Why did Germany get the blame at the end of World War One? Part 2 – Crisis in Austria-Hungary

Germany is often blamed for causing World War I – and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles led to the country needing to pay large reparations to the winners. Here, Denise Tubbs continues her look at why Germany got much of the blame for World War I. She considers Austria-Hungary and its pivotal role in the events that led to the outbreak of World War One.

Part 1 in the series focuses on the decades leading up to World War One: Available here.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. His assassination precipitated a crisis that led to World War One

In Part 1 we talked about the basics - some of who the main players were, and Germany’s habit of having a ruler who is an overachiever. We know that the country as a whole felt boxed in due to the alliances surrounding them. But what about their allies? We left off on the background of one of them: Austria-Hungary. Get comfy because this is where things get interesting.  

Succession in Austria-Hungary 

Wondering why the country was called Austria-Hungary and today they are just Austria and Hungary? Well, it is a bit complicated, but essentially both are separate countries and both are monarchies. Only, they have the same ruler just under different names. Using this example makes it clearer: after Queen Elizabeth I of England died, King James was called James I of England. But in Scotland, where he had been king since he was an infant, he was known as James VI of Scotland.

So, the ruler at the turn of the century was Franz Joseph I of Austria-Hungary and he was in a bit of a pickle. Good Emperor Franz had no male heir to take his place when he died. At the start at the war in 1914, he was 84 years old. He and his wife, the Empress Elisabeth (known as Sisi) had four children. But of those four, only one was a son. One thing to mention about Empress Sisi is that she was the most beautiful woman of her time, and was beloved by her people. Franz Joseph was deeply in love with her. Only she never quite felt the same. Her death in 1898 by an assassin deeply affected the Emperor and the country at large. The Crown Prince Rudolf was groomed from day one to replace his father. Only he would never get the chance.

Like many marriages of the day the relationship between Rudolf and his wife Stephanie of Belgium was an arranged one. Still they were able to have one child together. Perhaps it is fate, but that child would be a girl. Every prince had their occasional or favorite mistress, but Rudolf seemed to be a bit more involved with his than most. Mary Vestra was from society but had a reputation herself. At 17 years old the two of them had a torrid affair. In January 1888, Rudolf and Marie were found dead at the Mayerling Hunting Lodge. No one knows the circumstances of what the motive was or if they had planned it. The story that seems to fit best based on the discovery of Marie’s diary in 2015 is that they had a suicide pact. 

Either way, Rudolf’s death shook the country to the core. Franz only had one son and he was no longer alive to take his place. A true succession crisis was now clear to all those around the Emperor. After some consideration, the Emperor decided to make his nephew the Archduke Franz Ferdinand his successor. Ferdinand didn’t have the greatest relationship with his uncle and most of his family. His choice in marrying Sophie Chotek, a woman with no title and a morganatic marriage (a marriage with somebody of different social rank) alienated everyone. Upon the marriage, Sophie and Ferdinand waived the rights of succession for any children they had together. This was based on the fact that Sophie wasn’t of noble blood. It was a pain point for the couple, as in every official duty Ferdinand attended, his wife was forced to ‘take her place’ in the back of the room. 

Austria-Hungary’s maneuvers

Around this time, Austria-Hungary decided to officially annex the lands in Bosnia and Herzegovina into the country. This land had been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, but had been occupied and essentially run by Austria-Hungary since 1878. What they didn’t consider was the reaction from nearby areas. Serbia, for one, was not happy about the annexation. They felt that lands in the Balkans should be ruled by those living in the Balkans. As a result of this, pro-independence and terrorist groups begin to form within Serbia. By making this move, Austria-Hungary’s actions led to conflicts in the years leading up to World War One - the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.

With tensions high, Franz Joseph asked the newly made heir-apparent Ferdinand to travel to the region under instructions to review the military. The day of June 28, 1914 started just like any other day. Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were in Sarajevo; and they were put into an open car. Side note: it amazes me how long it took people to realize that any “open” mode of transportation linked with a target with this kind of high profile. Anyway, they traveled along behind local officials. As they moved through the streets, a man threw an object at the couple. There was an explosion, but the only people hurt were civilians. This would be assassin took a cyanide pill and planned to take his knowledge with him. He also threw himself in a river – but lived.

The danger apparently over, the motorcade arrived at the scheduled destination. The Archduke and his wife are a tad shocked but not too worse for wear. As they leave both Ferdinand and Sophie decide to change plans and make a visit to the local hospital to see those that were hurt in the bombing. The motorcade leaves, but no one told the driver that the plans changed and he made a wrong turn. In order to get them back the way they came and to the hospital he needed to turn around. It was in this moment that Gavrilo Princip just happened to be standing within steps of the couple. He pulled a gun and shot both Ferdinand and Sophie at point blank range. Initially those in the car did not realize that either of them had been shot. It wasn’t until Sophie loss consciousness and collapsed in Ferdinand’s lap that the realization set in. Ferdinand yelled “Sophie, don’t die. Stay alive for the children.”

