The Salvation Army (the Army) is predominantly known as an international charitable organization. For over a million people worldwide, it is an Evangelical church with its own distinctive polity and practice, owing its heritage to British Methodism and American Revivalism. Less well-known is that between 1891 and 1932, the Army supported over 100,000 men, women, and children to travel from Britain to her colonies across the sea. This Evangelical movement and engine for social reform became an emigration agency because they believed that moving the ‘surplus population’ out of Britain into unclaimed land in the colonies would reduce poverty, specifically urban deprivation, in the mother country.

Christopher Button explains.

Salvation Army co-founder William Booth.

Introduction

The Salvation Army began social service work in 1866, with the first food depots providing meals for dockers who had been laid off during the collapse of the Poplar shipyards. By the 1870s, social service work had transformed into social reform work. Early examples included the establishment of rescue homes for female sex workers who were trained to become domestic servants or given jobs such as bookbinders. They also set up sheltered workshops for unemployed or homeless men to enable them to learn a trade and return to work. According to William Booth, the simple principle was that:

Any person who comes to a shelter destitute and starving, will be supplied with sufficient work to enable him to earn the fourpence needed for his bed and board. This is a fundamental feature of the scheme, and which I think will commend it to all those who are anxious to benefit the poor by enabling them to help themselves without the demoralising intervention of charitable relief…There is no compulsion upon anyone to resort to our shelters, but if a penniless man wants food her must, as a rule, do work sufficient to pay for what he has of that and of other accommodation. I say as a rule because, of course, our officers will be allowed to make exceptions in extreme cases.[1]

 

The Victorian demand that people should lift themselves up by their bootstraps was adopted by the Army. The Army expected and demanded from the customers of its social relief efforts that they engage in hard work, commitment to personal transformation, and, where absolutely necessary, the absolute minimum of charity to allow them to do so.

 

In Darkest England

In 1890, the Army released the blueprint for a new, totalizing, and universal scheme of social reform that would provide a system of welfare designed to work towards eradicating poverty and destitution and bring about the salvation of the world. This project was called In Darkest England and the Way Out, written principally by William Booth and published in 1890. It sold over 100,000 editions within the first few months. It was, in its way, quite a simple scheme. There were three parts to this scheme. Each was a form of colony, consciously adopting the structures of empire just as the book’s title borrowed from David Livingstone’s book Darkest Africa. The language is telling and is something we will return to.

The first step was the ‘City Colony’ including food depots, shelters, rescue work for women, salvage yards and ‘elevators.’

The ‘Elevator’ was a new concept in social services, combining generous acceptance with patient but unwavering discipline. ‘No one brings a reference here’ explained an officer in charge of one such institution. ‘If a man is willing to work, he stays; if not, he goes.’ No guide line could be simpler for the entrant; none more demanding upon those who were seeking his rehabilitation…The elevator was, in effect, and entry form of ‘sheltered workshop’ – a concept which was little known at the time and consequently less understood.[2]

 

The elevator was a combination of shelter and workshop or factory. Men could find somewhere to live and work in various trades to pay for their bed and board and gain enough stability to seek work in the trade they were learning. Central to every part of the city colony was regular, often daily, worship for all the residents. None were compelled to attend, but for many, it was an easy source of entertainment. Attendance at salvation meetings in the shelters across 1891 was recorded at 136,579, with 708 recorded as being converted. The work of social reform was undertaken hand in hand with the work of personal reformation with the intent of universal conversion.

For those city colonists who thrived and demonstrated their proper attitude to work, the second stage of the Darkest England scheme beckoned. This was the ‘Farm Colony.’ The Army intended to take select members of the urban poor who had demonstrated their willingness to work and submit to discipline and transplant them to training farms. Sir John Gorst QC MP wrote:

The unemployed is taken away from the town where he competes with a congested mass of workers, too numerous for existing employment opportunities, and brought back to the land, where he produces more than he consumes, where his labour enriches the nation without lessening the earnings of his fellow workmen.[3]

 

The Army in the UK bought a farm in Hadleigh, Essex, and developed it to receive colonists from the city. Similar farms were purchased in Australia, America, and South Africa. Farm colonists would work for the first month purely for bread and board. Then, if they demonstrated their willingness to learn, work, and behave, they would start to be paid. The farm colonists learned to work the land in small holdings or as tenant farmers. Some were returned to the city as unsuitable for the farm. Others were encouraged to purchase a 5-acre smallholding from the Army at favorable interest rates and become independent. But for others, they would be eligible for the third part of the Darkest England scheme — the Colony Across the Seas.

 

The Colony Across the Sea

Here, we come to the point at hand. The Darkest England scheme was dependent upon the British Empire. The Darkest England scheme could not have worked without the shared culture, language, infrastructure and transportation links. The fact that the scheme did not live up to its promise has less to do with the Empire and more to do with the incredible amount of funding necessary to make it practicable. Despite the relative failure of the Darkest England scheme beyond the city colony, the limited successes and the plans for the scheme highlight the inherent links between the Army and the Empire. William Booth said:

It Is absurd to speak of the colonies as If they were a foreign land. They are simply pieces of Britain distributed about the world, enabling the Britisher to have access to the richest parts of the earth.[4]

 

In the same way, the Army intended to send Britain’s poorest, properly trained and equipped, out to the parts of the Empire where land was underutilized. The movement from city to farm to overseas farm or factory was meant to become a new system built into the structure of Britain. By reducing the overall population and upskilling the urban poor, not only would Britain benefit, but the colonies would be developed. Ausubel wrote:

Indeed, one of the purposes of the In Darkest England scheme itself was to bring about structural change, since Booth was one of those Victorian reformers who believed that as population was the root course of the long depression from the early 1870s to the late 1890s and that mass emigration was part of the answer to this problem.[5]

 

The Army started supporting the emigration of its farm colonists to the colonies over the seas in 1891. Initially, colonists went to New South Wales and Queensland. By November 1891, 95 emigrants had been sent overseas by the Army with letters of recommendation for farms and factories in the receiving territories. The 1907 yearbook reported that since 1905, 15,000 people had emigrated through the Army’s agency. However, problems in the scheme were starting to emerge.

A key example comes from New Zealand, where there was…

Agitation against the scheme by Trades and Labour Councils…On the grounds that living standards of workers would be depressed by this introduction into the Colonies of what they termed ‘undesirable persons the Pauper and criminal scum of the alleys and byways of Great Britain.’[6]

 

The colonies, especially New Zealand and Australia, did not want to receive people who had been destitute and dwelling in London’s slums until recently. The costs involved in emigration had, until then, helped to ensure that those emigrating from Britain had been able to support themselves on arrival. The Army supported the Salvationist colonists, but they were travelling to improve themselves and did not go with their own resources.

Another issue was that William Booth and the Army had somewhat misunderstood the relationship between Britain and her colonies and dominions. By the early 1900s, the Empire was already starting to decentralize, especially in the self-governing states and dominions. Britain could not simply tell the governments of Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa to give spare land to colonists from The Salvation Army. The Army was not empowered to create new colonies, and the Imperial government could not provide the Army with new land. The Army was not given unused land in the existing colonies. The third stage of the Darkest England scheme seemed to be failing, so the Army had to turn to a broader approach to emigration.[7]

 

Family Emigration

Colonel David Lamb, the new commander of the emigration department, decided to broaden the project to include families as well as single men. This brought into reality some of William Booth's hopes for Darkest England.

