This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. This article starts by looking at what happened as the Greek Civil War ended and the 1950s emerged, and ends by looking at the years of dictatorship – and the loss of part of Cyprus. Thomas P. Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here, part 5 on the issues of clientelism here, and part 6 on World War2 and a new divide here.

The leaders of the 1967 Greek military coup d'état. They are Stylianos Pattakos, Georgios Papadopoulos, and Nikolaos Makarezos. Source: Available here.

I Introduction: Power pillars after the civil war

Throughout the civil war and after that Greek remained a parliamentary democracy. To a certain extend and especially during the years of the fighting this was because of the need of the Americans and the British to appear to the public as supporters of a democratic regime that faced an imminent communist threat. Three very general political groupings could be distinguished that corresponded to right-center-left wings: The Right wing of the political spectrum was covered by the traditional anti-Venizelism, loyal to the throne and anti-communist. The Center had its historical roots in the Venizelist space that distinguished it form the right and was opposed to the communist left. The Left included non-communist components but was dominated by the Communist Party. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 17-22)

The latter was declared illegal, as post war Greece was an anti-communist cold war democracy pursuing the political and social exclusion of the Left, and thousands of its former partisans were imprisoned on remote Greek islands or excluded from state jobs. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Nevertheless, Greece never reached Stalinist Russia and there was much more freedom in the country compared to Franco’s Spain or Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, the Left had the opportunity to participate in the political arena with the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera – EDA), a party whose control from the communists was an open secret, achieving good elections results. Furthermore, clientelism and the powerful and ubiquitous networks of the Greek family were always present and managed to mitigate the effects of political and social exclusion. It was not unusual then for leftists to be recruited into the public sector, from which they were officially excluded, through family political networks. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), pp. 169-170) (Heneage, 2021, p. 206)

Within this framework there were also extra-parliamentary pillars of power. First, there was the palace and the king. The role of king George II was reconfirmed with the referendum of 1946, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) but he died soon after in April 1947 and was replaced by his son Paul. The palace would try to shape the political scenery according to its likings. This led the king to consecutive ruptures with all political wings and, from time to time, with the Army. (Rizas, 2008, p. 24)

The Army was the winner of the civil war and foremost agent of anti-communism. Although in the past the officers looked for political patronage with only some autonomous action (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), by 1949 the Army was a well-organized and well-equipped mechanism with war experience and confidence. It felt a kind of detachment and contempt for parliamentarism, although the stance of individual officers against the palace, on foreign policy issues and on certain parties and politicians varied. In any case, the real possibilities of the political establishment to control the military apparatus were small. (Rizas, 2008, p. 25)

Finally, there was the American factor. For Washington, Greece had critical geopolitical interest as part of the ‘northern frieze’, together with Turkey and Iran, that would prevent soviet access to warm waters in the Near and Middle East. Thus, they favored a political establishment consistent with this end. The political parties in Greece on the other hand, although with gradations among them and except for the communist Left, favored the integration to the US sphere of influence as a deterrent to the ‘threat from the North’, where traditional enemies, like Bulgaria, now joined the communist bloc. As they lacked the means for the country’s recovery, essential for their survival, and the retention of sufficient military force, American help was essential. The fragmentation of the political forces facilitated further the American intervention, but occasionally the latter faced strong political movements. Thus, the USA was neither the all-powerful factor that steadily and unimpededly shaped the scene at will, as a popular narrative of part of the historiography and political-journalistic literature claims, but nor the non-participating observer of Greek politics, without interests and perceptions, as they claimed from time to time in Washington. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 32-34)

II The way to dictatorship

Attempts for reconciliation (1949 – 1952)

It is only natural that the Greeks should look for reconciliation amongst the rivaling parties after the end of the civil war. The Americans wanted the ratification of the end of the war and the reconciliation of the main political factions to come through the people’s vote. A new, more representative parliament, compared to that running the country during the civil war, was necessary. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172) In fact, it was time for the struggle to become political and mostly economical with significant means for the necessary reconstruction arising from bold cuts in military spending. (Rizas, 2008, p. 64) American influence was ensured as foreign aid at the time covered 90,6 % of the deficit in the balance of foreign payments, 80,7 % of public spending for the reconstruction and 56,7 % of the Greek fiscal deficit. (Rizas, 2008, p. 119) Thus, the elections took place on the 5th of March 1950 using the electoral system of proportional representation.

The elections showed a clear lead for the Center – Left parties. This adds to the controversy over their decision to abstain from the 1946 elections, after which the civil war entered its most lethal phase. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Charged with the mission of implementing a policy that would seek to overcome the consequences of the civil war and emphasize on reconstruction and income redistribution, they failed to stand up to the occasion yet again though. Their division into several groups spreading from the Center – Left to the Center – Right (Nikolaos Plastiras, Georgios Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios, were leading the most important ones), hostile to one another, rendered cooperation difficult in matters such as that of general amnesty and the policy of leniency towards those exiled, imprisoned (including death row inmates) or prosecuted as communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172)

Things were further perplexed by international developments at that time. The Korean War (25th June 1950) completely changed the perceptions and priorities of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 75) The Marshall plan was to expire in 1952 (Rizas, 2008, p. 60) and American support was reduced from 250 million dollars in 1950-51 to mere 84 million in 1952-53. At the same time there was no talk anymore for a cut in military spending that took 10 % of the national income in 1951. (Rizas, 2008, p. 123) This led to a complete revision of an ambitious 4 year program elaborated in 1948 aiming at the exploitation of the national water and mineral resources for electrification, which was a prerequisite for the country’s industrialization as a means of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The Americans were not favoring industrialization anymore suggesting alternatives for economic growth, like tourism. This created resentment in political circles and the public opinion, which perceived the American policy as imposing colonial terms on the Greek economy. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 120 - 121) In fact, the most famous monography on the development of Greek heavy industry at the time came from the communist Dimitris Batsis. (Batsis, 1977 (11th Edition)) Its author, together with 3 more members of the communist party (Nikos Beloyiannis, Ilias Argyriadis and Nikos Kaloumenos), were executed as spies in March 1952, as the anti-communist vigilance intensified again. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 174)

In a nutshell, the Cold War climate after 1950 imposed that the development effort would have to be undertaken and paid for with mostly Greek resources, making the stabilization of the economy by any possible means, while at the same time maintaining a high level of military forces and spending, paramount. (Rizas, 2008, p. 120 ) Thus, the Centrist governments implemented a strict stabilization program, which cost them electoral losses and paved the way for the ascent of the conservative Right to power. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 125 - 129)

The conservative Right to power (1952 – 1963)

Alexandros Papagos

The dominant figure of the Right was field marshal Alexandros Papagos. Coming from the high Athenian society, he was Chief of the Army General Staff at the beginning of the Greco-Italian war of 1940 and later assumed the rank of major General of the Army. He was arrested during the occupation and sent to a concentration camp in Germany until 1945. The military stalemate of 1948, during the civil war, was the reason for the return to his duties as commander in chief. In this capacity he managed to close the war against the communists victoriously and received the title of field marshal in October 1949 at the age of 66. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 60 - 61)

Papagos’ profile obviously matched the political climate of the time as he was surely anti-communist and further posed as an alternative to a political establishment in crisis. (Rizas, 2008, p. 93) Nevertheless, a dictatorship was not an option for Washington. The Americans would not object though, if Papagos ran for office and was elected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 79) To this end he had to resign from his post, which he did in May 1951. His resignation caused reactions in the Army and members of the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatkon - IDEA), a secret military organization, which, according to its Constitution, ‘should establish a dictatorship if the political leaders were unable to protect the country’s national interests, namely to contain communism’, (Arvanitopoulos, 1991, p. 99)(Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 208-209) occupied the General Staff building, the radio station and other places in Athens. The movement ended within a day by the intervention of Papagos, which proves that at the time of his resignation he was in full control of the armed forces. (Rizas, 2008, p. 83) (Tsoucalas, 2020, σ. 209) Furthermore, characteristic of the Army’s power and independence was the fact that grace was granted to those involved in the movement and the matter was closed there. (Rizas, 2008, p. 90) This came to the dismay of the palace as the king particularly disliked the fact that Papagos was not willing to go into politics under his tutelage. (Rizas, 2008, p. 82) He even tried to bring the Army under his influence after Papagos’ resignation, but this met the opposition of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 84, 85, 95, 99 - 100)

Nevertheless, one thing on which there was a consensus within the power establishment at that time, with the exceptions of the Left, was the need to join a collective security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 112) The difference was that for the Center this was perceived as an opportunity to deter the threat from the communist countries in the north with reduced military spending (Rizas, 2008, p. 122), whereas Papagos believed that Greece could ensure its inclusion in the allied planning only if it maintained a significant military capability. (Rizas, 2008, p. 109) In any case, Greece’s participation in the Korean War, in response to the United Nations appeal for assistance, (Wikipedia, 2023) was included in this context, and the country finally joined the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with Turkey, in February 1952. (Rizas, 2008, p. 117) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 213-214)

Papagos’ party, the ‘Greek Rally’, came to power a few months later in November, winning 49.2 % of the votes and 247 out of 300 seats in the parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 130) His predominance was facilitated by the fact that the elections were in this case conducted using a majoritarian electoral system. In fact, the changes of the electoral system in a way to facilitate the formation of strong one-party governments away from collaboration is a characteristic of the parliamentary system of Modern Greece that remains to this day. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 200) This tactic obviously reinforces the phenomena of division and the client state. The result of EDA (9,6 %) confirmed the existence of a hard core of communists, but the party was left out of parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 131)

This did not go unnoticed by Papagos, who established a bureaucracy of ‘national security’ imbued with anticommunism, whose activity would normally remain opaque. The Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion – KYP) was established in May 1953. (Rizas, 2008, p. 132) He also completed Greece’s integration into the Atlantic security system with the bilateral Greek – American agreement on granting military bases to the USA in October 1953. While the agreement is linked to NATO’s strategy, the operation of the bases was controlled exclusively by the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 162) Further concessions to the Americans included the use of the Greek road and rail network by the American armed forces, low fees and tax exemption for the American activities, and the granting of US military and civilian personnel the right of separate jurisdiction. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 216)

Papagos’ government made an opening to Europe as well, in view also of the reluctance of the Americans to finance the Greek development program, as we saw before. The outstanding pre-war public debt, whose settlement was not allowed by Greek public finances, resulted in the creation of the European credit mechanism. The Greek government submitted specific projects to foreign governments, which they undertook to finance indirectly or directly, often in the form of export guarantees. From now on, West Germany will become Greece’s most important economic partner. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163)

In the field of foreign policy, the minister of foreign affairs Stefanopoulos signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey in February 1953 followed by a military agreement in August 1954. The Balkan Pact was perceived as a way for the Western allies to bring Yugoslavia into their sphere of influence in case of Soviet aggression. (Wikipedia, 2023)The undertaking was short-lived though after Tito’s reconciliation with post-Stalinist Soviet Union and the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 216-217) The latter arose after an unofficial referendum on the island in 1950 that called for a unification with Greece (Wikipedia, 2023). Nevertheless, whereas previous governments avoided raising the issue as there were other priorities, e.g. joining NATO, and British opposition was fierce, (Rizas, 2008, p. 166) Papagos worked more intensively on it. As we have seen, Great Britain obtained Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire and by 1950 the island was ruled by the British for almost 70 years. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 217-218) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

For Papagos and most of the Greeks unification with Cyprus was a matter characterized by strong emotional and psychological charge. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167) Although the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign practically put an end to Greece’s concept of the ‘Great Idea’ for expansion to its ancient territories (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), here we find remnants of exactly this concept. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Facing fierce British opposition on a bilateral level, Papagos tried to internationalize the issue by appealing to the United Nations in August 1954. The appeal was fruitless as it also met the American reaction. (Rizas, 2008, p. 168) The Americans had made it clear to Athens, that Greece had to devote itself to its economic and social reconstruction and political stabilization and that its general situation did not allow for redemptive adventures. (Rizas, 2008, p. 166)They also considered the need to safeguard Cyprus’ strategic advantages for Britain, that was now on retreat from the Middle East and Suez, and the Western security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167)

The next step for Athens was to recourse to armed action. This started on the 1st of April 1955 by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA) led by the Greek Cypriot colonel of the Greek Army Georgios Grivas. (Wikipedia, 2023) The British responded to the increased Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure by bringing Greece’s arch-rival into the game. In August 1955 they convened a tripartite conference in London with the participation of Turkey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 220-221) (Rizas, 2008, p. 169)

Turkey was opposing Cyprus’ unification with Greece for strategic reasons. It did not want the completion of a chain of islands enclosing the Turkish coast from the northern Aegean to the south. To this end it used the Turkish Cypriot minority that made up 18 % of the island’s population. The Turkish position does not accept minority status for the Turkish Cypriots and considers that their presence should be equal in the management of the affairs of the island. In fact, in 1955-56 Ankara went through a maximalist phase requiring either the continuation of the British rule or the return of the island to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 167 - 168) Thus, the tripartite conference failed completely, because of the unbridgeable approaches of the participants. To make things worse for the Greeks, the Greek minority in Constantinople suffered a pogrom because of the tension. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 221) (Wikipedia, 2023)

The US and British stance on the Cyprus issue caused the dissatisfaction of the Greek public opinion, including that of the Right press. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 222) The Left saw an opportunity to cause a rift in pro-Atlantic perceptions and in the nexus of international and internal arrangements of the post-civil war era. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Stalin’s death in 1953 brought about a change in the rigid and dogmatic practises of the Communist Party, which would now seek cooperation with the Center-Left and Center parties on the basis of a joint effort to oust the ‘Greek Rally’ from the government. Indeed, in the municipal elections of November 1954 the joint candidates of the Center-Left and the Left clearly prevailed in the three largest cities, Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus, and showed good results in a number of other municipalities as well. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 139 - 140)

The most significant development after the municipal elections of 1954 was Papagos’ illness (he eventually died in October 1955), that created the need for his succession to the leadership of the ‘Greek Rally’ and the premiership. The case as it developed is simultaneously indicative of the structural weakness and opacity of the Greek political and party system. As there is no stable party structure and institutionalized process of intra-party functioning and leadership succession, due to the political culture and tradition that structures party organization around persons, the natural eclipse of the leading figure allows informal processes to fill the gap, in which extra-parliamentarian factors have a prominent role. (Rizas, 2008, p. 156) The result of such processes including the extra-parliamentarian power pillars described in section I as well as interest networks formed by politicians and businessmen (see next section) resulted in Konstantinos Karamanlis taking over as prime minister. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209-212)

Konstantinos Karamanlis

Konstantinos Karamanlis is the founder of one of the few families that ruled over modern Greece (other famous ones include those of Trikoupis, Venizelos, Papandreou and Mitsotakis) significantly reducing the inclusiveness of the Greek political institutions. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) He was the minister of public works in the Papagos’ administration and his rise through the ranks of the Greek politics was quick after World War II . (Wikipedia, 2023) Karamanlis had the support of the palace (Rizas, 2008, p. 145) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209, 232) and king Paul gave him the mandate to form a government on the 5th of October 1955. (Rizas, 2008, p. 160) For the Americans, that after Papagos’ death turned to the king, who had the institutional capacity to be a factor of anti-communism continuity (Rizas, 2008, p. 152), this was a welcome development. The Left was on the rise again (see above) and the Americans were interested in the retainment of the Right in power (Rizas, 2008, p. 145), although the armed forces constituted a backup security force for the political and social establishment in case of exhaustion of the parliamentary means. (Rizas, 2008, p. 172) The British embassy was in agreement. (Rizas, 2008, p. 144)

This foreign consent was interpreted by the opposition press as the result of Karamanlis’ unpopular opinion referring to the need for a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) The fact was that there was a revision of the British strategic needs in Cyprus. London had concluded that to fulfill British commitments in the Middle East it was sufficient to maintain military bases in Cyprus rather than rule over the entire island. (Rizas, 2008, p. 241)The British made it clear that the Cyprus issue now depended very much on Turkish perceptions and sensitivities, which had to be taken into account as a priority, if the Western powers did not want to alienate a necessary ally in the critical region of the Middle East. (Rizas, 2008, p. 239)

Eventually, the idea of unification with Greece was given up and Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on the 16th of August 1960. The organization of the new state was based on the London and Zurich agreements of February 1959. (Wikipedia, 2022) These were met with displeasure in Greece, also by a portion of the officers corps, as the position of the Turkish – Cypriots was strengthened and the new state would operate under international and constitutional restrictions that contradicted the right of the majority to direct Cypriot affairs as they wished. In fact, the content of the agreements was considered roughly equivalent to national concession, abandoning the ideal of the union. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 233, 244) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 225) The leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou pointed out that with the London and Zurich agreements it was the first time that Turkey was returning to territory it had lost after the establishment of the modern Greek state. (Rizas, 2008, p. 245) Greece was on the retreat.

