the Soviet Union was in a chaotic state, Poland invaded former Russian territory annexing vast areas of Ukraine and Belarus. By the time these overlapping wars ended with the Treaty of Riga (1921) chunks of Lithuanian territory were added, which was further subsequently “legitimized” by a questionable election held in that country in 1922.
There were numerous motives; Poland wanted to incorporate Polish peoples into their new borders and more so to re-establish her pre-1772 glory. The opportunity was ripe as the newly formed Soviet Union was distracted by internal strife whilst simultaneously the Western powers the fates of Germany and her colonies, Turkey, and the balance of power in the Middle East.
By the time the 1921 Treaty of Riga was signed Poland had extended further into Eastern Europe. Polish borders extended 160 miles east of where they were intended by the Curzon Line and added 52,000 square kilometers. She had significantly grown her size – and the extent of her future problems.
The new Czechoslovakia would also be subject to territorial claims. In the Conference of Ambassadors in Belgium in August 1919 Poland received a portion of Cieszyn after a brief military clash. This would not be her last claim to Czech sovereign territory. In 1938 she would participate in the dismemberment of that country, taking advantage of the Munich conference and take the industrial town of Tesin as Germany took the remainder of that country.
Poland was clearly insatiable. Not being content with just European gains in 1935 she approached Britain and France to demand ten percent of Germany’s lost African colonies. It was strange in so much as she never had any presence colonial or otherwise in Africa. It was rejected by the West, as they already seized most of the territories for themselves. Why she set her sights on Africa was contended to be due to her growing anti-Semitism.
Anti-Semitism
Germany had cast the darkest shadow in the field of anti-Semitism, but other nations also held a complicit agenda against Jewish populations. Poland had the largest Jewish population in Europe and although her actions were not as violent as Germany, she instigated numerous laws that excluded the Jewish from many avenues of daily life.
These laws were introduced from March 1937, the first aimed at the restriction of Jews entering the legal and medical professions (not dissimilar from Nazi efforts). Another followed placing restrictions on the slaughter and supply of kosher products, which would be devastating for Jewish businesses. In April of the following year likewise restrictions were applied to Jews joining the journalist profession.
At the same time the government passed a Citizenship Law, which set rules to revoke Polish citizenship from anybody who had lived abroad in excess of five years and only having minimal contract with the Polish homeland. Although it did not specifically reference the Jews it was engineered to discriminate against them.
The success of these measures could be evidenced within the education sector. In 1937 the number of Jewish Students in universities stood at 7.5%; where as ten years earlier the figure stood at 20.4%.
Support of these measure where also present amongst the clergy. A surviving comment by a Cardinal Hlond labeled the Jews as a “vanguard of atheism, bolshevism and revolution.” The comment was so blatant as to label them an “evil influence” and advised his congregations “one does well to avoid Jewish shops”.
The lack of sympathy for the Jewish population was clear in their refusal to take in Jewish refugees expelled from Nazi Germany in October 1938. The refusals by the Polish government consequently saw fifteen thousand Jews interned in appalling conditions in a border zone of Zbaszyn. Their fate seemed marginally better than that of those remaining in Germany. The anti-Semitic movement within Poland continued during the occupation not by the Nazis or Soviets alone but with some Polish collaboration.
In 1937 Poland set up a commission (Lepecki Commission) jointly with France to investigate the feasibility of a scheme on the African Island of Madagascar to relocate their Jewish population - again expulsion of a similar a kind to the Nazi’s but expulsion all the same that has received little exposure. The idea failed.
Dealing with Danzig and Germany
In the following years Poland’s presence would be a bitter reminder for Germany over her lost Eastern borders and a sizable proportion of Germans peoples that found themselves under what they regarded as a foreign rule. Danzig would be the focal point of these major issues. Polish treatment of the overwhelmingly German population would sour German-Polish relations.
