How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 2 - Fidel Takes Power

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at US assessments of Fidel Castro just before he took power, the 1958 Cuban election, and the early days of Castro in power.

If you missed it, read part 1 on Cuba before the revolution here,

Fidel Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos in Havana in January 1959.

Enter Earl Smith. This non-Spanish-speaking businessman with no diplomatic experience took over duties as American ambassador in Havana in June, 1957. On the urging of his staff, Smith did some traveling in Cuba to get a better feel for the country. Based on his experiences and observations, Smith developed firm views on Castro and the anti-Batista movements, which views were not completely in accord with the CIA. The ambassador did not omit to inform Kirkpatrick that in his view, the CIA mission had allowed itself to fall under the sway of the July 26 movement. Smith urged the CIA to stop giving any encouragement to them. He furthermore accused the CIA of greatly underestimating the strength of the Communist party and its influence in Cuba. The CIA official responded by basically denying Smith’s charges with a bland recital of recent CIA operations, which he characterized as above reproach.

The new ambassador decided to conduct his own investigation into Castro’s background and what he found alarmed him. Smith conducted an intensive process of interviews including a multitude of people, many of whom had known Castro since his youth. He was careful to include those who were anti-Batista, representing different segments of Cuban society. According to Smith “No matter how anti-Batista these people were, they believed Castro would be worse for Cuba than Batista.” Among other reasons, those Smith interviewed stated that Castro was “an unstable terrorist.” Smith's ultimate conclusion was “It was becoming more and more obvious to me that the Castro-led 26th of July Movement embraced every element of radical political thought and terrorist inclination in Cuba.” But despite Smith’s position as ambassador, some personnel in the American Embassy continued to support Castro and relay messages to the State Department indicating that the Castro movement was nothing to fear. Not only that,  in early 1958 Radio Moscow broadcast its support of the effort to overthrow Batista. They continued especially supporting the 26th of July Movement. The State Department was informed of this by Ambassador Smith.

It was only when some rebels, under the command of Raul Castro, began kidnapping Americans that the State Department began to direct the CIA to prevent Castro from attaining power. The CIA then attempted to cultivate an alternative leader, without success.

Democratic process

Another possible solution lay in the democratic process. In 1958, after six years of military dictatorship under Batista, Cuba held a free election and began preparing the way for a peaceful transition of power. Three main candidates vied with each other for the presidency; Andrés Rivero Agüero of the Progressive Action Party, Carlos Márquez Sterling of the Partido del Pueblo Libre. The elections represented an opportunity to get rid of Batista but the US remained non-committal about which candidate to support or what official policy to adopt towards the on-going armed rebellion. Castro seemed to be a viable option. In his first speech on Radio Rebelde on April 14, 1958 Castro repeated many of the cherished ideals of classical liberalism; freedom of the press, republicanism and constitutionalism. He went out of his way to deny his association with communism, “These dictators will not tire of repeating the lie that we are "communists." He began the speech, in fact, with a withering attack on government censorship.  “As hateful as tyranny is in all its aspects, none of them is so irritating and crudely cynical as the absolute control that it has imposed on all the media for disseminating printed, radio and television news.”

On July 16 the American embassy passed along to the State Department the views of one of the opposition candidates, Dr. Marquez Sterling. Sterling communicated to the American Embassy that, in his view, the political situation was the most dangerous the Island had ever encountered. He claimed that the insurrectionists, unable to win on their own, were seeking to create conditions of anarchy that would allow them to seize power. He called Castro “mad” - not the first person to do so. Additionally, ambassador Earl T. Smith, vocally opposed any possible support of Castro. He declared openly that Castro was not someone with whom the US could trust or work with. Despite these warnings, the US did not take a firm position on Castro or the election.

The American embassy in Cuba's attitude was crystal clear, in contrast to the vague official American policy. The embassy represented a valuable front-line perspective which should have guided US policy. On October 3, 1958, just weeks before the election, an embassy dispatch entitled: “1958 Elections; Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections” arrived in Washington. After a thorough analysis of the political situation in Cuba, the embassy urged the following course of action:  "Though the coming Cuban elections will not meet all the standards of an ideal democratic election, they are the best that can be had under the circumstances now prevailing. They are in the Embassy’s view infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at all. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage them." In other words, the embassy opposed any of the armed opposition, which Earl Smith viewed as illegitimate.

Election

Despite such information, ambivalence continued to mark the US official attitude toward the bearded rebel. There were, however, more red flags. First, there was Castro’s attitude toward the election. Although  he repeatedly proclaimed himself as a proponent of democracy, during the 1958 election he issued repeated calls for a general strike and death threats against all candidates for political office as well as Cubans who wished to participate. As a result, in regions under the control of the insurrection, voter turnout was negligible. Insisting that the election was a US/Batista farce, the rebels issued the “Total War Against the Tyranny Manifesto.” In the uncompromising language of the fanatic, the Manifesto simply ignored the elections and declared “war” on the Batista regime.

