History Will Absolve the Cuban Republic, but Not Fidel Castro

In 1953, following his July 26 assault on the Moncada Barracks in Oriente province, a young lawyer and the mastermind of the attack in which many Cubans perished, named Fidel Castro, appeared in court to face prosecution. Out of as much desperation as revolutionary zeal, he delivered a powerful, hours-long speech in his defense. As of yet, no record of this speech has been found, and Fidel Castro was unsuccessful in avoiding conviction.

Here, Logan M. Williams considers Castro’s speech and looks at the history, successes, and failures of pre-revolutionary Cuba.

Fidel Castro under arrest after the 1953 attack on the Moncada Barracks.

Castro was sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment, of which he only ended up serving less than three, in Cuba’s Presidio Modelo on the Isle of Pines. During his time in prison, he gave newspaper interviews, and continued to participate in the organizing of Cuba’s anti-Batista efforts. While in prison, he also spent a great deal of time reconstructing a “record” – used loosely, because it was not an exact copy or a true record, due to the fact that it contained several embellishments and added phrases – of the speech that he delivered in court on that fateful day. One of the embellishments which he added to the recreated speech is one of the most infamous political phrases of the modern era, and it would become the title of his work: “History Will Absolve Me." The phrase was eerily similar to one used by the German despot, Adolf Hitler, who said when he found himself in a situation much like Castro’s, that the judgement of the “eternal court of history” would exonerate him.

Castro’s recreated speech would eventually transform into a manifesto for his future revolutionary activities and become required reading for militant leftists around the world. In it, Castro expressed the belief that the desperate conditions under which some Cubans suffered, provided justification for the radical nature of his actions. Castro described these conditions as follows: “the people have neither homes nor electricity” and those who were lucky enough to have shelter “live cramped [with their families] into barracks and tenements without even the minimum sanitary requirements.” He stated that “rural children are consumed by parasites which filter through their bare feet from the earth” and that Cuba had “thousands of children who die every year from lack of [medical] facilities.” Castro attributed these social conditions to an indifferent society as well as a corrupt and negligent government. Indeed, denigration of the Cuban Republic period is still a mainstay of Cuban regime propaganda today, which sees this sort of fear-mongering as the only way to justify its increasingly repressive regime.

Pre-Revolutionary Cuba

This propaganda may be effective, as most of today’s world now knows the Cuban Republic of 1902-1959 by its reputation for troubling and potentially neo-colonial relations with the United States or as a period of crime, graft, moral decay, political unrest, and total misery (if they know anything at all). However, this isn’t a complete representation of the era, as Castro himself alluded to in his speech before the court. Of the Cuban Republic, before the inception of the Batista dictatorship in 1952, Castro stated:

“It had its constitution, its laws, its civil rights, a president, a Congress, and law courts. Everyone could assemble, associate, speak and write with complete freedom. The people were not satisfied with the government officials at that time, but [the people] had the power to elect new officials and only a few days remained before they were going to do so! There existed a public opinion both respected and heeded and all problems of common interest were freely discussed. There were political parties, radio and television debates and forums, and public meetings. The whole nation throbbed with enthusiasm.”

He also noted that “the [Cuban] people were proud of their love of liberty and they carried their heads high in the conviction that liberty would be respected as a sacred right.” Within today’s Cuba, Castro’s pamphlet, “History Will Absolve Me,” is not easily found in its entirety.

While certain aspects of Cuban society (particularly the government and political class) may have earned the harrowing reputation presented by Castroist propaganda, the lived experience of the average Cuban who resided on the island in this era – which was actually a period in which Cuba underwent a remarkable transformation and made steadfast progress towards liberal development – tells a vastly different story. Due to the work of a few committed scholars, who have dedicated their time to chronicling the achievements of the Cuban people, we have brought light to the Cuban “Dark Ages.”

Cuban Republic in History

Traditionally, the Cuban Republic is identified as the form of government which existed between the years 1902 and 1959, although this is not entirely accurate, and it doesn’t do justice to the efforts of Cuba’s liberals and independence fighters. The Cuban Republic came into existence for the first time during the second half of the nineteenth century, during the Ten Years War, when the island revolted against Spain. However, it ceased to exist following the defeat of the Cuban separatists, and the complete reimposition of Spanish colonial rule. The Cuban Republic was revived during the Cuban War of Independence, and it experienced several early and remarkable successes in governance, whilst embroiled in a brutally destructive war with Spain. Horatio Rubens, a New York-based attorney who was a personal friend of Jose Martí and who served as a principal advisor to Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party as well as the U.S. provisional government during the brief occupation of the island, describes the accomplishments of this iteration of the Cuban Republic in an 1898 journal article for The North American Review. These revolutionaries, amid a war, had built a modern, representative government, based upon republican principles. This new government included a system for the collection of taxes, as well as significant checks and balances, especially upon military authority. In Eastern Cuba which, at this point, was largely poor as well as underdeveloped, and entirely in the control of the revolutionaries (except for major cities), newspapers were published frequently, which was a positive indicator for free speech as well as other democratic freedoms, and schools were even established. Most notably, the Cuban Republic experienced its first election in 1897, ostensibly free from the corruption and political violence which would plague future such elections.

After a brief period of initial occupation lasting from the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 to 1902, the United States’ provisional government and most of its soldiers departed Cuba; the island nation had finally achieved a measure of autonomy (autonomy is used in this case to indicate the existence of a level of agency and self-government short of complete sovereignty). Most scholars of the Republic during this period in Cuban history stubbornly refuse to refer to it as sovereign Cuba, at least until the 1930s, due to the existence of the Platt Amendment, which formalized the continuation of U.S. dominance over Cuba by restricting the new island nation’s rights in the realm of international relations and by cementing the United States’ right to intervene militarily on the island under certain circumstances. Thus, Cuba’s sovereignty was so constrained until at least 1934, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy – and the persistence of Cuban diplomats – brought about the dismantling of the amendment.

The economy

After 1902, however, regardless of the existence of the Platt Amendment, the Cuban Republic was once again free to pursue liberalization and advancement in a Cuban manner. In spite of the many aforementioned plagues and hurdles faced by Cuba’s newly formed state, the Cuban Republic made extraordinary progress in the economic and social spheres; it was fully engaged in the crucible that is liberalization.

Economic data from this period indicate that the Cuban Republic was a middle-income (likely upper-middle income by modern standards) country, with living conditions comparable to some European countries, or to those in the southern United States (which were the poorest states in the U.S. at this time). Consumption rates at certain points during the Cuban Republic measured as high as 70% of most European economies and exceeded those of almost every other Latin American nation. The Cuban Republic’s income per capita before the Revolution of 1959, was well above the average for Latin America; in fact, it was equidistant from the European and Latin American averages. Several consumption-based economic indicators are especially useful in highlighting Cuba’s prosperity during the republican period, mainly those which relate to private ownership of technology and luxury items, as well as those which relate to food supply and nourishment. The Cuban Republic’s rate of private television ownership (measured by the number of televisions per 1000 persons) was nearly 7 times greater than the average for Latin American states, and approximately equal to the European average. Likewise, Cuban private ownership of radios was well above Latin America’s average, as was the rate of private ownership for passenger vehicles. Additionally, during the Cuban Republic period, Cuba regularly led Latin America in food production, as well as per capita daily caloric consumption; whereas, Cuba following the Revolution of 1959 has often lagged behind other Latin American nations in these regards. Finally, the rapid development of Cuba during the Republic era is evident by the fact that for much of that time period, Cuba led Latin America as the region's largest consumer of cement, a resource which is essential for the construction of new infrastructure. Additionally, Cuba’s investment in technology and mechanization during this period drastically exceeded that of its neighbors. In 1920, a time known as the “Dance of Millions” due to its especially high levels of prosperity, Cuba’s investment in these goods accounted for a quarter of the total investment in machinery for the entirety of Latin America (more of a cultural conception than a geographic region, “Latin America” has ill-defined borders, but for context can be estimated as containing approximately between 20-30 different countries.) After presenting many of the above statistics, and in light of the decidedly positive, albeit one-sided, perspective that they offer, authors of the above-cited paper in the Journal of Economic History, Marriane Ward and John Devereux concluded that “The story of Cuba during the twentieth century is therefore the story of how it has fallen in the world income distribution…. Over the last fifty years, Cuba has replicated the failings of command economies elsewhere albeit in a uniquely Cuban fashion.”

