In spite of the Confederacy’s desire to preserve slavery, a number of African Americans actually supported the Confederates during the U.S. Civil War. Here, Jeb Smith looks at a wide range of ways that African Americans supported the Confederacy from financial support to the military.

A picture of Marlboro Jones. He was an African-American servant to a white Confederate soldier.

"These African Americans were real fighting men whose combat performances should not be silenced out of respect for these brave men and their sacrifices, despite the vigorous organized effort of today's politically driven historians and other black confederate deniers." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker Blacks in Grey Uniforms A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865, America Through Time 2019 

 

"I myself have collected over 1,400 newspaper articles on this subject published between 1861 and 1865. That's a lot of ink spilled over something that some today call a "myth." You will find that these activist historians are not telling you the entire story." 

-Shane Anderson Black Southern Support for Secession and War the Abbeville Institute July 22, 2019 

 

The existence of black confederates is a debated and controversial subject. A search of the internet will show no shortage of articles, blogs, and videos of radical pro-North author's claiming black confederates are a "myth." They ask why a Southern African American would defend the Confederacy when blacks were treated horribly; rather they desired to run into the arms of the first white Yankee savior they saw. After all, the war was over slavery- the North fighting to liberate the slaves and the South to preserve the institution so southern blacks would jump at the chance to help the North and overthrow their racist masters.  

If anything, I am attempting to show that the winner wrote the history. If the South did not fight to preserve slavery, if the North did not fight to free the slaves, and if slaves were generally well treated and content, blacks supporting the Southern cause and their homeland, friends, and family should not surprise us. Some, for political purposes, seek to deny that blacks willingly sided with the South. Why should we allow these modern whites to tell us who blacks were allowed to support? 

Pro-north authors such as Eric Foner and Kevin Levin will argue that it is a myth that hundreds of thousands of blacks served in the confederate army as armed soldiers. These authors have set up a straw man to knockdown since it is easy to show hundreds of thousands of blacks were not soldiers. They can then ridicule "lost cause" authors and the sons of confederate veterans for claims of hundreds of thousands of black confederates. All in the hopes of disqualifying any other documentation of black confederates. Yet, I have noticed that even those who claim black confederates are a myth will simultaneously admit blacks served in the southern armies. In the live stream conversation Fighting for Freedom the Civil War and its Legacies, Eric Foner said, "There is no question that some small number of African Americans did volunteer and serve in confederate armies." 

Further, having searched the internet, including the hated Sons of Confederate Veterans, and having read many "lost cause" books on the subject, I can say no one claims hundreds of thousands of blacks fought as soldiers for the Confederacy. The Sons of Confederate Veterans website, in the article The Role of Black Soldiers in the Confederate Army, reads, "There was between 50,000 to 100,000 blacks that served in the Confederate Army as cooks, blacksmiths, and yes, even soldiers. "The majority is in the noncombatant form. On every estimate I have read, they always classify noncombatant services as cooks, musicians, etc., as those counted in the estimates.

As modern statists, Foner and Levin count only federally recognized soldiers and then feel free to dismiss the claims of large numbers of southern black soldiers. If cooks, musicians, and those forced into service do not count as actual soldiers, then the southern and northern servicemen drafted (white and black) are not actual soldiers. And since the vast majority of soldiers, North and South, were state volunteers, they were not actual soldiers either, according to these authors. They must fight only for the master, the federal government, to be "true" soldiers. 

One argument presented to deny black confederates is to tell us the many observations of thousands of blacks in service in the southern armies were of noncombatant form. This, of course, is often true. However, a great many observed soldiers as well. The logic they use to counter this is that these observers must be incorrect since the Confederacy (federal) did not approve blacks until late in the war. Once more, only federally recognized soldiers are "true" soldiers in their minds. So when we do see these armed black confederates, these are not "real soldiers" since the Confederacy does not recognize them.

These historians are coming from our modern nationalistic views and looking back to antebellum America. The federal government education had raised them, so it was hard for them to understand the time when the states had authority or where federal law did not control them. Thus only federal soldiers count in their minds, and any documents that say otherwise must be declared false. States or individuals could not have equipped slaves since the federal did not. Thus in Levin's mind, the fact that Confederate General Cleburne and other confederates pushed to arm slaves as Confederate [federal] recognized soldiers in 1864 proves that there were no black soldiers in the Confederacy before this time!!! Otherwise, why push for federally recognized soldiers in 1864?

One argument used by Levin is to point out Southerners' resistance to arming large numbers of slaves and the fear of them running away to northern lines. At most, it only proves that many masters feared losing their property and the loyalty of slaves. Believing not all slaves were or would be loyal to the South. Northern whites had the same fears of arming blacks. And these fears did play a role in why the federal arming of slaves in the Confederacy took so long. However, this does not show that owners and local authorities did not arm southern blacks. 

Levin also points out that Black Confederate soldiers were little known before the internet and that the Sons of Confederate Veterans initiated the recent popularity of the subject in response to the famous movie Roots in the 1970s. Even if this is true, that does not refute that black confederates were a historical reality. If a popular movie that influences public perception is released on any subject, there is usually a backlash from the other side wishing to give a fuller , more accurate portrayal. Because Roots portrayed blacks as heavily mistreated, it is not surprising that in response, the SCV would look through history and use examples to counter. To remove it from a Civil War context, transubstantiation was declared Catholic dogma at Trent in 1551. But this does not prove it was a 16th-century invention; it was the majority opinion down through Christian history, and had been official doctrine since the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215. It was declared dogma in response to the early Reformation denial of the teaching. Likewise, the increase in awareness and books on black confederates is in response to the internet and, as Levin said, Roots. 

Very few of these arguments are about historical data. If you want to see the role of presuppositions and imaginative ways in which we are to "properly" understand newspaper photos and various other examples of black confederates, watch Kevin Levin's speech Searching for Black Confederates: The Civil War's Most Persistent Myth at the US National Archives. One will find politics, philosophy, and worldview are far more important than historical data. If these authors wish only to prove that hundreds of thousands of blacks did not willingly serve the federal government of the Confederacy, then I think they will find no one will object. 

However, I define a soldier as one who willingly took up arms for the Confederacy or fought under a Confederate general regardless of federal recognition. In other words, state militia and individuals are actual soldiers. The Confederacy left it up to the states to decide if slaves were to fight as soldiers. If the South objected to the federal government's involvement with slave property in the old Union, why would they allow the confederate government to do the same in the South? So slaves' involvement was up to the state and, more importantly, the slave and master. Free blacks were also left to local control. 

 

"Even before the opening of the conflict, Southerners began to enroll free blacks for service with the state militias, sometimes by state law or by purely local action. The use of free blacks in the military was varied, as they saw service as laborers, support staff or in rare instances as soldiers." 

-Frank Edward Deserino University College London A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London Department of History University College London July 2001

 

This is not intended to show a vast treasure of previously unknown material but as a summary of some of the findings of historians on the subject of black confederates that the general public does not encounter. Firstly, we will look at some examples of how southern blacks supported the Confederacy.

 

Southern Patriots

"About sixty free negroes volunteered and went down to Fort Macon to do battle for their country, while another gave twenty-five dollars cash to help support the war; and still another, who is a poor man, having just arrived at our wharf with a load of wood for sale, delivered it up to the town auctioneer, with a request to sell it and appropriate it in the same way." 

Richmond Daily Dispatch, April 19, 1861 

 

Just as John Brown was mistaken when he believed slaves would join him in revolt against the South, the abolitionists also predicted massive slave revolts during the war. Instead, it could be argued that Southern blacks sided with their own country. In Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, Ervin Jordan wrote that "Black confederate loyalty was more widespread than American historians has acknowledged." And while blacks who volunteered for the Union often had to be protected from whites, Southern blacks needed no such protection. Southerners were excited to have blacks volunteer.

 

"The free negroes of New Orleans, La., held a public meeting and began the organization of a battalion, with officers of their own race, with the approval of the State government, which commissioned their negro officers. When the Louisiana militia was reviewed, the Native Guards (negro) made up, in part, the first division of the State troops. Elated at the success of being first to place negroes in the field together with white troops, the commanding general sent the news over the wires to the jubilant confederacy: "New Orlean, November 23,1861. "Over 28,000 troops were reviewed today by Governor Moore, Major-General Lovell and Brigadier-General Ruggles. The line was over seven miles long; one regiment comprised 1,400 free colored men."

 -Joseph T Wilson The Black Phalanx African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War Da Capo Press New York 1994

 

Tens of thousands of Southern blacks, both slave and free, supported the confederate cause. Many southern blacks wanted to defend their country from the Yankee invaders. Many enslaved blacks had deep loyalty and family ties with their masters and followed them off to war. While it might be hard for some to believe today, many African American slaves and slave owners wanted slavery to continue and fought to protect the institution. In The Negro in the South, Booker T Washington writes, "A few colored men, it is said, were actually enrolled and enlisted as soldiers in the confederate army, fighting for their own continued enslavement."

"One may get the idea, from what I have said, that there was bitter feeling toward the white people on the part of my race, because of the fact that most of the white population was away fighting in a war which would result in keeping the Negro in slavery if the South was successful. In the case of the slaves on our place this was not true, and it was not true of any large portion of the slave population in the South where the Negro was treated with anything like decency." 

-Booker T Washington Up From Slavery Value Classics Reprint 1901 

 

As slave owners, many blacks defended slavery as an institution vital to their financial well-being. One Union soldier described a free black church as "Half-crazed black secessionists." Wealthy colored plantation owners such as South Carolina's William Ellison donated large sums of money to the Confederacy and bought confederate bonds and treasury notes in support. Ellison stopped growing cotton and instead grew food to help feed the confederate armies. Ellison's grandson John Buckner volunteered and fought for the 1st South Carolina artillery and helped defend Ft Wagner from the famous assault made by the 54th Massachusetts colored regiment. 

In the summer of 1861, The Winston Salem NC newspaper, People’s Press, reported that "fifteen free men of color volunteered for state service" and that they were in fine spirits and wore a "We will die for the South emblem." In New Bern, "fifteen to twenty free Negros came forward to volunteer their service to defend the city." A newspaper in Lynchburg, Virginia, reported on the 70 free blacks who enlisted to defend Virginia "Three cheers for the patriotic Negros of Lynchburg." 

Historian Phillip Tucker quotes a statement by the free mulatto population of South Carolina "Our allegiance is due to SO Ca. and in her defense, we are willing to offer up our lives, and all that is dear to us." And on March 21, 1863, the Nashville Daily Union Tennessee reported, "Negro rebel Cavalry pickets on the south bank of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg shows that negroes are ready enough to serve masters on the field, and that the rebels are ready enough to make use of them serve as common soldiers...these negroes are well in the service, as in their sympathy, of the south."

Abolitionist Horace Greeley published The American Conflict in 1866, and he quotes the following wartime newspapers reporting on black patriotism in the South. "A Washington dispatch to The Evening Post (New York), about this time, set forth that—"A gentleman from Charleston says that everything there betokens active preparations for fight…negroes busy in building batteries, so far from inclining to insurrection, were grinning from ear to ear at tile prospect of shooting the Yankees." The Charleston Mercury of January 3 said: "We learn that 150 able-bodied free colored men of Charleston, yesterday offered their services gratuitously to the Governor, to hasten forward the important work of throwing up redoubts wherever needed along our coast."  The Memphis Avalanche joyously proclaimed that - a procession of several hundred stout negro men, members of the "domestic institution," marched through our streets yesterday in military order, under the command of Confederate officers. They were all armed and equipped with shovels, axes, blankets, etc. A merrier set was never seen. They were brimful of patriotism, shouting for Jeff Davis and singing war songs."

 

"About fifty free negroes in Amelia county have offered themselves to the Government for any service. In our neighboring city of Petersburg, two hundred free negroes offered for any work that might be assigned to them, either to fight under white officers, dig ditches, or anything that could show their desire to serve Old Virginia. In the same city, a negro hackman came to his master, and insisted, with tears in his eyes, that he should accept all his savings, $100, to help equip the volunteers. – The free negroes of Chesterfield have made a similar proposition. Such is the spirit, among bond and free, through the whole of the State." 

