The Importance of the Telegraph in the US Civil War: Part 3 - The Union’s Use of the Telegraph

The American Civil War (1861-65) saw a breakthrough in various technologies. One of particular importance was the telegraph, a communication technology that had grown greatly in significance in the years before the US Civil War broke out. Here, K.R.T. Quirion concludes his three-part series on the importance of the telegraph in the US Civil War by looking at the role of the telegraph in the later years of the Civil War and its importance in the Union’s victory.

You can read part 1 in the series on the history of the telegraph in the 19th century here and part 2 on the telegraph in the early years of the US Civil War here.

Wagons and men of the U.S. Military Telegraph Construction Corps. Brandy Station, Virginia, 1864.

President Lincoln in the Telegraph Office

As an early adopter of the telegraph, Lincoln realized the importance of building a strong telegraphic infrastructure within the government and the military. With the Union facing the prospect of a 1,000-mile battle front, the telegraph gave Lincoln an unprecedented ability to “converse with his military leaders in the field as though he were in the tent with them” and power to “assume the role of commander-in-chief in a more titular sense.”[1]

Before Lincoln could exercise any degree of control over the nation’s dispersed military forces, it was necessary to organize the telegraphic capabilities of the Union. At the start of the Civil War all government telegraphs passed through one central communications hub, not even the War Department had its own separate line. [2]The organization of the USMTC soon remedied that deficiency when its headquarters were established inside of the War Department. By March of 1862, the telegraph had become so vital to the prosecution of the war that Secretary Stanton moved the USMTC telegraph office into to the “old library room, on the second floor front…adjoining his own quarters.”[3]In short order, the telegraph office of the War Department became Lincoln’s “Situation Room, where the president not only monitored events through incoming messages but also initiated communications directly to the field.” Lincoln spent more time in the telegraph office than in any other location during his presidency.[4]

Lincoln Takes Command

At first, Lincoln’s telegraphs were few. In the last six months of 1861, Lincoln sent only thirteen telegrams.[5]Despite this infrequency, the President exhibited no qualms about using the telegraph to “issue instructions regarding the disposition of troops.”[6]In these early telegraphs, Lincoln began exercising the authority of the commander-in-chief in a direct way. In one telegraph to John C. Fremont, the President ordered the General to begin deploying his troops in Kentucky. [7]Lincoln even went so far as to countermand Fremont’s own dispensation of his troops. [8]These first forays in taking direct command of Union troops were on a “glimmer of what was to happen.” [9]By 1862, the president had begun using the telegraph as means of directly communicating with commanders in the field without the filter of their commanding general. [10]Part of this direct action by Lincoln was brought about by has frustration with General George B. McClellan’s hesitancy to engage the enemy.

In May, the President traveled to the front lines of McClellan’s Peninsular campaign to see the work first hand. Upon arrival, Lincoln discovered that although the Union occupied Fort Monroe, the General had done nothing to silence the Confederate ironclad the Merrimac, or its base of operations at Norfolk, both of which resided just across the waters of Hampton Roads. Furious with McClellan’s complacency, the President took it upon himself to capture Norfolk and began “directing the movements” from his mobile White House at Fort Monroe. [11]

Having taken action and tasted the fruits of his decisiveness, Lincoln thereafter began issuing “explicit and direct command to his generals” through the telegraph network. [12]His deepening involvement with the intricacies of the war led Lincoln to practically live in the telegraph office, going so far as to request a cot be set up in that room so that he could remain in proximity to the wires rather than return to the White House. [13]The cipher and telegraph officers of the War Department on whom Lincoln relied said of the President that the “Commander-in-Chief…possessed an almost intuitive perception of the practical requirements of that….office, and…was performing the duties of that position in the most intelligent and effective manner.” [14]All of the “intuitive perception” in the world would have been useless however, had it not been for the amazing power of the telegraph.

