The Cincinnati Commercial noted, "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor or generals to manifest less judgment than were perceptible on our side that day." 160 years later, that still pretty much sums up the US Civil War’s Battle of Fredericksburg from the Union side. Yet, the fact is that, as bad as it was, and it was truly awful, it did not provide the South with any lasting strategic advantage. In fact, within seven months, the tables would turn after their own costly frontal assault.
Lloyd W Klein explains.
Union soldiers from Franklin's ‘Left Grand Division’ charge across the railroad during the Battle of Fredericksburg.
General Robert E. Lee's survival at Antietam was remarkable. McClellan missed numerous opportunities to create total disaster for Lee's army, and Lee likely recognized some fundamental errors in his strategy. Yet, Lee emerged with his army intact, high morale, and a new adversary.
After McClellan's lack of aggressive pursuit post-Antietam, he was relieved of command on November 5. His replacement, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, assumed command on November 9, under pressure from Washington to act swiftly. Burnside devised a plan to reach Richmond ahead of Lee's forces.
Situated near Warrenton, Virginia, Burnside was west of Richmond and Washington, at approximately the same latitude as Manassas. Continuing on the roads from there would lead to Culpeper and Charlottesville, necessitating the crossing of both the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers.
Burnside’s Plan
Burnside proposed abandoning the southwest movement of the army, which led away from any specific target. Instead, he planned to move southeast rapidly toward the lower Rappahannock River, positioning the Union army at Falmouth, just across the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg. From there, he aimed to launch a direct attack on Richmond, avoiding Lee's forces in Culpeper, and positioning himself between Lee and the direct route to Richmond. On paper, Burnside's plan held great promise, but successful execution hinged on speed.
The direct route from Warrenton to Fredericksburg was approximately 35-40 miles. It was a single country road in late Fall, presenting logistical challenges in organizing troops and supplies. However, Burnside managed to move his 100,000-man army to Falmouth on the north bank of the Rappahannock in just two days. Fredericksburg lay opposite Falmouth, a riverport town.
Lee had conducted a cautious retreat from Sharpsburg, ensuring his rear was secure in case McClellan launched an attack, which never materialized. This route brought Lee closer to the Shenandoah Valley than to Richmond. Lee, positioned at Culpeper, had a slightly shorter distance of about 35 miles to cover to reach Fredericksburg, but he had to cross the Rappahannock River. Thus, a race was on between the two armies.
When Burnside assumed command, he found himself in a strategic predicament. McClellan had left him in a remote location with a supply line that relied on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which extended to Culpeper Court House before heading east to Orange and Charlottesville. This placed Burnside far to the west of his desired destination, and there was no established supply line to support a rapid eastward movement. This situation raised concerns for Lincoln and Halleck, given that Burnside, a relative rookie as a general, aimed to move faster than his army had ever moved before, and he faced a cunning adversary who could launch attacks along the way.
However, Burnside devised a clever plan to address this challenge. Knowing that Longstreet was positioned at Culpeper, and Jackson was on his right flank, Burnside recognized that Longstreet had a shorter distance to reach Fredericksburg once his movement was detected.
The leadership in Washington believed that the primary target should not be Richmond itself, but rather Lee's army. They wanted Burnside to attack Longstreet at Culpeper while Jackson was separated from him. Burnside believed that this move was quite obvious and that Lee would anticipate it. He envisioned a scenario similar to the Second Battle of Manassas, with Jackson launching a flank attack against him. Burnside proposed feigning an attack on Culpeper, which would hold Lee in that area just long enough for Burnside to reach the eastern side of the Rappahannock River. He began moving supplies to Falmouth, located just north of Fredericksburg and close to the Potomac River. The plan was to reach Falmouth swiftly, resupply, and have a pontoon bridge constructed across the river before Lee could arrive. Halleck disagreed with Burnside’s plan but left it to President Lincoln, who chose to go along with it.
