How the Triple Entente Formed in World War I: Part 1 – The Origins of Germany

World War I is of course one of the most important wars in modern history, and of the key geo-political aspects of the war was the formation of the Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia. These Great Powers with overlapping interests were not necessarily natural allies in World War One, but the nature of international affairs in the preceding decades pushed them together.

Here, Bilal Junejo starts a series looking at how the Triple Entente was formed by considering the impact of the formation of the German nation in 1871 on other European countries. In particular, Austro-Russian tension in the Balkans and Franco-German tension on the Rhine, and a paranoia in Berlin is considered.

Otto von Bismarck, a key person in the early days of the German nation.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 remains, to date, one of the most formidable events in the entire history of mankind. The world, as we presently know it, owes the greater part of its lineaments to that carnage which pervaded Europe and her many empires for four years, and the (happy) abortion of which drastic upheaval might have resulted in contemporary atlases manifesting radically different features from those that happen to adorn it today. By 1918, many empires had evaporated and new states emerged in their stead; older powers were humbled and eventually supplanted by newer and bigger ones. The process that commenced in 1914 reached its apotheosis in 1945, when the losers of the First World War— who had fought in the Second specifically to reverse the verdict of the First— emerged as losers of the Second as well, but not before ensuring that the penalty of their misadventures exacted tribute from the victors too, since 1945 also marked the end of a whole era— the age of a world order dominated by Europe. What emerged in its wake was a bipolar, and infinitely more rigid, international system that lasted until the collapse of the redoubtable Soviet Union in 1991.

However, there was nothing inevitable about the Cold War, for all that happened post-1945 was largely determined by what had happened pre-1945 (or, to be more precise, post-1918). And what happened post-1918 was again determined by what had transpired prior to that time, particularly since 1871. This is by no means a year chosen at random, for, with the indispensable benefit of hindsight, this was the twelvemonth in which, it can reasonably be argued, the seeds of the ultimate downfall of Europe were sown. What came to pass in 1914 was caused directly, inasmuch as one event leads to another, by what had happened in 1871; but what happened post-1918 was determined in conjunction with what had transpired during the War itself, from 1914 to 1918. But, it should not be forgotten that the motives which precipitated World War I— avarice and/or fear, such as have animated just about every war waged in human history— had little or nothing to do with the magnitude of the conflagration that ensued, and subsequently engulfed the world. What was different in 1914 from any previous time in history were the means available, and the scale consequently possible, for the purpose of waging war. The formidable achievements that had been made in military technology since the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, and the vast colonial resources that were available to each of the Great Powers to realize the full potential of the technology at their disposal (indeed, it was primarily the existence of vast colonies and empires that had turned an essentially European war into a World War), ensured that even the slightest insouciance on anyone’s part would engender a maelstrom that would consume everything until there was nothing further left to consume. Given the exorbitant cost that was almost certain to attend any impetuous escapade, it becomes any thoughtful soul gazing down the stark and petrified roads of time to ask how the ends justified, if they ever did, the means. To recall the jibe of Southey:

“And everybody praised the Duke,

 Who this great fight did win.”

“But what good came of it at last?”

 Quoth little Peterkin.

“Why that I cannot tell,” said he,

“But ‘twas a famous victory.”

A short war?

Why did the European powers decide to appease Mars, at the woeful expense of Minerva, in that fateful year? Was it out of sheer necessity, or mere audacity? Possibly, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. Every war invariably stipulates a certain boldness that must be exuded by the participants, since it is humanly impossible to guarantee the outcome of any conflict, let alone one in which weapons capable of unleashing destruction and havoc on a colossal scale are to be employed. When war broke out in 1914, there was a wave of joy that swept through each of the belligerent countries, even though their respective governments did not exactly share that enthusiasm. Maybe this seemingly inexplicable effusion was owing to a misapprehension that the war would shortly culminate in a decisive victory— a reasonable enough supposition, since a World War, by definition, remained without precedent till 1914. Even the statesmen of the various countries involved did not anticipate anything like what eventually came to pass, a notable exception being the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, who presciently, if sadly, prophesied on the eve of the conflict that:

“The lamps are going out all over Europe— we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.”

The popular mood, however, was depicted more accurately by the last lines of His Last Bow, one of the many Sherlock Holmes stories penned by the estimable Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Although possibly a piece of propaganda to boost public morale, given that it was published after three years of savagery in September 1917, the lines in question, notwithstanding the palpable pathos they garner from the fact that both Holmes and Watson— proverbial for their friendship— are about to go their separate ways on the eve of war, are still notable for their espousal of, and patent lack of any regret for, war.

“There’s an east wind coming, Watson.”

“I think not, Holmes. It is very warm.”

“Good old Watson! You are the one fixed point in a changing age. There’s an east wind coming all the same, such a wind as never blew on England yet. It will be cold and bitter, Watson, and a good many of us may wither before its blast. But it’s God’s own wind nonetheless, and a cleaner, better, stronger land will lie in the sunshine when the storm has cleared.”

Why were the peoples of Europe so bellicose in 1914? A cogent rejoinder was tendered by the perspicacious Doctor Henry Kissinger, when he observed:

“In the long interval of peace (1815-1914), the sense of the tragic was lost; it was forgotten that states could die, that upheavals could be irretrievable, that fear could become the means of social cohesion. The hysteria of joy which swept over Europe at the outbreak of the First World War was the symptom of a fatuous age, but also of a secure one. It revealed a millennial faith; a hope for a world which had all the blessings of the Edwardian age made all the more agreeable by the absence of armament races and of the fear of war. What minister who declared war in August 1914, would not have recoiled with horror had he known the shape of the world in 1918?”

The Triple Entente

Even if the people felt ‘secure’ and animated by a ‘millennial faith’, could it be said that their respective governments also felt exactly the same way? Was there not even the slightest degree of compulsion that was felt by the statesmen of each belligerent nation as they embarked upon war? It seems that but for one glaring fact, the answer could have been readily given in the affirmative. That fact is the nature of those alliances into which the Great Powers were firmly divided by 1914. On the one hand, there was the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy; on the other, there was the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France and Russia. The rearrangement of some loyalties during the war, with corresponding additions and subtractions, lies beyond the purview of this essay, the sole purpose of which is to illuminate international perceptions as they existed prior to the outbreak of war. And it is in the realm of these perceptions that the cynosure of our discussion today is to be found, for there was something inherent in the Triple Entente that was very untoward and, consequently, very ominous. It was the fact that the Entente— a precise and deliberate reaction to the creation of the Triple Alliance— had come into being between sovereign states who were anything but natural allies of each other! Each of the three parties thereto was, for reasons to be canvassed later, an object of immense detestation to the others, so to whom must the credit for so unnatural a coalition be given? The answer is immediately clear— Imperial Germany. With its acutely myopic foreign policy, pursued unfailingly, from 1890 to 1914, it succeeded, however inadvertently, in ranging three very unlikely allies in an association aimed solely against itself.

Every war, it must be remembered, has both immediate causes and distant causes. In the case of the First World War, the former are ascertained by asking why did the War break out at all in the first place; whereas the latter by asking why did it break out in 1914. We shall review both of these questions, but it is by dint of this peregrination that you shall assure yourself of how the same impetus that had precipitated so aberrant an association as the Triple Entente in the first place, was also responsible for its ineluctable clash with the Triple Alliance, since nothing but the keenest awareness of an overwhelming peril in their neighborhood could have convinced such inveterate foes as London, Paris and St Petersburg to settle their mutual differences and together strive for the attainment of a common, to say nothing of congenial, end— the defeat of Germany. In this article, we shall confine ourselves to a succinct examination of the new European order (and its irrefragable hallmarks) that emerged in 1871. Since the Entente came about by way of reaction to the Triple Alliance of 1882, which was itself a natural consequence of this new order, it behooves us to first comprehend the origins of this order, before proceeding to contemplate how it influenced the advent of that century’s most portentous dichotomy.

The birth of modern Germany

To begin, it was the year 1871 that marked the birth of the new Germany. Up till that point in time, no such entity as a united Germany had existed. A myriad of states dotted the landscape to the east of France, north of Austria and west of Russia. Naturally endowed with every blessing that was the prerequisite of a Great Power in the nineteenth century— a people who were at once proud and prolific, vast natural reserves of coal and iron, and a position of geopolitical eminence in the center of the Continent— the German peoples north of a decrepit and declining Austria only needed a leadership of iron will and indomitable resolve to sweep away that panoply of effete princelings who still hindered the destined unity of an ancient race by dint of their endlessly internecine strife. And Providence favored the Teuton just then, for there arose a man whose impregnable personal convictions, filtered through his unmatched political acumen, were to forever change the course of European history. That man was none other than the formidable Otto von Bismarck, the founding father of modern Germany. Bismarck may not have been the first one to realize that a multitude of independent but moribund German kingdoms could never realize the dream of securing Great Power status for the German people, and that the course most favorable for its achievement would be a political union of all the kingdoms under the auspices of the strongest one of them, Prussia, which had become a major European power since the days of King Frederick II (1740-86); but he was certainly the one who demonstrated the veracity of that proposition beyond doubt. From the moment that he was appointed chief minister of Prussia in 1862, Bismarck set out to accomplish this stupendous goal that he had set himself with indefatigable perseverance. A statesman of unmatched astuteness, he perceived only too clearly for their own good which of his neighbors he had to humble before a tenable German Empire could be proclaimed. To that end, he waged three specific wars— against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and, finally, France in 1870. It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve into the particulars of those wars because what concerns us here are their political effects after 1871, when the Treaty of Frankfurt concluded the Franco-Prussian War by proclaiming the birth of Imperial Germany and the simultaneous demise of the Second Empire in France.

Liberalism and nationalism

At any given time in international relations, there are certain aspects that constitute constants, and certain that do variables. Just as the values of variables in a mathematical equation are determined by the constants that it entails, so also does it happen in the complex world of diplomacy and foreign policy, that the issues which lie beyond negotiation greatly circumscribe the range of values that may be attributed to a particular variable. The provenance of a constant in any state’s foreign policy lies in that state’s raison d’être; whereas that of a variable lies in the ambitions pursued and expedients adopted by the state to seek maximum expression for that raison d’être. It so happened that the three wars fought by Bismarck’s Prussia in the 1860s furnished European diplomacy with two of its most fateful and unfortunate constants, which lasted with uncanny steadfastness until 1914 and thus rendered the outbreak of a general European war inevitable. But what were the circumstances that made the two outcomes so rigid and impervious to any variation whatsoever? In other words, what was it that made the two outcomes constants? The answer to that can be found in the two cardinal features of nineteenth century Europe that were the legacy of the momentous French Revolution— liberalism and nationalism. Throughout the period designated by the late Professor Eric Hobsbawm as the ‘long nineteenth century’— i.e. from 1789, when the Revolution in France broke out, to 1914— these were the two isms that together comprised the ubiquitous hope of the people and the ubiquitous fear of their rulers.

The age of empires, which are inherently based upon the generation of fear and the deployment of force, was gradually drawing to an end, and what was to supplant it would be a polity whose quintessence could already be discerned in the United States and the United Kingdom— democracy. A true democracy, owing to its very nature, is inherently opposed to organizing its society by dint of force, which means that it perforce must turn to the precepts of nationalism and liberalism for inspiration, with the former defining its borders and the latter its government. For this reason, the autocratic courts and chancelleries of Europe were already on edge by the time Bismarck added to their troubles with his decisive victories over a stagnant status quo and forever altered the European balance of power. Having thus ascertained the background and context in which his feats operated, it should now be easy for us to understand how the two constants that we alluded to earlier actually came into being.

The first of them arose as a result of the Austro-Prussian War (also known as the Seven Weeks’ War) in 1866. Bismarck’s earlier victory over the Danes had been the means for engendering this conflict, since a portion of the territory that he had gained in 1864 (Schleswig-Holstein) had been granted to Austria, subsequent allegations of maladministration against whom eventually furnished Bismarck with the pretext that he needed for going to war against her. In reality, the reason for wishing to humiliate Austria was the fact that she remained the oldest German power, far older than Prussia, in existence on the Continent, the Habsburgs having ascended the throne as long ago as 1273. Austria, therefore, could have no rivals amongst the multitudinous German kingdoms when it came to legitimacy and pedigree, but her empire was an exceedingly multi-ethnic one, with just about as many Magyars and Slavs as there were Germans. In an age permeated by the ideas of the French Revolution, such an entity could not last for very long, since if Bismarck were to succeed in establishing a pan-German confederation, then the march of international events would dictate that the Germanic parts of the Austrian Empire should merge with Germany; whereas the Slavonic ones with the principal Slavonic power, Russia.

Bismarck, however ironic it may sound, was not at all keen to orchestrate such a development, for it would have turned his whole policy upside-down. Rather than being the offspring of popular sentiment alone, the German Empire, when it was eventually born in 1871, had primarily resulted from consent by all the German kings outside of Austria to unite as one under the indubitable hegemony of the Hohenzollern King of Prussia, who became the German Emperor (or Kaiser). Had German Austria, which was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, been allowed to merge with a Germany dominated by Protestant Prussia, then the decisive influence exercised by the latter would undoubtedly have been diluted, especially since the aforementioned credentials of legitimacy favored the hallowed Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns only having become the Royal House of Prussia in 1701. However, this fateful decision to exude magnanimity towards Austria after her defeat eventually became the first step in the march towards World War I, for having been allowed to exist but permanently barred from any further expansion towards the north in German-speaking lands, and never given to any kind of overseas colonialism, Austria had only one place left in which to expand and thus keep up the pretense of still being a Great Power— the Balkans. Overwhelmingly Slavonic and partitioned between the equally moribund and crumbling Austrian and Ottoman Empires for centuries, the Balkans of a nationalistic nineteenth century determined not only the common, not to mention insuperable, enmity of the two alien behemoths in Slavonic lands with Russia, the champion of Panslavism, but also the most egregious flashpoint in Europe that could trigger an irrevocable catastrophe of monumental proportions at the behest of even the slightest provocation. And eventually, in 1914, it was a Balkan conflict that, owing to centuries of arrogance and paranoia, eventually transmogrified into the cataclysm of World War I (in which both Austria and Turkey fought together on the same side, against Russia, and all three collapsed from a mortal blow at the end). Thus, intractable Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans became one of the unfortunate constants in international relations from 1866-1914.