In the Salvation Ship we shall export them all – father, mother, and children. The individuals will be grouped in families, and the families will, on the farm colony, have been for some months part more or less near neighbours, meeting each other in the field, in the workshops, and in the religious services. It will resemble nothing so much as the unmouring of a little piece of England, and towing it across the sea to find a safe anchorage in a sunnier clime. The ship which takes out emigrants will have the produce of the farms, and constant travelling to and from will lead more than ever to the feeling that we and our ocean-sundered brothers are members of one family.[8]

 

With Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa actively working against William Booth’s scheme of social imperialism, it was up to Canada to rescue Darkest England. The relationship between the Army emigration service and Canada developed until the Army became one of Canada’s leading immigration agencies, accredited and financially sponsored by the Canadian government and funded by direct donations in the UK. Between 1905 and 1907, the Army chartered fourteen ocean liners with a thousand immigrants on each. By the opening of the First World War, over 50,000 settlers had been supported in moving to Canada. By 1932, when the emigration service ended, more than 112,000 people from Britain had moved to Canada.

The system was comprehensive. Corps officers in the UK advertised the scheme and supported families in applying for emigration through the Army’s agency. Social officers helped identify likely candidates from the shelters or Hadleigh Farm and made their applications to the agency. The emigration department also stationed agents in the Army’s labour exchange bureaus, particularly helping domestic servants emigrate. The Army also offered emigration insurance for the settlers. For 10 shillings, the traveler would be insured against loss of belongings and against the risk of not finding employment. Whilst most settlers using the Army’s emigration agency had a position organized on their behalf for when they arrived, some went without work waiting for them in the hope of finding a position. The Army would pay for their return to Britain if they did not find work.

The Army chartered liners to carry the new colonists from the UK to Canada on an alcohol-free trip. They were accompanied on the ships by Salvation Army officers who led worship and prayer meetings, offered counsel, and gave lectures on the culture of the colonist's new home. The Salvationist colonists would then be welcomed by officers at receiving stations and transported to their new homes, where the local officer would make introductions and ensure they were connected to the corps. Then, if they did not join the local corps, they would receive a semi-annual visit from an Army officer to assess their progress. From start to finish, the whole scheme was operated as part of the Army’s international mission.

 

Conclusion

The Army combined the structures and methods of the British Empire with an Evangelical Zeal for conversion and the belief that salvation was as much about this world as it was about the next. William Booth wrote:

I saw that when the Bible said, ‘He that believeth shall be saved’ it meant not only saved from the miseries of the future world, but from the miseries of this [world] also. Then it came from the promise of Salvation here and now; from hell and sin and vice and crime and idleness and extravagance, and consequently very largely from poverty and disease, and the majority of kindred woes.[9]

 

The Army's social reform work was grounded In the underlying principle that social transformation would only make a lasting difference to the world if it were combined with individual conversion. Helping the poor through social reformation was at least partially undertaken to remove the obstacles to salvation. A hungry person, a cold person, or a homeless person would not become a Christian. By removing them from their circumstances of poverty, giving them a trade, and moving them to a new land with a place to become independent, the individual would better themselves and society as well.

However, far more critical for the Army was the hope that by transporting saved Salvationists around the world, they would create colonies of salvation which would spread the word of Salvationism. The central doctrine of Salvationism was that its members evangelized to the groups they had been part of. The converted drinker went back to preach to the drinkers. The sex workers told her previous colleagues about the possibility of rescue and redemption. Walker wrote:

One of the most significant features of The Salvation Army was the relationships of its members to the wider community. As soon as people were saved, they were asked to stand before a crowd and relate their experience of conversion…If the Spirit of God pervaded an individual, he or she was ready to preach and testify regardless of previous sinfulness, lack of education, of inexperience.[10]

 

Without the British Empire, its transportation network, its shared culture and language, and William Booth's implicit assumptions that the Imperial territories were simply an extension of Britain, The Salvation Army would not have been able to grow in the way it did. The British Empire was to be matched by a Salvation Empire, spread around the world, transporting Salvationists in ready-made units to the far reaches of Christendom to go out and grow William Booth’s Christian Imperium and usher in the prophesied Millennium.

 

Christopher Button writes at Theology Corner (link here).

 

  

Bibliography

All The World – Salvation Army Publication

Ausubel, Herman. In Hard Ties: Reformers Among the Late Victorians, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960)

Bradwell, Cyril R. Fight the Good Fight: The Story of The Salvation Army in New Zealand 1883-1983, (Wellington: Reed, 1982)

Bradwell, Cyril R. Fight the Good Fight: The Story of The Salvation Army in New Zealand 1883-1983, (Wellington: Reed, 1982)

Booth, William, In Darkest England and the Way Out, (London: The Salvation Army, 1890)

Coutts, Frederick. Bread for my Neighbour: The Social Influence of William Booth, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978)

Sandall, Robert The History of The Salvation Army Volume III 1883-1953 Social and Welfare Work, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1955)

Walker, Pamela J. Pulling the Devil’s Kingdon Down: The Salvation Army in Victorian Britain, (London: University of California, 2001)

White, Arnold, The Great Idea: Notes by an Eye-Witness on Some of the Social Work of the Salvation Army, (London: The Salvation Army, 1910)


[1] William Booth, quoted in Sandall, The History Vol. III, p. 120

[2] Coutts, Bread for my Neighbour, pp. 106-107

[3] John Gorst quoted in Coutts, Bread for my Neighbour, p. 78

[4] William Booth, Darkest England, pp. 143-144

[5] Ausubel, In Hard Times, p. 180

[6] Bradwell, Fight the Good Fight, pp. 53-54

[7] White, The Great Idea, p. 47-49

[8] William Booth, In Darkest England, p. 152

[9] William Booth, “Salvation to Both Worlds” All The World, January 1889 pp. 1-6

[10] Walker, Pulling the Devil’s Kingdom Down, p. 187

The British Empire did not suddenly start its decline in the post World War Two period; instead it was an event that began much earlier. The British Empire had been expanding and stretching out across the globe since the 1600s. After the American War of Independence Britain began to build a new empire with a new urgency. The British Empire grew to some thirteen million square miles and to govern over five hundred million subjects. This article focuses on Britain’s decline after World War 1 by looking at Egypt, Iraq, Ireland, and India.

Steve Prout explains.

King Faisal I of Iraq. He was King from 1921 to 1933.

The Decline of the British Empire

The contraction of the British Empire had already begun in the nineteenth century starting with Canada. Up until to 1921 Britain’s presence in the world was occupying a quarter of the planet’s land surface. Certain countries at distinct stages within that empire enjoyed a more independent status than others. Australia and New Zealand achieved their independence peacefully but others like Ireland would be forced to take a more violent approach in fighting Imperialist domination.

Independence was driven by motives such as the general desire of those nations to run their own affairs and the need to detach themselves from colonial repression and bloodshed (such as in Ireland and India). There was also the inequalities of trade in India, Iraq was piqued that they had found themselves rid of Ottoman only to have lost that freedom to British rule and subsequently lose control of their natural resources, and then just as important colonial rule often involved being dragged into the conflicts of far off European nations.

The Dominions

Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand independence came in the form of Dominion status which was achieved by a more diplomatic avenue. Dominion status was defined as ”autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”

Britain granted a Dominion Status in the 1907 Imperial Conference to a select number of nations. Australia and New Zealand were enjoying this privileged status since 1900 and 1901 respectively. South Africa would follow in 1910 after a series of unifications within its borders. Canada had already enjoyed this status since 1867. The Irish Free State would follow in 1922.

In 1926 the Imperial Conference revisited Dominion status with the Balfour Declaration which would be formalised and recognised in law with the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The British Empire now was now known as the Commonwealth of Nations. The Imperial hold had loosened but Britain initiated the change to allow complete sovereignty for the Dominions. The First World War left Britain with enormous debts, and reduced her ability and in turn her effectiveness to provide for the defence of its empire. The larger Dominions were reluctant to leave the protection of Britain as many Canadians felt that being part of the British Empire was the only thing that had prevented them from the control of the United States, while the Australians would later look to Britain for defence in the face of Japanese militarism. Except for the Irish Free State this change did not stop these dominions from supporting Britain in her declaration of war against Germany in 1939.