Crossing the Rappahannock River
Pontoon bridges have been essential in warfare for centuries. These floating bridges use floats or shallow-draft boats to support a continuous deck for infantry, artillery, cavalry, and supply wagons. The buoyancy of the supports limits their maximum load. Strong currents and storms can disrupt these bridges, making their use typically temporary, just long enough to cross a river. Connecting the bridge to the shore requires designing approaches that are not too steep, prevent bank erosion, and accommodate movements during changes in water levels (such as tides). During the Civil War, both armies commonly used pontoon bridges. They played a crucial role in key crossings, such as Grant's crossings of the James and Mississippi Rivers. Lee's use of a pontoon bridge over the Potomac River during the Gettysburg campaign is another notable example.
The plan for a pontoon bridge wasn't particularly complex, as it required old boats and wooden planks. When Burnside initiated his plans for this campaign, he requisitioned these materials on November 7, submitting his plan to Halleck. The plan was sent to Brig. Gen. George Washington Cullum, the chief of staff in Washington, on November 9. The pontoon trains were deemed ready to move on November 14.
However, when the Union Army commenced its march on November 15 and the first units arrived in Falmouth by November 17, they found no bridges built, no materials for construction, and no engineers to undertake the task. The pontoon materials were ready to move on November 14, except for the absence of the 270 horses needed to move them. Burnside was unaware until he arrived that most of the building materials had not been transported. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed because some functionary in Washington had failed to send the pontoons when Burnside asked for them. They were supposed to be there when he got there. Communications between Burnside's staff engineer Cyrus B. Comstock and the Engineer Brigade commander Daniel P. Woodbury indicate that Burnside had assumed the bridging was en route to Washington based on orders given on November 7.
So, when General Sumner arrived in Falmouth on November 17th, he ordered his men to race to Fredericksburg and cross the river. Except when he got there, there was no bridge. There were only 500 troops in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside became concerned that early winter rains would make the fording points unusable; that might make Sumner vulnerable, he could be cut off. Instead, Burnside ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth.
Lee didn't ascertain Burnside's movement early enough to launch an attack. The part of the plan that Halleck had expressed concern about worked out favorably. Lee believed that Burnside would outpace him and cross the Rappahannock River first, prompting Lee to prepare for defense along the North Anna River instead. This plan, however, was met with dissatisfaction from President Davis, who considered it too close to Richmond . Lee recognized that Burnside had beat him to the Rappahannock – and now found himself on the wrong side of the river. Instead of moving to the North Anna, he had Longstreet move instead to the heights above the river on its south side above the town.
The materials for one bridge arrived November 25, 8 days after the Union army. This is truly a failure of the Union Army quartermaster department. The fact that Burnside ended up taking the blame for this is unfair; there was plenty of blame for everyone. Burnside was looking for a place to ford the river. The arrival of the bridge was much too late to cross the river without a battle. He knew only half of Lee’s army was across the river. Still, Burnside had an opportunity because at that time only half of Lee's army had arrived and were not yet dug in. Had Burnside acted more expeditiously and attacked Longstreet sooner, he might have won a victory before Jackson arrived. Part of his reluctance to move was his fear that if only some of his army crossed, an attack by Longstreet might be decisive. It has always intrigued me that Burnside had delayed his attack at Antietam across the bridge and was criticized for not finding fords downstream; and 3 months later, he is criticized for the delays in looking for fords downstream.
Longstreet's arrival on November 23 marked a critical moment in the lead-up to the Battle of Fredericksburg. General Lee strategically positioned his forces, placing them on the commanding ridge known as Marye's Heights, west of the town. This defensive formation included Anderson's division on the far left, McLaws positioned directly behind the town, and Pickett's and Hood's divisions anchoring the right flank. Lee recognized the significance of holding this high ground.
Meanwhile, Lee had dispatched a message for General Stonewall Jackson on November 26, anticipating the need for his Second Corps. Jackson, known for his remarkable swiftness, had already foreseen the call and initiated a forced march of his troops from Winchester starting on November 22. They covered as much as 20 miles a day, a remarkable feat considering the challenging terrain. Jackson's timely arrival at Lee's headquarters on November 29 reinforced the Confederate position.