The elections took place on November 3rd with Progressive Action candidate Andrés Rivero Agüero winning 70% of the vote. Within days of his victory he met with the US ambassador and expressed his commitment to restore legitimacy and constitutional government in Cuba. The US was prepared to support him with military aid against insurgents. He would never get the chance. The Batista government was in the process of disintegration at that moment and would collapse within weeks. Agüero’s ambitions to restore the Cuban government were thwarted when Batista threw in the towel and fled Cuba on January 1, 1959, leaving the Island to anti-Batista forces.

When the rebels took Havana, a wave of euphoria swept Cuba. Most were hopeful that Castro and his fellow revolutionaries would establish a liberal democracy as he had stated many times. Castro and his revolution also captured the attention and hopes of many foreign observers. Although some uttered dark warnings about the bearded militant, others, mainly in the American media, helped to sway much American opinion in Castro’s favor. They denied Castro’s communism and actively promoted him as an acceptable leader of Cuba. After Castro’s arrival in Havana, American companies continued to act as if nothing would change. Investment in Cuba hit a record high of $63 million. One corporate executive remarked that the responsibilities of leadership would force Castro to “become conservative.”

Optimism

Everyone was caught up in the excitement. Immediately after Castro's entry into Havana, Ed Sullivan journeyed to the island and met the enigmatic rebel. Arriving at about two in the morning, Sullivan conducted and filmed an interview with Castro lasting about six minutes. Sullivan introduced the filmed interview with the comment “Somebody has said that ‘Freedom is Everybody’s Business.’ In the interview Castro came across as a soft-spoken, freedom-loving, responsible leader. Sullivan expressed great optimism about his subject and what it meant for the future of his suffering nation as well as Cuban-American relations.

Not long after Sullivan’s encounter with Castro, The popular show Face the Nation journeyed to Havana to expand on the entertainer’s brief conversation. Their purpose was to have a more serious and thorough opportunity to find out what this new Latin American hero was all about, and if indeed, the revolution was something to be worried about. Again, Castro emphasized his democratic ideals and opposition to communism. The main wrinkle in the generally hopeful mood was over the on-going executions. Once the anti-Batista forces took control of Havana, Batista followers were rounded up and hastily tried.  Summary executions took a gruesome toll as the revolutionary government took terrible revenge against Batista followers.for “crimes a./m gainst the people.” By the end of February 500 had been executed. The “trials” fell far short of American or European standards of justice. At one trial, a lawyer asked that the case against his defendant be dismissed due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor replied, “He has to be shot anyway as a measure of social health.” Horrified observers reacted with concern. When questioned about the executions, Castro’s responses betrayed a complete lack of understanding or sympathy for Western concepts of justice guaranteeing a fair trial. His closest associates, in fact, dismissed these ideals as “bourgeois concepts of justice.” Castro was actually surprised at the international outcry over the executions. “These men are assassins,” he declared, “We are executing murderers that deserve to be shot.” He justified denying due process of law to Batista men, declaring that the evidence was obvious and that simple accusations were all that was needed.

Anti-Americanism

The Consulate at Santiago continued to advise the State Department about conditions in the immediate aftermath of Castro’s ascension to power. They described a rising tide of anti-Americanism, encouraged, in part, by “the pronouncements of Fidel Castro.” An attempt to show films from the United States Information Service was shut down when a member of the audience rose and lectured them on “United States oppression of Cuba.” The consulate also took the opportunity to report the increasing influence of the communists. They were now accepted as a legal party, communist newspapers began to be reestablished and individuals with PSP backgrounds had been appointed to public office.

Time magazine also issued a frank assessment. The opening lines of an article of the January 26 issue warned; “The executioner’s rifle cracked across Cuba last week, and around the world voices hopefully cheering for a new democracy fell still. The men who had just won a popular revolution for old ideals—for democracy, justice and honest government—themselves picked up the arrogant tools of dictatorship. As its public urged them on, the Cuban rebel army shot more than 200 men, summarily convicted in drumhead courts, as torturers and mass murderers for the fallen Batista dictatorship. The constitution, a humanitarian document forbidding capital punishment, was overridden.” The article went on to luridly describe the executions, sounding more like descriptions of Einsatzgruppen activity rather than tribunals of real justice.

What do you think about Fidel Castro’s early days in power? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 1 - Before the Revolution

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at how the US intervened in other places in the 1950s, and its pre-Cuban Revolution attempts to understand Fidel Castro’s beliefs.

Fidel Castro with his in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba. December 1956.

In April 1959, Castro visited the United States itself, where he appeared on popular American TV shows, gave talks at Harvard and was buoyed aloft on the shoulders of an admiring audience. In the US he generally received royal treatment wherever he went. This included children sporting Castro beards and other manifestations of Castro-mania. This is strange considering the fact that his mortal enemy, Batista, enjoyed the full backing of the US but a few months before.