 – The Daily Dispatch, April 25, 1861, Quoted in Shane Anderson Black Southern Support for Secession and War Abbeville Institute July 22, 2019

 

Financial Support

Many blacks supported the Confederacy in a non-military capacity, and "enthusiasm with which many blacks endorsed secession" was widespread. Large-scale demonstrations of blacks were held in Petersburg and New Orleans. In Petersburg, blacks offered to construct fortifications for the Confederacy, telling the mayor of Petersburg:

"We are willing to aid Virginians cause to the utmost extent of our ability….there is not an unwilling heart among us." Charles Tinsley, Spokesman for Petersburg free blacks 1861. When handed a confederate flag he said "I could feel no greater pride."

 - Mrs J Blakeslee Frost The Rebellion in the United States or the war of  1861 Hartford, CT: Published by the Author, 1862

 

Blacks in Vicksburg, Mississippi, donated $1,000 to the war effort. In General Stand Watie's Confederate Indians, Frank Cunningham tells how it became custom for slaves to hold balls and concerts to give money to the war effort in Arkansas. Free and slave negroes gave a ball at 50 cents ahead for support for the Confederacy and General Hindman of Arkansas, who stated the local blacks "Have displayed much loyalty and patriotism in their donations to the confederate cause." Cunningham also tells of General Albert Pike's slave Brutus, who kept $63,000 safe from the federals during the battle at Pea Ridge. He returned to his master, who gave him his freedom in payment, but Brutus did not accept it and served General Pike instead. James Muschett, a free black store owner in Virginia, donated food, clothes, and blacksmith services to the confederate government. Later he was imprisoned by the Union for being a spy and a confederate sympathizer. 

J K Obatala writes about a slave named Henry Jones who donated $465 in gold to the Confederate government, and the Union Milledgeville, Georgia, on August 26, 1863, reported on the balls all over the South where blacks were donating large sums of money to the cause. In The Unlikely Story of Blacks Who Were Loyal to Dixie. Obatala writes, "Many slaves made financial and material contributions to the Confederacy. In Alabama, William Yancy's slaves brought $60 worth of watermelons to Montgomery for the soldiers." Historian E Merton Coulter wrote, "It became custom for slaves to hold balls and concerts and give the money...to aid soldiers." These were not isolated incidents but common actions throughout the South.

The "Confederate Ethiopian Serenaders" singers used all their funds to finance gunboats and munitions for the Confederacy. Horace King of Alabama gave clothes to soldiers. Just two months before Appomattox, blacks gave dinner to confederate soldiers in Louisburg, Virginia. A Fairfax County free black sold 28 acres of land and donated the money to the defense of Virginia. During the war, blacks gave to help build a monument for Stonewall Jackson. Former North Carolina slave David Blunt said, "Yes mam, de days on de plantation wuz de happy days..he hated de yankees for killing Massa Tom. In fact, we all hated de Yankees." It seems not to have been uncommon for blacks to side with the South.

"All de slaves hate de Yankees an when de southern soldiers came late in de night all de ******* got out of de bed an holdin torches high dey march behin de soldiers, all of dem singin We'll hang Abe Lincoln on de Sour Apple Tree. yes mam, dey wuz sorry dat dey wuz free an' dey ain't got no reason to be glad, case dey wuz happier den dan now." 

 - Alice Baugh North Carolina Slave Narratives, reminiscing about her enslaved mother’s Stories

 

"The consequential manner of the negro, and the supreme contempt with which he spoke to his prisoner, were most amusing. This little episode of a Southern slave leading a white Yankee soldier through a Northern village, alone and of his own accord, would not have been gratifying to an abolitionist. Nor would the sympathizers both in England and in the North feel encouraged if they could hear the language of detestation and contempt with which the numerous negroes with the Southern armies speak of their liberators." 

-Lt.-Colonel Arthur J. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States 1864

 

Information From Black Civilians

Southern blacks helped spread vital information to confederates or acted as spies. Former Arkansas Slave James Gill, a young boy at the time, said of his family "Us was Confedrits all de while...but de Yankees, dey didn’ know dat we was Confedrits." Slave Martin Robinson was hanged for falsely leading the federal troops the wrong way during the Kilpatrick- Dahlgren raid in 64. Slaves acting as spies for the South was so common that Union General Halleck gave his "General order number three" that disallowed any blacks into the federal lines because blacks were acting as runaway slaves but, in reality, were southern spies who gave vital information back to the Confederates. On November 20, 1861, Major-General Halleck wrote, "It has been represented that important information respecting the numbers and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil it is directed that no such person be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom." 

Slave Burrel Hemphill refused to give information on his master's hidden money and silverware, so Sherman’s men tied a rope to his ankle and dragged him back and forth by a horse until he died, still never saying a word. Federal soldiers after Bull Run were too trusting of southern blacks when they asked slaves for food; instead, the slaves brought them to confederate lines, and they were taken prisoner. In Thomas Jordan and J.P Pryors The Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, the authors tell of a local negro who helped Forrest capture federal cavalry with information helpful to confederates. Another local black helped General Forrest by leading the federals into a confederate trap. In 1864 a free black named Goler misled union soldiers of his loyalty by providing food and shelter, only then to notify the confederates who captured the federal soldiers in the night. 

Georgia's governor Joseph E Brown is recorded in The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia Volume 2 stating "The country and the army are mainly dependent upon slave labor for support… it is impossible for the women and children to support themselves." With their masters away, slaves worked the plantations. Slaves' work kept the families from starving and allowed whites to fight the war. Federal General M.C Meigs wrote, "The labor of the colored man supports the rebel soldier, enables him to leave his plantation to meet our armies, builds his fortifications, cooks his food, and sometimes aids him on the picket by rare skill with the rifle." Slave Henry Warfield of Warren County, Mississippi, said, "Negroes were used by the Confederates long before they were used by the Union forces...and a large number of these fought by the side of their masters or made it possible for the master to fight." And as US Grant said, slaves "worked in the fields and took care of the families while white able bodied men were at the front fighting." 

Confederate General Richard Taylor [son of President Taylor] said: "Wives and little ones remained safe at home, surrounded by thousands of faithful slaves." With the men gone, slaves could have left for the North or refused to work, yet the overwhelming majority worked so the master could leave to fight. Often masters put a trusted slave in charge of the family while gone. In many ways, this trusted slave took over the master's role.

"In order to defend and protect the women and children who were left on the plantations when the white males went to war, the slaves would have laid down their lives. The slave who was selected to sleep in the" big house" during the absence of the males was considered to have the place of honour. Any one attempting to harm "young Mistress" or "old Mistress" during the night would have had to cross the dead body of the slave to do so...As a rule, not only did the members of my race entertain no feelings of bitterness against the whites before and during the war, but there are many instances of Negroes tenderly caring for their former masters and mistresses who for some reason have become poor and dependent since the war. I know of instances where the former masters of slaves have for years been supplied with money by their former slaves to keep them from suffering."                                           

-Booker T Washington Up from Slavery Value Classics Reprint 1901

 

After the South officially allowed federal black soldiers in the armies, Abraham Lincoln took the positives away from the action. He said, "There is one thing about negros fighting for the rebels... they cannot at the same time fight in their army, and stay home and make bread for them."

Another way southern blacks supported the cause was in what today is considered an unpardonable sin, moral support by waving the confederate flag. The Central Georgian, April 24, 1861, reported, "Secession flags dot the country along the route from Wilmington, and even the negroes waved the Confederate banner at the cars as they passed." 

                                               

Service in the Confederate Military

"The credit of having first conquered their prejudices against the employment of Blacks, even as soldiers, is fairly due to the Rebels." 

-Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-65: Volume II Hartford. Published by O. D. Chase and Company. 1866

 

"Thousands of black southerners voluntarily supported the Confederate cause, ignoring an offer of federal freedom and, when allowed, to do so, took up arms to defend Dixie."

 -Charles Barrow, J.H Segars and R.B. Rosenburg, Black Confederates Pelican Publishing Company GretnaLouisiana 2004

 

Blacks, both free and slave, offered their service in the Confederate military. An estimated 58,000 blacks served in Confederate armies in a noncombatant role as cooks, musicians, chaplains, medics, scouts, or manual labor. Unlike the Federal army, Confederate armies gave equal pay to black service members (and soldiers) from the start of the war. The North did not do so until late in the war. Likewise, the southern blacks were in integrated units while the Federal troops segregated black union soldiers.

In Tenting Tonight, celebrated historian James Robertson writes, "Some slaves felt great loyalty to their masters and asked to be allowed to take up arms to defend what was, after all, their homeland too." Slave-owning Southern soldiers often brought along a slave with whom they had a close personal relationship. They had played together, ate together, worked together, and now wanted to defend their family and homeland together. Historian Phillip Tucker quotes from black confederate Tom Phelps who wrote home in June of 1861 "I will leave…today for a scout about the woods for yankees give my love to mistress and master…. Ps goodbye to the white folks until I killed a yankee." Azariah Bostwick of the 31st Georgia Infantry wrote home, "He [southern blacks] is no better to fight for his country than I am, my home is his." Even slaves not loyal to the South showed loyalty to their masters. A slave at Antietam risked his life to pull his master to safety before then running across the battlefield to the federal soldiers and freedom.

"A good many white confederates, who mostly hailed from the yeomentry, or small farmer class, actually considered these black confederates to be best friends and faithful companions and vice versa, because they knew each other so well, after having grown up together since childhood…A general familiar-like sentiment towards blacks was often demonstrated by white confederate soldiers, from lowly private to high ranking officers, and this has been fully revealed in their personal letters that were written from 1861-1865. After all blacks and whites shared a common southern culture and heritage, and especially in regard to love for their homeland that was now under threat." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker Blacks in Grey Uniforms: A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865 America Through Time 2019 

 

When interviewed decades later, many servants often were proud of their master's ability to fight Yankees "Why mass can whale a dozen of em fore coffee is hot, fair fight." Often the personal slaves would serve as cooks or general servants, but sometimes, they would be armed and join in a fight in various circumstances, or be armed as soldiers by their masters. Isaac Stier of Mississippi said, "When de big war broke out I sho' stuck to my Marster an' I fit de Yankees same as he did. I went in de battles' long side of him an' us both fit under Marse Robert E. Lee." Herndon Bogan of North Carolina told his master, "Ide rather go wid you ter de war, please sur, massa, let me go wid you ter fight dem yanks... old massa got shot one night an pap grabs de gun fore hit de earth an lets de yanks have it." 

Ervin Jordan wrote in Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees, "Body servants fought for the south if given the chance and occasionally replaced fainthearted white rebel soldiers." He gives an example where during the Seven Days Battles, Westley, a body servant, took the weapons from a frightened white confederate and killed a Yankee with almost every shot and was "An inspiration to the white soldiers." A servant named Jem was described as "A black fire eater," a strong supporter of secession, and fought at First Manassas. Other servants were thrown in as artillerymen at First Manassas. Historian Phillip Tucker quotes the Evansville Daily Journal of Indiana who mistakenly reported a regiment of confederate negro cavalry at Bull Run when in reality it was 30-40 armed servants who joined in the pursuit of retreating Federals.

Slave Primus Kelly volunteered for  the 8th Texas Cavalry and fought in the battles. Likewise, 12th Virginia Cavalry captain George Baylor's two slaves Tom and Overton "picked up arms" and "Joined in the company charges." Former Mississippi slave Henry Warfield observed "Negroes were used by the Confederates long before they were used by the Union forces...and a large number of these fought by the side of their masters."

On rare occasions, masters would send a slave to serve in their place. Former slave Geroge Kye said, "When the war came along I was a grown man, and I went to serve because the old master was too old to go, but he had to send somebody anyways, I served as Geroge Stover."

While not official in the ranks of the units, some of these body servants would serve as sharpshooters. Ervin Jordan documents Federal soldier George Hapman of the 89th NY reported killing a "Rebel sharpshooter negro" in June of 1863. Herman Clarke of the 117th NY wrote home that he was ambushed by a "****** sharpshoter." Tucker gives many examples of this class of southern soldiers.

One southern black sharpshooter around Yorktown earned a reputation for his aim among union soldiers who wrote of, "A rebel negro riflemen, who through his skill as a markeman, had done more injury to our men than any dozen of his white compeers." This sharpshooter was so good he eventually had to be taken out by the Federals' famous sharpshooter "California Joe," as reported in the NY Herald under "Sniper duels with black confederates." In June of 1862, George Hapman of the 89th NY wrote home that he had a ring made out of the tree that "Joe shot the rebel sharpshooter ****** out of."