As General Burnside awaited the construction of crucial pontoon bridges, General Lee organized his army for the impending battle. Lieutenant General James Longstreet's wing shifted eastward from Culpeper, securing a formidable position on Marye's Heights, which offered a commanding view of Fredericksburg from the western vantage point. To the south, Lieutenant General Stonewall Jackson's troops entrenched themselves along a line stretching from Prospect Hill to Hamilton's Crossing, a strategic position four miles south of the town.
However, as Burnside's wait for the bridges extended, he missed a valuable window of opportunity. Lee recognized this delay and anticipated that Burnside would eventually attempt to cross the Rappahannock River. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s wing moved east from Culpeper, and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s men hurried toward the Rappahannock from the Shenandoah Valley. Longstreet took up a position on Marye’s Heights, overlooking Fredericksburg from the west. To the south, Jackson’s men were entrenched in a line stretching over Prospect Hill and onto Hamilton’s Crossing, four miles from the town. Burnside had squandered his opportunity. During this delay, Lee anticipated Burnside’s crossing the Rappahannock. This strategic maneuvering and positioning by both sides set the stage for the dramatic events that would unfold in the Battle of Fredericksburg.
Originally, Burnside had planned to cross east of Fredericksburg at Skinker's Neck, a shallow marshy area downstream from the town. However, upon Jackson's arrival and Confederate movements in that area, Burnside changed his plan to cross at the town itself, hoping to surprise the enemy. When Jackson arrived, he placed DH Hill and Early in that area when he received notification of Union gunboats there. Union spy balloons detected this movement, so Burnside was aware of it. Since it seemed that Lee had moved toward his right, then a smarter place to cross would be to Lee’s left, so he decided to cross at the town itself, thinking it would surprise the enemy.
Union engineers finally began to assemble 6 pontoon bridges on December 11. They were designated to be placed as 2 north of the town center, 1 south of the town center, and 3 more south. In the pre-dawn hours, a regiment of Union engineers began assembling the pontoon bridges opposite the town. Confederate riflemen harassed the engineers and slowed their progress.
The delay between November 25 and December 11 was partly due to the weather. But several years later, Halleck reported to Stanton that he had never approved of the plan, and had suggested using the fords upriver instead. After the war. Burnside wrote that he had told Halleck that during the movement he wouldn’t be unable to receive telegraphic messages. I get the impression, reading these notes well after the fact, that Halleck just didn’t order things be done and Burnside didn’t think he had to be certain about this detail. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-were-burnsides-bridges-late-at-fredericksburg.7791/?amp=1
As Union forces under General Hunt positioned over 220 cannons on Stafford Heights, it seemed they held an impregnable advantage against any Confederate counterattack. In the late morning, the Union unleashed a formidable bombardment, This relentless shelling wreaked havoc, causing considerable damage to numerous buildings and instilling terror among the civilian population. After approximately four hours of intense bombardment, the engineers resumed their work on the pontoon bridges, but Confederate riflemen wasted no time in resuming their sharpshooting.
However, a significant challenge remained in the form of Confederate sharpshooters entrenched in the basements of buildings within Fredericksburg. It was then that General Hunt proposed a bold solution. He suggested that Burnside deploy infantry across the river to engage the sharpshooters directly, effectively proposing urban combat in the heart of Fredericksburg.
Faced with the bridging process grinding to a halt due to enemy fire, General Burnside authorized a daring plan to dislodge the Confederate snipers.
As the plan unfolded, 135 infantrymen from the 7th Michigan and the 19th Massachusetts courageously crowded into small boats, with the 20th Massachusetts following soon after. Colonel Norman Hall, a brigade commander from the nearby Second Corps, volunteered his brigade to row across the Rappahannock. Under enemy fire, these regiments successfully crossed the river and formed a skirmish line to eliminate the Confederate sharpshooters. While some Confederate soldiers surrendered, the fighting intensified as Union and Confederate forces clashed street by street throughout the town. Ultimately, the riflemen were driven from their positions on the riverbank.
By late afternoon, Sumner's Right Grand Division began its crossing at 4:30 p.m., although the bulk of his troops did not complete the crossing until December 12. Hooker's Center Grand Division followed on December 13, utilizing both the northern and southern bridges.