Then Austrian-Hungarian Colonel Count Franz von Harrach asked if Ferdinand had been wounded. He only replied: “It is nothing. It is nothing”, before he too lost consciousness. Those in the car with them moved with all haste to the Governor’s house for immediate care. Unfortunately both Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Chotek, Countess of Hohenberg, were dead on arrival. And with their deaths springs open a can of worms that changed everything for the next hundred years.

Aftermath

You would think that an assassination of an Archduke and heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary would send shockwaves across the globe. When we modern day folks tell the story, that’s the perception it gives. In reality, internationally it was not major news. It ended up in a few papers in some countries; but it certainly was no front-page affair. In the immediate days after their deaths, the government of Austria-Hungary wanted answers. In all honesty they were pretty annoyed. The Emperor had now lost his only son and heir, and that heir’s replacement.

Austria-Hungary knew the assassins were Serbian and wanted answers. And if they couldn’t get them, they were threatening a fight. The Serbian government was in a tough spot. The assassination wasn’t sanctioned by them, but the planning and execution of the plan were made by Serbs. For you conspiracy buff’s out there; there is a theory that the real killers were in fact part of a Serbian military force and Gavrilo Princip, along with the others, were just patsies. Maybe or maybe not, there were still no good options here for the government. So they did what any little brother would do when caught in a tough spot - they called their big brother Russia.

Now in part one I mention that the alliance between these two was nothing in a formal sense. What tied them together were ethnic lines. Many Russians were Serbian, and many Serbians were Russians. Serbia gave Russia the heads up that this situation may turn south and if it did they will need help against Austria-Hungary in a war. Russia, at the time, was still ruled by the 300-year-old Romanov Dynasty under Tsar Nicholas II. After consulting with his advisors, he opted to not make any move yet. Instead, he waited to see how things played out.

The July Crisis

While all this was going on in Serbia, Austria-Hungary made a call of their own to Germany. As part of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary asked Germany to support them if war breaks out against Serbia. It’s important to keep in mind here that these events are happening lightening fast. The assassination was June 28, 1914. By the time Austria-Hungary reached out to Germany the date was July 6, 1914. From this point until the outbreak of war, it will go down in history as the “July Crisis.” 

Germany decided to pledge to Austria-Hungary in the event of war. This is called the “Blank Check;” where it is implied that Germany more or less just agreed to whatever Austria-Hungary wanted to do. By agreeing, this was a huge risk for Germany. They were already surrounded by Russia and France. And while France was not in the picture yet, if fighting broke out at the Russian border, it could trigger a two front war. The other issue was the thought of honor. Their ally had suffered a terrible blow. The honor they lost from the initial act should be defended. There was one positive going for the Germans - that Russia was still rearming itself following the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. In order for them to come to Serbia’s aid, they had to mobilize faster than Germany thought they could. With that in mind, the war generals considered the idea of a quick and easy conflict. 

Meanwhile in Austria-Hungary the plan for war was in full motion. Generals devised a timeline of how they would deal with Serbia. Side note: this was a horrible. Anyway, their timeline was to invade, destroy and occupy Serbia in six weeks. We all should be for lofty goals but this is not one of them. Why won’t this timeline work? Because Austria-Hungary was seriously underestimating its own people and their readiness to prepare for war. Also, from a technology perspective, they had little to no paved roads, and a lack of a railway system. It had been 48 years since they’d seen a war; and their generals had an outdated way of thinking. Either way, the plan was to mobilize and when they did Russia would have to make a choice. That’s for next time.

What do you think about Austria-Hungary’s importance in the outbreak of World War One?

Sources

Wikipedia 

Dan Carlin’s Hardcore History Podcast (Blueprint for Armagedden parts 1-6)

The History of the Great War Podcast

A World Undone: The Story of the Great War by G.J. Meyer

From Rails to Ransomware – From a Prussian War in the 1860s and World War I, to Recent Russian Actions

While examining the past will not allow us to exactly predict the future, we can identify patterns whose parts could prove useful in understanding contemporary affairs. By considering a key cause of World War I, the War of 1866/Austro-Prussian War, we may be able to see similar patterns in present events and forecast how they could shape the future.

Here, Lieutenant Colonel Sean H. Kuester tells us about Germany and the War of 1866, and contrasts this with Russian actions over the last decade.

The Battle of Koniggratz in the War of 1866/Austro-Prussian War.