Karamanlis’ attempt to put the Cyrpus issue ‘on the self’ was done in order to manage to deal with the financial problems as a priority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) In fact, as minister of public works he had already won the admiration of the US Embassy for the efficiency with which he built road infrastructure and administered American aid programs. (Wikipedia, 2023) Furthermore, his premiership initiated the beginning of a period, that extended well into the 1970s, in which GDP grew nearly 7 % a year and per capita income trebled. It wasn’t far short of the German postwar miracle. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Karamanlis’ administration also pursued the association with the European Economic Community and the relevant agreement was signed in Athens in July 1961. (Rizas, 2008, p. 248)

Nevertheless, the Greek economic development of the 1950s and 1960s was based on foreign support (also in the form of tourism), that did not favor the industrialization of the country, (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 184) shipping and state intervention. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 190-191) (Rizas, 2008, p. 257) Favorable arrangements with Greek and foreign businessmen repeatedly provoked discussions of ‘colonial-style’ contracts, while the state’s capabilities (i) in selecting ‘partners’ to lease state-owned enterprises or (ii) to lend to commercial and industrial activities from state-controlled banks are such that they have certainly created networks of public and private interests (Rizas, 2008, pp. 258 - 259)starting a tradition that continues to this day. In fact, the Governor of the Bank of Greece at that time Xenophon Zolotas criticized the mentality of the Greek ‘entrepreneur class’ and the failure of the banking system to work against this mentality aiming at the hoarding of profits or the acquisition of consumer goods rather than the use of these profits for productive investments. (Rizas, 2008, p. 260) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 188)

It is then not inexplicable that from 1951 to 1963 405 thousand Greeks left the country in search for better luck elsewhere. Actually, the annual remittances to their families back home reached 173 million dollars in 1963 contributing also to the country’s development. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 191) By 1980 immigration would exceed 1 million, that is about a quarter of Greece’s active workforce. (Eleftheratos, 2015, p. 182) (Heneage, 2021, p. 204)Thus, the country continued to foster non-inclusive political and financial institutions, as discussed also previously (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021), which according to Acemoglu and Robinson are characteristic of a failed state. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)

Karamanlis and the Right was also accused, not unjustly, of authoritarianism and oppression. After his appointment as a prime minister he reorganized the ‘Greek Rally’ as ‘National Radical Union’ (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi -ERE), that concluded the transformation of the old anti-Venizelist faction to a conservative party of the post-war era, (Rizas, 2008, p. 174) and asked for the affirmation of the king’s choice through the public vote in February 1956. This was the first time that the Greek women were granted with voting rights. (Rizas, 2008, p. 179) He won only thanks to a carefully chosen electoral system that gave him 165 seats in the parliament with 47,4 % of the votes against the Center-Left alliance that gathered 48,1 % but only 132 seats. This immediately raised issues of political legitimation for the government. (Rizas, 2008, p. 181) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233) Karamanlis’ position was nevertheless strengthened with another round of elections in May 1958, (Rizas, 2008, p. 204) but the result reserved the unpleasant surprise of EDA becoming the largest opposition party. (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233)Karamanlis then responded with the intensification of police action against the Left, arrests and deportations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 206) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 234) When a third round of elections came in the autumn 1961 the leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou accused Karamanlis that he used the oppressive state mechanism set up by the Right during its rule, the army and paramilitary organizations against all rival parties and ERE’s victory was seen as the product of force and fraud. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 201-207) (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) He called the people to an ‘unyielding struggle’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 239-242) that managed to mobilize the electoral base of the Center as well as wider social strata, especially since the demand for new elections was linked to other political, economic and social issues such as the Cyprus issue, unemployment, poverty and immigration described above. (Rizas, 2008, p. 269) The tension culminated with the assassination of EDA MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May 1963 by a right-wing extremist organization under conditions that made even Karamanlis wonder ‘Who in God’s name is running this country?’. The truth is that Karamanlis’ relations with the other power pillars of section I were worsening after 1961 and especially the palace, that was also targeted by the ‘unyielding struggle’, was looking for a way out of the crisis. Karamanlis was replaced as prime minister by another king’s man, Panagiotis Pipinelis, but it became obvious that the only way to relief the tensions was free elections. These took place in November 1963 and Papandreou’s ‘Centre Union’ (Enosi Kentrou – EK) removed Karamanlis’ ERE from the government. The twelve-year rule of the Right had ended. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 242-245)

The short-lived government of the Center (1963 – 1965)

The Center won, but the majority in Parliament was small (42% of the votes and 138 seats against ERE’s 39.4% and 132 seats) (Rizas, 2008, p. 284) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 245) and the reaction of the, much closer to the Right, Army to the result of the elections unknown. Thus, Papandreou avoided extensive interventions in the latter at this phase and sought new elections, to obtain an independent majority in the Parliament. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 285, 292) Indeed, the Army remained in the barracks and Centre Union won an overwhelming majority of 52,7% of the votes and 171 seats (out of 300 in total) in the elections of February 1964. (Rizas, 2008, p. 293) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 247)

Significant changes in the social stratification of the country had occurred since the last government of the Center. The economic conditions described above did not cause only external but internal immigration as well. Whereas in 1958 the ratio of rural to urban income per capita was just over half (220 to 437 dollars), by 1964 it was significantly less (282 to 621). (Rizas, 2008, p. 295) No wonder then that the rural dwellers sought for a better fortune in the cities. The urban population increased from 37.7% in 1951 to 43% ten years later with another 13% living in semi-urban areas. 62.7% of this increase was absorbed by the city of Athens. By 1961 Greece’s capital had a population bigger than the total urban population of the rest of the country and was established as the most important center of the socio – economic life. It absorbed more than 50% of those working in the industry, received 80% of the country’s imports, paid 75% of the direct and 65% of the indirect taxation, the income of its population was 40% higher than the average national income, bought more than 50% of the daily newspaper sheets, had the highest amount of hospital beds, 85% of qualified doctors and housed the bulk of those working in the public sector. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 181 - 182) This dominance of Athens remains to this day.

Papandreou increased the agricultural subsidies from 2.6 to 4.4% of the state budget, (Rizas, 2008, p. 297) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 250) but this could do little to reverse the fact that Greece had also entered the stage of mass urban societies when the spirit of the 1960s was spreading through the western world. (Wikipedia, 2023)Combined with an ongoing economic boom, under the name ‘Trente Glorieuses’ in France (Wikipedia, 2023) or ‘Miracolo Economico’ in Italy (Wikipedia, 2023), this drove the demand for increased consumption and services through an income redistribution. Thus, Greece could not remain unaffected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 299)

Indeed, EK raised the daily wages, pensions, instituted vacations pay equal to ½ of the monthly salary and generally aimed at boosting the demand as a driver of accelerating economic growth. The result was that the increase in consumption exceeded the productive capacity of the domestic industry. In 1965, for the first time the value of industrial output exceeded the value of agricultural output. Thus, the Greek bourgeoisie also had every reason to be satisfied with the economic policy of EK during this period. Protective tariffs were in place, the credit process was simplified, prices were kept at stable heights and economic growth reached 8%. Business was going well, and profits were high. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 250 - 251) (Rizas, 2008, pp. 297 - 298)

The liberal, redistributive, and developmental spirit of the time was also present in Papandreou’s highly popular educational reform. He increased the time of compulsory education from six to nine years and established messes in elementary schools and scholarships for high schools to facilitate the access of children from the weaker social classes to them. To this end, the vernacular was also established as an equal language with the so called ‘clean’ (kathareuousa), that was based on the ancient Greek language and was mostly used by the elitist social strata. Ancient texts were also now to be taught translated in high school. The tuition and examination fees in higher education were abolished and a new university was established in Patras. Plans for two more in Epirus and Crete were laid. Finally, the Pedagogical Institute was also created, responsible for applied educational research, the creation of syllabi and the renewal of textbooks. (Rizas, 2008, σσ. 301 - 303) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 252)

In foreign policy, once again, the Cyprus issue was dominant. Here Athens did not have the control of the developments and Papandreou was particularly worried about the unbound and uncontrolled initiatives of the Greek-Cypriot leader and first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 312) The latter announced in December 1963 his intention to proceed with a unilateral revision of the constitution in order to limit the extensive veto rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 307) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 226) This caused tensions and armed conflicts between the two communities that culminated to the dispatch of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the island in spring 1964. This marked the consolidation of a situation rather favourable to the Greek-Cypriot side, which in the meantime prevailed in 95% of the island’s territory and had under its full control the state apparatus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 310) Nevertheless, the bombardment, in August 1964, of Greek-Cypriot positions on the islands by the Turkish Air Force, following an attack on a Turkish-Cypriot village by the Greeks, indicated that Turkey was not going to give up its ambitions on the islands easily. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 227)

Apart from appealing to the UN, several alternatives to solve the crisis were also brought forward by the Americans and NATO going as far as the partition of the island between the two communities. The rejection of these plans by the Greek government were interpreted as the result of the influence of the prime minister’s son Andreas Papandreou. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 313 - 317)

Andreas Papandreou was an economist and former university professor in the USA. Nevertheless, he represented a more radical left wing within EK. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) This was met with scepticism by the Americans, especially after J. F. Kennedy’s assassination and the assumption of the presidency by Lyndon Johnson that marked a shift in American policy from the need for liberal openness to more traditional notions credible from the point of view of Cold War strategy. (Rizas, 2008, p. 358) Andreas was also perceived as an obstacle for the personal ambitions of many EK politicians that hoped to succeed his aged father. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) Some of these, like Konstantinos Mitsotakis (the father of today’s prime minister), had also strong reservations about the economic policy, as they considered that the capacity for further benefits of any kind had been exhausted, and the prime minister’s handlings regarding the Cyprus issue that created tension in the Greco-American relations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 345)

Thus, in spring 1965 started a sequence of events that led to the eviction of Papandreou from the premiership and are often treated as the product of conspiracy by the American factor in collaboration with the palace, where the new king Constantine II had succeeded his father Paul that died in 1964, and defectors within EK. In May, the existence of an officers’ organization under the name ASPIDA (shield) became public. (Rizas, 2008, p. 337) Its aim, according to the indictment, was the establishment of a Nasser-style dictatorship. Politicians were also, supposedly, involved among which was Andreas Papandreou. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 260) The government perceived the accusations as an attempt of the Right to purge the army of pro-government officers and contrary to his original stance Georgios Papandreou now decided to intervene. (Rizas, 2008, p. 339) His proposals, among which was to take over the ministry of national defence himself, were rejected by the king though. The prime minister felt obliged to resign. Before even submitting his resignation in writing, the king had already appointed a new government supported by ERE and dissidents (defectors) of the EK. By July 1965 Georgios Papandreou was ousted, and his son faced charges of high treason. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 261)

The colonels come to power (1965 – 1967)

The 25 years old king Constantine had overestimated his powers. The dismissal of Papandreou was in direct opposition to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The attempt to form a government with defectors from EK was met with disdain by the Greek people. After two years of the more liberal Papandreou government the latter would now express its dismay in a dynamic way. For weeks, hundreds of thousand of people would demonstrate against the methods of the defectors and the palace. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 263 - 265)

Furthermore, the departure of the defectors from EK strengthened its more radical wing and Andreas Papandreou, who declared that: ‘The Nation’s infrastructure, transport and communication, the credit system and education must be owned by the state. In general, heavy industry should be state-owned and light industry private. There is a primary need to make efforts to limit or even eliminate heavy consumption and the import of luxury goods. It is necessary to stop the granting of monopoly privileges which help the entry of foreign capital.’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 268 - 269)Advocating national sovereignty, he also appeared skeptical of NATO and Greece’s integration into the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 391) The king was not spared from accusations of practices that exceeded the limits of constitutional monarchy and at the same time Andreas Papandreou was raising the issue of perceived American interference in Greece’s internal affairs. Finally, he argued that a fairer distribution of the national income was necessary by attacking the wealthier classes. (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) Greece’s elites had every reason to feel worried.

The army was also worried. The parliament did not lift Papandreou’s immunity for the case of ASPIDA and it was obvious that his father would give up his original stance of non-intervention in the army after that. In fact, there was a group of mid and low-level officers established in 1956 already, that exercised pressure on the respective military leadership for a coup, whenever it appeared that the Left and Center would get a majority in the parliament. The leader of this group was colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. (Rizas, 2008, p. 388)

Thus, in the 22 months that followed Georgios Papandreou’s eviction from office the Greek people remained agitated, EK strong in the electorate, Andreas Papandreou’s rhetoric radical, Greece’s elites and the Americans consequently worried and the king also feeling threatened, as his interventions had caused a revival of the issue of choice between monarchy and democracy, (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) was avoiding calling elections using government schemes supported by the Right and defectors from EK. Obviously, the margins for a parliamentary solution to the dispute had become very narrow. On the 21st of April 1967 colonel Georgios Papadopoulos’ group made their move: Dictatorship.

III Dictatorship

In his book on the many military interventions in the Greek politics between 1916 and 1936 Thanos Veremis distinguishes them in two categories: 1) The one refers to those interventions that gained national importance and were supported by a large portion of the public. 2) The second refers to those that aimed only to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of a military faction. (Veremis, 2018, p. 280) Thus, if we were to follow the same distinction, then the military coup of 1967 belongs to the second category.

Veremis further interprets the people’s tolerance to these regimes as disappointment from and consequently discontent for the political establishment. (Veremis, 2018, p. 279) Nevertheless, tolerance is by no means acceptance. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the repressive mechanisms of the 1967 junta cannot be ignored. The center-left and left-wing resistance organizations established immediately after the coup were quickly neutralized, and the protagonists were in many cases brutalized and tortured. The same is true for the democratic officers of the army (Rizas, 2008, p. 442)

The junta was also ad odds with the king. After all the coup did not come from the high ranking officers of the latter’s entourage, as discussed previously, and as the junta was aiming at the establishment of a permanent regime confrontation with Constantine II was inevitable. (Rizas, 2008, p. 434) In fact, on the 13th of December 1967 the king carried out a counter coup, but once again junta’s reaction was swift and Constantine found himself in exile.

There was also a wide spread belief in a large part of the population, that fed anti-Americanism for many years, that the political question could not be solved by the Greeks themselves, but by the sovereign will of the Americans, who were held responsible for imposing and maintaining the dictatorship. (Rizas, 2008, p. 443) The truth is that for Henry Kissinger, the American national security advisor, the nature of the regime was not an issue for Washington (Rizas, 2008, p. 453) as long as it identified itself with NATO and the western world and Greece remained an ally of the West in the Cold War. (Rizas, 2008, p. 432) The junta did.

Junta’s doings in the financial sector have often been the subject of controversy. During the 2010 economic crisis, for example, when the country found itself at the brink of bankruptcy and a tough program of austerity and heavy taxation was imposed on its people, public discontent against the parties working within the parliamentary system of government gave fertile ground for references to junta’s well-organized economy, which avoided thriftlessness and empowered needy social groups such as farmers. Researchers like D. Eleftheratos showed that this was a myth and stressed the devastating effects of junta’s policies on the Greek economy. (Eleftheratos, 2015)

Thus, the international oil crisis of October 1973 challenged the sustainability of the Greek model of financial growth (Rizas, 2008, pp. 351-352) and as the passing of time inevitably led to a relaxation of the police measures popular discontent was more readily expressed. Universities in particular became a permanent hotbed. (Rizas, 2008, p. 444)The revolt of the Polytechnic University in Athens in November 1973 was violently suppressed, but a group of fiercely nationalist and anti-communist officers already worried that Papadopoulos was becoming too moderate. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 446-447) The internal conflicts of the junta culminated to a coup within the coup on the 25th of November 1973, when brigadier Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos and assumed the leadership of the military regime. (Rizas, 2008, p. 474)

The final blow for the junta came a few months later during another crisis in Cyprus. It was mentioned in the previous section already that even Georgios Papandreou, whose funeral in November 1968 marked one of the first massive demonstrations against the military regime, had trouble dealing with the policies of the president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. In fact, the dispatch of an army division to Cyprus by Papandreou in 1964, apart from the increase of the Greek deterrent power on the island, was also interpreted as an attempt to increase control over Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 313) Nevertheless, the latter’s initiatives to bring Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement (Wikipedia, 2024), to side with the Arabs during the Six-Day War (Rizas, 2008, p. 480) (Wikipedia, 2024) or to order weapons from Czechoslovakia for the Cypriot armed forces (Rizas, 2008, p. 481) indicate clearly the structural divergence between the political system in Cyprus and the military regime in Greece.