Union artillery unleashed over 5,000 shells upon the town and the ridges to the west, transforming Fredericksburg into a scene of destruction. By nightfall, four Union brigades occupied the town, engaging in looting on a scale hitherto unseen in the war, enraging General Lee, who likened their actions to the ancient Vandals.
December 12: The Slaughter Pen
On December 12, the remainder of Burnside's army successfully crossed the river and established their presence in Fredericksburg. As the evening developed, Burnside formulated a strategy to secure the areas surrounding the town. His plan involved utilizing the nearly 60,000 troops in Major General William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division to crush General Lee's southern flank, commanded by General Jackson. Simultaneously, the rest of Burnside's forces would maintain General Longstreet's position on Marye's Heights and provide support to Franklin if required.
However, the planning that evening left everyone in a state of uncertainty. Despite Burnside's verbal instructions, which outlined a primary attack by Franklin, supported by General Hooker on the southern flank, with General Sumner leading a secondary attack on the northern flank, his written orders on the morning of December 13 were vague and confusing to his subordinates. These orders did not reach Franklin until 7:15 or 7:45 a.m., and when they did, they differed from Franklin's expectations. Rather than ordering a full-scale assault by the entire grand division, Burnside instructed Franklin to maintain his position but send "a division at least" to seize Prospect Hill around Hamilton's Crossing. Simultaneously, Sumner was to send one division through the city and up Telegraph Road, with both flanks ready to commit their entire commands. Burnside appeared to anticipate that these limited attacks would intimidate Lee into withdrawal.
Franklin, who had initially advocated a vigorous assault, interpreted Burnside's order conservatively. Map inaccuracies further compounded the confusion. Interestingly, Burnside's use of the word "seize" conveyed less forcefulness in 19th-century military terminology than the command "to carry" the heights.
The attack finally began when General Reynolds led the way, selecting General George Meade to initiate the movement. However, substantial artillery fire from Pelham's Cavalry artillery and later Walker's artillery on Prospect Hill delayed Meade's advance until nearly 1 PM. The attack eventually gained momentum, but Jackson had concealed approximately 35,000 Confederate troops on a wooded ridge.
The battle on the southern end of the field, known as the Slaughter Pen, resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. General A.P. Hill's poor performance at Fredericksburg led to a significant portion of Confederate casualties in Jackson's corps. A triangular patch of woods extending beyond the railroad, swampy and dense with underbrush, created a 600-yard gap between the brigades of Brigadier Generals James H. Lane and James J. Archer. Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg's brigade was stationed approximately a quarter mile behind this vulnerable gap. Meade's 1st Brigade entered the gap, ascended the railroad embankment, and turned right into the underbrush, catching Lane's brigade in the flank. This maneuver enabled Meade to attack both Confederate brigades from the flank.
However, Gregg, for unknown reasons, ordered his troops not to fire, believing mistakenly that the approaching Union forces were friendly. It is suspected that his partial deafness may have prevented him from hearing the sounds of battle and gunfire. Tragically, he was struck in the spine by a minie ball and succumbed to his injuries two days later. As the situation escalated, Archer called for Gregg to send reinforcements, but by then, Gregg's brigade had suffered defeat. Early and Taliaferro moved their divisions to cover the gap, effectively halting Meade's advance. A counterattack by Early and a counter-counter charge by Union generals Gibbon and Birney eventually forced the Confederates to withdraw into the hills south of town. Had Franklin supported Meade with all of his men the gap might have led to a rout.
The main Union assault against Jackson initially achieved success. In an area later known as the Slaughter Pen, Major General George G. Meade's division briefly penetrated Jackson's line, posing a threat to the Confederate right. However, a lack of coordinated reinforcements and Jackson's resolute counterattack thwarted the Union effort. The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, with neither gaining a significant advantage.