Union Military Commanders Use the Telegraph

Lincoln was not the only Union commander who learned to use the telegraph to project himself across the vast lengths of the battlefront. It was in fact the “Young Napoleon” George McClellan himself that first grasped the great potential of this new technology. Later, General Ulysses S. Grant would perfect the use of the telegraph giving him a precision of control over the movements and actions of his troops unheard of before in the history of warfare.

McClellan had experience with commanding through the telegraph before he was appointed to lead the Union army. Fresh out of West Point, the Army sent McClellan to Europe as an official observer of the Crimean War. There he witnessed the first application of the telegraph in battle. Following that, he resigned his commission to become a railroad executive, where he became intimately acquainted with the telegraph. Thus, when he rejoined the army at the start of the Civil War, there was perhaps no military commander better suited to make use of this new technology.

Within the first few months of the war, McClellan enlisted the services of a Western Union Executive, Anton Stager, to organize a military field telegraph. It was soon after this that Stager was assigned to oversee the operations of the USMTC. In short order, McClellan, because of the telegraph, was able to exert unprecedented tactical communication with his command which allowed him to rapidly change battle plans. [15]He brought his experience with using the telegraph network with him once he was appointed to lead the Union’s forces. Once in Washington, McClellan’s headquarters were quickly “festooned with wires connecting him to all the fronts and making [him] the hub of military information.” [16]

Unfortunately for the President, all the information in the world could not get McClellan to move. The commander who would most effectively employ the telegraph was Ulysses S. Grant. Greely writes that:

From the opening of Grant’s campaign in the Wilderness to the close of the war, an aggregate of over two hundred miles of wire was put up and taken down from day to day; yet its efficiency as a constant means of communication between the several commands was not interfered with. [17]

The lines of the USMTC bound the corps of the Army of the Potomac together like “a perfect nervous system, and kept the great controlling head in touch with all its parts.” [18]Never after crossing the Rapidan did a single corps lose direct communication with the commanding general. 

Grant, more than any commander before him, employed the telegraph for both “grand tactics and for strategy in its broadest sense.” [19]From his headquarters in Virginia, Grant daily issued orders and read reports on the operations of his commanders who were dispersed across the vast battlefront of the Confederacy. With Meade in Virginia, Sherman in Georgia, Sigel in West Virginia, and Butler on the James River, Grant commanded a military force exceed half a million soldiers and conducted operations over eight hundred thousand square miles. [20]In his memoirs, General William Tecumseh Sherman said that, “[t]he value of the telegraph cannot be exaggerated, as illustrated by the perfect accord of action of the armies of Virginia and Georgia.” [21]

Conclusion

The successful application of the telegraph by the Union was the result of the concerted effort of Lincoln, his military commanders, and thousands of skilled USMTC operators. By the end of the Civil War, the USMTC had constructed 15,000 miles of dedicated military telegraph lines. [22]These lines were operated in addition to the thousands of commercial lines which were taken over by the federal government. Together this vast telecommunications network brought the President, the War Department, and the commanding generals “within seconds of each other”, though enemy fortifications or even thousands of miles of wilderness might have intervened. [23]

This intricately organized network allowed Grant to utilize the full potential of the telegraph. Grant more than any other commander besides Lincoln, learned to project himself using this new technology. In this way, Grant was able to strategically maneuver his forces across the battlefields of Virginia, Georgia, West Virginia and elsewhere with rapidity and precision. As Plum writes, the telegraph was of “infinite importance to the Commander, who, from his tent in Virginia, was to move his men upon the great continental chess-board of war understandingly.” [24]Grant acquired a precision and speed with this powerful new technology that allowed him to out maneuver his opponents. He used this power to command his army in ways that were unthinkable to previous generations of military leadership. With a clear picture of the immense theater of war and a powerful means of mobilizing his units Grant was able to cut off reinforcements to General Lee and shorten the conflict. [25]

 

How important do you think the telegraph was in the Union’s victory in the US Civil War? Let us know below.