Germany and France

The second constant emanated from the Iron Chancellor’s triumph over the Sphinx of the Tuileries, the vainglorious Emperor Napoleon III of the French Second Empire (the First Empire designating the rule of his illustrious uncle, Napoleon Bonaparte). Up to the point of its categorical defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France had been generally perceived as being the strongest power on the Continent, and the Emperor Napoleon III as engaged in plotting machinations supposed to be as ambitious as they were surreptitious (hence his sobriquet). Moreover, France’s foreign policy during the Second Empire had done little to endear the country to her neighbors. Great Britain, the historic rival of France and the dominant figure in whose political life from 1852-65 had been the overtly chauvinistic Palmerston, was not reassured by French imperial endeavors, which spanned the globe from Mexico to North Africa to the Far East. Moreover, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which had been constructed by a French company headed by a French diplomat and engineer called Ferdinand de Lesseps, was greatly resented by London (which had taken no part in either the canal’s funding or its construction) because of its geopolitical importance. Standing at the crossroads between three continents, it was palpable in the age of empire that control of the Suez Canal meant control of Asia. For example, using this Canal meant that the distance from India to Great Britain was reduced by approximately 6,000 miles/9,700 kilometers (for both troops and traders). And for a predominantly mercantile people like the British, the more they could reduce the costs of their shipping to and from India, the more competitive would their goods become in the world market, and thereby improve profit margins all over. So Britain, at this time, had every possible interest in weakening France relative to its present standing. On the other hand, with regard to her eastern neighbors, France had stood by in unhelpful neutrality when Austria was defeated in two wars, first by the Italian kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1859, and then by Prussia in 1866. Russia had been humiliated by France in the Crimean War (1854-56). And as for Italy, whose unification could not be complete without the expulsion of the French troops in Rome who guarded the Pope, her reasons for supporting Prussia in 1870 were as comprehensible as were Austria’s and Russia’s.

Thus, with all the Continental powers keen to usher in a deflation of her ego, it is not surprising that France should have received no support in a war which, most importantly of all, she had been imperious enough to initiate herself against an ascendant Prussia. But what came to matter even more than the war itself were the peace terms upon which it was concluded. Enshrined in the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871), these terms stipulated that France must cede Alsace and most of Lorraine in the north-east to Germany, pay an indemnity of around five billion francs to the Germans, and accept an occupation force in the country until the indemnity had been conclusively defrayed. Whilst the indemnity was paid soon enough, and the German army withdrawn accordingly, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine (an area rich in natural deposits of iron) continued to remain a focal point of French resentment, which would only fester with the elapse of each year. Moreover, Bismarck, who had been as vindictive and punitive towards France as he had been lenient and magnanimous towards Austria, had chosen to proclaim the birth of the new German Empire from the hallowed Palace of Versailles, in the presence of all the German princes and upon the ashes of French pride. This manifest insult, coupled with the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, meant that henceforth (and up to 1914), France would be permanently available as an ally to any country in Europe that wished to wage a war against the newborn Germany, who, in turn, would be on an equally permanent lookout to nip the prospect of any such alliance in the bud. That this synergy of malice and paranoia on the Continent could betoken nothing better than what eventually deluged Europe in 1914 was eloquently illuminated by the late historian, Herbert Fisher, when he observed:

“During all the years between 1870 and 1914, the most profound question for western civilisation was the possibility of establishing friendly relations between France and Germany. Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way. So long as the statue of Strasbourg in the Place de la Concorde was veiled in crêpe, every Frenchman continued to dream of the recovery of the lost provinces as an end impossible perhaps of achievement— for there was no misjudgement now of the vast strength of Germany— but nevertheless ardently to be desired. It was not a thing to be talked of. ’N’en parlez jamais, y pensez toujours,’ advised Gambetta; but it was a constant element in public feeling, an ever-present obstruction to the friendship of the two countries, a dominant motive in policy, a dark cloud full of menace for the future.”

To recapitulate, the Europe that emerged after 1871, and lasted until 1914, bore three characteristics that were, sadly, as permanent as they were formidable: Austro-Russian tension in the Balkans, Franco-German tension on the Rhine, and (consequently) festering paranoia in Berlin. In so delicate a situation as now defined Continental affairs, and one which had been entirely of his own making, Otto von Bismarck would henceforth have to summon the services of all the diplomatic finesse and chicanery that could be proffered by his scheming mind, and which was the only force capable of staving off the consequences that inevitably follow in the wake of a rival’s bruised ego. That his worst fears for Germany were not realized until after his unfortunate dismissal in 1890 remains a testament to the fact that something went very wrong in the succeeding twenty-four years.

We shall turn our full attention to this after we have canvassed the marvels of Bismarckian diplomacy, from 1871 to 1890, in the next article.

What do you think of the wars Germany had in the 1860s? Let us know below.

References

Doctor Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 1994)

Doctor Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Phoenix Press 1957)

H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe (The Fontana Library 1972)

Nicola Barber and Andy Langley, British History Encyclopaedia (Parragon Books 1999)

A. W. Palmer, A Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945 (Penguin Books 1964)

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

The Longest Retreat in U.S History: The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River in the Korean War - Part 2

The Korean War (1950-53) pitted the capitalist South Korea, backed by the U.S., against communist North Korea. A major offensive by South Korea ultimately led to Communist China becoming involved in the war.

Here, Victor Gamma considers how failures in the U.S. understanding of China’s intentions and over-confidence that China would not intervene led to the U.S. backed forces moving ever closer to China and the eventual Chinese counter-attack.

If you missed it, part 1 on how the U.S. backed forces moving very close to the Chinese border is here.

U.S. soldiers with a tank make their way through the streets of Hyesanjin in November 1950.

“Home for Christmas”

UN forces continued their advance into North Korea, Pyongyang falling to South Korean troops on October 20. MacArthur quickly ordered his forces to continue their advance toward the border with China. The Eighth Army under General Walker advanced along the West Coast and the X Corp moved up the eastern side of the peninsula. The Chinese watched this advance warily. They decided that the UN's goal was now to invade China and overthrow the communist government. For his part, MacArthur demonstrated his complete disregard of Chinese capacity to disrupt his plans by neglecting basic rules of military science. He allowed his forces to become divided and advance toward a potentially significantly larger enemy army. The Chinese, in fact, had up to 500,000 troops massed in Manchuria. The potential enemy was close to his base of supplies, while his own men had now outrun their own.  In addition, the Eighth Army and X Corps were divided by a thirty-mile gap of extremely hilly terrain that made communications by phone impossible. Despite this, MacArthur urged his men forward until some units began to reach the Yalu River. The Chinese commander, General Lin Piao, now gathered his strength and waited for the UN forces to come within striking distance. In late October, 1950, the Chinese launched a series of probing attacks to gauge enemy strengths and reactions. The positive results convinced the Chinese that they could be successful in a major offensive. They withdrew their forces, giving the illusion of a retreat. American commanders accepted this as a fact, noting the drubbing the 7th Regiment gave to the Chinese and assumed they were in headlong retreat back to China. The reduction of fighting convinced many that the war was over. The misgivings of General Walker, commander of the Eighth Army concerning the supply situation, which was becoming critically short of needs for his widely scattered forces, were ignored.    

Also reflecting the lack of concern over the Chinese, the contingency plans of the UN failed to follow sound principles of military intelligence. The enemy's capabilities, not his possible or probable intentions, are supposed to form the basis for contingency plans. By the time the Chinese had begun to infiltrate troops into North Korea to begin their First Phase Offensive, the United States-dominated UN command decided that if the Chinese had wanted to intervene, they would have done so earlier.  By the time UN forces approached the Yalu River, it was held that the Chinese had missed their chance. The monitoring for possible Chinese intervention was therefore reduced. The capability of the Chinese to intervene was not considered. The massive buildup in Manchuria and the infiltration into North Korea was mostly missed by intelligence. In late October the first clashes with Chinese units occurred. However, this did not result in a major revision of contingency plans.Increasing reports of a Chinese buildup were spurned by senior intelligence and higher level commanders. American generals were focused on the Yalu River and ending the war. They did not want to consider the possibility of a protracted conflict. On November 24 MacArthur visited the front and repeated his promise that the troops would be home for Christmas once they reached the Yalu. Coupled with this massive failure of intelligence were the considerable abilities of the Chinese to remain unobserved. The Chinese secretly infiltrated divisions into the barren wastes of North Korea to the tune of 100,000, undetected by the UN forces. This success owed much not merely to American intelligence failings but Chinese skill at concealing their movements. Chinese troops had been trained to avoid any movement at the sight of enemy aircraft. They moved mostly at night. They moved mostly by foot. Since they did not use motorized vehicles on a large-scale, they were harder to spot. In contrast, UN units raised huge clouds of dust with even one vehicle as they moved along the unpaved roads of Korea. 

The End Result 

For the location of the attack, the Chinese wisely chose an area that would reduce the technical superiority of UN forces: the rugged terrain between the divided UN forces. The Eighth Army and X Corps should have been linked in a strong defensive line, but MacArthur deemed such a plan overly cautious. Additionally, the Supreme Commander believed that this terrain was too rugged for military operations. The battle was fought in a terrain that made communications and operations difficult. Ch'ongch'on River valley features a landscape so hilly that a mechanized army was effectively hindered in its movements. Thus, the UN superiority in equipment was largely overcome. The lack of flat places made setting up command posts or medical stations difficult or impossible. The endless hills also blocked vision and hearing. It became almost impossible for units to effectively support one another. Units often fought in isolation. UN forces also had not been trained to cope with harsh winter conditions. Many made the mistake of crossing streams or rivers in their pants. As a result some units had to have their clothing cut off because it had frozen solid. 

The UN forces began to encounter Chinese tactics as they neared the Yalu River. The Chinese tactics were the result of the conditions in China. They were hopelessly outgunned by UN forces, lacking equipment both in quality and quantity. Many Chinese soldiers attacked without a firearm and were expected to obtain captured or abandoned equipment from the enemy. Some even fought with spears improvised from enemy vehicles. However, they made up for these deficiencies with a number of devices. First and foremost, the Chinese took full advantage of their enormous reserves of manpower. They favored attacks by masses of men who rushed a smaller enemy unit from all sides. The Chinese 'human wave' was a reflection of manpower strength and a disregard for human life the UN forces found shocking. 

On November 24 MacArthur ordered a general offensive toward the Yalu River of his already tired and battered forces. In defiance of President Truman's specific orders, American units were ordered to advance along with Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. Forward units of the Eighth Army, including the American Second Division, began crossing the Ch'ongch'on River on the morning of November 24th. Due to the difficult terrain and probable overconfidence, they left most of their supplies south of the River including extra grenades and overcoats. On November 25-26 the Chinese attacked along the entire Korean front. As a part of a larger Chinese operation termed the Second Phase Campaign Western Sector, the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) 40th Army attacked across the Ch'ongch'on. These forces were reconstituted to avoid official war with the United States - officially, they were “volunteers” helping the North Koreans. At this time the Eighth Army was not in a good defensive posture. The advance units attacked by the Chinese were strung out. The ROK division on the right flank of the Eighth Army disintegrated and was now in danger of envelopment. A halt order was given to the Eighth Army but a panicked retreat soon developed. Despite this, the Eighth Army command continued to underestimate the seriousness of the situation and so failed to take effective counter measures such as ordering retreating troops to strategic points. Air attacks against the Chinese took a huge toll but did not stop the retreat. On November 27, the U.S. divisions retreated south of the Ch'ongch'on River and ultimately south of the 38th Parallel.

Long-term consequences

The battle permanently ended hopes for an early victory to the Korean conflict. A conflict limited to the Korean Peninsula now involved the world's most populous nation, threatening to explode into global war. Politically the battle led to the abandonment of United Nations efforts to achieve a unified Korea and a subsequent proposal to continue the division of the peninsula along the 38th Parallel to the Chinese by December 11. Had UN forces been expecting a large-scale Chinese attack and had the officials in charge taken measures to prepare for it, the battle either would not have occurred or at least the magnitude of the disaster could have been reduced. Possibly, the on-going difficulties with the North Korean regime would not exist. Nor would the presence of so many U.S. forces be necessary.

In retrospect, senior U.S. military and political leaders often failed in their ability to evaluate and act on quality intelligence. A soldier is often only as good as his commanding officers. The men closest to the action, including field commanders such as General Walker of the Eighth Army and General Almond of X Corps and their troops, had a much more accurate view of the situation, but their repeated warnings were dismissed. The same condition existed in intelligence with excellent information being interpreted as a bluff or simply ignored.

Now, you can also read Victor’s article on Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon here.

Finally, why do you think many in the U.S. did not think China would join the Korean War? Let us know below.

References

Aid, Matthew. The Secret Sentry, the Untold History of the National Security Agency. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009.

Alexander, Bevin R.  Korea: The First War We Lost. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1986.

Bacharach,  Deborah. The Korean War. San Diego: Lucent Books, 1991.

Conway, John Richard. Primary Source Accounts of the Korean War. Berkeley Heights: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 2006.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963.

Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New York: Hyperion, 2007.

Halberstam, David. The Fifties. New York: Fawcett Books, 1993.

Hammel. Eric Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press. 2018.