But between the interwar years there were further challenges to Britain’s Empire from various parts of the world. By the time the Great War was over India, Egypt, Ireland, and Iraq were all taking a less than passive approach in their demand for independence.

Egypt

Britain had partially governed Egypt since the 1880s under a veiled protectorate primarily to look after her interests and investments. It was never officially part of the British Empire in the same way for example as Rhodesia, Malaysia, India, or Cyprus. As soon as the Great War ended Egypt was demanding her own independence. By 1919 a series of protests had morphed into uprisings against British rule known as the 1919 Revolution. In that same year at the Paris Peace Conference, Egypt had sent representatives to seek independence from Britain. The sheer volume of international issues following the war distracted the allies and put Britain’s particular attentions elsewhere and Egypt left empty handed.

In 1920 an Egyptian mission led by Adli Pasha was invited by Britain to address the issues in Egypt. This mission arrived in the summer of that year and presented a set of proposals on independence for both Britain and Egypt to agree but after a return visit in June 1921 to ratify the agreement the mission left in “disgust”. No agreement could be reached on these proposals by Parliament or the Dominions at the Imperial Conference, notably over the control of the Suez Canal. More unrest in Egypt would follow resulting in martial law and by December 1921 the British realized that the situation was clearly unsustainable, and so they declared the Unilateral Independence of Egypt in February 1922. This independence would be in a limited form as the British still had control of the railways, police, courts, army, and the Suez Canal. By 1936 British rule had unwound further as King Farouk agreed an Anglo- Egyptian Treaty leaving just a garrison of troops to guard Britain’s commercial interests in the Suez Canal. This unwelcome presence was enough to involve Egyptian territory in the Second World War to the chagrin of the Egyptians.

Iraq

In 1932 Britain granted Iraq independence after a brief post war mandate that presided over the newly formed nation after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. From as early as 1920 Iraq had revolted against British occupation. Iraq now broke free of Ottoman rule only to find it had been substituted by their new British masters. The British military quickly quashed the revolts but like Ireland and other areas of the empire military repression was not the lasting solution, and the British continued in vain in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra.

Part of the answer was giving the throne to a British friendly monarch King Fayṣal, with British control in the background. A plebiscite in August 1921 augmented his position. A treaty of Alliance replaced the formal mandate obligating Britain to provide advice on foreign and domestic affairs, such as military, judicial, and financial matters - but the matter was not yet over.

King Faisal would still depend on British support to maintain his rule. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 provided for a close alliance which essentially meant Iraq had limited control on matters of foreign policy and would have to provide for an ongoing British military presence on her territory. The conditions granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country for a twenty-five-year duration. Despite being a sovereign state by 1932 this treaty would find Iraq being involved in World War Two as the British fought against Nazi infiltration.

Ireland

Ireland, like India and Iraq, was another violent struggle for independence, and this was closer to home shores. The conflict would inflict wounds that both sides would not easily forget and forgive at least well into the twenty-first century.

The desire for home rule was long anticipated and had been on the negotiating table since the nineteen century premiership of William Gladstone. All efforts to push the Home Rule Bill of 1886 had been thwarted by the political opposition because it was feared an Independent Ireland would pose a security threat providing an opportunity for Britain’s foes. Also, for the diehard Imperialists this might prompt other demands for independence across the Empire.

The patience of the Irish nation would grow thin. A third Home Rule Bill was almost formalised in 1914 but the outbreak of war suspended its implementation. The ever long wait and the lack of clarity over the fate of Northern Ireland’s Six Counties caused an escalation in violence. The most notable event was the Easter Rising in 1916 but more violence and further escalations occurred in the post war years as the British tried to reassert control with military means. It was by then too late for such measures.

Ireland would make unsuccessful attempts to gain support at the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris and in particular President Wilson. In 1920 the Government of Ireland Act (fourth Home Rule Bill) was introduced by the British Government. It was far from satisfactory as far as Ireland was concerned as they wanted to completely break away from its relationship with Westminster and its unpopular allegiance to the Crown. It also divided off the Northern Ireland from the rest of the country which remained part of the United Kingdom.

In 1922 dominion status was granted but it was not enough for the independence movement. The newly Irish Free State wanted total severance from the crown and the removal of the oath of allegiance. Dominion status was not satisfactory in the immediate post war years, and the Irish made strenuous representations to the League of Nations that they had the capability to become a fully independent nation, which they would achieve by 1937.

A number of laws that were passed, including the Constitution (Amendment No. 27) Act 1936 and the Executive Powers (Consequential Provisions) Act 1937, removed the Imperial Role of Governor General. Then, using religious grounds following the outrage from King Edward’s abdication, Ireland finally severed all remaining ties with Britain to become a fully independent nation. The Irish experience and the way they achieved their independence constitutionally would be noticed and emulated by other colonies much later.

India

India was also challenging British rule in this interwar period. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1917 that became the 1919 Government of India Act was an early attempt to establish a self-governing model for India. Indian nationalists felt that it fell short of expectations after their commitment to Britain in the First World War. The post war period had been hard on India, the flu epidemic and Imperialist free trade had affected society in all kinds of ways. The Rowlatt Act also fuelled the nationalist anger and allowed for the detention of any protesters and suppression of unrest. Protests encountered a typical coercive and violent reaction by Britain. This use of force was particularly heavy handed in Amritsar in April 1919 when Brigadier General Dyer had his troops open fire on a crowd killing almost four hundred local protestors. It was sufficiently bloodthirsty to cause even the bellicose Churchill to deem it “utterly monstrous,” but a subsequent enquiry failed to deliver justice to the perpetrators and exacerbated the situation. The British response was all in vain and in fact it fuelled Gandhi’s Non-Co-operation campaign. The issue would not go away but it would take another twenty-seven years to achieve independence.

Conclusion

The decline of the Britain’s Empire only accelerated in the post war period. The “Wind of Change” that Harold Macmillan spoke of on his visit to Africa in the 1950s was the just a continuation of the Empire’s sunset from many decades earlier. By the 1970s little of the Empire remained save for a few scattered islands around the world.

What do you think of the decline of Britain’s Empire after World War One? Let us know below.

Now read about Britain’s 1920s Communist Scare here.

References

Britain Alone – David Kynaston – Faber 2021

AJP Taylor – English History 1914-1945 – Oxford University Press 1975

The Decline and Fall of The British Empire – Piers Brendon – Vintage Digital 2010

Nicholas White – The British Experience Since 1945 – Routledge 2014

Losing Ireland, losing the Empire: Dominion status and the Irish Constitutions of 1922 and 1937 - Luke McDonagh

International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 17, Issue 4, October 2019, Pages 1192–1212

Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister of Britain at the peak of its power. He was Prime Minister on and off during the period from 1885 to 1902 and had a great influence on the country’s foreign policy at its colonial height. Avan Fata explains.

Lord Salisbury in 1886.

At the turn of the 20th century, the British Empire seemed to be at its zenith. Its colonial holdings far surpassed the second largest imperial power, the French, and the City of London was the trading capital of the world. Yet as the Victorian age gave way to the Edwardian, many in Whitehall and the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that these heights of economic and political might would not be easy to maintain, let alone to increase further. The economic-industrial disparity between Britain and other European great powers was closing, and from the New World the United States was also narrowing the gap.