Servant snipers became so common that on January the 10th, 1863, Harper's Weekly did a front-page illustration of two black confederate snipers titled "Rebel negro pickets as seen through a fiberglass." Tucker again quotes the Daily Sun of Columbus, Georgia, reporting on a servant soldier at Belmont. "In the recent battle at Belmont, Lieutenant Shelton [13th Arkansas]…had his servant Jack in the fight. Both Jack and his master were wounded, but not till they had made the most heroic efforts to drive back the insolent invaders. Finally, after Jack had fired at the enemy 27 times, he fell seriously wounded in the arm. Jack's son was on the field and loaded the rifle for his father, who shot at the enemy three times after he was upon the ground." Tucker quotes James G Bates of the 13th Indiana vol infantry writing home, "The rebels have negro soldiers in their army. One of their best sharp shooters, and the boldest of them all here is a negro." Thomas Knox, a journalist for the NY Herald, reported on the battle of Chickasaw Bayou "On our right a negro sharpshooter has been observed whose exploits are deserving of notice. He mounts a breastwork regardless of all danger, and getting sight of a federal soldier, draws up his musket at arm's length and fires, never failing of hitting his mark."

 

Black Confederate Soldiers

"As a matter of fact, it was in the Confederate armies that the first negro soldiers were enlisted. During the latter part of April, 1861, a Negro company at Nashville, Tennessee made up of "free people of color" offered its services to the Confederate Government. Shortly after, a recruiting office was opened for free Negroes at Memphis Tennessee."

-Booker T Washington, The Story of the Negro; the Rise of the Race from Slavery  New York, Doubleday 1909 

 

"It is now pretty well established, that there are at the present moment many colored men in the Confederate army doing duty not only as cooks, servants and laborers, but as real soldiers, having muskets on their shoulders, and bullets in their pockets, ready to shoot down loyal troops, and do all that soldiers may to destroy the Federal Government and build up that of the traitors and rebels. There were such soldiers at Manassas, and they are probably there still." 

-Frederick Douglass Douglass' Monthly, September 1861 

 

Thousands of Southern blacks loyal to Dixie fought as soldiers in Confederate armies. Southern states and local militia allowed blacks into service from the outset of the war, while the North initially rejected the idea. Virginia and Tennessee, in particular, set up recruitment stations for all able-bodied blacks. The colored Tennessee militia was described as "Brimful of patriotism, shouting for Jeff Davis and singing war songs." In Memphis, Tennessee. Two black regiments were raised in September, becoming the first state to authorize black soldiers

 

"The legislature of Tennessee...enacted in June, 1861, a law authorizing the governor—"To receive into the military service of the State all male free persons of color, between the age of 15 and 50, who should receive $8 per month, clothing and rations." 

-Joseph T Wilson The Black Phalanx African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War Da Capo Press New York 1994

 

The "Native Guards, Louisiana" consisted of 1,500 free colored volunteers from Louisiana who supplied themselves. They stated they were fighting because "The free colored population of Louisiana …own slaves and they are dearly attached to their native land … and they are ready to shed their blood for her defense. They have no sympathy for abolitionism; no love for the North, but they have plenty for Louisiana …They will fight for her in 1861 as they fought in 1814-1815." Swearing to the Louisianan Governor to defend the Confederacy, they became the first civil war unit to appoint black officers. On May 12, after the capture of New Orleans, Bailey Frank of the 34th NY volunteers wrote: "There is no mistake, but the rebels have black soldiers for I have seen them brought in as prisoners of war, I saw one who had the stripes of an ordinary Sargent on his coat." 

The very first land battle of the war in Hampton, Virginia, on June 10, 1861, involved a black confederate. Tucker reports that Sam, a servant soldier of Captain Richard Ashe, was the hero of the battle. Sam shot Union major Theodore Winthrop, stopping the advance of the federals. Winthrop was the first Union officer killed in battle. (Note: three different white soldiers also claimed to have killed Winthrop.) Tucker also reports on the battle of New Market, Virginia, where local black militia helped win the day. The NY Herald, on December 28, 1861, reported, "The rebels have an entire company of infantry composed of negroes." And "The skirmishers of the 20th NY vol regiment discovered the enemy, consisting of three companies of infantry. Among them one company of negroes, who appeared in the front, and made the attack." The local militia fought so well defending their home state, the Milwaukee Daily News headlined in January, "white soldiers outdone by blacks." One federal officer they quoted from the battle said, "Fifty armed negroes flanked the whites formed the center, and they fought better than their white fellows." And "Negro infantry opened fire on our men...the wounded men testify positively they were shot by negroes, and that not less than 700 were present, armed with muskets." On December 23, 1861, NY Tribune wrote of the "Attack on our soldiers by armed negroes." In all, six patriotic southern blacks were killed defending their homeland in the battle. After the battle, Ervin Jordan quotes a NY soldier who wrote, "If they fight us with negroes, why should we not fight them with negroes too?.... let us fight the devil with fire."

Likewise, Jordan reports the 1st Ohio Volunteer were was attacked on June 17, 1861, by the 1st South Carolina, accompanied by "A body of 150 armed negroes." Black members of the 1st Regiment Virginia Cavalry company H killed a Union soldier on July 2, 1861, at Falling Waters. Phillip Powers wrote to his wife that an armed black in his company shot and killed an escaping federal. General D.Stuart was quoted in the Army and Navy Gazette reporting, "The enemy, and especially their armed negroes, did dare to rise and fire, and did serious execution upon our men. The casualties in the brigade were 11 killed, 40 wounded, and 4 missing; aggregate, 55." 

Black fought with units at Petersburg. Bull Run, Vicksburg, Seven Days, Brandy Station, and Antietam. Frank Cunningham tells of armed negroes with no uniforms who fought for the Confederacy in Arkansas under a McIntosh regiment in March 1862. Both free and enslaved blacks fought under general Forrest, who after the war said: "Better Confederates did not live." In his book The Appomattox Campaign, Chris Calkins reports a skirmish on April 5, 1865, when black and white Confederate soldiers defended a confederate wagon train but were eventually captured by the 1st Pennsylvania and 24th NY cavalry. The federals reported that among the captured black prisoners some were termed "teamsters." After Gettysburg, the NY Herald, July 11, 1863, "Reported among the rebel prisoners were seven blacks in Confederate uniforms fully armed as soldiers." 

Thomas Tobi, a black man, served with the Army of Northern Virginia as a volunteer from May 12, 1861, to April 16, 1865,. A free man of color, Charles Lutz of the 8th LA volunteer infantry, was a two-time POW during the war. He fought at major engagements in Virginia and was first captured at Chancellorsville. Six blacks joined the Goochland light artillery and fought at Chaffin's Bluff. In August 1861, near Hampton, Virginia, Union army Colonel John W. Phelps of the 1st Vermont Infantry reported artillery manned by Negroes. 

 

"The most liberal calculation could not give them more than 64,000 men. Over 3,000 Negroes must be included in this number. These were clad in all kinds of uniforms, not only in cast-off or captured United States uniforms, but in coats with Southern buttons, State buttons, etc. These were shabby, but not shabbier or seedier than those worn by white men in the rebel ranks. Most of the Negroes had arms, rifles, muskets, sabers, bowie-knives, dirks, etc. They were supplied with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, etc and they were an integral portion of the Southern Confederate army. They were seen riding on horses and mules, driving wagons, riding on caissons, in ambulances, with the staff of generals and promiscuously mixing it up with all the Rebel horde."

 -Union Sanitation Commission Inspector Dr. Louis Steiner, Sept. 1862 

 

"William Colen Revels was twenty years old when he volunteered for Confederate service, and was one of the first men of any color in Surry County, North Carolina, to march off to war. He spent the greater part of the war in the 21 North Carolina Infantry, and is listed on the rolls as a "Negro." He was wounded in the leg at Winchester, and caught a bullet in the right thigh at Gettysburg, probably on East Cemetery Hill on July 2 1863." 

-Frank Edward Deserino University College London A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London Department of History University College London July, 2001

 

How Many Black Confederates Fought?

"We were defeated, routed and driven from the field. ... It was not alone the white man's victory, for it was won by slaves. Yes, the Confederates had three regiments of blacks in the field, and they maneuvered like veterans, and beat the Union men back."

-William Henry Johnson, 8th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry at Manassas Quoted in Kari A Kornell African Americans in the Civil War Abdo Publishing 2016

 

"At least nine documented blacks….served in the ranks of the 6th Louisiana Calvary...another company of enthusiastic blacks Louisianan troopers hailed from a vibrant free black community of Catholic mulattoes whitch was known as Isle Brevels these hard riding black cavalrymen...slashing with sabers at a target dummy with the appropriate name of "abe lincoln." 

-Phillip Thomas Tucker, Blacks in Grey Uniforms; A New Look at the South's Most Forgotten Combat Troops 1861-1865 America Through Time 2019 

 

After researching the question, Harvard professor John Stauffer concluded, "Thousands of Southern slaves and freedmen fought willingly and loyally on the side of the Confederacy." There is no question blacks willingly fought for the South; Historian Phillip Tucker writes, "To deny the fact that these courageous black rebels, free and slave, risked their lives in fighting on the battlefield has been a great injustice rooted in personal agendas that have little to do with history." 

However, it is impossible to tell how many blacks fought for the South as not all the records survived the war, nor were they all recorded. Estimates range from a few thousand to 10,000. Historians Stauffer and Tucker both estimate between three and ten thousand in total. Historian John Winters estimates that 3,000 black and mulattoes came from Louisiana alone, the state that provided more colored troops to the Confederacy than any other. Of course, we must define what a soldier is. If we only count those after the confederate congress officially recruited black soldiers in the regular army in 1865, then less than 1,000 served. If we accept a black man armed as an individual, in mixed regiments, or in-state militia units, fighting under a confederate general, then I would guess at least a few thousand. In some cases, blacks might have been forced by their master or white officer to help fight in battle; these would not count as soldiers, in my opinion.

However, there were a great many slaves who wanted to fight, but their masters would not allow them. Masters would send their sons to die, but not their slaves. In a speech given on February 9, 1865, Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin said, "Let us now say to every negro who wishes to go into the ranks on condition of being free, go and fight—you are free. My own negroes have been to me and said, 'Master, set us free and we'll fight for you." 

The Slave Narratives provide many examples of slaves wanting to go to war with their masters, but either their masters were unwilling to send them, or they were too young. Many free mulattoes had to sneak into the service to fight. One Confederate who pushed for the freeing of slaves and their enlistment by the Confederate federal government, was General Lee, who said he "Regrets the unwillingness of owners to permit their slaves to enter the service." And Charles Marshall wrote to General R.S Ewell on March 27, 1865, "The state authorities can do nothing to get those negroes who are wanting to join the army, but whose masters refuse their consent."

Large numbers of southern blacks wanted to join but many stubborn slave owners were unwilling. In fact, some slaves, like William Rose of the 1st SC Infantry, ran away to join the army as a musician.

 

"Every precaution should be taken to insure proper and kind treatment of the negroes and to render them contented in the service...there should be a system of rewards too, for good conduct and industry...most of the negroes are accustomed to something of this sort on the plantations." 

-J.F Gilmer Major-General and Chief of the Engineer Bureau 1864 

 

When the Confederate Congress did authorize the enlistment of federal black confederates, they did so with fair treatment in mind as statements like "primary importance that the negroes should know that the service is voluntary on their part" and "harshness...or offensive language or conduct to them must be forbidden." Southern blacks receive fair treatment from the outset of the war. They received equal pay and worked in integrated units, but they were also treated fairly otherwise.

On April 29, 1862, Secretary of War George Randolph heard rumors the slaves doing manual labor for the Southern army were in dire conditions on the Peninsula. He wrote to confederate general John Magruder who responded, "The soldiers, however, have been more exposed and have suffered far more than the slaves. The latter have always slept undercover and have had fires to make them comfortable, while the men have been working in the rain, have stood in the trenches and rifle pits in mud and water almost knee-deep without shelter, fire or sufficient food." Hard to detect any racism and discrimination there. 