Harry S. Truman, ed. by Laura K. Egendorf. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2002. 

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Hammel, Eric. Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press,1981.

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command. McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1997. 

Litai, John and Xue . Uncertain Partners, (Stanford University Press), 1995.

Paul Lashmar, New Statesman & Society; 2/2/96, Vol.9 Issue 388, p24, 2p, 1bw

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Year of Decisions. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955. 

Truman, Margaret, editor. Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private writings of Harry S. Truman. New York: Warner Books, 1989.

"Analysis:The Foreign Interventions:Stalin and USSR" www.mtholyoke.edu/~park25h/classweb/worldpolitics/analysisstalin.html‎) 

The Entertainment Industry and Mass Consumerism in America

The modern American entertainment has great reach and power; however, is that a good thing? Here, Daniel L. Smith explains the early origins of American mass entertainment and how the entertainment industry, along with mass consumerism, has contributed to problems in modern-day society.

Daniel’s book on mid-19th century northern California is now available. Find our more here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Justin D. Barnes in the 1903 film The Great Train Robbery.

Little Circus to the Big Show

P.T. Barnum is a man who unquestionably changed the world of entertainment in America. He used a business technique of “rational recreation” that would end up becoming a national “norm” for American families everywhere. He would take the thematic archaisms of dramatic plays and mix them with the upstanding ideals of individual and family. This type of script writing would allow for his new brand of entertainment. One great example is Barnum’s dime museum which featured tightrope artists and “educational” depictions of biblical events surrounding them.

The 1860s to the 1890s were the beginnings of a kind of modern-day enlightenment, comparable to that of the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries. In that time however, their movement was one of intellectual ideas in Europe. They would use reason to pull themselves from the dark ages, question traditional authority and embrace the possibility that humankind could be improved through logical and rational change. The difference between then and our contemporary renaissance that we have experienced in our times is one that has embraced technology (like phones and television) in the place of logic and reason.[1]

Broadcasted and televised mass media arrived on the scene in the 1890s. The first entertainment pushed to the public was boxing matches set in store-fronts or a burlesque scene in one of many penny arcade peep show boxes. These along with candy machines, coin-operated phonographs, and fortune telling games. The ultimate push by media moguls was to give the busy working man quick doses of instant gratification. It worked. In 1905 the media giants would bring nickelodeon (short-films) to the big screen. These 10-minute segments would feature slapstick comedy and adventure. By 1910—full blown movie theatres (upscale) were offering classy amenities comparable to that of the penny arcades.

Films would offer the American public visual stories of alluring love interests, criminal success, and power. This would further give the public an intimate-view of fantastic stories told that resonated with people in general. The result of this thought process is this: “I can live my life like that.” This pipeline of entertainment would end up fast tracking consequences for American society. Although filled with a “cross-cultural” appeal to all social classes in America, this form of entertainment would begin to loosen the fabric that kept the country woven together. This new cultural acceptance of appearance, dress, music halls, and amusement parks became a mass commodity for everybody. And also a newly accepted necessity.[2]

Eating It All Up

Fun, fashion, and fantasy goods would come out of the marketing and advertising piped through these entertainment fast-tracks - a release from traditional boredom and a new form of youthful energy. A gathering of individuality, liberty, self-expression would begin to subside during this period as the American public was underhandedly being silenced, separated, and increasingly brought-together by the “dream factories” in Hollywood and New York City. The mass change in public thinking related to this phenomena was more surprising to those in media and government than they expected. Fast forward fifty-years and the mass emergence of consumerism would show its face and TV would become a family member.

It is really important to mention this before continuing forward: By 1957, the average viewer was viewing 420 advertisements a week. One station would show 50-ads in two-hours in 1964. The TV-set would become a nearly-perfect expression of American suburban family life. TV would come to project domestic family-lives inside of the home (according to Hollyweird) and also warn people of urban-dangers in action-adventure shows - all of this to culminate in enticing viewers through ads to shopping malls and fast-food joints. Ultimately, it would go to reinforce a new trend (established by the radio) of “living room privacy” and a new national entertainment culture.

American materialistic behaviors really started emerging strongly by the 1930s, with the need for instant self-gratification and a certain emphasized want for individual attentions. For example, drive ins, quick-serve diners, dance clubs, social clubs, pool-halls, the list could drive on! These venues all served as a catalyst for American materialism which foundationally expressed the new cultural ideas of America. This also resulted in enabling emphasis on certain unethical and immoral counter-principles.

With little consequences from these self-destructive and humiliating behaviors, the result of this consumerist lifestyle is an American society filled with narcissistic, self-centered, attention hungry people—still all looking for more. They aptly look to make ends meet for financial gain in whatever way possible, all the while continually propping up their unattainable dreams.

Instant gratification has caused the need for instant attention… and public “likes.” It seems that a majority of Americans these days living life  by way of social media and television could definitely have the potential to be far more personable, thoughtful, skillful, creative, and generally well-rounded than they are nowadays.[3] America has lost her wealth in human capital (people who have invested in themselves by formal education and work experience) to irrational behavior, which has become detrimental to society.

In The End It’s Blurred Lines

The typical American consumer is most impacted by the issues of social division. More importantly, targeted audiences are more susceptible to the further divisions that consumerism tends to fuel in people. American families nationwide are vulnerable to the social separation that consumer behaviors have result from. Further, negative moral and ethical marketing targeting men, women, and children alike have aggravated the issue.

Consumer behaviors as a result, have stoked individual forms of division through one’s own psyche; such as not living to moral and ethical personal standards set down by America’s founders. Often it seems more and more that individuals leave behind their family morals and values when out in the public scene. I mean, who hasn’t heard about a Wal-Mart fight on Black Friday?

It is important for the typical American to understand that consumer behaviors are in many ways not normal. In fact, Forbes is actually promoting the marketing strategy of instant-gratification to other corporations world-wide.[4] It’s been blatant for quite some time. It is important to clarify that these associated consumerist behaviors create no tolerance for delay in public (even private) venues.[5]  

Richard Sweeney, a University Librarian, wrote a report on consumerist behaviors in Millennial Behaviors & Demographics and the social impatience further growing social division (and frustration):

“Millennial, by their own admission, have no tolerance for delays. They expect their services instantly when they are ready. They require almost constant feedback to know how they are progressing.  Their worst nightmare is when they are delayed, required to wait in line, or have to deal with some other unproductive process. Their desire for speed and efficiency cannot be overestimated. The need for speedy satisfaction, or as some believe instant gratification, permeates virtually all of their service expectations.”[6]

The speed today that one takes in information is unprecedented with its resulting effect of consumer behaviors on the American public. Instant gratification is the result of globalization’s far reaching effects on personal convenience. Receiving material or information at extremely fast speeds only exacerbates the personal issues for any American family; with an immediate effect on social impatience and a seemingly endless need for the self-gratification that instant information provides. It is with this blazingly fast speed at which information travels, that we as people keep our senses submerged in entertainment and distractions.

We need to understand how today’s marketing and entertainment effectively dis-enables individuals by constraining them intellectually, motivationally, and ethically. People tend to cut corners a lot more, to make their ends justify their means. This is an affecting consumer behavior, and as a result contributes to a negative social divide. We live in a systematized world, and this chain of systematization has further cut back on the need for human capital (educated people). The end result is the dumbing down (for lack of better words) of American society.

Researchers at the University of California, San Francisco have discovered that the controlled information from syndicated network television stations, have led to an arbitrary intelligence decrease in individuals that spend two to three hours a day soaked in media.[7] In terms of social media, it has desensitized individuals to what would be considered a “typical” social life. Impatience, self-gratification, and a desire for more pleasure – is by far the most typical of resulting consumer behaviors. I suggest collecting, reorganizing, and reinforcing upright moral and ethical values through daily contact with family members, friends, and strangers. It most certainly is one of the first-steps towards positive navigation through the mess that we call society.

2 Timothy 3:1-5 says, "But know this, that in the last days perilous times will come: For men will be lovers of themselves, lovers of money, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, unloving, unforgiving, slanderers, without self-control, brutal, despisers of good, traitors, headstrong, haughty, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, having a form of godliness but denying its power. And from such people turn away!"

Proverbs 14:34 says, "Righteousness exalts a nation, But sin is a reproach to any people."

You can read a selection of Daniel’s past articles on: California in the US Civil War (here), Spanish Colonial Influence on Native Americans in Northern California (here), Christian ideology in history (here), the collapse of the Spanish Armada in 1588 (here), early Christianity in Britain (here), the First Anglo-Dutch War (here), and the 1918 Spanish Influenza outbreak (here).

Finally, Daniel Smith writes at complexamerica.org.

References

[1] "Enlightenment." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed October 17, 2019. http://www.britannica.com/event/Enlightenment-European-history.

[2] Cross, Gary. "Setting The Course." In An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America, pp. 108-109. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

[3] Ritzer, George. "The Irrationality of Rationality." In The McDonaldization of Society, pp. 16. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018.

[4] Wertz, Jia. "Why Instant Gratification Is The One Marketing Tactic Companies Should Focus On Right Now." Forbes. Last modified May 1, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jiawertz/2018/04/30/why-instant-gratification-is-the-one-marketing-tactic-companies-should-focus-on-right-now/.

[5] Sweeney, Richard. "Millennial Behaviors & Demographics." University Librarian, New Jersey Institute of Technology, December 2006, 10.

[6] Ibid.

[7] "Watching Lots of TV 'makes You Stupid?" The Independent. Last modified December 3, 2015.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/watching-lots-of-tv-makes-you-stupid-says-american-universities-a6759026.html.

The Plan for Jewish Settlement in Australia in the 1930s: The Kimberley Scheme

In the 1930s, there was much discussion about how to help the many European Jews seeking refuge from the Nazis in Germany and Austria. Here, William Philpott returns (his first article on the man who proposed a Jewish state in the 19the century is here) and tells us how Isaac Nathan Steinberg proposed settlement of Jews in the Kimberley, a large, sparsely inhabited region in north-west Australia.

Isaac Steinberg, c. 1918.

By the time representatives of over thirty nations met at the French spa town of Evian in 1938 to discuss the plight of 700,000 Jews seeking places of refuge from Nazi controlled Germany and Austria, it was clear that their situation required urgent action. Despite many words of sympathy, there was very little practical assistance offered[i].

For Zionists, Palestine was the only credible option both for historic reasons and as a legitimate aim based on the approval at the San Remo Conference in 1920 which approved that ‘Palestine be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people’[ii]. However, as a result of subsequent Arab hostility to the idea, the British authorities had already introduced restrictions on Jewish immigration at a time when a refuge was needed more than ever. 

Three years before the Evian conference, a meeting took place at the Russell Hotel in London to officially launch the Freeland League[iii], which had the aim of securing locations across the globe where large-scale immigration of Jews could be facilitated.

It was not the first organization of its kind. Almost thirty years earlier, the Jewish Territorialist Organization (abbreviated as ITO[iv]) had also been formed in London under the leadership of the playwright and novelist, Israel Zangwill. The ITO had sought out locations for large-scale settlement in the wake of pogroms once again in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe. 

Despite intense diplomatic activity with representatives of several countries, all efforts failed and after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 supporting the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and the subsequent San Remo agreement three years later, the ITO went into something of a decline and finally lapsed following the death of Zangwill in 1926.

The Kimberley plan

The league’s most charismatic member was Isaac Nathan Steinberg (1888-1957), a Russian born Jewish social revolutionary who had served in the Bolshevik government under Lenin but was now in exile in London after disagreements with the regime.

Although an internationalist, Steinberg recognized the particular danger facing European Jewry and through his energy the league became organized, visible and increasingly vocal in seeking out support for refuges. He opposed the idea of a politically independent Jewish state which he considered was already no longer attainable in Palestine and would never be unacceptable to any government being asked to allow the creation of a state within a state.

The four requirements of finding at least one suitable location were that the land should be under populated; capable of sustaining a program of organized large-scale immigration; the area would be autonomous but there would be no political separatism; and finally, the project should not require any funds from the host government. 

A series of reports and articles appeared between 1934 and 1938 promoting the desirability of large-scale immigration into the vast area of the Kimberley in north-west Australia[v]. A letter was published in the London Jewish Chronicle in which the author, Charles Chomley called on the Australian government to view an influx of Jews as being of a mutual interest[vi].

Given the backdrop of the failed Evian Conference, it must have seemed to the Freeland League that a genuine alternative had appeared. Australia, a country built by immigrants was assessed as an ideal proposition with its areas of under population, vast land mass and an acknowledged need for economic growth through a substantial increase in population. The continent was seen by the League as an opportunity to be pursued with some haste and Steinberg, a supreme public speaker and organizer was tasked with the role of leading the initiative.

An outline submission was made to the Australian High Commissioner in London suggesting that a joint scheme funded by the League would unleash the economic potential which had so far not materialized to the extent envisaged. The outcome was an invitation from the Commissioner for the League to prepare a blueprint setting out its vision supported by practical plans to turn it into a reality, and a favored area of land was quickly identified as the preferred location.

For some years, the focus of the government of Western Australia (WA) had been keen on attracting settlers from Britain, but the land which accounted for approximately one third of the entire continent, had seen few making their way to the Kimberley region located in the northern most area of the state. Without a substantial increase in population the area could not become economically developed to what was believed to be its full potential. 

Making the case

Steinberg determined to find sponsors among influential members of British society, particularly but not only among the Labour Party movement where Ernest Bevin and Clement Atlee provided letters of reference for Steinberg. Similarly from the other side of the political stage, letters of introduction were sent by Conservative MPs, Leo Amery and Victor Cazalet to Australia’s new Premier Robert Menzies. In addition, the Anglican Church provided support resulting in the Bishop of Chichester writing to the Archbishops of Sydney and Perth asking each of them to give the League’s proposal a sympathetic hearing.