In foreign politics too, there were signs of a storm on the horizon. The competition between imperial states had also reached a crossroads; large swathes of the globe had already been partitioned between imperialist European states, and some feared that the next “Scramble” would be over the dying carcass of an empire at the end of its tether; not for nothing was the Ottoman Empire termed the “sick man of Europe”. Britain had reluctantly taken up the task of helping to secure the Sublime Porte - as the Ottoman capital at Constantinople was known - from foreign encroachment and possible invasion.

Russia remained the perceived enemy of British foreign policy; its expansion eastwards and into Central Asia had been dubbed “The Great Game” by a British officer and later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim. But Britain also faced the rising ambitions of a newly-created German Empire, whose Kaiser Wilhelm II had dismissed Bismarck as Chancellor in favor of pursuing a more expansionist foreign policy, dubbed Weltpolitik (world politics). 

 

Enter Salisbury

It was in these circumstances that Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, became Prime Minister. First elected to 10 Downing Street in 1885, he would go on to serve two more terms (1886 - 1892, 1895 - 1902); leading Britain for a total of 13 years and 252 days - only Robert Walpole, William Pitt the Younger, and Lord Liverpool served longer. Curiously however, Lord Salisbury also served as his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; a realm which he had considerable experience in.

Salisbury’s first foray into foreign affairs came in 1876, when he was chosen by then prime minister Disraeli to represent Britain at the Constantinople Conference. Despite the conference’s failure to secure greater rights and land for Bulgarian and Herzogvinian subjects in Ottoman territory, it catapulted Salisbury into the political spotlight. Two years later during the Russo-Turkish War, when Disraeli’s Cabinet protested the Treaty of San Stefano, Salisbury was chosen to succeed Lord Derby (who had resigned as Foreign Secretary due to the protest). Even before his official appointment on 2 April, Salisbury single-handedly drafted a circular calling for a congress of European nations to re-examine the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, which was duly approved and dispatched to the great powers.

At the resulting Congress of Berlin (1878), Salisbury was overshadowed publicly by Lord Beaconsfield, but it was apparent to all the plenipotentiaries that he had been the architect of the Congress and the subsequent settlement. The Congress overruled many of the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, reducing the size of a new Bulgaria and returning Russian-conquered territories back to the Ottomans, whilst also securing Cyprus for the British - ostensibly for use as a naval base to dissuade any future Russian aggression into the Straits.

Despite being a Conservative, Salisbury was not particularly supportive of the Empire. He questioned its actual economic benefits, and would come to prefer maintaining the status quo as opposed to seizing any new territory. In a speech as Prime Minister after the Diamond Jubilee of 1897, he remarked that ‘our first duty is towards the people of this country, to maintain their interests and their rights; our second is to all humanity.’ In his foreign policy, he eschewed these priorities, placing the security of the Empire first and foremost.

 

Foreign policy

To Salisbury, managing foreign policy demanded a calm and unwavering statesman. ‘Sleepless tact, immovable calmness and patience’ were, he deemed, the qualities which would allow a diplomat to succeed. Perhaps more significant to his government and those in Europe, he refused to entangle Britain in any alliances. Much like Gladstone, Salisbury did not prefer to enter Britain into any mutual defense pacts, viewing them as commitments which would seriously hinder Whitehall’s ability to act independently of its continental counterparts. When his government and public opinion pressed for an Anglo-German alliance, Salisbury was reluctant to permit talks with Berlin. When it became clear that the Germans were unwilling to support Britain in the Far East against Russia, whilst simultaneously asking for British colonial concessions, Salisbury remarked to German ambassador Paul von Hatzfeldt that ‘you ask too much for our friendship.’

This commitment to a lack of commitment was seen by Salisbury’s Conservative colleagues not as a deliberate choice, but rather a continuity of a longstanding preference in British - and prior to 1707 English - foreign policy. As far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, they argued, ensuring a balance of power in Europe and remaining independent of embroilments on the continent was the modus operandi. In 1896, Salisbury’s adherence to this doctrine earned a name: ‘splendid isolation’, after a Canadian politician and later Joseph Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) popularized it in debates. Salisbury’s critics were more inclined to use the term ‘terrible isolation’.

For his own part, Salisbury took disdain with the term, deriding it as ‘jargon about isolation’, and mentioned to Queen Victoria that isolation ‘is much less danger [sic] than the danger of being dragged into wars which do not concern us.’ In hindsight, non-intervention seems a more apt term to use, as Britain was far from isolated from the various quarrels taking place at the fringes of its empire: Russia in the Far East and Central Asia, Germany in Africa and the Pacific, and France in Northern Africa as well as the Sudan. In each case, Salisbury balanced the interests of London and the other powers with great skill and, as with the case of Portuguese claims in South Africa (1890), with military pressure if need be. It was during Salisbury’s reign that the Royal Navy adopted the ‘Two Power Naval Standard’, the policy that the British fleet should be equal in strength to the next two largest navies combined

 

Conclusion

Salisbury’s power declined following the Second Boer War, which broke out against his will in 1899. His own health was failing, and in 1900 he finally handed over the reins of the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne. At the end of his political career, he had managed to usher the British Empire into the 20th century with great diplomatic skill and tact. Far from being preyed upon by the other great powers,  Salisbury had defended British interests across the world and expanded the “red on the map” by six million square miles, a feat unmatched since the days of Pitt the Elder. His policy of splendid isolation however, was judged by his successors to be a relic of a bygone Victorian age, and Britain would enter into her first mutual defense pact with Japan in 1902. 

 

Let us know what you think of Lord Salisbury below.

Now read Avan’s series on First World War historiography here.

Sources

Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970.                                     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Howard, Christopher. “Splendid Isolation.” History 47, no. 159 (1962): 32-41. Accessed August 22, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24404639.

Leonard, Dick. British Prime Ministers from Walpole to Salisbury: The 18th and 19th Centuries. New                   York: Routledge, 2021. 

MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World                                     War. London: Profile Books, 2014.

Margaret M. Jefferson. "Lord Salisbury and the Eastern Question, 1890-1898." The Slavonic and East                                European Review 39, no. 92 (1960): 44-60. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab                               le/4205217.

Penson, Lillian M. "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy." Cambridge                                               Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1935): 87-106. Accessed August 22, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stab             le/3020834.

Roberts, Andrew. Salisbury: Victorian Titan. New York: Phoenix Press, 2006. 

In 1920 Britain was granted an official Mandate by the League of Nations to administer the country of Iraq - and ultimately allow it to achieve independence.

The whole affair, which lasted from the end of the First World War to independence in 1932, was largely a failure, with few flattering accounts and obligations often unfulfilled. It is from this point in time that the first underlying signs of declining British power are evidenced, while for Iraq it set a path to a fraught and unstable future.

Steve Prout explains.

King Faisal I of Iraq.

King Faisal I of Iraq.

The War and Occupation

The British presence had been building up in Iraq since 1914 when her forces had removed the Ottomans from the region with domestic support. As soon as the British had expelled the Turks they were making encouraging noises that raised Iraq’s hopes of independence.  

The British, in the words of General Maude and High Commissioner Percy Cox, implied loudly that they came as liberators.  This was welcomed by Iraq, which already had nationalistic aspirations and expectations were raised.

The Ottomans previously allowed levels of autonomy to many areas of Iraq and the noises from the British were encouraging, but what followed was very different and did little to assuage growing Iraqi concerns as the British occupation continued.

 

The Post War Mandate

The League of Nations appointed the mandate to Britain in 1920 to run Iraq and lead her on the path to self- determination.  In retrospect it resembled a poorly disguised colonialism. 

Iraq offered a geographically strategic position as a potential overland route from Egypt through the Middle East to South East Asia.  Iraq filled a gap of land in the middle of a long run of British possessions. It would provide a useful alternative to the long and arduous sea lanes that had been threatened by submarine warfare.