Other minorities fought for the South as well. Jews were the largest minority group of soldiers to fight for the Confederacy, with an estimated 10,000 soldiers who fought. Other minority groups who supported the Confederacy with thousands of soldiers were Native Americans, Chinese and Mexicans. As DiLorenzo points out, those who desire to make the civil war one of slavery and white supremacy of the South vs. tolerance and freedom from the North must stop to consider that federal units with slave owners fought against non-slave-owning southerners through the entire war. And black southerners volunteered to fight while white southerners, both slave-owning, and non-slave-owning, avoided the war.

 

 

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

Much of what happened on Civil War battlefields was determined by the economic and logistical foundations of the societies the armies represented. The military that a country puts on the battlefield is not a generic collection of soldiers but rather a direct reflection of the culture that creates it. War can be compared to an iceberg: the armies and battles are its visible and graphic “tip”, but what actually decides the outcome of the battles are the money and resources available to acquire the weapons and equipment needed to wage war effectively. The procurement and transportation of clothing, food and supplies were the decisive factors, but are typically relegated to footnotes, remaining submerged and invisible.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the logistical challenges in the Confederacy through the Confederate Quartermaster and the Subsistence Corps.

Colonel Abraham Myers.

The Logistics Problems of the Confederacy

The Confederate government faced myriad interconnected problems that hindered its ability to adequately plan for and address the logistical challenges during the American Civil War. The combination of the Union blockade, limited industrial capacity, transportation issues, financial strain, diplomatic challenges, and internal divisions contributed to the Confederate government's difficulties in acquiring and sustaining critical resources during the Civil War. The combination of resource limitations, economic constraints, political factors, and the nature of the conflict itself made it difficult for the Confederate government to plan and address the logistical challenges in a comprehensive manner (see below).

 

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Origins of the Logistics Issues Faced by the Confederacy

 

Blockade: The Union Navy imposed a blockade on Southern ports, severely restricting the Confederacy's access to foreign trade and essential supplies. This blockade made it challenging for the Confederacy to import much-needed goods and resources.

 

Insufficient Industrial Capacity: The Confederate states had a smaller industrial base compared to the more industrialized Northern states. They relied heavily on agriculture, and their limited industrial capacity hindered their ability to produce weapons, ammunition, and other crucial supplies necessary for war.

 

Poor Rail. Transportation: The war disrupted transportation networks, making it difficult to move resources efficiently within the Confederate states and further complicated efforts to acquire and distribute resources efficiently.

 

Political Conflict between states and national government: The Confederate states prioritized their individual interests over the collective needs of the Confederacy, leading to internal divisions and challenges in coordinating resource allocation.

 

 

The Confederacy had fewer resources and a smaller industrial base compared to the Union. They struggled to match the Union's manufacturing capabilities and lacked the infrastructure to support large-scale production and transportation of weapons and supplies. Moreover, the Confederate government faced economic difficulties throughout the war, including inflation and a strained financial system. These constraints made it challenging to allocate sufficient funds for logistics, transportation infrastructure, and the procurement of necessary resources. The Union blockade severely restricted the Confederacy's ability to import weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from foreign sources. This created a significant reliance on domestic production, which was insufficient to meet the demands of the war.

The Confederate government was structured in its Constitution to be a federation of states without a strong national government, consistent with its founding philosophy based on states’ rights. It was comprised of individual states with varying priorities and interests. Coordination and cooperation among these states in terms of logistics and supply chain management were challenging. Additionally, disagreements and competing interests among political leaders impacted efficient planning and execution of logistics.

Impact of military strategy. The Confederate military leadership, including General Robert E. Lee, opted for offensive strategies and focused on battlefield victories. This emphasis on aggressive tactics sometimes overshadowed the need for comprehensive logistical planning, leading to inadequate preparations for sustaining operations. As an insurgency, a better strategy might have been to defend critical territories and cities, hoping to withstand a Union invasion. But a short war was envisioned and this was not politically a choice Jefferson Davis thought was feasible at the time.

Limited industrial and manufacturing sector. The new Confederate nation possessed insufficient production capacity for the trial ahead. The Confederacy had fewer factories, foundries, and manufacturing facilities compared to the industrialized North. Consequently, the Confederacy struggled to meet the demands for weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other essential supplies. This scarcity hindered their ability to adequately equip and sustain their troops in the field.

The Confederacy relied heavily on imports to compensate for their domestic manufacturing limitations. However, the Union blockade disrupted their ability to import goods and materials, including weapons and vital supplies. The inability to access foreign sources of production and technology exacerbated the supply shortages faced by the Confederacy.

The limited industrial sector also affected the development of transportation infrastructure. The Confederacy had fewer railways, fewer navigable waterways, and fewer well-maintained roads compared to the Union. The lack of robust transportation systems made it challenging to move goods, weapons, and supplies efficiently to the front lines, resulting in delays and logistical difficulties.

The limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy meant there was a scarcity of raw materials, such as iron, coal, and other critical resources needed for production. This scarcity affected the ability to produce and maintain weapons, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, further straining logistical operations.

The Confederacy's industrial base was heavily agricultural, with limited diversification into other industries. This lack of diversification made it difficult to develop a robust manufacturing sector capable of meeting the varied demands of the war effort. The limited range of industrial capabilities constrained their ability to produce a wide array of equipment and supplies needed for the military.

Overall, the limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy had a profound impact on logistical operations. Supplying and equipping Confederate forces during the war was a serious problem for the entire 4 years but became worse as time wore on and critical ports and geographic areas came under Union control.

Scarcities of various essential war resources. The Confederacy struggled to produce enough firearms and ammunition to adequately equip its troops. Rifles, muskets, and other weapons were in high demand, but the limited manufacturing capabilities meant that many soldiers had to rely on outdated or inferior weapons. Ammunition shortages also occurred, limiting the firepower of Confederate forces.

The production of uniforms and clothing was insufficient to meet the needs of the Confederate Army. Soldiers often faced shortages of proper uniforms, resulting in a mix of civilian clothing, captured Union uniforms, and makeshift garments. This not only affected morale but also impacted the identification of friendly troops on the battlefield.

Adequate footwear was scarce among Confederate soldiers. Leather shortages and limited production capabilities led to soldiers marching and fighting with inadequate or worn-out shoes. This created significant discomfort, increased the risk of foot-related health issues, and impacted mobility on the battlefield.

The production of blankets and tents fell short of demand. Confederate soldiers often lacked sufficient protection from the elements, especially during harsh winter conditions. This further contributed to the hardships endured by troops in the field.

The Confederacy faced difficulties in procuring and producing medical supplies needed to treat wounded soldiers and to treat communicable diseases. Scarcities included items such as bandages, medicines, surgical instruments, and anesthetics. Medical personnel often had to improvise and rely on limited resources, resulting in compromised healthcare for the wounded.

The limited industrial capacity of the Confederacy affected the production of essential machinery and equipment needed for various sectors, such as manufacturing, mining, and transportation. This hindered the development and expansion of critical industries and further impacted the overall war effort.

 

The Sustainment Bureaucracy

Expecting only a brief war and anticipating merely a perfunctory Northern response, secessionist leaders had quietly planned to construct a sufficient military force for that limited mission. After preparing a political ideology that succeeded in establish secession, they planned for a single battle that would decide the question. They had amassed abundant weapons through subterfuge and capturing supplies at federal forts to last them for a year or two. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Confederate leaders had not expected to fight a long war and had not made contingency plans until secession actually forced a serious consideration.  The creation of military sustainment departments began on February 26, 1861, even before the authorization of an army on March 6 (1,2). A Bureau of Ordnance was created on April.27. The leaders of the Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordinance Departments, Colonel Abraham Myers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucius Northrop, and Major Josiah Gorgas had considerable influence on logistics organizations and operations for the Confederate armies. These three men were charged with the responsibility of harnessing the Southern economy to support the armies.

The Confederacy was a newly formed nation with a limited institutional framework and experience in managing large-scale logistics and warfare. The absence of a well-established bureaucracy and logistics system further hampered their ability to plan and execute effective supply chains. After Manassas, it became clear that food, additional armaments and clothes would be needed to carry on the war effort.  Financial means and mechanisms for their procurement became critical facets of war planning. As the duration of the war lengthened, inherent weaknesses in the Confederate economy began to show. The political and military leaders expected their land mass to be their defense, never thinking that the Union could build bridges and roads and repair railroads as fast as its cavalry could burn them. They expected cotton to be their financial strength, but never considered where armaments and supplies would come from or paid for, and never planned on the expense of a naval presence to counter a blockade of its ports.

 

The Quartermaster Department

The Confederate Congress created the position of Quartermaster-General on February 26, 1861. The Secretary of War was allowed to appoint one colonel and six majors to serve as Quartermasters (3, 4).  Abraham Myers served as the first Quartermaster General for the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. Myers was responsible for managing and supplying the Confederate Army with various provisions, including food, clothing, and equipment. The role of the Quartermaster General was crucial in maintaining the logistics and efficiency of the Confederate military operations. Myers played a significant part in ensuring that the Confederate forces were adequately equipped and provisioned throughout the war.

The Confederate Quartermaster Department was responsible for procuring, transporting, and distributing essential supplies to the troops, including food, clothing, equipment, and ammunition.

Overseeing the supply of an army is a complicated job: besides weapons and armaments procurement, the responsibilities also included uniforms, horses, wagons, and railroad cars; and finding the money and resources to acquire these supplies.  It also entails transportation of the materials to the location of the army, constructing supply depots near enough the front to be effective but not where it could be captured, and coordinating production with need. The quartermaster department is responsible for creating a supply network for the army; in particular, the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materiel, facilities, and personnel. It is the functional bridge between economics and tactical operations. To operate optimally, the logistical network must connect the combat forces with the strengths and capabilities of the society it defends. It does not simply create itself and it is not merely an administrative task; it is an enterprise in itself that requires using technological and economic resources to overcome an enemy and sustains the military forces by supporting its warfighting readiness (5).

Myers had a very difficult if not impossible situation to accomplish these goals. The Confederacy faced severe resource limitations, including shortages of essential supplies such as food, clothing, and equipment. Additionally, the Union blockade hindered the Confederacy's ability to import necessary goods from overseas.

His pre-war experience in southern forts and his contacts in those positions were especially valuable in getting started. Myers sent agents into the domestic market, contracting with local manufacturers and paying competitive rates. The department bought cotton, woolen cloth, and leather goods.  He also established shops for making clothing, shoes, tents, wagons, and other equipment, and purchased livestock at market prices for as long as possible.  During the first few months the South had sufficient supplies to cobble together a supply chain (6,7).

But the South lacked the manufacturing infrastructure required to produce and build the required huge quantities of food, equipment, shoes, and clothing.  Settling in for what would be a long war they had not planned for, the supply deficits developed into a crisis as the financial weakness of the country led to runaway inflation. The CSA government had to create a supply chain that would bring its armies the supplies needed to allow it to continue the war. Creating a new country with a new financial system, revamping its rail system, and developing its industrial capacity would have posed inconceivable and perhaps impossible problems for a state government dominated system in peacetime. Trying to accomplish these tasks while being invaded by a much larger, more resource rich country bordering its most critical strategic areas was likely beyond anyone’s capacity.

Myers was a highly experienced quartermaster officer who was widely admired for competence, integrity and efficiency (8). Myers' efforts to fulfill the needs of the armies brought praise from some and condemnation from others. He immediately began advertising for tents and other camp equipment from southern vendors (9).  As president of the military board, Myers helped design the first Confederate Army uniform. (10) Blankets, shoes and wool remained scarce. Quartermaster depots were created around the South in large cities (11). Supplying uniforms in bulk in 1861 was a huge problem (12). He estimated in 1861 that he needed 1,600,000 pairs of shoes for the first year, but he could only locate 300,000 (13). He also estimated that he would need hundreds of thousands of blankets, socks, and shirts, and almost no industry was present in the South to procure them. They would have to be imported from Europe and brought through the blockade.

It was not enough to purchase these items; they had to be transported to the armies. He devised a system of supply depots; Richmond and Nashville would be the main depots for the two armies, with multiple satellite storage areas closer to the front (14). The railroads were the primary means of transporting these items, as there was minimal merchant marine activity with the blockade and overland wagon routes were slow and subject to military attack.

Despite a very large service, he was restricted by a lack of funds, inflation, and poor railroads, over which he had no control. His department was criticized among its generals because the South could not obtain supplies to outfit the Army. His inability to provide shoes and uniforms was an especially serious problem.  He set goals and controls on southern manufacturing throughout the war. By commandeering more than half the South's produced goods for the military, the quartermaster general, in a counterintuitive drift toward socialism, appropriated hundreds of mills and controlled the flow of southern factory commodities, especially salt (15).

