One of the defining characteristics of Japan has been the consistency of its national politics, which since 1955 has been almost continuously dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Here, Vittorio Trevitt looks at this in the context of Ryokichi Minobe.
Ryokichi Minobe in 1967.
In most liberal democracies, voters have become accustomed to alternations in power between parties of diametrically opposed ideological persuasions. This feature of democracy is alien to Japan, where there have been only two occasions since the first LDP government (originally from 1993-94 and again from 2009-2012) when opposition parties were able to form administrations. Neither of them, however, succeeded in breaking the LDPs long-term stranglehold over national politics. But on a regional and local level a different picture has often existed, where opposition figures have on multiple occasions held sway. Such a trend was particularly prevalent during the Sixties and Seventies, when several prefectures and councils elected progressive reformers dedicated to policies of reform and innovation often different from those pursued by the hegemonic LDP. One of the most important of these was the governor of Toyko, Ryokichi Minobe.
A socialist of the Marxist tradition, Minobe had previously served in various government positions while also working as an economics professor. He became a known television personality, with a popular economics show where he discussed economic issues in an accessible way for people, while also conveying a positive image. When an election was held in 1967 for the position of Tokyo governor, Minobe stood as an independent candidate backed by the Socialist and Communist parties, winning a plurality against the LDP-backed incumbent. Minobe was the first progressive governor of the country’s leading metropolis to be elected to this post, one he would hold for the next 12 years.
Power
Minobe’s ascension to power, as historic as it was, was not a unique phenomenon. Instead, it was a reflection of the electorate’s appetite for fundamental change after decades of LDP rule. During the Sixties and Seventies more than 200 mayors supported by a socialist-communist alliance were elected, with more than 50% of Japanese by the end of Sixties already living under either a progressive mayor or governor, or even both. Progressives presided over measures such as the establishment of new social security benefits and (in the case of Kawasaki) compensation for victims of pollution, while also fighting successfully for the right to increase taxes on corporations; one that all local governments came to enjoy.
The rise of the Left on a local and prefectural level was in many ways the LDP’s own making. In the decade following its formation, the LDP had presided over a strong economy together with big rises in living standards. Nevertheless, they failed to prevent problems such as city overcrowding and pollution, while also failing to overcome deficiencies in housing, public transportation, and facilities for child care and the elderly. These contradictions provided fertile ground for reformers to build electoral support and tackle these problems headlong. In a speech he made following his election as governor, Minobe highlighted these contradictions by noting that ownership of TVs and electric washers existed alongside unpaved streets, an incomplete sewage system and cases of drinking water being shut-off. This was the situation that Minobe inherited; one that his administration offered the hope of rectifying. The legislative environment was favourable for Minobe, who had the benefit of working with a reformist majority made up of left-wing parties in Tokyo’s legislature. This included not only members of the Socialist and Communist parties, but also the Democratic Socialists (a moderate progressive force) and Komeito; a religious Buddhist party that supported improvements in amenities and welfare services, amongst other goals. This provided a strong basis for Minobe to put his ideals into practice. Free municipal transport passes and medical care for those aged 70 and above were introduced (the latter measure being one that other localities would subsequently adopt), together with nurseries for mothers at work, allowances for children and facilities for handicapped residents. Pensions were also expanded, while efforts were made to elevate conditions in Sanya, a slum area in Tokyo, with more up-to-date flophouses constructed and better waste collection. An emergency shelter for separated wives with children in the process of divorce was also established; the first of its kind in Japan.
Living standards
These programmes reflected Minobe’s belief in the universalistic “civil minimum system,” in which facilities existed that were essential for the maintenance of minimum living standards for citizens. Much of Minobe’s reform agenda focused on environmental matters, with pollution control standards adopted that were more stringent than those in place nationally. He also backed national legislation in 1970 that led to the introduction of 14 ordinances aimed at tackling pollution in the Tokyo area. “Pedestrian paradises” were also set up, in which cars were barred from some of Tokyo's major shopping and amusement areas on Sunday afternoons; an initiative which improved air quality for Tokyoites. In addition, pay was increased for welfare institution workers, the rights of sanitation workers (a discriminated against group) were improved, and a training school was set up to help senior citizens make a living past retirement. Government sponsorship of race tracks was also brought to an end, reflecting Minobe’s view of gambling being an unofficial tax on poor individuals. Minobe also believed in getting people involved in decisions that affected their lives, conversing directly with residents in town hall meetings in the belief that Tokyo’s residents could become managers of their own city.