Remember, you can read part 1 in the series on the history of the telegraph in the 19th century here and part 2 on the telegraph in the early years of the US Civil War here.

[1]Tom Wheeler, Mr. Lincoln’s T-Mails: How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War, (New York, NY: Harper Business, 2007), 65. 

[2]Ibid., 1.

[3]Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War, 38.

[4]Wheeler, Mr. Lincoln’s T-Mails: How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War, 10. 

[5]Ibid., 40.

[6]Ibid., 42.

[7]The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed., Roy Basler, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), vol. IV, 485. 

[8]Ibid., 499.

[9]Wheeler, 41.

[10]Ibid., 44.

[11]Bates, 117.

[12]Wheeler., 54

[13]Ibid., 77.

[14]Bates, 122.

[15]Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 37.

[16]Wheeler, 40.

[17]Greely, “The Military-Telegraph Service.”

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Plum, Vol. II, 140.

[22]Greely.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Plum, Vol. II, 128.

[25]Greely.

The Importance of the Telegraph in the US Civil War: Part 2 - The Telegraph in the Early Years of the War

The American Civil War (1861-65) saw a breakthrough in various technologies. One of particular importance was the telegraph, a communication technology that had grown greatly in significance in the years before the US Civil War broke out. Here, K.R.T. Quirion continues his three-part series on the importance of the telegraph in the US Civil War by looking at the role of the telegraph in the early years of the US Civil War and how the Union made use of it.

You can read part 1 in the series on the history of the telegraph in the 19th century here.

US Military Telegraph Service battery wagon, Army of the Potomac headquarters. In Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864.

The Telegraph Demonstrates its Usefulness 

In 1861, journalists flooded into Washington, D.C. and would remain through the course of the Civil War to disseminate information across the country. The news of the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12 spread like wildfire and was immediately followed by President Lincoln’s call for 75,000 militia volunteers. [1]Because of the telegraph, Americans would read about war as the events unfolded. This speed in communications precipitated a speed in events as well.

Having read Lincoln’s call for the organization of a military, secessionists in Virginia and Maryland mobilized, hoping to capture Washington off guard and end the war before it began. The Confederacy’s secretary of war predicted that his new nation’s flag would “fly over the U.S. Capitol by May 1.” [2]Governor John Andrew of Massachusetts however, had already mobilized his state’s militia for action. 

When news of the secessionist’s plan reached the capitol on April 17, the Massachusetts militia was called by the War Department. Andrews telegraphed back that, “Two…regiments will start this afternoon.” [3]These forces however, were held up by secessionists in Baltimore en routeto intercepting the forces headed to Washington, D.C. [4]Luckily, five Pennsylvanian companies had been contact by telegraph and ordered to hasten to the Capital before the arrival of the Massachusetts soldiers, thereby cutting off the secessionist coup d’état.[5]Without the near instant communication of the telegraph, Union forces would have arrived too late to secure the capitol.

The Union Organizes its Telegraph System

As the events of April 17 demonstrated, the telegraph was destined to play a significant role in the course of the Civil War. Anticipating this, Myer hoped toexpand the role of the Signal Corps by creating an officer core. In 1861, he submitted a draft of legislation to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, “for the organization of a signal corps to serve during the present war, and to have the charge of all the telegraphic duty of the Army.”[6]Despite various appropriations of money to buy equipment, Congress did not approve the creation of a dedicated officer corps for the Signal Corp until March 1863. In the interim, Myer had to rely on field commanders to detail officers and men to duty in the “acting signal corps.” [7]

Concurrent with Myer’s efforts to grow the Signal Corps was the creation of a rival organization, the U.S. Military Telegraph Service (USMTC). The secessionist uprising in the North and Upper South during 1861 caused the “seizure of the commercial [telegraph] systems around Washington.” [8]A young, ambitious Superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad was tasked with rebuilding, reinforcing, and extending the telegraph and railway infrastructure from Washington south toward the heart of the Confederacy. [9]The Superintendent’s name was Andrew Carnegie. Completing this, Carnegie and his task force enlarged the network to connect important stations such as “the navy yard and the arsenal, with the War Department, and to run lines to Arlington, Chain Bridge,” and other outposts.” [10]