Indeed, the junta worked towards the unification of Cyprus with Greece, but Makarios opposed the idea as Cyprus would then be subject to a dictatorship and, furthermore, the proposal included territorial concessions to Turkey (Rizas, 2008, p. 479), in accordance with American demands that Athens should consider the Turkish views in Cyprus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 482) This does not mean that an agreement with Turkey was reached. On the contrary, when the junta tried, unsuccessfully, to impose its views to the Turkish side at the end of 1967, the issue culminated to a Greco-Turkish crisis that eventually forced the junta to withdraw the Greek army division from the island. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 480-481) Later, in March 1970, the junta attempted to murder Makarios and eventually Ioannidis to overthrow him with a coup on the 15th of July 1974. Under the treaty of Guarantee (Wikipedia, 2024), this was the excuse that the Turks needed to justify their invasion in Cyprus 5 days later, that led to the division of the island that lasts to this day. On the 24th of July Karamanlis, in self-exile in Paris after losing the premiership in 1963 (see above), returned to Greece to form a government. The junta had fallen.

IV Conclusion

What we have seen in this series of articles so far is that modern Greece, since its foundation, was always able to move forward. Despite the difficulties, thanks to some capable leaders, favored also by coincidence and luck, it managed to continuously develop and expand.

Thus, at the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Greece was again a completely different country. The population had largely withdrawn from the countryside and lived in two large cities, Athens, and Thessaloniki. Financially, the rural-urban gap had narrowed, and per capita income had tripled since 1964. There was an extensive service sector, whereas the industry had developed to such an extent that about 40% of exports were industrial goods. It was thus an urbanized country, with a relatively industrialized economy that in parallel to the established relation with the USA was now pursuing admission to the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 490)

Nevertheless, much of all these was done through networks of public and private interests in a way that did not allow for the exploitation of the country’s full potential for the benefit of all its people. Many sought their luck abroad or became trapped in a clientelism system sponsored by exclusive political institutions. What changed after 1974 was the influence of the army. In many cases in the past the collaboration between politicians and military officers for the seizure of power resulted in mild punishments for the latter after army interventions into politics. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Although after junta’s fall in 1974 many of its collaborators were treated mildly and were even cared for by businessmen favored by the military regime (Eleftheratos, 2015, pp. 313-322) the leading officers were now sentenced to life in prison. Indeed, after 1974 the political establishment managed to eliminate the role of the army in the political developments in Greece. Nevertheless, it remains, to a significant extend, a ‘family business’ (after 1974, 6 prime ministers came from the Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis families, for example).

It was a matter of time then before Greece started to pay the toll for its exclusive political and financial institutions. As we saw, Georgios Papandreou’s remarks for the Cyprus issue, that the London and Zurich agreements marked, for the first time, the return of Turkey to a territory it had lost after the establishment of modern Greece, could be interpreted as an indication that Greece was going on the retreat. The invasion of the island and occupation of its north-eastern part by the Turks in July 1974 made it official.

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References

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail. London: Profile Books ltd.

Arvanitopoulos, C. (1991). The Rise and Fall of the Greek Military Regime: 1967 - 1974. Journal of Modern Hellenism, No. 8, pp. 97 - 116 (available at https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/view/118/119).

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Eleftheratos, D. (2015). Diddlers in Khaki, Economic 'miracles' and victims of the junta. Athens: Topos Eds. (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

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Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, March 22). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/3/22/the-modern-greek-state-19231940-the-issues-of-clientelism#.ZDj9i_ZBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, October 14). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/10/14/the-modern-greek-state-19411949-war-amp-a-new-divide

Rizas, S. (2008). Greek Politics after the Civil War. Parliamentaryism and Dictatorship. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Tsoucalas, C. (2020). The Greek Tragedy, From the liberation to the colonels. Athens: Patakis (in Greek, originally published in English by Penguin in 1969).

Veremis, T. (2018). The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936. Athens: Alexandria (in Greek).

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PostedApril 20, 2024

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, Blog Post

TagsModern Greek State, Modern Greece, Greek Junta, Post War Greece

CommentPost a comment

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. In 1922 Greece suffered probably the worst catastrophe of its modern history and the decades that followed brought political instability, economic crisis, and foreign intervention. But, as Thomas Papageorgiou explains, clientelism caused significant issues in the country.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, and part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here.

Eleftherios Venizelos in 1935. He was Prime Minister of Greece multiple times.

The previous article of this series on the history of modern Greece concluded the discussion of the first 100 years after the beginning of the War of Independence in 1821. According to G. B. Dertilis we find ourselves at the end of the third period of bankruptcies and wars (1912-1922) – the first being 1821-1880 and the second 1880-1912. Two more will follow (1923-1945 and 1946-2012). (Dertilis, 2020, pp. 11-17) The proposed cyclability indicates specific features present in modern Greece that significantly hinder the escape from the vicious cycles described by Dertilis. (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29) Here I will discuss these features and describe how they affected the developments in Greece during the interwar period. Clientelism is proposed as the main source of Greece’s problems. But let’s start with one of its consequences, that will better suit us to present the major events of this period: namely, division and civil war.

I Division & civil war

Division and civil war are present in modern Greek history already since the War of Independence. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) The latest quarrel we examined that once more divided the Greeks was that between the prime minister Venizelos and king Constantine. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) The division to Venizelists and anti-Venizelists continued even after the king’s resignation, following the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign in September 1922, and eventual death three months later in Palermo.

This period of modern Greek history starts with a gruesome event in November 1922, which is known as ‘the execution of the six’. These were leading figures of the anti-Venizelists including former prime minister Dimitrios Gounaris, that defeated Venizelos in the elections of 1920 preceding the disaster in Asia Minor. The execution took place under a military regime led by the Venizelist colonel Nikolaos Plastiras following a revolt of the defeated Army in September 1922. Despite international reactions calling for an annulment of the execution, Venizelos, at the time negotiating piece terms with Turkey in Lausanne as representative of the dictatorship in Greece (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 29), did very little to prevent it. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 25-35)

The Treaty of Lausanne (Wikipedia, 2022) marked the end of the Great Idea aspirations for Greece (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) bringing the country to its current borders, more or less, as the Dodecanese would be the last territorial gain of modern Greece after the end of World War II. The loss of the territories in Asia Minor and especially Eastern Thrace caused the nagging even of some officers within the military regime like major general Theodoros Pangalos, who criticized Venizelos’ handling. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 65) In fact, it was not unusual for members of the Venizelist or anti-Venizelist space to change sides because of a political disagreement or pure interest.

It was this mixture of political disagreement on an electoral law that favoured the Venizelist candidates in the elections prepared by the regime for December 1923 (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 33-34) and disappointment of officers feeling ignored by the Plastiras’ regime that led to a counter-revolt in October 1923. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 129) This was soon crushed by the Venizelists. The latter found the opportunity to purge the army from their rival officers (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 34) and as the palace identified itself with anti-Venizelism to rid themselves of the successor king George II. After the elections of December 1923, from which the anti-Venizelists abstained (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 35), the National Assembly declared the fall of the dynasty and the establishment of unreigned democracy on the 25 March 1924. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 38)

This decision was further supported by a referendum held in April (70% for the unreigned democracy) (Dafnis, 1997, p. 262) but the anti-Venizelist leader Tsaldaris expressed his reservations for the new status quo. Thus, under the pretext of the protection of democracy, prime minister Papanastasiou passed a law aiming at the silencing of the anti-Venizelist propaganda with severe punishments imposed by military courts. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 42) In his book, Mavrogordatos points out the similarity of the establishment of the unreigned democracy in Greece with that of the Weimar Republic in Germany as the result of the opportunistic partnership of the Liberals (Social – democrats in Germany) with the military. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 39)

Indeed, the grip of the military on the Greek political life during this period is marked by 43 different interventions between 1916 and 1936. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 291-299) Soon after the handover of the government to the politicians in December 1923, major general Pangalos came to power by force in June 1925 exploiting the reluctance of the government and of the leaders of the political parties to act decisively against him. In fact, he managed to obtain a vote of confidence from the parliament and to give this way a lawful mantle to his government. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 162) His turn towards the anti-Venizelists worried the democratic officers and following a series of blunders in domestic and foreign policy, including an invasion in Bulgaria on the occasion of a border incident involving the killing of three Greeks by the Bulgarians, he was finally removed from government and imprisoned in August 1926. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 45-47) He remained in prison till July 1928, when the Venizelists ordered his release. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 350)

The year 1928 marks the return of Eleftherios Venizelos himself to the premiership. Before that, Greece was under ‘’ecumenical government’’ following a public demand for, at last, collaboration between the parties, after the fall of Pangalos’ dictatorship (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 48) This did not last long though and, apart from some success in laying the groundwork for a sound economic policy (Dafnis, 1997, p. 395), it did not do much to cure the schism between the rival factions. Eventually, the Venizelists won a striking victory during the elections of August 1928: 226 out of 250 seats in the parliament. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 54)

Venizelos’ new term was one of the longest in modern Greek history lasting for 52 months till November 1932. His government is credited with the approach to Italy, that, under Mussolini briefly occupied the island of Corfu in August 1923 (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 83-125), Yugoslavia and Turkey, the retainment of good relations with the Great Powers, and especially Great Britain, the settlement of the war reparations after World War I to the benefit of Greece, an extensive investment program in new infrastructure mostly in the new lands (that is territories added to Greece after 1912), a satisfactory financial situation with consecutive surpluses of the state budget, the strengthening of the rural credit with the creation of the Agricultural Bank, an educational reform focusing on the reinforcement of the productive occupations, the establishment of the Council of State to restrict government arbitrariness, and the continuation of the effort for the integration and assimilation of the refugees that flooded Greece after the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 463-514)

One of Venizelos’ statements though, after his stunning victory in 1928, is characteristic of his intentions towards the opposition at that time. ‘The People of Greece made me a parliamentary dictator’, he said to his wife. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 57) Thus, the most famous law of this time was that of summer 1929 ‘against the pursue of the implementation of ideas aiming at the overthrow of the social regime’. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 58) It was introduced against the declared views of the Communist Party, although there was never a real communist threat during the interwar period (Dafnis, 1997, p. 505) (the Communists never received more than 5-6 % of the votes at the elections that took place between 1926 and 1936). (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 29) Nevertheless, it served, indiscriminately, the purpose of suppressing public protest during Venizelos’ term and later as well. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 58)

The global economic crisis of 1929, that undermined Venizelos’ ambitious program, led to his call for the formation of an ecumenical government in March 1932, (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 59) but the failure, once more, of Venizelists and anti-Venizelists to reach a compromise rendered any such attempt short lived and a failure. Short lived was also Venizelos’ last government in January 1933 and he was finally defeated in the elections of March 1933. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 64)

The military branch of the Venizelists did not take this development well. The former colonel Plastiras, leader of the army revolt in 1922 (see above), now a Lieutenant General, attempted to militarily cancel the passing of power to the anti-Venizelists. He failed and had to flee abroad in April to avoid the consequences. It is suggested that Venizelos did not act decisively to cancel Plastiras’ plans or that he even ordered the action. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 620-622) Nevertheless, he was not prosecuted.

The fact that Venizelos was not prosecuted by the parliamentary and judicial authorities does not mean that he was spared from the vengeful fury of the anti-Venizelists. On the night of the 6th of June 1933, a cinematic attempt on his life took place, when he was returning to Athens from dinner at a friend’s house in Kifissia. Venizelos escaped, but during the manhunt involving the car carrying Venizelos and his wife, his bodyguards’ car, and the attackers’ car, one of his guards was killed, his driver was seriously wounded, and his wife suffered minor injuries. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 636-640)

The acute confrontation between the two factions continued for twenty months after the assassination attempt. The sources of tensions included a systematic government: i) cover-up of the assassination attempt, ii) manipulation of the command of the army to end its control by Venizelist-democratic elements, iii) effort to change the electoral law to its benefit, iv) disregard of parliamentary procedures. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 68) Eventually, in March 1935, Venizelos poured fuel on the flames backing an insurrection across northern Greece and the islands. It failed and Venizelos fled into exile in Paris. He died a year later. (Heneage, 2021, p. 178)

The failed coup gave the anti-Venizelist the opportunity to lead in front of a court martial 1,130 Venizelist members of the army, politicians, and civilians. Sixty of them were sentenced to death of which 55 had already escaped abroad. Of the remaining five, two were finally pardoned and three were executed including generals Papoulas and Koimisis, protagonists during the trial that led to the ‘execution of the six’, that had never been forgotten by the anti-Venizelists. Nevertheless, the latter avoided a wider purge to avoid a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, the executions met the opposition of France and Great Britain. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 772-779)

The same way that a successful Venizelist coup led to the fall of the dynasty in 1924, the unsuccessful coup of 1935 led to its restoration. In fact, it took yet another coup, within the anti-Venizelist ranks this time, led by lieutenant general Kondilis, for the recall of king George II. The restoration was confirmed with a Soviet-style highly questionable referendum, held in November 1935, that gave it 97.8 % of the votes. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 803) The king pardoned the participants in the March coup and elections were called for January 1936. (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 811-814)

Venizelists and anti-Venizelists emerged from the elections as equals. Although this was indicative of the public will for a coalition government (Dafnis, 1997, p. 816), the two factions once again failed to work together. Furthermore, the contacts of both with the Communist Party (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 81), holding 5.76 % of the votes and 15 sits in the parliament (Dafnis, 1997, p. 815), for the formation of a government backed by communist votes caused worries in the army. Thus, the king appointed in March major general Ioannis Metaxas, who we have met before as an emblematic figure of the pro-royalists and the anti-Venizelist ranks, minister of the military to restore discipline. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 818) He was promoted to the premiership the next month, when the prime minister Demertzis died suddenly of a heart attack. Public unrest and the need for seamless war preparation, as the clouds of war were gathering over Europe, provided Metaxa with the arguments that persuaded the king to allow for a dissolution of the parliament and the suspension of civil liberties in August. (Dafnis, 1997, p. 837) So began the 4th of August Regime.

The 4th of August Regime was Greece’s rather unconvincing experiment in fascism. There were, for example, organizations like the National Youth Organization, promoting self-discipline for the boys and preparing girls to be dutiful mothers, anti-communism propaganda and political arrests, but at the same time Metaxas was not racist and repealed some of the anti-Semitic legislation of previous regimes. (Heneage, 2021, pp. 179-180) Furthermore, the king remained strong and autonomous (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 85) and the country was not linked to the Axes Powers. On the contrary, Metaxas was a supporter of Great Britain. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 90) Thus, when, on the night of 28 October 1940, the Italian ambassador Grazzi demanded that Greece surrender key strategic sites or else face invasion, Metaxas answered in French, the language of Democracy, ‘Non’, No, in Greek, ‘Ochi’. (Heneage, 2021, p. 183) Greece was at war. Again.