There was also an urgent need to offset the cost of the war that Britain bore in the region.  The overland route would be safer, quicker, and - more importantly - cheaper as there would be less demand on oil from the navy. Whether this theory was correct or not, the later revolt and the cost of suppressing it made the economic debate moot. By the end of 1920 Britain could see further lost opportunities as her plans to monopolize the oil reserves also met US resistance and generated a reversal of policy.

Nevertheless, another possession in the oil rich region at the time could enhance Britain’s international leverage, and counter French and Russian influence in the region (in May 1920 the Red Army invaded Northern Persia further fuelling Bolshevik expansionist fears).  

Now Britain had the mandate it was the India Office that provided the administration to mobilize it.  It imposed a very prevalent British presence in all aspects of Iraqi life – that would prove very unpopular. 

 

The Uprising

The uprising that occurred in Iraq in 1920 was fuelled by an unrelenting nationalism that was growing years before the British presence whilst under Ottoman rule.  The very loud and public promises made by the British during the war now looked like they were going to be unfulfilled. Arnold Wilson and other British high commissioners treated peaceful petitions and representatives in a high-handed and often dismissive manner, which no doubt irked these nationalists.  

The various tribes were treated inconsistently, controversial taxes were established, and a questionable plebiscite was orchestrated that favored a British outcome. Much of the country was resentful, as they felt excluded from political decisions.  The India Office imposed colonial rules on all aspects of life that felt more restrictive than that of the Ottomans.

The British responded to the uprising by deploying the full force of the military, with Royal Air Force (RAF) support.  Despite the belief that Churchill was an advocate of the use of poison gas, this was not deployed but the use of the air-force’s bombing tactics was no less brutal than that used by Italy in Abyssinia against poorly equipped tribes.  It was all over very quickly by the end of the year, but it was not an easily fought campaign for the British.

The British had far superior forces at their disposal with the presence of the RAF. This should have put them at a far greater advantage than the less well-equipped tribes.  The revolt was suppressed in a few short months after a brutal response that cost 10,000 Iraqi lives, the bombing of mosques and the burning of villages. There were also defeats and retreats that bloodied the nose of this huge Imperial force. Humiliating examples were the seizing of HMS Firefly and her artillery by the tribes who turned the arsenal on the British and the retreats from Karbala and Najal (to name but two).  It was a humiliating situation for a Great Power.

After counting the cost of the revolt and the continued strain on the finances, Britain began to urgently push for Iraqi independence. When the final tally was counted the uprising cost the exchequer circa £40m and the continued occupation of Iraq would cost circa £20m per annum.  Policy now had to change.  There was then an interim approach in Iraq in the meantime - and that was in the form of a democratic offering of sorts.

 

The Veneer of Democracy 

It was clear that military intervention would not be enough to keep a sustained peace.  The British needed a friendly Iraqi government that they could still influence and control in the background, whilst at the same time creating a veneer of a democratic government.  In 1921 that friendly pro-British ruler took the form of King Faisal, a man who was in favor with the British for his support during the war.  After his expulsion by the French for his attempt to establish power in Syria he took an offer by the British to head up a ruling government in Iraq. Faisal was not representative of the varied and diverse population - and it would not satisfy the underlying tensions completely.

Meanwhile, the British, with successive high commissioners over this period, still pulled the political strings. Faisal’s new government was shored up by 300 Ottoman officers who fought for his side in the Great War, but a large proportion of the population was still left ignored and dissatisfied.  This discontentment would still bubble under the surface long after the 1932 independence. Iraq was never going to be the stable state that Britain promised under the auspices of the League of Nations. 

 

Economic Concessions

There are several views on Britain’s intentions with the oil and petroleum reserves that Iraq had.  David Lloyd George wanted to monopolize the oil and petrol reserves for British interests as there was a dependency on US and Mexican oil that was embarrassing to Britain - despite having an abundant and sufficient source with The Turkish Petroleum Company. 

This stance would soon change from a monopolistic policy to one of an open free market by allowing US investment. There were other ways that the oil could serve British interests and that did not necessitate having a monopoly.

The oil revenues would financially support the objectives of the mandate and offset the economic liability she had undertook. Iraq’s own resources would be used but when it came down to the bare facts the Iraqi nation would have no voice in how their own natural resources would be used.

 

The Conclusion – An empire in decline and a new nation broken

Before the war Iraq was modernizing and progressing into the Industrial world.  The building of the Suez Canal had opened her grain and wool markets to the world.  There was German and British interest in her vast petrol reserves as early as 1907.  The war and the Mandate era had set her far back.

Although Britain was not the originator of the nationalistic fervor it was her heavy handed and brutal response that did little to help Iraq’s future unity and stability, as King Faisal would later comment in his memoirs.

There were ominous signs for Britain also. The Empire was dangerously over-stretched, and cracks were now appearing in Ireland and India as well as Iraq.  Although the idea of Empire was still something the British were proud, other priorities were becoming more apparent on home shores. 

On paper the revolt should have not been as troublesome to suppress for a Great Power such as Britain, with the power of the RAF and mechanized divisions at her disposal to fight the local tribes. Considering the resources, the British had this was not an easily fought campaign, possibly a sign of waning military strength.

The drain on the British Exchequer was not insignificant and the economic situation was bleak at the time. This was something the public purse could not tolerate as Britain had over one million unemployed, the large majority being de-mobilized servicemen. By 1921 unemployment had risen to over two million with several major strikes taking place.  There was no room for troublesome additions to an already troubled Britain.

All these factors contributed to a less that half-hearted commitment to Iraq. By 1932 a poorly produced independence was handed over. There were no winners or favorable outcomes for Iraq but for Britain that small snippet of history held so many signs of the beginnings of imperial decline. 

 

What do you think of the British Empire and Iraq? Let us know below.

References

David E Omissi – Air Power and Colonial Controls, Manchester University Press 1990

Dr Toby Lodge – The British Mandate in Iraq 1914-32, Institute for Strategic Studies

Amal Vinograv – The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 1972

William Shrivers - International Politic and Iraqi Oil 1918-1928, Business History Review 1981 (Pages 517-540)

Judith Yaphe – War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right, What Went Wrong?  Middle Eastern Journal 2003, Middle East Institute

The American Revolutionary War (1775-83) resulted in defeat for the British; however, its impact was very different in other parts of the world. Here Bilal Junejo explains how defeat in the war led to Britain strengthening its presence in India.

King George III of England, 1799/1800.

King George III of England, 1799/1800.

Of all the upheavals that dot the annals of the turbulent eighteenth century, it is improbable that many could readily vie in either import or impact with the seminal War of American Independence, a landmark which, whilst it tolled the death knell of imperial aggrandizement at one end of the globe, simultaneously, if inadvertently, also served to herald its retrospectively ineluctable flourish at the other by dint of the virtual liquidation that it secured of all non-Indian obstacles in the path of British expansion in India. Indeed, had it not been for this colossal western loss that preceded the eventually colossal eastern gain, General Charles Cornwallis, the Governor-General of India from 1786-93, might never have been afforded the means of expiating his ignominious capitulation to General George Washington at Yorktown in 1781.1 What might have happened in the case of the colonists’ defeat at British hands must necessarily remain the sport of conjecture, but what is certain is that with their victory, the eventual one of their erstwhile masters in London also became well-nigh certain in that illustrious subcontinent of Asia entitled India, the lure of the ages. The way Great Britain’s own fortunes were affected by the American fiasco directly determined the manner in which she would go on to determine those of India. Principally, the impact of the Revolution had two facets: one domestic and one foreign. But because the latter could scarcely have made any difference in the absence of the former, it is to the domestic aspect that we must first turn our attention, before proceeding to contemplate how it operated in conjunction with the other one to render the cumulative result of incorporating India as the brightest jewel in the British crown.