Infrastructure

The Cuban Republic’s remarkable success wasn’t limited to solely economic factors, Cuba also made remarkable progress in improving its transportation infrastructure. This helped the Republic to extend the rule of law, as well as healthcare and education opportunities, into the Eastern (largely rural and poor) portion of the island. During the republican period, railroads were constructed which spanned the entirety of Cuba, with the assistance of at least $60 million (likely over $1 billion in today’s currency) in American investment. The Cuban Republic’s relatively well-developed transportation is credited with facilitating much of the Republic’s incredible progress in healthcare. The same article notes that the Cuban Republic was exceptional by Latin American standards due to its ability to provide “relatively easy access to fairly high-quality healthcare for an unusually large share of the population…,” due partly to the government’s investment in social services, and aided by the government's drastic improvement of sanitation as well as water and sewer infrastructure. Before the Revolution of 1959, Cuba’s infant mortality rate was only 33 per 1000, less than a third of the average for Latin America and functionally identical to that of Europe. Additionally, the ratio of medical personnel to population in the Cuban republic was 2.5 times greater than the average for the region and virtually identical to the European average. Life expectancy in the Cuban Republic was 64 years, a full 14 years greater than the average for Latin America, and just five years below that of the United States. The Cuban Republic was also notably dedicated to matters relating to education, and the Cuban constitution – in its various iterations – always provided for free and compulsory education. As a result of this dedication, in 1955, Cuba’s literacy rate was 79 percent, amongst the highest in Latin America. Taking into account Cuba’s significant rural population, largely unreachable by the government at that time (not an unusual problem for developing nations), these feats in medicine and education are truly remarkable.

Human rights

Finally, and most importantly, the Cuban Republic continually made impressive advancements in human rights and liberalization. In Cuba’s 1940 Constitution, widely considered a bulwark of freedom and social justice, Cuban delegates included language which provided for anti-discrimination protections and other liberal principles. Notably, the constitution included unparalleled protections for Cuban women. The United States had, prior to the end of its provisional occupation in 1902, re-imposed the Spanish Civil Code upon Cuba as a stop-gap alternative to the difficult process of drafting a new body of law for the island. The Spanish Civil Code was heavily Catholicized, and thus, held regressive and prohibitive views of women and their role in society. During the short period of its existence, the Cuban Republic made remarkable progress in removing the religious influences from its body of law, and in elevating the status of women in the Cuban society. In the early 20th century, Cuban women catapulted from a position in which the law afforded them little autonomy and no property rights, to being able to own property, vote, divorce their husbands, and organize politically. Laws were also passed which attempted to abolish all forms of discrimination based upon sex, although their implementation proved difficult.

Cuba’s contributions to the cause of human rights during the republican period were not limited to the Constitution of 1940, or to Cuban domestic pursuits; Cuba was essential to the progress of the international human rights movement. In the latter years of World War 2, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt communed to discuss the post-war order, and to construct a world order amenable to their respective interests. The notions underpinning the United Nations, as an international organization dominated by the great powers and designed to serve as the arbiter of their new world order, emerged from these discussions. It was the efforts of various Latin American nations which made the United Nations what it is today: not just an organization designed for ensuring security and stability, but a dedicated, efficacious bastion of human rights. More specifically, it was Cuba’s delegation that assumed a leadership role of the Latin American bloc, at that time the largest group of nations in the original 58-state body, and spearheaded an aggressive charge to re-define the nature of the United Nations as a body primarily dedicated to the defense of human dignity. During the first session of the United Nations, the Cuban delegation became the first to submit a proposal that the United Nations consider issuing an authoritative statement demonstrating its commitment to human rights, a suggestion that ran counter to the immediate interests of the United States and other major members of the body. When the original motion failed the Cuban delegation resolved to pursue it with the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council which, due to the Republic of Cuba’s tenacity, established the Commission on Human Rights for the purpose of drafting an “international bill of rights.” Cuba also submitted a draft such declaration, which inspired the final document, serving as a model in both substance and form. If it were not for Cuba’s novel idea that universal human rights should be listed, so that they might be easily understood, attained, and defended by persons of every walk of life, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights might never have come into existence. Throughout most of the modern era, outside of religious doctrine and certain areas of academia, rights were seldom discussed in the context of “humankind,” “international,” or “universal.” Rather, rights were seen as the prerogative of the nation-state and were outlined in national contexts or documents (e.g., state constitutions.) Cuban, and larger Latin American influence over the United Nations assisted in shifting that paradigm, and it is perhaps the most incredible part of the Cuban Republic’s legacy.

Conclusion

It is important that the presentation of these facts not be mistaken as an effort to obscure the serious shortcomings of the Cuban Republic. It is especially critical that the aforementioned economic statistics not be misused to obscure the gross income inequality under which a segment of the Cuban Republic’s poor languished, or to exonerate those responsible for the political instability which plagued the era. Rather, knowledge of this period is crucial for two major reasons. First, the Cuban regime often boasts about spectacular achievements (particularly in the fields of health care and literacy), and these “achievements” form a central pillar of revolution propaganda, but the above data illustrate that most of these regime “successes” were largely achieved by the Republic which came before. Second, and even more important, this story of the Cuban Republic is the story of a brave people who fought for countless years to achieve some measure of freedom and liberalism, only to have it snatched away from them by a revolution – and revolutionaries – steeped in perfidy. Unfortunately, irony abounds in present-day Cuba which, once a key drafter of the original document, now bans the distribution of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the island and severely punished those in possession of the document. Additionally, while Fidel Castro was given the chance to defend himself in open court on July 26, 1953 – in front of relatively fair-minded judges and the press – those who live on the island in the present day are denied that right. While Castro was released from prison after organizing an amnesty campaign from his cell, having served less than 3 years of his 15-year sentence, Cubans are now subjected to draconian prison sentences in medieval prisons. Perhaps this is why many Cubans prefer to refer to the Republican period as “free Cuba,” drawing a powerful juxtaposition with present-day, “un-free Cuba.”

History has yet to absolve Fidel Castro, or the brutally oppressive regime that he left behind, but it seems to be in the process of absolving the principles of the Republic which Castro worked so hard to topple.

What do you think of pre-revolutionary Cuba? Let us know below.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 4 - What the US Got Wrong

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Part 1 on Castro before the revolution is here, part 2 on Fidel taking power is here, and part 3 on Fidel going to the US is here. Here, we look at what the US got wrong in its assessment of Castro, including how Castro waited until he consolidated power and the role of the US media.

Fidel Castro at the UN General Assembly in 1960.

How can we explain the failure of US intelligence to correctly assess the threat? Some, such as Earl Smith, blamed the State Department and the CIA. Later he wrote a book about his Cuben experience called The Fourth Floor. By “Fourth Floor” he meant the upper-level officials who determined US foreign policy. He accused them of the mindset “better a leftist dictator than Batista.” Thus, according to Smith, they took no proactive measures to prevent someone like Castro coming to power.

The CIA. indeed, were the nation’s first line of defense. The CIA is the organization supposed to analyze present and potential threats to US national security including threats to the Western Hemisphere. Especially, they would prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any foothold in this hemisphere and any Marxist regime from taking root.  According to the CIA 

“ … it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy-making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro’s communist affiliation.” And, yet, instead of the CIA, it was many other individuals, such as Earl Smith, various Cuban politicians and some American who in the early days tried to alert about the dangers of Castro. According to Ambassador Smith, the CIA underestimated the communist threat in Cuba. He asked the agency to re-check its estimate of communist party strength in Cuba. However, he found that the Chief of the CIA attached to the embassy was more of a hindrance than a help. He found him so sympathetic to Castro that Smith would sometimes call him a Fidelista, only half in jest. The Chief of the Central American Bureau of the CIA visited Smith did share fears of the communist threat in Cuba but did not consider Castro himself to be a communist. Why did Earl Smith come to a different conclusion than the CIA: namely that Castro was dangerous - while the CIA wallowed in indecisiveness? It must be noted that the Kirkpatrick fact-finding mission was sponsored by Bacardi Rum with the goal of reducing American worries about Castro and his movement. Their interest was to maintain investment and business. It could be that the Kirkpatrick mission did not WANT to find out that he was a dangerous and unstable extremist. Smith had no such agenda. His goal was to determine if Castro was an acceptable alternative to Batista or not.