Some criticisms of Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department include inefficiency, inadequate coordination, and difficulties in providing timely and sufficient supplies to the army. These issues were partially attributed to the limited resources and the overall logistical challenges faced by the Confederacy. The CSA lacked nearly all manufactured products and had little capacity to make them. The Quartermaster Department proved to be unable to properly equip and clothe the Confederate soldiers. Myers consistently failed to anticipate the operational requirements of the army (16). As a result, Lee was often at a logistical disadvantage. The significant constraints and limitations that Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department operated under made the task of supplying the Confederate army extremely challenging. Despite these challenges, Myers and his department managed to provide some level of support to the Confederate forces throughout the conflict. Overall, assessing Myers' performance as a quartermaster general requires considering the extraordinary circumstances of the Confederacy during the war.

 

Subsistence Department

Lt Col Isaac M. St. John Northrop served as the Commissary General and Subsistence Director of the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for procurement and transportation of food to soldiers in the field. Northrop's tenure as Subsistence Director was marked by significant challenges due to resource shortages, logistical difficulties, and the impact of the Union blockade on the Confederate food supply. These challenges resulted in widespread food shortages and inadequate rations for Confederate soldiers throughout the war.

Critics of Northrop argue that he was inefficient, lacked effective management skills, and failed to adequately address the logistical and supply issues facing the Confederate army. There were allegations of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement within the commissary department, which contributed to the inadequate provisioning of soldiers. Moreover, Northrop had a frustrating tendency to deny support by creating unnecessary administrative hurdles and red tape (17).

His performance in a capacity for which he was completely unprepared was abysmal.  The supply of food, shoes, clothing, and other materials has been termed inexcusably inadequate (18) Confederate soldiers were frequently obliged to make do inadequate rations, and to forage amongst their own countrymen. While the stuff of legend and a sign of intrepidness, it’s no way to fight a war – on one’s own territory. It is incomprehensible that commissaries in Vicksburg and Virginia were unable to stockpile provisions in military zones located in friendly territory (19).

 

Ordinance

In contrast, Josiah Gorgas served with distinction as the Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for overseeing the procurement, production, and distribution of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies for the Confederate forces. Gorgas is generally regarded as a highly competent and effective ordnance officer. Under his leadership, the Confederate Ordnance Department faced numerous challenges, including limited resources, inadequate industrial infrastructure, and the Union blockade. Despite these challenges, Gorgas worked to establish and expand Confederate arms factories, streamline production processes, and improve the efficiency of supply chains.

His primary function was to create an armaments supply system: the acquisition and distribution of armaments and ammunition in the Confederate army. The new country possessed almost no industry capable of providing arms and ammunition: ante bellum ordnance-making factories were mostly located in the North. Furthermore, existing supplies of weapons had been seized by Confederate state militias, and their state governments resisted sharing them. Gorgas recognized that only a limited amount of money was available to spend on arms and ammunition.

The limited production capacity due to the absence of manufacturing industries constrained the ability to mass-produce firearms. The scarcity of raw materials, particularly iron and steel, also posed a significant challenge for firearm production. The Confederacy lacked the technological expertise and infrastructure necessary for the efficient production of advanced firearms. They lagged behind the North in terms of machinery, precision manufacturing techniques, and skilled labor. This limited their ability to produce modern and sophisticated firearms.

Consequently, the Confederacy relied on imports to supplement their domestic firearm production. The Confederacy faced difficulties in accessing these resources from abroad due to the Union blockade. As the war progressed, the Union blockade efficacy increased, disrupting the ability to import finished firearms or components from abroad.

To compensate for these limitations, the Confederacy resorted to various measures. They converted existing weapons, such as hunting rifles or smoothbore muskets, into serviceable firearms. They also sought to repair and reuse captured Union weapons. Additionally, they established government-owned and private armories to manufacture firearms, although these facilities were often limited in output and faced resource shortages.

Gorgas implemented measures to increase domestic production of firearms, ammunition, and artillery, making the Confederacy less reliant on imported arms. He also made efforts to repair and refurbish captured Union weapons to supplement Confederate armament. Gorgas emphasized the importance of quality control and strived to ensure that Confederate forces were supplied with functional and reliable weapons.

Gorgas constructed systems to scavenge arms from battlefields, import arms and essential manufacturing supplies from Europe, and build an industrial complex to manufacture what the army required. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines (20,21). Gorgas created a system that supplied all the powder and artillery for the Confederacy, despite labor shortages. (22) Although the Confederate armies often lacked basic food and clothing, they were rarely without necessary ammunition.

Faced with the problem that the Confederacy had few facilities for weapons manufacture and no plants to produce gunpowder, Gorgas demonstrated brilliant administrative skill in building these capabilities. Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army, implemented several measures regarding weapon procurement during the American Civil War. Gorgas recognized the need to increase weapon production to meet the demands of the war. He established new armories and expanded existing ones to boost manufacturing capacity. He sought assistance from private companies to fulfill the Confederacy's weapon needs. He entered into contracts with private arms manufacturers to produce firearms, artillery, and other military equipment. He recognized the necessity of captured Union weapons and directed efforts to refurbish and reuse them. This practice helped supplement the Confederate Army's weapon inventory. Since the Confederacy had limited domestic manufacturing capabilities, Gorgas focused on importing weapons from abroad. He coordinated efforts to procure arms from Europe, primarily from countries such as Britain and France.

Gorgas and his team faced immense logistical challenges in transporting weapons.
Gorgas prioritized the allocation of available resources to meet the most pressing weapon needs. He assessed the demands of various theaters of war and distributed weapons accordingly, based on strategic requirements. He relied heavily on the existing railway networks to transport weapons and ammunition. Railways were crucial in moving large quantities of arms from manufacturing centers to distribution points closer to the front lines.

Other methods of transporting arms were necessary given the state of the railroads in the South. When feasible, Gorgas utilized rivers for transportation. Riverboats and steamers were employed to move weapons and supplies along navigable waterways, providing an alternative to overland transportation. Overland transportation via wagon trains played a significant role in moving weapons and supplies to the front lines. Wagons, pulled by horses or mules, were used to transport arms overland from distribution depots to the troops in the field.

By 1863, the South had several factories producing modern weapons. Despite the inferior southern rail system and southern governors who hoarded supplies in their own states, Gorgas almost single-handedly assured that the troops on the front line had sufficient weapons and ammunition to carry on. Gorgas performed an outstanding service in developing businesses to produce weaponry and transporting it to the front. Rifles and ammunition continued to be in abundance even when supplies of food and other materials had vanished (23,24).

 

Logistics Network

The procurement and transport of military materiel into the Confederacy was a dismal logistical failure. At first, it was borderline in its efficacy; but as ports were closed, key mining and farming territories lost, and supply depots captured, the network became increasingly unable to supply the needs of its armies in the field.

 

Cost of Supply

The Confederate government faced severe financial constraints throughout the war. The limited funds available hindered the procurement and distribution of supplies, and often resulted in inadequate provisioning for the troops.

Inefficiencies and corruption. The Confederate quartermaster department encountered issues with inefficiencies, mismanagement, and corruption. Supply routes were not always optimized, and there were instances of fraud and misappropriation of resources, leading to further logistical challenges. Perhaps even more problematic than limited resources was the “pervasive ineffectiveness that characterized every aspect of Confederate administrative life, especially its logistical and supply arrangements” (25).

Inflationary spiral. Understanding the problems that confronted these officers requires a comprehension of the costs of Confederate supply and how the Confederate inflationary spiral altered the war. As a comparison, the US dollar has experienced on average a 2.18% inflation rate per year since 1860. Hence, $1 in 1860 is roughly equivalent to $32.43 in 2023 dollars. (26). The inflationary spiral of the Confederate dollar during the four years of the war increased its costs exponentially: every 6 months, the value of the Confederate dollar decreased in value so much that costs were almost incomparable to the previous time frame. The total expenditures of the CSA government, nearly all of which were for the War Department, increased from $70 million in November 1861 to $329 million in August 1862. That is a dizzying figure to contemplate in retrospect, and impossible to imagine what it was like for Myers, whose job it was to administrate and develop budgets for his department a year in advance.  One example is that the $199 million allocated for the war budget for 1862 had run out by September (27). It’s impossible to operate a functional war machine with inflation at that unsustainable rate. 

A significant escalation of the problem can be ascribed to a single event of marked importance. On April 29, 1862, Commander David Farragut captured the South’s largest port city, New Orleans. (28)  The fall of New Orleans was a powerful financial disadvantage. For a nation composed of rebellious states to wage war, it must have capital with which to pay for war supplies: weapons, armaments, horses, food, clothing, soldiers’ salaries, etc.

Impact on Subsistence Administration. The resulting budgetary pressure had consequences all along the administrative path. In 1862, Myers saw his estimated budget cut from roughly $27 million/month to $19 million.  He informed the cabinet that at that time, the current actual expenditure was $24.5 million/month, and with inflation would clearly become much higher. Myers lobbied the Congress for more appropriations to keep the war effort on track. The CSA Congress then passed a supplementary expenditure of $127 million to pay for just the 3 months of December 1862 to February 1863 (29).

In response to these absurd cost rises, even more Treasury notes were issued on March 3,1863. In total over $517 million in notes were issued that year alone, reflecting the tripling of costs in just one year.  These would further worsen the inflationary spiral.

 

Centralization of Manufacturing

With the onset of the war, the Confederate War Department centralized control over the nation’s industries. This was surprising given that the CSA was designed as a state-controlled government with limited federal powers. The Quartermaster and Ordnance Bureaus organized the production and distribution of war materiel.  In time, many of the Confederacy’s large-scale manufacturers – textile mills, foundries, and machine shops – worked under contract with the Ordnance and Quartermaster Bureaus. The salt industry was entirely operated by the CSA government in what has been termed “salt socialism” (30). A government formed on the principles of state primacy and not a central government was finding it necessary to institute federal control of industry.

Moreover, by 1862 shortages of supplies and equipment, in addition to inflated prices in the domestic markets, led to the conferring of impressment powers on Myers in addition to the Commissary Department (31). While this somewhat alleviated the supply issues, it became demoralizing for the public.  The central government was now empowered to seize the products of its citizens and pay them what it could, not what it was worth.

Cost of Transportation. The transportation of supplies at a cost-efficient price was one of the Confederacies biggest difficulties. The southern railroad system failed to transmit sufficient supplies to the armies, and many supplies were kept in storage because they couldn’t get to the soldiers. By February 1862, horses and men were not receiving sufficient rations. The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac RR was not carrying food and forage because the prices able to be charged for these items were small and there was no centralized control. Eastern North Carolina had abundant stores of corn, bacon and grain but the route necessary to carry these items to the front was byzantine: The Wilmington and Weldon RR was a single-track road, connecting with the Richmond line, but this connection was in terrible condition and there was no cooperation between the lines. In a confederation system without centralized government authority, private ownership of railroads continued to run on profit not patriotism. Despite these inefficiencies, Myers opposed central government control or the building of its own trains, believing that would only increase the inefficiencies. Later in 1863, he worked with Secretary of War Seddon and President Davis to put pressure on the rail owners to expedite shipments despite lower profit margins (32).

And in 1862, the level of rail efficiency was at its peak: it declined from there. As the war continued, the rail system became even less adequate. The tracks began to deteriorate. The metal composition of the Southern rails was of relatively soft iron, frequently fractured or wear after continued use, requiring high maintenance. In the mid- 19thcentury, Northern foundries began to produce more durable iron products such as steel but the southern foundries did not switch to the more difficult to manufacture material. Steel must be smelted from iron ore, in which impurities (e.g., carbon, nitrogen silicon) are removed and alloying elements (e.g., manganese, nickel, chromium) are added. Consequently, the infrastructure of southern track crumbled throughout the war, with limited resources for their repair. Myers complained that the locomotives were breaking down and had no replacement parts. (33)

 

Conclusion

The skills of a society to identify, purchase and convey the goods and supplies necessary to maintain an army in working order is a window into the health of that society and transcends mere administrative planning.  How the needs of the Confederate armies in the field were determined, acquired, transported and distributed is a central but often overlooked piece of the Civil War narrative. How they fared is a vital part of the story of the Confederacy.