II Clientelism

For division and civil war to flourish, one needs at least two factions, in the case presented here Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, each with members ready to do whatever is necessary to prevail. This, in return for specific benefits. The phenomenon is called clientelism – namely, the distribution of benefits by politicians and political parties to their supporters in return for their votes, campaign contributions and political loyalty. (Trantidis, 2016, p. xi)

The origin of clientelism in modern Greek history goes back to the Ottoman occupation. Indeed, Ottoman oppression strengthened the importance of the family as an institution that more securely guaranteed the protection of its members, relatives, and friends. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 287) The phenomenon expanded when the newly founded modern Greek state, as we have seen in the previous parts of this series, failed to create institutions that would earn the trust of its citizens. Everyday experience taught that a relationship with a powerful patron was better guarantee of service than trust in an indifferent state apparatus. Thus, the individual was connected to the institutions of power through some powerful patron-mediator in order to promote his interest rather than waiting for the state institutions to function properly. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 278-279)

Although individual clients are, more or less, powerless, they can form networks and become important and valued for their patrons. Clients may be members of formally autonomous social institutions such as labor unions. Through this membership, they undertake overlapping roles: they are both political clients claiming individual patronage benefits and members of an organization claiming ‘collective’ or ‘club’ goods. Rather than isolated individuals, clients organized in party bodies, trade unions or other professional organizations can find in them the infrastructure by which they could hold patrons accountable. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 12)

Thus, for the interwar period studied here, the phenomenon of clientelism was probably most profound in the army. Already before the Balkan Wars, the then crown prince Constantine had created a small entourage of officers, which he promoted based not so much on their military performance but mostly on their loyalty to the dynasty. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 21) The ten years war period from 1912 to 1922, though, created a plethora of officers forged at the battlefield, outside of the military academy in Athens and the king’s cycle. In fact, by 1922 these officers made three quarters of the officer’s corpse. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 102) Probably the most astonishing example of rise in the army ranks during this period was the mutineer Plastiras, whom we met in the previous section, and who had started his career as corporal back in 1903.

For the conscripts that made it to the officers ranks the army also became a means of livelihood, but when the wars were over, they had the fewest guarantees of permanence (or further promotion). Thus, patronage was particularly important for those officers that came from the ranks of the reservists. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 102) The officers that could not find a patron within the royalists’ ranks, naturally, turned to the Venizelist – democratic space for protection.

It is certainly a paradox that parties competing for parliamentary rule within a nominally democratic framework possess military client-branches and that that they use these branches dynamically to influence the election process or even to overturn its results, when considered unfavorable. In fact, from the 43 military interventions between 1916 and 1936 only two presented the army as a supporter of liberal reform, a defender of the country’s territorial integrity and a punisher of those responsible for a national catastrophe. These were the revolt of the National Defense Committee in Thessaloniki in 1916 (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) and the army’s revolt of 1922 discussed above. Both gained national significance and were supported by a large portion of the public. The rest were only intended to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of some military faction. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, p. 280)

It should be noted though that the officers do not always work in coordination with their political patrons. Movements like that of 1922, when the military for the first time fully assumes the exercise of government, contribute to the emancipation of some military factions from political patronage towards an autonomous claim of the benefits of power. (Veremis, The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936, 2018, pp. 118-119)

The effect of clientelism on the social, political, and economic life in Greece has been discussed in more detail recently, because of the most recent economic crisis that started in 2010. Thus, we will return to it when recounting later periods of modern Greek history. Before I close this short reference to the subject here though, I further note that clientelism should not be seen as a political choice that is alternative to campaign strategies that seek to attract voters with programmatic commitments and ideology. In addition, clientelism must not be seen simply as a strategy of vote buying. Instead, organized clientelism, as described above, strengthens the capacity of political parties to recruit groups as campaign resources in order to appeal to voters via the conventional means of programmatic and ideological messages. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 10)

Clientelism as a method of political mobilization creates a strong preference for a political party in government to preserve policies that cater to clientelist demands and avoid policies that could limit the allocation of benefits and resources to their clients. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 17) This, in turn, limits the capacity for reform, especially during political and economic crises, as politicians in a highly clientelist system will try to preserve clientelist supply as much as possible. (Trantidis, 2016, p. 19) This will help us understand the problems of the Greek economy presented in the next section.

III Economy in crisis

Although the ten-year war period, between 1912 and 1922, ended with a catastrophe, interwar Greece was different from Greece before the Balkan Wars. Its population and territory had doubled: before the war Greece was made up of 2,631,952 inhabitants and its territory amounted to 63,211 square kilometers. By 1920 the population reached 5,531,474 and its territory 149,150 square kilometers. Finally, the census of 1928 recorded 6,204,684 inhabitants and a territorial expanse, after the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign and the settlements that followed, of 129,281 square kilometers. (Kostis, 2018, pp. 272-273) Of course, most of these gains had already been achieved by 1913 and the expansion of the war period, including internal turmoil, to 1922 simply postponed the integration of the new territories to the country and its economy. Not only that, but it made it more difficult as by the end of the war the country was left much poorer and in a much less favorable international position.

The situation was made worse by the arrival in Greece of more than 1.2 million refugees as the result of the uprooting of the Greek communities in the East, following the defeat of the Greek army there. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 157) The number represented 20 percent of the total national population and the country had to import significant quantities of goods in order to meet the emergency needs of these new populations. (Kostis, 2018, p. 279)

The arrival of the refugees was decisive for the ethnic homogeneity of Greece though. Following the treaty for the obligatory exchange of populations signed between Greece and Turkey in Lausanne in January 1923, and another one, this time for an exchange on a voluntary basis, between Greece and Bulgaria earlier, in 1919, 500,000 Muslims and 92,000 Bulgarians left Greece in the period that followed. (Kostis, 2018, p. 275) Thus, about 70% of the refugees that remained in Greece (about 200,000 left Greece to seek their fortunes elsewhere (Kostis, 2018, p. 275)) was settled in rural areas of Macedonia and Thrace taking up the fields and the houses of the Turks and Bulgarians that left. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 159-160)

The properties of the minorities that left Greece though could make for no more than 50% of what was necessary for the refugees in the rural areas. The other 50% came from a significant reform under the military regime of Plastiras in February 1923. That was the obligatory expropriation of the large country estates and real estate in general, without the requirement that the owners be fully compensated first. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 30, 369-373) This Bolshevik-like approach created many small owners in the countryside and actually kept the refugees away from the grasp of the Communist Party that additionally adopted the policies of the Communist International and promoted the autonomy of Macedonia and Thrace. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 383-391)

In fact, as the catastrophe of the Asia Minor campaign took place under anti-Venizelist rule and the rehabilitation and assimilation of the refugees is credited to the Venizelists, most of the refugees became clients of the Venizelist parties affecting the results of elections to a significant degree. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, pp. 134-140,152,154 ) Indeed, when a small percentage of the refugees abandoned the Venizelist camp in 1933, it reshaped the political balance and eventually led to an anti-Venizelist victory.

One more conclusion can be drawn at this point. The inability of a clientelist state for reform explains why, in several cases, this (the reform) comes from authoritarian regimes or dictatorships, like that of Plastiras that brought the agricultural reform. Consequently, these regimes remain practically unchallenged by the political establishment, like that of Metaxas after 1936 (Dafnis, 1997, pp. 880-881), that introduced a full social security plan and imposed compulsory arbitration in labor disputes to prevent social unrest. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 85) In any case, for reform or private interest (see section II), the collaboration between the politicians and the military officers (often based on a patron – beneficiary, that is clientelism, relationship) explains also why many military interventions went practically unpunished or why amnesty was very often granted to the protagonists during the periods of modern Greek history we covered so far.

The agricultural reform alone was not enough to settle the refugee’s problems. The country was lacking raw materials, equipment, and the necessary infrastructure to integrate the new territories to the state. As usual, Greece resorted to external borrowing to cover these needs. A 12,000,000-franc loan was granted to Greece on humanitarian grounds by the Refugee Settlement Commission under supervision of the League of Nations to be spent on rehabilitating refugees (Kostis, 2018, p. 279). Venizelos’ investment program (see section I) between 1928 and 1932 also increased the external national dept from 27,8 billion drachmas to 32,7 billion drachmas. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 77) This insured that a disproportionately large portion of the national budget would be used for debt payments: 25.6% of public revenue in 1927-28, 40.7% in the following year, while in the last of Venizelos’ four years the figure settled at 35%. These figures left little room for flexibility in the government’s budget. (Kostis, 2018, p. 286)

Flexibility was further reduced by the fact that more than 100 years after the establishment of the modern Greek state 70-80% of the country’s export profits was still coming from the cultivation of currant and tobacco. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, pp. 77-78) The industry’s share to the GDP increased from 10% in 1924 to 16% in 1939, nevertheless, this development was carried out under protectionism conditions and did not introduce qualitative improvements in the Greek industry that would prepare it for international competition. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 87) Both remarks are indicative of the effect of clientelism on the lack of economy reforms and as an observer put it, positive developments in economic growth were more the result of the efforts of individual cultivators and industrialists rather than of a planned government policy. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 84)

Eventually, one more of the vicious cycles of the Greek economy, proposed by Dertilis (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29), was repeated in the interwar period. Once again it started with war or preparation for war (military spending took 18% of the GDP between 1918 and 1822 (Dertilis, 2020, p. 99)) and culminated to the suspension of national dept servicing on 1 May 1932. The government also abandoned the gold standard, and the value of the drachma began to fluctuate freely. Strict measure for limitations on currency followed that would affect the Greek economy for many decades. (Kostis, 2018, p. 287)

The Greek economy then turned inwards and seeked to develop by exploiting its domestic resources and more centralized forms of economic management made their appearance as the state took on a leading role. The economy recovered, but this recovery did not solve the country’s economic woes. (Kostis, 2018, p. 287) By 1937, the deficit in Greece’s trade balance reached 5,649 million drachmas. A year later, Greece imported three quarters of the raw materials used by its industry, one third of the cereals needed for domestic consumption and significant amounts of machinery and capital goods. By March 1940, the nominal public dept had reached 630 million dollars, equivalent to 9.25% of the national income for Greece (this reflected to a great extent the prevailing situation till 1932, as since then borrowing was significantly reduced) compared to 2,98% for Bulgaria, 2,32% for Rumania, and 1,68% for Yugoslavia. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, pp. 88-89) Military spending was reduced to 6.2% of the GDP between 1934 and 1939 (Dertilis, 2020, p. 99) but the imminent second world war did not allow for further reductions. In fact, at the end of 1939, when the war in Europe began, the Greek government spent an additional amount of 1,167 million drachmas for military purposes. This unexpected expense burdened the state budget by 10%. Between July 1939 and October 1940, when Italy attacked Greece, the circulation of banknotes increased from 7,000 million to 11,600 million drachmas and the wholesale price index increased by 20%. (Veremis & Mazower, The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941), 2009, p. 90)

Thus, the Italian attack in October 1940 found Greece’s economy in a fragile state and as is very often the case, an economy in crisis invites foreign intervention. (Dertilis, 2020, p. 29)

IV Foreign intervention

Foreign intervention refers basically to that of the Great Powers of the time (Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria – Hungary, the German Empire/Germany, Italy, and the United States of America). That is because the interaction of modern Greece with its Balkan neighbors was rather antagonistic, if not hostile, and more often than not determined by the dispositions of the Great Powers. (Divani, 2014, σσ. 82 - 119) Exception is the short period of the Balkan Wars, when skillfully chosen alliances with its Balkan neighbors resulted in the doubling of Greece’s territory at that time. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) A significant improvement in the relation with its neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia, Italy and Turkey, was also achieved, again under the premiership of Venizelos, between 1928 – 1932, allowing for a significant cut in military spending to the benefit of investments in infrastructure and the rehabilitation of the refugees. (Divani, 2014, pp. 207-208) (see also section I above). In fact, a treaty of friendship was signed between Greece and Turkey in October 1930.

It goes without saying that state characteristics like the ones presented previously (division, civil war, economy in crisis) facilitate, if not invite, foreign intervention. Furthermore, the term (‘foreign intervention’) is perceived, in most cases, with a negative sign. It is synonymous to the limitation (or even loss) of a state’s sovereignty at the interest of a foreign power. Nevertheless, let us remember, at this point, some cases of foreign intervention that we have come across in this series on the history of modern Greece: i) at a critical point of the War of Independence, when defeat seemed imminent, the combined fleets of Great Britain, Russia and France defeated the Ottoman-Egyptian forces at Navarino Bay and later signed the Protocol of London granting autonomy to Greece (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021), ii) the first territorial expansion of Greece to the Ionian Islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George I in 1864, (iii) the second territorial expansion of Greece to Thessaly in 1881 came after the Great Powers intervened to revise the Treaty of St Stefano and cancel the creation of the ‘Great Bulgaria’, and (iv) when Thessaly was retaken by the Ottomans after the Greek defeat in the 1897 Greco-Turkish war the Powers once again intervened to keep Greece’s territorial losses to a minimum. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

Are we then to conclude, following the previous remarks, that foreign intervention was out of pure concern for the well-being of Greece? By no means. Great Britain’s intervention at Navarino, together with France and Russia, intended to the limitation of the latter’s influence in the region. That is why immediately afterwards Great Britain worked to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by keeping Greece’s original territory very limited. The Ionian Islands were also given to Greece at a period when their value for Great Britain was deemed limited and under the condition that they would be rendered demilitarized. The limitation of Russia’s influence in the Balkans was also behind the revision of the Treaty of St Stefano. And there were also cases, as for example during the Asia Minor Campaign, that the Great Powers simply abandoned Greece to suffer a disastrous fate. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) Thus, the remark that foreign intervention is synonymous to the limitation (or even loss) of a state’s sovereignty at the interest of a foreign power remains valid. Indeed, with some exceptions, e.g. during the Balkan Wars, Greece failed to keep its fate in its own hands. The previous discussion serves only to show that foreign intervention was also positive when, by mere chance, foreign interests coincided with those of Greece.

But is it generally easy for a small state to draw an independent policy? Certainly not. Things are even worse though, when clientelism governs its political, social, and economic life. In fact, during the interwar period, the small states had the chance to participate to an international forum where, for the first time, instead of being subjected to the decisions of the Great Powers, they could, even to a small extent, co-shape them. This was the League of Nations (LoN). (Divani, 2014, p. 134)

Greece’s initial experiences with the first global intergovernmental organization, founded in 1919, were not good though. When Italy invaded Corfu in August 1923 (see section I) the LoN did very little to contain Mussolini. This was the first indication of the flaws of the LoN that eventually failed to work effectively against the fascist aggression that culminated to the Second World War. On the contrary, when Greece, under Pangalos’ dictatorship invaded Bulgaria (see section I) the LoN moved swiftly to condemn and punish it. The feeling of injustice was strong, but Greece, once again at a weak spot, could not do much to expose the handlings of the LoN. It needed the latter for technical and financial support for the rehabilitation of the refugees following the disaster of the Asia Minor Campaign. (Divani, 2014, pp. 159-173)

Indeed, as the former prime minister A. Michalakopoulos’ put it in 1929, regarding the work of the LoN in Greece: ‘if the State attempted to do the work of the Refugee Settlement Commission the errors would be tenfold, and the work imperfect, and there would be multiple embezzlements and the costs would be greater’. (Mavrogordatos, 2019, p. 138) This was because the LoN took special interest in ensuring that the loan money would not be spent for reasons other than the productive and developmental settlement of the refugees. The Financial Committee of the LoN also demanded reforms aiming at the stabilization and modernization of the Greek economy. (Divani, 2014, p. 242) In fact, the financial control of the LoN coexisted with the International Financial Committee controlling the Greek finances already since 1897, after the military defeat by the Ottomans following the bankruptcy of 1893. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

International financial controls mainly aim to serve the interests of Greece’s creditors. No doubt. Nevertheless, even to this end, they often introduce necessary economic, political (and consequently even social) reforms that have been repeatedly postponed and avoided by the local political establishment as they collide with the interests of the stakeholders of the clientelist state. Thus, foreign intervention represents an alternative to authoritarian regimes for the introduction of reform (see section III). Similarly though, it is used as scapegoat from the clientelist establishment, usually under the veil of an alleged insult to national sovereignty or democracy. As such it is hated by the Greeks that, in such a way, miss (or turn away from) the real origin of their troubles. Once again: a satisfactory solution of the refugee problem would have been impossible without the help of the LoN. (Divani, 2014, p. 293) As the Refugee Settlement Commission worked independently though, keeping the available resources (especially the refugee loans) away from the grasp of the local political establishment, its work was repeatedly discredited by the press and the Greek parliament in consecutive sessions discussed accusations against it. (Divani, 2014, p. 299)

V Conclusion

At the heart of all this trouble lies clientelism. The Greeks fought the War of Independence (1821 – 1830) to free themselves from the Ottomans only to become serfs to a clientelism system that significantly hinders their ability to develop and exploit the full capacity of themselves and the resources of their country. This is because the system demands unquestionable loyalty to the party or the ‘clan’. So unquestionable that one should be prepared to harm even its fellow Greek members of the opposite ‘clan’. Thus, civil war is a phenomenon often met in modern Greek history. This often takes the classical form of armed conflict, but, more often than not, is present in the form of ‘exchanges’ in critical administration positions. Members of one ‘clan’ are usually kicked out when the next ‘clan’ comes to power and needs to ‘accommodate’ its own clients. This non-meritocratic system of course guarantees that the country almost never has the needed capacity in these positions and if this, by coincidence, happens, it is never for a long time. Thus, Greece’s ability to keep up with the signs of each time is crippled. After all, with clientelism it is never about long-term planning and reform. Thus, the often bankruptcies. Then reform comes, usually violently, from inside or the outside. Because a divided nation invites foreign intervention.