Additionally, evidence indicates that Castro was not an inflexible ideologue. He was first and foremost intent on maintaining the revolution and his own control. He ultimately decided the best way to accomplish this was to move the Island in the direction of hard-line communism. Within weeks after Castro’s return to Cuba, communists were openly serving in the Cuban government.

Waiting game

Before his power was consolidated, however, he found it expedient to keep any such tendencies quiet. Instead, he played a clever waiting game, introducing communist reforms and elevating communists to power gradually. He had used this strategy before. When fighting Batista’s troops, he once called for a truce as a mere ploy to buy time. A part of this long-term strategy was to keep his true intentions under the radar until he was strong enough. On his first visit to the US he purposefully brought along some officials whose views matched those of Eisenhower. This was a mere subterfuge. As was later shown, he never intended to allow these men any influence. He kept his distance from the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) and downplayed the importance of communists in his movement. Castro was well aware of the CIA coup in Guatemala that had toppled President Jacobo Árbenz and replaced him with Trujillo. The Caracas Resolution also led Castro to exercise caution. This declaration firmly condemned communism and expressed a determination “to eradicate and prevent subversive activities” in the Western Hemisphere. Castro did not want to give the US any excuse to try a similar intervention in Cuba against him.

Furthermore, many people simply took Castro at his word. They took Castro’s reassuring statements of democratic liberalism at face value and based their support on these and their own idealistic aspirations. Despite Castro’s efforts to distance himself from communists, his actions during the anti-Batista struggle displayed unmistakable signs of extremist tendencies that should have informed US policy. They may have been more perceptive than policy-makers but they were, in hindsight, less perceptive than a number of Cuban leaders and the US ambassador Earl Smith. A more telling approach should have been based on his actions. For example, Castro repeatedly stated that his goal was a democratic government. But how did he actually treat those guilty of “crimes” against the people? During his years in the Sierra Maestra, he led raids against rich landowners. After a rigged trial they were executed and their lands handed over to the poor. This was not the behavior of a committed believer in constitutional rights but a Marxist dedicated to class-war. These incidents were either unknown or overlooked. Dean Acheson, on meeting him during his visit to the United States, for example, called him “the first democrat of Latin America.” This was a strange judgment coming just weeks after hundreds of Batista’s followers had been executed without a real trial by the in-coming revolutionaries. Others promoted the idea that Castro was an anti-dictator and was not under the influence of the extreme leftists.

Media

Another factor to consider was the media. While government officials fretted over Castro, the American news establishment fell over each other in adoration of him. They cannot be judged too harshly for this, after-all, any reporter worth his salt is looking for one thing: a good story. And here was a real-live bearded, charismatic, fire-breathing revolutionary, clad in combat fatigues, emerging from the mountain jungle to overthrow a powerful dictator. It was irresistible. Herbert Matthews turned him into a celebrity which captured the imagination of many, including some in the CIA. It was the American Society of Newspaper Editors that extended its personal invitation to Castro to visit the United States. All of this helped take eyes off of the disturbing facts of Castro’s actions,ideology and agenda. The guerrilla leader was presented as a champion of liberty, a reasonable person who had his heart in the right place. The great Edward R. Murrow interviewed the Cuban leader with a TV broadcast from Castro’s living room. Castro appeared in his pajamas. His son Fidel was brought out to speak to answer some questions. Expressions of friendliness towards America were expressed. The set looked like a typical middle class home, comfortable and homey, with Castro playing the determined but soft-spoken, doting father. Anyone watching would have a hard time imagining him as a brutal dictator. Ambassador Earl Smith testified to the Department investigation committee that journalists like Herbert Matthews helped to influence US policy in favor of Castro.

Moreover, rivalry within the revolutionary movement may have played a part. Rarely have revolutions been achieved without some infighting. Was it only the scheming of brother Raúl and Che Guevara that forced Castro towards Moscow? The differences between the more pragmatic Fidel, still in the US, and the ideologically-driven Raul and Che resulted in a power-struggle and threatened to split the movement. On April 24 or 25 Fidel and Raúl engaged in a loud argument over a long-distance phone. Raúl was overheard accusing Fidel of “being seduced” by “them.” Fidel made several public comments that risked undermining communist goals. Raúl and Che seethed with indignation and threatened to go their own way. Perhaps realizing that danger, Fidel decided to commit himself more fully to the communist/progressive agenda. Ultimately, he opted to abandon moderation. In December, 1961 he openly proclaimed his communist ideology, “I am a Marxist-Leninist and shall be one until the end of my life,” he proclaimed in a televised speech. While Fidel was in America studiously downplaying communist influence in the revolution or ties with the Soviet Union, both Raúl and Che were aggressively promoting both. As for Fidel, he was not yet ready to formalize ties with the USSR or even associate with the PSP. As late as mid- May 1959 his public utterances brimmed with goodwill and moderation. That May 10, he praised the American people for their “enthusiasm” and understanding of the revolution. He expressed the desire for good relations with all of America and condemned any attempt to export the revolution to other Latin American nations. If Eisenhower had made a serious effort to form an accord with him, some say, history may have turned out differently. This theory overlooks the influence of those like Raul & Che, who would have nothing to do with such an arrangement.

Soon, though, Castro dashed any hopes of normal relations. That July, the Fundamental Law or Original Act 425 made it illegal to oppose the Castro regime. It also gave him dictatorial powers. And yet it was not until March, 1960 that the US determined firmly on a policy of regime change. Although one may argue the rightness or wrongness of the CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 Guatemala, a similar action may have taken place to keep Castro from power if it had been implemented firmly earlier. For example, unlike the case with Arbenz in 1954, there was no skillfully coordinated plan including a serious anti-communist propaganda campaign which could have martialed support against Castro.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the US misjudged Castro because many of those who were in positions of power underestimated the communist threat and failed to read the warning signs about Castro. A large groundswell of support for Castro was allowed to build up. It is now clear that from the moment he came to power, Castro began to steer Cuba in the direction of a communist state, working with both old-time communists and more recent communist colleagues. After 1965, when Cuba became officially communist, Castro remarked several times that it had always been his intention to turn Cuba into a Marxist state. His denials of communism in the early days of the revolution, he claimed, were all a deception. An investigation involving a multitude of interviews revealed, decades after the Revolution, that Castro and his associates built a “hidden” parallel government, readying it to take power when the time was right. The US did not present a united front as to Castro. Those who recognized Castro as a dangerous demagogue vied with those, both in the State Department, the embassy at Havana and the media, that championed his cause. All indications are that Castro never intended to do anything other than establish a dictatorship in Cuba. Unfortunately for Cuba and the World, this reality was recognized too late. 

What do you think of US intelligence’s view about Fidel Castro during his early days in power? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

Sources

Fursenko, Aleksandr  and Naftali, Timothy  One Hell of a Gamble

Krushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964,New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Smith, Earl E, The Fourth Floor, An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution. New York: Random House, 1962.

Central Intelligence Agency 1961 Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro 

https://s3.observador.pt/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Psychiatric-Personality-Study-of-Fidel-Castro.pdf

Dispatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State describing conditions immediately after the fall of Batista, Jan 6-14, 1959.

Dispatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, Havana, September 26, 1958 Subject: 1958 Elections: Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections.

"Myths of the enemy: Castro, Cuba and Herbert l. Matthews of the New York times," Anthony DePalma Working Paper #313 - July 2004

Face the Nation with Fidel Castro, in Cuba broadcast on January 11, 1959.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 3 - Fidel Goes to the US

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at Castro’s visit to the US in 1959 and how Castro had consolidated his anti-American rule by 1960.

If you missed it, read part 1 on Cuba before the revolution here, and part 2 on when Fidel took power here.

Fidel Castro in Washington, D.C. in 1959.