 

What do you think of the Confederacy’s logistical challenges during the U.S. Civil War? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

 

References

1.     Woodruff JD. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083715.pdf 6/23/23.

2.     Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. Pranava Books.1969, pages 6-7.

3.     Wilson HS. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War. University Press of Mississippi, 2002, pages 15-25. https://epdf.pub/confederate-industry-manufacturers-and-quartermasters-in-the-civil-war.html  

4.     The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate ArmiesSeries I, Vol. I, 495. (Hereafter: OR). https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0495

5.     Wissler, John E. Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power. Heritage.org. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power

6.     Goff op cit pages 15-

7.     The Twiggs-Myers Family. Fix Bayonets Blog. (hereafter: Fix) https://fixbayonetsusmc.blog/2019/03/29/the-twiggs-myers-family-part-iii/

8.     Goff op cit pages 33-35.

9.     Goff op cit pages 15-16.

10.  Goff op cit page 16

11.  Goff op cit page 16

12.  Goff op cit page 33

13.  Goff op cit page 34

14.  Goff op cit page 35

15.  Lonn, Ella. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York, W. Neale, 1933 and

Davis, William C. Look Away: A History of Confederate States of America. The Free Press, New York, 2002, Chapter 10.

16.  Wilson op cit page 4

17.  Vandiver F. Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1952, 165.

18.  Wiley, Bell I. (1968). The Road to Appomattox. New York City: Atheneum Books. 31.

19.  Hess, Earl J. Civil War Supply and Strategy. Louisiana State University Press, 2020. Page 84

20.  McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom.  Oxford University Press, 2003. page 318.

21.  Klein LW. How the Confederacy got their Weapons – Fueling the Confederate War Machine. The Civil War Center. Accessed 6/23/23. https://thecivilwarcenter.wpcomstaging.com/2022/06/06/how-the-confederacy-got-their-weapons-fueling-the-confederate-war-machine/

22.  Goff op cit 246

23.  Klein LW. How did the Confederacy Fund its War Effort in the U.S. Civil War? History is Now Magazine.http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/6/5/how-did-the-confederacy-fund-its-war-effort-in-the-us-civil-war Accessed 6/23/23.

24.  Josiah Gorgas. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/josiah-gorgas  Accessed 6/23/23.

25.  Hess op cit 361.

26.  Consumer Price Index Calculator. https://www.in2013dollars.com/

27.  Goff op cit page 90

28.  Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent Of Money. A Financial History of the World. 10th Anniversary Edition. Penguin, New York, 2009. And Edwin C Bearrs. The Seizure of the Forts and Public Property in LouisianaLouisiana History (2:401‑409, Autumn 1961) 

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Louisiana/_Texts/LH/2/4/Seizure_of_the_Forts*.html

29.  Goff op cit pages 90-91 & 47-49

30.  Davis op cit chapter 10

31.  Goff op cit pages 41-2

32.  Goff op cit pages 107 & 40

33.  Davis op cit 307

Following secession and the onset of the American Civil War, the southern Confederate states needed the funds and infrastructure to wage war. This article addresses the “sinews of war” from the Confederacy’s perspective: where did the money needed for weapons and supplies during the Civil War come from? How its needs were determined,  procured, transported and distributed is a complex story. Lloyd W Klein explains.

Above: George Alfred Trenholm, an influential supporter of the Confederacy and the Confederate States Secretary of the Treasury from 1864-65.

With secession, the Confederate States of America (CSA) recognized that war was a likely possible consequence.  After First Manassas, it was clear that a long struggle was ahead, which posed a series of problems for the CSA as to how it would obtain weapons. A rebellion cannot be sustained without armaments, and money is required to purchase them if your country has no manufacturing capacity, and doesn’t have foundries for their production.  Initially, federal forts were seized and weapons taken, but ultimately, a network of war goods supply would need to constructed.

Where did the Confederacy get financial support to purchase weapons and carry out a war with a limited treasury? Moreover, if there was no existing capacity to produce weapons, and must be imported from overseas, how did European armaments make it to the CSA despite a blockade? When the war began, the CSA had no manufacturing capability to produce artillery tubes. Tredegar was the only major iron foundry south of the Mason-Dixon line. There were no large scale rifle manufacturers. The armaments and weapons the Confederacy used were mostly made in Europe at the start of the war, and brought over despite the blockade.

The Blockade

General Winfield Scott predicted that a civil war would be a long affair when everyone else thought it would be over in weeks. He was a top-notch military strategist who was a hero of the Mexican War. He saw long in advance that the weakness of a Southern nation was its absence of manufacturing, supplies, and weapons production. Therefore, he developed what came to be known as the Anaconda Plan, named after the snake that squeezes its victims and suffocates them to death. The idea was that by blockading the southern ocean ports and the Mississippi River, the CSA military would slowly die as its supplies dwindled and the country isolated from its trading partners elsewhere.

Other Union commanders were not sanguine about the idea, preferring a rapid attack strategy to a slow suffocation. Although Anaconda was not implemented fully, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade in April 1861. This required the monitoring of 3,500 miles of Atlantic and Gulf coastline, including 12 major ports, notably New Orleans and Mobile.

The Union blockade was a powerful weapon that eventually destroyed the Southern economy, at the cost of very few lives, just as General Scott planned it. The river campaigns in the west crushed the CSA and the blockade raised the costs of overseas trade. The measure of the blockade's success was not the ships that slipped through but the thousands that never tried.

At first, the blockade was only partially effective; perhaps only about 10% of freighters attempting to evade the blockade were intercepted. However, the Union Navy gradually became better at the task; by 1864, about one-third of ships attempting to run the blockade were intercepted, and the only ships with a reasonable chance of evading the blockade were blockade runners, which were specifically designed for speed and maneuverability.

Beating the Blockade

Finding a way to deliver supplies and arms despite the blockade was a necessity. The only way its military could be supplied and the economy kept afloat was by international commerce. Therefore, the CSA had to build a fleet of ships to evade the blockade of its ports.

Blockade runners were steam ships built for speed in order to make its way through the Union blockade that extended some 3,500 miles along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastlines and the lower Mississippi River. To get through the blockade, the runners ran at night and if detected, they would attempt to outmaneuver or outrun the ships on blockade patrol. These vessels carried cargoes to and from neutral ports often located in Nassau and Cuba where neutral merchant ships in turn carried these cargoes, usually coming from or destined to England or other points abroad. Inbound ships usually brought badly needed supplies and mail to the Confederacy while outbound ships often exported cotton, tobacco and other goods for trade and for sale.

How did the CSA obtain the money to purchase these ships?

Charles Kuhn Prioleau was the most highly placed and influential supporter of the Confederacy in Britain. He was the sole British partner and representative of Fraser, Trenholm, & Co., the unofficial bankers to the Confederacy in Europe, which helped supply the South with arms throughout the war. He was a South Carolina cotton merchant who was the senior partner of the firm, based in Liverpool, acting as the European banker for the CSA. As such, this firm purchased military armaments, transported them to the US through the blockade, and extended the CSA credit when it couldn’t meet its obligations.

Prioleau was a partner in Fraser, Trenholm. He had moved to Liverpool in the early 1850s to establish a steamship line from England to Charleston. With his connections to Fraser, Trenholm, he became very well respected in Europe. When the war broke out, the CSA deposited large amounts of funds with his firm. Prioleau became the sole CSA agent in England, purchasing armaments and shipping them on blockade runners financed by Fraser, Trenholm.  Prioleau made a huge fortune on these transactions.

Who Made the Arrangements?

James Dunwoody Bulloch was the Confederacy's primary foreign agent in Great Britain. In 1861, almost immediately after the attack on Fort Sumter, he traveled to Liverpool to establish a base of operations. Britain was officially neutral in the conflict between North and South, but private and public sentiment of most of the English people – although not the monarchy -- favored the Confederacy. British firms were eager to purchase cotton smuggled past the Union blockade.  The proceeds provided the South with its only real source of hard currency.

His primary mission was to sell Confederate cotton, then use this currency to purchase arms and ammunition, uniforms, and other supplies for the war effort. Bulloch arranged for the purchase of Confederate cotton by British merchants, paid in cash, then purchased (mostly by credit) and transported armaments and other war supplies to the South.

Bulloch was employed by the shipping firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Company to buy and sell Confederate cotton, using this currency to purchase arms and ammunition. Fraser Trenholm & Co. became, in effect, the Confederacy's international bankers.  He operated blockade runners and commerce raiders. Bulloch arranged for the construction and secret purchase of commerce raiders as well as many of the blockade runners that acted as the Confederacy's commercial lifeline. In essence, Bulloch was the most significant international Confederate operative. His half-sister Martha was the mother of President Theodore Roosevelt and paternal grandmother of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt.

Bulloch worked with John Laird Sons & Co. in Birkenhead, across the Mersey River estuary from Liverpool, to build warships for the South. John Laird was the main ship builder in Liverpool. His business built the CSS Alabama and most of the other blockade runners. He was mayor of Birkenhead, across the river from Liverpool.

Warships could not legally be built in Britain for the Confederates as a consequence of its neutrality.  Bulloch circumvented this problem by ensuring that the ships, while clearly designed for battle, were not actually fitted with armaments in Britain. Through this strategy, the ships could be presented as civilian vessels when they left British jurisdiction, but they would then travel to Terceira, a Portuguese island located in the Azores, where they were re-fitted and armed. This blatant subterfuge successfully confused the legal definition of what could be defined a warship in Great Britain.

In 1862, Bulloch arranged for the CSS Florida and the CSS Alabama to cross the Atlantic and join the Confederate Navy. Other British-built ships soon followed. Bulloch's smokescreen, the British Government’s reluctance to become involved, and the complicity of Liverpool's port officials, who were Confederate sympathizers, allowed the CSS Alabama to successfully sail through. Confederates used the CSS Alabama to attack Union merchant and naval ships for two years, before the ship sank in 1864.

Who Did They Work With?

Although the British government remained neutral, the local government and port in Liverpool strongly favored the Confederacy. Businesses in the city tended to be favorable to the Confederate cause and had a long tie with slave trading. Liverpool had been the primary slave trading port and its ships and merchants were strongly associated with the slave trade. These businesses and owners formed what was called The Southern Club. Some were families with historical involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Nearly all had homes located in a single area called Abercromby Square. PM Gladstone also had a home there. There was a business and political conspiracy in Liverpool favoring the CSA, and it’s existence is clear. Prioleau lived at 19 Abercromby Square. The individuals who lived in Abercromby Square designed and built the ships. This included: improved propelling navigable vessels and the construction of metal, wood, and iron ships. sold arms to the Confederacy and built many of the blockade running ships.

The Man Behind the Curtain

George Alfred Trenholm was the principal partner of Fraser, Trenholm, manipulating all of the levers that allowed the building of blockade runners and the purchase of arms.  He was without a doubt the role model Margaret Mitchell used for Rhett Butler.  He was tall, handsome, fearless, crafty, highly intelligent, and very rich. This shipping and banking magnate from Charleston, South Carolina masterminded and made a fortune during the war.

Trenholm’s grandfather was a major slave owner in Haiti before the slave revolution.  Trenholm inherited large holdings of land and slaves. At age 16 he joined a cotton brokerage based in Charleston called John Fraser and Co. In 1853, he rose to partner and became its managing partner when Fraser died. He was one of the wealthiest men in the US, owning ships, hotels, docks, plantations, and cotton.  When secession happened, he moved his firm’s HQ from NYC to the West Indies and built an ironclad and 12 ships for the Confederacy. He owned 60 commercial ships running the blockade and he became even wealthier.  He worked directly with the Confederate government to supply their military needs, including arranging for funding for the building of blockade runners in England.

Fraser, Trenholm & Company was originally a commercial firm based in Charleston, S.C., with offices in New York City, that shipped cotton to Great Britain, among other ventures. When secession was declared, Trenholm saw a substantial business opportunity and moved his firm’s headquarters from to the West Indies.  During the war, the firm served as the overseas banker of the Confederate States of America, financing the supply of weaponry and essential goods in exchange for cotton, tobacco, and turpentine. His firm initially financed an ironclad and 12 ships for the Confederacy. Fraser, Trenholm and Company diversified to become an international bank representing the CSA, eventually owning 60 commercial ships running the blockade and he became even wealthier.

