The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side. That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.
Lloyd W Klein explains.
If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.
John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.
Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move
We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.
On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover, Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.
The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.
Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.
John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.
Buford
General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.
Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.
Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.
Reynolds
General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.
The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.
The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.
Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry. He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.
Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.
Abner Doubleday
After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.
Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.
But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.
As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.
Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike. The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.
For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.
The Railroad Cut
The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.
During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners
A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps to come to the field immediately.
In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.
On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.
In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town
Iverson
Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.
The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.
Rodes
When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.
Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.
Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.
Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.
After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.
Howard and Hancock
General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.
Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition. It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.
When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.
During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.
Barlow’s Knoll
The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.
Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll. The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.
As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.
Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.
Ewell Advances
At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.
With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.
Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.
Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order
Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.
Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:
‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘
From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.
Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.
What did Lee Expect?
Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.
Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.
Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack: a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.
Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.
On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.
When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.
Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.
Casualties
About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.
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References
• James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.
• Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.
• Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.
· Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.
• Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.
• Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.
• Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.
Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.
Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.
· https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/
· https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/
· https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/
· https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/
· https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/