In the provisional government set up by the revolutionaries, calm heads appeared to prevail. Castro also promised elections in eighteen months. The cabinet included José Miró Cardona as prime minister. This distinguished lawyer had fought with Castro for years. Once installed as prime minister on January 6, 1959, he began working to move Cuba towards a constitutional democracy. But in a move reminiscent of dictators, Castro ended up with Cardona’s job less than two months later when Cardona resigned. "I cannot run my office while another man is trying to run it from behind a microphone," Cardona complained. Ultimately, the environment in Cuba became so toxic for anyone daring to express opposition to Castro’s policies that Cardona fled Cuba. On March 3 the Castro government began a policy of nationalization and expropriation.

By the time of Castro’s visit to the United States that April, Castro’s anti-American rhetoric, his publicly stated intentions to nationalize the Cuban economy, including foreign property and his association with extreme leftists such as Che Guevara continued to sound alarm bells. The Eisenhower administration, in fact, came close to canceling Castro’s first visit. This option was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council at Washington on March 26, 1959, just prior to Castro’s arrival in the US. On the one hand, ugly signs of an imminent dictatorship were noted. Castro’s tendency to  fall back on public tirades to galvanize support, rather than taking sound administrative steps. The opinion of the CIA was that Cuba’s new leader was “moving toward outright dictatorship.” Additionally, communists were now playing an ever greater role in the new Cuba. Further dire warnings were delivered by eyewitnesses. Castro took such actions as jailing old comrades who resigned in opposition to the growing influence of communists in the revolutionary Cuban government. The day before the meeting a telegram arrived from Gonzalo Facio, the former Costa Rican Ambassador to the US. Facio had gone with José Figueres, former president of that republic, to Havana in March. He related that in Figueres’ view Castro’s policies were characterized by “extreme, unreasoning nationalism including anti-Americanism and communism.” At the NSC meeting various options were discussed: including a refusal to allow Castro entry into the country or goading the OAS into action against him. It was decided, however, that the negative impact of these measures would outweigh the benefits.

Washington

Controversy continued to swirl about the charismatic revolutionary upon his arrival at National Airport in Washington on April 15, 1959. Senator Smathers of Florida accused Castro of supporting violent revolutionary movements. Raphael Del Pino, a one-time supporter of Castro, now hurled accusations of dictatorship and sought to alert Americans to the danger of a “Communist-controlled beach head within 90 miles of the United States mainland.” Many Americans worried about the executions going on in Cuba, Castro’s ambitions and rumors that he intended to nationalize and confiscate American investments and holdings in Cuba., Richard Roy Rubottom, Jr. called him a “dangerous nationalist” and expressed "grave doubts concerning the character and motivation" of their celebrated visitor. Reports of on-going executions and Castor’s refusal to hold elections began to generate criticism and finally drove some. Democratic media such as The Atlantic and the New Republic to join the chorus questioning the genuineness of Castro’s assertions that he was a democrat.

None of this seemed to dampen the excitement of his whirlwind tour, though. Castro was feted everywhere and given free reign to make his case. To many, it looked like we had made a friend; he placed a wreath at George Washington’s tomb and the Tomb of the Unknown soldier. He sampled such staples of Americana as hot dogs and hamburgers at Yankee Stadium. Fidel publicly projected an image of moderation. He said nothing in support of the Soviet Union and repeatedly denied that his movement was even affiliated with communists. He even declared publicly, “We are against all kinds of dictators  . . . That is why we are against communism.” A highlight of Castro’s visit was a one-on-one session with Vice President Nixon. He met with Castro privately and concluded that Castro was “either incredibly naive about communism or under communist discipline — my guess is the former.” Unfortunately, these sentiments were not a matter of public record and, upon Castro’s return to Cuba, American policy was still miserably uncertain. This uncertainty would not last for long.

Back in Cuba

The actions of Castro himself in the next few months began to dissolve any remaining doubts about the dynamic Cuban leader and the worst fears of U.S. officials began to be realized. If not a communist by name, he imitated one very well. He continued to show no sympathy for the middle class, a steady stream of which headed to Miami rather than live in Cuba. Middle class disenchantment stemmed from many causes: a crackdown on religion, including confiscation of church property and the jailing of clerics and the banning of various religious expressions. On May 17, the First Law of Agrarian Reform began the process of land expropriation.  In July the communist lawyer Osvaldo Dorticós replaced Manuel Urrutia as president.  By that Fall, it had become dangerous to question the regime. For example, Huber Matos, who had fought alongside Castro. opposed the drift of the regime towards marxism. For this he found himself jailed for 20 years.

By the end of that year, Castro's cabinet had been purged of moderates. These had been replaced with communists or communist sympathizers. In addition, moderate critics found themselves in prison. Cuba began openly courting the Soviet Union. US policy gradually hardened in opposition, but it was not until March 1960 that US policy called for outright removal of Castro. By then, his power was probably too firm to be uprooted without an all-out invasion.

What do you think about Fidel Castro’s trip to the US in 1959? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 2 - Fidel Takes Power

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at US assessments of Fidel Castro just before he took power, the 1958 Cuban election, and the early days of Castro in power.

If you missed it, read part 1 on Cuba before the revolution here,

Fidel Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos in Havana in January 1959.

Enter Earl Smith. This non-Spanish-speaking businessman with no diplomatic experience took over duties as American ambassador in Havana in June, 1957. On the urging of his staff, Smith did some traveling in Cuba to get a better feel for the country. Based on his experiences and observations, Smith developed firm views on Castro and the anti-Batista movements, which views were not completely in accord with the CIA. The ambassador did not omit to inform Kirkpatrick that in his view, the CIA mission had allowed itself to fall under the sway of the July 26 movement. Smith urged the CIA to stop giving any encouragement to them. He furthermore accused the CIA of greatly underestimating the strength of the Communist party and its influence in Cuba. The CIA official responded by basically denying Smith’s charges with a bland recital of recent CIA operations, which he characterized as above reproach.

The new ambassador decided to conduct his own investigation into Castro’s background and what he found alarmed him. Smith conducted an intensive process of interviews including a multitude of people, many of whom had known Castro since his youth. He was careful to include those who were anti-Batista, representing different segments of Cuban society. According to Smith “No matter how anti-Batista these people were, they believed Castro would be worse for Cuba than Batista.” Among other reasons, those Smith interviewed stated that Castro was “an unstable terrorist.” Smith's ultimate conclusion was “It was becoming more and more obvious to me that the Castro-led 26th of July Movement embraced every element of radical political thought and terrorist inclination in Cuba.” But despite Smith’s position as ambassador, some personnel in the American Embassy continued to support Castro and relay messages to the State Department indicating that the Castro movement was nothing to fear. Not only that,  in early 1958 Radio Moscow broadcast its support of the effort to overthrow Batista. They continued especially supporting the 26th of July Movement. The State Department was informed of this by Ambassador Smith.

It was only when some rebels, under the command of Raul Castro, began kidnapping Americans that the State Department began to direct the CIA to prevent Castro from attaining power. The CIA then attempted to cultivate an alternative leader, without success.

Democratic process

Another possible solution lay in the democratic process. In 1958, after six years of military dictatorship under Batista, Cuba held a free election and began preparing the way for a peaceful transition of power. Three main candidates vied with each other for the presidency; Andrés Rivero Agüero of the Progressive Action Party, Carlos Márquez Sterling of the Partido del Pueblo Libre. The elections represented an opportunity to get rid of Batista but the US remained non-committal about which candidate to support or what official policy to adopt towards the on-going armed rebellion. Castro seemed to be a viable option. In his first speech on Radio Rebelde on April 14, 1958 Castro repeated many of the cherished ideals of classical liberalism; freedom of the press, republicanism and constitutionalism. He went out of his way to deny his association with communism, “These dictators will not tire of repeating the lie that we are "communists." He began the speech, in fact, with a withering attack on government censorship.  “As hateful as tyranny is in all its aspects, none of them is so irritating and crudely cynical as the absolute control that it has imposed on all the media for disseminating printed, radio and television news.”