December 12: Marye’s Heights
On the northern end of the battlefield, Brig. Gen. William H. French's division of the II Corps stood ready to advance, despite facing a barrage of Confederate artillery fire raining down upon the fog-shrouded city of Fredericksburg. General Burnside had instructed Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, the commander of the Right Grand Division, to send "a division or more" to secure the high ground west of the city. This move was initially seen as a diversionary tactic, with the main thrust of the Union assault expected to occur in the south. . General Burnside's orders to Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Right Grand Division, was to send "a division or more" to seize the high ground to the west of the city, assuming that his assault on the southern end of the Confederate line would be the decisive action of the battle.
Marye’s Heights, a prominent geographic feature overlooking the river and the city, presented an imposing obstacle. The low ridge, composed of several hills separated by ravines, including Taylor's Hill, Stansbury Hill, Marye's Hill, and Willis Hill, rose 40–50 feet above the surrounding plain. This gives an impression that it’s not an especially steep approach. While the approach was relatively open, it was punctuated by scattered houses, fences, and gardens, hindering the movement of Union forces. To reach the base of the heights, Union soldiers had to leave the relative cover of the city, descend into a valley crossed by a water-filled canal ditch, and then ascend an exposed slope of 400 yards.
Close to the crest of the ridge, specifically Marye's Hill and Willis Hill, a narrow lane in a slight depression known as the Sunken Road was protected by a 4-foot stone wall, supplemented with log breastworks in some areas. Initially, McLaws had placed about 2,000 Confederate soldiers on the front line of Marye's Heights, with an additional 7,000 in reserve positions on the crest and behind the ridge. At the front of Longstreet's position, the Sunken Road was packed with Confederates three ranks deep. Confederate artillery covered the plain below, making it a deadly approach. General Longstreet had received assurance from his artillery commander, Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, that they could effectively sweep the field with gunfire: "General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."
Burnside's original diversionary attack against Longstreet's defensive position behind the stone wall resulted in horrendous Union casualties. Wave after wave of Federal troops advanced across the open ground, only to be met with withering rifle and artillery fire from the strongly fortified Confederate position. Lee, witnessing the carnage, famously remarked, "It is well that war is so terrible. We should grow too fond of it."
The initial plan had been to distract Longstreet with this attack while the main effort took place elsewhere, but when the secondary engagement at the Slaughter Pen stalled, this ill-fated assault became the primary focus of the battle.
Sumner's Right Grand Division was the force behind the initial assault, which began at noon, kicking off a relentless sequence of attacks that persisted until nightfall. As Northern forces moved out of Fredericksburg, Longstreet's artillery rained destruction upon them. The Union troops encountered a perilous bottleneck at the canal ditch, crossed by only three narrow bridges. Once they surmounted this obstacle, they formed shallow battle lines, seeking cover behind a slight bluff that provided concealment but no protection.
The order for the final advance echoed across the field. The terrain beyond the canal ditch offered little cover, with few buildings and fences. Southern cannons wasted no time resuming their barrage on these exposed targets. As Federals covered about half the remaining distance, a torrent of bullets erupted from the Sunken Road, causing severe casualties. Survivors sought refuge behind a small depression in the ground or retreated to the safety of the canal ditch valley.
Darius Couch and the II Corps were at the forefront of this attack. His corps was ordered to assault the Confederate position at the base of Marye's Heights overlooking Fredericksburg. From the courthouse cupola, Couch watched as French's division, followed by Hancock's division and then Howard's, suffered heavy casualties. The II Corps alone sustained 4,000 casualties in this part of the battle. One may wonder why a flank attack was not attempted instead of a direct assault; in fact, Couch ordered Howard to march his division toward the right and flank the Confederate defenses, but the terrain did not permit such a maneuver; all such attempts were crowded back to the center.
Why Did Burnside order this attack?
The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. Although the assault was tactically devastating, it had minimal strategic impact on the war. It became the most one-sided Confederate victory in the war, yet it did not alter the overall trajectory of the conflict.
Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.
Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain.
While some subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations, Burnside persisted in ordering piecemeal attacks. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks
Aftermath
As darkness descended on the battlefield, strewn with the fallen and the wounded, it became evident that the Confederates had secured a decisive victory. The night resonated with the harrowing cries of the wounded, described as "weird, unearthly, terrible to hear and bear."