These and other actions were important preliminary foundations which would facilitate opportunities for Steinberg to meet leaders in WA and across Australia. In May 1939, he arrived in Perth, less than four months before the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start of war in Europe. Steinberg immediately set about what became an incredible almost single handed diplomatic offensive to secure support for the league’s project. What followed was a frenetic schedule which included eliciting support from leaders of the Perth community, an arduous journey to the Kimberley and upon returning, preparing and successfully presenting a report to WA Premier John Collings Willcock.

Connor, Doherty and Durack Limited, leased seven million acres of land in the eastern Kimberley and within days of his arrival, Steinberg met with Michael Durack who represented the company and found him supportive of a disposal to the League. Whether Durack and his partners saw this solely as a commercial opportunity or as a means of assisting Jews seeking a refuge, or both, is not clear but Steinberg was encouraged by this opportunity.

Rather than accepting Durack’s suggestion that they set forth immediately on a two thousand mile journey to the Kimberley, Steinberg decided his priority should be to build and strengthen support for the scheme among government, business, church and the labor movement and gain as much publicity as possible as a way of preparing the way for his eventual journey north.

He was soon engaged on his diplomatic strategy and received an invitation to a reception where the WA Premier was also on the guest list. Two days later they were meeting in the office of the Premier where Steinberg promoted the financial benefits which the scheme would bring to the state. Crucially, he also gave an assurance that the project would not require government funding, as the settlement would focus on becoming self-reliant and sustainable.   

Willcock announced that he would remain neutral on the issue for the time being and advised Steinberg to thoroughly investigate the area and if it met with his expectation, to bring back a clear set of proposals for further consideration.

Visiting the Kimberley

Steinberg remained in Perth to continue his diplomatic offensive and met trade union and church representatives including Archbishop Henry Le Fanu.  The cleric became so convinced about the scheme that he quickly arranged further meetings with other church leaders.  

Next on Steinberg’s list were the media. Herbert Lambert, the editor of the West Australian newspaper, soon converted from a recently held position of decrying the very idea of a Jewish colony in WA, to becoming a leading voice in promoting the cause of the Freeland League. 

In early June, after a flying from Perth to the port of Wyndham, Steinberg was surveying the landscape before him which he hoped would provide both shelter and a future for 70,000 Jews. He was accompanied by Durack and George Melville, an agricultural scientist who already had experience of investigating the potential for pastoral opportunities.

They spent the next three weeks motoring over 700 miles which was still a relatively small part of the Kimberley, but according to Steinberg covered the most important part of the region[vii].

Steinberg was impressed with what he saw and a vision emerged of Wyndham, the small coastal town becoming the gateway for new markets developed amid a mix of cattle and sheep farming alongside crops benefiting from the rich fertile soil, all benefiting from modern agricultural and management techniques. The availability of a plentiful water supply drawn from the Ord and Victoria Rivers would ensure the colony’s sustainability[viii].

Back to Perth

Upon their return to Perth, Steinberg and Melville began work on an extensive evaluation of the Kimberley’s potential for large scale development.

Reporting back to Premier Willcock, Steinberg again sought to reassure the Premier that the League would ensure the finance necessary to set up the colony was provided without recourse to either the WA treasury or Canberra which would have the ultimate say in whether the scheme could proceed.

The economic expansion of the colony would also reduce the state’s vulnerability of over reliance on imports. By contrast the opportunities for major exports to the Asian markets could provide sources for employment and revenue for the exchequer.

In terms of the specifically Jewish dimension, Steinberg viewed it as a colony but only in as much as it would provide a secure environment for promoting and sharing learning including the Yiddish language. However, he also made clear that the laws of Australia would be the laws of the colony and English would be the official language. This would not be a ‘state within a state’ which Steinberg knew to be unacceptable to both State and Federal governments.

Steinberg also recognized the fears often raised by critics of colonization schemes in general that once they had arrived, some settlers would seek their future in other parts of the state and even the wider continent. He was keen to address any such concern that Willcock might have and again gave an undertaking that the intention was to prevent this by building a self-sufficient and successful economic community.

The scheme would involve the League taking over a lease on the land area to be finally agreed for an initial three years and upon its expiry, a new lease of ninety-nine years would be granted.

In addition to securing the support of the Premier, Steinberg was also able to address the state parliament and by early September less than four months since his arrival in Australia, various newspapers were reporting that the WA government was backing the scheme, subject to the approval of the Federal government in Canberra[ix].

Support was also secured from the Perth Chamber of Commerce as well as the labor organizations, and a petition was issued which included members of the clergy, authors, and academics.

Not everyone saw the scheme in such a positive light. The idea of group immigration on the basis of colonization had never previously been part of Australian policy. Some critics did not accept that the League could prevent onward migration, after all the land both within the proposed territory and outside of it was still Australia.

World War Two

However, time was already moving against the scheme. Almost at the same point when Steinberg seemed to be conquering all before him, the Nazi invasion of Poland resulting in the declaration of war by Britain, France and the Commonwealth nations brought a new focus and changed priorities.

Steinberg and the many supporters of the League’s proposal continued to promote the scheme and in August 1940, a memorandum was submitted by the League to the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies in Canberra.

Early in 1940, at the invitation of individuals aware of the Kimberley proposal and sympathetic to the idea of Jewish settlement, Steinberg was in Tasmania and exploring the potential for a similar project. Ultimately the scheme did not materialize and is both an interesting but rather tragic story in itself. However, it also shows that he was still open to considering any location which offered the potential for the aims of the League to be achieved and also the tremendous energy he devoted to the cause.

Although the urgent war effort had delayed any response until the following year, the Federal government announced that the matter had been deferred[x]. Officially the opportunity remained on the table and even by November 1941, letters of support were being reissued and restated[xi]. Nevertheless, the momentum built up by Steinberg during those few months of 1939 was never again to be repeated.

Later that year, Australia faced a new enemy to the north as Japan entered the war siding with the Axis Powers in Europe and the urgency to focus on defending Australia, as well as continuing the Allied campaign for victory inevitably became the overriding objective. 

Decision

Three years after the letter announcing the decision to defer consideration of the memorandum, Steinberg received a letter from the Prime Minister, John Curtin announcing that the Government could not entertain ‘group settlement of the exclusive type contemplated by the Freeland League’[xii]. Understandably, the war effort took center stage for the Australian government, but perhaps it was the very nature of the proposed settlement which finally ended any meaningful hope of it becoming a reality.

Despite gaining support from many influential individuals and organizations, including some for whom the primary focus was the purported economic benefits to the Australian economy, the likelihood that the scheme would ever have become a reality remains little more than intriguing speculation.

For all the public support gained for the Kimberley project, the league had never envisaged accepting more than tens of thousands of German and Austrian Jews, but as Steinberg wrote: ‘let a small part of them at least have peace for a few generations’[xiii]. Even that was not to be.

Notwithstanding the ultimate conclusion of the scheme, Steinberg’s efforts should be recognized for the incredible speed of his success in gaining widespread support, particularly during those frenetic months of diplomatic activity following his arrival on that continent in May 1939.

Perhaps the most appropriate description of that time is encompassed in the words of Chaim Weizmann, who subsequently became the first President of Israel, when he wrote: ‘The world seemed to be divided into two parts – those places where Jews could not live and those where they could not enter’[xiv].      

Now, you can read William’s article about the man who proposed a Jewish State in the 19th century here.

Finally, what do you think of the Kimberley Scheme? Let us know below.

[i] The exception was an offer by the Dominican Republic to accept 100,000 Jewish refugees. In the event, less than 1000 arrived and there has been much speculation about the motivation for the offer (see: Metz A. Why Sousa? Trujillo’s Motives for Jewish Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic. University of Illinois). 

[ii] Besacenter.org. Mideast security and policy studies paper #172. The Conference signed the Treaty of Sevres which gave international recognition to a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

[iii] The full name was The Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonisation.

[iv] From the Yiddish name – Yidishe (Idishe) Territoryalistishe Organizatsye.

[v] Australian Quarterly. 1934. The article was written by a vice-chancellor. University of Melbourne.

[vi] Jewish Chronicle. May 1938

[vii] Steinberg I N. Australia: The Unpromised Land. Gollancz. 1948

[viii] Gettler L. An Unpromised Land: The Plan for a Refugee Haven in Australia’s North-west. 2019

[ix] Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 30th August 1939 and Herald (Melbourne). 1st September 1939 

[x] Steinberg. ibid

[xi] Steinberg. ibid

[xii] Steinberg. ibid

[xiii] Steinberg. ibid

[xiv] Manchester Guardian. Settlement of Refugees. May 1936.

The Author of Peter Pan’s Celebrity Cricket Team

James Matthew, or J.M, Barrie (1860-1937) is the author of Peter Pan and was very famous during his time. He was in act so famous that he was able to create his own celebrity cricket team, full of famous people from the pre-World War One era. Here, Pitamber Kaushik tells us about Barrie’s team, Allahakbarries.

Sir J.M. Barrie, circa 1895. Source: George Grantham Bain collection, available here.

If I were to ask you if Winnie The Pooh, Peter Pan, Mowgli, Sherlock Holmes, and The Invisible Man share a camaraderie: One beyond the obvious, beyond bookshelves. What would you think of? Disney? Bestselling? Animation?

Can a clique of elite literati get an etymology wrong? A clique so elite that it had multiple Knights, Nobel Nominees, Poet-Laureate Candidates, Statesmen, Royal Academics, and Aristocrats - cumulating 6 would-be knights, 2 Barons, and at least 3 Politicians.

'The Allahakbarries' were an amateur cricket club founded by J.M. Barrie, the author of Peter Pan, and comprised of like-minded contemporaries, who shared his intellectual niche. The team included literary and artistic bigwigs as Rudyard Kipling, HG Wells, Sir Arthur Canon Doyle, AA Milne, PG Wodehouse, Jerome K. Jerome, Walter Raleigh, GK Chesterton, Henry Justice Ford, and many others, including the son of Alfred Tennyson. Wherever the cricket team played would have been perhaps the highest concentration of prestige, scholarly esteem, and literary accomplishment, putting even Oxbridge campuses to shame, and an extraordinary convergence of diverse merits, accolades and qualifications, only matched by a few select award ceremonies and Royal Society Meetings.

The name of the team was derived from the phrase "Allah hu Akbar", and makes a pun on Sir James Barrie’s surname. It arose from a mistaken notion amongst the members, that the Arabic phrase meant "Heaven Help Us" instead of "God is Great". The usage was intended humorously (as with most things that pertain to Barrie), hinting at Barrie's partial realization of his cricketing ineptitude.

The book

Allahakbaries c.c. is a slim book documenting the exploits of this League of Extraordinary Gentlemen. Heavily-illustrated with humorous sketches and caricatures, and often mildly self-deprecating, the book was privately published for circulation amongst Barrie’s friends (as would be apparent, he had quite the friend circle, from Ginsberg to Kerouac). This makes the booklet notoriously difficult to get one's hands on, and hence remains highly-prized among collectors. The 40-page booklet, first published in 1890 had its revised edition in 1899, and was reprinted in 1950, with a foreword by legendary cricketer Sir Donald Bradman. Barrie’s salient comical touch is evident all through the book. An introduction by a former junior team-member in the last edition of the book opens it by saying:

“If you had met Barrie, a cricketer was about the last thing that you would have imagined him to be. For he was small, frail and sensitive, rather awkward in his movements, and there was nothing athletic in his appearance.”

Barrie, echoing his character Peter Pan, was physically and behaviorally childlike: he was the second youngest of six siblings, infirm, gaunt, and slight of physique. An elder brother’s death at an early age led to their mother neglecting the infant Barrie, which is suspected to have triggered a growth disorder in him. Psychosocial Short Stature (PSS), a medical condition marked by a lack of growth hormone, resulting in poor constitution is likely attributable to this. Barrie stood at 5’3.5” (161 cm). His having no children of his own lends further strength to the claim of his physical immaturity. Anyway, Barrie was certainly not the athletic type; however, his deficiency was overshadowed by his enthusiasm for the sport of cricket.

The book recalls his most remarkable calamity in the form of being clean-bowled by the famed American Broadway actress Mary de Navarro (nee Anderson) in the 1897 “test” against the village of Broadway. In fact, the book itself is dedicated ′To Our Dear Enemy Mary de Navarro′. The Broadway star who had retired to Worcestershire assembled a team from the community of artists resident in the area, and used to play against the Allahakbaries, often getting their better, much to Barrie’s chagrin.

Illustrations

An illustration from the booklet drawn by the eminent Barnard Partridge, titled “Result of the Test Match, 1808”, depicts Barrie and Mary de Navarro in not the most amiable of terms, a mockingly confrontational moment. In those days, losing to a woman in a physical pursuit was a subject of embarrassment, derision, and mockery. The characteristic postures, smug expression, and the difference in stature are all too noticeable. Barrie frequently made himself or his team the frivolous laughing stock in the work - which, considering how well the team performed, was often more truthful narration than selective emphasis.

The illustrator of the book is the same Barnard Partridge, who was once famously instructed by Barrie (the team’s self-appointed Captain) as, “Partridge, when bowling, keep your eye on square leg. Square-leg, when Partridge is bowling, keep your eye on him!” 

As an assertive and tactical captain, Barrie forbade his team from practicing on an opponent's ground before a match, as 'this can only give them confidence'. 

Barrie’s team choice was based on persona over play. In his own words: "With regard to the married men, it was because I liked their wives, with the regard to the single men, it was for the oddity of their personal appearance."  His wish was fulfilled with the admission of naturalist Joseph Thomson, who swapped cricket whites for pajamas on the ground. 