It is not to be considered that all Greeks participate or are being favored by the clientelism system. Many have individually thrived inland or abroad when they found themselves in a healthier environment. And indeed the country has made progress since its establishment. Nevertheless, I dare to say that this was and remains slow, and it was and still is more coincidental. Sometimes because its interests coincided with those of the Great Powers of the time. Sometimes because it was lucky enough to have great individuals in power.

At this point, as the period we are discussing coincides with the death of Eleftherios Venizelos, some remarks about the Cretan politician are necessary. As we have seen he was not a role model for parliamentarism. He did not hesitate to resort to arms or even divide the country when necessary. So should he be condemned as, at least at times, anti-democratic? Maybe. I propose though that, at the same time, he was simply being realistic. Venizelos knew how the system works. He saw the opportunity for Greece’s expansion and he wanted to take it. He knew that clientelism would slow things down and the opportunity might have gone missing. So he played by the real rules of the game. That of clientelism. Not “parliamentarism” or “democracy”. And if, for example, Napoleon of France squandered French power and prestige leaving France smaller than he found her and is still called ‘The Great’, (Kissinger, 2022, pp. 61-62) Venizelos was proved to be ‘Great’.

So, should the country continue to rely on chance and a few good, or even ‘Great’, men or women for its progress? That would be a great risk. Because clientelism is like the cancer developed in a certain part of the body. If not treated properly, it will soon drag the healthy parts of the body to death as well.

What do you think of the period 1923-40 in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Dafnis, G. (1997). Greece Between Two Wars 1923-1940. Athens: Cactus Editions (in Greek).

Dertilis, G. B. (2020). Seven Wars, Four Civil Wars, Seven Bankruptcies 1821-2016. Athens: Gutenberg (in Greek).

Divani, L. (2014). The Treacherous Caress, Greece and foreigners, 1821 - 1940. Athens : Kastaniotis Rublications (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

Kissinger, H. (2022). Leadership. London: Allen Lane.

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Mavrogordatos, G. (2019). After 1922, The continuation of the schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, May 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/5/20/the-modern-greek-state-19141922-greeks-divided?rq=Papageorgiou#.Yw-AoxxBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, January 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/1/20/the-modern-greek-state-18981913-glory-days#.YhPK6JaxW3A

Trantidis, A. (2016). Clientelism and Economic Policy, Greece and the crisis. New York: Routledge.

Veremis, T. (2018). The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936. Athens: Alexandria (in Greek).

Veremis, T., & Mazower, M. (2009). The Greek Economy (1922 - 1941). In T. V. (Editor), Metaxas and His Era (pp. 73-90). Athens: Eurasia Publications (in Greek).

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lausanne

PostedMarch 22, 2023

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, Blog Post

TagsGreek History, Greece 20th century, Modern Greece, Modern Greek State, Greece Clientelism

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This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. There was not much to celebrate one hundred years earlier though, when the first centenary was completed. Indeed, in 1922 Greece suffered probably the worst catastrophe of its modern history. Its origin can be traced back to after the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, and part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here.

King Constantine I of Greece in the early 1920s.

I After the Balkan War was over

Defeat is an orphan, whereas victory is claimed by many fathers. King Constantine and his entourage of officers at the general staff, blamed by the Military League for the defeat at the Greco-Turkish of 1897, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) saw their redemption at the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Their approach though was that of complete denial of any credit to the prime minister Venizelos. The latter and his environment, similarly, but more moderately, exalted their contribution against the deficiencies of the pro-royals. (Malesis, 2017)

This was a rather petty quarrel and a bad sign for the future in view of the effort required to integrate the recently acquired territories. Significant minorities (the census of April 1913 shows that in Thessaloniki, for example, out of the 157,000 inhabitants, 39,956 were Greeks, 61,439 Jews, 45,867 Muslims, 6,263 Bulgarians and 4,364 Europeans and other ethnicities) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) constituted a potential problem that could be solved neither easily nor quickly. Furthermore, efficient exploitation of the new lands required the build of infrastructure in areas recently devastated by war. The fiscal sufficiency though was slim. By 1913, expenses for military operations amounted to 411,485, 000 drachmas in addition to 280,000,000 of collateral costs. The nation’s public dept had risen by 755,000,000 drachmas. These were dizzying figures considering the state of the Greek finances at the time (GDP before the war is estimated at 735,000,000 drachmas).

The prevailing expectations in Western Europe about the future of the Greek State, after its victorious military campaigns, allowed for the takeout of a 500,000,000 francs loan in February 1914, under favorable terms, to settle the pending depts. Nevertheless, the budget of the same year amassed a deficit of 170,000,000 drachmas, while immediate needs to be covered (not included in the budget) were estimated at over 300,000,000 drachmas. Thus, even before the outbreak of the First World War, issuance of the whole 500,000,000-franc loan proved impossible. The government turned to the National Bank and internal borrowing to supplement the required funds.

In any case, the needs could not be met with continuous borrowing. Payments of salaries and pensions were not being made on time and this gave room to the opposition to criticize the government. Even basic military needs, like the supply of food to the army, were only possible thanks to the advances from the National Bank. (Kostis, 2018)

II The First World War (WWI)

Thus, the outbreak of WWI found Greece facing significant challenges. These suggested that staying neutral was probably the most preferable option. At the beginning of the war, this was also the preference of the Central Powers and the Entente. Both were wooing Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire to join their ranks and taking up their foe during the Balkan Wars could hinder their efforts. King Constantine favored neutrality also for strategic reasons (exposure to a possible naval blockade by the British Empire in case of an alliance with Germany). (Rizas, 2019)

On the other hand, Greece was bound by an alliance with Serbia (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) which was under attack from Austria-Hungary since July 1914. Furthermore, when the Ottomans and Bulgarians signed treaties of alliance with Germany in September 1914 and September 1915 respectively, (Glenny, 2012) Venizelos, convinced that the British Empire would prevail, saw an opportunity for further territorial gains, if Greece joined the Entente.

The defeat of Germany, though, was by no means a certainty, especially during the early stages of the war. By the end of 1917 Soviet Russia concluded an armistice with the Central Powers followed by the Treaty of Brest – Litovsk with favorable terms for the latter. It was the late entry of the USA into WWI that tilted the scale in favor of the Entente. (Efthimiou)

Thus, steering the country within this complicated framework of international relations by carefully considering Greece’s fiscal and military capacity as well as its political (diplomatic) options required the setting of clear goals and a close collaboration between the prime minister and the head of state and the army. Venizelos and Constantine did exactly the opposite.

At first, Venizelos suggested that the Greek army should undertake the landing at the Dardanelles in February 1915, in return for territorial gains in Asia Minor promised by the Entente. The king seemed fascinated by the idea (considering a possible capture of Constantinople, where his synonymous emperor Constantine died, when the city was taken by Turkey in 1453), but the pro-royal chief of staff Metaxas considered the campaign too risky, leaving the northern border exposed to a Bulgarian attack and resigned his post. Venizelos then proposed the limitation of the Greek participation to only one division raising the king’s doubts about the success of the undertaking. Finally, Constantine refused to give his approval and Venizelos resigned. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The prime minister’s Liberal Party, though, won again in the elections of May 1915. The opposition, gathered around the king, refused to interpret the result as a vote for the participation to WWI proposing that it only showed the people’s trust to Venizelos. The king’s refusal to complement led Venizelos to resign again in September and abstain from the new elections of December 1915. (Malesis, 2017)

Meanwhile Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and the attack on Serbia was imminent. To implement the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty Venizelos, in the brief period before his resignation, invited the Entente to send troops to aid the Serbians through the port of Thessaloniki. The revocation of the invitation by the pro-royals and Greece’s protest could not prevent the landing of French troops in October 1915. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The presence of the allied forces in Thessaloniki allowed for the formation there of the National Defense Committee by Venizelos’ supporters aiming to confront the Bulgarian threat and align foreign policy with that of the Entente. When the Bulgarians took the Greek fortress of Ruper in May 1916 and later advanced in Eastern Macedonia by August, the government in Athens did not react in the name of a questionable neutrality as foreign armies were now clearly violating national sovereignty. This caused the armed reaction of the National Defense Committee on the 17th of August and when the city of Kavala was lost to the Bulgarians on the 29th, Venizelos, although hesitant at first, decided to lead the revolt. (Malesis, 2017)

Thus, Venizelos was now leading yet another revolt and the country was split in two with one government in Athens in charge of the ‘Old Greece’ and another one in Thessaloniki in charge of the ‘New Greece’ (territories acquired after 1912 except Epirus). (Mavrogordatos, 2015) The military presence of the Entente helped Venizelos to reunite the country though. On November 18, a detachment of 3,000 allied troops landed in Piraeus and advanced to Athens, but they were repelled by forces loyal to Constantine. After that, the royalists turned against Venizelos’ supporters in Athens killing dozens of them, arresting others and committing all kinds of atrocities. On the 26th, the allied fleet implemented a strict naval blockade of the ‘Old Greece’ causing food shortages and other catastrophic consequences for the population. Eventually, the king was forced to leave the country in June 1917 leaving his son Alexander at his place but did not resign. (Malesis, 2017) Venizelos returned to Athens and ‘resurrected’ the parliament elected in May 1915 (thus described as ‘Lazarist’). It was time for his supporters to retaliate against the opposition. Venizelos might have united the country again territorially, but the Greeks were now divided to Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists.

The prime minister’s harsh measures included the exile of this opponents (his former adjutant Metaxas and the leader of the Anti-Venizelists Gounaris, for example, were sent to Corsica) and the cleansing of the public sector, including that of justice and the church, as well as the army from the opposition supporters. Nevertheless, during the last phase of WWI Greece managed to field 10 divisions, that is about 180,000 men, that performed well in the Macedonian front, where they constituted about 1/3 of the total allied forces. To compensate for the late entrance in the war and in order to have the best possible treatment during the peace negotiations in Paris, Venizelos also sent the 1st Army Corps (23,000 men) to fight against the Communists in Ukraine in January 1919. (Malesis, 2017). The campaign was unsuccessful for the allies and they withdrew in April of the same year. The Greek communities in the Crimean suffered the retaliation of the Bolsheviks and many of their members were forced to seek refuge in Greece. Nevertheless, for Greece, the worst was yet to come.

III The Asia Minor Campaign

The story of the Greek expansion to western Asia Minor goes back to 1914. It was offered by the Entente in exchange for Greek concessions to Bulgaria of some of the territorial gains of 1912-1913 so that the latter would join the allies. These amounted to about 5,000 square kilometers including the port city of Kavala affecting 35,000 Greeks living in the area. In return, Greece was claiming a territory of about 125,000 square kilometers with the city of Smyrna at its center and a significant minority of 810,000 Greeks. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) By the end of the war, though, no concessions were necessary as Bulgaria was on the side of the defeated.

Such offers, backed by mostly secret treaties, in order to lure one country or the other to their side, was a standard tool used by both camps during WWI. In April 1915, for example, southwestern Asia Minor was also promised to Italy with the treaty of London. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) The overall situation in the Middle East was further complicated by the antagonism between Great Britain and France as the Sykes – Picot agreement was challenged by the Young Turks of Mustapha Kemal, who was not willing to comply to any agreements of the defeated Ottoman Empire he deemed as harmful for the interests of the Turkish nation. To make things worse, President Wilson, representing the late entrant USA at the peace negotiations of Paris, was not aware of this covert diplomacy and was thus indifferent to any claims over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. (Churchill, 2021)

Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with the occupation of Antalya in southern Asia Minor. The claims and ambitions of the Italians to lay hands upon the Ottoman Empire resulted to a complete breach between them and President Wilson. This led to a temporary withdrawal of Italy from the peace conference in Paris. When reports reached the conference that the Italians were going to proceed further with the occupation of Smyrna, combined with stories of Turkish maltreatment of the Greek population, it was proposed that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Smyrna at once for the purpose of protecting their compatriots there. (Churchill, 2021) Although Venizelos was earlier warned by the chief of the British General Staff Sir Henry Wilson that he could not rely on any military or financial aid for the undertaking and that this would result in a long war with Turkey and a rapid depletion of Greece’s financial and human resources, he decided to take the offer. (Richter, 2020)

At the time of the Greek landing in Smyrna, on May 15, 1919, the Ottoman Empire was under the spell of defeat in WWI. It was surrendering arms and munitions. But as soon as Greece, the enemy of generations, landed its troops, Turkey arose and the leader of the Young Turks, Mustapha Kemal, was furnished with the powers of a Warrior Prince. (Churchill, 2021) Not unfairly. Whereas the Greeks had the sea on their backs and Smyrna was not protected by any natural defensible border, Kemal could exploit the strategic depth of Anatolia, where he could safely withdraw, after every strike. (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Furthermore, Italy was clearly hostile to the Greek presence in Asia Minor and France also opted for collaboration with Kemal in exchange for peace in Syria, now under the French Mandate. (Wikipedia, 2022)

Thus, Greece was alone when the treaty of Sevres was signed in August 1920. The treaty ceded Thrace to Greece, which was also to possess the Gallipoli Peninsula, most of the Aegean islands, and to administer Smyrna and its hinterland until a plebiscite could be held there. The British prime minister Lloyd George favoured the Greeks, but the imposition of the treaty on the Turks was entirely up to the Greek army, now showing signs of strain under the influence of protracted financial, military and political uncertainties. (Churchill, 2021)

The situation was difficult, and Sir Henry Wilson again describes Venizelos as hopeless and desperate during this period. ‘The old boy is done’, he remarked. (Llewellyn Smith, 1999) In the internal front the national schism continued to fuel despicable acts of hate. Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, Venizelos himself narrowly escaped an attempt against his life by two royalist soldiers in a Paris railway station on his way home. His decision to call general elections in November 1920 allowing also for the return and participation of the exiled opposition is still a point of controversy. Venizelos’ opponents claim that he was looking for a way to abdicate his responsibility for the outcome of the Asia Minor Campaign. If this was the case, he was successful, because he lost and now it was the royalists that had to find a solution.

Winston Churchill, who was later to experience himself a surprising electoral defeat after the triumph of WWII (Gilbert, 1991), gives a different account though. On October 2, 1920, Prince Alexander (at this point king of Greece) was bitten by a monkey during a walk in the royal garden. The wound festered and after three weeks Alexander died. It was decided to offer the throne to Prince Paul of Greece. The latter was living with his exiled father in Switzerland and, as Churchill puts it, was inspired to reply that he could only accept after the Greek people had at an election definitely decided against his father. This forced a General Election.