Burnside, undeterred by the grim outcome, issued orders to renew the assaults on December 14, even expressing a desire to personally lead them. However, his subordinates persuaded him against this perilous endeavor. On December 15, Burnside orchestrated a skillful retreat across the Rappahannock River, dismantling the bridges behind his army as they withdrew to Stafford Heights.
As darkness descended upon the battlefield, it revealed a haunting scene of devastation, strewn with the fallen and wounded. The cries of the wounded, described as "weird, unearthly, terrible to hear and bear," echoed through the night, serving as a grim testament to the horrors of war. The wounded soldiers who lay on the battlefield faced dire circumstances as there were limited means to evacuate them. Many had fallen in front of the Confederate lines, making any rescue attempt perilous and likely to result in even more casualties. Regrettably, many of the wounded likely succumbed to their injuries who might have been saved under different circumstances. Undoubtedly many of the wounded exsanguinated who might have been saved.
As a consequence of this tragedy, the role of Jonathan Letterman, appointed in June 1862 as the medical director of the Army of the Potomac, became pivotal. Letterman initiated a comprehensive overhaul of the Medical Service, armed with a charter from army commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to enact necessary improvements. By the time of the Battle of Antietam in September, Letterman had established a system of forward first aid stations at the regimental level, introducing principles of triage. He implemented standing operating procedures for the intake and treatment of war casualties and was the first to apply management principles to battlefield medicine.
Letterman also introduced mobile field hospitals at division and corps headquarters, along with an efficient ambulance corps that operated under the control of medical staff rather than the Quartermaster Corps. He streamlined the distribution of medical supplies. Regrettably, at Fredericksburg, Letterman's innovative system was often countermanded by Union officers. Nevertheless, it was adopted by the Army of the Potomac and other Union armies after the Battle of Fredericksburg, eventually becoming the official procedure for the intake and treatment of battlefield casualties.
Amidst the grim aftermath, one story of extraordinary compassion emerged. Richard Rowland Kirkland, known as "The Angel of Marye’s Heights," displayed remarkable humanity. Kirkland, a devout Christian, could not ignore the pleas of the dying Union soldiers. Initially denied permission by his commander, Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw, due to concerns for Kirkland's safety, he eventually received approval to assist the wounded Union soldiers, symbolizing a moment of humanity amidst the brutality of war.
The Battle of Fredericksburg was the single most lopsided victory in the war. The outrageous repetitive attacks on Marye’s Heights had led to an unnecessary attack and thousands of casualties. Although profoundly discouraging for Union soldiers and the Northern populace, did not deliver a decisive impact on the overall course of the war. Despite being the most one-sided Confederate victory in the war, it had minimal strategic significance. Confederate morale surged, despite their numerical disadvantage, while Union morale had already suffered due to the replacement of the popular McClellan with Burnside. Burnside's errors in planning and leadership led to rising insubordination and his infamous ineffective second offensive against Lee in January 1863, mockingly referred to as the “Mud March.”
Understanding the lack of a long-term advantage is essential in comprehending the broader dynamics of the Civil War. Although a resounding tactical victory for the Confederacy, the Battle of Fredericksburg proved to be a hollow triumph. The North's vast resources soon compensated for Burnside's losses in manpower and supplies. Conversely, Lee faced difficulties replenishing both missing soldiers and much-needed supplies.
Strength:
- Union: 122,009 (114,000 engaged)
- Confederate: 78,513 (72,500 engaged)
Casualties and losses:
- Union: 12,653 total (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing)
- Confederate: 5,377 total (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing)
The casualty ratio was about 2:1, which, when expressed as percentages, equates to approximately 11.1% for the Union and 7.4% for the Confederacy. While it was a clear Confederate victory, the casualties were not as catastrophic as some accounts suggest. Lee's forces suffered 5,300 casualties but inflicted over twice that number of losses on their Union counterparts. Notably, of the 12,600 Federal soldiers killed, wounded, or missing, almost two-thirds fell in front of the formidable stone wall at Marye's Heights.
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