To say that Barrie was the weak link of his team’s batting order would have been an understatement. This was in spite of the general lack of talent in the team. Augustine Birrell had to be explained the rules of the game including ‘which side of the bat to wave at the ball’ and ‘what to do when the umpire says “over”’, en route to the field. Author Birrell would go on to be the First Secretary for Ireland during the Easter Rising. Some of his teammates had never held a bat before.

Asked to describe his bowling, Barrie replied that after delivering the ball he would go and sit on the turf at mid-off and wait for it to reach the other end which ‘it sometimes did’. The team played for the sheer passion of the game, rather than the results, and Barrie was generous in his praise for his teammates and opposition alike. For instance, he lauded a fellow teammate’s batting performance as, “You scored a good single in the first innings but were not so successful in the second.”

His sole noteworthy achievement was that he had once bowled out Douglas Haig, later the commander of British Expeditionary Force in World War One.

A joke?

However, as Peter Pan’s First XI, a 2011 book on the subject suggests, some of Barrie’s tales should not be taken at face value, if not with a grain of salt. Circumstances cited are scarce, and most tales seem woven in the fabric of Barrie’s typical fantasizing. Barrie was ever the taleteller, and is likely to have traded authenticity for anecdotal hilarity. He was someone who would rather have you believe his life was eventful, than glorious. 

The Allahakbarries were essentially a long-running joke of Barrie’s. The book is full of jests and witticisms about his team′s abject lack of talent. It seems as if most players found it difficult to bat, bowl and or field. Able Players were occasionally (as and when required) recruited to bolster the ranks. A certain player was described as ‘breaks everything except the ball’, while Barrie had to issue explicit directives to his players that  "Should you hit the ball, run at once. Do not stop to cheer." One French player thought that when the umpire called “over,” the game was literally finished.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was the only face-saver in the team: adept, reliable, consistent, and experienced. Doyle was a seasoned cricketer. Enlistment into the team stressed more on celebrity status than sporting merit: Doyle possessed both. His “seasoned” credentials included getting hit by a fast delivery that kindled a box of matches in his pocket and set his trousers ablaze.  His sporting repertoire was quite the handful: A good goalkeeper in soccer, an adroit golfer and a first-class cricket player for the prestigious Marylebone Cricket Club. Doyle was described by Barrie as "A grand bowler. Knows a batsman's weakness by the colour of the mud on his shoes." Conan Doyle proved to be the exception as a fabulous batsman and fearsome bowler.  The six-footer was vigorous and formidable in sports from golf to alpine skiing. Carr describes Conan Doyle as Barrie’s ‘chief tower of strength’. Holmes however, described Barrie as being no novice and delivering impressive lobs: his ‘insidious good-length lefthand ball’ from leg, was always likely to take wickets. However, in retrospect, it seems that the erstwhile emphasis on off-side batting blocked out his prospects. Leg-side batting was seen as unruly and poor conduct. As for Barrie, when not disparaging his demerits, he took pride in his deceptively slow ball and sought solace in being ‘the slowest baller of all”. ‘My better class of bowling is “slow” ’, he confessed in his writing.

Celebrity cricket

The team can be regarded as the origin of ‘Celebrity Cricket’, and attracted considerable attention. It comprised Edwardian England’s crème de la crème intelligentsia. Barrie, ever-the kid-at-heart, dwelt in fantasy and fables. His imaginative, adventurous self had a fondness towards explorers and navigators.

His team included two famed explorers, Hesketh-Hesketh Prichard and Robert Falcon Scott, and travellers in Africa, Joseph Thomson and Paul du Chaillu. The latter he referred as (being) “of Gorilla fame”, citing his being one of the few white men of that time, to have seen the ape. It were also these two who would answer a fellow team member’s query of how the phrase ‘Heaven Help Us’ would be said in ‘African’ as ‘Allahakbar’. The naming alludes to the prevalent fascination with the exoticism and esotericism of the Orient, that characterized many Victorian learned people. None of the explorers in his team “had ever handled a bat before, and there was widespread confusion as to how it should be employed.”

The team played regularly until 1913, when the First World War brought it to an abrupt end. The gleeful, flamboyant team had a rather lackluster and gloomy decline, penned in Barrie’s diary as: “The Last Cricket Match. One or two days before war declared – my anxiety and premonition – boys gaily playing cricket at Auch, seen from my window. I know they're to suffer. I see them dropping out one by one, fewer and fewer.”

Let us know what you think of the article below.

You can read Pitamber’s first article for the site on the pioneering Soviet espionage device known as ‘The Thing’ here.

France in Algeria: Algerian Independence and its Lasting Legacy

France first started to colonize Algeria in 1830 and its influence grew there in the following century; however, after World War II, there was pressure to allow Algeiran independence, ultimetaly relwating in the Algerian War of Independence. Here Will Desvallees tells us about French colonialism in Algeria and the lasting impacts of it in contemporary France.

A depiction of the 1836 Battle of Constantine in Algeria. The French lost this battle, but ultimately took control of Algeria.

In 1945, WWII came to an end, but the European presence in North Africa did not, and tensions between settlers and local populations grew in the years that followed. In the case of Algeria, a “malaise politique”[1] set in between Algerians and French settlers. Eventually, this deteriorating relationship would push Algeria to achieve independence from France in 1962. Under French control, Algerians suffered. Questions, ambitions, and public sentiments regarding national identity animated the conflict, which would become increasingly violent in nature. The story of the Algerian War (1954-1962) and the history of Franco-Algerian relations before the conflict reveals how French colonialism took root and operated. The history, however, continues to resonate. The war’s cascading effects are present in the disturbing rise of anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic politics in contemporary France. The foundations of twentieth century French nationalism are rooted not only in the civic commitments to liberté, égalité, and fraternité, but also in the suffering the French inflicted upon Algerians in defense of their imperial acquisition. In the last ten years, France has seen a rise in violence and nationalist far-right ambitions, much of which can be linked to the human rights abuses, violence, and torture Algerians underwent at the hands of French colonial forces as they sought independence.

France in Algeria

French involvement in Algeria began in 1830 when France took direct political control of port cities on the Algerian coast, seeing in the territory a vast supply of raw materials for its nascent industry and presaging a process of accumulative expansion. In addition to natural resources such as oil, the Algerian territory was ideal for wine production as well as other agricultural products.[2] The years that followed led to an increasing number of French settlers and French présence: “En 1930, les terres issue de cette colonisation officielle représente 1,500,000 hectares sur les 2,300,000 possédés par les Européen.”[3] French colonization of Algeria only serves as one example of the broader rise of imperialism in Europe, as white settlers subjugated “natives” across the Global South. In 1919, the first Algerian social movement for independence would be created under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985), which would send representatives to the League of Nations to fight on behalf of Algerian independence. In the first half of the twentieth century, rightist ideology in European countries grew in response to social inequality. In response to this, the Algerian movement expanded in reach and popularity.

Following the Second World War, given Algeria’s economic dependence on French subsidies, the Algerian colonial economy was devastated. “The wine, grain, and livestock industries collapsed leaving an impoverished, unemployed proletariat of 10 million Muslims governed by an increasingly French colonial state” (Hitchcock 2003, 184). If the French were to stay in Algeria, how could they let its people suffer? Algerian resentment began to rise. In 1945 in a series of articles published by Albert Camus in a daily French newspaper, one article he entitled“malaise politique” depicts the rising strength of Algerian opposition to French rule:

The Algeria of 1945 is drowning in an economic and political crisis that it has always known, but that has not yet reached this degree of acuity. In this admirable country that’s Springtime without legal protection in this moment of its flowers and its lights, men are suffering from hunger and demand justice. These are sufferings that cannot leave us indifferent, because we have known them ourselves.[4]

Growing tensions

Camus wrote this piece on May 16th, approximately one week after the beginning of a violent French reassertion of control on May 8th 1945, as France celebrated its own liberation. That day, Algerian citizens began to protest in large numbers. Outraged by this, the French did not hesitate to use violence against Algerian citizens who participated in these demonstrations. One group of Algerians would claim the lives of twenty Europeans. That month, in an effort to retaliate and demonstrate their strength, the French killed thousands of Algerians and tensions between Algerian nationals and French authorities would reach a tipping point: “Over a hundred Europeans died during this month of insurrection, Algerian deaths are unknown, but have been estimated at between 6,000 and 8,000.”[5]

One of the main concerns for French armed forces in Algeria can be traced to the military defeats they suffered in Vietnam, largely because they were unprepared for the guerilla warfare tactics of the Viet Minh. Paranoia pushed the French military to employ more violent means of maintaining control in Algeria. The French would use excessive force in an attempt to prevent any of the military defeats they had suffered in Indochina.

While France was winning the war in Algeria in the late 1950s, the French public was increasingly opposed to the methods of torture used by French military personnel in Algeria, which were exposed in lurid detail by numerous French publications. Among those covering the war was Claude Bourdet, a journalist for France Observateur, who in an article entitled “Votre Gestapo d'Algérie,” gave his readers examples of the brutality employed by the French military: “l’empalement sur une bouteille ou un bâton, les coups de poing, de pied, de nerf de boeuf ne sont pas non plus épargnés. Tout ceci explique que les tortionnaires ne remettent les prisonniers au juge que cinq à dix jours après leur arrestation.”[6] In his article, Bourdet referred to French military officers as “Gestapistes,” drawing for a French public who had lived only very recently under Nazi occupation a sharp comparison between the methods used by French authorities and those employed by the German secret police.

Frantz Fanon on colonialism

Similar coverage in French mass media stimulated a snowball effect for domestic discontent and opposition to the war in Algeria. Indeed, the hypocrisy of employing Nazi-associated torture methods after the ruthless devastation France faced during WWII did not escape an increasingly conscious French public. The brutality of French colonial administration after WWII, in Indochina and Algeria, and the associated atrocities committed against “natives” pushed Frantz Fanon, a French psychiatrist and political philosopher from Martinique to write The Wretched of The Earth. He published this work as France was finalizing the last stages of its official exit from Algeria. In the first part of his work entitled “On Violence”, Fanon focuses on the vital role of violence as a necessary tool for activists to fight for independence. Principally basing his argument on the current events and recent history of what had taken place in Algeria, Fanon paints the portrait of decolonization as a violent process no matter where or no matter who is involved. He relates this tendency to a colonial structure he defines as the presence of a native population inevitably dehumanized by the settlers. Two foundational principles that come out of his work to explain the long term impact of colonization. First, he explains that it is the replacement of one’s population by another. Second, he describes the manner in which natives know they are human too and immediately develop a progressively deepening rebellious and resentful attitudes towards the settlers. Camus was warning the French public of this in 1945 when he was explaining the “malaise politique” he perceived was growing rapidly in Algeria between the settlers and the settled. 

Fanon would also explain that the colonial process divides the native population into three distinguishable groups: native workers valued by the settlers for their labor value, “colonized intellectuals” a term he uses to refer to the more educated members of the native population who are recruited by the settlers to convince natives that the settlers are acting properly, and “Lumpenproletariat” a term Fanon coined based on Marxist principles to refer to the least-advantaged social classes of the native population. He explains that this third, least advantaged group of natives will naturally be the first to utilize violence against settlers as they are the worst-off from the effect of colonization: “The native who decides to put the program into practice, and to become its moving force, is ready for violence at all times. From birth it is clear to him that this narrow World, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence.”[7] Some of the long-term effects Fanon focused on would help to explain the long-term cultural and human impact from colonization. French violence during Algerian occupation followed by the French-Algerian war would lead to long-term devastating impacts to Algerian nationals and generations to follow: 

In ‘On Violence’, Fanon highlights the mechanisms of the colonized violence against themselves. (...)The exacerbated militarization og the ‘indigenous sector’ in Algeria manifests itself physically in the de-humanization of the colonial subjects who turn the colonial violence and repressed anger against themselves (madness, suicide) or against each other (physical fights, murder) in a desperate attemt to extricate themselves from and escape the sordid reality of colonialism.[8]

Fanon’s work is important in explaining not only the violence that Algerians being the colonized needed to use to fight for their independence, but also in highlighting the internal social and cultural devastation that would lead to violence and devastation among Algerians themselves. Fanon suggests that the impact of colonialism can directly be linked to violence between the colonists and the natives, and indirectly between the natives themselves. This can be linked to the frustration, pain, and suffering felt by Algerians leading to internal deprivation and conflict among themselves. 

Fanon was an outspoken supporter of Algerian independence from France and of the FLN’s operations to accomplish this goal: “The immobility to which the native is condemned can only be called into question if the native decides to put an end to the history of colonization - the history of pillage - and to bring into existence the history of the nation - the history of decolonization.”[9] Fanon’s unique and powerful reflection on colonial violence and the long term effect of colonization would serve as an instrumental source to enlighten the French people of what was taking place in Algeria and that it needed to come to an end. Eventually public attitudes and the seemingly endless violence in Algeria would push French President Charles de Gaulle to move towards granting Algeria independence and put an end to French involvement in the region.