On July 16 the American embassy passed along to the State Department the views of one of the opposition candidates, Dr. Marquez Sterling. Sterling communicated to the American Embassy that, in his view, the political situation was the most dangerous the Island had ever encountered. He claimed that the insurrectionists, unable to win on their own, were seeking to create conditions of anarchy that would allow them to seize power. He called Castro “mad” - not the first person to do so. Additionally, ambassador Earl T. Smith, vocally opposed any possible support of Castro. He declared openly that Castro was not someone with whom the US could trust or work with. Despite these warnings, the US did not take a firm position on Castro or the election.

The American embassy in Cuba's attitude was crystal clear, in contrast to the vague official American policy. The embassy represented a valuable front-line perspective which should have guided US policy. On October 3, 1958, just weeks before the election, an embassy dispatch entitled: “1958 Elections; Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections” arrived in Washington. After a thorough analysis of the political situation in Cuba, the embassy urged the following course of action:  "Though the coming Cuban elections will not meet all the standards of an ideal democratic election, they are the best that can be had under the circumstances now prevailing. They are in the Embassy’s view infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at all. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage them." In other words, the embassy opposed any of the armed opposition, which Earl Smith viewed as illegitimate.

Election

Despite such information, ambivalence continued to mark the US official attitude toward the bearded rebel. There were, however, more red flags. First, there was Castro’s attitude toward the election. Although  he repeatedly proclaimed himself as a proponent of democracy, during the 1958 election he issued repeated calls for a general strike and death threats against all candidates for political office as well as Cubans who wished to participate. As a result, in regions under the control of the insurrection, voter turnout was negligible. Insisting that the election was a US/Batista farce, the rebels issued the “Total War Against the Tyranny Manifesto.” In the uncompromising language of the fanatic, the Manifesto simply ignored the elections and declared “war” on the Batista regime.

The elections took place on November 3rd with Progressive Action candidate Andrés Rivero Agüero winning 70% of the vote. Within days of his victory he met with the US ambassador and expressed his commitment to restore legitimacy and constitutional government in Cuba. The US was prepared to support him with military aid against insurgents. He would never get the chance. The Batista government was in the process of disintegration at that moment and would collapse within weeks. Agüero’s ambitions to restore the Cuban government were thwarted when Batista threw in the towel and fled Cuba on January 1, 1959, leaving the Island to anti-Batista forces.

When the rebels took Havana, a wave of euphoria swept Cuba. Most were hopeful that Castro and his fellow revolutionaries would establish a liberal democracy as he had stated many times. Castro and his revolution also captured the attention and hopes of many foreign observers. Although some uttered dark warnings about the bearded militant, others, mainly in the American media, helped to sway much American opinion in Castro’s favor. They denied Castro’s communism and actively promoted him as an acceptable leader of Cuba. After Castro’s arrival in Havana, American companies continued to act as if nothing would change. Investment in Cuba hit a record high of $63 million. One corporate executive remarked that the responsibilities of leadership would force Castro to “become conservative.”

Optimism

Everyone was caught up in the excitement. Immediately after Castro's entry into Havana, Ed Sullivan journeyed to the island and met the enigmatic rebel. Arriving at about two in the morning, Sullivan conducted and filmed an interview with Castro lasting about six minutes. Sullivan introduced the filmed interview with the comment “Somebody has said that ‘Freedom is Everybody’s Business.’ In the interview Castro came across as a soft-spoken, freedom-loving, responsible leader. Sullivan expressed great optimism about his subject and what it meant for the future of his suffering nation as well as Cuban-American relations.

Not long after Sullivan’s encounter with Castro, The popular show Face the Nation journeyed to Havana to expand on the entertainer’s brief conversation. Their purpose was to have a more serious and thorough opportunity to find out what this new Latin American hero was all about, and if indeed, the revolution was something to be worried about. Again, Castro emphasized his democratic ideals and opposition to communism. The main wrinkle in the generally hopeful mood was over the on-going executions. Once the anti-Batista forces took control of Havana, Batista followers were rounded up and hastily tried.  Summary executions took a gruesome toll as the revolutionary government took terrible revenge against Batista followers.for “crimes a./m gainst the people.” By the end of February 500 had been executed. The “trials” fell far short of American or European standards of justice. At one trial, a lawyer asked that the case against his defendant be dismissed due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor replied, “He has to be shot anyway as a measure of social health.” Horrified observers reacted with concern. When questioned about the executions, Castro’s responses betrayed a complete lack of understanding or sympathy for Western concepts of justice guaranteeing a fair trial. His closest associates, in fact, dismissed these ideals as “bourgeois concepts of justice.” Castro was actually surprised at the international outcry over the executions. “These men are assassins,” he declared, “We are executing murderers that deserve to be shot.” He justified denying due process of law to Batista men, declaring that the evidence was obvious and that simple accusations were all that was needed.

Anti-Americanism

The Consulate at Santiago continued to advise the State Department about conditions in the immediate aftermath of Castro’s ascension to power. They described a rising tide of anti-Americanism, encouraged, in part, by “the pronouncements of Fidel Castro.” An attempt to show films from the United States Information Service was shut down when a member of the audience rose and lectured them on “United States oppression of Cuba.” The consulate also took the opportunity to report the increasing influence of the communists. They were now accepted as a legal party, communist newspapers began to be reestablished and individuals with PSP backgrounds had been appointed to public office.

Time magazine also issued a frank assessment. The opening lines of an article of the January 26 issue warned; “The executioner’s rifle cracked across Cuba last week, and around the world voices hopefully cheering for a new democracy fell still. The men who had just won a popular revolution for old ideals—for democracy, justice and honest government—themselves picked up the arrogant tools of dictatorship. As its public urged them on, the Cuban rebel army shot more than 200 men, summarily convicted in drumhead courts, as torturers and mass murderers for the fallen Batista dictatorship. The constitution, a humanitarian document forbidding capital punishment, was overridden.” The article went on to luridly describe the executions, sounding more like descriptions of Einsatzgruppen activity rather than tribunals of real justice.

What do you think about Fidel Castro’s early days in power? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 1 - Before the Revolution

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at how the US intervened in other places in the 1950s, and its pre-Cuban Revolution attempts to understand Fidel Castro’s beliefs.

Fidel Castro with his in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba. December 1956.

In April 1959, Castro visited the United States itself, where he appeared on popular American TV shows, gave talks at Harvard and was buoyed aloft on the shoulders of an admiring audience. In the US he generally received royal treatment wherever he went. This included children sporting Castro beards and other manifestations of Castro-mania. This is strange considering the fact that his mortal enemy, Batista, enjoyed the full backing of the US but a few months before.

As we all know, this “honeymoon” period did not last. Before the end of that year, relations between the US and Castro deteriorated beyond the point of no return. The point is: if we had a more clear idea of his ideology, if he were a communist or might become one and would become an ally of the Soviet Union, we would have been justified in acting decisively to keep him from power. An operation similar to that carried out in Guatemala in 1954 or Iran in 1952 could have been mounted. In the tense competition with the Soviet Union, it was imperative to prevent a communist government 90 miles from American shores. But without a clear understanding of Castro's ideology and/or future plans no firm policy was formulated. Instead, US policy would evolve in reaction to Castro's moves. The result of that policy was that in less than two years diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba severed and relations degenerated into clandestine warfare. Subsequently, Cuba under Castro became a disaster for U.S. foreign policy for decades. Why did the US allow such a hostile regime to take hold so close to our shores? Why were US policy makers not clear on what Castro’s motives were or what the nature of his ideology was until too late? How did we miss the warning signs?

The problem began towards the end of the Batista regime. By 1957, after almost two decades of unwavering support of Cuban regimes, the State Department began to have doubts about continued support of Batista. Batista’s efforts to label Castro as a communist and tool of Moscow failed to gain Eisenhower’s continued support. In the corridors of power, criticism of America’s Cuban policy became more vocal. Such sentiments were even becoming a matter of public record. On August, 17, 1958, Henry Wriston, president of the Council on Foreign Relation appeared on the Mike Wallace Interview. He openly uttered such anti-Batista statements as “we don't like Batista'' and “we would be delighted to see Batista and Trujillo (the dictator of Guatemala) overthrown.” The US went beyond mere distaste. In March,1958 Eisenhower stopped sending arms to Batista, “Obviously Castro had won the emotional support of the Cuban people,” he said later in justification. The CIA had even actually begun supporting opposition movements in hopes of getting rid of an increasingly unpopular dictator. 