Venizelos, with the Treaty of Sevres that expanded the triumph of the Balkan Wars, felt confident. He was willing that the issue should be put crudely to the electorate: Were they for the restoration of Constantine or not? But he did not make sufficient allowances for the strain to which Greece had been put; for the resentments which the allied blockade to make Greece enter WWI had planted; for the many discontents which arise under prolonged war conditions; for the oppressive conduct of many of his agents, when during his continuous absence for the peace negotiations the Greek people lacked his personal inspiration and felt the heavy hand of his subordinates; for the complete absorption of his opponents to party politics and for their intense desire for office and revenge. Eventually, he lost. (Churchill, 2021)

The only sane policy arising from Venizelos’ defeat would have been to reduce promptly and ruthlessly the Greek commitments in Asia Minor, negotiating also for the safety and well-being of the Greek minority there. The pro-royal officer Ioannis Metaxas made suggestions along these lines. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) After all, the return of Constantine further dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece as the king was a bugbear for them second only to the Kaiser himself. Nevertheless, the new regime, under prime minister Gounaris, was determined to show Greece how little Venizelos had had to do with its successes that far. They would strike Mustapha Kemal at the heart of his dominion. They would have the army march to Ankara. (Churchill, 2021)

What about the army then? Winston Churchill again gives a vivid description of the Greek army during the campaign to Ankara (which partly applies for the Greek people as well). He writes: ‘Imagine an army of two hundred thousand men, the product of a small state mobilized or at war for ten years, stranded in the centre of Asia Minor with a divided nation behind them; with party dissensions in every rank; far from home, and bereft of effectual political guidance; conscious that they were abandoned by the great Powers of Europe and by the United States; with scant food and decaying equipment; without tea, without sugar, without cigarettes, and without hope or even a plan of despair; while before them and around them and behind them preyed and prowled a sturdy, relentless and even more confident foe’. And he continues ‘over the Greek Army in Asia Minor there stole an ever-growing sense of isolation; of lines of communication in jeopardy, of a crumbling base, of a divided homeland, and of an indifferent world’. (Churchill, 2021) Nevertheless, the Greek army remained in martial posture for upwards of three years in Asia Minor. But, after the triumphs of the Balkan Wars and WWI, eventually it was defeated. On September 16, 1922 the last Greek Soldiers left Asia Minor. The Hellenism of Asia Minor followed them to escape the Young Turks’ atrocities.

IV Conclusions

Carl von Clausewitz in his classic On War defines the ‘Culminating Point of the Attack’ as that at which the forces remaining are just sufficient to maintain a defensive, and to wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns, there is a reaction; the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow. Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of judgment. (Clausewitz, 1997) His fellow Prussian Otto von Bismarck did exactly that, when, after fighting against the Danes, then the Austrians and finally the French to achieve the unification of Germany in 1871, he stayed put in spite of expectations to storm the rest of Europe. (Steinberg, 2011) A more recent example is Menahem Begin, who, instead of provoking a civil war during Israel’s War for Independence, decided to take the blows of David Ben-Gurion without responding and remained in political exile for thirty years until he became prime minister in the end of the 1970s. (Gordis, 2016)

Obviously, the Greeks did not posses such qualities. As we have seen, civil wars were common during their War of Independence (and more came after that), and now political party quarrels that led to the national schism brought Greece beyond its culminating point of attack, deep in Asia Minor, after ten years of mobilization and war starting in 1912 with the Balkan Wars.

Who was responsible in the present case? Churchill criticized the United States, Britain and France for requesting the presence of the Greek Army in Anatolia, where it had been the foundation of allied policy against Turkey for three years only to fall victim to inter-Allied intrigues at the end. The way for the dissolution of all Allied loyalties to Greece was paved by the Greek people’s choice, at the moment of their greatest hopes and fears to deprive themselves of Venizelos, the commanding personality who had created the situation Greece found itself into and who alone might have carried it to success. (Churchill, 2021)

Several Greek commentators take the same stance (Mavrogordatos, 2015) although there are cases of harsh criticism against Venizelos and his policies and more favourable for the king (Kakouri, 2017). Others blame both Venizelos for his disregard of hard facts (e.g., Greek minority of only 20% of the total population in the disputed area, lack of natural defences etc.) that led to the disaster and the king for not opposing the advance to Ankara - even though he was convinced that the whole undertaking of the Asia Minor campaign would be fatal for Greece. (Stamatopoulos, 2020)

Indeed, in the period discussed here both Venizelos and the king (personally and as head of the anti-venizelists) offered bad service to their country. We have seen in previous parts of this short history of modern Greece that division, violence and civil war characterized its early years. Parliamentarism helped relax the tensions, but now the two rivals were resorting to the old methods again. Not only did they allow/cultivate violence for the (also physical) extermination of the opposition, not only did they allow/pursue foreign intervention for the support of their cause, but they did it with a ‘messianic’ attitude of infallibility that resulted in a complete disregard for the consequences on Greece and its people. This legacy, as we will see, tormented Greece in the following years. In contrast, in the short period of two years (1912-13) that Venizelos and Constantine managed to work together Greece triumphed.

What do you think of the period 1914-22 in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Churchill, W. S. (2021). The world crisis, Volume IV, The aftermath 1918-1928. London : Bloomsbury.

Clausewitz, C. (1997). On War. Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited.

Efthimiou, M. (n.d.). Global History IV: The Man Against Himself - Part B. Center of Open Online Courses (www.mathesis.cup.gr). Crete University Press, Heraklion (in Greek).

Gilbert, M. (1991). Churchill, A life. London: Heinemann.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Gordis, D. (2016). Israel, A concise history of a nation reborn. New York: Collins Publishers.

Kakouri, A. (2017). The two beta. Athens: Kapon.

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Llewellyn Smith, M. (1999). Ionian vision, Greece in Asia Minor 1919 - 1922. Michigan: The Univeristy of Michigan Press.

Malesis, D. (2017). Defeat - Triumph - Catastrophe, The army in the Greek State from 1898 to 1922. Athens: EPICENTER (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, January 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/1/20/the-modern-greek-state-18981913-glory-days#.YhPK6JaxW3A

Richter, H. A. (2020). The Greco-Turkish war 1919 - 1922, From the dream of the ''Great Idea'' to the Asia Minor disaster. Athens: Govostis Publications (in Greek, also available in English by Harrassowitz Pub. - 2016).

Rizas, S. (2019). Venizelism and antivezinelism at the beginning of the national schism 1915-1922 . Athens: Psichogios publications S.A. (in Greek).

Stamatopoulos, K. M. (2020). 1922 How we got to the catastrophe. Athens: Kapon Editions (in Greek).

Steinberg, J. (2011). Bismarck, A life. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Syria_and_Lebanon

PostedMay 20, 2022

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, Blog Post

TagsGreek History, Modern Greece, Modern Greek State, Greece 20th century, King Constantine I of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos

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On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1898 and 1913 and looks at what happed in Crete, the Greek political, and scene, the Balkan Wars, and how ultimately it was a positive period for Greece. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here and part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here.

A lithograph of the Battle of Yenidje/Giannitsa in the First Balkan War.

The story narrated so far for Greece is not unique. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) By the turn of the 20th century, all modern Balkan countries (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) had suffered indebtedness and political instability, and the maneuvering of the great powers restricted their foreign policy options. The governments of all three were committed to schemes of territorial expansion, but the restraining influences of disorganized armies, chaotic public finances and great power pressure inhibited them. Only through cooperation with one another could they realize their expansionist dreams. The cooperation process culminated to the inferno of the first and second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Greeks, these were good wars. (Glenny, 2012)

I. Introduction

Cooperation between the Balkan States was not easy. Under the guiding hand of Bismarck, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan States to three expanding spheres of interest – Austro-Hungarian, Russian and British. This created confusion and resentment in many parts of the Balkans. Especially Bulgaria was reduced from 176,000 square kilometers, after the Treaty of San Stefano, to just 96,000 square kilometers. Serbia’s westwards expansion was also blocked. Thus, they both turned their expansionist ambitions south to Macedonia, claimed also by Greece.

Things became more complicated when in 1885 Bulgaria, violating the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Eastern Rumelia, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Powers accepted the outcome of the Bulgarian intervention. The Serbian king Milan Obrenović knew that the annexation gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the impending struggle for Macedonia. He saw the treaty violation as an opportunity to test his new standing army and attacked Bulgaria but was thoroughly defeated.

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the victory over the Serbs and with Greece bankrupt, distracted by the Cretan Revolt and finally defeated by the Ottomans in 1897, Bulgaria had indeed an important strategic advantage in Macedonia at the eve of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the realization of the Bulgarian threat by the Ottomans and internal divisions among the Bulgarian parastatal organizations which, like in Greece, were coordinating foreign policy led to a significant decrease of the Slavic influence in Macedonia immediately after the suppression of the Ilinden uprising in 1903. (wikipedia, 2021)

Indeed, Greek guerrillas, under the leadership of officers secretly sent by the government in Athens, used the opportunity and swept through western Macedonia restoring the Greek influence in the region. This renewed activity and the retreat of Bulgarian aspirations hastened a change in Serbian policy, too. Serbia would now be fighting for territorial influence not just against the Greeks and Bulgarians, but also against the Ottomans and Albanians. The situation was so complicated that, at various times, the struggle for Macedonia pitted Slav against Slav (Bulgarians against Serbs); Slav against Hellene (Bulgarians against Greeks); Slav against Muslim (Serbs or Bulgarians against Ottomans or Albanians); Hellene against Muslim (Greeks against Turks or Albanians); and Muslim against Muslim (Ottomans against Albanians). The situation calmed after the Young Turks revolution of 1908, which, in its early stages at least, rejected the path of nationalism and created hope for peaceful coexistence among the different ethnicities in Macedonia. (Glenny, 2012)

The successes in Macedonia restored the confidence of the Greek officer’s corps after the debacle in the 1897 war. The army blamed the Crown Prince Constantine for the defeat against the Turks and the politicians for Greece’s chronic lack of preparedness for war. In August 1909 an army conspiracy, the Military League, launched a successful coup d’etat. This did not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of a junta. The officers involved exercised pressure on the new government from behind the scenes to provide for the necessary restructuring of the army and the obliteration of the influence of the palace on it. They also invited Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan rebel politician outside the old political establishment to lead the effort. (Glenny, 2012) (Malesis, 2018)

II Eleftherios Venizelos

In Crete

Venizelos was born in Mournies, a part of the city of Chania, in Crete in 1864, the year of the first territorial expansion of modern Greece to the Ionian Islands. His father Kiriakos, a merchant, was involved in the local social and political developments and was often prosecuted by the Turkish authorities during the frequent Cretan revolts. Thus, Venizelos spent part of his early life in exile.

His father was granted amnesty in 1872 and returned to Chania, where he successfully set up his business and provided for the best preparation of Eleftherios as merchant. The latter complied at first, but later managed to convince his father to study law in Athens, where he developed his interest for politics. He also became involved with chieftains and veterans of the island’s revolutions and exiles because of them, who, together with his compatriot students, constituted the core of the Cretan irredentism in the Greek capital. He develops intense activity and soon becomes a leading figure among them.

By the time that Venizelos returned to Chania to practise law in 1887, apart from the respect of the Cretans in Athens, he had the good fame of his father, who died four years earlier, and the help of Kostas Mitsotakis, a local politician and husband of one of his sisters (he had four as well as a younger brother) to rely on for the advancement of his political carrier. He also proved to be an excellent lawyer, which added to his fame and financial comfort.

Thus, it came to no-one’s surprise, when in 1889, he was elected to the Cretan Assembly, a representation body of the semi-autonomous state granted to the island by the Pact of Chalepa in 1878. (wikipedia, 2020) This first tenure did not last long though. A few days after the elections, the old political establishment, proposed the declaration of unification with Greece. Venizelos, as well as the Greek government, immediately realized the dangers of yet another premature revolt and worked to establish a climate of appeasement and moderation. To no avail. The Turks crushed the new revolt and declared martial law. The Pact of Chalepa was no more and Venizelos found himself in Athens once more, this time as an exile.

His exile does not last long. In April 1890 he returns to Chania, after general amnesty was granted, and in December 1891 he marries his wife, Maria. His happiness does not last long though. After the birth of his second son, in November 1894, his wife died. At the same time Crete was going through one of the worst periods of its history. The martial law and Turkish terror were casting a dark shadow over the island. The Cretan reaction comes with another revolt in May 1896. Venizelos feared a repetition of the harsh measures of 1889 and was against it. The international condemnation of the Hamidian massacres (wikipedia, 2021) though and the pressure exercised by the Great Powers to the Sultan did not allow for a similar reaction. Thus, the movement was successful in forcing the sultan to commit himself for the restoration of the privileges of the Pact of Chalepa.

Venizelos was not hesitant to get involved in another revolt though, when the sultan did not honour his commitment. Not only as a politician but also as front-line fighter. This is the crisis that culminated to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Although Venizelos was in line with Trikoupis’ approach that foreign policy should be dictated by the national centre and supported unification with Greece, he did not hesitate to disagree with the Greek government after the Greek defeat and opt for the more realistic solution of Cretan autonomy under the condition that the Turkish army withdrew from the island. His insistency and the clumsy handling of the situation by the Turks, with irregulars attacking British forces, resulted not only to Crete’s autonomy, but also to the appointment of the Greek king’s second born prince George as high commissioner.

In December 1898 prince George arrived in Chania. He claimed excessive powers for himself, and Venizelos supported him as a strong executive authority was necessary for the rebuilt of the devastated island. He also served for two years as minister of justice in the cabinet of the prince demonstrating significant legislative work. Cooperation did not last long though. Venizelos believed that the main aim should be full Cretan autonomy and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ armies from the island, which, in effect, occupied it. Prince George on the other hand was unsuccessfully trying to convince the Powers to accept the unification of the island with the Greek kingdom. When the commissioner used suppressive measures to settle the differences with the politician, Venizelos revolted.

The centre of the revolt was at Therisos, near Chania, where Venizelos and his supporters declared the unification of Crete with Greece on the 11th of March 1905. This was an attempt to turn the tables as any reaction from the prince would be an act against his own diplomacy that far. In any case, it was the reaction of the foreign armies on the island that would decide the outcome of the revolt. Eventually, Venizelos found himself in a tough spot, but, preferring a realistic approach instead of a fight to the end, he managed to exploit the differences between the Great Powers and by mid-summer managed to achieve: amnesty for himself and his supporters, the establishment of Cretan militia and withdrawal of the Powers’ armies from the island, a loan for the Cretan autonomous state, provisions for the settlement of important pending issues with the Turks, revision of the Cretan constitution. The Greek king would have the right to nominate the high commissioner, but his suggestion was subject to the approval of the Powers. King George decided to withdraw his son and substitute him with former prime minister Alexandros Zaimis. The Powers accepted. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Thus, by 1905 Venizelos had two revolts on his account and a major clash with the royal dynasty and the political establishment supporting it in mainland Greece. No wonder that the officers of the Military League considered him the ideal candidate for the premiership a few years later.

In the Greek political scene

In the elections of the 8th of August 1910 Venizelos was voted member of the Greek parliament for the first time in his career. Contrary to might be expected of him, he did not accept the premiership offered by the Military League. He pointed out that the army officers had committed a serious political mistake: They revolted against the old political establishment and the crown and after gaining control of the situation they trusted the same establishment with the reorganization of the state. Instead, he proposed a compromise: A revision of the constitution of 1864 to introduce the necessary reforms, after which the Military League would dissolve itself. Nevertheless, material provisions of the constitution and especially that concerning the form of government would remain untouched. The crown was safe. Venizelos’ stance served for an improvement of his relations with the palace, especially with king George.

After the king’s invitation to implement the compromise he suggested, Venizelos formed his first government on the 6th of October 1910. But, although the parliament elected in August included 122 independent members, the majority was still with the old parties and Venizelos was not willing to become ‘prisoner’ of this majority. Thus, he convinced the king to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections on the 28th of November. The leaders of the old parties considered this a constitutional coup and decided to abstain from the upcoming elections. As a result, Venizelos’ newly formed Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority of 307 out of 362 seats. 87% of the new MPs were elected for the first time.

The revision of the constitution introduced important novelties such as a new regime for the expropriation of land, the establishment permanence for the civil servants, compulsory and free elementary education and a ban on the election of army officers as members of parliament. The goal was to address chronic problems of the state like the oppression of the landless, clientism and army interventions in politics. Venizelos actually retained the ministry of the army for himself, and significant compromises were made here. He took as his adjutant the pro-royal captain Ioannis Metaxas, the later dictator during the interwar period in the 1930s, and most importantly restored the crown prince Constantine at the head of the army in June 1911. The reason behind these compromises was the avoidance of an internal front as Venizelos’ concern during this period was the country’s foreign policy. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Nevertheless, he ensured public support with the elections of March 1912 by winning again with an overwhelming majority against the united opposition this time.