As we all know, this “honeymoon” period did not last. Before the end of that year, relations between the US and Castro deteriorated beyond the point of no return. The point is: if we had a more clear idea of his ideology, if he were a communist or might become one and would become an ally of the Soviet Union, we would have been justified in acting decisively to keep him from power. An operation similar to that carried out in Guatemala in 1954 or Iran in 1952 could have been mounted. In the tense competition with the Soviet Union, it was imperative to prevent a communist government 90 miles from American shores. But without a clear understanding of Castro's ideology and/or future plans no firm policy was formulated. Instead, US policy would evolve in reaction to Castro's moves. The result of that policy was that in less than two years diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba severed and relations degenerated into clandestine warfare. Subsequently, Cuba under Castro became a disaster for U.S. foreign policy for decades. Why did the US allow such a hostile regime to take hold so close to our shores? Why were US policy makers not clear on what Castro’s motives were or what the nature of his ideology was until too late? How did we miss the warning signs?

The problem began towards the end of the Batista regime. By 1957, after almost two decades of unwavering support of Cuban regimes, the State Department began to have doubts about continued support of Batista. Batista’s efforts to label Castro as a communist and tool of Moscow failed to gain Eisenhower’s continued support. In the corridors of power, criticism of America’s Cuban policy became more vocal. Such sentiments were even becoming a matter of public record. On August, 17, 1958, Henry Wriston, president of the Council on Foreign Relation appeared on the Mike Wallace Interview. He openly uttered such anti-Batista statements as “we don't like Batista'' and “we would be delighted to see Batista and Trujillo (the dictator of Guatemala) overthrown.” The US went beyond mere distaste. In March,1958 Eisenhower stopped sending arms to Batista, “Obviously Castro had won the emotional support of the Cuban people,” he said later in justification. The CIA had even actually begun supporting opposition movements in hopes of getting rid of an increasingly unpopular dictator. 

The US and Castro

The US enjoyed major success in sponsoring overthrows of regimes in places as diverse as Guatemala and Iran. Unlike in those countries, however, the US had no plan about whom to replace Batista with. To complicate matters, the insurrection movements prowling around in the mountains and jungles of eastern Cuba were of uncertain ideology and attitudes toward the US - and time was running out. Castro’s group, called the “26th of July Movement,” which was the most important of the various anti-Batista movements, threatened yet another violent overthrow of a Cuban government. By the summer of 1958 it was becoming clear that his regimes’ days were numbered. What should US policy be? Some feared that if something were not done soon the threat of violent revolution would materialize and replace Batista with an even worse (and leftist) government. Since Castro was likely to be an increasingly dominant force, it was vital to decide whether to support him or keep him from power.

What did the US know of Castro? Much knowledge came not from official government efforts but enterprising journalists. The long struggle by the barbudos (bearded ones) attracted much sympathy from the American press, Chief among these was New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews. Castro had been reported killed by the Batista regime. But Matthews was able to locate him. After some days with Castro, Matthews sent his report to the Times. On February 24, 1957, the world was electrified by the news: “Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba’s youth, is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, at the southern tip of the island.” Along with the report Matthew provided the rebel leader’s signature as proof. The article gushed with praise, included a description of Castro as an “educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkable qualities of leadership.” He had not only dramatically revealed that Castro was not dead, he successfully portrayed him in a way that garnered widespread interest and sympathy from readers across the country. Even more importantly for US policy, he also denied that Castro was a communist or that communists were a significant force in his movement. Such reporting built a groundswell of support among the American public.

Less supportive of America

But if the US had done a profile on the indefatigable rebel, they would have known that he blamed the US for many of Cuba’s problems. At his trial in 1952 he defended himself and used the courtroom as a platform to promote his views. Included in his diatribe were such statements as “The United Fruit Company owns land the north to the south socast in Orient Province-but two hundred thousand Cuban families there don’t own an inch of land!” His villains were companies and landowners. As it was, the CIA psychological profile on Castro did not appear until December 1961, much too late. 

During this time, the American embassy in Havana was not much help. From the years 1953-57 under Ambassador Arthur Gardner, strict orders to avoid contact with anti-Batista movements were in force, effectively thwarting any chance to learn more about Castro. Not only that, such a policy put the CIA in an awkward position. It could not utilize embassy personnel and interfered with intelligence gathering. To overcome this problem, that spring of 1957 Washington sent an official fact-finding mission to Cuba to find out more about Castro. After obtaining Ambassador Gardner’s cooperation, the mission, led by CIA officer Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. set out to fill in the gaps of knowledge about the opposition to Batista. The delegation spent most of its time in Santiago de Cuba, the main town of Castro's home province, Oriente. Here they hoped to obtain first-hand information about Castro's character and philosophy. Basically, the mission did not discover anything alarming about Castro. He came from a large, wealthy land-owning family. He had attended parochial schools, gone to college, and enjoyed baseball. His former teachers had nothing but good to say about him, “He was a good Catholic boy,” said one. Others insisted that he could not possibly be a communist. The team felt that the rebel movement simply reflected the desire of Cubans to be rid of dictatorship and restore a functioning democracy. So as of 1958 the fog around Castro’s political leanings had still not cleared. It was known that he had been involved in leftist politics and that his movement included communists but in the words of Kirkpatrick “we were not sure whether he was an avowed Communist.” Castro himself had refused to make common cause with Cuban communists.

What do you think about American intelligence’s attempts to gather information on Fidel Castro in the 1950s? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.