"We spend a great deal of time studying history, which, let's face it, is mostly the history of stupidity." 

-Stephen Hawking

Stephen Hawking may be right.  Nevertheless, in an effort to change the would be historical trajectory he describes, let’s take a stab at the past to craft a better future.  For the next year, we will remain in the centennial window of World War I (WWI); one of the greatest man-made catastrophes in history.  As such, it’s appropriate to refresh ourselves on how this momentous upheaval came to pass with a view toward understanding goings on in our own time.

There is quite a bit more to WWI’s causes than the standard fare of rigid mobilization schedules and Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination.  While these explanations capture immediate catalytic events, they neglect less visible yet more significant (in their predictive value) underlying causes.  It is in these underlying causes where the true extrapolative lessons lie and where modern strategists may seek insights for contemporary happenings.  One of the underlying causes occurred 71 years prior; the second war of German unification, also known as the War of 1866.  This seven week clash was in its own time, and remains today, replete with both strategic and tactical portents.

However, rather than being viewed as a singular incident it is better regarded as one of several successive gales in a gathering storm of national intent.  This interconnectedness of events as indicators is a salient lesson.  Given the conflict’s brevity and the fact that it occurred in the wake of the political upheavals of the 1848 European liberalist revolutions, most leaders failed to see the more profound implications of this war.  As a result, one of the foundations for WWI was quietly laid.

Waged between Prussia and Austria over the territory of Schleswig-Holstein, which Prussia and Austria won from Denmark in 1864, this short decisive war resulted in the Prussian state securing hegemony over the German speaking peoples of Europe.  Perhaps more importantly, however, the struggle dampened liberalizing effects born out of the revolutions of 1848, namely broad popular support for more representative style governments.  This dampening effect was combined with Prussian influence gained through battlefield preeminence and breathed fresh life into autocratic rule which would manifest itself ultimately in the visage of Germany’s powerful Kaiser.  The temporal extension of this autocratic system allowed an inordinate amount of power to be placed in the hands of a very aggressive and ambitious few.  While the Prussian victory in 1866 did not represent a tectonic shift in the continental balance of power it did indicate one of the first strategic tremors in the second half of the 19th century in Europe.

Prussia would further unify the German peoples by defeating France in 1870-1871, placing itself at increased variance with the great European powers.  Through degrees, which Europe saw but did not directly contest, Prussia consolidated the myriad German speaking states, subdued its weaker neighbors, appeased larger states and in time carved out an empire that challenged the continental order. Viewed in this light, the War of 1866 was the first major point of departure from German disunity to unity. 

Lessons for today?

Are we witnessing manifestations akin to the above scenario today?  The case of a resurgent Russia is instructive.  In 2008 Russia tested the world’s tolerance for her application of force to protect her so called privileged zone of influence when she invaded Georgia.  The world complained, even elevating their outrage to “serious concern,” but did little else. Perhaps the world was not prepared to imagine that only 16 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia could pull this off.    

Western democracies bogged down in Afghanistan seemed disinclined to affix themselves to another conflict and confirmed their assumed passivity regarding a major force on force challenge on the continent; especially one so far East.  Like the War of 1866, the Russian invasion of Georgia was a whirlwind, lasting only 5 days.  Ending as quickly as it started allowed nations to surreptitiously go back to those affairs occupying them before.  Russia had nimbly reasserted herself on Europe’s political stage.  The aftermath is comparable to the relative calm that enfolded Europe after 1866.  This calm in both cases was, of course, a phony edifice concealing loftier designs.

Six years later Russia annexed Crimea and the world complained again.  NATO complained loudly.  However, three years on Russia still controls the Crimea and has flexed her might in the Middle East as well.  She, like late 19th century Germany, seems single-minded in steadily gathering her strength to become a global force.

What next for Russia?

Just as the War of 1866 was not the first nor last act of national intent to achieve Germanic unity, we must ask ourselves, where will Russia cast her gaze next?  The West seems to remain fixated on the stalemate in the Ukraine and Crimea and equally as frustrated with Russia’s involvement in Syria.  In spite of Russia’s clear successes in these areas will the west clumsily glower in those directions? With so much NATO effort on the Alliance’s eastern periphery, will Russia truly attempt to expand “Gray Zone” warfare into the Baltics or deeper into the Ukraine?  Or, might Russia pursue something less obvious and less interesting for the West? 