Danzig was a free city established in 1920 by the allies that occupied approximately two thousand square kilometers of territory. After Danzig’s new status became established Poland was given control of the commerce and development, which to the indigenous Germans was ominous itself. Poland did not always exercise her administration well and this angered the majority German population who saw their identity being diluted. Protests ensued and the Nazi Party began to gain support.
The German population was seeing Polish dominance with Polish letter boxes appearing, commerce controlled by the Poles and the presence of increasing numbers of their soldiers on the Westerplatte around Danzig.
Poland however could also accommodate the Nazis. By 1934 the Non-Aggression Pact eased tensions and Poland suppressed any anti-Nazi protests - and in return Germany curtailed the local Nazi Party’s actions. For the time being tensions eased but it would be short lived.
Alliances & Non-Aggression Pacts
Poland could form alliances with states considered abhorrent to the Western powers (Britain could also accommodate the dictators as well). She signed two Non-Aggression Pacts with the Soviet Union (renewed again in 1934) and one with Germany in 1934. At the same time, she had a nascent relationship with the West. It could be perceived that she was once again hedging her bets by playing both sides.
Apart from Italy, Poland had shown the most aggressive and expansionist tendencies for much of the inter-war years. Britain and France really did not want to expend any more loss of life, especially in an area they had less interests.
Lord Halifax and Chamberlain were rightfully hesitant over offering any promises to Poland yet ultimately favored Poland more out of lack of choices in that region for a suitable eastern ally. The only reason to favor Poland was that if Germany had to watch her eastern borders there was less of her military resource to send westwards. Poland seemed to be the only remaining choice after the USSR’s poor military performance in the 1920s and the detrimental effect of the purges on her military.
Conclusion
Britain ultimately leant to the side of Poland, but it took a lot of deliberation on the part of Chamberlain and Halifax, who harbored doubts - much to the dismay of the Polish.
On balance, perhaps the British were justified. Polish invasions and annexations into other European states up the eve of the war outweighed all other aggressive states other than Italy. This would cause the enmity of her neighbors and so create her own problems. The anti -Semitic laws that were passed, and Poland’s move to a dictatorship had many similarities to Germany. Poland it seemed could accommodate the Nazis and communists with separate non-aggression pacts when expedient, the very states that alarmed the West.
Britain ultimately opted for Poland out of political expediency. Britain was not averse to accommodating the dictator states either if her own interests needed serving though. Lord Halifax and Chamberlain still followed the appeasement policy as the nation wanted to avoid another war. However, they needed an Eastern ally for the containment of Germany, i.e., Poland or the USSR so there was less of Germany’s military resources to face Westwards. Poland seemed to be the most viable choice.
The Western Powers throughout the interwar period were troubled by the prospect of Soviet expansion westwards. Poland could provide part of the answer, but Britain also did not want to be tied into any perilous obligations nor did she want to guarantee Polish borders. Some of those concerns were addressed by the presence of Nazi Germany as a strong bulwark and that combined with Poland as an additional eastern buffer effectively halted Bolshevik expansion. The Eastern problem looked as secure as it could be, at least until the autumn of 1939.
The Polish question was not a straightforward one. Britain had already sacrificed a democracy in ceding Czechoslovakia to Germany, much to the outrage of public opinion (the same public opinions that also did not want war and praised peace in our time). It was a difficult and divisive time. The political landscape was an almost impossible one to navigate.
What do you think of Poland in the interwar years? Let us know below.
Now read Stephen’s article on Britain’s relationships with the European dictators in the interwar years here.
Sources
Origins of The Second World War – AJP Taylor
Europe Of the Dictators – Elizabeth Wiskeman – Harper Torchbooks 1966.
Article: Anti-Semitism in Interwar Europe: The cases of Poland and Hungary - Dr Marco Soddu
Article – Graham Stewart – Historical Notes – 1999 – Chamberlains motives for Standing by Poland
Anna Maria Ciencala – Polish Review – 2016 – University of Illinois
References also from Orgy OF Murder – Jan Gabowski I review by Ofer Aderet 2017 - Haaretz