Charles de Gaulle’s impact

General Charles de Gaulle, who was elected president of France in 1958, made it one of his main responsibilities to move France out of Algeria as peacefully as possible. His plan consisted of a gradual removal of French military personnel in Algeria in the goal of keeping what was left of any kind of relationship between the two countries as strong as possible. While he chose not to exit Algeria abruptly and quickly, de Gaulle wanted Algeria to be decolonized and for Algeria to eventually declare its independence. At the same time, he was attempting to preserve any international relationship they had before the years of the war: “Depending on one’s politics, the endgame that de Gaulle played in Algeria may be seen as the brilliant management of an explosive crisis in which he brought France to accept the inevitability of Algerian independence.”[10] Eventually, de Gaulle would put an end to the conflict in 1962 when he would formally declare Algeria to be an independent nation. On July 1st 1962, a referendum in Algeria was held with a voting population of 6,549,736 Algerians. The question which respondents had to answer in the affirmative or negative was: “En conséquence la Commission Central de Contrôle du référendum constate qu'à la question: ‘Voulez-vous que L'Algérie devienne un Etat indépendant coopérant avec la France dans les conditions définies par les déclarations du 19 Mars 1962’, les électeurs ont répondu affirmativement a la majorite ci-dessus indiquées.”[11] The declarations this central referendum question refers to are the conditions of a structured exit of France from Algeria in which both countries could continue to maintain a mutual and positive relationship. Of those who participated, 5,992,115 (91.5%) expressed that they experienced suffrage under French control, and 5,975,581 (91.2%) responded in the affirmative to the main question asked. In 1962, Algeria had an estimated population of approximately 11.62 million. This means that a large majority of the Algerian adult population participated in this referendum, meaning that the results were significant in showing the extent to which Algerians felt they had suffered under French control and were devout supporters of a new independent Algerian nation.

Among many other factors which contributed to the growing foundations for a successful right-wing nationalist political party, many viewed France’s withdrawal from Algeria as another military defeat, like they had suffered in Indochina. 

The purged collaborators of Vichy France joined virulent anti-communists and those disillusioned by the weakness of the Fourth Republic (1945-1958) to form a ready clientele for anti system nationalist movements. The impetus for the Radical Right in postwar France was seventeen years of unsuccessful colonial War, first in Indochina (1945-1954) and especially in Algeria (1954-1962).[12]

After independence

Post-independence relations between Algeria and France would lead to a massive increase in legal migration of Algerians into France. The 1960s and 1970s naturally became a time in which many first generation French citizens from non-french parents were born. This was also met by an increase in the number of mosques and Muslim establishments in France. Traditional French families became increasingly in number disfavorable to the transformation in the ethnic makeup of France’s population. The Front National’s (FN’s) resurgence can largely be connected to these trends, and Algeria was the principal country from which Muslims from the Maghreb immigrated into France. In 1999, the largest immigrant population in France was still Algerians at 576,000 total immigrants. Today, more than 8.8% of the French population is Muslim, and many of them are second or third-generation descendants of individuals who had migrated in the 1960s from the Maghreb. In recent years, the resurgence of the Front National was largely in response to the millions of Muslim migrants, many of whom were political refugees from Syria and other countries.

The French-Algerian War carried on for eight years. These were eight years of bloodshed in which hundreds of thousands of people died, the majority being under-sourced and outmatched Algerian nationals. The violence and oppression felt by natives during this time carries a burden for generations to come. Specifically, the perpetuation of this burden is reinforced by islamophobia and highly conservative views on topics of immigration. In 1962, once Algeria had finally declared its independence, many immigrated into France making Algerians the largest population of Muslim immigrants from North Africa. While speculation is foolish, one can certainly establish a link between far-right ideology, its resurgence in recent decades, and its relation to French colonial history. The implications of colonialism, as Fanon explains, can only lead to violence and long-term animosity between the settlers and the natives. The long-term sysemic oppresion facing french Muslim citizens of North African descent, perpetuated and reinforced by the populist far-right of France, are the implications that Fanon correctly forecasted in 1961 and symbolic of the stigmatizing view shared by so many in our world today. 

What do you think of France’s actions in Algeria? Let us know below.

[1] Camus, Albert. “Le Malaise Politique.” (Paris: Combat, 18 May 1945).

[2] William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: the Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 184.

[3] Marie Fauré, La Guerre d’Algérie: La Terre aux Remous de la Décolonisation (Ixelles: Lemaitre Publishing, 2017), 7.

[4]  Camus, Albert. “Crise en Algérie,” Combat, 13 May 1945.

[5]  Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 185.

[6] Bourdet, Claude. “Votre Gestapo d'Algérie.” France Observateur, 13 January 1955.

[7] Fanon, Frantz, Richard Philcox, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Homi K. Bhabha. The Wretched of the Earth. (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017), 37.

[8] Sajed, Alina. Postcolonial Encounters in International Relations: The Politics of Transgression in the Maghreb. (Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).

[9]  Fanon, Frantz, Richard Philcox, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Homi K. Bhabha. The Wretched of the Earth. (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017), 51.

[10] Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 189.

[11]  Sator, Kaddour. Proclamation Des Résultats du Référendum D'Autodétermination Du 1er Juillet 1962. (Algerie: Commission Centrale de Contrôle Electorale, 3 July 1962.)

[12] Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy of Fascism. (Vintage Books, 2005), 177

Secondary Sources

Fauré, Marie, and 50 Minutes. La Guerre D'Algérie: La France Aux Remous De La Décolonisation. Vol. 47, (Lemaitre Publishing, 2017).

Hitchcock, William I. The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present. (Anchor Books - A Division of Random House, Inc. New York, 2003).

Howell, Jennifer. The Algerian War in French-Language Comics: Postcolonial Memory, History, and Subjectivity. (Lexington Books, 2015).

Saada, Emmanuelle, and Arthur Goldhammer. Empires Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies. (The University of Chicago Press, 2012).

Sajed, Alina. Postcolonial Encounters in International Relations: The Politics of Transgression in the Maghreb. (Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).

Silverman, Max. Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks: New Interdisciplinary Essays. (Manchester University Press, 2017).

Primary Sources

Boualam, Bachaga. Mon Pays… La France. Paris, France: (Editions France-Empire, 1962).

Bourdet, Claude. “Votre Gestapo d'Algérie.” (France Observateur, 13 January 1955).

Camus, Albert. “Crise en Algérie.” (Combat, 13 May 1945).

Camus, Albert. “Des Bateaux Et De La Justice.” (Combat, 16 May 1945).

Camus, Albert. “Le Malaise Politique.” (Combat, 18 May 1945).

 Sator, Kaddour. Proclamation Des Résultats du Référendum D'Autodétermination Du 1er Juillet 1962. (Commision Centrale de Controle Electorale, 3 July 1962).

 Fanon, Frantz, Richard Philcox, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Homi K. Bhabha. The Wretched of the Earth. (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017).

The Longest Retreat in U.S History: The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River in the Korean War - Part I

The Korean War (1950-53) pitted the capitalist South Korea, backed by the U.S., against communist North Korea. A major offensive by South Korea ultimately led to Communist China becoming involved in the war.

Here, Victor Gamma considers how failures in the U.S. understanding of China’s intentions and over-confidence that China would not intervene led to the U.S. backed forces moving very close to the Chinese border.

You can also read Victor’s article on Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon here.

Fighting with the 2nd Inf. Div. north of the Chongchon River, Sfc. Major Cleveland, weapons squad leader, points out an enemy position to his machine gun crew. November 20,1950.

Seventy years ago, on June 25, 1950 the Cold War turned hot when North Korean forces launched a surprise attack across the 38th Parallel. The communist attempt to violently take-over the entire peninsula was thwarted by the firm U.S. response and General Douglas MacArthur's brilliant counterattack at Inchon that September. Now it was the turn of the U.S.-led UN and South Korean forces to attempt the unification of the Korean Peninsula on their terms. UN forces moved towards the Yalu River and victory seemed within sight. This objective, however, was shattered when massive, skillfully handled attacks by Chinese forces beginning on November 25 caused a disastrous defeat for UN forces, including the longest retreat in U.S. military history. The attacks on what the Chinese called the Western Sector came to be called the battles of the Ch'ongch'on River. These were among the most decisive in the post-World War Two era. How could the world’s premier superpower be taken by surprise? How could the nation with arguably the best intelligence-gathering capacity in the world be completely fooled? The answer is complex. It includes persistent miscalculations from the American military and political leadership, preconceived assumptions regarding communist China, ignorance regarding local conditions and China's interests, the refusal of American officials to deal with the Communist Chinese or to take their government seriously, and the on-going failure to correctly interpret intelligence.

Mistrust and Misunderstanding

Part of the problem can be traced to the atmosphere of heightened tension and suspicion that existed between East and West. This suspicion led to a breakdown in communications and effectively clouded understanding. The West viewed the communist world in a monolithic sense. The bickering between China and the Soviets was unknown to Western decision-makers. The Korean attack was viewed as an attempt by Russia to gain advantage and it was to the Russians the United Nations had to resist. The West's suspicions are understandable; had not Kim Il-Sung been an officer in the Red Army? Hadn't the Soviets accumulated a track record of forcing 'friendly' regimes on every state that came under their dominance? Hadn't the Red Army left behind a hardline communist state devoid of free elections in North Korea? However, documents declassified in 1992 fail to support the contention that Kim Il-Sung was merely a puppet acting under Stalin's orders. In contrast, the post-Cold War research revealed that although Stalin ultimately gave his approval and was willing to aid Kim, he was not the initiator of it. Valentin Pak, Kim's translator who read Stalin's communications to Kim, stated emphatically that Stalin did not encourage an attack on the South.

Dr. Katherine Weathersby examined declassified Soviet documents and affirmed that Stalin thought it unwise to initiate hostilities in Korea. This knowledge was unknown to U.S. policy-makers because American intelligence failed utterly to investigate the nature of the Soviet-Korean relationship. The reasons for Stalin's final go-ahead to Kim are still unclear. Whatever he may have hoped to gain by a communist victory, his contribution to the effort was relatively meager and he did not want to associate himself too closely with it.  U.S. intelligence failed completely to investigate the relationship between the Soviets and Kim. Instead, the Americans went into the conflict viewing Kim as a Soviet proxy. 

At first, China did not appear strongly concerned. The Chinese had several motives for intervening in Korea. First, they were alarmed by the rise of anti-communist sentiment in the West and thought the UN advance toward Manchuria was a military expression of this. North Korea was also deemed vital to the Chinese leadership, which had plans for large-scale industrial growth. Hydroelectric resources in North Korea were deemed essential to these plans.  U.S. officials failed to grasp these local conditions and took little interest in Korea beyond the view of Korea as merely one more piece in the massive chess game against Soviet expansionism. 

                  But rather than conduct talks with the Chinese, the animosity and mistrust that characterized East-West relations not only thoroughly poisoned any attempt at accommodation but effectively disrupted clear interpretations of Chinese or Soviet intentions. Throughout the period before open Chinese intervention (June 25 - November 25, 1950), communication between China and the West was hampered by the fact that there were no formal relations with Communist China. Any knowledge about Chinese intentions had to be gathered from reading the cables of foreign ambassadors stationed in China or by Signal Intelligence (SIGIN). The Armed Forces Security Administration (AFSA) had the responsibility for intelligence gathering. Information collected would then be passed on to the appropriate officials for evaluation. These leaders would then act on the information accordingly. There was sufficient intelligence during the summer and autumn of 1950 to alert Western officials that China had a vital interest in Korea and would back up their interests with force. China had communicated its approval of a pro-Western regime in Korea if it did not involve direct Western intervention and if it occurred at the expense of the Russians. This communication was ignored or misunderstood.  Cable traffic to and from the office of the Indian Ambassador at Beijing, Dr. Kavalm Madhava Panikkar, was being read by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Dr. Panikkar was probably the most well informed diplomat in Beijing and had built good relations with high-ranking Chinese officials. He was thus a quite valuable source of information regarding Chinese diplomacy. In July and August 1950, cables revealed that Panikkar had been informed that China would not intervene in Korea. However, decrypted cables began to reveal a dramatic change following the Inchon landing and the turn of the tide against North Korea. For example, the cables of the Burmese ambassador now revealed that China intended to intervene militarily. A week later, on September 25, Panikkar cabled New Delhi that China would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. This information was transmitted to Washington, where officials dismissed it due to Panikkar's supposed pro-Chinese sympathies. Less than a week later, on October 1, 1950, Mao Tse Tung publicly declared: "The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside if the imperialists wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor". Mao continued by warning that if non-Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the Chinese "will send troops to aid the People's Republic of Korea." That same day South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel. Accordingly, on the following day the Chinese Politburo made the decision to intervene in Korea. Mao Tse Tung ordered 260,000 troops to cross into Korea by October 15.

The Die is Cast

On October 2 the Indian ambassador was roused from sleep shortly after midnight and ordered to meet with Chou En-lai, China's premier and foreign minister.  Chou informed the Indian Ambassador of China's intentions regarding Korea, which information was passed to the West on October 3. Additionally, the Dutch charge d' affaires also cabled The Hague quoting Chou en Lai's comments that China would fight if U.S. forces crossed the 38th Parallel. These warnings were dismissed in Washington as a bluff. 

Meanwhile the first U.S. forces crossed the 38th Parallel on October 5 and advanced on Pyongyang.  MacArthur had not been totally incognizant of the possibility of Chinese intervention. In fact, in the days and weeks following Inchon, he repeatedly inquired of his subordinates if any sign of Russians or Chinese had been noted. Since no reports of their presence were forthcoming, he assumed that the Soviets and Chinese had decided to withdraw at America's demonstration of will. The United Nations mandate of June 27 read in part; "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the areas." It was widely held that the only way to accomplish this objective was the complete removal of the Kim regime as a threat to the south by occupying the north and reunifying the entire peninsula. 

Not everyone shared this sanguine hope, however. Several doubts about an advance into the north had been voiced. The Policy Planning Staff in Washington had also expressed grave doubts about the ability to invade the north without provoking a war with China. In addition, a National Security Council 81 report was circulated on September 1 emphasizing the risk involved but also pointed out the unlikeness of Soviet intervention. It recommended that only Republic of Korea (ROK) forces should cross the 38th Parallel. 