How did Fraser, Trenholm profit? Behind every one of these clandestine transactions for arms, supplies, and blockade running, military or commercial—stood Fraser, Trenholm, & Co. and its overseas director and Abercromby Square resident, Charles Prioleau.  Remember that Prioleau was in Liverpool and he was the one who contracted for building ships using designs for blockade running made by British firms, all of which were members of the Southern Club. A profit was made at every step by the business and its principals. So, on  the outward bound trips, cotton and other products were transported and sold for profit, and on the inbound trips, armaments, and all on ships built and owned by Fraser, Trenholm. The firm collected service fees on every transaction, received credit and cash internationally, and pocketed the proceeds.

Trenholm also served as Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederacy during the last year of the Civil War, an obvious choice since was building the fleet of ships on credit for the South. In essence, this private firm WAS the Confederate Navy, WAS the military supply line, and WAS the main fleet of blockade runners. The CSS Alabama was the most successful of these. Fraser, Trenholm remained highly respected until the end of the war when it went “bankrupt”.

The Supply Network

Prioleau worked directly with the Confederate government to supply their military needs. On board the ships were the weapons and armaments that the CSA needed for the war effort. But how did the agents in Europe know what was needed at any moment on the battlefield on this side of the pond? The answer was Brig Gen Josiah Gorgas, the Chief of Ordnance.  His experience made him the perfect man to serve as the linkage between industry and the military.

Born in Pennsylvania, he graduated from West Point and immediately served in the ordnance department. During the Mexican War, his job was to ensure that the army was supplied appropriately  from arsenals in the US. He routinely sought positions in the South because of his opposition to Republicans and abolitionism. By the time of the Civil War, he had served in almost every arsenal in the country. President Davis immediately hired him and he moved to Richmond. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines. His job was to create an armaments supply system literally from nothing and without much money.

He interacted directly with Prioleau to assure stockpiling of supplies and timely transport of the needed goods on blockade runners. Fraser, Trenholm arranged for the purchase and transportation of weapons on Gorgas’s order. Gorgas estimated in 1863 that Fraser Trenholm had made $9 million running the blockade. And they imported $4.5 million in cotton to England. The Confederate Army never lacked weapons. It was said that the only two things that worked well in the Confederacy was General Lee’s Army and General Gorgas’s supply lines. By 1863 Gorgas had several factories producing rifles. There was also a small foundry in Selma, AL.

After the War

As the southern economy tanked, Prioleau used his reputation to extend substantial credit to keep the war machine going. When the CSA collapsed and its credit called, Prioleau moved to Belgium.

Trenholm as CSA Treasury Secretary was in charge of the Confederate gold when Richmond fell. So, the part of the movie at the end of the war where the dashing Rhett Butler is in jail and accused of making off with the gold of the Confederacy? Not so far-fetched. Except there was no Scarlett involved; he was married with children and remained so forever (her name was Anna, FYI.) It would not be surprising if whatever Confederate Gold there was found its way into his pockets. Trenholm was captured and arrested escaping from Richmond, and his firm went bankrupt.

Trenholm never faced legal actions to make him responsible for treason, despite the fact that in essence, he bankrolled the Confederate war machine. Unquestionably, he hid his money overseas, in the Caribbean and London, and that his agent Charles Prioleau funneled the money here and there during and probably after the war.

How did Trenholm get out of taking responsibility for these obviously treasonous acts? Trenholm, just like Rhett Butler, was imprisoned for treason. Just like Rhett, he was believed to have possession of the Confederate gold.  Just like Rhett, he used his charm and influence (and surely his money), which extended into the United States Army and the White House, to get out of prison and secure a pardon. The pardon was especially clever since he never officially asked for it, nor did he ever admit that he had done anything wrong to deserve one.

After his release, Trenholm fought the Federal government in lengthy lawsuits. The government claimed Trenholm and his partners had illegally converted today’s equivalent of billions of dollars in Confederate assets. He disingenuously claimed he was bankrupt, saying he had lost everything in the war. And just like Rhett, he was cleared and completely exonerated.  But he reorganized, made another fortune after the war in phosphate mining and railroads, and became a philanthropist funneling money to black education. And then lived a lavish life until his death in 1876. Trenholm died a very wealthy man at age 69. Tomorrow is another day.

Prioleau moved back to London and died in 1887. He is buried in London. He was never held to account for his activities or war time debts.

Who Ultimately Paid for the Confederate War Machine?

In the international admiralty law, a foreign power cannot build a navy for an unrecognized combatant. After the Confederate surrender, the U.S. government filed suit against Great Britain for its conduct during the Civil War. The claim was heard at the Tribunal of Arbitration in Geneva in 1871. The US claimed direct and collateral damage against Britain. The US sued for the covert assistance given to the Confederate cause in the form of construction of commerce raiders and cruisers built or equipped in British ports for the Confederacy. Since the CSS Alabama was the ship that caused the US the most damages, the name given to the case was the "Alabama Claims".

The most serious charge was that the English allowed the Confederate cruisers "Alabama", "Shenandoah", and "Florida" to be armed in British ports. These ships created significant “damage” to the American merchant marine. Early attempts to resolve this dispute were unsuccessful. At one point, US Senator Charles Sumner stated that England was responsible for half of the cost of the war, and that the US would consider Canada as payment made on such a claim. This shocked the British and they realized that they had better come to some agreement.

In the Treaty of Washington, on May 8, 1871, it was agreed that the "Alabama Claims" should be referred to 5 arbitrators: one to be named by the US, one by England and one each by the King of Italy, the emperor of Brazil and the president of Switzerland. A commission was formed and met in Geneva on December 15, 1871.

The decision was given on September 14, 1872. England was held liable for the Alabama (unanimous), Florida (4-1), Shenandoah in part (3-2) and the tenders of both the Alabama and Florida (unanimous). The total amount of damage to be re-paid was $15,500,000, the US being left to settle with private claimants. This was a high reward at that time. In fact, by 1882 only 3/5 had been paid, requiring yet more adjudication. The British also lost their investment of $1,100,000 in Confederate Bonds.

Conclusion

How the Confederacy financed and constructed its blockade running and developed its war supply production network is rarely discussed.  Fraser, Trenholm and Company, working through its agents Charles Prioleau and James Dunwoody Bulloch, created an entire banking and military supply network, including a navy. A single privately held merchant company, a cotton export business, which diversified to become an international bank representing the CSA and then built and operated ships to run the blockade was the central mechanism. Trenholm had direct connections to the CSA Government and military. His business contracted and built the ships, took the orders for arms, arranged and took the risk to transport the cargo in both directions, acted as CSA banking agent in Britain, and represented the CSA government, all for profit. Huge profits were made at every step, in which the business received actual cash but paid in CSA credit. The business represented the CSA in European circles, and had ties to British businesses and its prime minister, Gladstone. None of this money was ever recovered, and the principals were never brought to justice, although many years later the British did have to pay damages.

What do you think of how the Confederacy funded itself during the American Civil War? Let us know below.

References

Abercromby Square and The Southern Club.

https://ldhi.library.cofc.edu/exhibits/show/liverpools-abercromby-square/abercromby-southern-club

James D. Bulloch: Secret Agent and Mastermind of the Confederate Navy By Walter E. Wilson, Gary L. McKay.

George Alfred Trenholm and The Company That Went to War 1861-1865 By Ethel Trenholm Seabrook Nepveux

Walter H. Taylor was indispensable to the Confederacy’s efforts in the US Civil War. His contribution to the southern war effort as Lee’s adjutant was key. His contributions to the City of Norfolk and the state of Virginia after the war are also well known. Taylor would also contribute to the history of the war by writing two books about Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. At one point, Taylor would comment about not loving Lee, but never losing respect for him. The other part of Taylor’s story is his relationship with Bettie Saunders, his future wife. Their wartime letters are an endless source of information about their relationship and what was taking place on the war front.

William Floyd Junior explains.

Walter H. Taylor, circa 1864.

Walter H. Taylor, circa 1864.

Taylor was born in Norfolk, Virginia on June 13, 1838. His early education took place at what today is Norfolk Academy. In August of 1854, he began attending the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington. Walter was an excellent student, but failed to complete his studies, having to withdraw upon the death of his father. He would go to work at the Bank of Virginia and then at the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Taylor was also part of a Norfolk Volunteer Militia group known as “Company F.”

On May 2, 1861, he received a telegram from Virginia Governor John Letcher to report for duty. Taylor was twenty-two years of age without any combat experience. On May 3, Taylor took the train to Richmond and went to the Spotswood Hotel. It was here that Taylor first saw Robert E, Lee, commenting that, “he appeared every inch a soldier and a man born to command.”

When the Provisional Army of Virginia, which Lee had been assembling, became part of the Confederacy, Lee was appointed one of five new generals. He would be retained in Richmond as military advisor to President Jefferson Davis. Taylor and other members of the headquarters staff would remain on duty with the general.

In late July Taylor would travel with Lee to western Virginia in an effort to reconcile differences between generals Floyd, Wise, and Loring. After three months in the mountains, Lee’s mission could not be called a success.

On November 6, 1861, Taylor left with Lee for Charleston, South Carolina. Lee had been given the job of building a defensive line along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and east Florida. In the following months defenses were improved around Charleston, Fort Pulaski, and Savannah. Lee’s work would soon come to an end with Davis ordering him to return to Richmond to begin his job as military advisor. Taylor would now be designated as an aide. Lee’s trust in Taylor would grow to a point that Taylor would be allowed to sign important documents in Lee’s absence.

 

1862

At this time, General Joseph E. Johnston was in command of Confederate forces defending Richmond. On May 31, 1862, at the battle of Seven Pines, Johnston would be severely wounded. President Davis would give command of Johnston’s forces to Lee. Taylor would remain on Lee’s staff when he assumed his new position. At this time, Taylor listed two assistant adjutants general, four aides and a military secretary as part of Lee’s staff.

The army that Lee took command of had an effective strength of 80,762 with which to defend Richmond during the Seven Days Battles. Taylor, at twenty-four years of age, would now have the heavy burden of acting as Lee’s alter ego, in matters of administration. Taylor would also be entrusted to deliver important orders to commanders on the battlefield.

On September 7, 1862, at the start of the Antietam campaign, Walter would write to Bettie about working for Lee, “But I never worked so hard to please anyone and with so little effect as with General Lee. He is so unappreciative-Everybody else makes me flattering speeches, but I want to satisfy him. They all say he appreciates my efforts, but I don’t believe it, you know how silly and sensitive I am.”

Taylor’s workload would increase even more, when he was directed to see after the sick and wounded from recent battles and arrange for their transportation to Winchester which had been designated a rendezvous point.

On September 17, the single bloodiest day of the war, would take place at Sharpsburg (Antietam), Maryland. Union General George B. McClellan enjoyed an almost two-to-one advantage in troops, but the Confederates would hold their own. The outcome of the battle was indecisive. In a letter to his sister, Taylor wrote, “Don’t let any of your friends sing ‘My Maryland’-not my Western Maryland anyhow.”

In early November, the Union Army crossed the Potomac back into Virginia. On November 7, McClellan would be replaced by General Ambrose Burnside. On December 13, Burnside would attack Lee’s strong position at Fredericksburg, which became a total disaster for the Federals. Taylor would later write that he had never seen anything like the fighting at Fredericksburg.

 

1863

Both armies would go into winter quarters after Fredericksburg. The fighting would be resumed on May 1 at Chancellorsville. In a daring move Lee would divide his army and win what was said to be his greatest victory. However, Lee would suffer the devastating loss of Stonewall Jackson. Taylor would praise God for their victory, writing, “Surely the hand of God was on our side, never was it more plainly demonstrated. . .”

In the latter part of June 1863, Lee in, an effort to move the war out of Virginia, began moving his army into Pennsylvania. This would eventually result in the Battle of Gettysburg beginning on July 1, 1863, when the opposing forces would clash west of the city. This would be the beginning of the battle that would be the turning point of the war. The first day’s fighting would be a decisive victory for Lee. The fighting on July 2, which Taylor described as “disjointed” took place on the Union left at the “Round Tops” and at the center of the Union line. Both Confederate assaults were turned back.