Minobe’s reforms had an impact on the LDP, who introduced on a nationwide basis several of the measures that Minobe and fellow progressives across Japan had inaugurated. When Tokyo’s government announced plans in 1971 for free medical care for children who had cancer, the national administration adopted its own plan. Two years later, the national government introduced new entitlements including indexed pensions and free medical care to the over-70s. Kakuei Tanaka, the prime minister who presided over these policy decisions, interpreted Minobe’s victory as a reflection of people’s frustration with overcrowding in big cities, and his government also initiated laws making it hard for large plants to be constructed in metropolitan areas while incentivising firms to locate new manufacturing facilities in the countryside. Arguably, the LDP’s decision to introduce several of the social programmes launched by local progressives on a nationwide basis was a reflection of their realisation of the electoral implications that such schemes could have on their incumbency. Indeed, it enabled the LDP to overcome the challenge that local progressives posed to them, who had taken the initiative in tackling issues concerning welfare and the environment. It also demonstrates how far Minobe’s influence, and by extension that of his progressive counterparts across Japan, went beyond local and regional boundaries in shaping that country’s social and economic development. Minobe was also a popular figure. When re-elected four years later, he did so with 65% of the vote and three-quarters of the electorate casting a ballot; a record at that time.
Historic continuity
It is arguable that Minobe’s agenda represented a historic continuity with the reform efforts of past leftist leaders, the lasting impact of which reverberated throughout Japanese society. During the Twenties and Thirties Japan was led on two separate occasions by the liberal Kensekei and Rikken Minseitō parties. Although the former presided over a tough law allowing for individuals that the government viewed as subversive to be imprisoned, and the latter for carrying out economic austerity during the Great Depression, they nevertheless delivered tangible results for ordinary citizens in the passage of visionary measures including a widening of the franchise, factory reform, health insurance, and legislation aimed at helping tenant farmers. Similar reforms were carried out under the socialist-led coalition of Tetsu Katayama that briefly led Japan in 1947, such as the granting of organisational and collective bargaining rights to workers and a Ministry of Labor which promoted the rights of not only workers, but also those of women and children in postwar Japan. The policy agendas of Minobe and other local progressives were part of this reform tradition in Japanese history, and offered the prospect of the Japanese Left replacing the LDP as the dominant force in national politics. But this was not to be.
The one factor that helped stem the progressive tide was the 1973 oil shock, which saw Japan’s Gross National Product fall for the first time since the war. This lowered the rise of tax revenue for local governments, which in turn limited the ability of progressives to fund imaginative reforms. Bureaucrats and the LDP rallied against welfare, associating it with societal problems including crime and divorce, and progressive local governments were criticised by the LDP “for throwing around money for welfare.” Such scaremongering helped conservatives score major gains locally. During the late Seventies several progressives either stood down or were defeated, replaced by figures from the political Right. Although Minobe was elected to a third term in 1975, he did so by a narrow margin. His tenure also had its shortcomings. Reflecting his belief in popular democracy, Minobe espoused a “philosophy of the bridge,” vowing that he wouldn’t construct a bridge if it faced opposition from just one resident. Although there were instances of local policy decision making working well, this philosophy had unfortunate consequences. Public housing projects, for instance, were delayed in the face of opposition from certain residents, with cuts in the number of new homes built despite the need for the latter in the face of a housing shortage. In a way, Minobe’s own ideas backfired and worked against his own agenda. In 1977, Minobe lost his majority in the Tokyo legislature, and two years later the LDP and Komeito teamed up to prevent a Socialist-Communist candidate from winning that year’s gubernatorial election. The following year only four opposition figures were left that held the post of governor. The golden age of local progressivism in Japan, which for a time seemed likely to usher in a new dawn in national politics, had finally ended.
Although Minobe and his fellow progressives failed to replicate their electoral successes nationally by becoming a viable, long-term alternative to the established LDP, the fact that they achieved so much on behalf of their communities is not only indicative of the pivotal role that local reformers have played in changing Japan for the better, but it also gives an idea of what the Japanese Left can accomplish if it were to attain national power. The growth in income inequality in recent years, together with surveys showing widespread public dissatisfaction with the existing democratic system, offers fertile ground for such a seismic shift in Japanese politics to take place. For Japanese progressives who hope to achieve their aims of electoral victory and a more egalitarian society, the Minobe era is a model worth emulating.
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