The immediate domestic consequence lay in the dissolution of that effete administration whose memory has become intertwined with the loss of the American colonies, and the hallmark of   which had lain in the anachronistic fantasies of a monarch and the correspondingly complaisant follies of his premier. The government of Lord Frederick North (1770-82) had distinguished itself not only by the acute myopia which had informed its dealings with the colonists since, at least, the Boston Tea Party (1773)2, but also by the slow, yet steady, erosion of those gains which had been consolidated in the practice of parliamentary government since the Glorious Revolution of 1688. King George III, the unfortunate disciple in his early years of the royalist tutelage that pervaded the philosophy of the ironically hapless Earl of Bute3, and in stark contrast to the relatively democratic predilections of the first two Hanoverians, ascended the throne with a vigorous resolve to effect the full exercise of royal powers, but in his personal capacity, a regression that would entail a gradual erosion of the need to govern through ministers responsible to parliament. The Settlement of 1689 had provided that thenceforth the government should be a constitutional monarchy, but the immediate consequence of that compromise, as Trevelyan explained, was to limit any further expansion of the royal prerogative, rather than effect its transfer from the sovereign to their ministers, which only transpired gradually over the decades— a classic example of what the Fabian Sidney Webb called the ‘inevitability of gradualness’. Of this inexorable transformation’s culmination, the essence was succinctly delineated by one Lord Esher, in a memorandum that His Lordship prepared for King George V in 1913, during the constitutional troubles over the issue of Home Rule for Ireland:

“Has the King then no prerogatives? Yes, he has many, but when translated into action, they must be exercised on the advice of a Minister responsible to Parliament. In no case can the Sovereign take political action unless he is screened by a Minister who has to answer to Parliament. This proposition is fundamental, and differentiates a Constitutional Monarchy based upon the principles of 1688 from all other forms of government.”4

 

The impact in Britain

It is not for us to delve into the constitutional implications of George III’s untoward proclivities, for all that need concern us here are the political ramifications, in the light of that era’s constitutional status quo, that would likely have ensued following a British victory in America. In any given society, it is axiomatic to say that an overseas victory achieved by the incumbent regime will redound to its credit and increase its popularity amongst the electorate, whereas any loss would only serve to undermine its popular appeal and support. Because the defeat in America was so categorical, the pretensions of the George-North administration were dealt a mortal blow, and the peril of a return to the polity of James II was practically expunged. Englishmen of the seventeenth century had waged a formidable Civil War for the blessings of political liberty and accountable government, restored Charles II when it seemed expedient to do so to restore stability after the less than favorable developments following Cromwell’s demise, but then again overthrown   James II a mere five and twenty years later when it appeared that his deleterious inclinations promised a return to the autocracy of his father’s days. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that had autocratic power begun to increase in the wake of a victory in America, the people (especially the Whigs) of Britain would have so submissively acquiesced in a renewed emulation of the traditions that still inspired the dilapidated ancien régime in neighboring France. Indeed, the famous writer and politician, Edmund Burke (1729-97), had begun to sound the alarm as early as 1770, even before the Revolution, when he published his pamphlet entitled Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, arguing that King George III was upsetting the balance between crown and parliament in the British constitution by seeking to rule without due acknowledgement of the party political system.5 And in 1780, whilst the war was still going on, Dunning’s resolution— which lamented that “the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished”— was passed by a distrustful House of Commons.6 Thus, it is not fanciful to suppose that victory in America would have given a fresh lease of life to the George-North administration, any continuance of which could have only served to deepen the fissures in British society. If the King could block Catholic Emancipation, despite his American failure, for as long as he lived, then one can only wonder at what he might have done had he won that redoubtable contest of wills on transatlantic shores. As it happened, though, a contretemps in America averted the much greater danger of domestic unrest and civil war at home, which would scarcely have conduced to the acquisition of empire in the world. The last Jacobite uprising of 1745-6, with all its turbulence, was still a living memory, and Bonnie Prince Charlie, the Young Pretender, was destined to live until 1788, which means that it was not impossible for him, or his nominee, to become the figurehead   of a popular resistance to a jubilant George-North oligarchy. An unstable metropolis cannot exude the aura of that infallibility and serenity which is indispensable for cowing a foreign people into deferential submission, even against their will.

 

The rivalry with France

The second aspect that merits consideration here is the impact that the Americans’ victory had on France, Britain’s historic— and, in India, the principal— rival and the chief abettor of seditious endeavors across the Atlantic. How the war affected France was aptly summed up by the historian, Herbert Fisher, when he observed that “for Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, no policy could have been more improvident, for not only did the American war give the final push to the tottering edifice of French finance, but the spectacle of republicanism triumphant and monarchy overthrown across the Atlantic kindled in every forward-reaching mind in France the vision of a Europe remade after the new American pattern of republican liberty.”7  Again, we can only speculate about what might have happened in the case of French neutrality or the Americans’ defeat, but what is certain is that after Washington’s triumph at Yorktown, and the ironic, not to mention portentous, fact that the treaty of peace and recognition between Great Britain and the new American democracy was signed at despotic Versailles, revolution in France became only a matter of time. The cost of the war was unlikely to have been inflamed to the degree that it was on the eve of the Bastille’s fall had it not been for the legitimate pride that the likes of Lafayette could take in the succor they had rendered the armies of Washington. France might have collapsed even earlier in the case of defeat in America, but it is also possible that she might have launched a fresh war of revenge in Europe for the distraction of domestic opinion from real domestic issues to manufactured foreign perils. And if France had lost, then England would have won, and thereby consolidated the insidious gains in royal power made by King George III up to then, resulting in British foreign policy coming to reflect royal predilections more and more, as opposed to those of Parliament. One must not forget that the English monarch back then, a Hanoverian, was also the Elector of Hanover at the same time, and if France had decided to avenge an ignominious failure in America by attacking Hanover to her east (thereby precluding the need to try to reach a conclusion with the Royal Navy), George III might have decided to focus his entire attention on saving his Electorate without worrying about Britain’s overseas possessions, and given the latent insanity with which we know, thanks to the benefit of hindsight, that he was afflicted, all sorts of untoward eventualities might have arisen.

 

The impact on India

How exactly did these two consequences cumulatively affect India? This is the question that constitutes the end of our discussion. In 1623, the massacre of Amboina had forced the English to withdraw from the East Indies. Now, Yorktown had also necessitated a kindred evacuation from the American colonies, so India was perforce the main attraction left for imperial gratification. But such gratification, quite naturally, presupposes uninterrupted stability in the metropolis, and this was achieved by the Revolution when it shattered the autocratic ambitions of King George III, any realization of which might have imperiled the island state’s security by precipitating a fresh civil war. And we must not forget that towards the end of the eighteenth, as well as the beginning of the nineteenth, century, some of the most crucial battles that would determine the fate of the East India Company in India were fought (e.g. with Tipu Sahib of Mysore and the Marathas). Even though France was wracked with internal unrest, the contagion of which soon pervaded the rest of Europe and did not abate until 1815, she was nevertheless able to create great problems for the British. Indeed, one of the main reasons for remembering Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of India from 1798-1805, is his frustration of Napoleon’s plans, which encompassed burgeoning contacts with Tipu, to subvert the Indians.8 And when Admiral Nelson decimated the overweening French fleet at Aboukir Bay in August 1798, thereby annihilating any hopes of Napoleon’s advance eastwards to India, it was the East India Company that, out of profuse gratitude, rewarded him with a munificent ten thousand  pounds sterling, a stupendous sum in those days.9 To judge from the magnitude of this largesse, such were the fears aroused by the grandiose ambitions of a feverish and unstable France that one can only wonder what might have happened had the Bastille not been stormed in 1789— a cogently distinct possibility, but for that eruption which commenced at Lexington and was carried to triumph under the auspices of French arms.