MacArthur harbored no such doubts, though, and the advance continued with non-Korean forces in support. On October 15 Chinese General Pen Dehuai received the order from Mao Tse Tung to begin moving his forces across the Yalu River into Korea. That night, the 372 Regiment of the 42nd Army crossed into Korea. Before long, more than 300,000 Chinese troops moved into North Korea, completely undetected by AFSA. However, other warnings did occur. SIGINT observed changes in Soviet, Chinese and North Korean military activity, indicating some kind of major operation was impending. The CIA sent a top secret coded memo (still only partially declassified) to President Truman. The memo stated that intelligence sources indicated that the Chinese would intervene to protect their interests in the Suiho Hydroelectric complex in North Korea. The memo also noted an increase in fighter aircraft in Manchuria. On October 21 AFSA reported from Chinese radio traffic that no less than three Chinese armies had been deployed along the Yalu River and reported heavy troop train movement from Shanghai to Manchuria. All of this information was dismissed because it contradicted the dominant opinions of the U.S. intelligence community. For an example of this view, an article in The Review of the World Situation dated October 18, stated: "Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason that Peiping does not think that war with the U.S. would result from open intervention in Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not openly intervene in North Korea."  In Tokyo, Lieutenant Colonel Morton Rubin went over the intelligence indicating Chinese intentions to intervene with General MacArthur and his intelligence chief General Charles Willoughby. Neither MacArthur nor Willoughby was convinced of the reality of the threat. In fact, the UN side also suffered from an atmosphere that discouraged healthy challenges to official decisions. Surrounding MacArthur, especially after Inchon, was an aura of infallibility that effectively wilted any suggestions for greater vigilance against possible Chinese action. In this atmosphere, the disregarding of the Chinese threat became the “party line” and a healthy exchange of views was discouraged.  Matthew Ridgway, who was soon to replace MacArthur, added: "the great fault over there was poor evaluation of the intelligence that was obtained. They knew the facts but they were poorly evaluated. I don't know just why this was. It was probably in good part because of MacArthur's personality. If he did not want to believe something, he wouldn't." 

Now, read part 2 on how the U.S. backed forces moved ever closer to China and the eventual Chinese counter-attack here.

Why do you think many in the U.S. did not think China would join the Korean War? Let us know below.

Sources

Aid, Matthew. The Secret Sentry, the Untold History of the National Security Agency. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009.

Alexander, Bevin R.  Korea: The First War We Lost. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1986.

Bacharach,  Deborah. The Korean War. San Diego: Lucent Books, 1991.

Conway, John Richard. Primary Source Accounts of the Korean War. Berkeley Heights: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 2006.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963.

Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New York: Hyperion, 2007.

Halberstam, David. The Fifties. New York: Fawcett Books, 1993.

Hammel. Eric Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press. 2018.

Harry S. Truman, ed. by Laura K. Egendorf. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2002. 

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Hammel, Eric. Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean. New York: The Vanguard Press,1981.

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command. McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1997. 

Litai, John and Xue . Uncertain Partners, (Stanford University Press), 1995.

Paul Lashmar, New Statesman & Society; 2/2/96, Vol.9 Issue 388, p24, 2p, 1bw

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Year of Decisions. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955. 

Truman, Margaret, editor. Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private writings of Harry S. Truman. New York: Warner Books, 1989.

"Analysis: The Foreign Interventions: Stalin and USSR" www.mtholyoke.edu/~park25h/classweb/worldpolitics/analysisstalin.html‎)

The Amazing Life of American Photographer Margaret Bourke-White

Margaret Bourke-White (1904-71) was a photographer who had a fascinating career. She went to the Soviet Union in 1930, photographed the Great Depression in 1930s America, and took photos in various wars. Parker Beverly explains – and we also include Parker’s documentary on Margaret below.

American Way of Life, a 1937 photo by Margaret Bourke-White

From the battlefields of Italy during World War II to the tranquil home of Mahatma Gandhi throughout the Partition of India, Margaret Bourke-White was there to capture it all. Born in the Bronx, New York in 1904, Bourke-White grew up in a modest household.[1] It was not until her college years that Margaret began exploring the art of photography.[2] A gifted writer, Bourke-White fused the line between visual and written mediums, creating photographs that spoke to viewers' emotions and sensibilities. A serendipitous shoot at Cleveland's Otis Steel factory landed her industrial photograph portfolio on the desk of Henry Luce, the publisher of Time magazine who tasked her with being the first photographer for Fortune magazine.[3]Climbing atop ledges of the Chrysler Building and entering hazardous industrial factories, Bourke-White soon gained a reputation of being a fearless photographer, undaunted by gender or occupational boundaries.  

Her 1931 book Eyes on Russia which documented her travels throughout the nascent industrial Soviet Union through photographs made her the first photographer to capture the country's steadily growing industrialization.[4] In 1937, she along with her then husband, Erskine Caldwell published You Have Seen Their Faces which detailed the plight of poor rural Southerners in the midst of economic hardship.[5] It was this experience with suffering along with a Fortune assignment covering Midwestern droughts[6] that changed Bourke-White's photography from an advertiser's lens to one depicting the human condition. One of her more famous photographs captures the stark difference between commercial and racial realities in the United States with a line of African Americans seeking emergency aid pictured against a billboard depicting a white unaffected family.  

Wars

In 1936, Margaret's career changed focus as she transitioned into her role as a staff photographer for Life Magazine.[7] Well regarded for its photo essays which documented everything from the building of the Fort Peck Dam to a wartime Thanksgiving, Life provided a national platform for Bourke-White's photography. Seeking to relay news from the battlefield to the home front, Life sent Margaret to photograph various scenes from World War II including torpedo attacks, bombing missions, and the liberation of concentration camps.[8] Soon after, she captured the struggles of apartheid in South Africa and lastly, documented the strife of the Korean War.[9]  While in Korea, Bourke-White began noticing symptoms of Parkinson's disease, a condition which she fought for nearly 20 years.[10]

I came across Margaret's fascinating story while researching for the National History Day (NHD) contest in 2017. I was struck by the lack of coverage on her remarkable and pioneering photojournalism career and knew I wanted to tell her story. Interviewing individuals such as Cokie Roberts and Judy Woodruff, I brought her noteworthy narrative to life through a documentary film seen in both the NHD contest and the All-American High School Film Festival. Three years later, I am still inspired by Margaret's overwhelming tenacity.  Today, her photographs still provide relevant discussion of important moments in history while her trailblazing career encourages others to follow their passions.

You can see Parker’s film on Margaret Bourke-White below. Let us know what you think below.

[1] Vicki Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White:  A Biography (New York City, NY:  HarperCollins, 1986).  

[2]  Ibid.  

[3]  Beverly W. Brannan, “Margaret Bourke-White (1904-1971),” Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division.  

[4]  Ibid.  

[5]  Jay E. Caldwell, Erskine Caldwell, Margaret Bourke-White, and the Popular Front:  Photojournalism in Russia     (Athens, GA:  University of Georgia Press, 2016).  

[6] Beverly W. Brannan, “Margaret Bourke-White (1904-1971),” Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division, https://loc.gov/rr/print/coll/womphotoj/bourkewhiteessay.html. 

[7]  Margaret Bourke-White, Portrait of Myself (New York City, New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1963). 

[8]  Ibid.  

[9]  Vicki Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White:  A Biography (New York City, NY:  HarperCollins, 1986).

[10]  Ibid. 

My documentary for the National History Day Contest (2017-2018) for the theme "Conflict and Compromise in History." 2018 Official Selection for the All Ameri...

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 4 – Conclusions – ’Such a big event, so little public memory’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 4 in the series considers some personal tales of the Great Flu of 1918 – and reflects on how little that flu is remembered today. After all, if we knew more about it, maybe the 2020 Flu Pandemic would have been less destructive.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy (here), part 2 considered the healthcare lessons from the pandemic by contrasting a successful and less successful approach (here), and part 3 looked at the importance of effective leadership (here).

Policemen in Seattle wearing masks made by the Red Cross, during the flu epidemic. December 1918.

My mom, who has long since passed away, was the first person to ever tell me about the “Spanish Flu” as she called it. Her uncle died from it in 1919 – several months after he returned from World War One. She was five at the time.

She had a photograph of him kneeling beside her in his “doughboy” uniform. He was quite a guy, I guess. Served with distinction, survived multiple “over-the-tops”, gas attacks, trench strafings, and came home to die in the third and last wave of the infamous influenza pandemic. 

He was one of the 675,000 American casualties of that virus.

Across America during the fall and winter of 1918-19, many such tragic memories were made. Here are a few from Mike Leavitt’s The Great Pandemic of 1918 State by State. (Leavit, 2006)

In Hartford, Connecticut, Beatrice Springer Wilde, a nurse, recounted the tragic story of four Yale students she treated. They had become ill while traveling and decided to get off the train in Hartford. Their last steps were taken from the train station to the hospital. Within twenty-four hours, all were dead. 

Bill Sardo, a funeral director in Washington, D.C., remembered:

"From the moment I got up in the morning to when I went to bed at night, I felt a constant sense of fear. We wore gauze masks. We were afraid to kiss each other, to eat with each other, to have contact of any kind. We had no family life, no church life, no community life. Fear tore people apart." 

All public gatherings were banned in Seattle, Washington including church services. Many of the local ministers complained until the mayor said publicly, “Religion which won’t keep for two weeks, is not worth having.” 

The town council in Rapid City, South Dakota made spitting on the sidewalks illegal. A local police officer was seen spitting shortly thereafter. He was arrested and fined $6 for committing the offense. No one was exempt.

Augusta, Georgia was the hardest-hit city in the state. The nurses in the local medical facilities were also struck down by the pandemic. As a consequence, nursing students were put in charge of shifts at a local hospital. Schoolteachers were enlisted to act as nurses, cooks and hospital clerks, and an emergency hospital was constructed on a local fairground. In Athens, Georgia, the University of Georgia indefinitely suspended classes.

An Ocala, Florida man named Olson traveled to Jacksonville, Florida for a carpentry job. Jacksonville was inundated with the flu at the time, and despite a citywide quarantine and the use of gauze masks, Olson contracted the flu. Eager to return to his hometown and family, he slipped past the quarantine and caught a train back home, taking the virus with him. Within days of his return, he had infected his family, and his neighborhood.

James Geiger, the U.S. Public Health Service Officer for Arkansas continuously downplayed the influenza threat to the state - even after he caught the flu, and his wife died from it.

Alaska & Authors

The 1918 pandemic also swept through Native American communities in Alaska killing whole villages. One school teacher later reported that, in her area, three villages were wiped out entirely. Others, she said, averaged as many as 85% deaths and probably 25% of those were too sick to get firewood and froze to death before help arrived. When the pandemic passed, because many were so sick that they were unable to fish or hunt and store food for the winter, they died of starvation. Some were forced to eat their sled dogs, and some sled dogs, unfed and hungry, ate the dead and the dying.

This last story from 1918 is about the effect this epidemic had on one of America’s best known authors - Katherine Anne Porter. 

Porter, who would later earn a Pulitzer Prize for her short stories, was one of the thousands who became ill during the epidemic in Denver, Colorado. Porter contracted influenza while working as a journalist for the Rocky Mountain News. She could not be admitted to the hospital at first, because there was no room. Instead, she was threatened with eviction by her landlady and then cared for by an unknown boarder who nursed her until a bed opened at the hospital. Porter was so sick that her newspaper colleagues prepared an obituary, and her father chose a burial plot. That near-death experience changed Porter in a profound way. She said afterward, "It just simply divided my life, cut across it like that. So that everything before that was just getting ready, and after that I was in some strange way altered." Her book, Pale Horse, Pale Rider, is a fictionalized account of her experience in the 1918 pandemic.

Lesson Four: Conclusions – ‘Such a big event, so little public memory’

Will and Ariel Durant, the husband and wife co-authors of that massive eleven-volume study The Story of Civilization, also wrote a thought-provoking short work entitled, The Lessons of History. On page eleven they ask:

As his studies come to a close the historian faces the challenge: Of what use have your studies been?... Have you derived from history any illumination of our present condition, any guidance for our judgments and policies, any guard against the rebuffs of surprise or the vicissitudes of change? (Durant, 1968)

While that quote is certainly apropos for this last article in a series entitled “Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic”, it’s not for that reason that I selected it. 

It’s for a far more personal reason.

When I grew up and became a historian, that epidemic in 1918-19, despite my personal connection to it, was never a topic in my teaching curriculum.

And it should have been. 

As an educator, I admit now that I was remiss in not teaching about pandemics and our nation’s susceptibility to them. Had I done so, perhaps one of my students (and there were many) would have gone on to do something in that field. Or perhaps, the 2020 Pandemic would have been less traumatic for all of them.

Every experience that we’ve had in 2020 - our delayed response to the threat of a pandemic - our overwhelmed medical personnel and inadequate supplies - the quarantines - the public pushback and even the key community “stakeholders” – was there in 1918. 

But no one paid attention. It’s unfortunate that we never seem to seek (or adequately teach) the lessons that the past provides us - until it’s too late. We are NOW facing the greatest threat to our Democracy and to our existence as a nation that the United States has faced since the Civil War. The lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic would have helped us in so many ways.

During my research for this series, I came across a 2018 comment that someone left at the end of an article on the Philly Voiceblog during the 100th Anniversary of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic – “Such a big event, so little public memory.” (McGovern & Kopp, 2018)

Indeed. How many five-year-olds will lose a favorite uncle this time?

Food for thought.

Why do you think there is so little public knowledge of the 1918 Great Flu Pandemic? Let us know below.

Read more from Mac Guffey in the Amazing Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War Two here.