The US and Castro

The US enjoyed major success in sponsoring overthrows of regimes in places as diverse as Guatemala and Iran. Unlike in those countries, however, the US had no plan about whom to replace Batista with. To complicate matters, the insurrection movements prowling around in the mountains and jungles of eastern Cuba were of uncertain ideology and attitudes toward the US - and time was running out. Castro’s group, called the “26th of July Movement,” which was the most important of the various anti-Batista movements, threatened yet another violent overthrow of a Cuban government. By the summer of 1958 it was becoming clear that his regimes’ days were numbered. What should US policy be? Some feared that if something were not done soon the threat of violent revolution would materialize and replace Batista with an even worse (and leftist) government. Since Castro was likely to be an increasingly dominant force, it was vital to decide whether to support him or keep him from power.

What did the US know of Castro? Much knowledge came not from official government efforts but enterprising journalists. The long struggle by the barbudos (bearded ones) attracted much sympathy from the American press, Chief among these was New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews. Castro had been reported killed by the Batista regime. But Matthews was able to locate him. After some days with Castro, Matthews sent his report to the Times. On February 24, 1957, the world was electrified by the news: “Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba’s youth, is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, at the southern tip of the island.” Along with the report Matthew provided the rebel leader’s signature as proof. The article gushed with praise, included a description of Castro as an “educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkable qualities of leadership.” He had not only dramatically revealed that Castro was not dead, he successfully portrayed him in a way that garnered widespread interest and sympathy from readers across the country. Even more importantly for US policy, he also denied that Castro was a communist or that communists were a significant force in his movement. Such reporting built a groundswell of support among the American public.

Less supportive of America

But if the US had done a profile on the indefatigable rebel, they would have known that he blamed the US for many of Cuba’s problems. At his trial in 1952 he defended himself and used the courtroom as a platform to promote his views. Included in his diatribe were such statements as “The United Fruit Company owns land the north to the south socast in Orient Province-but two hundred thousand Cuban families there don’t own an inch of land!” His villains were companies and landowners. As it was, the CIA psychological profile on Castro did not appear until December 1961, much too late. 

During this time, the American embassy in Havana was not much help. From the years 1953-57 under Ambassador Arthur Gardner, strict orders to avoid contact with anti-Batista movements were in force, effectively thwarting any chance to learn more about Castro. Not only that, such a policy put the CIA in an awkward position. It could not utilize embassy personnel and interfered with intelligence gathering. To overcome this problem, that spring of 1957 Washington sent an official fact-finding mission to Cuba to find out more about Castro. After obtaining Ambassador Gardner’s cooperation, the mission, led by CIA officer Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. set out to fill in the gaps of knowledge about the opposition to Batista. The delegation spent most of its time in Santiago de Cuba, the main town of Castro's home province, Oriente. Here they hoped to obtain first-hand information about Castro's character and philosophy. Basically, the mission did not discover anything alarming about Castro. He came from a large, wealthy land-owning family. He had attended parochial schools, gone to college, and enjoyed baseball. His former teachers had nothing but good to say about him, “He was a good Catholic boy,” said one. Others insisted that he could not possibly be a communist. The team felt that the rebel movement simply reflected the desire of Cubans to be rid of dictatorship and restore a functioning democracy. So as of 1958 the fog around Castro’s political leanings had still not cleared. It was known that he had been involved in leftist politics and that his movement included communists but in the words of Kirkpatrick “we were not sure whether he was an avowed Communist.” Castro himself had refused to make common cause with Cuban communists.

What do you think about American intelligence’s attempts to gather information on Fidel Castro in the 1950s? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

Cold War People - Episode 13 - Fidel Castro

How did one man inspire a generation of Communist revolutionaries? This podcast tells the story of Fidel Castro.

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Following our podcast on Brezhnev, we shall be looking at one of the most famous Communist leaders of all time, and almost certainly the most well-known Cuban in the world. He was also one of the longest serving leaders of the 20th Century, and somebody who inspires both fierce praise and fierce criticism, as well as somebody who was at the center of the most dangerous event of the Cold War.

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Take care,

George Levrier-Jones

PS – the new series will be on the American Revolution. Make sure you’re connected with us for updates on when the series will be out.

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Cold War History Series - Episode 4 - Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis, episode 4 of itshistorypodcasts.com's series on the Cold War is available now for your listening pleasure.

With hindsight, many historians see this crisis as the time that the world flirted most closely with nuclear destruction. By the time of the crisis, 1962, we shall see how both the USA’s and USSR’s nuclear weapons had become terribly powerful, but this was in a world where the rules of the game for nuclear war were still being made..

We're glad that you've decided to come and join the past.. Happy listening!

George Levrier-Jones

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The amazing story of Chairman Mao’s American best friend. HiN Mag – April Issue

Chinese ruler Chairman Mao Zedong was one of the most important leaders of the 20th century. He was one of two communists titan who defined the age. But there is one unknown aspect of his life – he had a lifelong friendship with somebody who was born in the USA, China’s capitalist enemy.

The new issue of History is Now magazine is out now. And our main article tells the story of this lifelong friendship that would go on to influence the Cold War.

To find out more, take up a free trial of the magazine for up to 2 months and download your free copy of our interactive digital magazine for the iPad and iPhone today!

Click here for more information!

Plus, the new issue is available in a text version – perfect for smaller devices.

And coming very soon – History is Now Magazine for Android.

And here is what our editor has to say about the new issue…

This month’s issue starts with a fascinating article on Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s American friend, Edgar Snow. Snow was a young American journalist living in China in the 1930s when he was selected to meet Mao and his rebel forces. This extraordinary article goes on to chart their relationship not only during the time when Mao was a revolutionary seeking power, but also when Mao assumed power in all of China. Our second article is another piece of fascinating writing. It charts the story of Lionel Wigram, a man who developed revolutionary military training in the British Army and went on to lead a very unique Anglo-Italian fighting force in World War II. And then we’re back to the Cold War in the article after that. In it, we consider the case of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov. Markov became an exile from his Communist homeland and dared to continue to criticize Bulgaria’s leader when he was in the West. Despite Markov being based in London, there were a number of attempts on his life…

Next up is an article on an idyllic English village that was evacuated during World War II. However, the village was evacuated for reasons that you may not expect. Rather than German airplanes driving people from their homes, it was the British Army. Following that, we continue our look at the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The invasion by a group of Cuban rebels based in the US sought to topple Communist Fidel Castro from his position as leader of Cuba. In this article, we look at how the battle progressed and how the rebels fought off repeated waves of attacks from Communist forces before the assault ended.

Finally, as we all know, 2014 marks the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I, and with that in mind, we will have a number of World War I articles this year. First up is an interactive essay on a largely unknown aspect of the Eastern Front. The Battle of Lake Naroch was a major battle with disastrous consequences for one of the sides involved. By the way, an ‘interactive essay’ features text accompanied by many images as well as videos.

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George Levrier-Jones

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Tropical Revolution! How JFK and the CIA tried to topple Fidel Castro. History is Now – Issue 4

The story of how a JFK-backed, CIA-led operation to topple Cuban Communist leader Fidel Castro unfolded. And how a decision by JFK changed everything.

The new issue of History is Now magazine is out now. And the cover story is a daring tale of intrigue in a country that had just been rocked by a revolution.

To find out more, take up a free trial of the magazine for up to 2 months and download your free copy of our interactive digital magazine for the iPad and iPhone today!

Click here for more information!

And here is what our editor has to say about the new issue…

Issue four of History is Now magazine has arrived. Since we left you in January, we have continued to refine the layout of the magazine, as well as writing some great history articles!

This month we have two pieces on how Cuba and America dramatically fell out following the Cuban Revolution. Firstly, we look at the fascinating real story of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This invasion took place in 1961 and sought to topple Cuban Communist dictator Fidel Castro from power. But with US President John F. Kennedy wavering in his support for the Cuban dissidents, this task became much harder. Our second article considers Castro’s rise to power and argues that Castro was not a committed Communist when he visited Eisenhower’s America in 1959. Even so, the US would go on to try and assassinate Castro a number of times. These articles are complemented by our podcast on the Cuban Missile Crisis, an event that very nearly destroyed our world.