Preparation for war

In February 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a defence agreement and two months later a military pact for common action against the Turks regarding their claims in Macedonia. Venizelos actively pursued Greece’s participation to the alliance but was at first met with reservation from the Bulgarian side. (Malesis, 2018) Nevertheless, the Slavs had no navy and Greece was necessary to restrict the capacity of the Turkish fleet to move freely in the Aegean. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) As far as the Greek army was concerned though, after Greece’s defeat in 1897 and considering its financial problems, it was estimated that it counted far below those of the other Balkan States. (Glenny, 2012) Knowing this, Venizelos did not insist on any settlement of the division of the potential territorial gains in Macedonia during the negotiations. Thus, finally Bulgaria felt comfortable to accept Greece in the alliance in May 1912. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Bulgaria completely underestimated the capacity of the Greek army. The international financial control after 1897 helped tiding up the country’s finances and the surpluses of 1910 and 1911 together with loan take outs in the same period created an abundance of cash for the Greek state at the eve of the war. (Kostis, The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day, 2018) Actually, the reorganization effort started in 1904 already with the establishment of the National Defence Fund by the government of George Theotokis. From 1904 till 1912 214 million drachmas were spent on armaments of which 50% during the last two years, when Venizelos came to power. For comparison, the national GDP in 1910-11 was 282.28 drachmas per capita (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) , whereas the legendary armoured cruiser Averof (Carr, 2014) cost 24 million drachmas. Venizelos also materialized the decision of Stefanos Dragoumis’ government in 1910 to invite, following a demand of the Military League, French and British officers to undertake the training of the army and navy. The French mission under general Eydoux arrived in January and the English mission under admiral Tufnell in May 1911.

During this preparation period Venizelos faced the opposition’s criticism that once again preferred the old ‘wait and see’ tactic determined by public opinion and possible political cost. The palace and general staff were also not pleased with the invitation of the Anglo-French military missions as the crown prince and his officers were trained in Germany and admired the Prussian military tradition. Nevertheless, Venizelos was determined to pursue an active participation to the upcoming war and did not hesitate, against the public opinion, to refuse the admission of Cretan representatives to the Greek parliament in May 1912 that might have triggered a reaction form the Great Powers (and the Turks) that at this point were split regarding their policies in the region and could not undertake coordinated action to prevent the war. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars commenced on the 8th of October 1912, when tiny Montenegro, the fourth member of the Balkan alliance, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Five days later an ultimatum issued by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia was delivered to the Turks, demanding such an extensive number of reforms in favour of the Christian populations of the empire that could not be accepted. Their declaration of war followed on the 17th of October. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Military operations lasted only 10 weeks, but the numbers of combatants involved were huge. The Bulgarians mobilized a full 25% of their male population, just under 500,000 men. (Glenny, 2012) The Greeks and Serbs fielded about 200,000 men each and this at a time when their population was less than 3 million. (Malesis, 2018) The Turks were about 350,000. 200,000 combatants, excluding civilians, were killed. The vast massacres of the soon to come First World War relegated the social and economic impact of the Balkan Wars to the penny place. But those who witnessed or participated in them were given a unique insight into what the 20thcentury had in store for the world. (Glenny, 2012)

During the first phase of the war (First Balkan War) the Turks had just come out of a war with Italy and were obliged to fight in four different fronts: against the Bulgarians in Thrace; against the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia; against the Serbs and Montenegrins in northern Albania (I refer to modern Albania, as this state did not exist at the time of the Balkan Wars) and Kosovo; and against the Greeks in Epirus. (Glenny, 2012) The Greek army made significant gains in southern Epirus, setting the city of Ioannina under siege, and in western and central Macedonia, taking Thessaloniki, after winning the race to the city over the Bulgarians. The Greek navy was proved predominant in the Aegean by blocking the naval transport of Turkish troops from Asia Minor to the different fronts and freed all occupied islands. At the same time the rest of the Balkan Allies neutralized almost every pocket of resistance in Europe stopping only 40 km from Constantinople. Thus, soon the Turks reached for an armistice which was signed with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins in December. The Greeks retained a state of war as Ioannina was still under siege and they also needed to continue controlling the movements of the Turkish fleet in the Aegean. (Klapsis, 2019)

At the conference of London, in December 1912, the Great Powers tried to regain the initiative in the Balkans with their ambassadors discussing separately from those of the war parts. Nevertheless, Sofia, Athens and Belgrade were no longer prepared to bow to the strategic requirements of the Great Powers. (Glenny, 2012) Furthermore, the Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, although it confirmed the drastic reduction of the Turkish possessions in Europe, contained no specific provisions for the definition of the new borders in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. The incorporation of a new Albanian state complicated things even more.(Klapsis, 2019) It was time for the Balkan states to settle the differences among themselves.

Meanwhile, Greece, still in a state of war with the Turks, had taken Ioannina and advanced into northern Epirus, before the Treaty of London was signed. Bulgaria, overemphasizing the contribution of its army during the hostilities, was by no means willing to accept any conventional ratification of the status quo after the First Balkan War. (Klapsis, 2019) Realizing the danger, Venizelos turned to Serbia for the formation of a common front against their former ally. The Serbs accepted but demanded that the Greco - Serbian Defensive Treaty includes also mutual support in the case of an Austrian attack against Serbia now that the latter’s ambition on the Adriatic were restricted by the Italo – Austrian push for an Albanian state in the region. Although the Germanophile crown prince Constantine was against this development, later to play a crucial role for the Greek participation to the First World War, the Treaty was signed on the 1st of June 1913. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

The Second Balkan War commenced in mid-June with a sudden Bulgarian attack against Greece and Serbia. After few initial successes, the Bulgarian army was thoroughly defeated by the combined armies of Greece and Serbia (supported also by the Montenegrins). Taking advantage of the situation Romania also entered the war occupying Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. The Turks also retook Adrianople from the Bulgarians. The final settlement took place on Balkan ground with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. For Greece the result was astonishing. The gains in Epirus, west and central Macedonia were supplemented by eastern Macedonia till the port city Kavala. In Bucharest, Crete was also finally ceded to Greece that occupied also the islands of north - eastern Aegean, although their fate was to be decided by the Powers at a later point. Within a year the frightened and despised Greece of the past doubled its territory (from 63,211 to 120,308 square kilometres) whereas its population increased by 80% (from 2.6 to 4.7 million people). (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

III Conclusion

Greece’s expansion before 1912 was rather coincidental. The Ionian islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George in 1864. The annexation of Thessaly was also the result of serendipitous international relations in 1881. It was actually lost to Turkey after the defeat of 1897 and was luckily granted back to Greece, together with the right to appoint the high commissioner in Crete, because of the power play between the Great Powers that the Greek government could barely influence.

At the beginning of the 20th century things were different. Greece was actively pursuing international alliances. It did not hesitate to change sides when the national interest and not have public opinion dictating it. It capitalized on the painful cumulative growth it had experienced since its establishment and combining military action with diplomacy achieved its greatest triumph to this day. As it was noted ‘For the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Greece was fighting and winning without patrons’. (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Nevertheless, despite Venizelos’ criticism to the Military League that it tried to push reform using the old establishment, he worked with the same establishment. It was probably necessary in view of the imminent developments and the need for internal peace. By restoring the crown prince at the head of the army and pro-royal officers at the general staff though, he revived a power system that the Military League meant to neutralize. Already during the Balkan wars there was significant friction between the politician and the commander in chief regarding the appropriate strategy. The disagreement for the race to Thessaloniki in 1912 (supported by Venizelos) against an advance to Monastir (supported by Constantine) or that on signing the agreement with the Serbs, before the Second Balkan War, are typical examples. King George, who, within a few months, tasted all the joy that was deprived of him during the humiliations of the past, was able to mediate successfully between the two. But in March 1913 he was murdered in Thessaloniki by a paranoid person, according to the official version. It has been commented though that the murder came in handy for the ‘German factor’. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Constantine was now not only at the head of the army but at the head of the state, too.

In short, this was undoubtedly a triumphant period for Greece. But the seeds for another catastrophe to come had also been planted.

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Carr, J. (2014). R.H.N.S. Averof, Thunder in the Aegean. Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Kostis, K. (2018). The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Wikipedia. (2020). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Halepa

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilinden%E2%80%93Preobrazhenie_Uprising

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidian_massacres

PostedJanuary 20, 2022

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, 19th century, Blog Post

TagsModern Greek State, Modern Greece, Balkan Wars, Crete

CommentPost a comment

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1863 to 1897 and looks at the instability that Greece and the wider region felt over the period before bankruptcy and military defeat came for Greece in the 1890s. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on 1827-1862 here.

A photo of influential Greek politician Charilaos Trikoupis.

Acemoglu and Robinson describe why the establishment of a virtuous cycle of inclusive political and economic institutions is a prerequisite for the prosperity of nations. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) In the previous article though, it was shown that in the first thirty years after its independence, the Modern Greek State did little to suppress the remaining tradition of the extractive institutions of the Ottoman occupation. (Papageorgiou, 2021) It tried to speed up after that by doing too much too fast in a turbulent political scenery. The result was bankruptcy in 1893 and military defeat in 1897.

Introduction

After the deposition of King Otto I in 1862, the search for a new king of the Greeks begun. Several candidates were considered including the nephew of the Tsar Nikolao and Alfred, the second born son of the English Queen Victoria. British foreign policy was especially interested in avoiding another champion of the Great Idea, namely, the liberation of all Greeks under Ottoman rule by all means, including war. Finally, it was Prince William of Denmark who ascended to the throne under the regal name of George I. To increase its influence, Great Britain ‘offered’ George the Ionian Islands under the condition that they would be rendered demilitarized. This infuriated the locals, but a compromise restricting neutrality to the islands of Corfu and Paxous, facing mainland Epirus still under Ottoman occupation, allowed for the integration of the islands to Greece in 1864. This was the first expansion of Modern Greece. The Ionian Islands added 1,813 square miles to the Greek territories and increased the population by 236,000, among which were significant intellectuals and politicians. A key figure during the negotiations for the integration of the new territories was the debutante 32-year-old politician Charilaos Trikoupis. (Divani, 2010)

Charilaos Trikoupis

Trikoupis was a shining example of the Greek political oligarchy. (Kostis, 2018) His father Spyridon and uncle A. Mavrokordatos were former prime ministers. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) This is a ‘tradition’ that lasts to this day. The current prime minister of Greece is also the son of a former prime minister. Other members of the Mitsotakis family serve(d) as ministers, members of parliament and mayors of Athens. The father Georgios, the son Andreas and the grandson, also Georgios, of the Papandreou family have all also served as prime ministers in the period from the Second World War to the beginning of the 21st century. The last prime minister of the Papandreou family succeeded Konstantinos Karamanlis who is the nephew of another former prime minister with the same name. So much for the inclusiveness of Greek political institutions.

Following his service at the Consulate in London and the negotiations for the Ionian Islands, Trikoupis was elected Member of Parliament in 1865. His appointment as minister of foreign affairs in 1866 coincided with another crisis of the early years of modern Greece, the Cretan Revolution. Trikoupis believed that Greece was unable to undertake any military initiative on its own. On the contrary, Athens ought to look for allies in the Balkans and beyond and coordinate its diplomatic and military actions with them. (Klapsis, 2019) Politically, this is a particularly turbulent period though. Between 1863 and 1875 twenty-two governments were formed. (Malesis, 2018) The system of government after 1864 was Crowned Democracy with the power for the appointment of the government resting in the hands of the king. The latter did not necessarily consider the balance of power in parliament, and it was not unlikely that minority governments were appointed. Thus, coordination for internal and external affairs was lost.

The gap was filled by National Associations, similar to the Society of Friends (Filiki Eteria) that prepared the War of Independence. They had a diversified membership including university professors, journalists, bankers, politicians and officers of the army pervaded with the Great Idea. (Malesis, 2018) These associations substituted the official state in the conduct of foreign policy. They supplied the Cretan rebels with material resources and organized the dispatch of volunteers so the island. This infuriated the Ottomans as well as the European Powers, although the Greek State officially did not approve of the Associations’ actions after the debacle of 1854, during the Crimean War. At the same time though no action was undertaken to restrain the Associations in fear of the political cost. (Klapsis, 2019)

Trikoupis was describing the National Associations as ‘the fungus of national policy’ and believed that all resources of the nation should be subject to the national center. Foreign policy was to be mandated by the government and not by ‘irresponsible clubs’, he said. (Malesis, 2018) Thus, as minister of foreign affairs, Trikoupis contributed significantly to the signing of the Greek state’s first alliance treaty with Serbia against the Ottomans (Vöslau, August 1867). (Kostis, 2018)Nevertheless, the king was skeptical, opting for a more moderate approach and refused, at first, to ratify the treaty. (Klapsis, 2019) Furthermore, a few months later George I married the Grand duchess Olga of Russia. This enraged Trikoupis. The Ionian Islands were given as a dowry to the king upon his ascendance to the throne, but now the British and the French had absolutely no reason to endow with Crete the Tsar’s niece. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) By the time the Cretan crisis was settled in 1869 at the Paris Conference, with no gains for Greece, Trikoupis had long resigned his post (December 1867).

1870s

By 1872 Trikoupis was the leader of the ‘Modernist Party’ pursuing political stability. His most famous action to this end is the publication of the article ‘Tis ptaiei?’ (Whose fault, is it?), accusing the king of a lack of respect for the terms of parliament and holding him responsible for the country’s political situation. The king succumbed to the pressure and in August 1875 declared that the principle of declared confidence of Parliament would govern the appointment of the government from that point on. This did not help much though as between 1875 and Trikoupis’ retirement in 1895 another 21 governments were formed. (Kostis, 2018)

Thus, the quirky foreign policy continued after 1875 during another Balkan crisis initiated by the revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This expanded to Bulgaria in May 1876. Serbia and Montenegro considered that the circumstances were favorable and went to war against the Ottoman Empire in June. Nevertheless, the Ottomans suppressed the revolt and defeated the joint forces of Serbia and Montenegro. Russia intervened and an armistice was signed in November. A conference was held in Constantinople in December, where the Great Powers envisaged increased autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The crisis was not resolved though because the Ottoman government rejected the decisions of the conference.

The intransigent stance of the sultan caused yet another Russo-Turkish war in the spring of 1877. After all, Russia’s intervention in the first place was the result of a secret treaty with Austria–Hungary in July 1876, which, in the case of Serbian victory that year, provided for significant territorial gains not only for the cosignatories, but also for Serbia, Montenegro, the independent Bulgaria and Greece. The latter was to receive Epirus, Thessaly and Crete. Eventually, the content of the treaty became known to Greece, and this caused significant excitement to the public. (Klapsis, 2019)

Greece’s response was similar to that of 1866–69. The realistic policy of neutrality was opposed by the pro-war and anti-ottoman stance of the public forged by the activity of National Associations. The compromise reached by the universal government of the elderly admiral K. Kanaris included military preparation, instigation of revolts in the Ottoman territories and the development of diplomatic initiatives. (Malesis, 2018) In fear of the political cost, the successor of K. Kanaris, A. Koumoundouros, decided to invade Thessaly in early 1878 under the pretense of the protection of the Greek populations in the area. This came to the dismay of both Great Britain, which demanded Greek neutrality, and Russia, which signed an armistice with the Ottomans two days before the Greek invasion and was hoping that this would have come much sooner.

To make things worse, the Treaty of St Stefano in March 1878 between the Russians and the defeated Ottoman Empire attempted to set in motion the plans for the creation of Great Bulgaria and provided for significant gains for Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bosnia–Herzegovina. This would significantly increase Russia’s influence in the Balkans and Greece was to face significant competition in the face of the pan-Slavic movement.

1880s

Luckily, the other Great Powers reacted to the Russian plans and the Treaty of St Stefano was revised in Berlin in the summer of 1878. Despite its disorientated policy, Greece was to negotiate with the Ottoman Empire for the settlement of their borders in Thessaly and Epirus. The Powers intervened once more to overcome the obstructionist tactics of the Ottomans, which delayed the settlement for another two years. Finally, in July 1881 most of Thessaly but only a small part of Epirus around the city of Arta was ceded to Greece. Crete remained under Ottoman rule and Great Britain, for its diplomatic services to the sultan, acquired the right of ‘temporary’ administration of another very important island for Greece, that of Cyprus. (Klapsis, 2019)

At about this time Trikoupis formed, as prime minister, the first ‘long term’ government of Greece from March 1882 to April 1885. This was followed by another one from May 1886 to October 1890. By that time (1882) clientelism weakened the state institutions (Hazony, 2018). In response, Trikoupis expanded the election districts to break the bonds between politicians and their supporters. He also took measures to discourage the participation of army officers in the elections. Stricter rules for hiring and promoting public servants aimed for an increased effectiveness of public administration.