Perhaps an attempt to consolidate her authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the next increment of expansion; Putin commemorated the Russian-Georgia War by visiting Abkhazia this year.  This is clear diplomatic signaling that this region is in Russia’s sphere of influence.  Or perhaps Russia will attempt something still less predictable such as working to tilt Moldova in her direction.  Moldova has parliamentary elections in 2018, and has been a traditional geopolitical halfway point between East and West.  Or possibly Russia will be content expanding her influence east into the Central Asian Republics (CAR) where she can both grow her prestige, increase economic opportunity, and avoid substantial NATO interference while simultaneously frustrating NATO efforts in Afghanistan.

The point is this: much like 19th century Germany, 21st century Russia possesses a long range national vision that certainly has stages and designs western strategists can discern.  The Georgian War, the annexation of the Crimea, and Russia’s enthusiasm in Syria are not random acts of opportunity, just as the War of 1866 was not uncalculated opportunism.  Russia’s next move will be no less premeditated.

21st century railways

Inclining back to the War of 1866 with a view toward a phenomenon that resided below the strategic echelon, another observation may serve to reframe current events.  One major feature of the War of 1866 was the growing ability to concentrate troops by rail to achieve mass at a point of one’s own choosing.  In Arden Bucholz’s book, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871, he concludes that rail usage was one component of a technological revolution in military affairs.  What then is the significance of rail today?

The key factor of rail in 1866 was that it provided a means to rapidly concentrate that era’s defeat mechanism (land power) where it needed to be before the adversary could counter it. The object for modern strategists, however, is to uncover the 21st century’s comparable means that can deliver this era’s defeat mechanism. 

One modern equivalent of this ability to concentrate a defeat mechanism may be found by splicing two rapidly evolving concepts: the swarm attack and cyber warfare.  The potency of cyber warfare is self-evident and on the rise; its working definition is now generally well enough understood too.  A useful initial definition of a swarm attack is provided by Sean J. A. Edwards in his 2004 RAND dissertation, “Swarming occurs when several units conduct a convergent attack on a target from multiple axes.” Swarm attacks are generally viewed as being physical attacks, but that interpretation is now incomplete, outmoded and likely on the cusp of shifting.

The railway of the 21st century may be the internet with the coin of the realm being digitized information and operations (think banking data and air traffic control systems) and the ability to message or influence (think online news, social media and email servers).  So how do swarm attack and cyber warfare conjoin together as a defeat mechanism?  Imagine a scenario where distributed cyber operatives (hackers) use the internet to deliver malware.  Envision further that instead of attacking one sector such as happened in 2015 against the Ukrainian power grid, cyber operatives simultaneously attack multiple sub-systems of a larger more complex system.

What if operatives, for example, instantaneously targeted the health system, telecom industry, natural gas sector and electrical grid?  In fact, such a scenario already played out – this year.  The attack began in Europe and spread to over 100 countries.  The motive in this ransomware attack appeared to be the accumulation of bitcoin.  Imagine though, if the motive had been more sinister, with broader and a longer duration impact being the objective.

Digitally delivered defeat mechanisms can be designed to achieve something akin to what the US Army’s Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Operations, calls disintegration which is “…to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight…specifically targeting…command structure and communications systems.” While it is difficult to imagine a state being “defeated” in the classical sense by a cyber-attack it is easy to conceive use of the internet “railway” to “collapse” a state or institutions’ critical capabilities or as part of a broader campaign or preliminary strike.

The War of 1866 in retrospective

“Whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times.  This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions and thus they necessarily have the same results.”  Machiavelli may have been no less jaded than Stephen Hawking regarding the record of mankind’s past.  He did, however, see merit in studying the past.  This work subscribes to Machiavelli’s outlook that clues to the future can indeed be found in the past if strategists ask the right questions and use their imagination.   Historical patterns often repeat themselves.  World War I was not the result of spontaneous combustion. The fuel for this fire was gathered and plainly stacked for all to see over the course of half a century.

The War of 1866 was a primary underlying cause for WWI even though it occurred seven decades previous.  While it did alter the strategic landscape in its overall result, as a single event it did not make WWI inevitable.  Conversely, if viewed as one rung on a larger German ladder of national purpose and aligned with earlier and subsequent events, the case for a European showdown is strong.   Embedded within the conflicts’ day to day operations innovations such as rail transport gave a marked advantage to the state visionary enough to exploit it.

Comparing and contrasting the War of 1866 and other events that contributed to WWI with the case of today’s resurgent Russia is educational.  Considering how modern technology might be leveraged by a state like Russia is equally educational.  Strategists must constantly engage in these types of academic exercises in the pursuit of “why.”  As Phillip A. Crowl concluded in The Strategist’s Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers the future cannot be exactly predicted by studying the past; yet, as Crowl goes on to say, “…the study of history will help us to ask the right questions so that we can define the problem – whatever it is.”

What did you think of this article? How are events of the last decade comparable to events before World War One?

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.