Thus, the inevitable conclusion we draw is that the American Revolution, by domestically strengthening Britain at the same time as it domestically weakened France, made it assured that no serious challenge from without could henceforth arise to check the British rise within India. It was so because, to recollect the memorable verdict of Fisher, after the Peace of Versailles, “the continent merely saw that an empire had been lost. It did not perceive that a constitution had  been saved. Yet such was the case. The failure of the king’s American policy involved the breakdown of the last effectual experiment in personal rule which has been tried in Britain.”10 And it was from the ashes of this humbled royal pride that there arose the Pax Britannica. God bless Peace, and God bless Britain.

 

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

1 John Kenyon, The Wordsworth Dictionary of British History (first published 1981, Wordsworth 1994) 93

2  Ibidem, 44

3  Ibidem, 55

4 G. M. Trevelyan, The English Revolution 1688-1689 (first published 1938, Thornton Butterworth Ltd 1938) 193

5 John Kenyon, The Wordsworth Dictionary of British History (first published 1981, Wordsworth 1994) 54

6 Ibidem, 118

7 H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe (first published 1935, The Fontana Library 1972) 861

8 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-speaking peoples (Cassell and Company Ltd 1957) Volume 3, pages 188-9

9 James Brown, The Life & Times Of Lord Nelson (Parragon Book Service Ltd 1996) 41

10 H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe (first published 1935, The Fontana Library 1972) 862

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The Falkland Islands are some 300 miles (or about 480 kilometers) off the coast of Argentina and have been a British-owned territory since the nineteenth century; in 1982 Argentina and Britain fought a war over ownership of the islands. Here, Matt Austin considers civilian casualties during the Falklands War in the wider context of the decline of the British Empire.

Argentine prisoners of war during the 1982 Falklands War. Source: Ken Griffiths, available here.

Argentine prisoners of war during the 1982 Falklands War. Source: Ken Griffiths, available here.

Introduction

Beginning on the second of April and lasting until the fourteenth of June 1982, Britain was engaged in a seventy-two day war to retain one of its few remaining commonwealth territories. Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges refers to the Falklands War as “two bald men fighting over a comb,” a comparison that strongly outlines the sheer needlessness of the conflict in the eyes of many historians and writers.[1]It is therefore possible to suggest that the casualties endured during the Falklands War, an estimated eight hundred and seventy eight in total, with the inclusion of Argentine prisoners of war, numbering over eleven thousand, were themselves needless.[2]Ultimately, the motivations behind the Falklands War and the nature of how it was fought have led it to be considered one of the most unique conflicts in British military history.

 

The Decline of the British Empire

Following the Second World War, Britain underwent a period of decline. Due to the heavy economic losses endured during the conflict, the nation was unable to effectively fund its Empire and granted independence to a number of its former colonies from the 1940s onwards. The first of the major colonies to gain independence following the Second World War was India. With warring political groups and a lack of ‘safeguards’ for British business and trade interests, UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided Britain was to ‘abandon control’ of India in 1947.[3]

This was followed by the loss of numerous territories in the following decades, such as Ghana in 1957, Uganda in 1962, and Kenya in 1963. Consequently, the loss of Southern Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, as the newly independent state became known, in 1980, was the last of the British territories in Africa. The loss of Southern Rhodesia represented the end of an era for the British Empire, following its inevitable decline in the decades after the Second World War.[4]This left the former international powerhouse of the British Empire with a severely reduced, sparsely scattered group of commonwealth territories, so threatening the nation’s global influence. With the threat of the Empire being completely lost, a concept that had become gradually apparent throughout the past several decades, Britain would therefore rigorously attempt to retain and protect any of its remaining territories against invasion. 

 

The Falklands War

The origins of the Falklands Warcan be attributed to the militant Argentine government’s decision to invade and occupy the neighboring islands in an attempt to encourage positive public opinion. Despite having a severely weakened economy and dealing with increasing demand for the introduction a democratic voting system, the government, under the control of their military dictator Leopoldo Galtieri, received an outpouring of public support in favor of the invasion of the islands, as Argentine feelings of nationalism surged.[5]This reinforced the decision to defend their newly captured territory against the prospect of a British invasion.

Following news of the Argentine invasion and take over of the Falkland Islands, Britain responded by sending a naval taskforce on April 5, 1982 to defend the islands from the invading forces. Ultimately, the conflict was short lived, as Britain was successful in its attempt to regain the Falkland Islands through the use of more advanced military technology and superior combat training. US president Ronald Reagan was initially skeptical of Britain’s decision to win back the Falklands, suggesting that it was not worth an invasion. However, in an attempt to avoid any political tension between the United States, and the United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he eventually decided to support the effort, providing Britain with weaponry and munitions, which aided the victory and shortened the conflict.

 

Military Casualties

The Argentine casualties during the Falklands War numbered up to six hundred and forty nine, around four hundred more than those of the British. The majority of the casualties of the Falklands War occurred during the attacks on naval ships carrying large numbers of troops. The specific case of the British attack on the Argentine ship, the General Belgrano, resulted in almost half of all Argentine casualties, with three hundred and twenty one of the ship’s one thousand one hundred crew being killed.[6]This has since been considered a highly controversial moment of the Falklands War, sparking the debate over a possible war crime, as the Belgrano was attacked thirty six miles away from the British exclusion zone that had been set up around the islands.[7]

Nevertheless, despite a vast majority of the casualties originating from naval attacks, friendly fire was a larger issue for British troops in the Falklands than the majority of its other twentieth century conflicts, relative to the scale and nature of the war. The majority of incidents of British friendly fire occurred at night. The reason for this can be attributed to the result of misinterpretation of the identity of British troops, among the ‘monotonous, featureless terrain’ of the Falkland Islands.[8]Furthermore, it was not simply British troops that fell victim to friendly fire, as the only civilian casualties of the Falklands War are attributed to this.

 

Civilian Casualties

The decisive British victory, however, was underpinned by the regularly overlooked deaths of three civilians.[9]Whilst civilian casualties are unfortunately rarely unique during wartime, the case of the death of three Falkland Islanders is in itself a rare occurrence, as these deaths were caused by friendly fire. The three civilian deaths of the Falklands War hold great significance, as they demonstrate the contradictory nature and moral considerations that embodied this conflict. As the islands had been under British rule for centuries, those living there were British citizens and being predominantly farmers, had little to no means of preventing the unexpected Argentine invasion. Consequently, there must have been a sense of relief when news that the British would launch an invasion to secure back the islands reached those living there.[10]However, this was not to be the case for three Falkland Islanders living in the capital, Port Stanley, as Susan Whitley, Doreen Bonner, and Mary Goodwin unfortunately lost their lives during the British bombing of the capital.[11]Whilst these deaths are often overlooked in what is a considerably neglected conflict in itself, they have come to somewhat represent British international relations in the latter half of the twentieth century.

What is therefore so intriguing about these deaths are the wider moral implications that surround them. Britain, in an attempt to recapture the islands, supposedly for the safety of the Falklanders and the right to retain their British identity, contributed to the only incidents of civilian casualties of the war. This represents the contradictory nature of this conflict and creates a wider moral question of whether the unrealistic perception of the ‘Empire’ and the lengths that Britain would go to ensure its survival was worth more to the government and foreign policy makers than the people they were trying to protect. 

 

Conclusion

The Imperial undertones of the Falklands War are highlighted by these deaths; this article therefore concludes by posing the question of British morality and whether this conflict was simply an overreaction to the post war decades characterized by the decline of the once powerful Empire that built up and bubbled over, culminating in one of the most unnecessary, frustrating conflicts in the nation’s history.