The most striking feature of Trikoupis’ government though was his extensive program of public works. This included the construction of roads and railways, bridges and ports, the Isthmus of Corinth and land reclamation. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis and the Public Works, 2001) These were prerequisites for the development of the economy and allowed for a rapid deployment of the army.

Trikoupis took special care of the latter with measures for better training, the reorganization of the officers’ schools and the utilization of the reservists. He also carried out an extensive rearmament program including the construction of several new battleships. (Malesis, 2018) In short, Trikoupis aimed for efficient representation at international level based on a well-administered state of justice, with an efficient economy and strong armed forces. (Klapsis, 2019)

It was very risky. Trikoupis relied on external and internal borrowing to go through with his reform. From 1879 to 1890 Greece took out external loans amounting to 630 million drachmas plus 65 million from internal loans. Although Greece had settled the loans that led to the bankruptcy of 1843, the new ones were agreed under very unfavorable terms with only 72% of the nominal value collected at the end. (Eleftheratos, 2020)

It was crucial that the economy would grow fast enough to allow for consistent loan servicing. But Greece remained an agricultural country and after the recovery of the French vineyards from phylloxera in 1890, currant exports, which after 1860 accounted for 50–60 % of the total value of Greek exports, decreased dramatically. (Eleftheratos, 2020) The exploitation of the fertile lands of Thessaly also did not bring much for the peasants. Wealthy expatriates bought the large manors from the Ottomans and the feudal system of the empire remained in place. This prepared the way for the peasants’ revolts at the beginning of the 20th century. (Divani, 2010) Trikoupis did not actually get the help he was hoping for from the expatriates’ investments. Although many of them developed philanthropic activity in the country, some were also involved in financial scandals, e.g. that of the Lavrio silver mines, with devastating effects for the general public. (Eleftheratos, 2020) The growing financial problems led to an unprecedented immigration wave, mainly to the USA. (Klapsis, 2019) So much for the inclusiveness of the Greek financial institutions.

Thus, the amount of public expenditure going to the service of public debt grew from 9% in the period 1871-1878 to 53% in the years 1887-1892. Considering that military spending remained high during this period (100 million of the 460 million drachmas of foreign loans that reached Greece were spent on military equipment), it comes as no surprise that from 1887, 70% of the new loans were used to serve the older ones. Taxation was another measure used by Trikoupis to support his program at the cost of his popularity among the people. (Eleftheratos, 2020)

It was the disagreement for taking out yet another loan, for the service of older ones, between king George and Trikoupis that led to the latter’s resignation in 1890. He became prime minister two more times after that (out of seven times in total between 1875 and 1895) but could not prevent state bankruptcy in December 1893. Interestingly, when comparing with recent experience, at the time of the bankruptcy the public debt was 200% of the GDP, somewhat higher than the 182% that led to Greece’s ‘rescue’ by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF in 2010.[1] (Eleftheratos, 2020) Trikoupis suffered a devastating defeat at the elections of 1895, when he was not elected member of the parliament, retired and died the next year. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016)

From bankruptcy to defeat

Trikoupis’ archrival was Theodoros Deligiannis. The two alternated in the prime minister’s office, inaugurating bipartisanship in Greece. Deligiannis was often described as anti-Trikoupis aiming to systematically cancel the latter’s work (e.g., the expansion of the election districts, the discouragement of army officers to enter politics and the rules for hiring and promoting public servants) and for this he is blamed by some authors as the main culprit for the bankruptcy of 1893. (Tricha, Charilaos Trikoupis, 2016) One should keep in mind though that Trikoupis’ governments ruled four times as long as those of Deligiannis and that it was he that took out seven colossal loans. (Eleftheratos, 2020)

There can be no doubt though that Deligiannis’ foreign policy was catastrophic. Back in 1885, when he succeeded Trikoupis for a brief period of one year, he had to handle another Balkan crisis. That was the annexation of Eastern Roumelia by Bulgaria. Under public pressure and with parliamentary support, Deligiannis mobilized the army, but for months he was taking no military initiative, apart from some skirmishes in Thessaly because of some hotheaded army officers. At the same time the Great Powers demanded that Greece demobilize its army and abstain from any war effort. Deligiannis’ indecisiveness finally led to another naval blockade by Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy and Russia and his resignation in 1886. (Malesis, 2018)

By 1895, when he was again prime minister, it was Crete’s turn to rise once more. Greece had regained confidence after holding the first Olympic Games of the new era in 1896 and the pattern was once more the same: public pressure under the propaganda of a National Association (Ethiniki Etaireia) for military action, demands for self-restraint from the Great Powers and the government trying to balance in between. To that end, Deligiannis sent the fleet and an army detachment to the island hoping for another naval blockade that would help him save face on the internal front and avoiding, at the same time, war with the Ottoman Empire. (Klapsis, 2019) Things did not go that way though. The Powers asked for a withdrawal of the armed forces of both the Greeks and the Ottomans and opted for an autonomous Crete under the rule of the Sultan. The Ottomans accepted. Deligiannis attempted a catastrophic maneuver: he withdrew the fleet, but not the army suggesting this way that Greece preferred the union with Crete. At the same time guerrillas were sent into Thessaly under the command of officers of the army. (Malesis, 2018) This gave the Ottomans the opportunity they were looking for. In April 1897 they declared war on Greece and having overwhelming numerical superiority the Ottoman army had retaken most of Thessaly within days, stopping only thanks to the intervention of the Powers. In a sign of weakness, Greece was not invited to the peace negotiations of the Powers with the Ottomans and luckily it had to make only small territorial concessions. On the other hand, war reparations to the amount of four million Turkish lira were imposed and to make sure that Greece would honor its obligations to the lenders the Powers set up an international committee to oversee the fiscal policy. (Klapsis, 2019) The International Financial Committee remained in Greece for 81 years - until 1978.

Conclusion

A critical juncture is a major event or confluence of factors disrupting the existing economic or political balance in society. It is a double-edged sword that can cause a sharp turn in the trajectory of a nation. On the one hand it can open the way for breaking the cycle of extractive institutions and enable more inclusive ones to emerge. Or it can intensify the emergence of extractive institutions. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) The 19th century included several such junctures for Greece. Revolution, independence, expansion to the Ionian Island, Thessaly and part of Epirus. Political and economic developments though did not allow for the emergence of inclusive institutions.

Exclusive institutions do not rule out growth. And indeed, Greece was (inevitably) slowly growing. Cities were developing and the distribution of GDP in different economic sectors was changing. Whereas in 1861, 74% of the economically active population were employed by the primary sector, by 1881 the figure dropped to 69.9% with the secondary sector employing 11.8% and the tertiary sector 18.3%. (Kostis, 2018) The expansion of the road and railway network and the rest of the public works would be Trikoupis’ legacy for the future. However, growth under extractive institutions has moderate results, as it does not allow for creative destruction through innovation. It is therefore not sustainable. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)

Social and political ills discussed previously (Papageorgiou, 2021) were not cured by the end of the 19th century. To this we can add, new ones like the establishment of para-statal organizations playing a significant role in political developments and officers’ mentality that they constitute a special group increasingly autonomous from the political leadership and with support from the palace. (Malesis, 2018)

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

[1] The word ‘rescue’ is in brackets because of the conflicting views regarding the necessity and effectiveness of the implemented policies whose analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

Bibliography

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail. London: Profile Books ltd.

Divani, L. (2010). The Territorial Completion of Greece (1830-1947), An Attempt at Local Lore. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Eleftheratos, D. (2020). An Oblique Look at History, 200 Years of Modern Greek Laughter and Cry. Athens: Topos (in Greek).

Hazony, Y. (2018). The Virtue of Nationalism. Basic Books: New York.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Tricha, L. (2001). Charilaos Trikoupis and the Public Works. Athens: Kapon (bilingual in Greek and French) .

Tricha, L. (2016). Charilaos Trikoupis. Athens: Polis (in Greek).

PostedSeptember 5, 2021

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories19th century, Blog Post

TagsGreek History, Modern Greek State, Modern Greece, Theodoros Deligiannis, Charilaos Trikoupis, Greece 19th century

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When Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul, or Byzantium prior to Constantinople), the queen of cities, fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the millennia-old Roman Empire, in the form of the Byzantine Empire, was lost to the world. But the memory of Byzantium did not die, and the Romaioi (Romans), the Greek-speaking population of the former Byzantine Empire, yearned for freedom and the restoration of their long-lost empire. When Greece officially became independent in 1832, this dream of restoring Byzantium became Greek national policy, and was aggressively pursued for the next nine decades, shaping the development of the modern Greek state. This is known as the Megali Idea.

Michael Goodyear explains.

Eleftherios Venizelos, who became Greek Prime Minister in 1910.

400 Years of Ottoman Rule

Following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire quickly conquered the remaining independent Greek-Byzantine territories. These new Ottoman subjects were subjected to restrictions and obligations based on their religion, including being subject to a poll tax in lieu of military service and the devşirme levy on Christian boys for imperial service.[1]On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire practiced much greater religious tolerance than European nations at that time.[2] The Ottomans categorized their subjects based on religion, and this kept ethnic Greeks looking to Constantinople and its Patriarch, as their identity as Orthodox Christians was of preeminence under the Ottoman Empire. This in turn maintained the Greek memory of Constantinople as their great city, and Greeks continued to think of themselves as Romans. For example, when the Greek political thinker Rigas Feraios thought of a Pan-Balkan federation in the late eighteenth century, he was thinking of the Byzantine Empire as a model.[3]

When Greeks started agitating for independence, they looked to the greater Greek community living in the Ottoman Empire. The Byzantine Empire served as a model of independence. Revolution broke out in 1821, and through eight years of bloody struggles, and the assistance of Great Britain, France, and Russia, a newly independent Greek state emerged. Constituting little more than southern Greece and a few islands, the nascent modern Greece would quickly develop ambitions to recover all territory that had been Greek.

Once More They Shall Be Ours

Due to its small size, from its inception, modern Greece wanted to grow and recover more territory where ethnic Greeks resided. This irredentist mission to rescue the Greeks remaining under Ottoman rule ultimately took form as the policy of the Megali Idea (the Great Idea). In 1844, Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis first used the term in a political context to advocate for the recovery of “any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race.”[4] The contemporary Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos connected Kolettis’ vision with Byzantium, fleshing out the Megali Idea as the dream to restore the Byzantine Empire, the last “Greek” polity prior to Ottoman rule.[5] While the goal was to recover all historically Greek lands, there was a clear goal: Constantinople. As Kolettis had put it, “Constantinople is the great capital, the dream and hope of all Greeks.”[6]

Throughout the nineteenth century, Greece embarked on a slow but steady expansion. In 1864, Greece acquired the Ionian Islands from Great Britain as a present for the new Greek king, George I. When George was crowned, his title was King of the Hellenes, rather than just Greece, and thus a direct claim to the mantle of the Megali Idea. In 1881, Greece acquired Thessaly from the Ottoman Empire. But Greek expansion was stalled in 1897; the Greek army attempted to assist the island of Crete, which was rebelling against Ottoman rule, but the Ottoman army crushed the Greeks. Yet even in military defeat, the Megali Idea was preserved. The Great Powers intervened and forced the Ottomans to make Crete an autonomous province inside the Ottoman Empire, with George I appointed as the High Commissioner of the Cretan State.

Zenith and Fall

The height of the Megali Idea, however, was at the start of the twentieth century. As the new century dawned, the Ottoman Empire was the Sick Man of Europe. The nations of Europe waited for its imminent demise, and the newly independent countries of the Balkans hungrily eyed the decaying corpse. One of the leading proponents of the Megali Idea, Eleftherios Venizelos, became the Greek prime minister in 1910. Venizelos was a native Cretan, and as an ethnic Greek born outside of Greece, he actively wanted to recover former Greek territory from the Ottomans. Venizelos allied with the other Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire. In 1912-1913, this Balkan League quickly obliterated the Ottoman military and occupied practically all of Ottoman Europe, even advancing on Constantinople itself. Greece occupied former core territories of the Byzantine Empire: Epirus and the Aegean islands, including Crete, were taken. The greatest prize was the taking of Macedonia, and its provincial capital of Thessaloniki, the former second city of the Byzantine Empire.

George I was assassinated upon entering Thessaloniki as the victor, but this hardly slowed the advance of the Megali Idea. George I’s successor, Constantine I, was even named in honor of the Megali Idea; the last emperor of Byzantium was Constantine XI, so Constantine I was also known as Constantine XII. The start of World War I in 1914 was a potential problem, as Constantine supported the Central Powers while Venizelos supported the Entente, and although a national schism ensued between the two, Venizelos prevailed and authorized the Entente to use Thessaloniki as a forward base against the Central Powers. Venizelos’ gamble paid off: when the Ottoman Empire capitulated in the Treaty of Sevres, Greece was given Thrace and the area around the major Anatolian port city of Smyrna. Greek territory now surrounded the Aegean and approached the very gates of Constantinople.

Greece, seeing an opportunity, landed troops in Smyrna and conducted operations to occupy more Ottoman land to the east and northeast. The timing seemed ideal: the Ottoman Empire had effectively disintegrated and Constantinople was occupied by Allied forces. But the future president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was rallying Turkish forces in the east, and in late 1920, the briefly deposed Constantine I returned and Venizelos fell from power. The purge of Venizelists from the army substantially weakened its effectiveness and the Greek Army, which was numerically small, was stretched thin across western Anatolia. Kemal’s forces halted the Greek advance at the Battle of Sakarya in 1921, and the next year Turkish forces began the counter attack. The Greek army had never properly reorganized after Sakarya and their withered forces were decimated by the Turks at the Battle of Dumlupınar. The remnants of the Greek army fled to Smyrna. Greek soldiers, citizens, and local Christians crowded the docks of Smyrna as Turkish soldiers started to burn the city behind them. The dreams of a restored Byzantium perished in those flames.

Lingering Memory

In 1923, a new treaty was signed between Greece and Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne, which returned all Anatolian land and Eastern Thrace to Turkey. In addition, Greece and Turkey exchanged their local populations of Greeks and Turks: over a million ethnic Greeks moved from Turkey to Greece and 400,000 Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. Irredentism was effectively dead, as almost all of the Greeks in Turkey had now moved to Greece. This massive influx of people would significantly affect the Greek economy and society, with neighborhoods such as Nea Smyrni (New Smyrna in Athens) and the distinctive rebetiko music serving as lingering examples of the Megali Idea in Greece. But the idea has not completely died; Ioannis Metaxas invoked it during his dictatorship from 1936-1941 and similar ideas emerged over the issue of Cyprus in the mid-twentieth century. Even today, the ultranationalist far right Greek political party Golden Dawn has claimed Constantinople.[7] These lingering memories leave little doubt of how irredentist dreams of restoring a lost medieval empire shaped the course of modern Greek history.

How important do you think regaining Byzantium/Constantinople/Istanbul has been to modern Greece? Let us know below.

[1] David Brewer, Greece, the Hidden Centuries: Turkish Rule from the Fall of Constantinople to Greek Independence 51, 115 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

[2] Id. at 35-36.

[3] See Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976 45-46 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[4] See Yannis Hamilakis, The Nation and Its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece 107, 114-115 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[5] Id. at 115; see also Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea,” in Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity (David Ricks & Paul Magdalino, eds.) (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 1998).

[6] Hamilakis, supra note 4, at 114-115.

[7] “Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Says Istanbul Will Be Greek,” Hurriyet Daily News (June 1, 2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/neo-nazi-golden-dawn-says-istanbul-will-be-greek.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22118&NewsCatID=351.

PostedJuly 21, 2020

AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Categories20th century, Blog Post

TagsByzantium, Constantinople, Modern Greece, Megali Idea, Istanbul

4 CommentsPost a comment

The Modern Greek State: 1950–1974 – The Road to Dictatorship and Retreat

The Modern Greek State: 1923–1940 – The Issues of Clientelism

The Modern Greek State: 1914–1922 – Greeks Divided

The Modern Greek State: 1898–1913 – Glory Days

References

The Modern Greek State: 1863–1897 – Bankruptcy & Defeat

Modern Greece and the Idea of Regaining Istanbul/Constantinople: Dreaming of Byzantium

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