Anson Stager, the general superintendent of the Western Union Telegraph Company was appointed captain and assistant-quartermaster of the USMTC on November 11, 1861, and was “assigned in Special Order 313 to duty as general manager of military telegraph lines.”[11]Stager and the entire USMTC reported directly to Secretary of War Stanton. By an act of Congress in 1862, the civilian operated USMTC, through the oversight of the War Department, took control of all commercial telegraph lines in the Union.

Battle for Supremacy

In an effort to outflank the USMTC, Myer proposed the creation of a “Telegraphic or Signal Train to accompany the Army on the march.”[12]These “trains” consisted of two wagons equipped with five miles of telegraphic wire and telegraph equipment. Raines, explains that, “[i]n battle, one wagon remained at the starting point as a receiving station, while the other traveled into the field with the sending instrument.” [13]The first field operations of the telegraph train were during the Peninsula campaign in May 1862. General McClellan witnessed “the great usefulness of this system” but perceived it as a supplement to the work already being done by the USMTC. [14]

The telegraph trains of the Signal Corps were again deployed during the battle of Fredericksburg. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was connected with his division commanders Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner and Maj. Gen. William Franklin, as well as the Union supply base at Belle Plain throughout the course of the combat. The success of the trains enabled Myer to appropriate additional funds so that “by late 1863 thirty [telegraph trains] were in service throughout the Army.” [15]This success however, exacerbated the tension between the Signal Corps and the USMTC both of which were actively operating lines throughout the battlefront.

This inter-governmental conflict reached its peak following the failure of the Chancellorsville campaign in 1863. At the battle of Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, both the Signal Corps and the USMTC were once again deployed side by side. The Signal Corps however, was forced to relinquish some of its lines to the USMTC as a result of the “technical limitations” of the Beardslee telegraph machine which the Signal Corps employed.[16]

The problem was that the Beardslee, which was powered by revolving magnets rather than by batteries, was only capable of generating enough electricity to transmit message in the five to eight mile range. [17]Maj. Gen Joseph Hooker was on the South side of the Rappahannock while his chief of staff Gen. Butterfield was ten miles on the North side of the river. The Signal Corps required three hours to transmit messages between the two commanders using a combination of electrical and visual signals. [18]Butterfield and Hooker soon overloaded the capacity of the Signal Corps lines which were staffed with many new operators and badly in need of repair after months of use. The system eventually collapsed entirely and the USMTC took over complete control of communication duties for the remainder of the campaign.

The USMTC Takes Over

In the wake of the Chancellorsville disaster, Myer decided to convert the Signal Corps to the superior Morse machine. This action however, put the Signal Corps in direct competition with the USMTC for trained operators. Without gaining the approval of Secretary Stanton, Myer placed a series of advertisements in the Army and Navy Official Gazette “calling for expert telegraphers to apply for commissions in the Signal Corps.” [19]Myer’s action was promptly chastised as “irregular and improper” by Assistant Secretary of War W. A. Nichols. [20]

Colonel Stager reacted to Myer’s action by recommending to Secretary Stanton that “management of all field and military electric telegraphs be confined to the...[USMTC], or, that that Department be abolished, and the whole business placed under the control of the Signal Corps.” [21]On November 10, 1893, Myer was recalled to the War Department where he was relieved of command. Stanton promptly issued Special Order 499 requiring “all magneto-electric field signal trains and apparatus” of the U.S. Signal Corps to be turned over to the USMTC as well as all Signal Corps personnel. [22]

In the aftermath of the Civil War the USMTC would be disbanded and the Signal Corps would by the sole department tasked with maintaining military communications. From 1863 until the end of the war however, all military telegraph communications would be carried out by the War Department through its civilian apparatus the USMTC. With this consolidation, the Union would finally be able to realize the potential of the telegraph.