 

What do you think of the author’s arguments? Let us know below.


[1]Miles Kington, “What did you do in the Falklands War, Daddy?” The Independent, October 28, 1998, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/what-did-you-do-in-the-falklands-war-daddy-1181032.html.

[2]“Falkland Islands War. Cost and Consequences,” Britannica, accessed 17/11/2018, https://www.britannica.com/event/Falkland-Islands-War#ref302171.

[3]Nicholas Owen, “The Conservative Party and Indian Independence, 1945-1947,” The Historical Journal 46, no. 2 (June 2003): 404.

[4]Hevina S. Dashwood, “Inequality, Leadership and the Crisis in Zimbabwe,” International Journal57, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 209.

[5]Paola Ehrmantruat, “Aftermath of Violence: Coming to Terms with the Legacy of the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982),” Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 15 (2011): 95-96.

[6]“Is Maggie Thatcher a War Criminal?” Belgrano Enquiry, accessed 10/12/2018, http://belgranoinquiry.com/.

[7]“Is Maggie Thatcher a War Criminal?”

[8]Beck, “How Are You Enjoying the Day?”

[9]Lucy Beck, “How Are You Enjoying the Day? Remembering the victims of the Falklands War,” April 2007. http://archive.ppu.org.uk/falklands/falklands3.html.

[10]David Saunders, Hugh Ward, David Marsh and Tony Fletcher, “Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A Reassessment,” British Journal of Political Science 17, no. 3 (July 1987): 281-282.

[11]Beck, “How Are You Enjoying the Day?”

Our image of the week is from a rather gruesome colonial episode.

 

The Ashanti Wars occurred between the 1820s and the start of the twentieth century. They took place in the Ashanti Empire, a territory in modern-day Ghana, West Africa, and were fought between the British Empire and the Ashanti Empire

The above image is a scene from a battle early in these wars, in July 1824 to be precise. It shows the British in their red coats overcoming the Ashantis. But what can we take from it? The fact that European technology was superior to the Ashanti’s more traditional weapons? Or that this was a victory for ‘civilization’?

Or merely that it was just a futile battle in a war that ultimately damaged the territory and in which nearly everybody was a loser?

 

 

Now, have you heard about History is Now magazine? It has a range of fascinating articles related to modern history! In the latest issue there is even a piece related to the Ashanti Wars.

Click here for more details: Android | Apple iOS

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AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Our image of the week shows an impact of British colonial rule in India, the use of Indian soldiers as British forces.

 

The British ran India – or at least parts of it – for hundreds of years. This led to a number of, shall we say, interesting outcomes. From bizarre social customs to ‘White Mughals’, there were a number of fascinating results.

Another of these interesting outcomes is shown below in our image of the week.

The image shows us a group of redcoats, British soldiers, but with a twist. Rather than coming from Britain, these soldiers were Indian. Known as sepoys these troops were very important to British rule in India. Indeed, without them it would have been nearly impossible to run a country the size - and with the population - of India.

In the painting we can see troops in a variety of different-colored clothing, turbans, flags in their hands, and a variety of facial hair! Behind them are troops high-up on camels. A fascinating scene.

 

You can find more about the British in India in the new issue of History Is Now Magazine. The magazine is free now for one month or more on both Android and the iOS store.

Click here for more details: Android | Apple iOS

Image source

http://history1800s.about.com

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AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

This week’s image of the week is from the time when the British Empire was dominant.

 

It has been a few weeks since we shared an image of the week, so it is time for this majestic image…

The Great Exhibition, a type of World’s Fair, took place in London in 1851. Opened by Queen Victoria, it was a majestic event that happened at a time when the British Empire was at its peak. It was also well-attended and extremely popular among many of the local population, not least because it had exhibits from over 25 countries, so allowing people to marvel at wonders from the world over, as well as exhibits from closer to home.

The image above shows the main hall with flags from a variety of countries and well-dressed people visiting the different stands from all over the world. At the top we can see the roof, a glass structure known as the Crystal Palace, situated in Hyde Park, London. Light also fills the exhibition hall.

The second image shows a poster advertising trips to the Great Exhibition from Abergavenny in Wales. People traveled from very far to come to what was an unprecedented spectacle and a rare opportunity to see much of the world under one roof.

 

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George Levrier-Jones

Elizabeth Yates (1845–1918) was the mayor of Onehunga in New Zealand in 1894, just two months after women gained the right to vote in New Zealand. This made her the first woman to be a mayor anywhere in the British Empire.

Elizabeth Yates

Elizabeth Yates

Born Elizabeth Onan in Scotland, she was the older of two daughters. She moved with her parents and sister to Auckland, New Zealand in 1853, where her father worked as a laborer. Onehunga, which is now a suburb of Auckland, was an important harbor at the time. Most shipping in the 19th century came to Onehunga via South Africa and Australia from Great Britain.

Elizabeth was married to master mariner Captain Michael Yates in 1875. He became mayor of Onehunga from 1888 to 1892 until he had to retire due to ill health.

By the time of her husband’s retirement, Elizabeth had already been involved in politics. She strongly supported women’s suffrage, and participated in debates at the Auckland Union Parliament. Also, Elizabeth was the first woman to record her vote in 1893 when women were first legally allowed to vote in New Zealand in parliamentary elections.

When her husband stepped down as mayor, she accepted the nomination for the office. Only a few months after New Zealand women led the world by voting in a general election, Elizabeth Yates defeated her opponent Frederick Court at the poll. The race was very close, decided by only 13 votes. She was sworn in on January 16, 1894.

Manukau Harbour and Onehunga from Mangere Bridge, before the urbanization of Onehunga. 

Manukau Harbour and Onehunga from Mangere Bridge, before the urbanization of Onehunga.

 

Her appointment as the first female mayor in the British Empire was news around the world. Queen Victoria even congratulated her on her election.

“Women’s enfranchisement proceeds apace. Early this morning I read of the election of the new mayor of Onehunga, Mrs. Elizabeth Yates! She defeated a male candidate. If we Britishers have a queen, why not a lady mayor?” (Letter To the Editor. Wellington, December 30, 1893. The Inland Printer, Volume 12. Maclean-Hunter Publishing Corporation, 1894.)

Along with her appointment as mayor she also automatically became a Justice of the Peace. She occasionally officiated as magistrate in cases involving women.

Elizabeth Yates was an able and effective administrator. During her tenure as mayor, she liquidated the borough debt, established a sinking fund, reorganized the fire brigade, and upgraded roads, footpaths, and sanitation.

Despite all her accomplishments, she met stubborn opposition in her role as mayor. When she was elected, four councilors and the town clerk resigned immediately in protest. A group of three councilors organized against her, opposing her every proposal. Even members of the town joined in, cramming the council chamber to hoot and jeer at her at every meeting. Critics blamed her for bringing it on herself by being “tactless” and “dictatorial” and disregarding established rules of procedure.

All of her achievements were accomplished with only one year as mayor: Elizabeth was defeated in the polls in November of the same year, 1894. Afterwards, she served on the Borough Council for two years from 1899 to 1901.

In 1909, Elizabeth was admitted to Auckland Mental Hospital for reasons unknown. She died while still in the hospital on September 6, 1918, and now rests beside her husband in St. Peter’s churchyard in Onehunga.

 

First country to grant women suffrage?

Of all the countries which still exist independently today, New Zealand was the very first to grant women the right to vote on September 19, 1893. The Corsican Republic, Pitcairn Island, the Isle of Man, and the Cook Islands, along with various American states and territories, granted women suffrage before New Zealand.

 

This article by KeriLynn Engel was originally published on AmazingWomenInHistory.com, a website about all the kick-ass women the history books left out. Article here.

 

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