Then there is the story of David Porter and the USS Essex during the War of 1812, a tale of adventure, some success against the British, and much more. An equally intriguing article looks at the life of Sidney Reilly. Reilly was a Russian-born British spy who successfully changed the course of oil exploration in the Middle East in the early 20th century, and more significantly, almost changed the course of Russian and world history. Following, we finish our story of the Imjin War and look at Yi Sun-shin’s epic victories when faced against a Japanese fleet of epic proportions. This is a true story of success and tragedy – like many of the most captivating events in history are. Our final article takes a light-hearted look at food in the 19th century. What food did the average person normally eat? How did the upper-class dine? And what constituted good manners for a lady? You’re about to find out!

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George Levrier-Jones

John F Kennedy’s Central Intelligence Agency – Trouble in Cuba and Vietnam

This is the third in a series of articles that explores the iconic CIA and its use as a tactical weapon by the US presidents of the Cold War (1947-1991). The Central Intelligence Agency – In the Beginning and The Central Intelligence Agency – Eisenhower and Asia’s Back Door are the preceding posts. 

JFK delivering a speech

A very tired John F. Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States, was sworn into office on a clear, windy, brutally cold January 20, 1961.(1) It wasn’t an easy day. Eight inches of snow had fallen the night before, causing a monumental traffic jam. The streets were littered with abandoned vehicles.  Former President Herbert Hoover missed the entire inauguration event because Washington National Airport was closed due to the weather.  An inauguration is an important national symbol that characterizes the Republic and the all-night effort to clear Pennsylvania Avenue greeted the sun with space to accommodate the large crowd that would gather to witness the duly elected president assume the helm of the ship-of-state.  

The snowfall of the previous night and the windy, frigid temperatures of inauguration day are also apt codes for the sea change that had already gathered momentum around the relationship between the new president and his intelligence agency, the CIA.  The CIA, as authorized by The National Security Act of 1947, was still fairly young, but Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was an old hand and seemingly enjoyed the game.  By 1961, the CIA, in its short life, had tripped the light fantastic around the globe; Col. Lansdale was merrily fighting rebels in The Philippines following which he ported his obsession with asymmetric guerilla warfare to Vietnam where he spent two-years as a houseguest and confidant of President Diem. Other CIA operatives overthrew governments in Iran and Guatemala, and raised general hell with Cuba and Chile. 

During the latter Truman and the Eisenhower administrations there was a trend to combine the Cold War objective of fighting the creep of Communism with business interests. Iran, for example, nationalized British oil interests and Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh refused to budge in spite of punishing sanctions. According to the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, “Eisenhower worried about Mossadegh's willingness to cooperate with Iranian Communists; he also feared that Mossadegh would eventually undermine the power of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a staunch anti-Communist partner. In August 1953, the CIA helped overthrow Mossadegh's government and restored the Shah's power. In the aftermath of this covert action, new arrangements gave U.S. corporations an equal share with the British in the Iranian oil industry.”(2)

In Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman initiated land reforms that seriously impacted the holdings of the anti-Communist, New Orleans-based United Fruit Company who controlled over forty percent of Guatemala’s arable land.  The Truman administration came to the support of American business interests by arming the anti-Arbenz rebels.  Under Eisenhower, the CIA finished the job by overthrowing the Arbenz regime and installing Carlos Castillo Armas.  Codenamed PBSUCCESS, the coup d'état was the first-ever clandestine military action in Latin America but it was certainly not the last.(3)

Kennedy and the CIA

After fifty years the controversy surrounding Kennedy and the CIA obscures the landscape like the white-out conditions in a blizzard.   At one end of the opinion spectrum, Marquette University’s John McAdams’ The Kennedy Assassination site concludes that Kennedy and the CIA had some rough spots but got through them. (4) At the other end of the spectrum is Dr. Jerome R. Corsi, who maintains that Kennedy and the CIA locked horns and never retreated. (5) Excellent research and the documented citations for both perspectives leave the reader with many questions.  One corner of this argument does not appear to be disputed; Kennedy consistently refused to use the U.S. military to support private sector interests.  In this matter, President Kennedy was a traditionalist. The military, in his opinion, was to be used only in defense of national security interests.  If we can escape the white-out conditions of the never-ending controversy, the political landscape, once again, becomes hard and navigable.  

As Kennedy came to office, covert CIA actions initiated by the Eisenhower administration were in play in both hemispheres.  Two noteworthy examples are the storm clouds that were gathering around the Diem brothers in South Vietnam and the vexing problem of Fidel Castro in Cuba.  For discussion purposes I have separated these two significant events, but during the early days of the Kennedy administration they were unfolding concurrently linked through the CIA node.

President Kennedy and DCI Allen Dulles

South Vietnam

South Vietnam was a U.S. government construct, a nation-building exercise illuminated by the Pentagon Papers.

“The United States moved quickly to prevent the unification and to establish South Vietnam as an American sphere. It set up in Saigon as head of the government a former Vietnamese official named Ngo Dinh Diem, who had recently been living in New Jersey, and encouraged him not to hold the scheduled elections for unification. A memo in early 1954 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that intelligence estimates showed "a settlement based on free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the Associated States [Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam-the three parts of Indochina created by the Geneva Conference] to Communist control." Diem again and again blocked the elections requested by the Vietminh, and with American money and arms his government became more and more firmly established. As the Pentagon Papers put it: "South Viet Nam was essentially the creation of the United States."(6)

By 1961, Southeast Asia was rapidly becoming a tinder box.  During a discussion of an Edward Lansdale report on Vietnam with Walt Whitman Rostow, the National Security advisor, Kennedy lamented, “'This is the worst one we've got. You know, Eisenhower never mentioned it. He talked at length about Laos, but never uttered the word Vietnam.”  Lansdale’s report brought the deterioration of South Vietnam’s political stability into focus for Kennedy as he remarked to Rostow that the “Lansdale's narrative was 'an extremely vivid and well-written account of a place that was going to hell in a hack.'…” (7)

Diem and his brother persisted in implementing domestic policies based on impressing the Catholic religion and requiring personal loyalties that accelerated the destabilization of the country.  The prevailing religion in Vietnam was Buddhism at the time and the Diems were persecuting Buddhists terribly.  Making matters worse were two notable supporters of the Diem’s, neither of whom had a clue about the national culture of Vietnam.  Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, a Montana Democrat, lectured in Far Eastern and Latin American history in his previous life. Mansfield was also a practicing Catholic.  While Mansfield openly admitted he knew nothing about Vietnam, he very much liked Diem and he was generally considered to be Congress’ resident Vietnam expert.  The second big player who knew nothing about Vietnam was Col. Edward Lansdale, a CIA asset who befriended and used the Diems but was only committed to his concept of counterinsurgency warfare.  The Pentagon Papers revealed that, based on Lansdale’s advice, Kennedy approved secret operations to "dispatch of agents to North Vietnam" to engage in "sabotage and light harassment”.

Growing involvement

The Diem brothers’ refusal to cease and desist acting on their paranoia, resulted in thousands of Buddhists and dissenters being imprisoned, tortured, and murdered.  The Geneva Accords permitted the U.S. to have 685 military advisers in South Vietnam. Eisenhower sent several thousand and, under Kennedy, the figure rose to sixteen thousand with some of them taking part in combat operations. Diem was losing. Most of the South Vietnam countryside was now controlled by local villagers organized by the NLF.(See Footnote 6)  It became clear that a new government was necessary if the U.S. was to be effective in keeping Vietnam out of Communist hands.  Kennedy authorized the overthrow with the provision that the Diem brothers would be extracted to live in exile. 

Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam, received a cable (Cable 243) outlining the issues and actions that were the next steps in changing regimes or bringing the Diem regime into line with American interests, following the midnight raids on the Buddhist Pagodas on August 21, 1963.(8)  The Diem brothers would not or could not change direction and South Vietnam’s Diem government was overthrown in a military coup d'état according to play book.  What did not go ‘according to plan’ was the murder of the Diem brothers whose desperate calls for rescue went unheeded by the U.S. government that had put them in power.  The brutal assassinations of the Diems on November 2, 1963 haunted Kennedy.  By November 22, 1963, less than three weeks later, Kennedy himself would die from an assassin’s bullet(s).