On July 3, just before 3 o’ clock, the attack on Cemetery Hill began, with 13,000 Confederates led by George Pickett’s division. A small group of Confederate soldiers, led by General Lewis Armistead, reached the Union line but were soon pushed back. The day was a total loss for Lee. After the war, Taylor would write, “After the assault on the enemies works on the third of July, there was not any serious fighting at Gettysburg. The day passed in comparative quiet.” After Gettysburg, there was no fighting of any consequence for three months. During this lull, Taylor travelled to Richmond to see Bettie and would return with a promise to marry.

 

1864

Both armies would remain inactive for the most part through January and February. On January 7, 1864, Taylor had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, assuming more responsibility and was in reality Chief of Staff.

In March of 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was made General in Chief of all Union forces. The Federal army of more than 141,000 was on the north bank of the Rapidan River in Virginia. Lee’s army of 50,000 was on the south bank. On May 5, Grant moved his army to the south side, exactly as Lee had predicted beginning what would be known as the “Overland Campaign.”

The first battle of the campaign was on May 5 in the Wilderness, in which the Federals would incur twice as many casualties as the Confederates in the confused fighting of the thick forest.

Lee now anticipated that Grant would move to Spotsylvania. Taylor would write, “The general thinks there is nothing to indicate an intention on [Grant’s] part to retire, but rather appearances would indicate an intention to move toward Spotsylvania.”

In the ensuing fighting, Taylor would rally troops to drive back Union forces and recover a vital portion of the Confederate line. He would later write to Bettie, “God has indeed been merciful to me thus far.” The fight would continue until the 20th when Grant began moving to the south and east.

At the end of May, forces reached a crossroads northeast of Richmond known as Cold Harbor. On June 3, Grant attacked a well-entrenched Confederate line which turned into a total disaster for the Federals, suffering 7,000 casualties. After the battle, Grant would begin his move toward Petersburg. Lee would do the same on June 18.

 

1865

The siege of Petersburg would go on for ten months. The siege would devastate the city. On April 1, 1865, General George Pickett’s Confederate force suffered an overwhelming defeat at Five Forks, which essentially caused the Confederates to abandon Petersburg.

As the evacuation of Petersburg was getting under way, Taylor asked Lee if he could travel to Richmond to marry Bettie. Although Lee was surprised to hear this request at this time, he gave his permission. The wedding took place on April 3, after which Taylor returned to the army.

On April 6, the battle of Sayler’s Creek would take place. It was an overwhelming Union victory and the beginning of the end of Lee’s army.

On April 9, Lee would surrender to Grant at the Mclean House in Appomattox. Taylor could not bring himself to attend, not wanting to see the general humiliated. Taylor would accompany Lee to Richmond and after two weeks leave with Bettie on their wedding tour.

 

After the war

Back home Taylor would go into the hardware business. On April 30, 1870, he would accompany Lee on his visit to Norfolk. In 1877, he would become president of Marine Bank where he would remain for life. Taylor would belong to a number of Southern organizations dedicated to the memory of the Confederacy. Taylor would also become, “an official court of last resort,” concerning information on the Army of Northern Virginia. Taylor would publish two books, “Four Years With General Lee,” and “General Lee, 1861- 865”, both considered as authorities on Lee.

Some of Taylor’s other interests included serving on the Board of Visitors at Virginia Military Institute and the Board of Directors of the Norfolk & Western Railroad. In community affairs, he would promote waterworks, railroad consolidation, and the development of Ocean View, a resort area on the Chesapeake Bay in Norfolk. He was also influential in the beginning of the Building Loan Associations. He was president of the Ocean View and Hotel Company.

For the Jamestown Exposition, taking place in Norfolk in 1907, Taylor would play a major role in raising funds for the project. In the end the exposition was a financial failure.

Taylor would play a role in the development of Hampton Roads to a major trading center and seaport. He would be a member of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association and was chairman of the Virginia area.

Of course, it cannot be forgotten during this time that Walter and Bettie were expanding and raising what become a large family. They would have eight children, the last of which was named Robert Edward Lee Taylor. Lee would write to Taylor on April 13, 1868, saying, “Give my congratulations to Mrs. T. Tell her I hope that when her fancy for girls is satisfied (mine is exorbitant) she will begin upon the boys. We must have someone to work for them.”

In the last year of his life, Taylor became seriously ill, being diagnosed with cancer of the lower bowel. Radium treatments would extend his life, but in the end, it would be the cause of his death. On March 1, 1916, with Bettie and the children by his side, Walter would pass away just before midnight. On Thursday, March 2, the afternoon Norfolk newspaper read, General Lee’s Adjutant Dead, the article read, “Colonel Walter H. Taylor, one of Norfolk’s leading citizens and among her most distinguished citizens passed away last night at 11:35 o’clock at his home, 300 West York Street, following several months of failing health and two weeks of extreme illness.”

 

What do you think of Walter H. Taylor? Let us know below.

Now read William’s first article for the site on three great early influences on Thomas Jefferson here.

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Over 150 years after its end, the American Civil War continues to provoke debate and controversy. One of the longest running debates is whether and how the South could have won the war. Here, we explain some theories on this ever-topical subject.

The Confederate Cabinet from Harper’s Weekly, June 1861, including Confederate President Jefferson Davis in the center-right of the picture.

The Confederate Cabinet from Harper’s Weekly, June 1861, including Confederate President Jefferson Davis in the center-right of the picture.

The Civil War was the bloodiest war ever fought on American soil. While both the armies of the Union and the Confederacy sustained devastating casualties, the American South bore the brunt of this carnage economically for years postbellum. Forty percent of the South’s livestock was killed. Over two-thirds of the South’s rails and bridges were destroyed. The direct costs to the Confederacy in human capital, government expenses, and physical destruction from the war totaled $3.3 billion. Over a quarter of Southern white men of military age died during the war, which left alarming numbers of families destitute. The end of the Civil War saw a large migration of former slaves to the cities whose dislocations caused a severe negative impact on the black population, with large numbers of sick and dead. 

With Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865 the American Civil War had finally reached its conclusion. In just four years, the newly formed Confederate States of America that had so confidently entered the war in defense of what they viewed as state sovereignty had dissolved back into the Union. Debates among historians continue today on what the South could have done differently to achieve victory in a war in which time was on the side of the much more industrialized North. To better understand how the South could have possibly achieved its goal of a lasting secession it is important to first consider the in some ways overwhelming strengths of the Union.

 

The Power of the Union

General Lee himself recorded after his surrender, “The Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources…” There were 20 wholly Union/Northern states with 5 border “slave” states fighting against 11 Southern states. The passage of time on incomplete or lost records has made it difficult to estimate the exact number of soldiers on either side of the war. At best guess, the Confederate Army likely consisted of between 600,000 and 1,000,000 men. The Union was estimated to have 1,550,000 to 2,400,000 soldiers, clear numerical advantage. In addition to this, new conscripts were readily available for the North in the form of immigrants who faced such dire circumstances in their homelands that joining the Union Army seemed a better alternative. Immigration to the South was however limited due to the extensive blockade of its ports.

With industrial superiority, the Union states possessed a much greater capacity to produce armaments and the infrastructure necessary to move supplies efficiently. Financially the North also possessed a great advantage as the South’s primarily export based economy was also greatly hampered by the Union blockade.

 

Theories from the South and North

Many Southerners however, were convinced that they possessed superior soldiers and leadership and were fighting in defense of their homeland. Yet, some modern historians attribute the Confederacy’s loss to Lee’s aggression in offensive tactics rather than the more successful strategies of defensive approaches or even guerilla warfare after Appomattox, one of the last battles of the American Civil War. Historians hypothesize that Lee should have held the North at bay until it got tired of the clash and instead sought the route to a negotiation. Others are certain that the Confederates could have won if Atlanta, Georgia and Mobile, Alabama as well as the Shenandoah Valley, were held by them beyond the 1864 election. The Shenandoah was a strategy favored by the Confederates for its terrain that was west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, stretching from the southwest to the northeast. This route conveniently funneled troops for deployment.

Early in the war, the Confederacy had the upper hand following repeated victories. While not a complete victory like the Union later on achieved, the Confederates wanted to negotiate rather than conquer the North. By 1863, President Lincoln and his cabinet were reduced to three strategies for winning the war. First, a massive area of the Confederate States needed to be conquered and occupied, preferably the size of the whole of Western Europe. Second, the South’s infrastructure had to be demolished. Third and possibly most difficult to achieve was annihilating the South’s armies as an effective fighting force. The Union may have possessed superior manpower and material resources, being industrial while the South was mainly agricultural, but the South still had at least four well-established advantages from the start of the war that counteracted the North’s manpower and material resources.

 

The South’s 4 Advantages

First, a psychological benefit was associated with the Confederacy’s need to protect their family, homes, and lifestyles. It can be observed that the South possessed a more determined fighting spirit than the North on many occasions. Second, the South was filled with rivers, mountains, and swamps that acted as fortresses combined with successful deployments of armies. Third, and surprisingly, the South’s resources in life’s necessities such as livestock and corn were greater than that of the North. Fourth and most well-known, the Confederacy was abounding with cotton. Cotton would have been considered an economic or diplomatic factor as the cotton was in the hands of the Confederacy as a cash crop of substantial value. However, as the war carried on, planting was reduced and bales prepared for shipments were burned, thereby discouraging overseas exports. 

Military leadership and experience, specifically those in their respective Commander-in-Chief, was starkly contrasting between Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Union President Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was lacking in military experience when elected president in 1860. During the Black Hawk War of 1832, he shortly served as an officer in the Illinois state militia, but saw no combat. During the Mexican-American War, Lincoln fiercely criticized President James K. Polk for hounding Mexico and engaging in western land grabs that only benefited slaveholders. During the Fort Sumter crisis, Lincoln issued conflicting orders to the navy, resulting in confusion. A humiliating Union loss at the First Battle of Bull Run took place when he put pressure on the army to mount an immediate assault on Richmond in the summer of 1861 against advice. Despite his inexperience, Lincoln was a hands-on commander-in-chief, studiously learning the business of war, testing new weapons on the White House lawn, and reading books on military strategy from the Library of Congress. 

Davis, on the other hand, had a decorated political and military career. He was a West Point graduate with seven years of service in the frontier army, a Mexican-American War veteran (wounded in battle), and Secretary of War under President Franklin Pierce. Even during his time as the Confederacy’s first president, his hunger for war never left him. During the first major battle of the war at Bull Run in July 1961, Davis fled his office in Richmond and sprinted towards the sound of the fighting, some believe with the intent of assuming the command of the troops and leading them into battle. Despite his habit of micromanaging more than Lincoln, Jefferson Davis proved an effective administrator and motivator of men. He operated under a similar command structure as Lincoln in constitutional terms. Under the Confederacy’s constitution, Davis would serve a six-year term and was forbidden from running again after that term was up.

 

How the South could have won

With the backgrounds of respective leaders and war advantages and motivations established, it is time to overview options the Confederacy could have taken that may have well guaranteed victory over the Union, ending the American Civil War. 

If the Confederates exported cotton as much as possible to Europe, most notably Great Britain before it sought cotton elsewhere in India or Egypt for a cheaper price, before the Union’s blockade of Confederate ports, then the Confederacy could have established lines of credit to buy war material. This could have been utilized to construct and repair the broken-down railway system to move troops and goods to critical positions. This was possible before the failed alliance with European nations was realized and trade nations like Britain conducted with the Union far outweighed the value of Southern cotton. 

Jefferson Davis had less consolidated power than his enemy and given his lack of men and resources, Davis was argued to have better served the cause by writing off large portions of the Confederacy’s scattered territory which would enable him to focus his armies around a few key areas important to the South’s survival. It has even been suggested conventional warfare should have been replaced with guerrilla warfare on Union occupation forces. Davis was never comfortable with guerrilla warfare and pursued this option to only a limited extent. For example, after the Union seized control of the Mississippi River in the summer of 1863, he permitted states west of the river to fend for themselves in the war and let “irregular” Confederate guerilla units operate without much intervention from his administration. 

The question of how the Confederacy could have won the Civil War has been debated and questioned endlessly by historians and scholars, professional and amateur. It should be recognized such a topic deserves far more discussion and study than noted in this article. Ultimately, the Union and its president won the Civil War. The Confederacy and its president lost the war and it is not difficult to foresee that a self-proclaimed nation with limited resources was bound to lose such a catastrophic war.

 

What do you think of this article? How could the Confederate South have won the US Civil War?