The 1897 Greco-Turkish War took place over 32 days from April to May 1897. Greece and the Turkish Ottoman Empire fought, primarily over the question of the status of Crete. However, the war had lasting consequences. Rama Narendra explains.
The Battle of Domeke in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. Painting by Fausto Zonaro.
The 1897 Greco-Turkish War is a war few remember or even know about outside of the countries involved. The war was relatively short, involved two relatively minor players in the European Concert, and is completely overshadowed by wars and crises happening shortly after it like the Agadir Crisis, the Italo-Turkish War, The Balkan Wars, and World War I. However, the war still had major, but subtle consequences for both countries which, like dominoes, led to the Balkan Wars in the 20thcentury.
Background
Just like other Empires at the time, the Ottoman Empire was troubled with nationalist revolts in the 19th century. One particular hotbed for nationalist fervor was Crete, with its Greek-speaking majority demanding autonomy or even self-rule. To escalate the situation, King George of Greece was of one mind with Greek nationalists in wishing to annex the island, and frequently sent arms and men to support Cretan nationalists. 1897, however, would prove to be a fateful year as the over-confident Greek leadership saw the chance to annex Crete or even expanding on the mainland further north. This overconfidence was fueled by the humiliation of the Ottoman armed forces back in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War, and an exaggerated view of the internal problems of the Ottomans, especially regarding the Armenian rebellions.
The Ottoman military, though, was far from what the Greek leadership had imagined. Sultan Abdülhamid II has been working closely with German advisors to reform and improve the Ottoman army. The mission led by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz in 1886 had particularly lasting effects on Ottoman leadership and planning. He not only drastically improved the Ottoman education and training system, but also changed the overall status of the general staff officer corps within the army. Close cooperation with German firms also ensured that the Ottomans were armed with modern bolt-action rifles.
Escalating Tensions
On February 15, 1897 two regular Greek battalions, joined by local rebels landed on the shores of Crete. Within two weeks, Greek semi-official gangs, called the Ethnike Hetairia, reinforced with regular officers and soldiers, began to launch raids into Ottoman Thessaly. On April 9 Greek raiders, with some Italian volunteers, attacked Ottoman border towers and defeated a border company in Kranya. They were repulsed by Ottoman border guards the next day, and even though the Ottoman government were reluctant to enter a full-blown war, intense public pressure eventually pushed the Ottomans to declare war on Greece on April 17.
The war was fought in two separate theaters: Alasonya-Thessaly and Yanya-Epirus. However, most of the fighting was done in the Thessaly Front. During the war, the Ottomans used plans devised by none other than Von der Goltz himself. The plan was to force the Greeks to overstretch their defensive lines, which were very near to the border. The main body of the Ottoman Army at Alasonya would then try to encircle the Greeks before they were able to retreat back to the Yenisehir line. Von der Goltz expected that the Great Powers would not let the Greeks be beaten and would intervene in the conflict in less than 15 days. So the Greek army had to be crushed in less than two weeks.
The War
The first stage of the war (April 16–22) was marked by border clashes and the occupation of mountain passes. This stage also shows that despite the reforms the Ottoman army still had glaring shortcomings. Officers and soldiers sometimes ran towards the enemy as if in a race without paying attention to combat tactics and techniques, and as a result officers suffered abnormally high casualty levels. Instead of conducting the encirclement maneuver as planned, most units simply tried to push the Greek defenders back by frontal assaults. Confusion, delay, and lack of coordination and communication were the norms until the Ottoman forward units reached weakly defended Yenisehir two days after the Greeks withdrew from the town.
The second stage (April 23–May 4) was marked by the battle of Mati-Deliler and the occupation of Tırnova and Yenisehir. The second stage proceeded almost the same way as the first stage, with Ottoman units pushing the Greek defenders back without attempting encirclement maneuvers, and the Greeks safely evacuated their defenses and retreated to their last defensive line.
The third and last stage (May 5–17) was marked by the decisive battles of Velestin, Catalca, and Domeke, in front of the last Greek defensive line. The first battle of Velestin was a disaster for the Ottomans. In this encounter, a forced reconnaissance turned into a futile and bloody assault, and the Greek lines held firm against Ottoman cavalry and infantry charges. However, the Ottomans eventually pushed through Greek lines in the second battle. The Ottoman army finally decisively beat the Greeks at the battles of Catalca and Domeke. The Greek defenders were thoroughly beaten and the road to Athens was opened.
Conclusion and Consequences
However, as Von der Goltz had predicted, the Great Powers intervened and Greece was saved from further humiliation. Even though the Ottomans militarily won the war, they did not gain much from the victory. The Great Powers forced the Ottomans to give Crete autonomy and refused an Ottoman plea to obtain the region of Thessaly, previously lost in the aftermath of the 1877 Russo-Turkish War. Greece, however, was required to pay a heavy war indemnity to compensate the Ottomans for the territory won by them in Thessaly and returned under the terms of the peace. The victorious Ottoman troops retreated as if defeated, and Abdülhamid spent several tense months trying to explain to the public why the war had been won in the battlefield but lost at the diplomatic table.
So what were the consequences of this short war? As it turned out, they were big. In the Ottoman Empire, despite the disappointing result, the victory gave the Ottomans a public morale boost and confidence after being humiliated by the European powers for decades. This confidence is what eventually drove an overwhelmingly pro-war public opinion on the eve of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars. If their armed forces had beaten Greece in 1897, what prevented them from doing it again? Yaşasın harb! (Long live War!), cried the pro-war demonstrators in 1912.
In Greece, the defeat was seen as disgraceful and humiliating, mostly due to the rapid and unexpected advance of the Ottoman army. This defeat though, fueled the country’s irredentist policy of the Megali Idea (Greater Greece) and led Greece to reform its politics and economy, redefine its international alliances, and prepare the military and naval forces that helped Greece double its territory over the next 20 years.
If you enjoyed this article, you can read about the Megali Idea and how it shaped the modern Greek state here.
References
Ginio, E. (2016). The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katsikas, S., & Krinaki, A. (2020). Reflections on an" Ignominious Defeat": Reappraising the Effects of the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 on Greek Politics. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 38(1), 109-130.
Uyar, M., & Erickson, E. J. (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk: From Osman to Ataturk. ABC-CLIO.
