At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.
In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at how the US intervened in other places in the 1950s, and its pre-Cuban Revolution attempts to understand Fidel Castro’s beliefs.
Fidel Castro with his in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba. December 1956.
In April 1959, Castro visited the United States itself, where he appeared on popular American TV shows, gave talks at Harvard and was buoyed aloft on the shoulders of an admiring audience. In the US he generally received royal treatment wherever he went. This included children sporting Castro beards and other manifestations of Castro-mania. This is strange considering the fact that his mortal enemy, Batista, enjoyed the full backing of the US but a few months before.
As we all know, this “honeymoon” period did not last. Before the end of that year, relations between the US and Castro deteriorated beyond the point of no return. The point is: if we had a more clear idea of his ideology, if he were a communist or might become one and would become an ally of the Soviet Union, we would have been justified in acting decisively to keep him from power. An operation similar to that carried out in Guatemala in 1954 or Iran in 1952 could have been mounted. In the tense competition with the Soviet Union, it was imperative to prevent a communist government 90 miles from American shores. But without a clear understanding of Castro's ideology and/or future plans no firm policy was formulated. Instead, US policy would evolve in reaction to Castro's moves. The result of that policy was that in less than two years diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba severed and relations degenerated into clandestine warfare. Subsequently, Cuba under Castro became a disaster for U.S. foreign policy for decades. Why did the US allow such a hostile regime to take hold so close to our shores? Why were US policy makers not clear on what Castro’s motives were or what the nature of his ideology was until too late? How did we miss the warning signs?
The problem began towards the end of the Batista regime. By 1957, after almost two decades of unwavering support of Cuban regimes, the State Department began to have doubts about continued support of Batista. Batista’s efforts to label Castro as a communist and tool of Moscow failed to gain Eisenhower’s continued support. In the corridors of power, criticism of America’s Cuban policy became more vocal. Such sentiments were even becoming a matter of public record. On August, 17, 1958, Henry Wriston, president of the Council on Foreign Relation appeared on the Mike Wallace Interview. He openly uttered such anti-Batista statements as “we don't like Batista'' and “we would be delighted to see Batista and Trujillo (the dictator of Guatemala) overthrown.” The US went beyond mere distaste. In March,1958 Eisenhower stopped sending arms to Batista, “Obviously Castro had won the emotional support of the Cuban people,” he said later in justification. The CIA had even actually begun supporting opposition movements in hopes of getting rid of an increasingly unpopular dictator.
The US and Castro
The US enjoyed major success in sponsoring overthrows of regimes in places as diverse as Guatemala and Iran. Unlike in those countries, however, the US had no plan about whom to replace Batista with. To complicate matters, the insurrection movements prowling around in the mountains and jungles of eastern Cuba were of uncertain ideology and attitudes toward the US - and time was running out. Castro’s group, called the “26th of July Movement,” which was the most important of the various anti-Batista movements, threatened yet another violent overthrow of a Cuban government. By the summer of 1958 it was becoming clear that his regimes’ days were numbered. What should US policy be? Some feared that if something were not done soon the threat of violent revolution would materialize and replace Batista with an even worse (and leftist) government. Since Castro was likely to be an increasingly dominant force, it was vital to decide whether to support him or keep him from power.
What did the US know of Castro? Much knowledge came not from official government efforts but enterprising journalists. The long struggle by the barbudos (bearded ones) attracted much sympathy from the American press, Chief among these was New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews. Castro had been reported killed by the Batista regime. But Matthews was able to locate him. After some days with Castro, Matthews sent his report to the Times. On February 24, 1957, the world was electrified by the news: “Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba’s youth, is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, at the southern tip of the island.” Along with the report Matthew provided the rebel leader’s signature as proof. The article gushed with praise, included a description of Castro as an “educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkable qualities of leadership.” He had not only dramatically revealed that Castro was not dead, he successfully portrayed him in a way that garnered widespread interest and sympathy from readers across the country. Even more importantly for US policy, he also denied that Castro was a communist or that communists were a significant force in his movement. Such reporting built a groundswell of support among the American public.
Less supportive of America
But if the US had done a profile on the indefatigable rebel, they would have known that he blamed the US for many of Cuba’s problems. At his trial in 1952 he defended himself and used the courtroom as a platform to promote his views. Included in his diatribe were such statements as “The United Fruit Company owns land the north to the south socast in Orient Province-but two hundred thousand Cuban families there don’t own an inch of land!” His villains were companies and landowners. As it was, the CIA psychological profile on Castro did not appear until December 1961, much too late.
During this time, the American embassy in Havana was not much help. From the years 1953-57 under Ambassador Arthur Gardner, strict orders to avoid contact with anti-Batista movements were in force, effectively thwarting any chance to learn more about Castro. Not only that, such a policy put the CIA in an awkward position. It could not utilize embassy personnel and interfered with intelligence gathering. To overcome this problem, that spring of 1957 Washington sent an official fact-finding mission to Cuba to find out more about Castro. After obtaining Ambassador Gardner’s cooperation, the mission, led by CIA officer Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. set out to fill in the gaps of knowledge about the opposition to Batista. The delegation spent most of its time in Santiago de Cuba, the main town of Castro's home province, Oriente. Here they hoped to obtain first-hand information about Castro's character and philosophy. Basically, the mission did not discover anything alarming about Castro. He came from a large, wealthy land-owning family. He had attended parochial schools, gone to college, and enjoyed baseball. His former teachers had nothing but good to say about him, “He was a good Catholic boy,” said one. Others insisted that he could not possibly be a communist. The team felt that the rebel movement simply reflected the desire of Cubans to be rid of dictatorship and restore a functioning democracy. So as of 1958 the fog around Castro’s political leanings had still not cleared. It was known that he had been involved in leftist politics and that his movement included communists but in the words of Kirkpatrick “we were not sure whether he was an avowed Communist.” Castro himself had refused to make common cause with Cuban communists.
What do you think about American intelligence’s attempts to gather information on Fidel Castro in the 1950s? Let us know below.
Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.