“Kennedy learned of the deaths on the following morning when National Security Council staffer Michael Forrestal rushed into the cabinet room with a telegram reporting the Ngô brothers' alleged suicides. According to General Maxwell Taylor, "Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before." Kennedy had planned that Ngô Đình Diệm would be safely exiled and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. recalled that the U.S. president was "somber and shaken". Kennedy later penned a memo, lamenting that the assassination was "particularly abhorrent" and blaming himself for approving Cable 243, which had authorised Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu's attacks on the Buddhist pagodas.  Forrestal said that "It shook him personally ... bothered him as a moral and religious matter. It shook his confidence, I think, in the kind of advice he was getting about South Vietnam."   When Kennedy was consoled by a friend who told him he need not feel sorry for the Ngô brothers on the grounds of despotism, Kennedy replied "No. They were in a difficult position. They did the best they could for their country." 

Cuba

While the South Vietnam pot was coming to a boil in the Eastern Hemisphere, the Cuban kettle had boiled dry with the Bay of Pigs and was heating up a second time with Operation Mongoose in the Western Hemisphere.  Without getting into the ‘why’ of it, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy left the door open to depose Cuba’s new dictator Fidel Castro during the fourth presidential debate.(9)  The New York Times the next day ran the story as the lead item on the front page with the headline: "Kennedy Asks Aid for Cuban Rebels to Defeat Castro, Urges Support of Exiles and Fighters for Freedom." James Reston wrote in the Times that "Senator Kennedy (has) made what is probably his worst blunder of the campaign.”(10)  After Kennedy was inaugurated, DCI Allen Dulles came calling to cash the Bay of Pigs check and Kennedy approved the invasion as had been planned under the Eisenhower administration except that he refused to commit the U.S. military support. 

George Washington University’s National Security Archives Bay of Pigs Chronology provides a wonderfully detailed account of the invasion and reads like a spy thriller.  Prior to the invasion factories and cane fields were fire bombed using white phosphorus and other incendiaries, E. Howard Hunt and others made covert trips into Cuba to check the lay of the land, small aircraft overflew Cuba taking pictures and reporting back to the CIA (at least one was shot down by Castro’s forces), communication stations on remote islands were constructed in preparation for command and control of the prospective invasion, and exiled Cubans were trained.  The exiles wanted to return home to the country they remembered and American business interests wanted the island playground back in their domain.

The pressure was on to execute the invasion and, in April, about three months after Kennedy’s inauguration the green light was given. “On April 15, 1961, C.I.A. pilots knocked out part of Castro's air force, and were set to finish the job. At the last minute, on April 16, President Kennedy called off the air strikes, but the message did not reach the 1,511 commandos headed for the Bay of Pigs. Three days of fighting destroyed the invading force. A brigade commander sent his final messages: ''We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help,'' and: ''In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must arrive in next hour.''(11) The help never came and 1500 Cuban exiles fighters did not come back.

To his credit, President Kennedy assumed full public responsibility for the debacle although he allowed the blame to spread through leaks and rumors.  Kennedy fired Allen Dulles and threatened to break the CIA apart.  The fiasco that was the Bay of Pigs, however, did not deter the effort to rid the Western Hemisphere of Castro.  In November 1961, Operation Mongoose was born with a primary objective to identify mechanisms to get rid of the Cuban leader and the CIA was not the lead player.  Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor were the operation’s overseers.  Col. Edward Lansdale was recruited to coordinate activities between the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department. 

Operation Mongoose employed intelligence collection, sabotage operations, and identifying and recruiting leaders within Cuba who could overthrow Castro. But there were other methods used. With Lansdale’s obsession on asymmetrical warfare, a subset operation known as the Northwoods operation was developed. This considered using faked and real terrorist activities which could be blamed on Castro and used as a provocation for invasion.  It has never been decisively determined whether or not assassination plots were a component of Operation Mongoose.(12)  The Church Committee did, however, uncover a 1962 memo from Lansdale to Robert Kennedy claiming that "we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional program we are spurring."  Operation Mongoose was ‘officially’ ended in October 1962 with the advent of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The ‘official’ efforts to ‘get Castro’ fade from the presidential office in October 1962 and go deep underground.  The next blip on the ‘get Castro’ radar appears in New Orleans in the rabid anti-Communist, anti-Castro corporate culture at the United Fruit Company upon whose trustee board the fired DCI Allen Dulles sat.  The United Fruit Company story must be told at another time, however.

The CIA and Kennedy in perspective

President Kennedy’s fractured relationship with the CIA meant, for his term in office, a reduced CIA influence on foreign policy and affairs.  Kennedy, however, did recognize the usefulness of covert operators and plausible deniability’s lack of presidential fingerprints.  Publicly Kennedy was shamed twice by CIA failures and fired the powerful Allen Dulles.  Did Kennedy really forget and forgive as some analysts portray or would his ego have driven him to keep his promise to break up the CIA?  Certainly, Kennedy attempted to dilute the CIA influence during Operation Mongoose.  Kennedy’s assassination ended all of the speculation of the CIA’s relative political standing as the status quo quickly returned under the Johnson administration.

The Kennedy administration lasted just 1036 stormy days. His last day, like his first, was preceded by a storm in Dallas, Texas.  As on Kennedy’s inauguration day, the storm cleared and Kennedy elected to have his convertible open to the people; the better to relate to the people.  That, of course, worked well for the assassin(s).  I find it interesting where the ubiquitous Allen Dulles shows up; on the United Fruit Company Board of Trustees and on the Warren Commission investigating the death of the man who fired him.  The Diem brothers may have been assassinated but Fidel Castro, the object of so much time and effort, outlived them all.

By Barbara Johnson

Barbara is the owner of www.coldwarwarrior.com, a site about the men and women from all the cold wars who worked so hard for something they believed in and played so hard they forgot the pain.

This article has been published as we approach the 50th anniversary of the assassination of John F Kennedy. We shall be posting about JFK on Twitter and Facebook this week.

To find out more about John F Kennedy’s life, listen to our podcast on him. Click here.

References

1.       NOAA’s National Weather Service Forecast Office; Presidential Inaugural Weather; http://www.erh.noaa.gov/lwx/Historic_Events/Inauguration/Inauguration.html

2.       University of Virginia; Miller Center; American President: Eisenhower Foreign Policy A Reference Resource; http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/5

3.       The Cold War Museum; Guatemala 1954; Article 1 of 2; http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/guatemala.asp

4.       Marquette University; Craig Frizzell and Magen Knuth; Mortal Enemies? Did President Kennedy Plan on Splintering the CIA?; http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/jfk_cia.htm

5.       Dr. Jerome R. Corsi; Who Really Killed Kennedy?: 50 Years Later: Stunning New Revelations About the JFK Assassination; http://www.amazon.com/Really-Killed-Kennedy-Assassination-ebook/dp/B00EMFH0M0/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1379766666&sr=8-1&keywords=who+killed+president+kennedy+corsi 

6.       A People's History Of The United States; Howard Zinn; Chapter 18: The Impossible Victory: Vietnam; http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/zinnimvivi18.html

7.       George Washington University National Security Archives; The Wall; Episode 9; INTERVIEW WITH WALT ROSTOW; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-9/rostow1.html

8.       George Washington University National Security Archives; Cable 243; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn02.pdf

9.       Commission on Presidential Debates; October 21, 1960 Debate Transcript; The Fourth Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate; October 21, 1960; http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-21-1960-debate-transcript

10.   George Washington University National Security Archives; Chapter 3; Into Politics With Kennedy and Johnson; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/cia/Chapter%203%20--%20Into%20Politics%20With%20Kennedy%20and%20Johnson.htm   

11.   New York Times; TIM WEINER; February 22, 1998; C.I.A. Bares Its Bungling in Report on Bay of Pigs Invasion; http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/22/world/cia-bares-its-bungling-in-report-on-bay-of-pigs-invasion.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

12.   George Washington University National Security Archives; July 25, 1962; Brig. Gen. Lansdale; Review of Operation Mongoose; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620725%20Review%20of%20Op.%20Mongoose.pdf