What do you think about the importance of the telegraph in the US Civil War? Let us know below.

Now, you can read part 3 on The Union’s Use of the Telegraph in the US Civil War here.

[1]Paul Farhi, “How the Civil War gave birth to modern journalism in the nation’s capital,” Washington Post, (March 2, 2012). 

[2]Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 1 Fort Sumter to Perryville, (New York, NY: Random House, 1958), 53.

[3]James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2001), 164.

[4]John E.O’Brien,Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War, (Scranton, PA: The Reader Press, 1910), 5.

[5]Plum, Vol. I, 64.

[6]Plum, Vol. I,9.

[7]Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, 8.

[8]A.W. Greely, “The Military-Telegraph Service,” Signal Corp Association.

[9]David Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007), 73.

[10]J. Emmet O’Brien, “Telegraphing in Battle.” The Century, Vol. 38, Is. 5 (Sep., 1889).

[11]David H. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War, (New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1907), 31.

[12]Raines, 17.

[13]Ibid., 18.

[14]U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), Ser. 1, Vol. 5, 31.

[15]Raines, 20.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Paul J. Scheips, “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict,” Civil War History, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Dec. 1963), 11.

[18]Raines, 20.

[19]Scheips, “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict,” 11.

[20]Raines, 21.

[21]Plum, Vol. II, 101.

[22]Ibid., 102.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Bates, David H. Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War. New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc. (1907).

The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Ed. Roy Basler. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. (1953).

Greely, A.W. “The Military-Telegraph Service.” Signal Corp Association. Accessed May 3, 2016. 

http://www.civilwarsignals.org/pages/tele/telegreely/telegreely.html

Morse, Samuel F.B. “Improvement in the Mode of Communicating Information by Signals by the Application of Electro-Magnetism.” Patent No. 1,647. United Stets Patent Office. (June 20, 1840).

O’Brien, John E. Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War. Scranton, PA: The Reader Press. (1910).

Plum, William R. The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States, Vol. I & II. New York, NY: Arno Press. (1974).

“War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols.” U.S. War Department. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. (1880–1901).

Secondary Sources:

Cambou, Don. Civil War Tech in Modern Marvels. New York, NY: A&E Television Network. (2006).

“Civil War and Industrial Expansion, 1860–1897 (Overview).”  Gale Encyclopedia of U.S. Economic History. 1999. Encyclopedia.com. Accessed February 28, 2016. 

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3406400169.html

Clark, John E. Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. (2001).

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 1 Fort Sumter to Perryville. New York, NY: Random House. (1958).

“First transatlantic telegraph cable completed.” History.com. Accessed March 01, 2016. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/first-transatlantic-telegraph-cable-completed.

Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. (1988).

McPherson, James M. Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction. New York, NY: McGraw Hill. (2001).

Nasaw, David. Andrew Carnegie. New York, NY: Penguin Books. (2007).

Peters, Arthur K. Seven Trails West. New York, NY: Abbeville Press. (1996).

Raines, Rebecca R. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History. (1996).

Wheeler, Tom. Mr. Lincoln’s T-Mails: How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War. New York, NY: Harper Business. (2007). 

Journal Articles:

Farhi, Paul. “How the Civil War gave birth to modern journalism in the nation’s capital.” Washington Post.(March 2, 2012). 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/how-the-civil-war-gave-birth-to-modern-journalism-in-the-nations-capital/2012/02/24/gIQAIMFpmR_story.html.

O’Brien, J. Emmet. “Telegraphing in Battle.” The Century, Vol. 38, Is. 5 (Sep., 1889). http://www.civilwarsignals.org/pages/tele/teleinbat/teleinbat.html.

Scheips, Paul J. “Union Signal Communications: Innovation and Conflict.” Civil War History, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Dec. 1963).

Trotter, William R. “The Music of War.” HistoryNet. http://www.historynet.com/the-music-of-war.htm.