Works Cited

Durant, W. a. (1968). The Lessons of History. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Leavit, M. (2006, January thru July). The Great Pandemic of 1918: State by State. Retrieved May 3, 2020, from Flu Trackers.com: https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/welcome-to-the-scientific-library/-1918-pandemic-data-stories-history/14750-the-great-pandemic-of-1918-state-by-state

McGovern, B., & Kopp, J. (2018, September 28). "In 1918, Philadelphia was in 'the grippe' of misery and suffering". Retrieved April 10, 2020, from Philly Voice: https://www.phillyvoice.com/1918-philadelphia-was-grippe-misery-and-suffering/

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 3 – Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 3 in the series considers the importance of effective leadership. Mac looks at how the cities of St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis managed to have lower rates of infection when compared to other comparably sized cities thanks to effective leadership.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy (here) and part 2 considered the healthcare lessons from the pandemic by contrasting a successful and less successful approach (here).

A 1918 poster warning about ‘Spanish Flu’ and how it could impact war production for World War I.

The federal government’s role regarding the public health is generally an advisory one. By and large, the real business of public health and safety is basically a local matter. State, county, and city health departments operate under a rag bag of rules and regulations that vary from community to community based on a community’s prior public health experiences. (Garrett L. , 2020)

Because of this, the way the 1918 Influenza Epidemic unfolded across the United States actually provides a tremendous series of independent case studies about what worked and what didn’t work.

The determining factor – community mortality rates.

Thirteen years ago, Anthony Fauci* and David Morens did just that and wrote an article about the 1918 Influenza Pandemic for The Journal of Infectious Diseases. It was subtitled “Insights for the 21st Century”. 

In their article, they made several key points. One - historical evidence about pandemics suggests there are no predictable cycles; therefore, countries need to be prepared for the possibility of a pandemic at all times. Two - if a novel virus as virulent as that of 1918 were to reappear, a substantial number of potential fatalities could be prevented with aggressive public-health and medical interventions. 

But the best antidote, they said, was prevention - through vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning. (Morens & Fauci, 2007)

Morens’s and Fauci’s recommendations were partially based on the similar way several major urban areas truly “met the moment and prevailed” with the lowest mortality outcomes during that exceptionally virulent second wave of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.

It was all about leadership.

Lesson Three: Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’

In addition to St. Louis (covered in Parts 1 and 2 of this series and reviewed here for comparison), Milwaukee, and Minneapolis also registered lower mortality rates than most urban areas of a comparable size during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic. 

These cities also encountered many of the same problems and challenges during that pandemic that we’ve faced across the nation in 2020 – disruptive citizens, pushback from churches, schools, and businesses, and failures to comply with mask and distancing mandates.

However, the way those city leaders approached these problems and challenges had a major impact on the civilian death rates in their cities.

St. Louis

As just a quick review, St. Louis was led by a strong-willed and capable health commissioner, Dr. Max C. Starkloff, who had the foresight to actively monitor the news as the influenza contagion spread westward. The city’s medical and political communities were quickly prepared for the inevitability that the epidemic would find its way to St. Louis. His first action was to issue a request through the influential St. Louis Medical Society that physicians voluntarily report to his office any and all cases of influenza they discovered. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1918)

When St. Louis physicians reported their first cases of influenza, he asked the city’s Board of Aldermen to pass an emergency bill declaring influenza a contagious disease. This gave the mayor the legal authority to declare a state of public health emergency. The bill also levied stiff fines for physicians who failed to report any new cases of the disease. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1918)

Starkloff and St. Louis Mayor Henry Kiel then executed an open-minded, flexible approach to quarantining, school closings, and other social distancing measures. They also maintained a unified front despite persistent pushback from various St. Louis constituencies. Because of the quick and sustained action by its leaders, St. Louis experienced one of the lowest excess death rates in the nation. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

Milwaukee

Even with two influenza waves between October and December 1918, the magnitude of Milwaukee’s brush with the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was still less severe than other U.S. cities of a comparable size. In the aftermath, Milwaukee Health Commissioner George C. Ruhland believed there were three reasons for the better outcomes. (Milwaukee Health Department, 1918)

The first reason was the readiness of the public to comply with any regulatory measures. For that Ruhland credited the Milwaukee medical community’s plan to engage the public. With the support of the city’s newspaper editors, the group began an immense public education campaign - with printed literature in six languages, including English. They created flyers and speaker’s notes, selected respected physicians and city notables as speakers, and requested the area clergy to discuss the flyers from the pulpit. If citizens, business owners, and city government all understood exactly what they were facing, there might be greater cooperation and acceptance should any draconian measures be necessary to blunt the epidemic. (Milwaukee Sentinel, 1918)

The second reason Ruhland listed was the timing of the closing orders and the generally widespread compliance from Milwaukee’s citizens. What’s interesting is that because of the two waves – October and December - Ruhland’s team actually tried two different approaches to see which one worked better. The October approach involved mandated closings - all places of amusement, churches, public gatherings, and eventually the schools. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

However, as the number of new cases in Milwaukee declined, some citizens and business owners believed the influenza threat was almost over. They got together and sent a number of requests to Ruhland to lift the bans on public gatherings. He refused. As more businesses clamored for relief, Ruhland publicly pointed out the consequence of overconfidence in other cities - reopening prematurely resulted in another wave of the infectious disease. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

Despite Ruhland’s gradual reopening however, a resurgence of the virus occurred in December 1918.

This time, to avoid outright closures, Ruhland shifted the responsibility to the public. He recommended masks be worn in public, set restrictions to the amount of personal space surrounding people in public - every other row was vacant in theaters and churches, retail customers surrounded themselves with six square feet of vacant space – and then he left it up to the people to govern themselves. The citizens, for the most part, ignored the self-restrictions, and that idea failed. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

The conclusion Ruhland came to after these two experiences have important ramifications for the world pandemic today. While closures don’t prevent influenza, they are very necessary in order to flatten or prevent the severe spikes in the number of influenza cases that can occur over a short period of time. It’s the severe spikes, he said, that overwhelm the available hospital facilities, healthcare workers, and medical supplies. Preventing those spikes flattens the mortality curve because those who do fall ill have access to better – not desperate - healthcare. (Milwaukee Wisconsin Department of Health, 1918)

The last factor that helped contribute to the lower mortality rates was the overall cooperation from all the community “leaders” during the epidemic – city government, physicians, hospital administrators, businessmen, the Red Cross and other relief agency leaders. Thanks to that cooperation, all necessary decisions were implemented rapidly and immediately. (Milwaukee Health Department, 1918)

In this city of 450,000 people, more than 30,000 of them came down with the flu during those two waves in 1918. Thanks to leadership vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning, fewer than 500 died.

Minneapolis

“Spanish influenza does not exist in Minneapolis and never has, but it probably will reach here during the fall,” the City of Minneapolis Health Commissioner, Dr. H. M. Guilford, told residents on September 19, 1918. (Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 1918)

Less than a month later, the flu epidemic struck the city. By then, Guilford had a plan ready. The health department ordered all schools, churches, and non-essential businesses closed indefinitely. The measure was unanimously endorsed by the Minneapolis city council. The council also stipulated that the city’s department of health had the full authority to issue any closure orders with or without the consent of Minneapolis’s mayor or the council. (Minneapolis City Council, 1918)

Pushback, however, was almost immediate. 

The Minneapolis Board of Education disagreed with the shut-down order and reopened the schools. The Superintendent of Schools, B. B. Jackson, argued that the leading medical authorities across the nation had determined that epidemic influenza was not a children’s disease. Guilford however, refused to give ground and at his request, the Minneapolis Chief of Police met with the school board and persuaded them to close the schools once again. (Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 1918)

In spite of the school board resistance and a later protest by the owners of amusement businesses, Guilford kept the city closed down until November 15, when the number of new influenza cases reached what he deemed an acceptable level. At that point, schools and businesses were allowed to reopen. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

However, in early December, the number of Influenza cases spiked again – this time, it was among the school populations. Guilford reinstituted the school closures until the end of the month, but he added an important caveat: All students would be required to undergo a thorough examination to ensure that he or she was free of any illness before being allowed to return to the classroom. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

Strong leadership, sustained adherence to science, and a unified front both politically and medically throughout the 1918 Influenza Epidemic enabled Minneapolis to keep the mortality rate of its citizens lower than most urban centers of a comparable size.

Conclusion

One of the more important “negative” leadership lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was the ‘too little, too late” actions by many public officials at the national, state, and local levels that exacerbated the spread of that deadly pandemic. (Mihm, 2020)

That was not the case in St. Louis, Milwaukee, or Minneapolis. Doctors Stackworth, Ruhland, and Guilford each showed vigilance by tracking the progression of the epidemic in other cities, in the military camps nearby, and mandating that their local medical communities report every new case of influenza. They all formed teams, set sound policy directions, communicated and educated about them, and implemented effective, predetermined countermeasures.

However, the greatest insight that 1918 epidemic provides for our 21st century health crisis is the determination of those leaders to maintain the aggressive public-health and medical interventions they put in place for the well-being of their citizens in the face of political, economic, and public pushback.

History Is Now

After taking office in 2017, the Trump administration fired the government’s entire pandemic response chain of command, including the White House management infrastructure, and disbanded the National Security Council’s pandemic team and a State Department program designed to identify outbreaks and other emerging threats around the world. (Garrett L. , 2020)

Then, in late December or early January 2020, Trump and his administration were informed by intelligence officials of a contagion raging in Wuhan, China. The administration, however, publicly treated the epidemic as a minor threat that was under control, at least domestically, and repeatedly assured the public that the risk to Americans was very low. 

By the end of January, there were about 12,000 reported cases in China, and growing rapidly by the day. At this point, the U.S. had a handful of confirmed cases, but there was almost certainly already significant community spread in the Seattle area.

Finally, on January 27, the White House created the Coronavirus Task Force (publicly announced on January 29) and declared a public health emergency on January 31. At that point, the federal government began to put in motion the executive, legal, and regulatory pandemic response procedures already on the books. (Wallach & Myers, 2020)

On March 24, 2020, the U.S. death toll from the Covid-19 Pandemic stood at 705 Americans. (CDC, 2020) That day, President Donald Trump said in his then daily Coronavirus Task Force briefing:

“There is tremendous hope as we look forward and we begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Stay focused and stay strong and my administration and myself will deliver for you as we have in the past." (Woodward & Yen, 2020)

Trump’s ‘hope’ versus the ‘vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning’ of Starkloff, Ruhland and Guilford.

As of June 1, 2020, America’s death toll stands at over 106,000 coronavirus-related deaths. (CDC, 2020)

Food for thought.

Now, read part 4 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 4 – Conclusions – ’Such a big event, so little public memory’

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

References

CDC. (2020, April 30). “Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic – Overview: statistics”. Retrieved May 2, 2020, from Bing.com: https://www.bing.com/search?q=death+toll+coronavirus&form=EDNTHT&mkt=en-us&httpsmsn=1&msnews=1&rec_search=1&plvar=0&refig=60ce389eba704e0788409300929840cb&PC=HCTS&sp=1&ghc=1&qs=EP&pq=death+toll&sk=PRES1&sc=8-10&cvid=60ce389eba704e0788409300929840cb&cc=US&

Garrett, L. (2020, January 31). Trump Has Sabotaged America’s Coronavirus Response. Retrieved April 28, 2020, from FP (Foreign Policy): https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/coronavirus-china-trump-united-states-public-health-emergency-response/

Markel H, L. H. (2007). " Nonpharmacuetical interventions implemented by U.S. cities during the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic". JAMA, 298:647.

Mihm, S. (2020, March 3). Lessons From the Philadelphia Flu of 1918: Prioritizing politics over public health is a recipe for disaster. Retrieved April 22, 2020, from Bloomberg Opinion: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-03/coronavirus-history-lesson-learning-from-1918-s-flu-epidemic

Milwaukee Health Department. (1918). Bulletin of the Milwaukee Health Department 8, no. 10-11. City of Milwaukee, Health. Milwaukee: np.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, October 10). "City closed to fight flu,” Milwaukee Journal, 10 Oct. 1918, 1. Milwaukee Journal, p. 1.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, December 2). "Schools closed to stop flu". Milwaukee Journal, pp. 1, 6.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, October 26). "Weather Cause of Deaths". Milwaukee Journal, p. 2.

Milwaukee Sentinel. (1918, October 11). "City Starts Big Battle On Influenza". Milwaukee Sentinel, p. 6.

Milwaukee Wisconsin Department of Health. (1918). Forty-second annual report of the Commissioner of Health City of Milwaukee. Milwaukee: np.

Minneapolis City Council. (1918). Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from January 1, 1918 to January 1, 1919. Minneapolis City Council, Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, (p. 536). Minneapolis.

Minneapolis Morning Tribune. (1918, October 20). "Clash Over School Order Due Monday". Minneapolis Morning Tribune, p. 1.

Minneapolis Morning Tribune. (1918, September 20). “No Spanish Influenza in City, Says Guilford”. Minneapolis Morning Tribune, p. 2.

Morens, D. M., & Fauci, A. S. (2007). The 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Insights for the 21st Century. Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 195, Issue 7,, 1018-1028.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat. (1918, September 20). “Doctors Here Must Report Influenza,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 20 Sept. 1918, 2. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, p. 2.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat. (1918, October 6). “No Quarantine Here against Influenza, Says Dr. Starkloff". St. Louis Globe-Democrat, p. 8.

University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine. (2016, September 19). City Essays. Retrieved April 21, 2020, from American Influenza Epidemic of 1918 - 1919: A Digital Encyclopedia.: http://www.influenzaarchive.org.

Wallach, P. A., & Myers, J. (2020, March 31). “The federal government’s coronavirus response—Public health timeline - part of the Series on Regulatory Process and Perspective”. Retrieved April 4, 2020, from Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-corona

Woodward, C., & Yen, H. (2020, March 28). ”Fact check: Donald Trump is a rosy outlier on the science of the virus”. - Saturday, March 28, 2020. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from Associated Press Website: https://apnews.com/

Wright, J. (2020, March 3). Four disastrous mistakes that leaders make during epidemics. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/03/four-disastrous-mistakes-that-leaders-make-during-epidemics/